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UNIVERSITÀ CATTOLICA DEL SACRO CUORE SEDE DI MILANO Facoltà di Economia Corso di Laurea Magistrale in Economia E Finanza Internazionale Islamic Banking and Finance in Europe: A Challenge and Insight Possibilities in Italy Islamic finance, growing phenomenon to impulse the economy growth. European experience and an insight on the possibilities in Italy, the ethical challenges, future prospect and suggestions. Relatore: Chiar.mo Prof. Federico RAJOLA Tesi di Laurea di: Imad EL KANJ Matricola n. 3807255 Anno Accademico 2011/2012
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UNIVERSITÀ CATTOLICA DEL SACRO CUORE

SEDE DI MILANO

Facoltà di Economia

Corso di Laurea Magistrale in Economia E Finanza

Internazionale

Islamic Banking and Finance in Europe:

A Challenge and Insight Possibilities in Italy

Islamic finance, growing phenomenon to impulse the economy growth. European experience and an

insight on the possibilities in Italy, the ethical challenges, future prospect and suggestions.

Relatore:

Chiar.mo Prof. Federico RAJOLA

Tesi di Laurea di:

Imad EL KANJ

Matricola n. 3807255

Anno Accademico 2011/2012

1

2

Dedication

To my beloved Mother

الحبيبة أمي إلى

، واإلكرام الجالل ذا يا ، قيوم يا حي يا اللهم

إليك األحب ، المبارك الطيب األعظم باسمك أسألك

، رحمت به استرحمت وإذا ، أجبت به دعيت ذاا الذي

فرجت به استفرجت وإذا

، السابقين من درجاتك أعلى والى المقبولين من أمى تجعل أن

المسلمين وجميع وخطاياها ذنوبها لها واغفر

وارحمها عنها واعف وعافها لها اغفر اللهم

الواثقين من رضوانك بجود وأجلعها

المطمئنين من رحمتك وبأنس

الراحمين أرحم يا

أستعين برحمتك

3

Sommario FIGURES ............................................................................................................................................ 9

TABLES ............................................................................................................................................ 11

BOXES .............................................................................................................................................. 11

GLOSSARY OF ARABIC TERMS ................................................................................................. 12

ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................................... 14

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 15

I. INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC FINANCE ............................................................................... 17

1. Understanding Islamic Finance ..................................................................................................... 17

1.1. Islamic Law ............................................................................................................................ 17

1.2. Fundamental Principles of Islamic Finance ........................................................................... 17

1.3. Basic Principles ...................................................................................................................... 18

1.3.1. Prohibition of Riba (Usury) ............................................................................................. 19

1.3.2. Prohibition of Activities With Elements of Gharar (Uncertainty) .................................. 22

1.3.3. Prohibition of Maisir (Speculative, High-Risk, Gambling) ............................................ 24

1.3.4. Zakat ”Alms For Poor” ................................................................................................... 25

1.4. Understanding Time Value of Money in Islamic Finance ..................................................... 27

II. ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SYSTEM (IFS) ..................................................................................... 28

2. The Stability of IFS and differences between Islamic - Conventional Banking ........................... 28

2.1. Financial Stability of Islamic Finance .................................................................................... 28

2.1.1. Theoretical Considerations .............................................................................................. 33

2.1.2. Some Empirical Evidence ............................................................................................... 34

2.2. Differences between Islamic and Conventional Banking ...................................................... 35

2.3. Advantages and Disadvantage of Islamic Finance ................................................................. 38

2.3.1. Advantages of Islamic Finance ....................................................................................... 38

2.3.2. Perceived Disadvantages of Islamic Finance .................................................................. 42

III. FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS .................................................................................................. 46

3. Islamic Financing Techniques and Products ................................................................................. 46

3.1. Equity-Based Financing Techniques ...................................................................................... 48

3.1.1. Mudarabah ....................................................................................................................... 48

4

3.1.2. Musharakah ..................................................................................................................... 50

3.1.3. Wakalah ........................................................................................................................... 51

3.1.4. Difference Between Mudarabah and Musharakah Contracts .......................................... 52

3.2. Debt-Based Financing Techniques ......................................................................................... 53

3.2.1. Murabaha ......................................................................................................................... 53

3.2.2. Bay Salam ....................................................................................................................... 54

3.2.3. Istisnaa ............................................................................................................................. 55

3.3. Leasing ................................................................................................................................... 56

3.3.1. Pure Ijarah ....................................................................................................................... 57

3.4. Capital Market Instruments .................................................................................................... 58

3.4.1. Islamic Stocks and Equity Funds .................................................................................... 61

3.4.2. Islamic Investment Certificates (Sukuk) ............................................................................. 65

3.5. Funding operations and Accounts .......................................................................................... 69

3.5.1. Current Accounts ............................................................................................................. 70

3.5.2. Savings and Investment Accounts ................................................................................... 70

3.5.3. Islamic Credit Cards ........................................................................................................ 71

3.6. Takaful (A Shariah Compliant Insurance Concept) ............................................................... 73

3.7. Use of Islamic Financing Products and Profitability .............................................................. 75

IV. GOVERNANCE AND SHARIAH BOARD .............................................................................. 77

4. Governance and Compliance Structure of Islamic Banks ............................................................. 77

4.1. Corporate Governance and Shariah Board ............................................................................. 77

4.1.1. Shariah Board and Performance of Islamic Banks .......................................................... 78

4.2. The Shariah Supervisory Board ............................................................................................. 79

4.2.1. Shariah Supervisory Board Standards ............................................................................. 80

4.2.2. Characteristics of a Shariah Supervisory Board .............................................................. 80

4.2.3. Functions of a Shariah Supervisory Board ...................................................................... 83

4.2.4. Product Innovation Process ............................................................................................. 84

4.2.5. Shariah Board and Profit ................................................................................................. 85

4.2.6. Inconsistency of Fatawa .................................................................................................. 87

4.3. Regulatory Framework ........................................................................................................... 88

5

4.3.1. Standardization and Harmonization ................................................................................ 88

4.3.2. AAOIFI ........................................................................................................................... 89

4.3.3. IFSB ................................................................................................................................ 89

4.3.4. Regulation ....................................................................................................................... 90

4.3.5. Accounting, Reporting and Zakat ................................................................................... 91

V. ISLAM AND MANAGEMENT .................................................................................................. 92

5. Management from Islamic Perspective ......................................................................................... 92

5.1. Managerial Leadership: An Islamic Perspective .................................................................... 93

5.1.1. Team Building Under Islamic Leadership ...................................................................... 97

5.1.2. Islamic Model of Managerial Leadership ....................................................................... 98

5.2. IF Asset Management........................................................................................................... 102

5.2.1. Shariah Compliant Fund Management .......................................................................... 103

5.2.2. Islamic Fund Management Structure ............................................................................ 105

5.2.3. Asset Management Company Structure ........................................................................ 106

5.2.4. The Islamic Fund Market .............................................................................................. 107

VI. ISLAMIC RISK MANAGEMENT .......................................................................................... 112

6. IF Risk Management ................................................................................................................... 112

6.1. Specific Risk Surrounding Islamic Banks ............................................................................ 112

6.2. General Risk Surrounding Islamic Banks ............................................................................ 114

6.3. Reducing Risks of Islamic Banks ......................................................................................... 115

6.3.1. Credit Risk..................................................................................................................... 116

6.3.2. Market Risk ................................................................................................................... 116

6.3.3. Liquidity Risk ................................................................................................................ 117

6.3.4. Operational Risk ............................................................................................................ 118

6.3.5. Legal Risk ..................................................................................................................... 118

6.3.6. Displaced Commercial Risk .......................................................................................... 118

6.3.7. Shariah Risk .................................................................................................................. 119

6.3.8. Risk Management Techniques And Regulations .......................................................... 120

6.3.9. Suitable Clear Information Strategy .............................................................................. 121

VII. ISLAMIC BANKING AND FINANCE: ON ITS WAY TO GLOBALIZATION................. 123

6

7. History and Current Development of Islamic Finance ................................................................ 123

7.1. Historical Milestones............................................................................................................ 124

7.2. Islamic Banking and Finance in the Middle East ................................................................. 126

7.2.1. Bahrain .......................................................................................................................... 127

7.2.2. Iran ................................................................................................................................ 128

7.2.3. Jordan ............................................................................................................................ 129

7.2.4. Kuwait ........................................................................................................................... 130

7.2.5. Lebanon ......................................................................................................................... 131

7.2.6. Qatar .............................................................................................................................. 132

7.2.7. Saudi Arabia .................................................................................................................. 133

7.2.8. Syria .............................................................................................................................. 134

7.2.9. United Arab Emirates .................................................................................................... 135

7.2.10. Islamic Banking and Finance in Sudan (Africa) ......................................................... 136

7.2.11. Best Islamic Institutions for 2011 ............................................................................... 138

7.2.12. Prospects For Islamic Financial Industry .................................................................... 140

7.3. Issues and Challenges for IF Globalization .......................................................................... 141

7.3.1. Regulating and Supervising Islamic Finance ................................................................ 142

7.3.2. Reluctance to Promote Risk Sharing ............................................................................. 146

7.3.3. Performance of IB: “Difficulties to return to pre 2007 profitability levels” ................. 147

7.3.4. Concentrated Banking ................................................................................................... 155

7.3.5. Liquidity ........................................................................................................................ 156

7.3.6. Weak Risk Management and Governance Framework ................................................. 156

7.3.7. Integration with Global Financial Landscape ............................................................... 157

7.3.8. Risk Management Framework ...................................................................................... 157

7.3.9. Wealth Management ..................................................................................................... 158

7.3.10. Shortage of Competent Shariah Experts and University Talents ................................ 159

7.3.11. Going Beyond Banking ............................................................................................... 160

7.4. Suggestions for enhancing the Islamic industry. .................................................................. 161

7.4.1. Promotion of SME Financing ....................................................................................... 161

7.4.2. Proposals for Organizational Structure of Islamic Banks ............................................. 163

7

7.4.3. Proposals for Growth of PLS on Assets ........................................................................ 164

Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 167

VIII. EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC BANKING IN EUROPE ........................................................ 169

8. State of Islamic Banking in Europe ............................................................................................. 169

8.1. Euro-Arab Banking Relation ................................................................................................ 169

8.2. Islamic Finance in Europe .................................................................................................... 171

8.2.1. Shariah Compliant Liquidity Management in Europe................................................... 173

8.2.2. Sukuk Issuance and Trading in Europe ......................................................................... 175

8.2.3. Shariah Compliant Fund Management .......................................................................... 182

8.2.4. Islamic Retail Banking Europe...................................................................................... 186

8.2.5. Islamic Investment Banking .......................................................................................... 192

8.3. European Countries - Current Situation and Future Outlook ............................................... 195

8.3.1. The UK .......................................................................................................................... 195

8.3.2. France ............................................................................................................................ 200

8.3.3. Germany ........................................................................................................................ 205

8.3.4. Other European Countries ............................................................................................. 209

8.3.5. Future Prospects for Islamic Finance in Europe ........................................................... 216

IX. ITALY A POTENTIAL MARKET FOR ISLAMIC BANKING ACTIVITIES ..................... 219

9. Islamic Finance Growing, But Not In Italy ................................................................................. 219

9.1. The European Experience: A Message to Italy ................................................................... 222

9.1.1. Europe’s Countries Market Players ............................................................................... 225

9.2. Italy A Potential Market For Islamic Banking? ....................................................................... 228

9.2.1. Islamic Finance In Italy: “how much Potential in terms of Euros?” ............................. 232

9.2.2. A Solution to the Italian Economic Crisis? ................................................................... 240

9.3. Obstacles And Hindrances Facing Italy ............................................................................... 244

9.3.1. Main Challenges For Islamic Institutions Wishing To Set Up In Italy ......................... 246

9.3.2. Islamic Banking and Prudential Supervision in Italy .................................................... 247

9.3.3. Islamic Banking: Impression of an Italian Jurist: Pietro Abbadessa ............................. 250

9.4. Prospect for Islamic Finance and Banking in Italy .............................................................. 255

9.5. Results: The Determinants of IRB in the Italian Context..................................................... 256

8

9.5.1. Demand Conditions ....................................................................................................... 258

9.5.2. Supply Conditions ......................................................................................................... 260

9.5.3. Societal Conditions ....................................................................................................... 261

9.5.4. Regulatory Conditions ................................................................................................... 263

9.6. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 265

9.6.1. Suggestions: .................................................................................................................. 268

ANNEXES ...................................................................................................................................... 283

ANNEX 1 Islamic Banking Structures Within The Conventional Banking System .................. 283

ANNEX 2: Example: The use of Tawarruq to make the transition from conventional to Islamic

balance sheets .............................................................................................................................. 287

ANNEX 3 The UK Example ....................................................................................................... 289

ANNEX 4 Islamic banking for Italian SMEs .............................................................................. 295

ANNEX 5 Determinants of Islamic Bank Profitability: Evidence from Jordan ......................... 316

ANNEX 7 The Constitution Of An Islamic Financial Institution In Italy .................................. 329

9

FIGURES_______________________________________________________ P.__

Figure 1 -- Example of a Mudarabah 49

Figure 2 – Permanent or diminishing Musharakah transaction 50

Figure 3 -- comparing equity and agency structures 53

Figure 4 -- Murabaha transaction 54

Figure 5 -- Salam transaction 55

Figure 5a – Istisna 56

Figure 6 -- Pure Ijarah transaction 57

Figure 7 -- The pay-off profile of asset-backed securities under the three basic forms of

Islamic finance. 60

Figure 8 -- Islamic equity fund based on Mudarabah partnership from Gassner and

Wackerbeck (2007) 64

Figure 9 -- Simple Sukuk Structure 67

Figure 10 -- The concept of an Ijarah Sukuk transaction 69

Figure 11 -- Takaful model based on Mudaraba transaction (Gassner and Wackerbeck,

2007) 75

Figure 12 -- A Diagram of Team Building under Islamic Leadership, (Ather and Sobhani

2008) 97

Figure 13 -- Model of Managerial Leadership from Islamic Perspective (Ather and Sobhani

2008) 98

Figure 14 -- SALAM model 101

Figure 15 -- Islamic Asset Management Structure (Schoon 2011) 106

Figure 16 -- Asset management organization (Schoon 2011) 107

Figure 17 -- Average assets under management (Schoon 2011) 108

Figure 18 – Islamic Banks geographical investment strategy (Schoon 2011) 109

Figure 19 -- Muslims as a Share of world population, 1990-2030 (Pew Research

Center) 123

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Figure 20 -- Muslims population by Region, 1990-2030 (Pew Research Center) 124

Figure 21 -- Best Islamic Bank by Country, 2010

(www.IslamicFinanceNews.com) 138

Figure 22 -- Painful decline in profitability of Islamic Banks (Ernest and Young

2011-12) 147

Figure 23 -- Growth Rates of Assets and Deposits across Countries (Salman Syed Ali,

2011) 149

Figure 24 -- Analysis of leading Islamic commercial banks in the MENA region shows a

large variation in the average ROE between 2006-10. (Ernest and Young 2011-12) 150

Figure 25 -- shows Return on Assets (ROA), ROE and NFI averaged for all Islamic banks

by each country for each year since 2006. Data for Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,

and UAE up to 2010. (Ernest and Young 2011-12) 151

Figure 26 – Comparison of sector allocation of S&P 500 and S&P Shariah 500, Source:

S&P (2009) 154

Figure 27 - EUROPE -- Number of Muslims in Western Europe, 2010-2030 (Pew Research

Center) 172

Figure 28 EUROPE -- Projected Distribution of Muslim Population, 2030 (Pew Research

Center) 172

Figure 29 -- Regulatory initiative in the United Kingdom (Financial Services Authority

2007) 199

Figure 31 - EUROPE -- Number of Muslims in Western Europe, 2010-2030 (Pew Research

Center) 230

Figure – 32 Degree of use of banking services by Nationality (percentage of total

bankerized by country) 231

Figure – 33 Muslims and non-Muslims considerations towards Islamic Banking (own

illustration) 233

Figure – 33 Muslims considerations towards Islamic Banking (own illustration) 234

Figure – 34 Italian Companies considerations towards Islamic Banking

(own illustration) 236

11

Figure 35 -- The determinants of Islamic retail banking (IRB) in Italy

(own illustration) 257

TABLES_________________________________________________________P.__

Table-1: Comparison between Riba and Profit 22

Table-2: Differences between Islamic & Conventional Banking 36

Table-3 Shariah approval process for a new product orstructure, Natalie Schoon

(2011) 84

Table-4: Differences between Islamic & Conventional Banking, (Iqbal 2011) 162

BOXES__________________________________________________________P.__

Box-1: Landmark Islamic finance deal inked, (Khaleej Times: 03 July 2003) 41

Box-2: Do Islamic Banks Perform Better than Conventional Banks? (Hadeel Abu Loghod,

2011) 43

Box-3 Research study Islamic perspectives on conflict management within project managed

environments (Kasim Randeree and Awsam Taha El Faramawy, 2009) 100

Box-4 How to Invest Today According to Shariah according to Eurekahedge

(2009) 110

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GLOSSARY OF ARABIC TERMS1

Al wadiah Principle to keep or deposit something in-custody

Amanah Describes both a relationship of trust and items in safekeeping

Bay Salam A contract determining a pre-paid purchase

Daruah Doctrine of necessity

Fatwa (plural: fatawa) An authoritative legal opinion issued by a Shariah Supervisory

Board/ single Shariah scholars, based on the Shariah

Fiqh Practical Islamic jurisprudence (jurists’ law)

Fiqh Mu’amalat Islamic commercial jurisprudence (rules of transaction)

Hadithe Technical term for sources related to the sayings and doings of the Prophet,

authentic traditions

Ijarah / Ijarah wa Iqtina A contract determining a leasing agreement/A lease-purchase

agreement

Istisnaa A contract of sale of specified goods to be manufactured

Maisir Gambling

Manfa’a The right to use an asset

Mudarabah A partnership contract in which one partner contributes capital and the other

partner invests time and effort 1 The explanations are aligned with the Glossaries of Hassan

and Lewis 2007 and Jaffer 2005.

Mudarib The entrepreneur or manager in a Mudarabah contract

Murabaha The resale of goods with an agreed upon profit mark-up on the cost

Musharakah A partnership contract in which both parties contribute capital and may form

a joint management

Qard Hassan A benevolent (interest-free) loan

1 The explanations are aligned with the Glossaries of Hassan and Lewis 2007 and Jaffer 2005.

13

Qirad A dormant partnership (for example in a Mudarabah contract)

Rabb al mal The partner in a Mudarabah agreement providing the funds

Shariah Islamic religious law derived from the Holy Quran and the Hadith

Sukuk (plural of sakk) Participation securities, coupons, investment certificate

Tabarru Donation

Takaful A Shariah compliant insurance concept (similar to conventional mutual

insurances)

Tawarruq The purchase of goods on deferred payment and their subsequent sale (to raise

cash)

Wakalah An agency contract

14

ABSTRACT

Islamic banking is a relative young industry, with a high rate of growth, which in the last

years became a highly discussed subject, due to the challenges and opportunities that it

brings. Due to the fact, that in the last decade, the Islamic banking made its presence in the

European Union market, however, unlike in all of Europe, is far from appearing in Italy,

despite the fact that investors are saying they are ready for it and that Italy shares ethical

and religious principles with the Islamic world.

Italians have wrong perception on Islamic finance considering that it is only for Muslims

and on the other hand Muslim community is not a strong community in Italy and their

integration with the Italian community is limited and they are not debating how they can

develop this work and repair the Muslim image in Italy.

Moreover, other than Regulatory and tax obstacles, the main challenges for Islamic

institutions wishing to set up in Italy is that Italian traditional banking lobby is particularly

strong and closed in the territory, and has no interest in losing market share, neither its

monopolistic position in the Italian/European financial markets in favor of Islamic financial

institutions.

However, the success of a financial model in a market must not be allowed to depend on

market rules. Market participants must observe market rules but it will be the market itself

that decides whether or not a kind of institution may enter into the market, providing that its

products are complying with standards of contractual and market transparency as well as

investor protect legislation.

Italy’s strategic positioning, its dense network of small financial institutions throughout the

territory and the most powerful movement of business ethics in Europe make Italy a natural

candidate for the development of the Islamic sector. Once solved the problems of societal,

fiscal and regulatory, Italy will play a central role in the Mediterranean and Islamic

Banking will be a new engine for finance in Italy.

15

INTRODUCTION

Islamic finance is growing fast. It has a global value of 1.7 trillion USD and counts 400

institutes with their offices. The Muslim population in Europe is over 18 million and in

Italy there are over 1.5 million Muslims (2011), who represent about one third of foreign

residents and 2.8% of Italy’s population, and a remarkable number of Italian non-Muslims

are willing to shift towards Islamic finance instruments but the system is not breaking

through into Italy.

Islamic finance can no longer be dismissed as a passing fad or as an epiphenomenon of

Islamic revivalism. Islamic financial institutions now operate in over 70 countries. They

have grown at respective annual rates of 10% and 15%. By certain (probably overly

optimistic) estimates, up to half of the savings of the Islamic world may in the near future

end up being managed by Islamic financial institutions. The first Islamic banks were

created in the 1970s, at the time when the aggiornamento of Islamic doctrine on banking

matters was taking shape. At the time, Islamic banks were typically commercial banks

operating on an interest-free basis. Today, as a consequence of broad changes in the

political–economic environment, a new generation of Islamic financial institutions, more

diverse and innovative, is emerging as the doctrine is undergoing a new aggiornamento.

Perhaps the most important development has been the growing integration of Islamic

finance into the global economy. There is now a Dow Jones Islamic Market Index2, which

tracks 600 companies (from inside and outside the Muslim world) whose products and

services do not violate Islamic law. Foreign institutions such as Citibank have established

Islamic banking subsidiaries, and many conventional banks – in the Muslim world but also

in the United States and Europe – are now offering ‘Islamic products’ that are sometimes

aimed at non-Muslims.

2 The Dow Jones Islamic Market Indexes, introduced in 1999, was the first representative set of Sharia compliant benchmark portfolios. Today the indices listed are over 70 and remains the most complete family of Islamic market indicators, includes global indexes, regional,

individual countries, individual industries. Among the most important are the Dow Jones Islamic Market Titans 100 index (indicator of

the 100 largest companies compatible with the dictates of Sharia), the Dow Jones Islamic Index (Dow Jones selection made with Islamic criteria), and the Dow Jones Islamic Market Asia / Pacific Titans 25 Index (the 25 largest companies in Asia and the Pacific).Other very

important group of indices are the FTSE Global Islamic Index Series, these are also an indicator for those wishing to invest in global

equity and in line with Islamic laws, we FTSE SGX Shariah then the Index Series, a set of indexes made in collaboration with the Stock Exchange of Singapore, representing the performance of companies in the markets of Asia and the Pacific (Japan, Singapore, Taiwan,

Korea and Hong Kong), the FTSE Bursa Malaysia Insex Series, with two indices for Muslim investors, and finally the FTSE DIFX Index

Series, in collaboration with the Dubai Stock Exchange, which represents the leading companies in the Arabian Peninsula.

16

Islamic finance is thus in many ways well suited to the global economy. This is all the more

striking and paradoxical in that it is often said that Islam is incompatible with the “new

world order” that emerged with the end of the cold war. In addition, how could a medieval

economic system be relevant in a world of revolutionary, technology-driven global finance?

And how could an interest-free system fit within the broader interest-based financial

system?

The first part of the thesis provides background information on Islam and Finance,

introduces and describes the world of Islamic finance (Chapters 1 to 6). Explaining the

Islamic law , its principles, Islamic financial instruments, regulatory framework, Islamic

Management, strategy and culture (how the practices of Islamic financial institutions differ

from those of conventional ones.

The second part of the thesis traces the historical evolution of Islamic economics and

finance in the Arabic world and in Europe(Chapters 7 to 8). It traces the birth, challenges,

managerial problems, evolution of modern Islamic finance and places it in its proper

political and economic context. It accounts for the diversity of the industry by analyzing the

ways different countries have introduced and dealt with Islamic finance, and by providing a

typology of Islamic financial products.

The third part (Chapter 9) deals with the issues and challenges facing Italy to host Islamic

Finance and Islamic Retail Banking from four points: demand conditions, supply

conditions, societal conditions and regulatory conditions. Discussing the main challenges

embedding Islamic finance to locate in Italy and the cultural barriers to the implementation

of true Islamic financial systems; economics (the role of Islamic finance in mobilizing

savings, allocating funds, and promoting development; Islamic capital markets; the macro-

economic implications of Islamic finance); regulation (the regulatory issues raised,

domestically and internationally); politics (the connection between Islamic finance and

domestic politics); and religion (the battles over religious interpretation).

17

I. INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC FINANCE

1. Understanding Islamic Finance

In order to understand how Islamic law informs Islamic finance, it is necessary to know

something about how law and authority are positioned in Islamic thought.

1.1. Islamic Law

In order to give more comprehensive idea about Islamic banking, some background

must be examined. Islamic financial principals are derived from Holy Qur'an. It

plays essential role in every Muslim's life. Basically it can be described as the

guidance for life, where duties and practices of crime, inheritance, worship, prayer,

moral values, marriage and commercial transactions are described. Islamic law or

Shariah is directly derived from it. Shariah embraces all aspects of human activity

moreover it consists of regulatory and constitutive rules according to which every

Muslim, must conduct their affairs.

As the primary source in conducting affairs Muslims rely on Qur'an, furthermore

secondary sources are Hadith, oral traditions relating to the words and deeds of the

prophet Muhammad (pbuh), and Sunna those religious achievements and manners

that were instituted by the prophet Muhammad (pbuh3) during the 23 years of his

ministry, which Muslims initially obtained through consensus of companions of

Muhammad (pbuh), and further through generation-to-generation transmission.

1.2. Fundamental Principles of Islamic Finance

The Islamic financial system broadly refers to financial market transactions,

operations and services that comply with Islamic rules, principles and codes of

practices. The laws and rules of the religion require certain types of activities, risks

3 Peace Be Upon Him

18

or rewards to be either prohibited or promoted. While Muslims undertaking

financial transactions are encouraged to use financial instruments that comply with

these rules, other investors may find the appeal of these instruments from an ethical

standpoint.

Islamic laws and rules are known as Sharia and are also referred to as Islamic

jurisprudence. Sharia governs all aspects of Islamic Finance. The rules and laws are

derived from three important sources, namely the Holy Quran (the holy book of the

religion of Islam), Sunnah (the practice and tradition of the Prophet Muhammad

pbuh) and Ijtihad (the reasoning of qualified scholars). Further elaboration and

interpretation of the rules dictated by the Holy Quran and Sunnah are provided by

qualified scholars in Islamic jurisprudence via Ijtihad or an interpretative process

which is carried out within the framework of Quran and Sunna.

Modern Islamic financial products and services are developed using two different

approaches. The first approach is by identifying existing conventional products and

services that are generally acceptable to Islam, and modifying as well as removing

any prohibited elements so that they are able to comply with Sharia principles. The

second approach involves the application of various Sharia principles to facilitate

the origination and innovation of new products and services.

In order to provide a better understanding on the unique attributes of Islamic

finance, this Chapter discusses the fundamentals, principles and structure, which

form the foundation of Islamic financial services.

1.3. Basic Principles

Islamic law on commerce is known as fiqh4. Much of the laws, rules and

interpretations of Shariah takes into consideration issues of social justice,

4 Fiqh is the collection of all sources of law including Qur’an, Sunna, Qiyas (The practice of analogical reasoning) and Ijma (The

principle of independent human reasoning) and constitutes the Islamic jurisprudence. It regulates the relationship between men and Allah (Fiqh´Ibadah) as well as all aspects and relationships of men among each other (Fiqh Mu´amalat). The latter comprises the regulation of

commercial and financial transactions and financial institutions. The Shariah gives important incentives according to religious beliefs

whereas Fiqh adjusts to the pressure of society as it is subject to political influences and public opinions.

19

equitability, and fairness as well as practicality of financial transactions. In general,

the Shariah legal maxim in relation to commercial transactions and contracts state,

“they are permissible unless there is a clear prohibition.” In a nutshell, prohibited

elements of a commercial transaction must first be removed for it to be Shariah-

compliant. The major prohibited elements under Shariah are riba (interest), gharar

(uncertainty), maisir (gambling), non-halal (prohibited) food and drinks and

immoral activities.

1.3.1. Prohibition of Riba (Usury)

Majority of conventional banks run its activity on the basis of interests,

which in turn not applicable and prohibited by Shariah law.

Riba has the literal meaning of “an excess” and is defined as an increase or

excess which accruesvto the owner in an exchange or sale of a commodity,

or, by virtue of a loan arrangement, withoutvproviding equivalent value to

the other party.

More precisely there are two categories of riba – riba qurudh and riba buyu`.

Riba qurudh, in its application to modern financial transactions, occurs

through loans. The prohibition of riba qurudh relates to any fixed or

predetermined rate of return tied to the maturity and the amount of principal

(i.e., guaranteed regardless of the performance of the investment). The

general consensus among Shariah scholars is that riba covers not only usury

but also the charging of “interest” as widely practiced.

However, the lending activities or loans are still allowed in Islam through

the concept of Qardh Hasan. This type of lending is a contract of loan

between two parties on the basis of social welfare or to fulfill a short-term

financial need of the borrower. The amount of repayment must be equivalent

to the amount borrowed. It is however legitimate for a borrower to pay more

20

than the amount borrowed as long as it is not stated or agreed at the point of

contract.

On the other hand, riba buyu` occurs through the sale and purchase of six

riba’s commodities (i.e., gold, silver, dates, wheat, barley and salt). The

transaction of riba’s commodities is required to adhere to the following

conditions84:

i) In trading commodities of the same group and kind, such as gold for gold

or dates for dates; two conditions must be fulfilled, i.e., both commodities

must be exactly equivalent and there must be prompt delivery

ii) In trading commodities of the same group but of different kinds, such as

gold for silver, or wheat for barley, there is only one condition, i.e., the

promptness in delivery is not a condition.

iii) In trading commodities of different groups and kinds, such as gold for

wheat, or silver for barley; no condition is imposed and free trading can

exist, whether there is equality, inequality, promptness or delay.

Thus, Islam encourages the earning of profits but forbids the charging of

interest. Profit symbolizes successful entrepreneurship and the creation of

additional wealth through the utilization of productive assets, whereas

interest is deemed as a cost that is accrued irrespective of the outcome of

business operations and may not create wealth if there are business losses.

Social justice under Shariah requires borrowers and lenders to share rewards

as well as losses equitably and that the process of wealth accumulation and

distribution in the economy be fair and representative of true productivity.

“Truly those who believe, and do deeds of righteousness, and perform As-

salat, and give Zakat, they will have their reward with their Lord. On them

shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve. O you who believe! Be afraid of Allah

21

and give up what remains (due to you) from Riba (usury) (from now

onward), if you are (really) believers. And if you do not do it, then take a

notice of war from Allah and His Messenger but if you repent, you shall

have your capital sums. Deal not unjustly (by asking more than your capital

sums), and you shall not be deal with unjustly (by receiving less than your

capital sums)”.5 Linguistic definition of Riba is stated as follows:

“To increase, to augment, swellings, forbidden “addition”, to make more

than what is given, the practicing or taking of usury or the like, an excess or

an addition, or an addition over above the principal sum that is lent or

expended”6

1. Riba reinforces the tendency for wealth to accumulate in the hands of a

few, and thereby diminishes human beings concern their fellow men.

2. Islam does not allow gain from financial activity unless the beneficiary is

also subject to the risk of potential loss; the legal guarantee of at least

nominal interest would be viewed as guaranteed gain.

3. Islam regards the accumulation of wealth through interest or usury as

selfish compared with accumulation through hard work and personal

activity.

According to Mirakhor(1989) regarding interest as being a reward for

savings, it is justified if it resulted in reinvestment and growth in capital was

not due to only postponed consumption.

As for interest as productive capital, interest paid on money and is required

no matter whether capital used productively and thus is not justified. Interest

as an adjustment between value of capital goods in present and future is not

5 Surah al-Baqarah:275-279

6 E.W. Lane's Arabic-English Lexicon, zamir iqbal

22

rightness, it is more reasonable next year's economic condition to determine

the extent of reward as opposed to predetermining it in the form of interest.7

Table-1: Comparison between Riba and Profit

Riba Profit

1. When money is “charged”, its

imposed positive and definite result is

Riba

1. When money is used in

productive activity (e.g., in

trading), its uncertain result is

profit.

2. By definition, Riba is the premium

paid by the borrower to the lender along

with principal amount as a condition for

the loan.

2. By definition, profit is the

difference between the revenue

from production and the cost of

production.

3. Riba is prefixed, and hence there is

no uncertainty on the part of either the

givers or the takers of loans.

3. Even if a sharing ratio is agreed

in advance, profit is still uncertain,

as its amount is not known until the

activity is completed.

4. Riba con not be negative, it can at

best be very low or zero.

4. Profit can be positive, zero or

even negative.

5. From Islamic Shariah point of view,

it is Haram (prohibited).

5. From Islamic Shariah point of

view, it is Halal (allowed).

1.3.2. Prohibition of Activities With Elements of Gharar (Uncertainty)

Gharar is defined as activities that have elements of uncertainty, ambiguity

or deception. In a commercial transaction, it refers to either the uncertainty

of the goods, price of goods, deceiving the buyer on the price of goods,

payment terms are not specified in detail over a period of time, or ignorance

all this gharar occurs.

An element of gharar is considered a normal phenomenon in the market if it

is not excessive in the contracts and where the effect on the economy and

society is considered minimal. This is accepted by Shariah as it would be

practically impossible to eradicate this element completely from the market.

A large element of gharar in a commercial transaction, on the other hand, is

prohibited according to Shariah as it may affect the legality of a transaction.

7 Hennie van Greuning, Zamir Iqbal , risk analysis for islamic banks, p 9.

23

One of the examples of gharar in the financial market is in conventional

insurance. Shariah scholars are of the opinion that conventional insurance is

not Shariah compliant due to the large element of gharar. This is because the

policyholder enters into an agreement to pay a certain sum of premium and

in turn the insurance company guarantees to pay a certain sum of

compensation in the event of disaster. However, the amount of

compensation that the company will pay to them is uncertain and it is also

dependant on the occurrence of specific events in the future. Prohibition of

Gharar clearly indicated in Hadith: Ahmad and 'Ibn Majah narrated on the

authority of 'Abu Said Al Khudriy (mAbpwh)8:

“The Prophet (pbuh) has forbidden the purchase of the unborn animal in its

mother's womb, the sale of the milk in the udder without measurement, the

purchase of spoils of war prior to their distribution, the purchase of

charities prior to their receipt, and the purchase of the catch of a diver.”

Thus in Islamic finance prohibits contract with high degree of asymmetric

information. Most financial derivatives like options, forward, futures, in

speculation and short-selling, are banned because it involves uncertainty

regarding future delivery of the underlying assets. More detailed explanation

is given by Sheikh Dhareer.

“In this variety of sale the offer is shifted from the present to a future date,

for example, one person say to another; 'I'll sell you this house at such price

as of the beginning of next year' and the other replies: 'I accept'. Majority of

Jurist are of the view that the sale contract cannot accept clauses of this

manner. If the sale is shifted to a future date the contract becomes invalid.

Gharar in a future contract lies in the possible lapse of the interest of either

party and to his consent with the contract when the time set therein after. If

somebody buys mudhaf (futures) contract and his circumstances changes or

8 May Allah be peace with him

24

market changes bringing its price down at the time set for fulfillment of the

contract, he undoubtedly be averse to its fulfillment and will regret entering

into it. Indeed, the object in question may itself change and the two parties

may dispute over it. Thus, gharar infiltrates the mudhaf contract from the

viewpoint of uncertainty over the time, when parties conclude the contract

they do not know whether they will be in agreement and have continued

interest in that contract when it falls due.”9

1.3.3. Prohibition of Maisir (Speculative, High-Risk, Gambling)

Gambling is referred to as qimar or maisir in Arabic, which means any

activity that involves an arrangement between two or more parties, each of

whom undertakes the risk of a loss where a loss for one means a gain for the

other, as it is common for gambling activities. The gain accruing from these

games is unlawful in Islam, as it diverts the player’s attention from

productive occupation, and amassing wealth without effort. It is considered

an immoral inducement by the person involved in expecting to make a profit

at the expense of another party.

In relation to the above, Muslims are also prohibited from having any

affiliation to gambling activities including participating, investing or

financing any businesses related to, or associated with, the gambling

industry.

Holy Qur'an explicitly prohibits games of chances:

“O ye who believe! Intoxicants and gambling, (dedication of) stones, and

(divination by) arrows, are an abomination,- of Satan's handwork: avoid

such (abomination), that ye may prosper. Satan's plan is (but) to excite

enmity and hatred between you, with intoxicants and gambling, and hinder

9 Mervyn K. Lewis, Latifa M. Algaoud (pp.18-19)

25

you from the remembrance of Allah, and from prayer: will ye not then

abstain?”10

Gambling in all forms are banned by Islam, besides its explicit forms,

business transactions involving gambling like features are prohibited.

Regarding the question whether is it permissible to invest in stock market,

many scholars agree that if the earnings are halal(permitted)11

it is lawful to

invest in the stock market if certain conditions are met which should exclude

prohibited elements (Haram)7. Prohibition of involvement into the financing

of Conventional Banking and Insurance, alcohol, pork-related products,

tobacco, adult entertainment, gambling, weapons, arms and defense

manufacturing. (Please refer to chapter 3.4.1. Industry Screen) Islam

prohibits any financing or business transaction which are not line with

ethical norms.

To summarize the essence and goal of Sharia I can quote Al-Ghazali's

statement regarding Islamic law:

"The very objective of the Shariah is to promote the welfare of the people

which lies in safeguarding their faith, their life, their intellect, their posterity

and their property. Whatever ensures the safeguard of these five serves

public interest and is desirable."

1.3.4. Zakat ”Alms For Poor”

Religious levy, is one of the five fundamental pillars of Islam. Fulfilling this

obligation causes Muslims for share one fortieth of their surplus wealth to

poor. By carrying this process Muslims are purifying themselves from

selfishness and greed.

10

Qur'an 5:90-91 11

Halal and Haram – Code of “ethical investment”

26

“Believe in Allah and His apostle, and spend (in charity) out of the

(substance) whereof He has made you heirs. For, those of you who believe

and spend (in charity),- for them is a great Reward.”12

This wealth redistribution mechanism of income is inherited in Islam, so that

every Muslim individual is guaranteed fair living standard. Zakat plays

essential economic and social functions. Some scholar suggest that in can be

used in fiscal policy quite effectively. By redistributing wealth fr om rich to

poor, this instrument helps to maintain equality and justice within society.

Since all resources are gifts of God to all human beings, there is no reason

why they should remain concentrated in few hands (Chapra). Noble Qur'an

states:

“(so that) wealth does not circulate only among your rich”13

Moreover funds raised through zakat can be used only specific things. Noble

Qur'an clarifies where these funds can be utilized.

“the poor and needy, those who work to collect them, those whose hearts

are brought together[in the Truth], the ransoming of slaves, debtors, in the

God's way, and the traveler, so Allah ordains..”14

Zafar Sareshwala emphasizes main objectives and positive effects of Zakat.

(1) the promotion of stable economic growth through investments,

employment and balance consumption, and (2) the achievement of greater

income equality through an equitable distribution of wealth, thereby

eliminating poverty and extreme disparities of wealth between the rich and

the poor. Positive economic effect of Zakat is an increase in the money

supply and a consequent increase in the demand for goods and services.

Zakat also provides debt relief and enhances price stability.

12

Qur'an 57:7 13

Qur'an 59:7 14

At- Taubah, 60

27

1.4. Understanding Time Value of Money in Islamic Finance

Interest rate is regarded as the main tool of making profit in finance. As interest is

clearly prohibited in Islamic finance, still there are some confusions regarding time

value of money. As already mentioned above, Islamic finance based on strict

principles. According to Najmul Hassan, in order to better understand time value of

money, basic principles of both Islamic and conventional banking should be

examined (Please refer to chapter 2.2.), having in mind that in Hadith Quoted by Ali

Ibn Talib: “All loans that draw interest is riba” and Qur'an's verse (2:275) where

any excess of loan besides principal amount is considered as riba, furthermore

money and commodity has different characteristics, as money has no intrinsic value

but can be regarded as medium of exchange and measure of value, in order to

satisfy human needs it should be converted into commodity.

Shariah, approves time value of money in the case of sale transaction, but in lending

interest is prohibited as material compensation for time. Zamir Iqbal and Abbas

Mirakhor (2011) As commodity has its quality and intrinsic value, and owner can

sell at whatever price both parties agree on even though the prevailing market price

is higher. Thus, excess money charged against deferred payment is riba where

money exchanged for money, as excess charged against nothing but time.15

15

Time value of money in Islamic Banking, Najmul Hassan

28

II. ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SYSTEM (IFS)

2. The Stability of IFS and differences between Islamic -

Conventional Banking

2.1. Financial Stability of Islamic Finance

The Islamic financial system (IFS) consist of a banking sector, a stock market, an a

market for securitized assets. It was also shown that the banking sector may have a

sub-sector which specializes in high-credit and short-maturity securities to finance

trade or commodities on the basis of murabaha ( cost-plus sale) to support the

payment system. This would be analogous to the concept of narrow banking which

has been suggested in the conventional system to promote stability in the payment

system and in the financial system.

Proponents of the Islamic system claim that a financial system based on the Islamic

framework of risk sharing would be more efficient in allocating resources than a

conventional interest-based system. This claim can be defended on the basis of the

general proposition that any financial development that causes investment

alternatives to be compared to one another based strictly on their productivity and

rates of return is bound to produce improved allocations. Such a proposition is the

cornerstone of the Islamic financial system. But would such a system also improve

stability?

The general argument underlying the proposition that the Islamic financial system is

more stable that the conventional system is based on three notions: 1) the avoidance

of leverage and debt refinancing due to the prohibition of debt; 2) the matching of

assets and stabilities; and 3) the elimination of the multiplier effect.

29

Due to the essence of Islamic banking it was not or at least less affected by the

financial crisis. As Islamic banks do not deal with debt trading and engage in highly

speculative transactions that most conventional banks are undertaking. There are

several opinions of experts regarding this issue.

“Islamic banks do not rely on bonds or stocks, and are not involved in the buying

and selling of debt unlike most conventional European and US banks. He noted that

Islamic banking is distinguished by the fact that it is prohibited from buying debts

under Islamic Sharia law; therefore, Islamic banks are safe from the effects of the

global financial crisis.”-CEO of the Bahraini-based Albaraka Banking Group

Adnan Ahmed Yousif, adding also that Islamic banks became safe place for secured

liquidity.

“Islamic banks have not been affected by the mortgage crisis that afflicted the

international financial markets and that they are largely immune against such crisis

thanks to inherent factors within Islamic banking. The most important of these

factors is the prohibition of debt trading, taking precautions against money

laundering, as well as the official and professional restraints upon which banks are

based such as caution against embarking upon projects that entail financial

difficulties and risks, crisis has caused significant global inflation in world banks

because they buy debts and enlarge accounts without tangible transactions taking

place or without brokers being aware of them, in which Islamic banks do not

engage ”-General Manager and board member of the Arab Finance House Dr.

Fouad Nadim Matraji.

“Islamic banking is a part of the global economy and can be affected either

negatively or positively by it but Islamic banks are not major investors in

conventional western banks so as to be affected by such crises, I expect expects

Islamic banks to end the year successfully with the forthcoming announcements of

their budgets because of the clarity of contracts and Islamic banking projects that

30

are spread throughout the countries of the Islamic world.”-Dr. Tawfiq Bin Abdul

Aziz al Swailem, Chairman of the Gulf Bureau for Research and Economic

Consultation.

According to Zamir Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor (2011) Conventional banks fail to

meet inherent stability conditions even in the presence of prudential regulations.

First, credit losses from debt default or the depreciation of assets may create a large

divergence in relation to liabilities that remain fixed in nominal value. Second, bank

credit has no fixed relation to real capital in the economy and bears no direct

relation to the real rate of return. Un- backed credit expansion through the credit

multiplier and further leveraging is a fundamental feature of conventional banks.

Cash flow could fall short of expectations and force large income losses on banks,

especially when the cost of funds is fixed through a predetermined interest rate.

Third, banks caught in a credit freeze, with a drying up of liquidity, may default on

their payments. Fourth, banks are fully interconnected with each other through a

complex debt structure; in particular, the assets of one bank instantaneously become

liabilities of another, leading to fast credit multiplication. Credit cash causes a

dramatic contagion and a domino effect that many impair even the soundest of

banks.

Credit can be issued to finance consumption, and hence many rapidly deplete

savings and investment. The depletion of savings could be significant if credit

finances large fiscal deficits. Hence, credit is no longer directly related to the

productive base, as it is in the equity-based system, and the income stream from

credit is no longer secured by real output as shown for the equity system. Credit can

expand through leverage to an unsustainable multiple of real national income,

increasing the risk of default. Credit expansion through the credit multiplier is

determined by the reserve- requirement system, whereas equity in the equity-based

system cannot expand more than real savings. In the case of securitization, credit

can, in the theory, expand to an infinite degree.

31

In an economy governed by the principles of Islamic finance, the rate of return on

equities is determined by the marginal efficiency of capital and time preference, and

is positive in a growing economy. This implies that Islamic banks are always

profitable provided that real economic growth, and conventional banking, where

profitability is not driven primarily by the real growth. As we have seen, the Islamic

banking system has two types of banking activity: deposit banking for safe keeping;

and banking for payment, and fees may be collected for this type of service. In the

system, investment banking operates on a risk/profit-sharing basis, with an overall

rate of return which is positive and determined by the real economic growth rate.

Islamic banks do not create and destroy money; consequently, the money multiplier,

defined by the savings rate in the economy, is much lower in the Islamic system

than in the conventional system, providing a basis for strong financial stability,

greater price stability, and sustained economic growth.

Conventional banks issue debt and earn interest. Debt accommodation by banks has

often been unlimited and has been checked only by crashes. We have shown that

credit expansion may have no relation to the real capital base an no direct relation to

the real cash flow in the economy that may be required for servicing debt. If

financing were to be extended to consumption, then credit could erode the capital

base and economic growth. The equilibrium interest rate that clears the money

market may have no direct relation with the real rate of return in the economy. Such

a deviation was acknowledged by the classical economists and was seen to be a

cause of booms and busts, and excessive speculation in commodities and assets.

Banks are obliged to pay the face value of their liabilities. In the case of credit loss,

banks have to fully absorb these losses from their capital reserves or through

recapitalization. Governments may be compelled to extend large and costly bailouts

to rescue impaired banks and prevent a total collapse of the financial system.

32

The conventional system is vulnerable to many sources of instability. Besides the

inability to reach full-employment output, the system can suffer from interest-rate

distortions in relation to a natural interest rate and can suffer from the absence of a

direct link to a real capital base that generates cash flow for servicing debt. Minsky

(1986) described the conventional system as endogenously unstable, evolving from

temporary stability to periods of crisis. Credit losses play havoc with the real

economy and cause unemployment. The drying-up of credit during credit crashes

makes the Modigliani-Miller theorem untenable. In such circumstances, leveraged

firms will face higher financing costs for their investments of fluctuations in their

operations. The issue of instability in conventional finance is not limited to the role

of commercial and investment banks. In conventional finance, the central bank

plays the critical role of lender of last resort. If it didn´t do so, conventional banks-

which are interrelated through loans- would risk simultaneous failure. Banks are

exposed to credit and interest rate risk and many run out of liquidity. In order to

maintain their payments, the rediscount and borrowing from the central bank

become pillars for the smooth functioning of conventional finance. In Islamic

finance, banks do not have or cause any liquidity mismatch and are thus nor

dependent on central bank finance to maintain their liquidity.

Finally, I should note that the social and human costs of financial instability and

financial crises, through impossible to quantify, might dwarf even the economic

costs. The human cost of prolonged unemployment-its impact on the individual

psyche and on families- cannot be overestimated. The impact on individual regions

is much more extreme than average effects. The unfair redistribution of wealth, at

the expense of individuals on fixed incomes and creditors, is simply immoral.

Islamic finance avoids these and other pitfalls of a financial system based on credit

and leveraging. Islamic Finance shed its reliance on debt, interest and leveraging, to

totally revamp the financial system to rely on risk sharing.

33

2.1.1. Theoretical Considerations

From a prudential perspective, given that Islamic banks are expanding their

presence in conventional systems, it is relevant to know whether Islamic

banks are more or less stable than conventional banks. As mentioned above,

some authors have argued that the risks posed to the financial system by

Islamic banks differ in many ways from those posed by conventional banks.

Risks unique to Islamic banks may arise directly from the specific features

of Islamic contracts, as well as indirectly from the overall legal, governance

and liquidity-management infrastructure available to Islamic institutions.

For example, PLS financing shifts the direct credit risk from banks to their

investment depositors. But it also increases the overall degree of risk on the

asset side of banks’ balance sheets, because it makes Islamic banks

vulnerable to risks normally borne by equity investors rather than holders of

debt.

In addition, the absence of viable Islamic money markets could exacerbate

liquidity risks. Similarly, prohibitions against the use of conventional

derivatives limit Islamic banks’ ability to hedge certain risks. Moreover,

most Islamic banks have operated in environments with less developed or

nonexistent interbank and money markets and government securities, and

with limited availability of and access to lender-of-last-resort facilities

operated by central banks. These differences have been reduced somewhat

because of recent developments in Islamic money market instruments and

Islamic lender-of-last resort modes, and the implicit commitment of most

authorities to provide liquidity support to all banks during exceptional

circumstances.

On the other hand, there are features of Islamic banks that could render them

less vulnerable than conventional banks. For example, Islamic banks are

able to pass through a negative shock from the asset side (such as a

worsened economic situation that causes lower cash flow from PLS

transactions) to the investment depositors. The risk-sharing arrangements on

34

the deposit side thus arguably provide another layer of protection to the

bank, in addition to its book capital. Also, it could be argued that the need to

provide a stable and competitive return to investors, the shareholders’

responsibility for negligence or misconduct (operational risk) and the more

difficult access to liquidity put pressure on Islamic banks to be more

conservative.

Furthermore, because investors (depositors) share in the risks (and typically

do not have deposit insurance), they have more incentive to exercise tight

oversight over bank management.

Finally, and partly due to the lack of short-term investment opportunities,

Islamic banks have traditionally held a larger proportion of their assets than

commercial banks in reserve accounts with central banks or in correspondent

accounts with other banks. Thus, even if Islamic investments were more

risky than conventional investments, from a financial stability perspective

the question is whether or not these higher risks are offset by bigger buffers.

In sum, whether Islamic banks are more or less stable than

conventional banks depends on the relative sizes of the effects discussed

above, and it may in principle differ from country to country and even bank

from bank.

2.1.2. Some Empirical Evidence

Čihák and Hesse (2008) find, based on a sample comprising 18 countries,

that larger Islamic banks tend to be riskier than smaller Islamic banks and

similar large commercial banks, while smaller Islamic banks tend to be more

stable than small commercial banks. Furthermore, as the presence of Islamic

banks grows in a country’s financial system, there is no significant impact

on the soundness of other banks. This suggests that Islamic and commercial

banks can co-exist in the same system without substantial “crowding out”

effects through competition and deteriorating soundness.

35

A plausible explanation of the contrast between the high stability in small

Islamic banks and the relatively lower stability in larger ones is that it is

significantly more complex for Islamic banks to adjust their credit risk

monitoring system as they become bigger. For example, the PLS modes,

used by Islamic banks, are more diverse and more difficult to standardize

than loans used by commercial banks. As a result, as the scale of the banking

operation grows, monitoring of credit risk becomes rapidly much more

complex. That results in greater prominence of problems relating to adverse

selection and moral hazard. Another explanation is that small banks

concentrate on low-risk investments and fee income, while large banks do

more PLS business.

2.2. Differences between Islamic and Conventional Banking

An Islamic bank is similar to a modern Western bank in almost all functions which

empower it to mediate any shortcomings or surpluses that may exist in a monetary

exchange economy. The Islamic bank requires a careful management team to

balance the different levels of credit (personal credit, secured credit, letters of

credit), and also functions as a specialist in estimating projects risks and estimated

returns. The main difference between Islamic and conventional banks (see Table-2)

lies in the fact that conventional banks charge and pay interest, whereas Islamic

banks do not as they consider interest as riba (Please refer to chapter 1.3.1.).

Traditionally, rather than charging interest, Islamic financial institutions will

typically share some of their borrowers’ risks and profits. A bank’s profit from these

‘loans’ depends on the overall success of the loans in generating additional revenue

or profits for the borrowers.

Islamic finance also avoids investing in ventures that may have components that are

not in line with the values of Islam (alcohol, gambling, drugs and tobacco) and

speculation (e.g., reliance on the occurrence of events that may or may not take

36

place). Despite such, Islamic law does not require that the seller of a product be

Muslim, or that its services also be Islamic.

Table-2: Differences between Islamic & Conventional Banking

Characteristics Islamic Banking System Conventional Banking System

Guiding

principle

Guided by Quranic edicts,

Hadeeth, Islamic ethics and

Islamic laws.

Guided by profit motive alone, with

no religious or ethical considerations.

Ethics of

financing

Financing being asset-backed,

and meant for productive use

helps reduce the overall debt

burden.

Debt burden arising out of excessive

use of credit leads to bankruptcies,

and waste of financial resources.

Liquidation

Assets

An Investment Account Holder

will have similar rights as

shareholders.

Depositors are paid before the

shareholders.

Involvement of

risk & Equity

financing

Equity financing is available to a

project or venture that involves

profit-and-loss sharing. Risk-

sharing and profit sharing go

together.

Commercial banks do not usually

indulge in equity financing, only

venture capital companies and

investment banks do. Conventional

banks carry much less risk, major part

of the risks being transferred to the

borrowers.

Return on

Capital

Depends on productivity, idle

money cannot earn any return.

Money is not capital per se, only

potential capital16

.

Even idle money in bank deposits

earns returns.

Prohibition of

Gharar

(uncertainty)

The existence of uncertainty in a

contract is prohibited because it

requires the occurrence of an

event which may not ultimately

occur. “Full disclosure” by both

parties is the norm in contracts.

Derivatives trading e.g. options

are considered as having

elements of Gharar.

Trading and dealing in derivatives are

widely considered as the main source

of liquidity in the conventional

financial, commodity and capital

markets.

Profit and Loss

Sharing

Most transactions are based on

this variable returns, dependent

on lenders’ performance. Greater

share of risks forces them to

manage risks more

There is no relationship between bank

performance and returns to the

depositors or investors, who mostly

enjoy a risk-free return. Conventional

institutions mostly act as

16 It becomes actual capital only when it joins hands with other resources to undertake a productive activity. Islam recognizes the time

value of money, but only when it acts as capital, not when it is "potential" capital.

37

professionally, to ensure better

returns than conventional

accounts. Depositors & investors

have opportunity to earn higher

returns than in conventional

systems.

intermediaries between lenders &

borrowers enjoying almost a risk-free

spread.

Zakat It has become one of the

functions of the Islamic banks to

collect and distribute Zakat.

Government Taxes perhaps serve the

same purpose - mode and rate of

charging are different, though.

Compounding

or Interest on

interest

The Islamic banks have no

provision to charge any extra

money from the defaulters.

It can charge additional money

(compound rate of interest) in case of

defaulters.

Money-Market

Borrowing

For the Islamic banks, it is

comparatively difficult to

borrow money from the money

market.

For commercial banks, borrowing

from the money market is the main

source of liquidity.

Developing

expertise

Since it shares profit and loss,

the Islamic banks pay greater

attention to developing project

appraisal and evaluation

systems.

Since income from the advances is

fixed, it gives little importance to

developing expertise in project

appraisal and evaluations.

Viability v/s

credit-

worthiness

The Islamic banks, on the other

hand, give greater emphasis on

the viability of the projects.

The conventional banks give greater

emphasis on credit-worthiness of the

clients.

Relationship

with Clients

The status of Islamic bank in

relation to its clients is that of

partners, investors and trader.

The status of a conventional bank, in

relation to its clients, is that of

creditor and debtors.

Capital

Guarantee

No guarantee. Built into the system.

Deposit

insurance

None An integral component

38

2.3. Advantages and Disadvantage of Islamic Finance

2.3.1. Advantages of Islamic Finance

Efficient allocation of funds: Since allocation of funds by banks will be

dependent upon the soundness of projects under the PLS17

arrangements,

the allocation is more efficient.

Productive use of capital: Banks are likely to know their fund users

better in order to ensure that the funds are used for productive purposes.

In this way, both the fund providers and the financial intermediary

contribute to promoting productive economic activities and greater

financial responsibility. Thus, IBFs would promote economic growth

(Chapra 1998 and Siddiqui 1983)

Similarly, since banks have no pressure of fixed regular payments on

deposits, the efficiency of allocating resources to profitable and more

productive use is further boosted.

Equitable distribution of wealth: The efficiency in allocation leads to

this, and creates additional wealth as well. Interest distribution is

considered unjust and inequitable because it is not based on any

productive use of capital, and it exploits the misfortune of the borrower

(who has run out of money).

Generation of employment: Productive use of capital implies

investments and creation of jobs. The investment is not dependent upon

the cost of capital (and positive NPVs) or time value of money, hence

number of investible projects is likely to be much higher resulting in

larger capital formation.

Saving-in information costs: Being a partner of the entrepreneur (or a

firm), the financial institution has easier and cheaper access to

17 Profit Loss Sharing

39

information on matters relating to the firm. This may make credit rating

agencies redundant, and lending more efficient.

Saving in deposit insurance costs: Risk-sharing concept built into the

IBF system, there will be no need for deposits to be insured.

Reduction of debt burden: The IBF system of equity financing

encourages debt to be swapped with equity which can help many

developing countries get rid of the immense debt-burden. Instead of

rescheduling of existing loans or selling Brady bonds at heavy discounts,

which does not help relieve the pressure much, converting debt to equity

promises a much more fruitful alternative.

Promoting Ethical behavior: Because of its strong emphasis on the

ethical and moral dimensions of doing the business and selecting the

activities/ commodities to be financed, the Islamic financing institutions

could play an important role in promoting socially desirable investment

and corporate behavior. In this context, it is worth mentioning that

Islamic financing institutions are subject to Shariah (Islamic Law)

regulations in addition to conforming to the conventional regulatory

standards. This is further expected to ensure greater prudence and

responsibility.

Higher profits: Account holders under Islamic finance could expect

higher profit from their investment as Islamic banks are required to share

the entire net profit according to the agreed formula rather than just a

portion of the profit, as is the conventional practice.

Reduction in run-on-deposits: Banks using profit and loss sharing (PLS)

to mobilize resources are less likely to face a sudden run on their

deposits.

More stable economic environment: The perspective of investments is

long-term in comparison to short-term expectations of returns in

40

conventional financial system – this may result in a more stable

economic environment less dependent on business cycles.

Less likelihood of flight of capital: Under Islamic finance, debt

instruments that may be created through selling goods and services on

credit are not readily tradable. This greatly eliminates the possibility of

sudden mass movement of funds from one country to another.

Reduction in speculative transactions: Examination of daily records of

trading in financial markets vividly shows that institutional participants

carry out huge speculative transactions. More often than not, such

transactions are sources of instabilities. In contrast, Islamic banks and

financial institutions are inherently prevented from carrying out such

activities. As a result destabilizing speculations would be significantly

curtailed in financial markets, although liquidity will remain with

secondary market trading allowed in stocks or investment certificates.

Reduction of inflationary pressures: Under Islamic economics the

inflationary pressures would be reduced to a great extent, as over or

under-supply of money with respect of supply of goods is not allowed

(money directly linked to supply of goods in the economy).

Reduction in unproductive use of borrowings: By eliminating

unnecessary and excessive borrowing (borrowing beyond productive

use), risk to lenders is reduced under PLS, as lending is directly related

to project appraisals and feasibility.

Automatic Shock-absorption: For banks involved in the equity-based

system, Khan (1986) argues that the shocks to asset positions are

immediately absorbed by changes in the values of shares held by

depositors in the bank. This makes the real values of assets and liabilities

of banks equal at all times, preventing banking crises. Nienhaus (1986)

agrees with the argument.

41

Box-1: Landmark Islamic finance deal inked

Khaleej Times: 03 July 2003

DUBAI - In a landmark deal for Islamic finance, Dubai Islamic Bank (DIB), in partnership

with ABC Islamic Asset Management of London, has signed a leasing transaction agreement

with the AAA-rated General Electric of the USA. The transaction involves the purchase of

machines and engineering equipment by DIB and ABC and leased under Sharia principles to

General Electric.

"We intend to source more deals with investment grade companies from around the world," Mr

Aref Kooheji, DIB's Executive Vice-President for Investment Banking said. "We pay special

attention to the elimination of risk by means of watertight structures that provide protection

against residual risk during the term of the lease."

Mr Kooheji concluded the signing with Mr Duncan Smith, ABC Islamic Asset Management's

CEO, in Dubai recently.

"This is a landmark deal. If General Electric is prepared to go the Islamic financing route, then

it's hard to see how similar multinationals will not avail themselves of this excellent financing

facility in the future. This will give the Islamic industry a tremendous boost," Mr Smith said.

Mr Smith added that the partnership transaction was made possible through cooperation

between investment professionals at DIB and ABC Islamic Asset Management, whose

understanding of complex structures, legal and other matters, particularly Sharia compliance,

facilitated smooth cross-border dealings of significance in the development of investments in

the Islamic financial industry.

Abu Dhabi power project signs $1.8b loan deal

Khaleej Times: 3 July 2003

ABU DHABI - A $1.8-billion loan facility was signed here yesterday for the expansion of

Abu Dhabi's fourth independent power and water project in what was described as "the largest

project financing ever" in the capital of the United Arab Emirates.

Project developers International Power of Britain and Japan's Mitsui and Co. and Tokyo

Electric Power Company (Tepco), signed the facility with a consortium of local and

international banks to finance the Umm Al Nar project.

Lead arrangers of the conventional loan include Gulf International Bank, HSBC, Sumitomo,

Mitsui Banking Corporation and National Bank of Abu Dhabi, while Abu Dhabi Islamic

Bank lead arranged a $250-million Islamic tranche.

42

2.3.2. Perceived Disadvantages of Islamic Finance

With Profit-Loss Sharing (PLS), the role of the bank undergoes a change

from being an intermediary trader of money, earning profits from the

margin between lending and borrowing, to being an investing partner.

The role of an investment bank brings in added costs:

- Search cost resulting from the need to decide on the most

profitable ventures. With an Islamic bank required to finance so

many different kinds of businesses, acquiring skills in all of them

may be immensely costly.

- Monitoring costs resulting from the need to prevent mishandling

of the venture and fraudulent means (including creative

accounting) adopted by borrowers/ partners are in addition to

those involved in conventional financial system.

- Managing costs incurred because of its obligation as a partner in

the PLS deals.

Determination of mechanism for profit sharing in the short-term is

difficult in a PLS system based on returns only from productive

deployment of funds. In the absence of a standard mechanism for profit/

loss sharing (both for short-term as well as long-term), the possibility of

exploitative contracts cannot be eliminated.

Eliminating interest may reduce the propensity to save (with banks) or

invest (considering the risk associated with returns), thus curtailing

economic growth affecting employment (Pryor-1985), generation of

wealth and its distribution. Of course, IBF proponents do not agree, as an

opportunity for equitable sharing of wealth earned from productive

activities could be enough stimulant for investors.

Dispute settlement mechanism adds to the cost further, as the account put

forward by the borrower (entrepreneur) may not be convincing enough

43

for the banks or other investor partners. Fixed return of the conventional

system has no such costs.

A risk sharing proposition of IFBs and resulting absence of deposit

insurance system leaves small investors in the risky avenues, particularly

when the Islamic financial institution carries fraudulent intentions.

Curtailing speculative activities in the secondary market would be

extremely difficult resulting in the same risks and costs that the

conventional financial systems carry.

The mark-up system of most of the non-PLS schemes resembles the

interest-based system to the extent of becoming indistinguishable,

sometimes, and provides unscrupulous financiers opportunity to replicate

the conventional system.

Additional cost of supervision by the Sharia Board: Product

development, its offering, agreements between counterparties,

functioning of the IBF system, accounting, etc.. Need to be Sharia

compliant which needs certification by the Sharia Boards resulting in

additional cost burden over the IBF Operators.

Account holders under Islamic finance could expect higher profit from

their investment as Islamic banks are required to share the entire net

profit according to the agreed formula rather than just a portion of the

profit, as is the conventional practice.

Box-2: Do Islamic Banks Perform Better than Conventional Banks?

Evidence from Gulf Cooperation Council countries

Hadeel Abu Loghod: 2011

Islamic Banking has been growing worldwide significantly in the past three decades and is

developing remarkably in the Southeast Asia, Middle East and even in Europe and in North

America. The Gulf Cooperation Council Countries (GCC18

), have dual banking system

18 Gulf Cooperation Council. Economic cooperation between Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

44

where Islamic and conventional banks are operating side by side. The purpose of this paper

is to compare the financial performance (profitability, liquidity and structure) of the two

banking styles over the 2000-2005 time period.

The Empirical Results

To summarize, there are some ratios indicate that there are differences between the

performance of both types of banks and some showed that there are no differences.

Empirical results showed that there were no significant differences in terms of profitability

between both types of banking. However, Islamic banks proved to be profitable in all GCC

banks except for UAE. That was due to high competition, and more diverse market. In

markets where there are customers who are willing to deal with Islamic banks, such as,

Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, Islamic banks proved to be more profitable.

As expected that Islamic banks tend to have high liquidity ratios relative to conventional

banks and that was due to the fact that Islamic banks cannot rely on borrowing money from

central bank or any other sources. On the other hand, conventional banks are more

leveraged compared to Islamic banks. This is my partially explained by the nature of

Islamic banking, they cannot borrow money from central bank or other sources because of

the interest.

Summary and conclusions

The aim of this paper was to compare between the financial performance of Islamic banks

and conventional banks in the GCC countries using statistical analysis of summary

financial information and selected financial ratios. Most of the published literature explains

the differences in culture and principles between both banking types, but very few studied

the differences in financial performance in practice utilizing statistical model.

In this paper, quantitative method is used to examine the differences in financial

performance between both types of banks. For the most part, financial ratios were also

used to predict future performance such as type of a bank. The analysis utilized an

econometric LOGIT technique to find out the differences between the financial

performance of Islamic banks and conventional banks using key financial ratios over the

period (2000–2005), in a panel sample of both types of banking in the GCC countries. Six

models were developed to avoid multi collinearity.

The results were very significant and robust and were confirmed by the calculation of

marginal effect, since the magnitude of calculated marginal effects of financial ratios to the

probability of bank type is less than one and standard errors were very small. Models were

successful in describing the differences in financial performance based on selected

financial ratios.

The obtained statistical results suggest that:

1- Market share, defined as total assets, of the financial data published over the period

(2000-2005), shows that conventional banks are dominant in GCC countries.

However, they are losing their market share against Islamic banks. Since in 2000 the

45

total assets of conventional banks in GCC countries was 87.91%. It decreased to

85.84% in 2005 with 40.64% growth rate. Islamic banks increased from 12.09% in

2000 to 14.16% in 2005 with 50.53% growth rate. This indicates that Islamic banks

are growing faster than conventional banks over time.

2- Analysis of differences in Profitability ratios, presented in this paper, by return on

assets, return on equity and dividend payout ratios, the statistical results show that

there are no significant differences between both types of banks. However, comparing

averages of both banking types and industry in each country of the GCC countries

show that Islamic banks had higher ratios in GCC countries except in the case of

UAE. The result is reasonable, market and management play important role in

determining profitability, in addition to the bank performance.

3- As for differences in Liquidity ratios, it is vital for the survival of a bank. Liquidity

ratios are presented by Cash to Assets and Cash to Deposits ratios in this paper.

Analysis of the ratios shows that conventional banks are exposed to liquidity risk

more than Islamic banks. Liquidity ratios are in favor of Islamic banks.

4- Analysis of differences in structure ratios shows the following statistical results:

Debt to Asset ratio is in favor of Conventional banks indicating that conventional

banks depend more on external liabilities.

Loans/Receivables to Assets ratio is in favor of Islamic banks too. This implies

that customers are more attracted to use Islamic banking financing instruments

because they comply with Islamic sharia.

Deposits to Equity, Deposits to Assets and Investments and deposits to Assets

were in favor of conventional banks but this result is debatable. Average of these

ratios for both banking types showed that Islamic banks in some GCC countries

like Kuwait and Qatar had higher ratios than conventional banks, while in

Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and UAE showed the opposite. This can be explained by

conventional banks outnumbered Islamic banks in these countries, which made

competition high in attracting deposits.

Fixed Assets to Assets ratio is in favor of Islamic banks. This result is very

rational because Islamic banks use financial instruments such as Murabaha, Ijara,

and these instruments increase the rate of Fixed Assets to Assets.

The statistical results show that there are no significant differences between both

banking types in terms of Internal Growth rates.

Loans/Receivables to Deposits and Loans to Equity ratios are in favor of Islamic

banks, indicate that Islamic banks are more into financing operations rather than

receiving deposits and this implies that credit risk of conventional banks is less

than it is in Islamic banks.

Deposit to Equity ratios and Investment and deposits to Assets ratios are in favor

of conventional banks. Obviously, this result indicates that the ability of

conventional banks to leverage their operations by attracting more deposits and

investments.

Equity to Assets ratio is in favor of conventional banks. This ratio is an important

measure of capital adequacy; higher values of this ratios reflect a strong financial

structure of the bank and less possibilities of financial difficulty.

46

III. FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS

3. Islamic Financing Techniques and Products

One may view the Islamic financial system as grounded in four basic principles:

Risk-sharing -- the terms of financial transactions need to reflect a symmetrical

risk/return distribution each participant to the transaction may face;

Materiality -- a financial transaction needs to have a “material finality”, that is it is

directly or indirectly linked to a real economic transaction;

No exploitation -- a financial transaction should not lead to the exploitation of any

party to the transaction;

No financing of sinful activities such as the production of alcoholic beverages.

Financial intermediation based on the principles of Islam has an established historical

record and has made significant contributions to economic development over time.

Financiers in early periods of Islam were known as sarrafs who undertook many of the

traditional and basic functions of a conventional financial institution, such as intermediation

between borrowers and lenders, operation of a secure and reliable domestic as well as

cross-border payment system, and offering services such as issuance of promissory notes

and letters of credit.19

Sarrafs operated through an organized network and well-functioning markets, which

established them as a sophisticated intermediary given the tools and technology of their

time.20

19

For further details see Udovitch (1981), who equated the function of sarrafs with a bank and considered them as "bankers without

banks". 20

Chapra and Ahmed (2002). It is claimed that financial intermediaries in the early Islamic period also helped each other overcome

liquidity shortages on the basis of a mutual help arrangement.

47

There is evidence that some of the concepts, contracts, practices and institutions developed

in the Islamic legal sources of the late eighth century provided the foundations for similar

instruments in Europe several centuries later.21

In Islam, the whole fabric of Divine Law is contractual in its conceptualization, content,

and application. Islam forcefully places all economic relations on the firm footing of

“contractus”.22

Islamic economics is based on a set of contracts and instruments which

form the backbone and building blocks for more complex and elaborate frameworks.

Islamic banking and financial institutions have developed a wide range of techniques which

allow them to uphold the religious and legal principles while enabling them, at the same

time, to offer viable financial products. The search is actually still going on to find newer

techniques, and for variations based upon the existing ones to offer more attractive and

useful instruments for the investors.

The four root transactions according to Shariah are sales (Bay), hire (Ijâra), gift (Hiba) and

loan (Ariyah) describing respectively the transfer of ownership, the transfer of the right to

use, the gratuitous transfer of ownership and the gratuitous transfer of the right to use.

These basic forms are applied to specific transactions such as pledge, deposit and guarantee

and build the basis for all transaction structures in Islamic finance. (Lewis and Algaoud

2001)

The traditionally most accepted and most correct forms of Islamic financing are the profit-

and loss sharing contracts: Mudaraba and Musharaka. According to Algaoud and Lewis

(2007) this form of equity based financing is considered as the “backbone of Islamic

banking practice” as it represents the idea of the Holy Qur’an, namely that every

investment should foster economic development by providing capital to companies and

infrastructure projects (Gassner and Wackerbeck 2007). As can be derived from the name,

profits and losses are shared between the creditor and the borrower on a predetermined

21

Udovitch (1981). 22

Mirakhor (1989). Contractual foundation of the Shariah judges the virtue of justice in man not only for his material performance but

also by the essential attribute of his forthright intention (niyya) with which he enters into every contract. This intention consists of sincerity, truthfulness and insistence on rigorous and loyal fulfillment of what he/she has consented to do (or not to do). This faithfulness

to one’s contractual obligations is so central to Islamic belief that when the Prophet was asked “who is the believer?” He replied that “a

believer is a person in whom the people can trust their person and possessions.”

48

basis. Consequently it is considered as a “return-bearing” contract in contrast to an

“interest-bearing” contract in conventional banking (Mirakhor and Zaidi 2007). The two

basic concepts Mudarabah and Musharakah and other financial products will be explained

in the following chapter.

The following list covers many of them:

3.1. Equity-Based Financing Techniques

Mudarabah (fund management) and musharakah (equity partnership) are

mainstream contracts for capital investment.

3.1.1. Mudarabah

The Mudarabah contract is a two tiered transaction for an Islamic bank. On

the asset side it provides money, for example for an entrepreneur called

“Mudarib”, and finances its project as so called “Rabb al-mal”. As such it

possesses all assets but does not have any active part in the enterprise. At the

end of the contract the investment is redeemed by the entrepreneur and the

bank participates in the generated profit on a predetermined basis. However

if the project fails it participates simultaneously in the losses and can, in the

worst case, lose all its investment (but not more). The entrepreneur manages

the project and provides his economic and technical knowhow.

49

Figure 1 -- Example of a Mudarabah

He is liable to the bank in case of gross negligence and might lose his

income. As he has not invested capital, his financial damage will be very

limited (Mirakhor and Zaidi 2007 and Zamir Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor

2011). The funds used by the bank are usually held in trusteeship from

savings or investment account holders, i.e. depositors (liability side). The

depositors share in turn the profits and losses experienced by the bank and

thus participate in the earnings of the projects or companies the bank has

invested in. To come to full circle their rate of return depends from the real

sector and cannot be considered as interest (please refer to chapter 1.3.1.)

(Mirakhor and Zaidi 2007). As the bank only provides capital but no

management expertise this form of financing is also called “Qirad”, to be

translated as “dormant partnership” (Lewis and Algaoud 2001). The

50

mechanism of a Mudaraba contract between a bank and a company (i.e. the

asset side) is shown in Figure 1.

3.1.2. Musharakah

The Musharakah partnerships are very similar to the Mudarabah form

however in contrast to the former both, entrepreneur and bank, provide

capital for the project and form de facto a kind of Joint Venture. Both

partners have the rights (but not the obligation) to participate in the

management and share profits according to a predetermined ratio and losses

in proportion to their respective capital invested. Consequently both have the

incentive to invest wisely and should have an active interest in the

investment (Mirakhor and Zaidi 2007). In order to illustrate the structure of

a Musharakah partnership, please refer to Figure 2.

Figure 2 – Permanent or diminishing Musharakah transaction

Subcategories of the Musharakah contract can be differentiated according to

the duration the bank’s engagement in the venture:

Permanent Musharakah

The duration of the contract is unlimited until one party resigns the

contract or the project is liquidated. This form of financing is

51

designed for long-term financial investment of the bank. (Altundag

and Nadia 2005,)

Diminishing Musharakah

In contrast to the permanent Musharakah, the bank’s engagement is

reduced over time and another party (usually the entrepreneur) buys

the bank’s shares to a higher price than the original value. Hence the

bank commits to a short or medium term investments and receives a

profit out of the difference between original share value and received

price. The diminishing Musharakah structure is used for example in

house financing. (Zamir Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor 2011).

3.1.3. Wakalah

A recent trend among Islamic banks is to apply the concept of Wakalah, or

agency, to both financing and deposit taking. While Wakala bears strong

resemblances to Mudarabah, there is a key difference: a Wakil, or agent,

merely represents the party that has the money.

For instance, if the bank appointed Mario as Wakil instead of Mudarib, then

Mario would be eligible for a salary, not just a share of the profits. As an

agent of the bank, Mario uses the bank’s money, but owes it back (unless

there is a loss). Here the financial dynamics are more like those of a loan.

Conversely, if after many successful years, Mario wishes to deposit his

funds with the bank, he may place them in a Wakalah deposit. This too is a

PSIA, except that it is one in which the funds belong to Mario and are

applied by the bank. The bank is able to pay itself a fee akin to margin. If the

bank loses money, so may Mario. If not, the bank must return his money at

the term of the Wakala.

The main difference beyond the fee concept is that the Mudarabah is either a

formal partnership or a business operation contract. As a formality, the

Mudarabah must be terminated and the partnership dissolved or bought out.

The Wakalah, however, ends without a business operation terminating or a

52

partnership being formally dissolved. The Wakalah simply ends with the

repayment of funds.

3.1.4. Difference Between Mudarabah and Musharakah Contracts

In a Mudarabah contract, the managing agent (beneficiary or the borrower,

called the Mudarib) does not have any financial participation. In a

Musharakah contract, the agent is a financial partner along with the provider

of fund (Rabb-al-Mal of Mudarabah contract) sharing the gain or loss at the

pre-designated ratio which is likely to be higher than what he is likely to get

in a Mudarabah contract. Thus, in Mudarabah, the agent acts as a working

partner who does not bear any losses and simply manages the fund (the

project in which the fund is invested), whereas in Musharakah, all the parties

are shareholders in the venture.

For both Mudarabah and Musharakah contracts, the profitability of Islamic

banks is directly linked to their physical investments. This is the main

difference to conventional banks who earn interest on the loans they provide

irrespective of the profitability. Therefore Islamic banks are more likely to

demand a continuous, complete flow of information from their counterparty

which might lead to higher transparency and stability. They tend to be more

interested in stable long-term relationships with their clients. (Mirakhor and

Zaidi 2007) According to Iqbal these forms of equity financing fosters the

better understanding and monitoring of the business and involved risks from

the bank’s side. However Gassner and Wackerbeck argue that the current

use of equity-based forms in Islamic finance is very low (approximately 5

percent on the asset side in Islamic banks). This is mainly due to the high

risk involvement of the banks, an obvious principal-agent problem and the

increasing innovation in the Islamic finance industry evolving debt-based

instruments, leasing forms and efficient capital market instruments.

53

Figure 3 -- comparing equity and agency structures

3.2. Debt-Based Financing Techniques

These contracts can be categorized into two components. First component is more

concerned with sale, which includes deferred purchase, manufacturing, deferred

payment sale and etc. Second type of contracts deals mainly with operational and

financial leasing.

3.2.1. Murabaha

In Islamic banking business, loans to private and business clients have to be

granted for a specific purpose (for example to buy a specific commodity). In

this way the Islamic bank purchases the commodity from a third party on

behalf of its client. Before reselling it to him it adds a predetermined mark-

up on the spot price constituting the return for its services. The client

redeems the amount either immediately or on a deferred payment basis-

called “Murabaha-bimuajjal”. (Mirakhor and Zaidi 2007 & Lewis and

Algaoud 2001) The mark-up is fixed in a contract before hand and cannot be

changed during the duration of the contract. Therefore it is to be clearly

differentiated from interest at it is not linked to the duration but “computed

on transaction basis for services rendered” (Lewis and Algaoud 2001). The

54

bank bears an associated risk as it owns the assets between purchase and

resale. (Mirakhor and Zaidi 2007)

Figure 4 -- Murabaha transaction

In order to adapt the Murabaha concept to different customer needs, several

variations exist. Two of them are Bay Salam and Istisnaa.

3.2.2. Bay Salam

According to the Shariah, goods cannot be sold if they are not yet in

existence, at the time when the contract is closed. The Salam contract

constitutes an exception, provided strict rules are adhered. It is mostly used

in agricultural context and recently as Islamic alternative to conventional

derivatives. Following this transaction, the bank purchases the goods (for

example the yield of a farmer) in advance before they are produced. It pays

the full purchase price immediately to the farmer as soon as the contract is

closed (please refer to Figure 5). Therefore both parties have an advantage.

55

Figure 5 -- Salam transaction

The quality and quantities of the goods to be sold, the date and place of

delivery and the purchase price have to be exactly determined in the

contract. The deal cannot be closed if the provision of the goods is uncertain.

(Zamir Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor 2011) Furthermore it has to be about

“homogenous goods” (Zamir Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor 2011) which are not

characterized by special features that could make it difficult to find a

substitute. The contract is binding. In this way that the seller (farmer) has to

buy the goods on the market if he is not able to provide them at the agreed

date. (Zamir Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor 2011) Usually the Islamic financial

institutions tries to resell the goods immediately as it does not want to be in

the physical possession of it.

Consequently they might enter a parallel contract. Either the goods are

resold to the original seller or to a third party for a higher price than the

purchase price, so that the Islamic financial institutions makes a profit.

(Bacha 1999)

3.2.3. Istisnaa

The Istisnaa contract can be seen as subcategory of Salam, designed for a

special purpose, such as the financing of manufacturing on contract or for

project financing. The structure becomes obvious using an example: A

56

customer approaches the Islamic bank because he needs a specific good (for

example a machine), which is not yet produced and which he cannot pay

immediately. After the Istisnaa contract is closed, the bank assigns a

respective supplier with the production of the machine according to the

specifications of its customer. The manufacturer receives a first installment

from the bank at the start and further payments as the production advances

until the machine is finished. Subsequently the machine is handed over to

the bank and later on to the customer who pays the purchase price plus a

predetermined margin to the bank in regular installments after he has

received the good.

Additionally to Salam and Istisnaa there exist further forms of contracts that

are based on the Murabaha concept (for example Arbun) which will not be

explained in the context of this paper.23

Figure 5a -- Istisna

3.3. Leasing

“The transfer of the right to use” (Ijarah) was mentioned before as one out of four

root transactions in Islamic banking. Ijarah contracts are quite similar to the

conventional concept of leasing, however some aspects are different in order to

23

Further information can be retrieved from for example from Gassner and Wackerbeck (2007, 53 to 63) or Lewis and Algaoud (2001,

55 to 59).

57

avoid Riba and Gharar (please refer to chapters 1.3.1. and 1.3.2.). They are very

popular with Islamic financial institutions and can be found in the structures of the

most innovative structures (please refer, for example, to Ijarah Sukuk in chapter

3.4.2.) owing their great flexibility. In one of the largest Islamic financial centers,

Malaysia, 31.6 percent of the total Islamic financing activities in 2005 was based on

the Ijarah concept.24

(Bank Negara Malaysia 2005) As described below the bank

owns the assets until the end of the lease term at least. Even if the lessee fails to pay

the rental payments, the bank still can sell the asset on the market easily. Additional

to the pure Ijarah contract, the further development Ijarah wa Iqtina exist.

3.3.1. Pure Ijarah

Core of the Ijarah contract is the sale of the “Manfa’a”, the right to use an

asset, for a specific period. The goods are bought by the Islamic bank from a

third party. Afterwards they are leased out to the clients who pay rental fees

for their use (please refer to Figure 6). The bank, as lessor, bears the risk as

it is the owner of the assets. Consequently it is responsible for maintenance

and insurance.

Figure 6 -- Pure Ijarah transaction

24 The Annual Report states further that only 0.3 percent was based on Mudaraba and Musharaka contracts and the Mudaraba principle

was applied in 6.9 percent of the cases. (Bank Negara Malaysia 2005)

58

The leased asset must have a productive usage (for example building,

aircraft, car) and the rent is pre-agreed for the whole period, in order to

avoid speculation. (Mirakhor and Zaidi 2007) However the terms of the

lease payment can be renegotiated at agreed time intervals so that the bank

can react to major market developments. (Bergmann 2008) The pure Ijarah

transaction can be compared with the conventional operating lease contract.

(Lewis and Algaoud 2001) Ijarah wa Iqtina.

In the pure Ijarah contract (refer to the chapter above) the lessee has not

option to buy the asset at the end of the lease term. In the Ijarah wa Iqtina, to

be translated as “hire and purchase”, he has. (Mirakhor and Zaidi 2007),

Consequently the ownership is transferred to the lessee after the term of the

contract when all rental payments have been made. Up to this point of time,

the lessor bears all risks for possible losses or damages regarding the lease

asset, except they are caused by gross negligence of the lessee. The Ijarah

wa iqtina contract is similar to a financing lease arrangement in the

conventional system. (Lewis and Algaoud 2001)

3.4. Capital Market Instruments

Due to the infancy of the Islamic financial industry the number of Shariah-

compliant capital market instruments is very small compared to the conventional

market. However numerous product innovations have been developed in the last

decades in order to create competitive products for private and business customers

as well as for the Islamic financial institutions themselves. Islamic capital markets

are generally underdeveloped. Religious constraints on permissible investment rule

out conventional forms of interest-bearing debt finance. In the absence of tradable

debt and valuation problems of financing contracts, Islamic finance has proven

conceptually difficult especially for money management. Banks operating under

Islamic law are predisposed to adopt buy-and-hold investment strategies and carry

59

excess short-term reserves for lack of sufficient long-term reinvestment

opportunities, which has inhibited efficient financial intermediation and capital-

market deepening. Nonetheless, financial institutions have been able to develop

various forms of Islamic finance instruments that are virtually identical to their

conventional counterparts in substance. However, as I will explain in this chapter,

these securities are not surrogates for conventional interest-based securities that

mimic the interest rate structure.

To give some examples, this chapter will focus on Islamic stocks, mutual equity

funds, Sukuk and Islamic derivatives.

Before examining the implications of shariah compliance on conventional

structured finance, it is necessary to clarify how Islamic securitization fits with the

notion of Islamic finance. Since most Islamic financial products are based on the

concept of asset backing, the economic concept of asset securitization is

particularly amenable to the basic tenets of Islamic finance. Asset securitization

describes the process and the result of issuing certificates of ownership as pledge

against existing or future cash flows from a diversified pool of assets (“reference

portfolio”) to investors. It registers as an alternative, capital market-based

refinancing mechanism to diversify external sources of asset funding in lieu of

intermediated debt finance based primarily on the risk assessment of securitized

assets (Jobst, 2006).

Islamic securitization transforms bilateral risk sharing between borrowers and

lenders in Islamic finance into the market-based refinancing of one or more

underlying Islamic finance transactions. In its basic concept, originators would sell

existing or future revenues from lease receivables (asset-based), “sale-back profit”

(debt-based) or private equity from a portfolio of Islamically acceptable assets to a

60

special purpose vehicle (SPV),25

which refinances itself by issuing unsecured

securities to market investors, who are the “capital market corollary” to a singular

lender in Islamic finance (see Figure 7). They assume the role of a “collective

financier” whose entrepreneurial investment does not involve guaranteed, interest-

based earnings.

Figure 7 -- The pay-off profile of asset-backed securities under the three basic

forms of Islamic finance.

In keeping with our previous presentation of the three basic forms of Islamic

finance above, I can illustrate the concept of Islamic securitization by simply

reversing the ex-ante lender payoff from Islamic finance transactions (Exhibits 1

and 2). Using a pass-through securitization structure on the proceeds from a

dedicated reference portfolio of one or more Mudharabah futures with deferred

delivery or payment (which implies limited recourse due to market risk or other

25

In conventional securitization, a SPV is set up solely for the purpose of the securitization and might be a trust, limited liability

company, partnership, or a corporation. In Islamic securitization, the objectives set out in the constitutional documents of the SPV also

must not infringe on the prohibition of riba and haram under Islamic law.

61

contingencies from certain payment and repurchase provisions), originators would

be able to issue unsecured financial obligations with investor payoff S+C(E)-P(F)

backed by expected repayment L2. Investors receive full repayment of principal and

a pre-specified share of profits (as investment return) if the asset performance of the

underlying Islamic transaction generates proceeds in the amount of PV(F) or higher

(indicated by area “A” in Figure 1). Whenever the issuer is unable to repay some or

all of the promised return (and original investment amount), default occurs

(indicated by areas “B” and “C” in Figure 1). If the originator had no endowment to

finance the underlying asset(s) in the first place, expected repayment L2 would be

reduced by asset value –S owed to a third party as “asset supplier” over the term of

the lending transaction, who holds a short position –P(E). Therefore, the maximum

issuance amount would be limited to PV(E)-PV(F).

3.4.1. Islamic Stocks and Equity Funds

Investment in shares is very interesting for Muslim investor as no element of

Riba (please refer to 1.3.1.) is involved in contrast to other capital market

instruments, like bonds for example.

From the point of view of Shariah scholars, equity shares are preferred

instruments because the capital is provided for productive purposes and the

shareholder participates directly in the entrepreneurial success. However

investment targets have to be filtered following two processes: the “industry

screen” and the “financial-ratio screen”. (Dow Jones Indexes 2012)

Industry screen

Firstly there exist restrictions regarding the industry in which the

target company operates. According to the code of ethical investment

that distinguishes between Haram and Halal investments, Muslims

are only allowed to invest in shares of Halal businesses.

The business activity screening aim to exclude Investment in

companies dealing with haram activities/products such as:

62

- Companies that produce/sell/trade/slaughter/distribute pork-

related products;

- Companies that promote pornography or obscenity in any form;

- Companies whose activity involves gambling, such as casinos,

lotteries, bingo, Internet gambling…;

- Companies active in the conventional banking and insurance;

- Companies primarily active in the pure entertainment business

(e.g. movies, theater, cinema…)

- Companies active in the defense or weapons industry;

- Companies active in the tobacco or alcohol business (this

includes producers, sellers and distributers); and Any other type

of company that might be prohibited by the Shariah board.

Although some business activities are very easy to monitor, others

are more difficult to determine precisely. Indeed, halal businesses

such as grocery stores, supermarkets, airlines, hotels and restaurants

may derive part of their profits from prohibited activities such as

selling cigarettes or alcohol.

In these cases, Islamic scholars generally allow Islamic funds to

invest in such halal businesses on condition that the income derived

from that prohibited activity is no more than 5% of the companies'

total income and that any dividends received as a result of investing

in these companies are purified. The purification principle is

relatively straight-forward and involves donating to a charitable

organisation (not necessarily Islamic) 5% of the dividends received

from that particular investee company as it is deemed to be attributed

to the non Shariah compliant activities.

63

Financial - ratio screen

As soon as a stock passed the industry screen its financial parameters

are scrutinized.

Firstly the debt to equity ratio26

has to be lower than 33 percent.

Secondly the percentage of cash and interest bearing securities has to

be lower than 33 percent in reference to market capitalization. The

same is true for the relation between accounts receivables and market

capitalization. (Dow Jones Indexes 2008). Due to complexity of

modern companies, in cannot be avoided that firms are to a very

limited extend active in Haram businesses. Therefore more liberal

Shariah scholars argue that the ratio of Haram business in relation to

total revenues must not exceed 5%. However this ratio is

controversial and not applied by all Shariah Supervisory Boards.

(Zamir Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor 2011). As can been seen from

both the industry and financial-ratio screen it is rather complicated

for a private investor to find a Shariah-compliant investment.

Therefore Islamic equity indices are very popular as the screening

processes are executed by professional firms and supervised by a

Shariah supervisory board. The major Islamic equity indices are the

Dow Jones Islamic Market Index series, the Standard and Poor’s

Shariah Indices and the FTSE Global Islamic Index Series. Many

Islamic funds as well as private and business investors align their

portfolio with these indices.

Islamic equity funds

Islamic equity funds can be structured in two ways- either as a

Mudarabah partnership (please refer to 3.1.1.) or according to the

Wakalah model27

. In both cases a Shariah Supervisory Board has to

26

The debt to equity ratio is calculated by dividing the total debt by the 12-months average of equity capital or the firm’s market

capitalization. (Dow Jones Indexes 2008) 27

Literally Wakalah means “looking after, taking custody” (Ayub 2007, 347) and describes an agency contract in Islamic finance.

64

supervise the Shariah-conformity of the investment decisions and the

investment companies operations.

In the first case the investment company is the Mudarib and the

shareholders assume the role of the Raab-al-mal. The remuneration

for the investment company is taken from the generated profits and

variable depending on the result. If the fund generates a loss, it is

passed on to the shareholders and the investment company receives

nothing. (Zamir Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor 2011 and Ayub 2007)

Figure 8 -- Islamic equity fund based on Mudarabah partnership

from Gassner and Wackerbeck (2007)

In the second case the investment company operates as an agent for

the shareholders and agrees on fix remuneration in advance (absolute

or percentage of the fund volume). This has to be approved by the

Shariah Supervisory Board and disclosed in the fund prospectus.

Furthermore this concept is consistent with the conventional equity

fund. (Zamir Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor 2011). There are several

other categories of Shariah compliant funds in existence for example

Ijarah funds, commodity funds, Murabaha funds or mixed funds.

65

(Ayub 2007) At present approximately 350 islamic funds are issued,

the majority of them being equity funds.

3.4.2. Islamic Investment Certificates (Sukuk)

Sukuk is probably the most well-known instrument in Islamic finance and is

most correctly identified as an investment certificate. It is often called a

bond type instrument because it has some similar characteristics.

Although the religious prohibition of the exchange of debt and the required

conferral of ownership interest to participate in business risk still poses

challenges to further development of Islamic securitization, the gradual

acceptance of Islamic investment certificates, so-called sukuk bonds,

represents a successful attempt to overcome these impediments based on the

adequate interpretation and analogical reasoning of shariah principles

applied in Islamic finance. Sukuks are shariah-compliant and tradable asset-

backed, medium-term notes,28

which have been issued internationally by

governments, quasi-sovereign agencies, and corporations after their

legitimization by the ruling of the Fiqh Academy of the Organization of the

Islamic Conference in February of 1988.29

“Over the last five years, the

sukuk has evolved as a viable form of capital market-based Islamic

structured finance”30

, which reconciles the concept of securitization and

28

“Investment sukuk are certificates of equal value representing undivided shares in ownership of tangible assets, usufructs and services

or (in the ownership of) the assets of particular projects or special investment activities.” (AAOIFI Standard No. 17). 29

Although there is no formal obligation of compliance associated with the ruling, it carries considerable weight with most Islamic

financial institutions. 30

Source Financial Management | March 2011: The global Islamic finance industry grown from about $10bn worth of invested assets

in 1975 to $2.2trn today, according to the 1st Ethical Charitable Trust, an adviser on sharia compliance in the UK. The tenets of Islamic

finance generally forbid the payment of interest and investing in activities deemed speculative, uncertain or unjust (such as gambling, alcohol and the sale of certain foods). This has appeal beyond the Muslim world. Indeed, about 80 per cent of sharia-compliant

investment products in Malaysia are held by non-Muslim investors.

So will the rise of Islamic finance continue, particularly given the lack of trust in Western banking? And what changes can be expected in the global sharia investment mix?

By the end of 2010 5.5 per cent of the $2.2trn invested in Islamic instruments was held in dedicated Islamic funds, with 31.1 per cent in

broader-based assets (mainly in sharia-compliant bank accounts and money-market vehicles). The rest was held in other Islamic instruments, particularly sharia-compliant bonds (sukuk), insurance packages (takaful) and equities products.

Where are the world's Islamic finance hot spots? "The main centres have stayed largely the same for the past three years: Malaysia

continues to lead the way in sukuk and equities products, while Saudi Arabia does the same for bank deposits," says Sohaib Umar, a partner in Ernst & Young's Islamic financial services group in Bahrain. Dedicated multi-product Islamic funds are

split largely among Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Bahrain, the Cayman Islands and Ireland. Yet the focus of the Islamic

finance industry - especially for bond and equity products.

66

principles of the shariah law on the provision and use of financial products

and services in a risk-mitigation structure subject to competitive pricing (El-

Qorchi, 2005). The Accounting and Auditing Organization of Islamic

Finance Institutions (AAOIFI) (please refer to chapter 4.5.2.) currently

recognizes different types of sukuks, which are traded on the Scripless

Securities Trading System (SSTS)31

in Malaysia. Only appropriate Islamic

bodies, so-called shariah boards, may adjudicate the shariah compliance of

the terms of any sukuk issuance. Sukuk notes convey equity interest to

(capital market) investors in the form of a call option on partial or complete

ownership of underlying reference assets, including the right to some

calculable rate of return as a share of profit (secondary notes) and the

repayment of the principal amount (primary notes). All three broad types of

Islamic finance transactions (asset, debt, and equity-based) can be reference

assets of such Islamic securities. I distinguish between two broad structures

of sukuk contracts that convey shariah-compliant asset ownership to

investors: either (i) asset originators themselves issue notes backed by

existing Islamic assets, or (ii) the originator sells Islamic assets (and/or the

proceeds thereof) to an unaffiliated SPV, which issues notes with a

put/tender feature to fund the acquisition of assets. The notes are funded by

the proceeds from the underlying assets paid to the SPV as part of the

repurchase obligation by the asset originator. Depending on the claim-

generating asset type of Islamic finance, the SPV acquires ownership rights

on either (i) existing assets within a lease-purchase or sale-repurchase

agreement, or (ii) future assets as equity investor, and structures the

anticipated cash flows from these assets into sukuk payment obligations of

different risk and maturity. These obligations entitle investors to a pro rata

ownership in the SPV and the proceeds generated from the net revenue of a

31 The SSTS is a system operated by the Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM)’s real time gross settlement/deliveryversus- payment system through which sovereign and unlisted corporate bonds are registered, cleared, and settled via the Real-time Electronic Transfer of Funds

and Securities (RENTAS), Malaysia’s scripless book-entry securities trading and funds transfer system. SSTS also maintains securities

accounts for financial institutions.

67

loan, a lease or an investment project. The amount of debt issued is limited

to the value of assets held by the SPV.

Most sukuk issues have been sponsored by sovereign and quasi-sovereign

issuers in Islamic countries. A government-linked SPV would issue

discounted and tradable zero coupon bonds with varying maturities on the

back of Islamically approved assets with pre-fixed terms to maturity.

However, the indemnification of investors in such transactions may not

conform to the shariah prohibition of guaranteed investment income. The

shariah compliance of these bonds has been contested by Islamic scholars on

two grounds: (i) the discount on the issued bonds could be construed as

equating to interest return, and (ii) the guaranteed ex ante profit from a

discounted offer does not exposure investors to investment risk.

Figure 9 -- Simple Sukuk Structure

Sukuk always has one of the following underlying transaction types as a

basis:

68

Mudarabah

Musharakah

Ijarah

Salam

Istisna

Although asset-based (ijarah) sukuks are the most common form of Islamic

securitization, sukuks on other Islamic finance transactions have been

structured as well over the recent past.

Ijarah Sukuks

Are financial obligations, issued by a lessor, and backed primarily by

cash flows from lease receivables from a credit lessee, such as

sovereign governments, regional governments, corporations, and

multilateral lending institutions (Richard, 2006). In the popular sale-

leaseback ijarah sukuk transaction structure (“sale model”), the SPV

holds legal title to the assets, which are leased back to the originator

in return for rental payments (and possibly other cash flows from the

assets depending on the transaction structure) to service payments on

the issued sukuks. The SPV holds a repurchase obligation for a price

equal to the amount of outstanding debt in order to insulate the

transaction from an adverse performance of the underlying assets

(see Figure 10). In the head lease-sublease ijarah sukuk model, the

owner of the assets head leases them to the issuer and rents them

back. Since this arrangement does not include a repurchase

obligation of transferred assets like a sale-leaseback ijarah sukuk, the

credit risk of non-performance by the sub-lessee is usually covered

by a quasi-guarantee on payments due to sukuk note holders. One

69

recent example of such a transaction was the US$250 million sukuk

issued by the Bahrain Monetary Agency International Sukuk Co. in

June 2004 as an unconditional, unsubordinated, unsecured and

general-payment obligation, backed by the full faith and credit of the

Kingdom of Bahrain.32

In this case, the notes are more akin to

guaranteed obligations than to non-recourse, secured obligations of

RMBS or CMBS transactions.33

Figure 10 -- The concept of an Ijarah Sukuk transaction

3.5. Funding operations and Accounts

Islamic retail banking is a very recent phenomenon and fostered by certain newly

established Islamic financial institutions, for example the Islamic Bank of Britain.34

32

The payments to sukuk note holders were serviced by the Kingdom of Bahrain acting through the Ministry of Finance and National

Economy (“sub-lessee”). 33

An alternative guarantee is the purchase of sukuks by the asset originator if the underlying assets fail to perform.

In April 2005, the Dubai Metals and Commodities Centre Authority (DMCC) issued a US$200 million musharaka sukuk (joint venture)

backed by the sale of three residential tower complexes via the Gold Sukuk DMCC transaction. In order to insulate the transaction’s rating from the performance of the underlying assets, DMCC as originator would be required to purchase musharaka units from the issuer

and not the commercial property per se in the case of credit event. 34

In 2004 when the Islamic Bank of Britain (IBB) received authorization by the FSA, it attracted major media attention being the first

fully-fledged Islamic bank in the United Kingdom, after the Al Baraka company gave up its banking license in 1993 (please refer to

2.1.1), and the pioneer in Islamic retail banking business. (Wilson 2007, 421) The company formerly known as “Islamic House of

Britain” was found in 2002 with £14 million start-up capital raised by a private placement in the Gulf, major contributors being the Qatar International Islamic Bank with 49 percent share in initial capital and the Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank which provided resources and

personnel. (Middle East Economic Digest 2004 and Islamic Bank of Britain 2008) In October 2004 the bank became listed on the

Alternative Investment Market of the London Stock Exchange in order to broaden the shareholder base and especially to include more

70

In the following chapters, typical retail banking products like Islamic current,

savings and investment accounts are briefly described.

3.5.1. Current Accounts

Deposits in current accounts are guaranteed loans to the Islamic bank. These

funds are held in trust by the bank and can be used for its operations, as long

as they are in conformity with the Shariah. However these deposits cannot

be invested in profit and loss sharing ventures by the bank (in contrast to

deposits of other accounts, please read below) as this might endanger the

customers’ deposits. As taking of interest is prohibited (please refer to

chapter 1.3.1.), the

depositor receives no remuneration. The money is hold according to either

of the following principles: “Al wadiah” to be translated as trust and

safekeeping (Lewis and Algaoud 2001), “Qard hassan”, to be translated as

good, interest free loan (Gassner and Wackerbeck 2007) or as a benevolent

loan (Lewis and Algaoud 2001).

Basically Islamic banks provide the same services in conjunction with

current accounts like conventional banks. These are, for example, the

execution of bank transfers, the use of automated teller machines (ATMs)

with the help of debit cards or the provision of online banking facilities and

credit cards. Obviously Islamic banks are not entitled to charge interest on

overdraft. In order to compensate this problem, banks might charge a

“penalty charge” which is a lump sum, independent from the amount and

duration of the overdraft. (Gassner and Wackerbeck 2007)

3.5.2. Savings and Investment Accounts

Islamic savings and investment accounts are similar in their nature to their

conventional counterparts. In a savings account the customer makes a

UK investors (Middle East Economic Digest 2004). IBB’s board and management are staffed with Gulf and UK business men who all

have gained extensive working experiences in Bahrain and Qatar before.

71

deposit at the bank and is guaranteed the full repayment plus a small return.

In investment accounts, however, the full repayment is not secured but the

return is usually higher. The major difference between conventional and

Islamic accounts is that the return (if paid) is not fixed in advance, as this

would constitute interest.

For the savings accounts the already mentioned principle of “Al wadiah” can

be extended by a permission, granted by the depositor, that the funds can be

employed at own risk. This guarantees him full return and voluntary profit

sharing in the return generated with the help of his funds. A second

possibility to realize a savings account is to treat the deposits as “Qard

hassan” deposits (please refer to chapter above) while the bank grants

“pecuniary or non-pecuniary benefits”(Lewis and Algaoud 2001).

Investment accounts are realized on the basis of Mudaraba contracts. In this

way the depositors participates in the entrepreneurial risk resulting from the

use of his funds in equity participations. Thereby the bank acts as Mudarib

and the depositor takes the role of the capital provider Raab al mal. The

returns generated are shared, according to an agreement made in advance,

between the bank and the depositor. However in case of a loss, the depositor

risks parts or all of his deposits. (Lewis and Algaoud 2001)

3.5.3. Islamic Credit Cards

An Islamic credit card holder does not pay interest on outstanding debt. The

cardholder pays an upfront fee which represents a part of the total payment

and through this mechanism it is possible to rollover the outstanding debt

balance to the next payment cycle. Some Islamic banks return a part of the

upfront fee to an Islamic card holder if the credit is repaid in time.

The Islamic credit card is based on the principle of Al Bai Bithaman Ajil

(BBA) (deferred payment sale). In other words, the bank issues an interest

free and penalty free credit card. As goods are purchased using this credit

72

card, the bank makes the transaction on behalf of the customer and

simultaneously sells it back to the customer. This credit is payable over a

deferred period through installments within a certain time frame. However,

the BBA principle is sometimes criticized as a two-party transaction that

tries to circumvent Riba. This is because the financing of the credit amount

is normally done based on the bank selling a part of its assets (based on

“cost + margin”). Instead of paying cash to the credit card holder, s/he is

given ‘an overdraft’ facility which can be utilized when paying using the

card.35

Several banks are doing away with this concept and are using Tawarruq

(Commodity Murabaha) and Ijarah instead. In Tawarruq, the relationship

between the issuer (a bank) and borrower (credit card holder) is developed

based on actual sale and purchase of a tangible asset through a third party.

Ijarah is a new principle used where a bank grants financing (the credit

limit) to the holder with an agreed predetermined profit. The holder will then

pay the bank a fee for utilizing the facility. This fee is calculated based on

the total profit amount due (based on the credit limit) minus the percentages

of the unutilized amount.

The most common features of an Islamic credit card in the UK are:

A small fee may be charged annually for the credit card.

Customers may enjoy the value-added benefits of conventional credit

cards e.g. bonus points, gifts, shopping discounts, travel cheques etc.

Customers may need to have some kind of collateral that has been

agreed upon in advance with the financial institution.

A credit limit will be based on the customer’s collateral value.

It may be possible to obtain general Takaful (insurance) coverage.

Some banks may provide other services such as Zakah (welfare

contribution) payment via this credit card.

It may be possible to apply for a supplementary card.

35 Bhattacharya 2007.

73

3.6. Takaful (A Shariah Compliant Insurance Concept)

“Analogue to the development of Islamic banks, Muslim economists have tried to

find a Shariah-compliant alternative to conventional insurance. In this way the so-

called Takaful insurance evolved.” (Zamir Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor 2011) Given

the increasing popularity and the high market growth rates in this segment (10 to 25

percent per annum according to Ayub (2007), the Islamic alternative to

conventional (non-mutual) insurance products will be briefly explained in the

following focusing on the basic concept. In principle Takaful products are

distributed by Islamic banks which either promote their own takaful products or

establish a separate takaful company.

Conventional insurance products are not Shariah-compliant due to the involvement

of Riba, Maisir, Gharar and an “invalid transfer of risk from the insured to the

insurer” (Ayub 2007).

Firstly Riba (please refer to 1.3.1.) is involved as the insurance companies usually

invest the capital in interest-bearing capital market instruments and secondly as

soon as the amount insured is exchanged against the amount of premiums, there

emerges an excess of money on one side, constituting Riba, too. (Ayub 2007)

Furthermore the insurer-insured relationship contradicts with Shariah principles as

“commercial benefit is involved on both sides for an uncertain event” (Ayub 2007),

hence Gharar (please refer to 1.3.2.). Assuming a life insurance one could also

detect elements of Maisir (please refer to 1.3.3.) as the insured person “bets” on the

fact that he is still alive when the insurance contract term ends, so that he can enjoy

the redemption. In other words “the profit of one party is dependent on the loss of

the other” (Ayub 2007).

The Islamic alternative to conventional insurance, called Takaful is based on the

concept of mutuality and a contributory agreement among the insured parties,

similar to conventional mutual insurance models. The International Monetary Fund

(Solé 2007) explains:

74

“Several individuals agree to pool resources with the understanding that in case of

need, each of them is entitled to draw resources from the pool.”

In this way the Takaful concept is based on “shared responsibility, common benefit

and mutual solidarity” (Ayub 2007). The pool mentioned above is a Takaful fund

which might be complemented by savings funds. The Takaful operator (either an

Islamic bank or a Takaful company) manages these funds and receives

remuneration from the premium payers. The mode of operation of the Takaful

insurance depends on the underlying basic transaction (for example Mudaraba or

Wakalah) and the type of insurance (for example property insurance or life

insurance). (Ayub 2007).

To take an example out of Gassner and Wackerbeck (2007), a Takaful insurance

based on a Mudarabah transaction is assumed (please refer to Figure 11). In the first

step the insured persons pay their premiums in the Takaful funds in form of a

donation (called Tabarru concept). The Takaful operator administers these funds

and withdraws resources needed for potential damages of the insured, for Retakaful

premiums for Islamic reinsurer and for distribution costs. The fund and the operator

close a Mudarabah agreement (please refer to 3.1.1.), in which the operator takes

the role of a Mudarib, who is agent of the Takaful funds (Rabb-al-mal), responsible

for the Shariah-compliant investment of the premiums. Consequently the annual

surplus is shared on a predetermined basis between the two parties whereas the

operator distributes parts of the results to the shareholders. In this way the operator

has an incentive to generate positive results and minimize risks. However the

operator has the responsibility to provide for the risk of a loss. Firstly reserves are

accumulated in profitable years and secondly the operator commits to provide

interest-free loans (Qard hassan principle) to the funds to be used for payment in

cases of damage.

75

According to Iqbal a main difference to conventional insurance products is that the

insured person in a Mudarabah Takaful insurance participates in the profits or losses

generated by his/ her funds.

Figure 11 -- Takaful model based on Mudaraba transaction from Gassner and

Wackerbeck (2007)

3.7. Use of Islamic Financing Products and Profitability

On a global base Iqbal and Mirakhor (2007) note that “Murabaha (41 percent) has

been the first choice of Islamic banks, followed by Musharakah (11 percent),

Mudaraba (12 percent), Ijarah (10 percent) and others (26 percent)”.

Being subject to several religious restrictions Islamic finance and banking products

bear generally higher risks. At the same time they should render the same return as

conventional products in order to stay competitive. Given the requirement that every

contract must be based on assets, transaction costs are significantly higher as well as

monitoring costs, especially in equity contracts (Iqbal and Mirakhor 2007).

Consequently it could be assumed that Islamic products and services are more

76

expensive, which might be partially accepted by Muslims who appreciate the

Shariah conformity. According to Gassner and Wackerbeck (2007) empirical

researches have shown that lower competitiveness of this product cannot be proven

and Muslims and non-Muslims alike are increasingly attracted by those offers. For

example a high percentage of Chinese (non-Muslims) in Malaysia buy Islamic

financial products. However other sources indicate that it is very difficult in practice

to measure the performance of Shariah compliant products and the efficiency of

Islamic banks as adequate and transparent benchmarks are missing so far. At

present the LIBOR (London Inter-Bank Offer Rate) is used generally, however it

belongs to the interestbased system. (Iqbal and Mirakhor 2007)

Furthermore it has to be kept

in mind that the industry is

driven by high growth rates

and rising demand whilst

institutions face few market

pressure and competition.

This situation might lead to

unrealistic assessments. In

this way “some levels of

inefficiency is compensated

by the abnormal initial profit

margin” that might erode fast as more banks become active in this Islamic

financing. (Iqbal and Mirakhor 2007) Additionally to the special requirements for

products and services offered by Islamic financial institutions, the latter are

challenged by further specifications resulting from Islam. In this way they have, for

example, to establish a second layer of governance and compensate the lacking

Islamic inter-bank market to manage their liquidity and risks. These aspects will be

discussed in the next chapters.

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IV. GOVERNANCE AND SHARIAH BOARD

4. Governance and Compliance Structure of Islamic

Banks The governance issues in Islamic banking differ substantially from those of the

conventional system. The main difference lies in additional key stakeholders that have to be

considered in everyday operation.

One out of two new stakeholder groups is, according to Algaoud and Lewis (2001), the

Islamic Community. The Islamic bank has an “overriding obligation” (Lewis and Algaoud

2001) to obey Islamic law, being the Shariah. That implies that all products and services

offered have to be strictly Shariah compliant. The ideas of “Amanah” (trust) and

stewardship play important roles in this respect and should guide the operational practice of

every Islamic financial institution. In order to safeguard the compliance with the strict

religious standards, each Islamic financial institution is supposed to have a Shariah

Supervisory Board as defined in chapter 4.2.

The second stakeholder group which is not present in conventional financial institutions

consists of Musharakah and Mudarabah partners (please refer to chapter 3.1.1. and 3.1.2.).

The Islamic bank captures the role of a management or dormant partner in a selected

business venture and has therefore different obligations and risks to bear. These two

stakeholder groups provide “strong justification for an additional layer in the corporate

governance of an Islamic bank” according to Voker Nienhaus (2007), being the Shariah

Supervisory Board.

4.1. Corporate Governance and Shariah Board

From its nature, a bank conducting Islamic finance is subject both to those forms of

regulation which apply to conventional banks (banking supervision, financial

reporting standards and external audit), with due regard to the characteristics of

78

Islamic banks, and also to the review of its compliance with Islamic principles and

rules by the Shariah board, which constitutes a key organ of governance in an

Islamic bank. The Shariah board of a bank is part of the corporate governance

framework. (Racha Ghayad)36

Islamic banks offer Islamic banking products and services (IBS banks) are required

to establish Shariah board /consultants to advise them and to ensure that the

operations and activities of the bank comply with Shariah principles. Each Islamic

bank will have a Shariah board which reviews both proposed new products of the

bank, and the types of transactions into which that bank has entered, to ensure that

they are Shariah-compliant. New products will not be introduced until they are in a

form acceptable of Shariah board.

Shariah board in the past has been composed of Shariah scholars, some of whom

had little knowledge of modern banking and who often could not understand the

language in which transactions were documented. This could be a significant

handicap to the progress of Islamic finance and the development of new products.

There is currently a move to recruit Shariah board members with more experience

of banking and this can only be welcomed.

4.1.1. Shariah Board and Performance of Islamic Banks

The Islamic system imposes important constraints on operation of Islamic

banks and their directors. In fact, added to the governorship exerted by the

board of directors, undertaken very conventionally, the directors of the

Islamic banks are subjected to a second governorship, that of the Shariah

board. In theory, the Islamic bank should not seek the profit at any price

because this last is not an end in itself.

Unlike the directors of the conventional banks, the directors of the Islamic

banks are subjected to important constraints as they do not have a margin of

rather broad work.

36

Paper “Corporate governance and the global performance of Islamic banks” Lebanese University-CNAM, Beirut, Lebanon.

79

In an Islamic bank, the director does not have the autonomy to deploy their

resources in any activity or any sector.

Unlike conventional banks, Islamic banks do not have many instruments on

the secondary market. Also Islamic banks do not have an inter-bank deposits

market to make the excess of short-term liquidity profitable or to meet

immediate requirements in liquidity. In general, they cannot use derived

products and even less the financial lever. Additionally, the leaders can

make only ethical decisions and which ensure the legitimacy and the

acceptability of the organization.

The role of an Islamic bank director is to ensure profit in compliance with

Islamic law. In addition the governorship of an extremely demanding of

board directors with regards to the financial performance, which remainder

it is not easy to reach under such conditions, are subjected to the strict

control of the Shariah Board which is laid out to approve only the

compliance of the banking transactions with the rules of Shariah, without

consideration of the dimension profit required by the leaders.

Which role does the Shariah board play in the operation of Islamic banks?

And what influence does it have on the performance of these banks? I will

discuss in the following chapter.

4.2. The Shariah Supervisory Board

The Shariah Supervisory Board takes a “unique position in the governance structure

of an Islamic Bank”. It acts as a religious supervisory board ensuring that the bank’s

practices and activities do not contradict Islamic ethics. One distinct feature of the

modern Islamic banking movement is the role of the Shariah board, which forms an

integral part of an Islamic bank. A Shariah board monitors the workings of the

Islamic bank and every new transaction that is doubtful from a Shari’ah standpoint

has to be cleared by it. These boards include some of the most respected

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contemporary scholars of Shariah and the opinions of these boards are expressed in

the form of fatwas. In addition, the International Association of Islamic Bankers, an

independent body, supervises the workings of individual Shariah boards while its

Supreme Religious Board studies the fatwas of the Shariah boards of member banks

to determine whether they conform with Shariah.

Shariah law is open to interpretation and Shariah boards often have divergent views

on key Shariah issues. In this regard, there is no practical guide as to what

constitutes an acceptable Islamic financial instrument. A document or structure may

be accepted by one Shariah board but rejected by a different Shariah board.

4.2.1. Shariah Supervisory Board Standards

Until recently there was a lack of unique requirements and standards

regarding the composition, characteristics and functions of Shariah

Supervisory Boards. However as the industry grows, they are increasingly

important in order to create a level playing field for all Islamic financial

institutions. By today, approaches to harmonize essential standards are taken

by the “Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial

Institutions” (abbreviated AAOIFI, please refer to chapter 4.3.2.). An

increasing number of financial insitutions committs to the “Accounting and

Auditing General Standards for Islamic Financial Institutions ” (AAGSIF)

issued by the AAOIFI.

4.2.2. Characteristics of a Shariah Supervisory Board

For every fully-fledged Islamic bank it is obligatory to have a permanent

Shariah Supervisory Board. (Iqbal and Mirakhor 2007) This religious

committee is characterized in three features, being the qualification of its

members, their independence from the financial institution and the binding

nature of its decisions for the respective financial institutions (Zamir Iqbal

and Abbas Mirakhor 2011).

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Qualification

According to the AAOIFI (please refer to 4.3.2.) a Shariah

Supervisory Board should consist of at least three Shariah scholars,

who must have a comprehensive education in legal questions (Fiqh

Mu’amalat, please refer to 1.3.1.) (Zamir Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor

2011). Traditionally the scholars’ reputation in public, achieved by

excellent education and a high position in society, was most decisive

for their appointment (Altundag und Nadia 2005). Today the

financial expertise of the Sharia Supervisory Boards members

becomes increasingly important as they have to assess financial

instruments, products and processes that are becoming more and

more complex (Zamir Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor 2011) there are

currently not more than fifty scholars worldwide who fulfill both of

the prementioned requirements. Often, one Sharia scholar holds

several mandates in various Sharia Supervisory Boards of different

financial institutions and additionally in standard setting

organizations like the AAOIFI. The shortage of adequate Scharia

Scholars hinders the development of this industry as religious

supervision is one of the most important features in Islamic banking.

Consequently Islamic financial insitutions, non-governemental

organizations and governements of certain countries invest heavily in

the education of new Sharia scholars. It is common practice that the

Sharia scholars are appointed by shareholders upon recommendation

of the board of directors. There are no specifications regarding the

duration of a scholar appointment.

Independence

It is essential for the credibility and reputation of the financial

institution within the Muslim community that the Sharia Supervisory

Board is absolutely independent. Therefore its members should

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neither have management positions nor important financial interest

in the company (for instance as a shareholder) in order to avoid

conflicts of interest. (Algaoud und Lewis 2007). The Sharia

Supervisory Board must not be “subject to instruction by

management, board of directors and shareholders” . However the

scholars are mostly employed by the bank and “their remuneration is

proposed by the management and approved by the board” (Iqbal and

Mirakhor 2007). This employment status may affect the required

unbiased opinion.

Binding nature of fatawa

As described later in this chapter the main function of a Shariah

Supervisory Board is to certify that the bank’s products and

processes are compliant with Shariah precepts in order to give

believers the certainty to invest or deposit in accordance with their

faith (Jaffer 2005).The scholars, being experts in Islamic

jurisprudence (Fiqh Mu’amalat) are capable to issue their own

interpretation of Islamic law (Shariah) as described in chapter 1.1.

This “authoritative legal opinion” (Jaffer 2005) of a Shariah

Supervisory Board or single scholars is called “fatwa” (plural form is

“fatawa”) and absolutely binding for the financial institution.

(Algaoud und Lewis 2007) Looking at Islamic banking practice in

Europe, it is appearent that the fatawa are only binding inside the

financial instituion, (i.e. between the Sharia Supervisory Board and

the management) as the legal system in non-Muslim countries does

not rule on Islamic law. (Zamir Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor 2011)

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4.2.3. Functions of a Shariah Supervisory Board

According to Iqbal the Sharia Supervisory Board is “entrusted with

directing, reviewing and supervising the activities of the Islamic financial

institution, in order to ensure compliance with Islamic Shari’a rules and

principles”. These activities are referred to as “Shariah Audit and

Certification” and comprise the issuance of fatawa. The Sharia Supervisory

Board functions can be differentiated between a constitutive and an

alternating or operative function.

The constitutive function

Before a new Islamic bank can start operations, its Sharia

Supervisory Board has to certify the Sharia conformity of all

products and internal processes. Afterwards the scholars should

prepare a report of compliance. (Zamir Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor

2011) This process has to be run only once and is described by Iqbal

and Mirakhor (2007) as “ex-ante Shariah audit”.

The alternating or operative function

Subsequently the running operations of the institution are monitored

and the Sharia Supervisory Board has to “vet all new contracts, audit

new contracts, approve new product developments and overseas the

collection and distribution of Zakat” (please refer to chapter 1.3.4.)

(Algaoud und Lewis 2007). Furthermore it is concerned with the

“disposal of non-Shariah compliant earnings and [the] advise on the

distribution of income or expenses among the bank’s shareholders

and investment account holders” (Iqbal and Mirakhor 2007). The

management has to inform the Sharia Supervisory Board regularly

on activities and should consult it whenever a new product or process

is under development. For daily business, internal employees with

respective knowledge are asked to control the processes and provide

their results to the Sharia scholars. In the annual report of the Islamic

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financial institution, the report of the Shariah Supervisory Board

should be integral part. (Iqbal and Mirakhor 2007) The product

innovation process will be described seperately due to its high

complexity and importance for competitveness and development of

Islamic financial service institutions.

4.2.4. Product Innovation Process

The certification of new products and processes belongs to the most

important processes in an Islamic bank. Natalie Schoon (2011) how the

Shariah Supervisory Board can be integrated in the product innovation

process. (Please refer to table-3).

Structuring

Product

In-house

Product/concept

Approval from

SSB

Legal

Document-

tation

Internal

Sharia

Review

SSB

review Finalise

Table-3 Shariah approval process for a new product orstructure,

Natalie Schoon (2011)

In the first step the management or the respective operative entity develops a

rough outline of the new financial product or internal process. The drafted

structure is then presented to the Shariah Supervisory Board which examines

and fundamentally approves the basic structure. After this first hurdle is

taken, business experts can refine the concept and a jurist is contracted to

prepare necessary papers. Subsequently the final product or process

description is handed over to the Shariah Supervisory Board which proceeds

with the detailed analysis. If applicable it gives recommendations for

improvement which should be incorporated before the fatwa – constituting

the final certification- is issued. If the Shariah Supervisory Board is not

content with the business experts’ proposals the process is repeated several

times.

85

Consequently the period for product development is considerably longer for

Islamic banks compared to their conventional competitors. This fact is

amplified by the small number and high work load of available Shariah

scholars. Both constitute a bottleneck factor for the growth of Islamic

financial institutions and leads to a disadvantage in competition with

conventional banks.

However the vetting and auditing of new products and processes is essential

for credibility and marketing. (Natalie Schoon 2011)

In search of measures for improvement, Islamic banks hire special Sharia

consultants or advisers who are involved in product and process

development. They identify critical issues beforehand and shorten the

process considerably. (Natalie Schoon 2011) Notably many London law

firms advise on Islamic financing techniques and new market entrants rely

on their expertise, experience and well-established contacts to financial

institutions in Muslim countries. (Baba 2007)

4.2.5. Shariah Board and Profit

As I previously mentioned, the main objective of an Islamic bank is to offer

banking services according to Islamic law. Therefore, the presence of

Shariah board is so essential to control bank transactions.

The Islamic doctrines encourage man to adopt a positive attitude in regard to

the profit; Islam encourages the true profit as an output of the

entrepreneurial effort and the financial capital. According to the Islamic

definition, a true profit, i.e., conforms to Shariah. For the Shariah board, the

organizational performance is measured by the respect of the principles of

Islamic law by the bank directors. Therefore, profit must be generated with

full respect of Shariah rules. The bank directors do not have, therefore, any

86

interest to present transactions which generate incomes coming from Riba.

As it has been observed, Shariah and profit are quite compatible. These

directors of Islamic bank had called upon the specialists in Islamic

jurisprudence to help them to develop financial products and single

investments not only adapted to ensure the needs of the extremely

demanding and increasingly sophisticated clients, but also compatible with

the prohibition of the interest.

In this division of competence, economic calculation and the profit concerns

are allocated to the directors and the appreciation of the licit character of this

profit is allocated to the Shariah board. The members of Shariah board are

increasingly conscious of the challenges and pressures to which the leaders

are subjected.

It has been observed, that in the early stages of Islamic banking, the

membership of Shariah board was a serious handicap for the directors of the

Islamic banks. Directors and members of Shariah board did not speak the

same language. The members of the Shari’a board were not very specialized

in the fields other than Shariah, which was contrary the directorship in the

Shariah. Therefore, having regular periodical meetings between the Shariah

supervisory board and the management of the bank is preferred not only by

the Shariah advisers but also by the management of the bank. It could be that

in this way, the bank will only present the cases that they think require

deliberation. In other words, the bank can shortlist the issues of discussion.

This could be very problematic if the bank management fails to disclose

cases of practices that they think to be non-Shariah compliant in their

banking operations. The other possible reason that is perhaps the most likely

is that many, if not most, of the Shariah advisers are not full-time Shariah

advisers to the bank.

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Accordind to Racha Ghayad it is advised that Islamic bank must have

Shariah advisors board with a good knowledge in finance to help the

management of the bank to develop a new products in accordance with

Shariah rules. In order to achieve better corporate governance in Islamic

banks, it has been proposed to broaden the scope of investment account

holder (IAH) represented in the board of the bank. Because, IAH share risks

so they should have a seat in the board.

4.2.6. Inconsistency of Fatawa

In absence of global standardization and of a superior national or

supranational Shariah Supervisory Board it is possible that fatawa of

different Shariah Supervisory Boards on the same financial product are

inconsistent. This leads to the scenario that for example the same transaction

is prohibited by the Shariah Supervisory Board of the Islamic bank A but

certified – and therefore declared admissible – by the Shariah Supervisory

Board of Islamic bank B. (see example in Gassner and Wackerbeck 2007).

In consequence decision-making within the industry is inefficient as efforts

are duplicated and standards are missing. (Iqbal and Mirakhor 2007) Thanks

to improved transparency of issued fatawa (for example in the internet) and

active exchange between Sharia scholars, it becomes more common to

consider old fatawa in decision processes. (Natalie Schoon 2011) However

an extensive harmonization of fatawa cannot be expected. This would

contradict the Islamic idea that every men has to interpret the Holy Qur’an

and the Shariah in his own (imperfect) way as no common interpretation

exists. (Iqbal 2001)

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4.3. Regulatory Framework

Even though the Islamic banking and finance sector expanded rapidly over recent

decades it is still in its infancy. In Western and Islamic countries Islamic banks are

still a minority compared to conventional banks, expect Iran, Sudan and Pakistan

where the whole financial sector is Islamized. (Brown, Hassan and Skully 2007)

Consequently Islamic banks’ efficiency is constrained, among others, by lacking

industry-wide standards and regulations as well as by disadvantages in the tax

treatment of their products in Western legislations (for example the double stamp

duty). It is one of the most important tasks ahead to create adequate legal, regulatory

and tax frameworks to contribute to the further development of this industry. In

addition to national legislators, non-governmental agencies like the AAOIFI and the

IFSB (please refer to the chapter below) invest considerable efforts in order to foster

standardization and harmonization. These approaches are important in order to

enhance the comparability between Islamic banks and their competitive position

regarding conventional banks. (Iqbal and Mirakhor 2011)

4.3.1. Standardization and Harmonization

The two most important standard setting organizations in Islamic finance

and banking sector are the “Accounting and Auditing Organization for

Islamic Financial Institutions” (AAOIFI) and the “Islamic Financial

Services Board” (IFSB). Islamic financial institutions are not forced to adapt

the standards, guidelines and concepts issued by both organizations.

However regulatory and supervisory agencies in many Muslim countries

have aligned their laws and standards according to their publications

(Gassner and Wackerbeck 2007). Furthermore they are used on a voluntary

basis by Western fully-fledged Islamic Banks like the European Islamic

Investment Bank and Islamic Windows in conventional Western banks like

the HSBC Amanah.

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4.3.2. AAOIFI

The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions

(AAOIFI) is an international Islamic non-profit body that was found in 1991

in Bahrain based on an agreement signed in 1989 by large financial

institutions from Middle East37

. AAOIFI’s objectives are to “develop,

disseminate (through training, seminars, publication of periodical

newsletters), interpret, review and amend accounting and auditing standards

for Islamic financial institutions”. In this way the confidence from consumer

side should be improved.

So far the organization has issued about fifty-six standards in accounting,

auditing, governance, ethics and Shariah compliance for Islamic financial

institutions. Furthermore the AAOIFI carries out professional qualification

programs (for example the Sharia Adviser and Auditor “CSAA”) to

“enhance the industry’s human resource base” (AAOIFI[1] 2006-2007)

AAOIFI’s members comprise currently about 150 financial institutions in

thirty countries

(Natalie Schoon 2011and AAOIFI[4] 2006-2007) as well as regulatory and

supervisory authorities (for example central banks or monetary agencies),

organizations and associations responsible for regulating the accouting and

auditing profession and “supporting members” who “already have or intend

to have relations with Islamic financial institutions’ products” (AAOIFI[3]

2006-2007).

4.3.3. IFSB

Another international organization dedicated to standardization in the

Islamic financial industry is the “Islamic Financial Services Board” (IFSB)

found in 2002 in Kuala Lumpur. (IFSB[1] 2008) The IFSB works in close

37 The institutions involved were the Islamic Development Bank (Saudi Arabia) , the Al Baraka Banking Group (Bahrain), Dar Al Mal

Al Islami (Switzerland) , the Al Rajhi Banking and Investment Corporation (Saudi Arabia), the Kuwait Finance House (Kuwait) and

Bukhari Capital (Malaysia). (AAOIFI[3] 2006-2007)

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cooperation with international associations of bank and capital market

supervisors, for example the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. In

principle it adapts the existing standards and guidelines of these

international associations and adjusts them according to the particularities of

Islamic financial institutions. So far the institution has issued seven

standards, guidelines and technical notes for instance on the areas of risk

management, capital adequacy, corporate governance, transparency and

market discipline and recognition of ratings. (IFSB[2] 2008) In particular the

IFSB strives towards the determination of uniform criteria to identify23 The

institutions involved were the Islamic Development Bank (Saudi Arabia) ,

the Al Baraka Banking Group (Bahrain), Dar Al Mal Al Islami

(Switzerland) , the Al Rajhi Banking and Investment Corporation (Saudi

Arabia), the Kuwait Finance House (Kuwait) and Bukhari Capital

(Malaysia). (AAOIFI[3] 2006-2007) measure, manage and publish risks of

financial institutions. (Gassner and Wackerbeck 2007) By the end of Januar

2008, the IFSB counted 150 members including the International Monetary

Fund, the World Bank, the Bank for International Settlement as well as

several market players in twenty-nine countries. (IFSB[2] 2008)

4.3.4. Regulation

Islamic financial institutions compete in all countries with conventional

banks (except Iran, Sudan and Pakistan38

). The conventional competitors

outnumber the Islamic financial institutions and regulations are “generally

aligned to the conventional system” (Brown, Hassan and Skully 2007). This

leads to disadvantages for Islamic financial institutions and Shariah

compliant products, for instance to unfavorable in tax treatment of their

products or to difficulties in refinancing. “Several studies indicated that

these regulations influence the operational performance of Islamic banks

significantly” (Gassner and Wackerbeck 2007). Consequently it is

38 Iran, Sudan and Pakistan have fully Islamized their financial sectors.

91

questionable whether both conventional and Islamic institutions should be

subject to the same regulatory frameworks as their business models differ

substantially.

Some countries like Malaysia, Bahrain and notably the United Kingdom

actively support the improvement of regulatory conditions for Islamic

financial institutions from a national quarter. (Natalie Schoon 2011)

4.3.5. Accounting, Reporting and Zakat

Referring to chapter 4.3.2. it can be stated that generally accepted

accounting and reporting standards are missing. Despite the fact that many

Islamic financial institutions align their systems by now with the standards

issued by AAOIFI, the majority of them reports additionally according to

conventional standards, for example IFRS. This leads to confusion and

problems, due to operational differences in Islamic banking business. In this

way the calculation of key figures such as the results generated with certain

Islamic financing activities is very difficult. The treatment depends very

much on the basic Islamic concept applied in the respective financing

technique and “the same products can affect the balance sheet and profit and

loss statement of an institution in completely different ways.” (Gassner and

Wackerbeck 2007) Another problem constitutes the reporting of additional

risks comprised in active Islamic financing techniques.

Furthermore the Islamic finance and banking concept requires additional

duties of disclosure, such as the reporting on the Shariah conformity of its

products (please refer to chapter 4.2.) and the information necessary to

calculate and pay Zakat (please refer to 1.3.4.). Uniform Zakat regulations

are not in place, yet leading to a distortion of competition.

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V. ISLAM AND MANAGEMENT

5. Management from Islamic Perspective

Management is evaluated according to technical ability, leadership, administrative

capability, ability to plan and respond to changing circumstances and also willingness to

serve the legitimate needs of the community. All these factors should be considered in

Islamic financial institutions. Given the complexity of many Islamic banks’ operations,

monitoring of investment projects, managing the assets at times, legal uncertainties relating

to the Shariah litigation system, control of risks and validation of contracts play a vital role

in the effective management of operational risks.

The Islamic approach to management is an emerging discipline. Often referred to as Islamic

management, it views the management of organizations from the perspective of Islamic

sources of knowledge, and results in applications that are compatible with Islamic beliefs

and practices. Muslim workers derive their motivation from their religious and cultural

heritage; thus, any approach to motivation that ignores this will not be successful. The

Prophet (pbuh)39

taught that every human endeavor is an act of worship and charity. For a

Muslim, working is a form of worship of his Lord, and this in itself is a powerful motivator,

irrespective of any material gain. (Ahmad, 2006) Overall, the study of leadership from the

Islamic perspective is still in its infancy, compared with more the advanced research

conducted in Western countries. However, how is managerial leadership defined from

Islamic perspective?

39

Peace be upon him

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5.1. Managerial Leadership: An Islamic Perspective

Allah (Swt)40

has created mankind with noble objective that people would lead their

lives in peace and harmony following the tenets of His revelations sent down

through Prophets from time to time since the very beginning of the society.

Leadership is one of the core corners in our social activities (Patwary, 2003). It

refers to a process of influencing and supporting others to work enthusiastically

toward achieving objective (Koontz, 1994). It is a major factor for the success of

any organization whether it is small or large, formal or informal. An effective leader

is a must for attaining success in family life, business concern, government and

political parties. Classically, managerial leadership is an approach of getting things

done through others most effectively and efficiently in an organization. In view of

Islam, leader is a member of a team who is given a certain rank and is expected to

perform in a manner consistent with it. A leader leads a group who is expected to

exercise influence in forming and accomplishing the ethical goals and objectives.

The success of a leader is dependent on team building that leads to team spirit.

Islam does not permit any Muslim to live without having a leader in any situation

even if they are on a trip or in a desert. The primary duties of a leader are to lead the

people in offering prayers, to look after their interest with justice and run their

activities in a disciplined and systematic way (Ahmad, 2006). However, an Islamic

managerial leader will serve his followers or subordinates under some distinctive

principles, out of which some distinct operational principles are mentioned below

(Ather and Sobhani 2008):

Shura

Managerial leaders in Islam must consult with their people before

making any decision. It is also the fundamental aspect of democratic

system. Managers in an organization must consult with their

subordinates in formulating any strategy or policy. Allah (Swt)

40

SWT is from Arabic meaning "subhanu wa ta'ala" which translates as "Glorified and Exalted".

94

directed his Prophet (Sm) to consult with his companions. Allah says

“And those who have answered the call of their lord and establish

prayer and who conduct their affairs by consultation and spend out

what we bestow on them for sustenance.”41

Allah also says “And by the mercy of Allah, you dealt with them

gently. And had you been severe or harsh-hearted, they would have

broken away from about you; so pass over (their faults), and ask for

(Allah’s) forgiveness for them; and consult with them in affairs.

Then when you have made a decision, put your trust in Allah.”42

Freedom of Thought

Islam encourages freedom of thought. Practicing managers or

executives should create such an environment in the organization so

that the staff members can easily opine on any issue. The Four

Khalifs of Islam considered this as an essential element of their

leadership (Patwary, 2003). Hazrat Umar (R) praised Allah (Swt)

that there were people in the Ummah who would correct him if he

went astray.

Sources of Islamic Jurisprudence

There are four sources of Islamic Jurisprudence. These are: Quran,

Hadith, Izmah, and Kias. In managing any activity, the managers

first look to its hints for solution from the Holy Quran. If hints are

not available, he should give a second search of Hadith. Again if the

solutions are not found in Hadiths, he should look to Izmah and Kias

of recognized religiously learned persons and his good conscience.

41 Surah Al Shura, Verse-38 42 Surah Al-Imran, Verse-159

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Justice

The management leaders must behave with team members justly and

fairly without any discrimination regardless of their race, color or

religion. Islam always urges for doing justice to all. The Qur’an

commands Muslims to be fair and just in any circumstances even if

the verdict goes against their parents or themselves. Allah says “O

you, who believe! Stand out firmly for justice, as witness to Allah,

even as against yourselves or your parents or your kin and whether it

be against rich or poor, for Allah protects both”43

.

Dependence on Allah

The managerial leaders in Islam must depend on Almighty Allah

(Swt) for the outcome of any action. It is known in Islam as

Tawakkul. Allah asked his believers to depend on Him. Allah says, “

….when you have made a decision, put your trust in Allah, certainly,

Allah loves those who put their trust (in Him)”44

. However,

dependence on Him without any endeavors is not supported by

Islam. The mangers must prepare managerial plans and policies in

order to achieve the rational (halal) objectives. But he must depend

on Allah (Swt) for the success of his plan.

Accountability

Islam teaches accountability as vital component of management. The

managers must be accountable for their duties and responsibilities to

the Board of Directors. The Board must be accountable to the

beneficiaries or stakeholders. According to Islam, each and every

human being will be made responsible for his good or bad deeds and

accordingly he will be rewarded or punished. Allah says

43 Surah An-Nisa, Verse-135 44 Surah Al-Imran, Verse-159

96

“…whosoever does good equal to the weight of an atom (or a small

ant) shall see it. And whosoever does evil equal to the weight of an

atom (or a small ant) shall see it.”45

Sincerity

An Islamic managerial leader must be sincere enough to achieve the

objectives of an organization. The Qur’anic terminology of sincerity

is Khulusiat. The Holy Quran urges people to be utmost sincere in

his praying, meditations, and good deeds.

Dignity of Labor

Islamic leaders must recognize the dignity of labor. Mohammad

(Sm) says, “Pay the wages to the labor before his sweat dries up” (Al

Hadith). Islam pointed out that earning as the best, which is earned

by the toil of the labor. Hence, practicing managers should duly

recognize the dignity of all categories of efforts especially physical

labor of the workers and employees.

Esprit de corps

The managerial leaders must try to achieve organizational goals and

objectives with team rather than individual endeavors. The highest

level of unity should be maintained among the executives, staff and

workers for motivating and energizing team works. Islam encourages

esprit de corps i.e. team efforts. Prophet Mohammad (Sm) says “The

Hand of Allah is with the Jama’ah (team)” (Sunon Al Tirmidhi).

(Ather, 2006)

45 Surah Az-Zilzal,Verse- 7-8

97

5.1.1. Team Building Under Islamic Leadership

A team is not a random collection of individuals with different agenda. A

dozen of individuals in a restaurant by random chance are not a group

although they may be interacting, have a common goal of eating and

drinking and be aware of each other. Teamwork does not just happen. It has

to be organized and nourished through effective leadership and management

(Altalib, H., 1991). Working together with team spirit is an Islamic

directive. It is said in Hadith “The Hand of Allah is with the team (Jama’ah).

Then, whoever singles himself out (from the Jama’ah) will be singled out for

the Hell Fire” (Sunon Al Tirmidhi). A team from Islamic point of view may

be defined as a group of people under a team leader who work together on a

continuing mission with common (halal) goals and objectives.

Figure 12 -- A Diagram of Team Building under Islamic Leadership

(Ather and Sobhani 2008)

The figure 12 is a diagram where people designate A, B, C, P, Q, X, Y, and

Z are working together under a team leader ‘M’ to achieve organizational

goal considering Islamic values. Here the team members are mutually

98

interactive and connected with their leader. The goal is accomplished

through specific and defined tasks that may be simultaneous or sequential

and may change from time to time. A large team may be divided into sub-

teams. Everyone in the team is expected to take responsibility for the

success of the team as a whole. The work and performance of each member

and of the whole team must relate to clearly defined objective. While each

team member contributes particular skills and knowledge, the team as a

whole, as well as each member, is responsible for the task on which it is

focused. (Ather and Sobhani 2008)

5.1.2. Islamic Model of Managerial Leadership

A model has got lot of significance. It pictorially represents something for

better understanding and communication of thoughts and ideas, which has

got ever lasting impressions in the readers mind. Therefore, the authors

believe that without developing a model the research on ‘Managerial

Leadership: An Islamic Perspective’ cannot be well conveyed and

convincing to the interested groups. Hence it is rationally justified to

develop the following model.

Figure 13 -- Model of Managerial Leadership from Islamic Perspective

(Ather and Sobhani 2008)

99

Explanation of the Model

On the bases of previous discussions, concepts and facets of Islamic

Leadership, a Model of Managerial Leadership from Islamic

Perspective has been developed (see Figure 13). Basic three elements

of leadership as shown in the model are: Organization, Leaders and

Followers. Leaders will take decisions consulting with the followers.

Leaders will act, as both the servant and guardian leadership while

the followers will show dynamism in their participation and action.

Leaders will be gentle to the followers and they should never be

harsh with them. Leaders must pass over followers’ faults, if any,

and ask for Allah’s forgiveness. They must consult followers when

necessary.

After consulting leaders must decide and put trust in Allah (Swt).

The role of followers in Islamic leadership process will be positive.

They will act as observers of men, women and things. They must be

cooperative with their leaders. They provide necessary suggestions to

their leaders thus contributing to decision-making. They also warn

their leaders for their actions if necessary. The followers must

withdraw their support if and when the leaders are seen deviating

from the right path of Islam (Anisuzzman, 1996). Thus they will play

the role of dynamic rather than blind followership.

The functions and operations of the organization must be guided and

controlled by the rules of Islamic Shariah i.e. Qur‘an, Hadith, Izma

and Qias. Nothing will be considered which is not supported by

Islamic Shariah. The leaders and followers both will be accountable

for their responsibilities to the organization and Allah (Swt) as well.

The objectives of Islamic leadership include both mundane welfare

and eternal bliss. The ultimate objective of the Islamic Leadership

100

will be attaining satisfaction of Allah (Swt) through fulfillment of

organizational rational (halal) objectives.

Box-3 Reaserch study Islamic perspectives on conflict management within

project managed environments46

Kasim Randeree a, Awsam Taha El Faramawy

b

aBT Centre for Major Programme Management, Saı¨d Business School, University of Oxford, Park End Street,

Oxford, OX1 1HP, United Kingdom, bM.A. Al Kharafi & Sons, United Arab Emirates (2010)

The research study set out with the objectives to address questions proposed: (a) Is there is an

Islamic conflict intervention model available for project managers to implement in their workplace?

(b) Is such a model beneficial and can it be implemented by project managers and individuals with

non-Islamic backgrounds?

The Islamic approach to conflict management is derived from the major principles and values of

Islam as a religion, such as justice (Randeree, 2008), equality, freedom, and affirmative critical and

goal oriented thinking (Abdalla, 2001; Al-Buraey, 2001; Khadra, 1990; Yousef, 2000). Leadership

has a vital impact on effective conflict management from an Islamic viewpoint. In the case of the

project manager, the leadership role includes resolving conflict (Khadra, 1990; Randeree and

Chaudhry, 2007).

The nature of Islam as an adaptive method of thinking allows individuals to implement several

techniques to cope with conflict even if such techniques are imported from western cultures unless

such styles contradict with Islamic values and principles (Abdalla, 2001; Al-Buraey, 2001; Khadra,

1990; Yousef, 2000).

Ali (1996) reflects that from an Islamic perspective, conflict is characteristic of an unhealthy

situation as it is a threat to cohesiveness and conformity of the group, adding that, it may be reduced

by openness in dealing with subjects; it is avoidable by expressing concerns through strong-willed

debate, consequently reinforcing consensus. He further states that debating issues over which there

is conflict is necessary for group benefit and that differences in ideas should be respected. Conflict

can thus become a foundation for positive change, and can lead to the voicing of concerns to

46

Available online at www.sciencedirect.com -- International Journal of Project Management 29 (2011) 26–32

www.elsevier.com/locate/ijproman

101

increase awareness which is important to avoid stagnation. Thus, the concept of change is a positive

one in an Islamic connotation, where change is goal oriented and is a continuous and normal

process (Ali, 1996;

Al-Buraey, 2001).

There are different drivers that provoke change and once the environment is ready for change it is

time for people to act. People, however, are not passive actors; rather people are proactive in

directing change in a way that serves their own or the project’s interests. Therefore, change should

be planned, managed, and monitored by all stakeholders (Ali, 1996; Al-Buraey, 2001). Existing

research provides conceptual Islamic models of conflict management, three of which are tested

empirically here, following the viewpoint conceded by established research that change is a key

factor in conflicts, and pertinently the cause or effect or both.

The SALAM model

Fig. 1 illustrates the SALAM model which prescribes the starting point by stating the conflict view

(S), which means that the disagreement is defined obviously to all parties part of the conflict. Here

the conflict nature, source, and size are to be stated clearly. Subsequently the participating parties

agree (A) that a disagreement exists without making any judgment and by disregarding any

personal

Fig. 14 -- SALAM model

bias. Thereon the listen and learn (L) process

between parties is aimed for, which is denoted

as the most demanding part of the model. In

this model the parties listen to others points of

view to learn about the disagreement. This step

can be effectively practiced through swapping

the positions, whereby, implicitly each party

adopts the other’s position and defends the idea

in a consulting environment. Such conflict

environment will foster advising (A) one another by finding a common area that both share as a

ground for conflict management. In addition, after agreement about the intervention, one party may

propose to assist the other(s) in a proactive behavior that facilitates implementing the intervention

and fosters a collaborative environment. Idealistically, consequently by minimizing (M) aspects of

possible conflict through proactive debate, destructive conflict sources could be thus eliminated

(Ahmed, 2007).

The S.N.T model

The S.N.T model is a proactive process that fosters constructive conflicts. Avoiding conflict in the

102

S.N.T model does not refer to conflict ignorance; rather it presents ways to enrich favorable

conflicts. The “S” stands for a key principle in the Islamic religion which is ‘Shura’, or

consultation, implying consulting others before implementing any change. Such an approach

minimizes disagreement between stakeholder parties and enables fostering a conducive

environment for change. The second principle is ‘Naseeha’ “N” which means advice. In a project

context, advice can be offered to all stakeholders, with feedback to project managers and clients

providing clarity about changes. Sincere advice and viewpoint exchange between parties fosters

common understanding of consequences of the change. The last element ‘Ta’awun’ denoted by

“T”, indicating cooperation which is essential for the change process, to promote healthy

communication, reduce change opponents, and eliminate hostile workplace environment (Ahmed,

2007).

Conclusions of the research

The literature review has indicated existence of pervasive Islamic style conflict management

models with potential for application by project managers. The Islamic models as the proactive,

S.N.T and SALAM are pure Islamic approaches to handle conflict.

Overall, the study of leadership from the Islamic perspective is still in its infancy,

compared with more the advanced research conducted in Western countries.

Conventional management studies have made rapid strides during more than a

century of its existence. Attention to working on Islamic perspectives is a later

development and as yet remains a relatively unexplored field of research work.

Studies done till now are more of a tentative, descriptive type and do not yield much

scope for future directions for research. A start has yet to be made in the real sense.

5.2. IF Asset Management

The last decade has seen increasing demand for shariah compliant asset

management from institutional and private clients in the GCC47

, partly driven by the

rapid rise in the region’s wealth, but also by the increasing number and breadth of

asset classes now available for Islamic investors. International banks, notably

HSBC, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, UBS and Standard Chartered have seized the

47 Gulf Cooperation Council. Economic cooperation between Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

103

opportunity to adapt their existing asset management services to the needs of

Islamic investors, and have appointed their own boards of shariah scholars to assure

their clients that they are indeed Shariah compliant. This has been a learning

experience for the banks themselves as well as the Islamic investors, the former

learning about shariah principles, while the latter have learnt about asset

management options and the implications for portfolios of the trade-off between

risk and returns.

Asset management encompasses both fund management and discretionary portfolio

services for institutions and individuals of high net worth. For private banking

clients, this may involve the management of trusts, established for tax or inheritance

reasons. Shariah compliance in all of these areas poses interesting, but usually

solvable, challenges. Fund management is a good starting point, as over 100 shariah

compliant funds are available for retail investors in the Gulf, but treasury, wealth

management and investment portfolio services, including the holding of Islamic

sukuk securities, will also be reviewed in this chapter, as these are crucial for both

private and corporate clients in the GCC.

5.2.1. Shariah Compliant Fund Management

Funds offer major advantage for investors who wish to have shariah

compliant asset holdings as a shariah board is usually accountable for the

criteria governing the portfolio selection and in the case of equities, the

actual stock included. Muslim investors who purchase stock directly through

a broker or invest in other types of assets such as commercial property can

have no guarantee that their money is being utilised for halal purposes,

unless they had the resources to engage personal shariah advisors to monitor

all their investments. Few, other than high net worth investors, could

contemplate such an approach, and in practice it is ruled out, not only on

grounds of cost, but because it would delay investment decisions, and

104

undermine potential gains in financial markets where timing is crucial for

success. In contrast, fund managers can operate within known parameters

that are established by the shariah boards of the institutions in which they

are employed.

Unfortunately, none of the major specialized fund management providers

such as Fidelity or Jupiter offer shariah compliant funds, most at present

being offered by Islamic banks or conventional banks providing shariah

compliant products. In these cases, it is the shariah boards of the banks that

have the responsibility to audit the funds offered, their remit being to

approve new product offerings and monitor the operation of existing funds,

especially their purchase of equities and other financial assets. This requires

different skills and experience however to those needed to audit Islamic

banking activities. The task of shariah auditing consists in the authentication

of the Islamic products to ensure they are compatible with the traditional

contracts used in fiqh jurisprudence. In contrast, most funds comprise

financial instruments such as equities that were unknown under shariah,

although now regarded as conditionally permissible on the grounds that all

instruments are allowed unless explicitly forbidden. Equities are not

forbidden, as there are simply no references to such instruments in historical

fiqh texts, the emphasis instead being on partnership contracts such as

mudarabah and musharakah that have quite different financial and legal

characteristics.

Rather than relying on bank shariah board to authenticate assets as halal, the

task can be outsourced. The Dow Jones Islamic Indices provide such a

service, as when compiling their indices they have to exclude stock that is

not shariah compliant. This information can therefore be shared with clients

for a fee, as it is of commercial value to fund managers who are seeking to

market their products to pious Muslim investors. It is therefore the shariah

105

board of the Dow Jones Islamic Indices who are responsible to ensure the

investments are halal, but as specialists in this area of finance, with almost a

decade of experience, they are arguably better qualified to act than a bank’s

shariah board that has little knowledge of stock selection criteria. Of course

Dow Jones Islamic Market Indices does not have a monopoly in this area, as

there are also the Financial Times Islamic Indices, and the specialist

provider of shariah financial solutions, Yasaar Limited of Dubai and

London, has expertise in this area through its access to leading scholars who

undertake work on a free-lance basis.

5.2.2. Islamic Fund Management Structure

The general fund management structure is shown in Figure 15. The fund

investors are generally known as the rabb al mal, or the providers of capital.

The relationship between the investors and the fund is based on a

Mudarabah (see chapter 3.1.1.) or Wakalah (see chapter 3.1.4.) contract in

which the fund manager is either the Mudarib or business manager, who

provides investment knowledge, expertise and experience or, in cases where

the fund management contract is based on a wakalah contract, the wakil or

agent. When it comes to the investment processhowever, the fund manager

takes on the role of the capital provider on behalf of the fund unit holders.

106

Figure 15 -- Islamic Asset Management Structure (own illustration)

5.2.3. Asset Management Company Structure

Funds have a variety of associated parties, which vary marginally depending

on the type and the jurisdiction in which they are based. A generic structure

is defined in Figure 16, which demonstrates that the structure of Shariah

compliant asset management is almost identical to that of its conventional

equivalent but with one major difference. In order to ensure Shariah

compliance of the funds, a Shariah supervisory board is part of the structure.

(Please refer to chapter 4.2.)

Where a Shariah compliant fund is part of a conventional bank or asset

manager48

or an Islamic bank, the fund platform tends to have its own

Shariah supervisory board. For a Shariah compliant vehicle that is part of a

conventional institution, the Shariah supervisory board is typically

specifically appointed for the fund or fund platform. Where the fund is part

of an Islamic financial institution, there are three options:

48

Each fund is managed by a dedicated asset manager whose responsibility it is to ensure the monies are invested in the most efficient

and effective way given the fund’s investment mandate.

107

1. The fund’s compliance is included in the overall Shariah

compliance of the institution which is catered for by the

institution’s Shariah supervisory board.

2. The fund’s compliance is segregated from the institution’s

but the fund’s Shariah supervisory board consists of (a

subset of ) the same members as the parent company.

3. The fund’s compliance is fully segregated from the

institution and the fund appoints its own Shariah

supervisory board.

Figure 16 -- Asset management organization (own illustration)

The organization structure outlined in figure 15 above identifies a variety of

roles and responsibilities which are designed and structured in such a way as

to ensure segregation of duties and appropriate corporate governance and to

avoid conflict interest.

5.2.4. The Islamic Fund Market

As of the end of 2009, the number of funds listed in the Eurekahedge49

database was nearing 700 with reported assets of just under $50 billion.

Taking into consideration the fact that around 20 per cent of the funds do not

disclose their assets under management, the total assets is estimated to be

around $70 billion. This implies an average size in assets under management

of $100 million which, in comparison with the conventional fund market, is

49 http://www.eurekahedge.com/news/07_nov_IFN_shariah_governed_asset_management.asp

108

particularly small. In comparison, the Lipper50

database contains in excess of

200,000 funds operating globally.

Out of the funds that report their assets under management, the majority

hold assets below $50 million. Only very few funds hold assets under

management in excess of $ 500 million, the amount which for conventional

funds is deemed to be benchmark size.

Figure 17 -- Average assets under management (own illustration)

The geographic investment mandate of the majority of shariah-compliant

funds focuses on Asia, the Middle East51

and Africa or has a global mandate.

50 http://www.lipperweb.com/default.aspx 51 Eurekahedge: There is a wide variety of asset managers operating and investing in the Middle East. They run the gamut of large

international banks and independent money managers to local entrepreneurial firms that are gaining assets and attention. There is believed to be more than US$15 billion in assets in about 125 Islamic funds worldwide. The asset managers with the highest number of

funds include Wellington Management Co, Pictet & Cie, Worms & CIE/SEDCO, Al Rajhi Banking & Investment and Azzad Asset

Management. Some estimates place the number of funds overall in equities, structured products and real estate at more than 500, including both open and closed funds.

Prominent local financial institutions in the Middle East and Southeast Asia include Dubai Islamic Bank, Global Finance House

(Bahrain), National Commercial Bank (Saudi Arabia), Bank Islam Malaysia and Bahrain Islamic Bank, among many others. Asset management firms active in Shariah fields include international money managers such as Société Générale Asset Management

Alternative Investment and numerous entrepreneurial asset managers in the local markets. Although the Islamic asset management

market has existed for some time, progress has only really occurred in this decade, specifically with advancements in the capital markets, coupled with Middle Eastern and Asian governments updating regulation and formalising greater acceptance of a foreign presence in

their countries. These changes have created a market considered ripe with opportunity, attracting multinational foreign firms.

A few foreign, conventional, multinational firms that focus on the capital market side of the business have extended their participation into Shariah asset management through their firms’ money management divisions active in the capital markets or asset management. Two

notable firms with Shariah-compliant asset management products are HSBC, which works through its Amanah Capital division, and

UBS, which operates under Noriba Bank. Barclays wealth division launched a presence in Dubai in 2007.

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

Below $50 million $50 million - $ 100million

$100 million - $ 500million

In excess of $500million

109

Most funds have a fairly wide remit within which they invest. Few funds

have specific focus on sub-segments such as the gulf cooperation Council

(GCC), or individual countries.

Figure 18 – Islamic Banks geographical investment strategy (own

illustration)

In excess of 65 per cent of the funds listed does not specify a particular

industry, but reports all industries are in scope of the investment mandate.

Generally, the types of fund offered are similar to the ones offered in the

conventional world. The funds are divided into following broad categories:

1. Fixed income funds

2. Lease funds

3. Commodity funds

4. Equity funds

a) Private equity

b) Public equity

c) Equity index funds

5. Real state funds

6. Exchange traded funds

7. Hedge funds

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

NorthAmerica

Global Europe Emergingmarkets

Asia Pacific Middle East& Africa

110

Box-4 How to Invest Today According to Shariah according to

Eurekahedge (2009)

How to Invest Today According to Shariah

Islamic asset management is no different than conventional asset management when it

comes to constructing a portfolio that will have a high probability of achieving an

investor’s goals. To do that, an investor seeking professional investments with competent

fatwa does not need to sacrifice anything: not performance, not transparency and not

pricing.

The process starts by choosing an asset manager who understands Shariah. For many

bankers, the entire concept of socially conscious investing is perfectly acceptable, but the

idea of Shariah-compliant investing is strange and exotic. It is not. Shariah is not rocket

science, understood only by a rare qualified few. It is the guiding principles of a faith

with over a billion adherents. Surely such a popular and common religion does not exist

based on mysteries and secrets. The moral precepts of Shariah are abundantly clear to

anyone who wishes to pick up a copy of the Holy Quran. Bankers unfamiliar with Islam

will find nothing alien in Shariah, in particular when it comes to Shariah compliance of

investment products.

The community of generally accepted Shariah scholars makes it easier for the novice

investment manager to achieve a balanced and professional portfolio allocation. By

choosing assets that have been granted a fatwa by that group of Shariah specialists who

closely follow financial markets, any investor or asset manager can start the process to

assemble a portfolio allocation that meets both Shariah and MPT standards.

All that said, we are living in dangerous times. One major investment company chairman

declared earlier this year that nearly 40% of worldwide wealth had been destroyed by the

global credit crisis. Clearly we have to be careful.

Being careful means diversifying your assets. It means not overloading on any single

asset class, but instead ensuring that your portfolio is carefully constructed with certain

amounts of cash, fixed income, stocks and alternative investments. A typical allocation

111

today for a non-Muslim investor might be 5% in money market investments (cash), 45%

in a diversified mix of bond funds (fixed income), 35% in a globally diversified

allocation of stock funds, and 15% in a mix of real estate funds, hedge funds, commodity

funds and other alternative investments (but no structured products, please!). This

provides no guarantee of outstanding performance in the short-run, but it does guarantee

that your savings are protected from the worst of the swings we have seen in the world

today.

A Muslim investor who wants to achieve the same objectives can do so, as long as he

seeks the aid of a dedicated professional who understands both Shariah compliance and

MPT. Proper security selection can now be made at every level of the allocation

spectrum, from cash to fixed income to stocks to alternative investments, all with

respectable fatwa from notable Shariah scholars. While presently there is a dearth of

professional managers in Islamic asset management sector, with the high demand this

trend is likely to change.

The Shariah asset management industry is small but growing. Shariah investment

products are found most easily on the equity side of the business. The Shariah committee

screens or filters listed securities according to the restrictions and requirements of

Shariah law. Portfolio managers then use the approved list of securities to construct an

investment portfolio. For the bond and derivative asset classes, an entire industry has yet

to be developed, and capital market participants are just gearing up to the market’s

demand for products.

Shariah investing requires trained religious scholars who combine an understanding of

Islamic law with a firm grasp on the financial markets. It is a unique combination,

particularly given the relatively young industry of Shariah investments and a still new

capital market. Global estimates claim that there are about 250 qualified religious

scholars and only about two dozen or so that are internationally known, and who are

therefore coveted to help design and approve investment products. Portfolio managers

must have trades approved by the Shariah committee.

Islamic institutions and governments are now advocating the training of additional

scholars to create a broader base of available and qualified individuals and to create a

future pipeline of scholars. Several have set up funds to develop more scholars.

112

VI. ISLAMIC RISK MANAGEMENT

6. IF Risk Management

Islamic banking is a relatively new concept and its instruments are generally not well

comprehended, neither are their risks. Risk management in Islamic banks deserves special

attention. However, it has many complex issues that need to be better understand. In

particular, the nature of specific risks facing Islamic banks together with the virtually

unlimited number of ways available to them to provide funds through the use of

combinations of the permissible Islamic modes of financing – PLS and non-PLS – raise a

host of issues in risk measurement, income recognition, adequacy of collateral and etc.

Thus, innovative solutions and an appropriate adoption of available risk management are

needed to reflect the special characteristics of Islamic financial products and services.

Several studies have identified weaknesses and vulnerabilities among Islamic banks in the

areas of risk management and governance. Operational risk, which arises due to the failure

of systems, processes, and procedures, is one area of concern. Weak internal control

processes may present operational risks and expose an Islamic bank to potential losses.

Governance issues are equally important for Islamic banks, investors, regulators, and other

stakeholders. The role of Shariah boards brings unique challenges to the governance of

Islamic financial institutions.

6.1. Specific Risk Surrounding Islamic Banks

The features of Islamic banks and the modes of financing that they follow include

special risks that needed to be recognized to help make risk management.52

The PLS

modes of financing raise several important considerations. Specifically, while PLS

modes shift the direct risk of Islamic banks to their investment depositors, they may

also increase the overall degree of risk of the asset side of banks. In practice, PLS

52 Special risks in Islamic banking can be seen in Chapra and Khan (2000).

113

modes make Islamic banks vulnerable to risks normally borne by equity investors

rather than holders of debts. There are a number of reasons for this, including:

The administration of PLS modes is more complex than conventional financing.

These modes imply several activities that are not normally performed by

conventional banks, including the determination of profit / loss sharing ratios on

investment projects in various sectors of the economy, as well as the ongoing

auditing of financed projects to ensure proper governance is doing. Also, there is a

number of activities that Islamic banks can engage in, in addition to a number of

ways they can provide funds through the use of the PLS and non-PLS modes.

When Islamic banks provide funds through their PLS facilities especially in

Mudarabah contract, there is no recognizable default on the part of the entrepreneur

until PLS contracts expire. A default of PLS contracts means that the investment

project failed to deliver what was expected. In this case the low profit or loss is

shared between parties according to stipulated PLS ratios.

Islamic banks have no legal means to control the entrepreneur who manages the

business financed through Mudarabah contracts. This individual has complete

freedom to run the enterprise according to his judgment. Banks are entitled only to

share profit or loss from the agent according to the contract ratio. In Musharakah

and direct investment contracts, banks have better opportunities to monitor the

business because, in these contracts, partners may influence on the enterprise and

use the voting rights.

In Islamic finance PLS modes cannot logically be made with collateral or other

guarantees to reduce credit risk.

The mentioned considerations underline operational risk in Islamic banking.

Operational risk may arise from various sources:

The unique activities that Islamic banks must perform.

The non-standardized nature of some Islamic products.

114

The lack of an efficient and reliable Shariah legislation system to

enforce financial contracts.

Non-PLS modes of financing also carry special risks that need to be recognized.

Specifically, Salam (purchase with deferred delivery) contracts expose Islamic

banks to both credit and commodity price risk. This is because banks agree to buy

the commodity on a future date against current payment and also hold the

commodity until it can be converted to a cash. Similar risk is also involved in Ijarah

(leasing), because this contract do not provide Islamic banks with the ability to

transfer substantial risks and rewards to the lessee as leased assets must be carried

on the balance sheet of banks for the term of the lease.

In the liability side, the specific risk inherent the operations of Islamic banks arise

from the special nature of investment deposit, that is the capital value and rate of

return are not guaranteed. This feature coupled with asymmetric information

resulting from the unrestricted PLS and non-PLS contracts where banks manage

deposit of people at their own discretion.53

This increases the potential of moral

hazard and creates an incentive for risk taking and for operating Islamic financial

institutions without adequate capital.

6.2. General Risk Surrounding Islamic Banks

In addition to the specific risks mentioned above, there are other more general

factors that make the operation of Islamic banks riskier and/or less profitable than

traditional banks. These are:

Lack of risk-hedging instruments. The prohibition against riba and some

fiqh issues in the interpretation of gharar mean that many risk hedging

instruments based on traditional tools, such as option, futures and

forwards are not available to Islamic banks in the current state of Islamic

banking.

53 According to the unrestricted contract, depositors agree that their funds be used by banks at their discretion and they expect to share

with banks the overall profits that the bank may earn.

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Underdeveloped money market and government securities based on

profit – loss sharing. This may difficult to manage the liquidity in term

of mismatching the asset-liquidity and increases the liquidity shocks.

Fortunately, significant progress has been made in Iran for government

securities and short-term instruments such as National Participation

Certificates and Central Bank Musharakah for such issues.

Limited availability to access to lender- of- last resort (LOLR) facilities

by central banks. The lack of Shari’ah-compatible LOLR facilities is

associated to the prohibition of interest and thus discount rate.

Islamic banks have historically been forced to hold a large proportion of

their assets in reserve accounts in central banks or in correspondent

accounts than conventional banks. This has significantly affected their

profitability because central banks give minimum or no return to these

reserves. This in turn, has affected their competitiveness and increases

their potentiality to the external shocks with its consequences.

6.3. Reducing Risks of Islamic Banks

Islamic banks bear considerable risks in providing their products and conducting

their business. These risks include firstly those faced by conventional banks

likewise (for example the credit risk), moreover Islamic banks are often unable to

afford high-cost management information systems or the technology to assess and

monitor risk in a timely fashion. With weak management and lack of proper risk-

monitoring systems, the risk exposure of Islamic banks is high. (Iqbal 2011).

However additionally they are affected by additional risks unique to Islamic banks

“owing their compliance with the Shariah” (Ahmed and Khan 2007).

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Based on the list in Ahmed and Khan (2007) and in comparison with several other

literature sources54

, the most important risk classes for Islamic banks are outlined

below.

6.3.1. Credit Risk

The Credit Risk can be defined as “the potential that the counterparty fails to

meet its obligations in accordance with agreed terms” (IFSB 2005). The

claim for interest paid on overdraft is forbidden, like every form of interest,

and cannot be used to compensate the banks shortfall in payment. Credit risk

can arise, for instance, out of a Murabaha contract (please refer to 3.2.1.)

when the counterparty fails to fulfill the debt. The IFSB defines in its

principle guideline 1 (please refer to 1.3.6.2) a subcategory of credit risk,

being the “Equity Investment Risk”. This relates in particular to the risk

exposure in equity participations in Mudarabah and Musharakah contracts

(please refer to 3.1.1. and 3.1.2.). (Islamic Financial Services Board[2]

2005) The bank is exposed to the risk that the counterparty does not redeem

the shares if due or provides false information about generated profits. In

these cases the bank has little opportunity to counteract. (Ahmed and Khan

2007)

6.3.2. Market Risk

Market risk refers “to the potential impact of adverse price movements on

the economic value of an asset” resulting in a “loss in on- and off-balance

sheet positions” (Islamic Financial Services Board[2] 2005). The systematic

market risk arises out of macro sources. In Islamic Finance and Banking a

typical example is the “mark-up risk” comprised in Murabaha contracts. As

explained banks usually use a benchmark to price their product, for example

the LIBOR.

54 Please refer also to the Risk Management Standard of the Islamic Financial Services Board[2] 2005, Zamir Iqbal and abbas Mirakhor

(2011) Chapter Risk Management.

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However an important prerequisite for the product’s Shariah compliance is

that the mark-up is fixed in advance. Assuming a Murabaha contract over a

longer duration, the benchmark, in this example the LIBOR, may change

significantly whereas the mark-up has to stay the same. (Ahmed and Khan

2007) In this way the bank might be charged higher mark-ups in short-term

liquidity transactions with other banks than it receives.

The unsystematic market risk is asset or instrument specific. All Mudarabah,

Musharakah, Bay Salam and Ijarah (please refer to chapters 3.1.1., 3.1.2.

and 3.2.2.) contracts comprise the commodity/ asset price risk. It emerges

out of the fact that the bank buys a durable asset on behalf of its customers

and might, in case the customer does not fulfill his obligation, be forced to

resell the commodity for the lower price.

6.3.3. Liquidity Risk

In general it is problematic for Islamic banks to “obtain cash at reasonable

cost”, also called “funding liquidity risk”, and to sell assets at a profitable

price, also called “asset liquidity risk”. This is due to three obstacles. Firstly

there are strict Fiqh restrictions (please refer to 1.3.) on the securitization of

debt instruments leading to the fact that banks have problems to sell its

receivables. Secondly the inter-bank money market for Islamic banks

develops very slowly. The main reason for this dilemma is that conventional

money market instruments “cannot or hardly be converted to a Shariah-

compliant form” (please refer to chapter 4.2.). Therefore Islamic banks

cannot raise funds quickly from the market. Finally the lender of last resort

facilities provided by central banks are not accessible for Islamic banks as

they are all based on interest.55

(Ahmed and Khan 2007)

55 There exist some exceptions, for example in Malaysia. There the Bank Negara offers interest-free lending

facilities to Islamic financial institutions. (Bank Negara Malaysia 2005)

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6.3.4. Operational Risk

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004) defines operational

risk as follows: “Operational risk is defined as the risk of loss resulting from

inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external

events. This definition includes legal risk,56

but excludes strategic and

reputational risk.”. In Islamic banking the personal risk is especially high

due to the infancy of the industry, for example lacking qualified

professionally or appropriate IT infrastructure.

6.3.5. Legal Risk

The legal systems (except Sudan, Pakistan and Iran) do not provide for or

even hinder of the activities of Islamic financial institutions. Regulations

aligned with the conventional system might constrain Islamic bank’s

efficiency or make certain transactions impossible. Transactions and

contracts are only standardized to a small extent and banks have to invest

considerable time and money in the negotiation of complex transactions.

Finally Islamic law is not enforceable in front of courts in Non-Muslim

countries so that Islamic banks might have problems to sue counterparties

who failed to fulfill their obligations. (Ahmed and Khan 2007)

6.3.6. Displaced Commercial Risk

The displaced commercial risk can also be referred to as “rate of return risk”

according to IFSB 1 and “derives from competitive pressures on IIFS to

attract and retain investors (fund providers)” (IFSB 2005). Ahmed and Khan

(2007) give an example: In case the Islamic bank is not able to “offer

competitive rates of return” compared to its peer group (including

conventional banks) due to the restrictions of Shariah, it may be forced to

56 Legal risk includes, but is not limited to, exposure to fines, penalties, or punitive damages resulting from supervisory actions, as well as

private settlements.

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“apportion part of [its] own share in profits to investment depositors” in

order to avoid that depositors withdraw their funds. (Ahmed and Khan 2007)

6.3.7. Shariah Risk

Shariah risk describes “the risk that the terms agreed in the contract do not

effectively comply with Islamic jurisprudence and thus are not valid under

Islamic law” (Solé 2007). It can be minimized by constant monitoring of a

Shariah Supervisory Board or Shariah adviser. However it might still be

rejected by other Shariah scholars or customers, as the interpretation of

Islamic law is not uniform. Consequently the product has to be withdrawn

from the market and restructured and the Islamic bank might lose in

reputation within the Muslim community. Furthermore it is possible that

standard setting organizations change the requirements and likewise the

competitive basis for the financial institutions. The Frankfurter Allgemeine

Zeitung (2008) reported the following example. In March 2008 the AAOIFI

(please refer to 4.3.2.) tightened the regulations for the emission of Sukuk

(please refer to 3.4.2.). Its scholars declared that most products available on

the market are not compliant with Islamic faith because issuers are

guaranteed to receive the original face value at maturity on the buyback of

the respective commodity, no matter whether it generated profit or loss.

Such transactions are now forbidden according to the AAOFIF as the

investor and issuer have to participate both in profits and losses equally

generated by the commodity. Fortunately already issued Sukuk did not have

to be restructured but only new ones. However Sukuk issued before the

change might be rejected by some investors and banks have to invest in the

product development of the new Sukuk.

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6.3.8. Risk Management Techniques And Regulations

Regarding the product descriptions in chapter 1.2 and the various types of

risk mentioned in this chapter, it becomes obvious that “Islamic banking

goes beyond the pure financing activities of conventional banking” (Lewis

and Algaoud 2001). Therefore risk management and diversification of risk is

of utmost importance. In the following several approaches to deal with the

high risk exposure are presented.

Firstly most Islamic banks have a strong preference for particular contracts.

For example, they prefer a debt financing mode (like Murabaha) over an

equity participation (like Musharaka) in order to limit the potential loss. In

this way the original “twin pillars” (Lewis and Algaoud 2001) of Islamic

banking, being Musharakah and Mudarabah contracts (please refer to 3.1.1.),

lose importance compared to more innovative and more secure modes of

financing, for example Ijarah (please refer to 3.3.) and Sukuk issuance

(please refer to 3.4.2.).

Secondly banks establish extensive “reserve funds out of past profits”

(Lewis and Algaoud 2001) to compensate major losses resulting, for

example, from counterparty default in a partnership contract (Musharaka or

Mudaraba). Consequently they hold a higher, more conservative, level of

equity in relation to debt compared to conventional banks that usually

operate with higher leverage ratios (Lewis and Algaoud 2001). Due to large

conceptional difference compared with the conventional system, regulatory

frameworks like Basel II57

can only be adopted in Islamic banking to a small

extent. However the standard setting organization IFSB mentioned in

chapter 4.3.3. issued own guiding principles for risk management and capital

adequacy that “serve to complement BCBS’s guidelines in order to cater for

the specifities of IIFS [Institutions offering only Islamic Financial Services]”

57 The Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (BSCB) is a standard-setting body on all aspects of banking supervision in the conventional (interest-based) banking system. The framework “Basel II” provides a measure and a minimum standard for capital

adequacy that is implemented by various national authorities. (Bank for International Settlement 2008)

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(Islamic Financial Services Board[2] 2005). These are in particular the

standards “IFSB 1: Guiding Principles of Risk Management for Institutions

(other than Insurance Institutions) offering only Islamic Financial Services

(IIFS)” and “IFSB 2: Capital Adequacy Standard for Institutions (other than

Insurance Institutions) offering only Islamic Financial Services (IIFS)”

(IFSB 2005).

It is quite problematic to structure derivatives in compliance with Shariah.

(Gassner and Wackerbeck 2007). Eventhough the demand is increasing such

instruments are very rare in the Islamic banking system, so far. This leads to

major difficulties in efficient risk management.

6.3.9. Suitable Clear Information Strategy

A Clear information system in Islamic banks is more important than the

conventional banking system. This is because the impact of PLS methods on

depositors and the need for such investments is at the core of Islamic

banking. The more depositors are needed, the more public disclosure of

information about banks’ strategy become necessary to enable depositors to

monitor banks’ performance. Moreover, in the Islamic banking system,

depositors have more incentives to monitor banks operations than traditional

banks, because in Islamic banks return to depositors depends on the

performance of the bank. Monitoring ensure depositors that the rates of

return paid to them reflect the application of PLS principle, which are the

cornerstone of Islamic finance, by banks and also reduces the possibility of

asymmetric information and thus, adverse selection and moral hazard. The

advantageous of such a system are:

This System helps depositors to choose a specific bank in which they

can allocate their funds according to its performance.

A clear information system in Islamic banks assists depositors with

regard to diversification of their portfolio.

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Disclosure provides information on the main risk factors associated

with the investment portfolio.

Good governance and internal controls which reduce

mismanagement and also brings market confidence for banks.

Providing data for depositors for the expected rate of return which is

an important consideration of the public.

Providing information on the education and professional background

of the banks’ staff and management.

The basis for the above considerations for more developing of Islamic banking in the future

is an Islamic financial regime which could compete with the international financial

organizations.

One of the major pillars required to be put in the place in order to strengthen both

international and domestic financial system is; to develop a uniform supervisory and

regulatory frameworks which are consistent with internationally accepted practices for

banks and non-banks financial entities. Organizations such as Islamic Development Bank58

(IDB) in Saudi Arabia can play a major role in the development of Islamic banks and the

essential dissemination of information on the above issues to its global membership. The

issues include such vital topic as:

The need for regulation and uniform supervisory of Islamic Banks.

Issues of risk management and guidelines on risk weight of assets.

Capital adequacy, liquidity management and issues of controlling of

the asset side of Islamic banks.

Issues in profitability and good governance.

In the next chapter will be discussed the development of IF and its Issues/Challenges.

58 http://www.isdb.org

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VII. ISLAMIC BANKING AND FINANCE:

ON ITS WAY TO GLOBALIZATION

7. History and Current Development of Islamic Finance

Being the third and last “great monotheistic religion” the Islam counts over 1.2 billion

followers worldwide and is the second largest religion in terms of numbers after

Christianity. It was “promulgated by the Prophet Muhammad in Arabia early in the 17th

century” (Lewis and Algaoud 2001) and spread around the world since then. Today

Muslims constitute the majority of population in more than 40 countries (for example

Malaysia, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain). Further to over 18 million59

live in Western

Europe. (Lewis and Algaoud 2001) It is important to mention that the Muslims population

is growing faster with 1.8 percent per annum (see Figure 19) than the rest of the population.

(Walker, et al. 2007)

Figure 19 -- Muslims as a Share of world population, 1990-2030 (Pew Research

Center)

59 Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life • The Future of the Global Muslim Population, January 2011

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Figure 20 -- Muslims population by Region, 1990-2030 (Pew Research Center)

7.1. Historical Milestones

Islamic vision of socio-economic justice is based on abolishing interest and all other

exploitative elements from the economic sphere. The Islamic financial system

facilitates lending, borrowing and investment functions on a risk-sharing basis. This

allows market forces to determine the productivity of capital rather than fixing it in

priori as an ‘‘interest rate’’ to sabotage the free market mechanism and encourage

speculative use and hoarding of capital. The Islamic financial system ensures the

optimal rate of capital formulation and its efficient utilization leading to a

sustainable economic growth and fair opportunities for all. It is a value-based

system that primarily aims at ensuring moral and material wellbeing of the

individual and society as a whole (Naqvi, 1982; Zarqa, 1983; Ahmed, 1994;

Siddiqi, 2000). The Islamic banking and finance discipline is nearly four decades

old. The conceptual developments of Islamic banking took cognizance in late 1940s

and in the next two decades, they got to a point of yielding a model which was

adopted in the Middle Eastern countries to fulfill their aspiration of having their

own banks. Many reputable Islamic banks came into being in 1970s that included

Nasser Social Bank Cairo (1972), Islamic Development Bank (IDB) (1975), Dubai

Islamic Bank (1975), Kuwait Finance House (KFH) (1977), Faisal Islamic Bank of

Sudan (1977) and Dar Al-Maal Al-Islami (1980). In early 1980s, the nascent

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industry took the world by surprise when three Muslim countries, namely, Iran,

Pakistan and Sudan decided to transform their economies and financial sector on

Islamic lines. The Western financial market players such as Citibank, ABN AMRO,

HSBC and others established their own Islamic windows or subsidiaries to attract

petrodollars’ deposits from the Middle East and Muslims clientele in local markets.

The Islamic banking and finance system continued to grow by seeking innovation

and diversity of products, clientele and markets. It has been growing in areas such

as Sukuk, Takaful, hedging funds, Mutual Funds, private equity and assets

management, wealth management, real estate, corporate finance, liquidity

management, treasury, derivatives, swaps, future and forward market, Islamic Stock

Exchange and Dow Jones Islamic Index.

Islamic banking and finance activities are mainly clustered around three parts of the

world that include the Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia.

The Middle East, overwhelmingly populated by Muslims, is a motherland of

Islamic banking and finance. Islamic banks enjoy strong support from rich

individuals, governments and other state institutions in the Middle East. The

majority of regulatory and other supporting bodies of the Islamic banking and

finance industry are located in the Middle East. The Gulf countries have decided to

merge their monetary and central banking systems by 2010. These developments

will bear far-reaching impacts on the Islamic banking and finance industry in the

Middle East and worldwide. Referring to South Asia, Islamic banking has been

recently revived in Pakistan under the duel banking system. Bangladesh has been

following more rigorous Islamic banking policies under the increasing market and

public demands. India and Afghanistan may adopt Islamic banking operations in the

near future. Three Southeast Asian countries, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia and

Singapore are promoting the most comprehensive and advanced version of Islamic

banking and finance in their region so as to attract Islamic business and finance

from the Middle Eastern countries and elsewhere.

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The government of Sudan has recently adopted more pragmatic approach to

promote the Islamic banking and finance practice in the region. Islamic banking and

finance is gaining momentum in the USA and European countries. These countries

are now more willing to bring changes to their banking and tax laws so as to allow

the Islamic banking and finance practice in their markets. The increasing number of

ethically based business organizations and individuals worldwide are dealing with

Islamic financial institutions. The Middle East Southeast Asia and South Asia are

the main emerging hubs of Islamic banking and finance. At present, there about 300

Islamic banking and financial institutions across 75 countries, holding a paid-up

capital of over US$13 billion, controlling assets worth US$300-US$500 and

investments US$500 billion-US$800 billion, with an average annual growth of 15

per cent over the past five years to reach over $1trillion in March 2011, suggesting

robust demand for Islamic investing. It is expected Islamic finance will continue to

grow at this rate for the next few years and that total assets in Islamic finance could

reach US$4 trillion to US$5 trillion by 2015. (HSBC Amanah)

7.2. Islamic Banking and Finance in the Middle East

The Middle East is the mainstream of Islamic banking and finance. Islamic financial

institutions are making individual and collective efforts to develop a wide array of

innovative, customer-oriented and competitive products services to their clientele. It

is their core objective to get strong hold over the indigenous oil-wealth and

discourage its outgoing to financial institutions in the European and Western world.

Recent market developments suggest that the Islamic banking and finance industry

is a big success and enjoys a very strong regional support. An increasing number of

conventional financial institutions in the Middle Eastern markets are converting

their operations either fully or partially on Islamic lines, which could pose a serious

threat to a long established legacy of conventional banking in the region.

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7.2.1. Bahrain

Bahrain is sitting on the top of Islamic banking affairs worldwide. It is the

house of Islamic banking practice, regulations, research, innovation and

scholarship. It hosts the largest number of Islamic financial institutions and

other supporting bodies. In 1978, the first Islamic bank – Bahrain Islamic

Bank – was established in the country. There are over 400 financial

institutions in Bahrain, out of which 33 are Islamic with a total capital of

US$2.24 billion. Islamic banking operations in Bahrain are undertaken by

full-fledged commercial banks, offshore banking units and investments

banks. A significant number of Islamic banks use Bahrain as a base to

operate in the Gulf, European Union and North America. Bahrain hosts the

biggest Takaful industry of the Islamic finance world. Presently there are

more than 26 Takaful and three re-Takaful companies in Bahrain. Dubai

International Financial Centre is promoting trade in Sukuk at regional and

international levels. Bahrain plans to establish Sukuk Exchange Centre

which will enhance the investment and liquidity options for Islamic financial

institutions in the Middle East and elsewhere. The Islamic mortgage industry

is rapidly growing in Bahrain due to prolonged boom in its real estate sector.

Business firms and individual investors in Bahrain are increasing their

reliance on Mutual Funds. Islamic financial institutions have secured

unprecedented growth in Bahrain in terms of income, assets and deposits

over the years. They are expected to experience further growth down the

track.

The Bahrain Monetary Agency has developed internationally recognized

standards, regulations and infrastructure for Islamic financial institutions. It

is very keen on increasing the co-operation among main players of Islamic

banking in the Middle East and worldwide. It is actively contributing in the

pool of Islamic banking training and research. It has developed a network of

Islamic banking research and regulatory institutions such as Accounting and

Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions, International

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Islamic Financial Market and Islamic International Rating Agency. These

institutions are making significant efforts to strengthen the base of Islamic

banking and finance and make it more dynamic and competitive in local and

international financial markets. Bahrain is making worthwhile contributions

to improve Islamic banking systems such as regulatory frameworks,

accounting standards, capital adequacy, liquidity, asset management,

hedging, corporate governance, etc. The country has assumed a key role in

developing the Islamic financial market in the areas that include asset

securitization, syndicated financing and credit, collective investment

schemes, Mutual Funds, Sukuk, Takaful, etc. Islamic financial institutions in

Bahrain enjoy greater community recognition and support. For example, 91

per cent of new staff appointments in 2001 consisted of citizens of Bahrain.

7.2.2. Iran

It is a novel feature of Islamic banking practice in Iran that it has been

adopted at state level since the Islamic revolution 1979. In the early two

decades of Islamic banking practice, the Iranian banking sector was highly

centralized and did not share much from the pool of knowledge, experience

and developments in global markets as well as Islamic banking world. After

mid-1990s, however, the Iranian government showed some inclination

towards adopting privatization and deregulation in the financial sector. In

1997, the central bank of Iran – Bank Markaz – issued licences to a number

of credit cooperatives, interest-free Qardhul Hasan centres and three non-

bank credit institutions to launch their operations in Iran. Since 1999 foreign

banks have been working in the designated free trade zones of Iran. The

private banking sector started to build up in Iran at the beginning of twenty-

first century. In December 2001, the first private bank – Bank Karafarin –

was granted a licence to commence its operations in Iran. Two private

banks, Bank Eqtesdae-e Novin and Bank Parsian emerged in the Iranian

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market. The Iranian government denationalized its two banks, i.e. Bank

Saderat and Bank Rfah-e Kargaran to enhance the diversity of private

banking sector in the country. Presently, more than 44 applications for

establishing private banking and financial institutions in Iran have yet to be

decided by the Bank Markaz. The Iranian government has been working on

evolving more flexible, competitive and innovative financial system in the

country. The growing global exposure and deregulation of the oil-rich

Iranian economy and financial sector may bear far-reaching implications on

Islamic banking growth and development in Iran. The Iranian government

should achieve greater integration of its Islamic financial sector with global

finance as well as the Islamic banking and finance world.

7.2.3. Jordan

Jordan Islamic Bank has been dominating the Islamic banking practice in

Sudan since 1978. Presently, it operates through 64 branches and cash

offices established across the country. It also offers mutual insurance funds

and products in the financial market of Jordan. It held 10.8 per cent of total

investment facilities of the local Jordanian banking industry in 2005 (Jordan

Islamic Bank, 2005). In March 1997, another Islamic bank –Islamic

International Arab Bank – was established in Jordan. It has 12 branches that

offer a wide range of products and services to their customers. Its assets and

income amounted over US$5.71 billion and over US$3.348 million,

respectively, at the end of 2011. Takaful or Islamic insurance services and

Sukuks are becoming popular in business and finance spheres of Jordan.

Jordan’s Investment House for Financial Services (Investhouse) has decided

to establish an Islamic financing company in the country. Recently, the

government inserted the Articles 50-59 in the Banking Constitution of

Jordan so as to provide proper legal cover to Islamic banking activities in the

country. The government of Jordon aims to use Islamic banking and finance

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as a tool to attract business and investments from regional and international

players of the Islamic banking world.

7.2.4. Kuwait

Kuwait hosts the largest number of Islamic financial institutions. It has been

ranked as third in terms of holding the Islamic banking assets of worth

US$22.7 billion. It is estimated that Islamic financial institutions in Kuwait

will manage funds about US$60 billion by 2015. The establishment of KFH

in 1977 laid down the foundation of Islamic banking in Kuwait. KFH has

made great success over time and presently, it has been successfully

competing with 12 conventional banks and three specialized government

banks in the Kuwaiti financial market. The National Bank of Kuwait and

some other conventional banks also offer a wide range of Islamic financial

products and services in Kuwait. In early 2006, Kuwaiti Parliament gave

approval for the establishment of two new Islamic financial institutions,

namely, Jaber Islamic bank and Jaber Funds in the country. A new Islamic

bank, Boubyan Bank, will launch its operations very soon in the country.

Kuwait Retail Estate Bank has decided to gradually transform itself into a

fully dedicated Islamic entity. Islamic finance and insurance activities have

also rapidly grown in Kuwait.

Currently, five Takaful and one re-Takaful companies are operating

alongside 18 conventional insurance companies in Kuwait. They hold a 14

per cent share of the Kuwaiti insurance market (Islamic Finance news).

There is an increasing demand for Sukuk in the corporate and real estate

sectors and the government is working on developing proper regulatory

framework for Sukuk market. The FTSE Doha International Financial

Exchange (DIFX) Kuwait 15 Shariah Index, comprising 15 Shariah

compliant stocks of Kuwaiti companies, has been recently listed at DIFX.

The use of Islamic funds has become more rampant in the financial market

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of Kuwait. Towards the end of 2006 the Standard Chartered Bank

introduced first Islamic derivatives in the Kuwaiti financial market by

entering into US$150-million three-year Profit Rate Swap with the Kuwait-

based Aref Investment Group (Chowdhury, 2006). The Kuwaiti Ministry of

Awaqaf and Islamic Affairs provides full guidance and supervision to the

Islamic Shairah supervisory boards at Islamic financial institutions.

The Central Bank of Kuwait introduced Islamic banking laws in 2003 and

has ensured highly regulated and transparent Islamic banking and finance

practice in the country.

7.2.5. Lebanon

The Islamic banking institutions are passing through an embryonic stage in

Lebanon. The Lebanese Parliament passed Islamic banking laws in February

2004 which legitimized Islamic banking operations in the country. By the

end of 2006, four Islamic banks emerged in Lebanon, namely, BLOM

Development Bank, Arab Finance House, AlBaraka Bank Lebanon and

Credit Libane. Four applications for establishing new Islamic banks were

looking for the government’s approval at the same time.

Conventional banks in Lebanon are encouraged to establish fully dedicated

Islamic banks but not permitted to establish their own Islamic window.

Presently, Islamic banking assets amount to US$60 billion, with a growth

rate of 15 per cent per annum. The Central Bank of Lebanon expects that

Islamic banking will be able to secure 5-10 per cent of the total financial

market of Lebanon within next three to five years (Arab News).

The Central Bank of Lebanon aims to introduce Sukuk and Takaful products

so as to gradually expand the base of Islamic banking and finance in the

market. The government embarked on the Islamic banking project to enrich

its market with Islamic business and finance from its next-door countries.

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7.2.6. Qatar

Qatar is another hot spot of Islamic banking and finance affairs in the

Middle East. There are four major Islamic banks in Qatar, namely, Qatar

Islamic Bank (established in 1983), Qatar International Islamic Bank

(established in 1991), Doha Islamic Bank (established in 2006) and Al

Rayan Bank (established in 2006). Other Islamic financial institutions that

include First Finance Company, Investment House, Al Jazeera Islamic

Company and Islamic Financial Securities are delivering Islamic retail

products and brokerage services in the country. Qatar Islamic Bank has

decided to establish Islamic Investment Bank of Qatar with US$1 billion

capitalization at Qatar Financial Centre (QFC) (Taib Research, 2006). Al

Safa Islamic Bank, a subsidiary of a conventional bank, plans to offer

Islamic products in retail and corporate finance sectors in Qatar.

Recently, Qatar International Insurance Islamic Company and Qatar

International Islamic bank have established a joint Islamic entity – Tasheelat

Company – which will specialize in meeting the financing needs of

individuals and business enterprises in Qatar. Presently, the share of Islamic

banking practice represents 30 per cent of the Qatari financial industry, and

is expected to grow up to 50 per cent in the coming years ( Jaidah, 2006).

Islamic finance and insurance activities have registered a rapid growth in

Qatar. In 1994, Qatar Islamic Insurance Company was established which has

now become one of the leading insurance service providers in the country.

First, Sukuk were issued in 2003 and at present they constitute 20-35 per

cent of the total project financing in Qatar (Islamic Finance News, 2006d).

The FTSE DIFX Qatar 10 Shariah Index is listed at DIFX. Islamic Mutual

Funds are becoming a popular choice in the Qatari capital market. Qatar

Islamic Bank is the main sponsor of Mutual Funds in Qatar. Doha Securities

Market is playing a key role in promoting Islamic capital and secondary

markets in the country. The QFC is also performing an extremely imperative

role in promoting Islamic finance at regional and international levels. Qatar

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is the smallest but richest region of the Arabian Gulf due to a mammoth

inflow of oil-wealth in its economy over the recent years. The Qatari

government is ambitious to take up infrastructure and development projects

worth billions in the country. Islamic financial institutions can play very

effective role in economic growth and development of Qatar.

7.2.7. Saudi Arabia

Islamic banking is making good headway in Saudi Arabia despite the fact

that there are no separate Islamic banking laws in the country. There are two

major players of Islamic banking in Saudi Arabia, namely, Al Rajhi Banking

and Investment Corporation and Bank Al Jazira. Conventional banks are

also serving the Islamic banking clientele by establishing their own Islamic

window or subsidiary. The Saudi financial sector comprises of 14

commercial banks and five credit unions and holds assets of worth over

US$20 billion. Islamic banking operations capture 64 per cent of the total

market share in Saudi Arabia (Arab News). There are increasing numbers of

products at Saudi banks which are based on Islamic principles. A large

number of banks in Saudi Arabia are restructuring their operations on

Islamic lines. Bank Al Jazira has recently completed its gradual conversion

into a fully Islamic entity.

The National Commercial Bank has decided to convert itself into a fully

dedicated Islamic bank in the next five years. Saudi British Bank has

recently increased its range of Islamic banking and finance products in the

country. In 2006, Saudi Investment Bank established an Islamic arm to offer

Islamic products in retail and corporate banking in the Saudi financial

market. The National Commercial Bank has decided to re-shift its retail

operations on an Islamic basis. Saudi Investment Bank has recently opened

ten fully dedicated Islamic branches which represent more than 50 per cent

of its total operations (Arab News). Al Bilad is a new comer in the Islamic

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retail banking market in Saudi Arabia. Amlak Finance and Dallah Al Baraka

of Saudi Arabia have established an Islamic Company to look after

financing needs of the real estate sector of Saudi Arabia. The first Takaful

company – SAAB Takaful Company has recently emerged in the Saudi

Arabian insurance market. There is a tremendous scope of growth for

insurance services in the country. It is estimated that Takaful company

services will be able to secure 15 per cent annual growth rate in Saudi

Arabia over the next 15 years, with a gross premium income reaching to

US$3 billion. The Saudi Stock Market and Capital Market have experienced

growing demand for the Sharaih compliant stocks, bonds and instruments.

Banks and financial institutions are increasing their reliance on Sukuk to

meet financing needs of the real estate sector in Saudi Arabia. In July 2006,

SABIC singed the underwriting agreement for its debut Sukuk issuance for a

total amount of SAR 3 billion (US$799.98 million), the first public issuance

in the Saudi market under the new Capital Market Law (Al- Humaidi, 2006).

In early 2006, the first Islamic private equity fund – AlTawfeek – was

successfully launched in the Saudi financial market. Saudi Arabia hosts the

IDB which is performing a very crucial role in promoting Islamic banking

practice in the Muslim world.

7.2.8. Syria

The entry of Syria into the Islamic banking club is one of the most recent

developments of the Islamic banking world. The Syrian Parliament

approved Islamic banking laws in 2005. By the end of 2006, the Syrian

government permitted three Islamic banks, namely, Al-Sham Bank, Saudi

Dalat Al-Baraka’s Al-Baraka Bank and Syrian International Islamic Bank to

launch their operations in the country whereas six applications for

establishing Islamic banks were under its consideration. Moreover, three

Takaful companies, namely, Aqeelah Insurance Company, Al-Nour

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Insurance Company and Syrian-Qatari Company are planning to launch their

operations after seeking their licenses from the Syrian Insurance Supervision

Committee. Al-Qatar Islamic Insurance Company plans to establish its

subsidiary in Syria. Syrian International Islamic Bank along with its Qatari

partners has applied for launching one Takaful company in Syria. Islamic

financial institutions and investors from the Middle East are underwriting

share capital of new Islamic banks and Takaful companies in the country.

Islamic banking and finance institutions may help in integrating the Syrian

financial market with mainstream Islamic banking and finance systems

which are rapidly growing across the Middle East region.

7.2.9. United Arab Emirates

The worldwide Islamic banking practice originated in the UAE when the

first biggest Islamic bank – Dubai Islamic Bank (DIB) – came into being in

1975. Presently DIB has established a network of 30 branches across the

country which is expected to expand to 70 branches by the end of 2012.

There are four other fully dedicated Islamic banks in the UAE, namely,

Sharjah Islamic Bank, Emirates Islamic Bank, Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank and

Dubai Bank. Conventional banks also offer Islamic products either through

an Islamic window or subsidiary. Presently, the Islamic banking assets

amount to Dh750 billion (US$204.234 billion), comprising 10 per cent of

total banking industry in the UAE. They are expected to grow to 30 per cent

of total banking in the country by 2012 (Islamic Finance news). Islamic

banking and finance institutions in the UAE are experiencing increasing

growth patterns in their profits and assets. More frequently in the UAE than

elsewhere in the Middle East, conventional financial institutions have been

converted on Islamic basis, partially or completely. For example, Dubai

Bank, National Bank of Sharjah (Sharjah Islamic Bank), Middle East Bank

(Emirates Islamic Bank) and Amlak Finance transformed themselves on

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Islamic lines over recent years. The complete conversion of the Dubai

Financial Market into an Islamic entity is also included in the UAE’s

government plans.

There is an increasing demand for Takaful or Islamic insurance services in

the UAE. Major Takaful companies in the UAE include Abu Dhabi National

Takaful, Dubai Islamic Insurance and Re-insurance Company (AMAN),

Islamic Arabic Insurance and Re-insurance Company (SALAMA) and

Insurance Islam TAIB. In June 2006, Swiss Re launched Family re-Takaful

services in the UAE insurance market. In 2005, Takaful or Islamic insurance

companies held 2 per cent of total insurance premium income of the

insurance market in the UAE (Aquil, 2005). Sukuk are becoming the

backbone of corporate financing in the UAE. The funding needs for the

UAE’s real estate sector are largely met by Islamic mortgage and Sukuk

issues. DIB is the biggest dealer of the global Sukuks market.

The demand for Islamic retail finance and private equity funds has gradually

increased in the UAE over the time. In 2006, DIB and DubaiWorld launched

US$5 billion private equity funds (Razak, 2006b). The Dubai International

Financial Centre (DIFC) and Dubai International Financial Exchange

(DIFX) are encouraging trading in Islamic securities, equities, derivatives,

funds (such as Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs)), depositary receipts and

other instruments. The UAE is the key sponsor and contributor of Islamic

banking and finance seminars, conferences, training and other intellectual

activities.

7.2.10. Islamic Banking and Finance in Sudan (Africa)

Sudan started the journey of Islamic banking in 1977 under the duel banking

system. The first Islamic bank – Faisal Islamic Bank Sudan – was

established under the patronage of Saudi Prince Muhammad Bin Faisal Al

Saud. In 1983, three more Islamic banks, namely, Tadamon Islamic Bank

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Sudan, Sudanese Islamic Bank and Islamic Cooperative Bank were

established in Sudan. Afterwards the government of Sudan passed the

Islamic Sharaih Act of Banking 1984 which required the whole banking and

finance sector to be transformed on Islamic lines by 1 July 1984. However,

due to economic crisis and political chaos over the decades the government

made little success in implementing the Islamic banking system in the

country. In 2002, the Islamic banking movement took another twist in Sudan

at the wake of new political developments. The newly formed coalition

government decided to adopt the duel banking system in the country from

2004. In Northern Sudan, where Muslims are in vast majority, the Islamic

banking system was to be adopted. Whereas in Southern Sudan which holds

Christians in the majority the conventional banking system was to be

practiced. Both financial systems were to be operated under the same

monetary and fiscal policies devised by the Central Bank of Sudan.

Presently, the banking and finance sector of Sudan comprised 26 banks,

including three foreign banks. New Islamic banks in Sudan include Al

Salam Bank Sudan and Emirates and Sudan Bank. Sudan took the initiative

of introducing Takaful products and services in the Islamic business and

financial world. The first Takaful company – Islamic Insurance Company

Sudan – was established in Sudan in 1979. It may be aspired that the

economy and political system of Sudan may become stable with the passage

of time so as to provide environments conducive for the development and

growth of Islamic banking and finance activities in the region.

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Figure 21 -- Best Islamic Bank by Country, 2010 (www.IslamicFinanceNews.com)

7.2.11. Best Islamic Institutions for 2011

COUNTRY WINNERS

Best Sukuk Bank CIMB Islamic

Best Islamic Retail Bank Jordan Islamic Bank

Best Islamic Investment Bank Jadwa Investment

Best Takaful Provider Salama-Islamic Arab Insurance

Best Asset Management Company CIMB-Principal Islamic Asset Management

Best Shariah-Compliant Index

Provider Dow Jones Islamic Market Indexes

Best Islamic Project Finance Provider SABB

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Best Islamic Commodities Provider Al Rajhi Bank

Best Islamic Real Estate Finance

Provider Kuwait Finance House

Best Islamic Fund Manager Falcom Asset Management

Islamic Finance Deal of the Year Maaden Aluminum, Saudi Arabia, $1.6 billion project

financing.

REGIONAL WINNERS

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Kuwait Finance House

Non-GCC Middle East/Africa Absa Islamic Banking

Asia CIMB Islamic

Europe Bank of London and the Middle East

COUNTRY WINNERS

Algeria Al-Salam Bank Algeria

Bahrain Bahrain Islamic Bank

Bangladesh Islami Bank Bangladesh

Brunei Bank Islam Brunei Darussalam

Egypt Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt

Indonesia Bank Muamalat Indonesia

Jordan Jordan Islamic Bank

Kazakhstan Al Hilal Islamic Bank

Kuwait Kuwait Finance House

Lebanon Arab Finance House

Malaysia CIMB Islamic Bank

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Pakistan Meezan Bank

Qatar Qatar Islamic Bank

Saudi Arabia Falcom

Singapore OCBC Bank

South Africa Absa Islamic Banking

Sudan Al Salam Bank

Turkey Kuveyt Turk

United Arab Emirates Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank

United Kingdom HSBC Amanah

United States Devon Bank

7.2.12. Prospects For Islamic Financial Industry

As pointed out in the section above, the Islamic financial services industry

shows promising growth prospects for several reasons. Firstly Muslims

become increasingly aware of the possibilities to invest in conformity with

their faith which leads to rising demand. On the supply side a growing

number of financial institutions worldwide are interested to establish

themselves in the niche market of Islamic finance, either as fully-fledged

Islamic bank or Islamic Window. They either settle down directly in Middle

East and Southeast Asia where the proximity to local clients (especially high

net worth individuals) and the liberalization and reformation of markets

bring their influence to bear or try to approach the Muslim communities in

Western markets. The second path should be subject of the following

chapters.

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In the United Kingdom, that has established as European Islamic financial

center, the market depth is already significant. Fully-fledged Islamic banks,

in retail and investment banking, can be found as well as professional

Islamic Windows of well-known conventional banks and specialized Shariah

advisors and lawyers. The government issues regulations to smooth the way

for these developments. Initiatives in other European countries, like Italy

and France to build up fully fledged Islamic banks show that they do not

want to lack behind the United Kingdom in this respect. The 18 million

Muslim living in Europe might show great unexploited market potential and

could be addressed, for example via ethno- and minority marketing

approaches backed by a Shariah compliant product and service offering. The

following section 2 gives a market overview of the existing Shariah

compliant product and service market in Europe complemented by experts’

opinions on further potential and challenges ahead. Finally in section 3 the

results of interviews with several key financial institutions in Italy are

presented leading to recommendations on how Italy banks could become

active in Islamic finance.

7.3. Issues and Challenges for IF Globalization

Islamic finance has established itself as a permanent element within the global

financial landscape. Nevertheless, despite the recent advances, important challenges

lie ahead.

There are challenges on several fronts; theoretical, and operational. On the

theoretical side, further work needs to be done on developing core principles of

Islamic economics, and understanding the functioning of a financial system

operating on a profit/loss-sharing basis. On the operational side, issues relating to

innovation, intermediation, and risk management are worthy of attention. Special

attention should also be given to as system-wide implementation. Each of these

challenges could take up a volume of its own, but for my purposes a brief

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discussion of some of these challenges will have to suffice. (Iqbal and Mirakhor

2011)

7.3.1. Regulating and Supervising Islamic Finance

Undoubtedly, one of the biggest challenges is developing a framework for

governing, supervising, and regulating Islamic banks. To begin with, there is

no common approach among countries where Islamic banking exists. One of

the two main views—held by regulators in Malaysia and Yemen, for

example—is that Islamic banks should be subject to a supervisory and

regulatory regime of central banks that is entirely different from that of

conventional banks. The second main view recognizes the uniqueness of

Islamic banks' activities, but favors putting them under the same central

bank supervision and regulatory regime as that for conventional banks, with

slight modifications and special guidelines that are usually formalized in

occasional central bank circulars. Bahrain and Qatar are examples of

countries that practice this latter form of central bank supervision and

regulation.

Since the late 1990s, however, the Islamic banking world has stepped up

efforts to standardize regulation and supervision. The Islamic Development

Bank is playing a key role in developing internationally acceptable standards

and procedures and strengthening the sector's architecture in different

countries. Several other international institutions are working to set Sharia-

compliant standards and harmonize them across countries. These include the

Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions

(AAOIFI), the Islamic Finance Service Board (IFSB), the International

Islamic Financial Market, the Liquidity Management Center, and the

International Islamic Rating Agency.

A number of countries and institutions have adopted accounting standards

developed by the AAOIFI, which complement the International Financial

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Reporting Standards. The IFSB aims to promote the development of a

prudent and transparent Islamic financial services industry and provides

guidance on the effective supervision and regulation of institutions offering

Islamic financial products. The IFSB has recently finalized standards on

capital adequacy and risk management, and has made progress in developing

standards on corporate governance.

Once developed and accepted, these international standards will assist

supervisors in pursuing soundness, stability, and integrity in the world of

Islamic finance.

There is an ongoing debate over the fact that Islamic banks do not separate

fund management and investment activities from commercial banking. From

a supervisory perspective, Islamic banks are often compared with universal

banks and mutual funds, which may cause technical difficulties for

regulators and supervisors. For instance, an Islamic bank acting as a

Mudarib—an agent in Mudarabah, a type of profit-and-loss-sharing (PLS)

instrument—might be considered more a fund manager than a bank.

Consequently, in these cases, some supervisors support taking the

supervisory approaches applied to conventional fund managers. There are

instances in which various risks are aggregated into a single Islamic

instrument and offered within a single institution (for example, Salam) and

the principle of pooled savings and risk sharing in the outcome applies.

Closer examination of the character of the underlying transaction is needed

for effective supervision, however.

Because of the risks associated with the activities carried out by these

institutions and the contracts that govern their mobilization of funds, some

argue that their supervision and regulation require a much broader coverage

extending beyond the banking sector. Moreover, the risk-sharing nature of

liability contracts has raised issues concerning the definition of capital and

the capital adequacy ratio.

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Some analysts also argue that an appropriate regulatory framework for

Islamic banking must place greater emphasis on operational risk

management and information disclosure than is normally the case in

conventional banking. This argument is based on the specific nature of the

risk profile in Islamic financial intermediation, relating to both PLS and

non-PLS modes of financing. Investment risk is considered the most critical

operational risk affecting Islamic banks' PLS activities. While PLS modes

may shift the direct risk to investment depositors, they may also expose

Islamic banks to risks normally borne by equity investors rather than holders

of debt. PLS modes involve banks in activities that go beyond conventional

banking, such as the determination of profit- and-loss-sharing ratios on

investment projects. Moreover, banks' exposure is heightened because of the

lack of recognizable default on the part of the agent-entrepreneur in PLS

contracts, except in cases of negligence or mismanagement. If a project

posts a loss under a Mudarabah contract, for instance, the bank would not be

able to recover its loan since it would bear all the financial losses. This

situation would not constitute a default on the part of the entrepreneur whose

liability is limited to his time and efforts. Furthermore, there is no legal

means allowing banks to control the agent-entrepreneur who manages the

business financed through Mudarabah contracts, and banks cannot reduce

risk by requiring a collateral or other guarantee in PLS modes of financing.

Additional hurdles: Besides developing money markets and sorting

out regulation and supervision, policymakers will need to tackle two

other big hurdles.

Data collection. The lack of aggregate data makes it virtually

impossible to compare Islamic banks across countries, which,

together with the absence of common reporting and accounting

standards, complicates the work of supervisors. No data are available

on cross border Islamic banking, the amount of cross-border Islamic

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financial transactions, and real-estate investment based on Islamic

principles for developed countries. Some central banks, including

those in Bahrain, Malaysia, and Turkey, have begun to produce a

chapter in their annual reports on Islamic banks, putting them in a

separate group, with aggregated data that provide information on the

size and growth of Islamic banking at the country level.

Nevertheless, a multilateral effort is needed to collect and

consolidate cross-country data.

Capital markets. The markets for Islamic instruments and

government securities remain shallow and an organized international

Islamic financial market is still nascent. The sector must improve the

range and sophistication of asset and liability classes and develop

new instruments and financial techniques that would enable Islamic

banks to diversify their balance sheets.

Adoption of a common position on certain financial instruments

would help develop Islamic finance and improve its competitiveness

globally. For example, a number of issues relating to speculation and

the use of derivatives must be resolved before a fully functioning

Islamic stock market can evolve. While arbitrage and short selling

are not acceptable under Sharia, other financial transactions appear to

be, in practice, subject to varying interpretations. For instance,

transactions involving the purchase and sale of debt contracts in

secondary markets are permissible only in Malaysia.

In sum. Resolving these important issues, as well as adopting best

practices for supervision and accounting, are critical for future

market and industry development. For the foreseeable future,

supervisory authorities will continue to face the dual challenges of

understanding the industry and striking a balance between providing

effective supervision and facilitating the industry's legitimate

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aspirations for further growth and development. These challenges

can be overcome if the concerned central banks and institutions

enhance their multilateral cooperation, and create the appropriate

environment and conditions. These conditions would create a level

playing field and provide the infrastructure needed for the industry's

market-driven development. A sound, well-functioning Islamic

financial system can pave the way for the regional financial

integration of the countries involved. It can also contribute to their

economic and social development, by financing the economic

infrastructure and creating job opportunities.

7.3.2. Reluctance to Promote Risk Sharing

Risk sharing is the objective of Islamic finance. To foster the development

of Islamic finance, there must be a sustained effort to remove the bias

against equity finance; to reduce the transaction costs associated with

participation in the stock market; to create a market-based incentive

structure to minimize speculative behavior; and to develop long-term

financing instruments and low-cost, efficient secondary markets for trading

equity shares. These secondary markets would enable better distribution of

risk and achieve reduced risk with expected payoffs in line with the overall

stock market portfolio.

Without true risk sharing, Islamic finance may provide a false impression of

being all about developing debt-like, short-term, low risk and highly liquid

financing without manifesting the most important dimension of Islamic

finance: its ability to facilitate high growth of employment and income with

relatively low risk to individual investors and market paticipants. (Iqbal and

Mirakhor 2011)

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7.3.3. Performance of IB: “Difficulties to return to pre 2007 profitability

levels”

As with conventional institutions, Islamic banks will find it challenging to

return to pre 2007 profitability levels – question is how big will the cuts be?

Painful decline in profitability – industry ROE now appears to be stabilizing

around the 10% range (2006: 23%)

Figure 22 -- Painful decline in profitability for Islamic Banks (Ernest

and Young 2011-12)

What happened?

Islamic banking in the MENA region has been a fast growing sector. As

evidenced by data in figure 23 the assets, deposits, and financing all grew

fast in the region during 2006-2007. However, the growth rate tapered off in

2007-2008 period, which may be due to the knock on effect of the financial

crisis. Even with this moderation affect the performance of Islamic banking

sector had been much better than conventional banks during that period. The

adverse effect of the crisis spilled over to Islamic banks only in 2009.

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To systematically compare the performance of Islamic banks across

countries a methodology is devised in this section whereby compare the

average of key ratios of Islamic banks in one country with the similarly

averaged key ratios of Islamic banks in the other countries. This is, as if an

average (representative) Islamic bank in one country is compared with the

average (representative) Islamic banks in other countries, as well as with the

average for the MENA region. The key ratios selected for analysis are:

return to equity, return on assets, asset utilization ratio, and operating

income to asset ratio.

Return to equity (ROE) as measured by net profit to total equity varied

significantly across Islamic banks in our sample but in general remained

high even during the global financial crisis when the conventional banking

sector globally was severely affected. For example, for the average Islamic

bank in the UAE during 2008, the ROE was above 15 percent, the highest in

the region compared to other countries. During the same year ROE for an

average Islamic bank in Bahrain was 7.2 percent, in Egypt about 0.1 percent,

Jordan 14.4 percent, Kuwait 8.2 percent, Lebanon negative 9 percent, Qatar

11.9 percent, Saudi Arabia 10.7 percent, and Yemen 7 percent. The figures

for Lebanon are an outlier in our sample as the only Islamic bank there was

established in 2006 and it is undergoing a developmental phase. However,

the situation changed in the MENA region during 2009 when ROE of

Islamic banks declined in most countries.

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Figure 23 -- Growth Rates of Assets and Deposits across Countries

(Salman Syed Ali, 2011)

Figure 24 and 25 shows historical data on ROE, as measured by the ratio of

net profit to total equity, for the years 2006 to 2010 for six countries. The

ROE in the MENA region shows a converging pattern from 2006 to 2010

across countries. This may be due to the moderating effect of the financial

crisis or it may reflect increasing integration and competition across the

countries. However, between 2008 and 2010 a diverging trend is quite

apparent with banks performing very differently across countries. Bahrain

and Kuwait displayed highly negative ROE. While ROE figures also

declined in other countries, they remained positive. Islamic banks in Qatar

witnessed an increase in ROE. Why did the Islamic banking sector perform

so differently across various countries during the stressful time in 2009

while they were converging in performance earlier? This is a highly

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important research question that can shed light on the importance of various

aspects for stability and growth of Islamic banking which requires a full-

fledged research in future. Based on a-priori information, negative ROE in

Bahrain can be attributed to large number of small banks with relatively low

capital base that reduce their capacity to diversify as well as lower their

capacity to absorb credit losses from soured Murabaha and Ijara

transactions. In case of Kuwait the negative ROE, despite high capitalization

of banks, may be attributable to lax regulation as well as to the limited

domestic investment opportunities that led banks to invest in foreign

markets and over exposure to real estate sector. The better performance of

UAE in 2010 compared to Bahrain and Kuwait may be due to strong

liquidity support provided by the Central Bank of UAE to its banking sector

including the Islamic banks during the crisis.

Figure 24 -- Analysis of leading Islamic commercial banks in the MENA

region shows a large variation in the average ROE between 2006-10.

(Ernest and Young 2011-12)

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Return on assets (ROA) had declined for the average Islamic bank in every

MENA country in 2008 compared to 2007 but remained in the range of 2.3

percent to -0.06 percent. The trend in ROA had been downwards in most of

the countries since 2006 with the exception of Qatar and UAE where it had

edged up during 2007 before coming down in 2008 (see Figure 9). However,

in 2009 ROA declined sharply in most countries but in very divergent ways.

The ROA declined to negative 7 percent in Bahrain and negative 2.1 percent

in Kuwait. It declined but remained at positive 1.7 percent in the UAE and at

less than one percent in Saudi Arabia. However, it increased to more than 4

percent in Qatar during the same year.

Figure 25 -- shows Return on Assets (ROA), ROE and NFI averaged for

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all Islamic banks by each country for each year since 2006. Data for

Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE up to 2010. (Ernest

and Young 2011-12)

The performance of the average Islamic banks across countries as well as in

comparison with average conventional banks in those countries by using

return to equity, return on assets, asset utilization ratio, and net operating

income to assets ratio. In the past, the ROE and ROA in general had

remained high and differed significantly across countries of the region.

Between 2006 and 2008 there appeared to be a declining but converging

trend in ROE, as well as in ROA, among these countries. However, after the

crisis both ratios changed in considerably different ways among the

countries. This may be a reflection of the differences in institutional and

economic conditions among these countries resulting in different behavior of

Islamic banks under financial stress. In comparison with conventional banks,

Islamic banks‟ ROA was similar to their conventional counterpart in the

respective countries. However, ROE was lower in case of Islamic banking

compared to the conventional banking reflecting higher capitalization and

lower leverage of Islamic banks. (Please see ANNEX 5 Determinants of

Islamic Bank Profitability: Evidence from Jordan)

The Islamic banking sector has demonstrated more resilience against the

financial crisis mainly due to avoidance of interest. The requirement to

abstain from interest made their financing activities more tied to real

economy and also required them to avoid exposure to toxic financial

derivatives. The commercial risk associated with Islamic banking activities

and the non-availability of lender of last resort facility to these banks also

forced them to hold liquid assets in greater proportion than their

conventional counterparts. All these factors helped them during the crisis.

Figure 26 shows the sector allocation of two indices and reveals that the

Islamic index has almost no allocation to the financial sector, which

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confirms my earlier assessment that Islamic indices have done better in the

crisis period when investors suffered losses due to problems in the financial

sector whereas Islamic investors had no exposure to that sector.

An S&P study found that, in the first nine months of 2008, commercial

Islamic banks continued to exhibit strong profitability, reporting an average

return on assets (ROA) of 3.1%. These banks appear to have benefited from

the supportive economic environment that prevailed in the first half of 2008,

from their good efficiency and from the low cost of risk. In line with the

Islamic principle that all transactions must be backed by a real asset, one of

the referred asset classes of Islamic banks is real estate. Studies show that

the total lending, which is high and increases the IFIs is equivalent to about

20% of total lending, which is high and increase the IFIs’ exposure. With

deteriorating market values, IFIs can face problems in passing the losses to

investors/depositors unprepared to face this reality. IFIs will have to wait

and hope for a rebound in these values to achieve modest returns for their

investors/depositors.

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Figure 26 – Comparison of sector allocation of S&P 500 and S&P

Shariah 500, Source: S&P (2009) (own illustration)

The impact of the crisis came to these banks late and indirectly through a

slowdown in the real economy. Some banks were affected due to their asset

concentration in the real estate sector (see chapter 7.4.3.). However, there

was no case of failure of Islamic bank in the region.

The performance of Islamic financial institutions can be considered good,

especially in light of the fact that Islamic institutions are part of an emerging

and developing market that is trying to overcome many challenges and

obstacles. The return to Islamic banks have been comparable to those prime

crisis. The risk-adjusted returns of some Islamic capital-market products are

higher than comparable ones in conventional markets. These are, however,

preliminary results and may change with time.

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7.3.4. Concentrated Banking

Islamic banks tend to have a concentrated base of deposits or assets. They

often concentrate on a few select sectors and avoid direct competition. For

example, one Islamic bank may specialize in financing the agricultural

sector, while another might do the same in the construction sector, and

neither attempts to diversify to other sectors. This practice makes Islamic

banks vulnerable to cyclical shock in a particular sector. Dependence on a

small number of sectors—lack of diversification—increases their exposure

to new entrants, especially foreign conventional banks that are better

equipped to meet these challenges.

This concentration in the base of deposits or assets reflects a lack of

diversification, which increases their exposure to risk. Islamic banks’ assets

are concentrated in a handful of products. In terms of sector allocation,

average financing activities of Islamic banks have been oriented primarily to

trade (32 percent), followed by industry (17 percent), real estate (16

percent), services (12 percent), agriculture (6 percent), and others (17

percent; see Kahf). Islamic banks are not fully exploiting the benefits that

come from both geographic and product diversification. At present, they rely

heavily on maintaining good relationships with depositors. However, these

relationships can be tested during times of distress or changing market

conditions, when depositors tend to change loyalties and shift to large

financial institutions they perceive to be safer. This risk of losing depositors

raises a more serious exposure known as “displacement risk.” Displacement

risk refers to a situation where, in order to remain competitive, an Islamic

bank pays its investment depositors a rate of return higher than what should

be payable under the “actual” terms of the investment contract; it does this

by forgoing part or all of its equity holders’ profits, which may adversely

affect its own capital. Islamic banks engage in such practices to induce

investment account holders not to withdraw their funds. By diversifying

their base of depositors, Islamic banks could reduce their exposure to

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displacement or withdrawal risks. With the changing face of banking and the

introduction of Internet-based banking, achieving a high degree of

geographic diversity on the liabilities side is conceivable and should be

encouraged.

7.3.5. Liquidity

Islamic banking is still highly nascent when compared with conventional

banking. It has been facing a range of problems and challenges. Islamic

banks are haunted by the chronic problem of excess liquidity. They carry

about 40 percent more liquidity than their conventional counterparts because

there is a serious dearth of long-term Shariah-compliant investment tools

and avenues (Hakim, 2002). They commit 95 percent of their funds to short-

term Ijarah, Murabaha and Musharakah instruments (Islamic Finance News,

2006a). In 2002, four major Islamic banks established the Liquidity

Management Centre (LMC), which has been engaged in developing a

secondary liquid market for Islamic bonds, government securities, equities,

mutual funds and other instruments. Other institutions such as the Bank of

Malaysia, the Islamic Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ICCI), the

International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM) and the Dubai International

Finance Centre (DIFC) have been working to find effective solutions to the

liquidity problem.

7.3.6. Weak Risk Management and Governance Framework

Several studies have identified weaknesses and vulnerabilities among

Islamic banks in the areas of risk management and governance. Operational

risk, which arises due to the failure of systems, processes, and procedures, is

one area of concern. Weak internal control processes may present

operational risks and expose an Islamic bank to potential losses. Governance

issues are equally important for Islamic banks, investors, regulators, and

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other stakeholders. The role of Shariah boards brings unique challenges to

the governance of Islamic financial institutions. Similarly, human resource

issues, such as the quality of management, technical expertise, and

professionalism, are also subject to debate.

7.3.7. Integration with Global Financial Landscape

Increasing globalization has spread Islamic finance to many different

geographical locations where the infrastructure does not support Islamic

finance-friendly institutions. This poses a problem for policymakers and

regulators and can create an obstacle to the growth of Islamic finance. For

Islamic finance to integrate well with the conventional system there is a need

to develop international institutions and standard-setting agencies that can

provide the necessary support to local authorities and develop procedures

and standards which can be adopted with ease.

7.3.8. Risk Management Framework

Given their limited resources, Islamic banks are often unable to afford high

cost management information systems or the technology to assess and

monitor risk in a timely fashion, which means that their risk exposure is

high. IFIs need to adopt appropriate risk management, not only for their own

portfolio but for that of their clients. Diversification and risk management

are closely associated with the degree of market incompleteness. In highly

incomplete markets, financial intermediaries are in a better position to

provide diversification and risk management than the investors for whom

they act. (Please see chapter 6.)

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7.3.9. Wealth Management

Wealth management entails offering financial planning and management to

high-net-worth individuals, private and public institutions, with the goal of

sustaining long-term wealth. With the current wave of petro-dollars being

earned by GCC countries, the demand for such services from public sector

institutions is bound to increase. Although several GCC countries are

currently using conventional investment vehicles, the increasing demand for

Shariah compatible products is likely to mean that some portions of this

wealth may be available for Islamic financial markets. Similarly, there are

increasing numbers of institutional investors who will be interested in

Shariah compatible wealth management. These include central banks with

excess foreign-exchange reserves, state pension funds, future funds (such as

the oil funds established by some countries), and sovereign wealth

managers.

However, offering robust wealth management in Islamic finance presents

serious challenges. Any wealth management process begins with a defining

investment objectives and goals. This followed by a rigorous strategic asset-

allocation (SSA) which determines the optimal mix of asset classes to

achieve the desired goals and objectives. Constructing a meaningful SAA

framework in Islamic finance is a challenge. First, a fixed-income debt

market other than the limited and illiquid Sukuk market does not exist(see

chapter 3.4.2.) . Therefore, the SAA framework would have to resort to

using proxies from conventional debt markets, which may not be ideal

situation. Second, there are no Shariah compliant benchmarks against which

an SAA strategy can be devised. Although a number of such benchmarks are

available in the equity asset class, they have yet to be developed for fixed

income markets. Third, given the prohibition of interest, and thus of pure

debt security, an SAA framework would have to work with other asset

classes with distinct risk/return profiles.

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All these factors mean that the SAA framework will require a more complex

design and therefore extensive quantitative modeling. In the absence of a

meaningful SAA framework, the investor will be exposed to unknown risks

and , as a result of potentially inappropriate asset allocations, may not be

successful in achieving log-term goals.

7.3.10. Shortage of Competent Shariah Experts and University Talents

Only a small group of Shariah experts is serving on several Shariah boards

of Islamic banks worldwide. Majid Dawood, a London-based consultant on

Shariah compliance, pointed out that Shariah experts earn as much as

US$88,500 per year per bank (Matthews, 2005). In some cases, they charge

up to US$500,000 for advice on large capital market transactions (Tett,

2006). On the other hand, Shariah scholars at small Islamic banks have little

insight into the complexities of present-day financial markets. Islamic banks

should build up a strong base of research and training to develop a corps of

Shariah experts of high moral and professional integrity. They should also

establish a central Shariah board and an external audit committee to provide

a truly independent scrutiny of the Islamist operations.

The rapidly growing industry of Islamic finance, like in any other industry,

is trapped in the classic case of demand and supply mismatch. Since the

industry is growing above the conventional financial industry average across

the globe, competition for talent between and within the industry is very stiff

and it is a natural thing to happen. This mismatch may be attributed to

several factors: including the fact that university curricula on Islamic finance

have very little or no relevance to the ever-changing needs of the industry

because the industry was not consulted in the design of these curricula. The

universities, in their rebuttal, point out that their primary role is not to mass-

produce the workforce for the industry, but rather to produce knowledgeable

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or thinking graduates equipped with generic as well as specific

competencies. While I do not intend to delve into this debate further, suffice

it to say that both the industry and the universities need to find a focal point

and come up with an Islamic finance curriculum that is relevant to the

industry.

The mismatch is also due to the fact that the number of universities offering

Islamic finance-related courses throughout the world is still relatively small

compared to the number of talents required by the industry. A survey

conducted by Deloitte in 2010 among the leaders of Islamic finance in the

Gulf area demonstrates a very worrying trend. The findings suggest that

more than 60% of Islamic finance professionals and practitioners require

further training and skills development. The findings also suggest that only

18.5% of the respondents believe that the Islamic finance institutions in the

GCC are properly staffed with people that have the depth and experience to

cope with the challenges ahead in the industry. This provides room for

educational providers to embark on Islamic finance training, courses, or

programs that lead to degrees or professional qualifications.

7.3.11. Going Beyond Banking

The distinction between traditional commercial banking and investment

banking is becoming blurred, and there is a global trend to mix financial

services with non-banking services. Although this trend is prevalent in major

industrial economies, it has not been embraced by many of the emerging

markets where Islamic finance is practiced. For example, an IMF study in

2003 ranked several countries in the Middle East according to their level of

financial development and found that countries throughout the region had a

weak institutional environment and a poorly developed non-bank financial

sector. There has not been much progress since then. Islamic finance has

been dominated by commercial banking, and the amount of investment

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banking, insurance, asset management, SME financing, and microfinance is

very small.

Islamic finance that claims to promote social justice and advocates equal

opportunity for less-fortunate segments of society needs to develop an SME

and microfinance industry. A well-developed microfinance industry will

promote economic development in underdeveloped Islamic countries. As

poor segments of society become economically empowered, they will

expand the base of depositors and investors. While microfinance institutions

have been successful in conventional markets, there are only a few cases of

such institutions operating on Islamic finance principles. Their phenomenal

success within conventional finance has forced even private investors to

regard microfinance as a potential and viable asset class.

7.4. Suggestions for enhancing the Islamic industry.

7.4.1. Promotion of SME Financing

The Islamic financial industry and policymakers should develop ways to

promote SMEs and their access to the formal financial sector. In

developing appropriate products, Mudarabah contracts based on

principal/ agent principles would be well suited for the propose.

However, this type of contract has yet to be institutionalized in most

Muslim countries. While conventional banks are constrained by their

conservative approach to risky assets and by protective regulatory

regimes from extending credit to SMEs , this need not be the case of

Islamic banks, which can hold Mudarabah-based assets with no

regulatory constraints. Furthermore, IFIs are encouraged to enter into

equity partnerships, which can be used to promote the SMEs sector.

These instruments should be developed through the banking or non-

banking sectors to promote SME financing.

162

To facilitate operation of the SME sector, the SME report (2006) makes

the following suggestions, which are equally applicable to the Islamic

financial industry:

Government measures to promote SMEs should be carefully

focused, aiming at making markets work efficiently and at

providing incentives for the private sector to assume an active

role in SME finance.

Public policy should improve awareness among entrepreneurs of

the range of financing options available from official programs,

private investors, and banks.

The principles of risk sharing should be observed, committing

official funds only in partnership with those of entrepreneurs,

banks, businesses or universities.

The tax system should not inadvertently place SMEs at a

disadvantage.

The legal, tax and regulatory framework should be reviewed in

order to ensure that the business environment encourages the

development of venture capital, including opportunities for exit.

Table-4: Differences between Islamic & Conventional Banking, (Iqbal 2011)

Islamic

Banking

Money,

Capital

Markets

Legal / regular

Issues

Others

Consolidation Develop

liquidity-

enhancing

Mechanism

enhance and

harmonize

standards

social sector

financing.

institutionalization

of Islam’s

redistributive

instruments

Expand Scope,

services, products

Develop asset

linked, rather

asset-based,

products

Enhance corporate

governance

Develop non-bank

financial

intermediation

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Enhance risk

management

Develop Sukuk

based on

intangible assets

such as services,

rights, working,

capital, etc.

Enhance Shariah

governance

reputational risk

Lessen reliance on

commodity/ fixed-

income like

products

Develop

partnership and

risk-sharing

products

supervision and

monitoring

Financial

engineering.

ease of product

development

Reduce Exposure

to operational risk

Develop

Shariah-

compliant

securities / stock

markets

Financial Sector

development

Hedging with or

without

Derivatives

Liquidity-

enhancing

products

Develop Islamic

benchmarks

Investors/creditor

rights

Public Finance

Hedging products public finance

instruments

Insolvency laws Monetary policy

management

Source: Iqbal (2010)

7.4.2. Proposals for Organizational Structure of Islamic Banks

Islamic banks are set up as private limited companies or as mutual

organizations. If set up as private limited companies, their owners will not

be shareholders from the general public; rather large institutions and

entrepreneurs may provide initial capital. On the other hand, Islamic banks

choosing mutual organizational form will have more democratic character

enabling their depositors to enjoy some ownership rights.

Alternatively, a mix of these organizational forms may prove useful. The

lack of liquidity as posed by PLS on the liabilities side may be tackled by

encouraging pension funds, insurance companies and other such

organizations to invest in Islamic banks.

As organizations aim at long-term growth, and not short-term capital gains,

Islamic banks will not be much vulnerable to unexpected withdrawals or

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liquidity crises. Long-term investment or strategic development, audit,

compensation, and nominating may have marginal effect (Klein, 1998).

Public confidence in PLS can only be established if ownership and

management of Islamic banks show their own commitment to this principle.

An important step in this direction will be introduction of profit-related pay

for managers and employee share ownership plans (ESOPs). This is

expected not only to have a positive effect on the productivity of

management and other employees, but will send a healthy signal to the

general public indicating commitment of the owners and managers to the

principle of PLS.

7.4.3. Proposals for Growth of PLS on Assets

Banking regulations need serious overhauling. In most Muslim countries,

banks are either prohibited from taking controlling rights in corporations

(regulated so that taking control blocks would be costly) or structured so that

managers of the borrowing firms control their decision-making. These laws,

along with hostile attitude of the Mudarabah contract towards capitalist,

have been a major hindrance in the adoption of PLS by Islamic banks.

Hence reforms in banking regulations are required to balance the

management and control rights between Islamic banks and managers of the

companies they invest in.

A propose of an organizational structure based on Venture Capital (VC).

Venture Capital is a form of equity financing in which the investor

actively participates in the venture being financed. According to

Suwailem (n.d.), once a venture capital fund has been established, the

venture capitalist must identify investment opportunities, arrange deals

with entrepreneurs, monitor the investments, and ultimately achieve

some return on his capital. The venture capitalist usually invests in

recipient companies in the form of convertible preferred stock; that is,

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preferred stock that can be converted into common stock. The financing

process is done in stages, and the amount of capital given at each stage is

sufficient only to reach the next stage. Venture capitalists take an active

role in the recipient companies through membership on Boards of

Directors. To avoid losses, venture capitalists form a portfolio by

investing in several companies at one time. Sharing has important

consequences. One is that it creates incentives for the capital provider to

monitor and assist his partner (Davis, 1992). Given the venture

capitalist’s stake in the venture, the better the quality of assistance he

provides to the entrepreneur, the better the likelihood that the venture

will succeed, and therefore, the higher the expected value of his stake.

One venture capitalist writes, ‘‘A venture capitalist is not merely a

money manager for investors’ funds but also a full partner with the

entrepreneur, sharing a mutual goal of creating a valuable company’’

(Kunze, 1990).

Based on a survey obtained from a sample of venture capitalists, Gorman

and Sahlman (1989) found that venture capitalists spend about half their

time monitoring and assisting their portfolio investments. They also

found that venture capitalists provide three critical services in addition to

providing money:

(1) building the investor group;

(2) reviewing and helping to formulate business strategy; and

(3) filling in the management team.

As Suwailem (n.d.) indicates, such a degree of involvement by venture

capitalists would be inconceivable from traditional financiers.

Combining harmony of interests with monitoring and assistance, I see

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how venture capital structure helps to overcome the high risk and

informational asymmetries associated with typical ventures.

The venture capital provides a balance of power between management

and other owners who have a financial stake in the firm. The

shareholders are not passive capitalists but share decision-making with

the management when it comes to running the organization. The value

creation by a ‘‘VC’’ will be much better than other organizations.

Sapienza (1992) founds that the average value-added by venture

capitalists, as perceived by both venture capitalists and entrepreneurs, is

significantly positively related to the level of innovation pursued by

these companies.

Managers, who also hold shares in the ‘‘VC’’, will be more productive

as they possess private information about the projects because perhaps

they already have been professionally associated with the ventures. In

addition, joint ownership between managers and other shareholders will

result in alignment of interests between them, mitigating the agency

problem. Furthermore, in a VC, strategic controls will replace financial

controls because all the shareholders (managers, Islamic banks and

institutional investors) will be intimately involved in managing the

company and making key decisions. These controls encourage long term

investments in projects, which influence the firm’s value. In a VC,

information sharing will be less costly, quickening the pace of decision-

making.

Involvement of the institutional investors serves a positive monitoring

function. Institutional investors in a VC will closely monitor managerial

actions, thus reducing agency costs.

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Conclusion

Despite a number of challenges that I outlined in the previous sections, the

future looks bright for Islamic finance. Financial institutions in countries such

as Bahrain, the UAE, and Malaysia have been gearing up for more Shariah-

compliant financial instruments and structured finance both on the asset and

liability side. In addition, financial innovation will contribute to further

development and refinement of Shariah compliant derivative contracts. For

instance, the development of Islamic derivatives bodes well for the Islamic

insurance (takaful) industry, whose Shariah compliance has traditionally

resulted in overdependence on equity and real-estate investment, restricting the

potential of risk diversification from a wider spectrum of available assets.

At the same time, the leading financial centers, e.g. Hong Kong, London, New

York and Singapore, are making significant progress in establishing the legal

and prudential foundations to accommodate Islamic finance side-by-side with

the conventional financial system. Many of the largest western banks through

their Islamic windows have become active and sometimes leading players in

financial innovation and new Shariah compliant financial instruments that

attempt to alleviate many of the current constraints such as a weak systemic

liquidity infrastructure. More conventional banks are expected to offer Islamic

products, enticed by enormous profit opportunities and also ample liquidity

especially across the Middle East.

New product innovation is also driven by domestic banks’ interest in risk

diversification. With a large number of new Islamic banks across the Middle

East and Asia especially, diversification of products enables banks to offer the

right product mix to more sophisticated clients. A few banks are already active

across different jurisdictions, and this trend is certainly going to continue in the

near future with possibly some consolidation.

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On the regulatory front, the IFSB has moved ahead with its standardization

efforts of the Islamic financial services industry that will foster the soundness

and stability of the system. Globally accepted prudential standards have been

adopted by the IFSB that smoothly integrate Islamic finance with the

conventional financial system. For instance, the adoption of the IFSB Standards

(somewhat akin to Basel II) which take into account the specificities of Islamic

finance, ensures a level playing field between Islamic and conventional banks.

Finally, the shining example of the growth and potential of Islamic finance are

sukuk bonds. Defying the ramifications from the US subprime crisis so far, the

sukuk market has been growing rapidly, driven by demand from financial

institutions, insurance companies and pension funds across Islamic and non-

Islamic countries. Many challenges still lie ahead, but the banks’ search for

profitable opportunities and the ensuing financial innovation process in tandem

with favorable regulatory developments at domestic and international levels as

well as growing capital market sophistication, will ensure that the Islamic

finance industry will continue to develop at a steady pace.

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VIII. EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC BANKING

IN EUROPE

8. State of Islamic Banking in Europe60

Islam all too often resonates negatively in Europe, with much non-Muslim public opinion

uncomfortable with Islamic culture and values. Secular and Christian opinion is at best

suspicious of Shariah, Islamic law, and indeed often antagonistic. The notion of wanting to

apply Shariah principles to banking and finance is treated with skepticism if not outright

hostility, especially as there is no concept of Christian or Jewish banking, even if there are

some parallels between Shariah financial principles and the teaching of the Old

Testament.61

Yet Islamic finance is thriving in Europe, and many major European banks perceive it as a

profitable opportunity to generate new business rather than as a threat to existing business.

Although Islam is sometimes viewed as prescriptive and concerned with restricting choice,

Islamic finance is about widening choice, and in particular about providing alternatives to

interest based finance. The aim is to develop financial products that are seen as ethical and

within the realm of socially responsible investment. It is perhaps appropriate to start by

examining the role of Islamic finance in Euro-Arab banking relations.

8.1. Euro-Arab Banking Relation

Islamic finance has become a key dimension of the relationship between Arab and

their European counterparties.62

While the Arab banks imported most of their

conventional financial products for Europe in the past, now European banks are

importing Shariah compliant products from the Arab World, not only for their

overseas Arab clients, but more significantly for the growing Muslim population of

60 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,

Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United

Kingdom. 61 Rodney Wilson, Economics, Ethics and Religion: Jewish, Christian and Muslim Economic Thought, Palgrave Macmillan, London,

1997. 62 Rodney Wilson: This section is based on an address given by the author to the Union of Arab banks in Brussels on 29 June 2007.

170

Europe (see Figure 27 and 28). Thanks to the emergence of Islamic banking,

knowledge transfers in finance have become a two way process rather than simply a

one side affair. European banks have as much to learn from the Arab World as the

latter have from Europe as interdependence replaces dependence.

The increasing spread of Shariah compliant finance, and the dynamism of the

economies where it is important, is making the Euro-Arab financial relationship

more a partnership of equals in the twenty first century. In contrast for much of the

nineteenth and twentieth centuries the Arab economies underperformed those of

Europe, and one explanation for this underperformance was the development of a

financial system in the region based on Riba that was never fully accepted given its

inherent conflict with Islamic values. Fortunately now pious Muslims have a real

choice, as shariah compliant products have been developed over the last three

decades to serve most of their financial needs, and these products are at least as

efficient as their conventional counterparts.

The United Kingdom has been the gateway for Islamic finance to enter Europe,

partly reflecting the role of London as the leading international financial center, but

also as a consequence of the exposure of leading British banks to the Arab and

wider Islamic World and their knowledge of these markets. It was the Arab joint

venture banks that first brought Islamic finance to London in the early 1980s as

Islamic banks in the Gulf found that re-depositing on Murabaha basis could be an

effective tool for liquidity management, with the marks-ups generated from trading

activity on the London Metal Exchange. UK has also hosted the first Islamic retail

bank in Europe, the Islamic Bank of Britain which started operations in September

2004, and the European Islamic Investment Bank, which opened for business in

2006. The leading conventional banks have also become involved in serving the

local retail market for Islamic financial services, notably HSBC and Lloyds TSB,

both of which provide Islamic deposit facilities and housing finance using Shariah

compliant structures.

171

It is of course internationally that European banks have made the greatest

contribution to Islamic finance with Barclay Capital partnering Dubai Islamic Bank

for the world’s largest Sukuk issuances, Standard Chartered making a notable

contribution to Islamic finance through its networks in the Gulf, Pakistan and

Malaysia, Deutsche Bank in pioneering capital protected funds in the Gulf and UBS

in developing shariah compliant wealth management services to name just some

examples. It is operations of these major European banks that will be also reviewed

here.

8.2. Islamic Finance in Europe

The number of Muslims in Europe has grown from 6 million in 1990 to 18 million

in 2010.63

Europe’s Muslim population is projected to exceed 29 million by 2030.

Muslims today account for about 6% of Europe’s total population, up from 4.1% in

1990. By 2030, Muslims are expected to make up 8% of Europe’s population.

Although Europe’s Muslim population is growing, Europe’s share of the global

Muslim population will remain quite small. Less than 3% of the world’s Muslims

are expected to be living in Europe in 2030, about the same portion as in 2010

(2.7%).. The following table provides an overview of the Muslim population and

the potential customer base in mainland Europe.

63 The 2010 population estimates for 25 of the 50 European countries and territories vary significantly from the 2009 estimates contained

in the Pew Forum’s 2009 report Mapping the Global Muslim Population, http://pewforum.org/Muslim/Mapping-the-Global-Muslim Population.aspx. The updated estimates take into account new and better sources of data that have become available since the first report

was published. They also reflect differences between the methodology used in this report and the one used in the 2009 report. (See

methodology beginning on page 165.) The 2010 estimates were calculated primarily by the staff of the Age and Cohort Change project of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria. Updated population estimates are used for the following

countries: Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Ireland,

Italy, Kosovo, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Republic of Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine and United Kingdom. In all but a few cases, the 2010 estimates are higher than the 2009 estimates. In the

Netherlands, for example, the percentage of the population that is Muslim in 2010 (5.5%) is actually lower than the percentage reported

in the 2009 Pew Forum report (5.7%). IIASA used a newer source from Statistics Netherlands to calculate the 2010 estimate.

172

Figure 27 - EUROPE -- Number of Muslims in Western Europe, 2010-2030

(Pew Research Center)

Figure 28 EUROPE -- Projected Distribution of Muslim Population, 2030 (Pew

Research Center)

173

8.2.1. Shariah Compliant Liquidity Management in Europe

All banks need to maintain liquid assets to meet depositor withdrawals and financial

obligations to other institutions including banks. Rather than merely holding cash,

which yields no return, usually liquid assets are held as treasury bills or repos,

repurchase obligations on which a financial institution which holds these monetary

instruments earns interest.64

Islamic banks cannot hold such instruments, as interest

is regarded as Riba, which is explicitly prohibited in the Holy Quran.65

This

presented a challenge for Islamic banks, as they were required by regulators to hold

liquid assets as part of prudential risk management requirements, but there were no

Shariah compliant liquid instruments available which they could hold.

From 1980 onward a number of banks in London offered Shariah compliant

liquidity management services to Islamic banks from the Gulf and the Jeddah based

Islamic Development Bank. This involved inter-bank wholesale operations, with

banks in London providing overnight deposit facilities for the newly established

Islamic banks in the Gulf. The major institutions involved were the joint venture

Arab banks in London, such as Saudi International Bank and the United Bank of

Kuwait. They accepted deposits on a Murabaha mark-up basis, with the associated

short term trading transaction being conducted on the London Metal Exchange.66

The margins were very small on these buying and selling transactions, but they were

sufficient for the banks in London to offer the Islamic financial institutions in the

Gulf and Jeddah a return which was comparable to that on conventional treasury

bills. The attraction of London was the financial expertise available and the low risk

transactions facilitated by the London Metal Exchange because of the depth of the

market. The joint venture counterparties were not directly involved in the trading,

but rather engaged specialist brokers, notably Dawnay Day, which soon acquired

the knowledge of the Shariah issues that concerned their Gulf clients.67

64 Shelagh Heffernan, Modern Banking, John Wiley and Sons, Chichester, 2005, p. 59. 65 Sura 2:275 66 For a wider discussion of liquidity management issues see Youssef Shaheed Maroun, ‘Liquidity management and trade financing’, in

Simon Archer and Rifaat Abdel Karim, Islamic Finance: Innovation and Growth, Euromoney Books, London, 2002, pp. 163-175. 67 www.dawnayday.com/Display.aspx?&MasterId=019b5780-e3

174

Although the provision of Murabaha facilities as an instrument for liquidity

management remains significant, the real transactions involved result in it being a

relatively costly means of ensuring Shariah compliance. A preferable and less costly

solution is for Islamic banks to hold modified treasury bills that satisfy Shariah

requirements.68

Progress has been slow in developing such instruments, and the

trading of securities based on Bai Dayn69

debt contracts, which is allowed by Shafii

scholars70

in Malaysia, is not permitted by more conservative schools of Islamic

jurisprudence, including those whose opinions prevail in the Gulf.71

European

Shariah scholars tend to follow the more conservative interpretations in the Gulf and

South Asia associated with the Hanafi72

and Malaki73

schools of Islamic

jurisprudence rather than the Shafii School which prevails in Malaysia and

Indonesia.

How to manage liquid assets remains a major matter of controversy in Islamic

finance, not least because many Islamic banks continue to have liquidity well in

excess of regulatory requirements.74

Although the Islamic Financial Services Board

has provided guidelines for regulators on liquidity management, it does not specify

68 Osman Babikir Ahmed, Islamic Financial Instruments to Manage Short-Term Excess Liquidity, Islamic Research and Training

Institute, Islamic Development Bank, Jeddah, 1997, Research Paper No. 41, p. 77. 69

Bay dayn is an Arabic term for “sale of debt” as originated from two words; bay’ which means sale, while dayn means debt. As far as

bay dayn is concerned, it simply means a sale and purchase transaction of a quality debt. The selling of debts is to avoid the occurrence of

riba between two debts and also to avoid any kinds of gharar and makhatara which may arise at the level of inability of a buyer from

possessing what he has bought as it is not permitted that the buyer sold before actual receipt of the purchased item. On 21st August 1996,

The Malaysian Securities Commission Shariah Advisory Council passed a resolution unanimously agreed to accept the principle of bay

dayn as one of the concepts for developing Islamic capital market instruments. This was based on the views of some of the Islamic jurists

who allowed this concept subject to certain conditions for instance there is a transparent regulatory system in the capital market to safeguard the maslahah (public interest) of the market participants. 70Shafii School is one of the schools of fiqh, or religious law, within the Sunni branch of Islam. Named after Imām ash-Shafii, it is

followed by approximately 35% of Muslims worldwide in Southeast Asia, Northeast Africa, the Middle East, and parts of the Indian subcontinent. 71 Resolutions of the Securities Commission Shariah Advisory Council, Kuala Lumpur, 2nd edition, 2006. 72 Among the four established Sunni schools of legal thought in Islam, the Hanafi school is one of the oldest and by far, the largest in parts of the world. It has a reputation for putting greater emphasis on the role of reason and being more liberal than the other three

schools. The Hanafii school also has many followers among the four major Sunni schools. This is largely to its being adopted as the

official madhab of The Abbasid Caliphate, the Ottoman Empire and the Mughal Empire. As such, the influence of the Hanafii school is still widespread in the former lands of these empires. Today, the Hanafii school is predominant in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh,

India, China as well as in Mauritius, Turkey, Albania, Bosnia And Herzegovina. It is also practiced in large numbers in other parts of

Muslim world, particularly in parts of the Levant and Iraq. 73 is one of the schools of Fiqh or religious law within Sunni Islam. It is one of the four schools, followed by approximately 35% of

Muslims, mostly in North Africa, West Africa, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, in parts of Saudi Arabia, Oman and many middle

eastern countries. In the past, it was also followed in parts of Europe under Islamic rule, particularly Islamic Spain and the Emirate of Sicily. 74 Tariqullah Khan and Habib Ahmed, Risk Management: An Analysis of Issues in the Islamic Financial Industry, Islamic Research and

Training Institute, Islamic Development Bank, Jeddah, 1997, Occasional Paper No. 5.

175

what instruments should be used.75

In Bahrain Salam Sukuk securities have been

developed which serve the same function as treasury bills, but as these are asset

backed, the issuance and redemption involves buying or selling a claim to the

underlying real asset rather than simply acquiring or disposing of debt.76

This has

been approved by the more conservative Shariah scholars in the Gulf as a preferable

alternative to Bai Dayn debt contracts and the Bai Bithaman Ajil77

Sukuk traded in

Malaysia which are backed by financial rather than real assets. A Salam contract

involves a payment for a real asset to be delivered in the future, with the timing of

delivery and the precise details of the asset specified in the contract. In the case of

Bahrain the issuer is the government, the assets are commodities such as aluminum

used by the country’s smelter and the time to maturity is ninety days. Islamic

financial institutions purchase the Salam Sukuk and on maturity are reimbursed

after ninety days with a mark-up representing their return on the asset. On receipt of

these funds they relinquish their rights to the underlying asset which reverts to the

government as the issuer.

At present Salam Sukuk are not traded on a secondary market, even though Bahrain

has a Liquidity Management Centre established for Sukuk trading, as the Shariah

scholars view them as financial instruments and are concerned about the link with

the underlying asset.78

This is a major limitation for Salam Sukuk, as treasury bills

and repos are usually widely traded in secondary markets, resulting in greater

liquidity.

8.2.2. Sukuk Issuance and Trading in Europe

At present there are no Salam Sukuk available in Europe although most countries

have active treasury bill and repo money markets. This presents a problem for

Islamic banks in Europe that have to continue to rely on Murabaha inter-bank

deposits for their treasury management. There is an opportunity to develop markets

75 Islamic Financial Services Board, Guiding Principles of Risk Management for Institutions (Other Than Insurance Institutions) Offering

Only Islamic Financial Services, Kuala Lumpur, December 2005. 76 Rodney Wilson, ‘Overview of the sukuk market’, in Nathif J. Adam and Abdulkader Thomas, (eds.) Islamic Bonds: Your Guide to Issuing, Structuring and Investing in Sukuk, Euromoney Books, London, 2004, pp. 6-7. 77 sale of goods with deferred payment 78 Zamir Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor, An Introduction to Islamic Finance, John Wiley and Sons (Asia), Singapore, 2007.

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in Islamic securities in Europe which would attract institutional Shariah compliant

investment from the Middle East as well as serving Islamic banks in Europe.

London is an obvious location given the depth and breadth of its financial markets,

especially as the Islamic Bank of Britain and the European Islamic Investment Bank

are listed on the Alternative Investments Market (AIM). Developing a market in

salam Sukuk is problematic however unless tradability is allowed by the shariah

scholars, as merely having issuance is not a substitute for an Islamic money market.

The pioneering Sukuk in Europe was by the German Federal State of Saxony-

Anhalt which raised €100 million through an issuance on 31st July 2004. The sukuk

is for five years using an Ijara leasing structure with a floating return based on the

six month Euribor rate plus one percent. In other words in financial terms it is

identical to a floating rate note but because of the Ijara structure the payments to the

investors represent rent rather than interest or Riba which is prohibited under

Shariah. This is not merely the renaming of the return, but rather having a structure

that is recognized as distinctive under national law, and in the case of the Saxony-

Anhalt Sukuk, German law. Like other German state debt instruments the sukuk

was listed in Luxembourg, with an additional listing in Bahrain to attract Gulf

investors. Citigroup Global Markets was the arranger for the Sukuk, and the Shariah

advisory board of Citi Islamic Investment Bank in Bahrain vetted the legal

documentation for Shariah compliance.

The Sukuk was rated –AA by S&P and –AAA by Fitch with the state of Saxony-

Anhalt acting as guarantor.79

The Kuwait Finance House, the second largest Islamic

bank in the Gulf, acted as lead manager for the issue, with its visibility and

reputation helping ensure that other Islamic financial institutions would invest in the

Sukuk.

79‘Saxony-Anhalt sukuk to be offered’, Eastern Oracle, August 2nd 2004. (cited in Islamic Finance Information Service, ISI Emerging

Markets: subscription website http://site.securities.com)

177

As Sukuk have to be asset backed, the solution under German law was to establish a

‘Dutch’ foundation, which corresponded to the classical Islamic concept of a waqf.

The Ministry of Finance then transferred usufruct rights to its building to the

foundation, which served as the underlying asset.80

When the Sukuk is traded investors are buying and selling rights to the real

underlying asset which is permissible under Shariah, rather than simply paper debt

instruments which cannot be traded in the view of Gulf Shariah scholars as already

indicated. Effectively the structure is a sale and lease back arrangement, with the

foundation serving as a special purpose vehicle, (SPV), which is wound up on

termination of the Sukuk, when the usufruct rights revert back to the Ministry of

Finance which no longer pays rent to service the investors. In this respect it is

different from a Waqf81

religious endowment trust which exists in perpetuity rather

than for a definitive period. The idea for the Sukuk followed an earlier road show

during 2001 when German states tried to ascertain if there was a market for near

sovereign issuers in the Gulf countries, with institutions there suggesting that any

offering would attract more attention if it was Shariah compliant rather than being

structured as a conventional bond or floating rate note.82

Most of the Sukuk issued in the Gulf and South East Asia are for corporate clients

rather than sovereign Sukuk, but corporate issuances have been slow to start in

Europe. The Swiss company, EnergyMixx AG announced on 15 August 2007 that it

had appointed Faisal Private Bank and the law firm Vinson Elkins to advise it on a

suitable Sukuk structure to fund a power plant project in the Gulf, but the structure

and the terms have still to be decided.83

A relatively small corporate Sukuk worth

$26 million was arranged in April 2005 by ABC Islamic Asset Management in

London and the Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank on behalf of Al Safeena Ltd of

80 Michael Saleh Gassner, ‘Sukuk breathes new life into federal state’, Islamic Banking and Finance Magazine, December 2004. 81 It is under the context of 'sadaqah', a inalienable religious endowment in Islamic law, typically denoting a building or plot of land or

even cash for Muslim religious or charitable purposes. The donated assets are held by a charitable trust. The grant is known as mushrut-

ul-khidmat, while a person making such dedication is known as wakif 82 Michael Saleh Gassner, ‘How a sukuk was developed in the state of Saxony-Anhalt’, Islamic Banking and Finance Magazine,

December 2004. 83 Islamic Finance Information Service, ISI Emerging Markets: subscription website, 13 September 2007.

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London.84

The English Law firm Norton Rose advised on the structure together with

Voisin and Co. of Jersey, as the trust structure governing the sukuk was registered

under Jersey’s offshore laws. This was the first Islamic security to be used to

finance shipping, as the asset used was a Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC), Venus

Glory, which was chartered to a Saudi Arabian shipping company.85

An ijara

structure was used for the sukuk, with the tenor being five years and the return a

fixed six percent payable quarterly with the return of the principle on maturity. A

fixed return is unusual on an ijara sukuk, which in this case means in financial terms

it is equivalent to a bond rather than a floating rate note. Normally a murabaha

structure with a mark-up would be used for a fixed return sukuk, but as murabaha is

a short term instrument, arguably an ijara structure is preferable for a period of five

years. A larger corporate sukuk worth $261 million was used to finance the

purchase of the Sanctuary Building in London in 2005.86

Taylor Wessing, the international law firm, advised on the structuring, the clients

being Bahrain based Taib Bank and Hong Kong based Dominion Asset

Management, represented in the United Kingdom by Pelham Associates. This sukuk

was also based on an ijara structure, but with a variable return linked to LIBOR, the

London Inter-Bank Offer Rate, rather than a fixed return.

Turkey, an aspiring European Union member, has more Islamic bank branches than

any other European country, although the role of shariah compliant finance in its

banking system remains marginal. It is an active member of the Jeddah based

Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and subscribes to and has received

shariah compliant funding from the Islamic Development Bank, the aid agency of

the OIC. At present all of Turkey’s government debt is funded through conventional

bill, bond and note issuance involving interest based payments, but since September

84 21 ‘ABC Islamic and ADCB co-underwrite $26 million ‘Al Safeena’ sukuk’, Islamic Finance Information Service, ISI Emerging

Markets: subscription website, 17 April 2005. 85 ‘Norton Rose acts on first ever Islamic bond for the shipping sector’, Islamic Finance Information Service, ISI Emerging Markets:

subscription website, 26 April 2005. 86 Islamic Finance Information Service, ISI Emerging Markets: subscription website, 24 August 2005.

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2005 consideration has been given as to whether some debt should be funded

through sukuk securities.87

As always in Turkey the issue has been complicated by political considerations,

given the tensions between the AK, the moderate Islamist governing party, which

supports Islamic finance, and the former president, and upholder of Turkey’s

secularist constitution, who was at best skeptical towards the notion of finance

being shariah compliant. The tensions between Islamists and secularists in Turkey

are long standing, and Islamic banking and finance is viewed from the perspective

of political symbolism, rather than being simply about financial choices.88

The

change in Turkish law necessary for the issuance of sukuk has been made more

likely since the decisive election win by AK in 2007 under the Prime Minister,

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and the appointment of his political ally, Abdullah Gül, as

President.

It is inevitably London that has the most potential as a centre for sukuk issuance in

Europe given itsvestablished reputation in Islamic banking, the depth and breadth of

its financial markets and avregulatory framework that encourages rather than

inhibits financial innovation. There has been overvthree decades of official support,

initially by the Bank of England, and from 1997 onwards by the Financial Services

Authority as it took over regulatory responsibility for banking, including Islamic

banking. However the Treasury has only been marginally involved, largely through

granting tax concessions to ensure a level playing field for shariah compliant

housing finance, rather than viewing Islamic finance as a vehicle for raising

revenue.

During 2006 the idea of London serving as a center for sukuk issuance was first

raised at an Islamic finance conference in June, which was attended by the then

Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, and his deputy Ed Balls.89

As they

87 Farhan Bokhari, ‘Turkey weighs up benefits of Islamic bond’, Financial Times, 27 September 2005. 88 Filiz Baskan, ‘The political economy of Islamic finance in Turkey: the role of Fethullah Gülen and Asya Finans’, in Clement M. Henry

and Rodney Wilson, (eds.), The Politics of Islamic Finance, Edinburgh University Press, 2004. 89 Mustak Parker, ‘Waterloo sunset’, Islamic Business and Finance Magazine, London, 1st April 2007.

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became involved this gave the cause of sukuk issuance political momentum which

has propelled subsequent developments. Three factors appear to be positively

influencing developments. The first is to ensure that British Muslims see that their

government is open and responsive to the opportunities that Islamic finance offers.

There is a political desire to ensure that British Muslims feel included rather than

excluded, not least because Muslims who are United Kingdom nationals may vote,

and their support is crucial to ensure that the Labor Party maintains control of key

marginal constituencies. A second factor is to ensure that the City of London

continues to play a major international role in Islamic finance and attracts business

for investment banks and law firms, which results in well-paid jobs. The

government has established a Working Group on City Competitiveness to ensure

that London’s leading role in international finance is consolidated and enhanced,

and the encouragement of Islamic finance is viewed as part of this strategy. Third

although government debt is relatively modest in relation to gross domestic product

(GDP) in the United Kingdom and funding can be secured easily, there is a desire to

diversify funding sources to keep costs low and attract attention to Sterling as a

stable and attractive currency for international investors, including Muslim

institutions and individuals concerned with shariah compliance.

On 23rd April 2007 the Treasury announced that it would be undertaking a

feasibility study of the potential for sovereign sukuk issuance by the British

government, the am being to include a statement of progress in the pre-budget

report for 2007.90

On 16 August 2007 the first meeting of the Islamic Finance

Experts Group was convened in London, an official body established to advise the

Treasury and the Financial Services Authority on issues relating to Islamic finance,

including sukuk issuance.91

Issues being considered include who and how shariah compliance will be ensured,

the structure and size of the issuance, the period to maturity and the pricing. Shariah

90 Mustak Parker, ‘UK government serious about sukuk’, Arab News, Jeddah, 27 April 2007. 91 ‘City Minister Kitty Usher chairs Islamic Finance Experts Group meeting on feasibility study into government sukuk,’ Islamic Finance

Information Service, ISI Emerging Markets: subscription website, 16 August 2007.

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assurance could imply the Treasury either appointing its own shariah board or

outsourcing compliance, both options having advantages and disadvantages. The

structure is most likely to be based on an ijara leasing contract, with the payments to

the sukuk holders being rents. As with other ijara based sukuk the government

would establish an SPV which would hold the asset, a piece of state owned land, for

the duration of the sukuk that is anticipated to be five years. The government rental

payments for the use of the asset would be paid through the SPV to the investors

with the tax treatment the same as for conventional securities.92

Rents would be

benchmarked to either the London Inter-Bank Offer Rate (LIBOR) or Bank of

England Minimum Lending Rates (MLR), the expectation being that the actual rents

paid would be at a discount to LIBOR or MLR reflecting the high quality of the

government paper issued and its implicit AAA rating as the United Kingdom

government always meets its financial obligations. The pricing would be in line

with conventional government debt instruments, and it is anticipated that the same

financial institutions will take up the offer as hold the conventional equivalent. The

prime aim is not to attract Gulf capital inflows, but rather to establish a benchmark

for high quality Islamic debt that can be used as a base for the higher pricing of

future more risky corporate sukuk issuance in London. There was some

disappointment that no sukuk announcement was made in the Chancellor of the

Exchequer’s pre-budget statement of October 2007, but given the complexity of the

legal and technical issues to be resolved, the omission at this early stage was not

surprising.93

The Chancellor

Alistair Darling indicated that further announcements would be made in 2008, and

that a report identifying key issues in the sukuk issuance would be announced,

including the tax treatment of assets transferred into and from the SPV.94

It was also

proposed that National Savings and Investment (NS&I), the British government

92 ‘Sukuk not feasible’, Islamic Finance News, 12 October 2007, p. 4. 93 Mohammed Amin, ‘Promoting Islamic finance: the new UK tax law on sukuk’, New Horizon, July-September 2007. 94 Mushtak Parker, ‘UK Islamic bond plan progressing’, Arab News, Jeddah, 15 October 2007.

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savings scheme, would offer shariah compliant products to retail investors through

the national post office branch network.

8.2.3. Shariah Compliant Fund Management

Funds represent an ideal vehicle for Muslim investors as the fund manager can

assume responsibility for shariah compliance whereas an individual investing

directly in assets cannot easily know if they are compliant. In many respects the

principles of Islamic fund management are similar to ethical fund management, as

both types of investment rely on pre-determined screening criteria to determine

what it is legitimate to fund. There are two types of screens used for shariah

compliant investment, sector screens and financial screens.95

Unacceptable sectors to invest in include brewing and distilling and the production

and distribution of other alcoholic beverages, pork production and distribution,

gambling and casino operations and media companies whose output includes

material seen as offensive, including pornography.96

In practice this rules out a wide

range of companies, as for example hotels chains with gaming operations are

excluded, as are supermarket companies selling alcohol, although some more liberal

shariah scholars may not object to the latter if it is a secondary segment of the

business. Conventional banks are the most significant sector screened out because

of their dealings in interest and it is this exclusion that has the greatest significance

for returns on shariah compliant equity investment. Empirical studies have shown

that shariah compliant investments out-perform the market when bank shares fare

badly but under-perform when conventional bank profits are healthy.97

The financial screens are designed to avoid exposure to heavily leveraged

companies or those having excessive interest earnings. Hence, using the criteria

developed by the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index, companies that have borrowing

95 Rodney Wilson, ‘Screening criteria for Islamic equity funds’, in Sohail Jaffer, Islamic Asset Management: Forming the Future for

Shariah Compliant Investment Strategies, Euromoney Books, London, 2004, pp. 38-40. 96 FTSE, Ground Rules for the Management of the FTSE Global Islamic Index Series, London, October 2001, p. 6. 97 The Dow Jones Islamic Indices or FTSE Islamic Indices have been compared to total market indices and banking sector indices to

appraise performance.

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in excess of one third of their market capitalization are excluded, as are companies

that derive more than one third of their income from interest, as is the case with

most conventional banks.98

Companies whose ratio of conventional receivables

exceeds 45 percent of their market capitalization are also excluded, the argument

being that such companies are in practice offering conventional lending, as the

revenue from the receivables will include a premium reflecting market rates of

interest.

Islamic funds have been offered in Europe for over two decades, the pioneering

fund being offered by Kleinwort Benson in 1986 and the most publicized being

Flemings Oasis Fund launched in 1996 which was closed after the take-over by

Chase of Flemings.99

The challenge for Islamic equity funds in Europe was to

attract sufficient investment to achieve viability, which proved difficult for stand-

alone offerings. The funds currently available are mostly offered by those large

multinational banks that have a portfolio of shariah compliant services for their

clients. HSBC Amanah for example offers three funds from Dublin and one from

Luxembourg, European centers that have attracted offshore fund business. Those

offered from Dublin include an American equity fund, managed by Wellington, an

Asia-Pacific Fund managed by Aberdeen Asset Management and a Pan-European

Fund managed by Pictet Asset Management. The fund management outsourcing to

specialist managers enhances performance, the aim of HSBC Amanah being to

provide its existing Muslim clients with more choice. For each of the funds the

initial charge is 3.25 percent, the annual management fee 1.85 percent and there is

in addition a switching charge of 1 percent for those wishing to move to other

HSBC funds. The minimum investment is only $10,000 with daily dealing, the

leading holdings of the pan-European fund being BP, Royal Dutch Shell, Glaxo

Smith Klein, Total and Novartis.100

Exposure to European oil companies is thought

to appeal to Gulf investors.

98 Dow Jones, Guide to the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index, New York, June 2005, p. 6. 99 Rodney Wilson, ‘Islamic fund management’, in Muhammad Anwar and Mohamad Aslam Haneef, (eds.), Studies in Islamic Banking

and Finance in the 21st Century: Theory and Practice, International Islamic University of Malaysia, 2005. 100 HSBC Ammanah Pan-European Equity Fund, Report, Dublin, 31st December 2006.

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The only independent shariah compliant fund offered in Europe is by Oasis, a South

African based financial services group with extensive ties with the Gulf. Their

Crescent Global Equity Fund, which was launched from Dublin, is valued at almost

$37 million. Nearly half of the fund’s exposure is to European equities, with the

United States accounting for less than one third. The major sectors for investment

are retailing, healthcare, manufacturing industry and information technology. The

fund has performed well since inception, with an annualized return of 14.5 percent

in dollar terms, well above the 2.6 percent annualized returns from the Dow Jones

Islamic Market Index.101

The appreciation of the Euro has undoubtedly helped

performance given the higher exposure to European stock than is the case for most

global equity funds, whether conventional or Islamic.

The major shariah compliant funds managed from London are offered by Deutsche

Bank and Scottish Widows, the fund management and subsidiary of Lloyds TSB.

The Deutsche Islamic Equity Builder Certificates have been offered since January

2003 and are marketed in the UAE by Emirates Islamic Bank, and white labelled in

Saudi Arabia by the National Commercial Bank, the largest provider of shariah

compliant funds worldwide, as Alahli Islamic Equity Builder Certificates. Shariah

compliance is provided by the shariah board of the National Commercial Bank in

Jeddah. Although managed from London the certificates are listed in Frankfurt.

There are four certificates available based on the United States, the Asia-Pacific

region, Europe and a Global fund combining the other three. The Asia Pacific

Certificates have given a return of 139.6 percent since inception, the European

Certificates a return of 83.9 percent and the United States Certificates a return of

57.6 percent.102

The appreciation of the Euro undoubtedly accounts for the superior

performance of the Euro Certificates in dollar terms relative to the United States

Certificates.

The Scottish Widows Islamic Global Equity Fund was launched in October 2005

the aim being to provide a fund that could be offered to Lloyds TSB Muslim clients

101 Oasis Fund Facts: Crescent Global Equity Fund, Fourth Quarter 2006, Dublin, March 2007. 102 National Commercial Bank Investment Services, Fact Sheet: Alahli Islamic Equity Builder Certificates, Jeddah, 25 December 2006.

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both in the United Kingdom and in the Gulf from their Dubai branch. Scottish

Widows Investment Partnership is one of Europe’s leading asset managers with

funds worth £97.8 billion being managed. The Islamic Global Equity Fund was

valued at $19.3 million, with its major shareholdings including Intel, Pfizer, Bayer,

Rolls Royce, OCC Petrol, China Mobile and Merck.103

The annual management

charge is 1.5 percent, which is very competitive for an Islamic fund given the

additional costs incurred with shariah compliance. Scottish Widows and Lloyds

TSB also market the Children’s Mutual Shariah Baby Bond which qualifies for a

tax free lump sum for children and young people once they become 18. The United

Kingdom government also contributes to this saving scheme by providing vouchers

worth £500 all parents in receipt of Child Benefits.104

Up to £100 per month can be

paid into the fund which can generate a considerable sum which the young person

can use on maturity after their 18th birthday to cover further education costs, a

deposit on a apartment or other expenses. The Shariah Baby Bond is also marketed

by the West Bromwich Building Society, which has a substantial branch network in

the Midlands, where many British Muslim families reside.105

London is also a center for shariah compliant property and leasing funds, although

these are all closed ended, with only a few institutions and individuals of high net

worth subscribing, rather than the general public as with the open ended equity

funds. The property and leasing funds are usually less liquid, with the investment

typically locked in for periods of 3 to 5 years and only limited facilities for

redemptions, usually with exit penalties. ABC Islamic Asset Management is the

leading player in the market through funds that invest in the student, healthcare and

residential property markets as well as club transactions and private portfolio

management where the bank forms partnerships with small groups of investors and

provides leverage through Murabaha and Ijara structures, with the largest residential

property project being in Leeds where almost £60 million was invested.106

The total

103 Scottish Widows Investment Partnership, Islamic Global Equity Fund Report, London, September 2007. 104 Children’s Mutual Shariah Baby Bond Stakeholder Child Trust Fund Account, Key Features, London, 2007. 105 www.westbrom.co.uk/westbrom/news?id=1484 106 Arab Banking Corporation, Islamic Asset Management, London, 2007.

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value of the United Kingdom shariah compliant commercial property portfolio

exceeds £329 million, with the property restricted to halal use which excludes

tenants such as betting shops or alcohol vendors.

Although the leasing funds are offered and managed from London the assets are

worldwide, examples being G.E. Quartz Japan whose operating equipment leases

were financed and the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad in the United States

where the leases covered railway equipment and rolling stock.

8.2.4. Islamic Retail Banking Europe

As the main source of support for Islamic banking has always come from ordinary

Muslims, and the development of Islamic finance can be regarded as a populist

movement rather than an initiative from governments, it is not surprising that retail

Islamic banking has been the dominant activity.107

The world’s largest Islamic

financial institutions, the Al Rajhi Bank of Saudi Arabia and the Kuwait Finance

House, primarily provide retail, personal and private banking products, as do the

Dubai Islamic Bank and Bank Islam Malaysia. In Europe Islamic finance has also

been a bottom up rather than a top down movement, although it is only in the

United Kingdom that the regulator, the Financial Services Authority, has actively

facilitated the development of the industry. Yet France and Germany have much

larger Muslim populations than the United Kingdom, where the total was only 1.8

million when Islamic retail banking started in the 1990s and still remains below

three million today.108

As Muslims are no different to non-Muslims in their needs

and demands for financial services, not surprisingly Islamic banks and conventional

banks offer shariah compliant retail products that mirror those provided to ordinary

clients. Current account or transactions deposits are always offered, as these

facilitate payments through cheques, standing orders, direct debits and most

importantly debit cards for use at point of sale or through automated teller

107 Rodney Wilson, ‘The growth of Islamic banking and product development among Islamic retail banks’, in Sohail Jaffer, (ed.) Islamic Retail Banking and Finance: Global Challenges and Opportunities, Euromoney Books, London, 2005. 108 Rodney Wilson, ‘Challenges and opportunities for Islamic banking and finance in the West: the United Kingdom experience’,

Thunderbird International Business Review, Vol. 41, Nos. 4/5, 1999, pp. 421-444.

187

machines. Of course as conventional current accounts pay little or no interest, some

observers may question the need for special shariah compliant current accounts.

Such accounts however are provided using wakala trust structures, where the

financial institutions guarantees that the amounts deposited will not be used for

interest based financing, or under the qard hassan principle, where the depositor

provides the bank with in interest free loan on the understanding that no riba will be

charged when the finance is utilized. In the United Kingdom both Lloyds TSB109

and HSBC Amanah110

offer shariah compliant current accounts. Banks providing

shariah compliant retail financial services in Europe all offer a range of savings and

investment products. The Islamic Bank of Britain offers a treasury account, where

those who have £100,000 or more to invest can place their funds for fixed periods

ranging from 1-24 months, with higher returns offered for longer time deposits.111

The deposits are structured on a murabaha basis, with the funds used to buy and sell

commodities on the London Metal Exchange, with the client being paid a mark-up

reflecting the trading profit. The profit rate is pre-determined, eliminating risk for

the client, and the bank covers its position in the commodity exchange by agreeing

the sale price at the time of purchase. Such transactions are permissible under

shariah, as the hedging does not involve the use of derivatives such as futures and

options, but rather real trading transactions involving physical commodities.

Savings accounts are also offered where no minimum balance is required but returns

are significantly lower than with the treasury placements. The Islamic Bank of

Britain offers three instant access accounts, an internet direct access account paying

3 percent in September 2007, a young person’s account paying 2.5 percent and a

undetermined savings account using a passbook with branch deposits and

withdrawals paying 2.0 percent. It also offers term savings deposits with minimum

notice periods for withdrawals, the 30 day account paying 3.25 percent, the 90 day

account 3.50 percent and the 180 day account 3.75 percent.112

These accounts are

109 http//:www.lloydstsb.com/current_accounts/Islamic_account.asp 110 http://www.hsbc.co.uk/1/2/personal/current-accounts/more/amanah-finance 111 http://www.islamic-bank.com/islamicbanklive/CommodityDeposits/1/Home/1/Home.jsp 112 http://www.islamic-bank.com/islamicbanklive/IAProfitsRates/1/Home/1/Home.jsp

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based on a mudarabah structure, with the depositor sharing in the profits of the bank

rather than earning interest. It should be noted that the percentage returns indicated

are target rates, which are not guaranteed, as under a mudaraba structure returns

cannot be pre-determined.

With mudaraba the profit rate declared on which returns on deposits are based

should be related to the profitability of the financial institution.113

However most

Islamic banks, including the Islamic Bank of Britain, maintain a profit equalization

reserve into which a proportion of bank revenue is paid rather than being distributed

to depositors. The aim is to maintain a reserve fund, from which a profit share can

be paid, even in years when the bank generates less profit.114

The cost to depositors

is that they receive less in the more profitable years. This profit smoothing, which is

encouraged by regulators, including the Financial Services Authority, enables

Islamic banks to stay competitive with conventional banks, with the option of

increasing profit rates when interest is rising and other financial institutions pay

more to depositors. Islamic banks are often criticized by strict Muslims for

benchmarking profit rates to interest indices, but legally the returns they pay are

profits, not interest, and as Islamic banks only account for a minute share of bank

deposits in most markets, they are price takers, not price makers. There is a

potential conflict between mudaraba depositors and shareholders in an Islamic bank,

as higher dividend payments to the latter may be at the expense of profit share

payments to the former.

However if the mudarabah depositors are not sufficiently rewarded, not many will

be attracted to the bank, which will adversely affect the bank’s growth and its long

run profitability. In other words the market can provide a solution, without the need

for regulatory intervention. Mudarabah is regarded as an equity type arrangement,

but it is not the same as equity investment, as it is the shareholders who own the

bank and enjoy voting rights, not the mudarabah depositors. However while the

shareholders may receive very variable dividends, and suffer capital losses as well

113 Mervyn K. Lewis and Latifa M. Algaoud, Islamic Banking, Edward Elgar, Cleltenham, 2001. 114 Islamic Financial Services Board, Guiding Principles of Risk Management for Institutions (Other than Insurance Institutions) Offering

only Islamic Financial Services, Kuala Lumpur, December 2005.

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as gains, returns to the mudarabah depositors fluctuate less, but they do not benefit

from capital gains. Under shariah the nominal capital value of mudarabah deposits

cannot be guaranteed, but in practice it is never written down as it is the

shareholders dividend that is cut or eliminated when losses occur, with mudaraba

depositors also higher in the pecking order with regard to claims in the case of

insolvency. In addition to offering mudarabah accounts which entitle the depositor

to a share in the bank’s profits, a number of Islamic banks provide specified

mudaraba accounts where the funds deposited are allocated to a single company

with the agreement of the depositor. The Islamic bank in these cases acts as an

agent, charging an arrangement and annual management fee, with the depositor

sharing in the profits of the specified company. The returns will normally be more

volatile than those in general investment accounts, as bank profits will partly

depend on its competency in risk and debt portfolio management. The depositor

expectation would however be for a higher return with a specified investment

account. So far such accounts are not offered in Europe, but they have proved

popular elsewhere, notably with Jordan Islamic Bank depositors.115

Islamic banks cannot provide overdraft facilities or personal loans on which interest

is payable, but rather structured financing facilities for specific purposes usually

involving the acquisition of physical assets. In markets such as Europe however

many retail clients want cash loans, so that they can shop around for the best price,

rather than relying on murabaha facilities, where an Islamic bank purchases a

commodity on behalf of a client, who then purchases the commodity from the bank

for a larger payment including a mark-up, with settlement being on a deferred

payments basis. To avoid tying financing to particular trading transactions, and

provide greater flexibility, a number of Islamic banks, including the Islamic Bank of

Britain, offer a tawarruq facility.116

This involves an initial murabaha transaction,

and a simultaneous reverse transaction, where the client sells the commodity

115 Jordan Islamic Bank, Annual Report 2006, Amman: www.jordanislamicbank.com/annualreport.html 116 http://www.islamic-bank.com/islamicbanklive/PFGenerateCash/1/Home/1/Home.jsp

190

received to a third party nominated by the Islamic bank, in return for a cash sum

being deposited in his or her

current account.117

The effect is identical to an overdraft or personal loan with the

client repaying on a deferred payments basis, but the legitimacy under shariah is

that the financing is asset backed and involves trading rather than a straight loan.

The legal rights and obligations under English law, as well as under shariah, are

distinctive, but because tawarruq mirrors conventional financing, it has many

critics.118

In most European countries, especially in the United Kingdom and France, most

people, including Muslims, want to own the home they live in, and are prepared to

take out substantial mortgages for this purpose, with this becoming their largest

single financial commitment. As conventional mortgages are based on interest on

the amounts borrowed, the challenge in Islamic finance was to develop satisfactory

shariah compliant alternatives. The first Islamic mortgages in Europe were offered

in 1988 by Al Baraka Bank to Gulf Arabs for properties in London, with the

mortgages structured through an ijara rental contract, whereby the bank purchased

the property, and the client repaid by monthly instalments and in addition paying

rent to the bank, which was based on the implicit rental value of the property as

agreed through an independent valuation.119

After the Al Baraka Bank reverted to

becoming an investment company it ceased to provide housing finance and the

United Bank of Kuwait, which already provided conventional mortgages, started to

offer mortgages based on murabaha from 1997, and the following year housing

finance based on ijara contracts, the latter being the equivalent to a variable rate

mortgage, while repayments and the mark-up for the murabaha mortgage was fixed.

Both were perceived as expensive, not least because stamp duty had to be paid

twice, initially when the bank purchased the property and subsequently when the

client purchased from the bank. It was only after the 2004 budget in the United

117 Harvard Law School Islamic Legal Studies Programme, Workshop on Tawarruq, 1st February 2007, London School of Economics.

Included papers presented by Mohamed A. Elgari and Mohammad Nejatullah Siddiqi. 118 Mahmoud A. El-Gamal, Islamic Finance: Law, Practice and Economics, Cambridge University Press, 2006. 119 Rodney Wilson, ‘Islamic banking in the West’, in M. Kabir Hassan and Mervyn K. Lewis, Handbook of Islamic Banking, Edward

Elgar, Cheltenham, England and Northampton, Massachusetts, 2007.

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Kingdom, when the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced the abolition of the

double stamp duties on these mortgages, that shariah compliant housing finance

became more competitive.

Following the stamp duty relief, Al Buraq, the Islamic retail finance subsidiary of

the Arab Banking Corporation, devoted more energy and resources to marketing

shariah compliant home finance. As a result it has become the leading player in the

United Kingdom market. Al Buraq does not have a branch network, but it markets

its Islamic home finance through Bristol and West,45 a former building society

purchased by the Bank of Ireland, with a substantial branch network, including in

areas with significant Muslim populations. In addition the Islamic Bank of Britain

offers Al Buraq shariah compliant home finance through a white labeling agreement

under which they receive a fee for every client signed up. The Arab Banking

Corporation has a large base of shariah compliant deposits which can be used to

finance the Islamic mortgages, unlike Islamic Bank of Britain, whose deposit base is

small. Lloyds TSB also offers Al Buraq mortgages,120

as although it is one of the

largest banks in the United Kingdom, with enormous deposits, these are

conventional and pay interest, and hence cannot be used to fund shariah compliant

housing finance. Al Buraq’s Islamic mortgages are based on a combined ijara and

musharaka structure with the bank and the client entering a partnership, and the

bank paying up to 90 percent of the capital and the client at least 10 percent.

Repayments are scheduled up to 25 years, with the client paying rent to the bank for

its share of the property, this being the main element in the bank’s profit.121

Most

young clients are more concerned with their initial monthly payments rather than

payments after 10 or 20 years, as by then their financial circumstances should have

improved as their careers progress.

Therefore to ensure the initial payments are competitive, only very small

repayments are made at first, the major servicing element being the rent. After

several years repayments increase as rent diminishes, but the aim is to backload

120 http://www.alburaq.co.uk/homefinance.asp 121 http://www.lloydatsb.com/mortgages/islamic_home_finance.asp

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rather than frontload total monthly payments so that they increase rather than

decrease over time. Actual repayments can be tailored to the needs of individual

clients and their future income prospects. Most types of property are acceptable for

shariah compliant mortgages including leaseholds with more than 70 years of life.

Self-certification of income is permitted, and Islamic mortgages are also available

on a buy to let basis. The major competitor to Al Buraq in shariah compliant

housing finance is HSBC Amanah which offers a similar financing structure.122

Their mortgages were seen by some as more expensive, but the terms have become

more favourable as they have sought to increase market share. (Please see

ANNEXES 1, 2 and 3)

8.2.5. Islamic Investment Banking

It is only during the last decade that investment banking has become significant in

the Muslim world, and all of the largest Islamic banks, such as Al Rajhi Bank or the

Kuwait Finance House, are retail rather than investment institutions. Investment

banks are focused on financing mergers and acquisitions; the arranging of initial

public offerings (IPOs) of shares when companies are floated; the securitization of

assets, as well as bond and note issuance and the development of structured

products and financial derivatives.123

Most, but not all, of these activities are shariah

compliant, but what makes investment banking potentially attractive from a shariah

perspective is that most of their income is fee based, rather than being dependent on

interest, as with conventional retail banks.

There is only one exclusively shariah compliant investment bank in Europe, the

European Islamic Investment Bank, (EIIB) which was established on 11 January

2005.124

The EIIB obtained its license from the United Kingdom’s Financial

Services Authority on 8 March 2006 and has its headquarters in the City of London,

Europe’s major investment banking center. Its initial financial backing was from

123 Shelagh Heffernan, Modern Banking, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, 2005. 124 European Islamic Investment Bank, Annual Report and Accounts, London.

193

Gulf investors, but like Islamic Bank of Britain, it was admitted to the London

Stock Exchange Alternative Investment Market (AIM) where its shares were listed

for its IPO. This raised capital worth £73 million, giving the bank a capital base of

£184 million, which is of course very small in relation to most major investment

banks.

The EIIB is focused on three business areas with specialized divisions: treasury and

capital markets, asset management and corporate finance and advisory.125

The

treasury and capital market division provides spot foreign exchange rate quotes and

the Islamic equivalent of forward quotes for transactions which must be undertaken

as futures trading is not permissible under shariah. It also quotes sukuk prices in

London, and is involved in inter-bank commodity murabaha and wakala money

market transactions mostly through the London Metal Exchange. The capital

markets remit covers sukuk securitization and structured trade finance and the bank

is hoping it can play a leading role in Sterling and Euro corporate sukuk issuance.

Asset management services include the provision of property investment, structured

product and private equity funds although all of these products is at an early stage of

development within EIIB. The corporate finance services involve advising on

capital raising opportunities, mergers and acquisitions and cross border private

equity placements, with the focus on businesses based in the Gulf but with financial

interests, including subsidiaries, in Europe.

The market for investment banking services is highly competitive and the leading

European investment banks have of course much more expertise and resources than

niche operators such as EIIB. In contrast to wealth management and private banking

where the stress is on building long term client relationships, in investment banking

clients are more likely to shop around for the best deal when awarding their

mandates. Several leading European investment banks have secured the services of

shariah advisors or appointed shariah boards so that they can compete for

investment banking business in the Gulf and South East Asia which involves

125 European Islamic Investment Bank, Our Business, London, 2006, pp. 3-8.

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Muslim clients or institutions concerned with shariah compliance. Deutsche Bank

has been particularly active through its specialist Islamic banking operation based in

Dubai. It has provided investment structures that facilitate the issuance of shariah

compliant securities that offer investors access to alternative asset classes.126

Together with Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank launched 14

structured products in August 2007 which are traded on the Dubai International

Financial Exchange (DIFX). Returns are linked through DIFX TraX that gives

investors exposure to shares listed on the Dubai Financial Market and the Abu

Dhabi Securities Market, as well as commodities including oil.127

Earlier in June

2007 Deutsche Bank joined forces with Dubai Islamic Bank to issue five year

capital protected notes with the returns linked to the Deutsche Bank – Goldman

Sachs Asset Management ALPS Index.128

Deutsche Bank also pioneered a shariah

compliant profit rate swap with Dubai Islamic Bank, the equivalent to a variable and

fixed interest rate swap through a transaction worth $500 million.129

French investment banks have also been actively involved in Islamic finance,

notably Société Générale and Calyon, the investment banking subsidiary of Credit

Agricole. Société Générale arranged refinanced the Taweelah desalination plant in

Abu Dhabi through its Islamic banking unit in Dubai with a $150 million share

being shariah compliant and the remaining $390 million share including

conventional bonds and corporate lending.130

Calyon has been active with its

affiliated bank, Banque Saudi Fransi, in syndicated Islamic financing. Its largest

deal to date in June 2007 was the arrangement of a $2.9 billion shariah compliant

financing facility for Mobily, the Saudi Arabian mobile phone subsidiary of

Etisalat, the UAE telephone company.131

This was based on a murabaha fixed mark-

up pricing arrangement, as was an earlier $150 syndicated facility for the Alliance

126 www.db.com/press/en/content/press-releases-2007-3347.htm 127 DIFX Press Release, Dubai, 28 August 2007. 128 ‘DIB launches DB structured notes’, Trade Arabia Banking and Finance, Dubai, 14 June 2007. 129 ‘Deutsche Bank closes first Islamic collar profit rate swap with Dubai Islamic Bank’, ISI Emerging Markets Press Release, London, 3rd October 2007. 130 www.sgcib.com/deal-focus.rha?c=deal-focus{unid=64AA780BF11046BFC1256E... 131 www.calyon.com/news/corporate-investment-bank/etisalat-mobiliy-murabaha-refer...

195

Bank, one of the leading financial institutions in Kazakhstan, Central Asia.132

The

shariah board of Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank provided the compliance advice, as

Calyon does not have its own shariah board.

8.3. European Countries - Current Situation and Future Outlook

8.3.1. The UK

The UK is the first country in Europe to have promoted and encouraged retail

Islamic banking. It is in the process of embracing Islamic financial techniques by

introducing new laws to facilitate further market entry and practice of Islamic

finance in the UK.

According to the Office of National Statistics133

the UK Muslims within the UK

have the following countries of origin:

Pakistan - 43%

Bangladesh - 16%

India - 8%

Other Asian - 6%

Other - 27%

According to research carried out by The Runnymede Trust the Muslims from

Middle East and Africa represent 24% of the total Muslim population in the UK.

The UK already has five licensed Islamic banks including The Islamic Bank of

Britain, which was formed by a group of investors from the Middle East, and The

European Islamic Investment Bank (EIIB), which is the first investment bank in

Europe that offers Shariah compliant investment banking products and services. The

founding shareholders of European Islamic Investment Bank (EIIB) include Persian

Gulf based individuals and institutions, including a number of Islamic banks, as

well as individuals and companies based in Europe. The Bank of London & the

132 www.calyon.com/news/corporate-investment-bank/references-2007141 133 UK Office of Statistics 2004.

196

Middle East (BLME), Securities House (UK) and the European Finance House

(EFH) are the other three Islamic financial institutions authorised in the UK.

The role of the UK Government in facilitating the expansion of Islamic banking in

the country is remarkable. Since the early 2000s the Government has introduced a

series of tax and legislative changes specifically designed to remove obstacles to the

development of Islamic finance. The first significant change came in the Finance

Act 2003 which introduced relief to prevent multiple payment of Stamp Duty Land

Tax on Islamic mortgages. The Finance Acts of 2005 and 2006 contained further

measures aimed at putting other Islamic products on the same tax footing as their

conventional counterparts. Most recently, the Finance Act 2007 clarified the tax

framework further in the case of Sukuk. In March 2008 the first government Sukuk

was listed on the London Stock Exchange. The sovereign bond is a USD 350

million bond issued by the Gulf Kingdom of Bahrain and it is structured to avoid

paying interest in line with the Islamic law. At the end of 2008 a license for an

Islamic investment bank was also lodged by Gatehouse Capital PLC, a wholly

owned subsidiary of Kuwait’s Global Securities House.

Furthermore, the UK Government is determined to maintain its momentum on work

on Islamic finance and to make clear to stakeholders its commitment to this

industry. As such, it aims to publish a paper detailing the UK strategy on Islamic

finance in 2009. There are many conventional banks in the UK which provide

Islamic products:

HSBC Amanah is the global Islamic banking division of the HSBC Group. It

was established in 1998 with the aim of making HSBC an international provider

of Islamic banking worldwide. In the UK the HSBC Amanah Finance UK134

is

the division which provides a wide

range of Islamic financial products, developed in consultation with independent

Sharia scholars such as current accounts for private and business customers as

well as mortgages, chequing facilities, investment opportunities, personal and

corporate financial solutions.

134 For further information on HSBC Amanah UK, please visit: www.hsbcamanah.co.uk/amanahuk/index.html.

197

UBS operates the UBS Islamic Finance service135

providing investors the

freedom to choose a Shariah-compliant investment profile across a range of

assets such as commodities, equities, fixed income, FX, indices and investment

banking. In December 2008 Barclays launched the UK's first Sharia-compliant

exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and has formed a panel of Islamic scholars to

supervise such products.

Lloyds TSB is the best example within the retail and commercial sector as they

have developed a suite of Shariah approved products for their customers –

including those who wish to bank ethically who are not necessarily Muslim. It

offers current, business and student accounts, mortgages and investment funds.

In January 2008 it launched its new current account, the Islamic Nostro

Account136

. Related to Islamic home finance, Lloyds TSB collaborates with the

Arab Banking Corporation International Bank (ABC) which provides Alburaq, a

Shariah-compliant home finance service for Islamic house purchases.137

8.3.1.1. Government Initiatives

In the course of researches and investigations initiated after the terrorist

attacks on September 11, 2001 it was found that many Muslims in Western

countries face social exclusion and live concentrated in urban areas of large

cities. (Plews 2005 and Wilson 2000) The United Kingdom government

promoted thereupon more tolerance in British society and issued several

programs. (Plews 2005) Some of those facilitated the provision of Shariah

compliant financial services, by abolishing regulatory hurdles and tax

disadvantages, in order to give local Muslims the possibility to handle their

financial matters in accordance with their faith.

135 To obtain more details on the UBS Islamic offer, please visit: www.ibb.ubs.com/mc/islamicfinance/index.shtml. 136 LLOYDS TSB has launched a new bank account enabling Muslims to transfer money around the world without breaking the rules of Islam. The group claimed its Islamic Nostro Account was the first of its kind to be offered by a mainstream Western bank. A Nostro

account, complying with Shariah law, does not pay interest on money and does not offer an overdraft facility and it does not allow any of

the funds held to be invested in industries – such as alcohol and gambling – which are prohibited under the rules of the faith. Read more at: http://menmedia.co.uk/asiannews/news/business/s/1033498_new_islamic_account_for_lloyds 137 To obtain further information on the Lloyds offer of Islamic products and services, please visit:

www.lloydstsb.com/current_accounts/islamic_account.asp.

198

Lord Edward George (Governor of the Bank of England) emphasized

already in 1995 the growing importance on Islamic banking on an

international level and suggested to “put Islamic banking in the context of

London’s tradition of ‘competitive innovation’” (Financial Services

Authority 2007). It became apparent that the United Kingdom has a “clear

economic interest” (Financial Services Authority 2007) in establishing as the

European Islamic financial center. In 2001 a high level working group was

initiated chaired by Lord George with the target to “examine the barriers to

Islamic finance in the UK” (Financial Services Authority 2007). Its

members included representatives from the City of London, the government,

the Muslim community and the FSA who identified, for example, the

problem of double stamp duty paid on Islamic mortgages138

. All resolutions

passed became a matter of public policy and were translated into respective

government legislations (please see figure 29). The overriding principle is

“no obstacles, but no special favors” for Islamic banks with the purpose to

create a level playing field facing competition of conventional banks.

In the subsequent years the interaction with the Muslim community has been

reinforced, for example, by maintaining working level contacts with Islamic

institutions (such as the IIBI), other regulatory agencies, the Islamic

financial service industry and international organizations (such as the

AAOIFI). (Financial Services Authority 2007) Since 2004, at least four

fully-fledged Islamic banks have be granted a banking license by the FSA,

namely the Islamic Bank of Britain (2004), the European Islamic Investment

Bank (2006), the Bank of London and Middle East (2007) and the

Gatehouse Bank (2008). Together with the numerous Islamic Windows

operated by London’s conventional banks (who are not subject to special

authorisation by the FSA), this results in the highest concentration of Islamic

financial insitutions in a non-Muslim country.

138 Before the stamp duty had to be paid in Islamic mortgage contracts twice as it was first paid on the purchase of the property by the

bank and secondly it emerged on the transfer of the property by the bank to the customer at the end of the mortgage term. Similar tax

disadvantages for Islamic financial products exist in several legislations due to the asset transactions involved.

199

8.3.1.2. Future Prospect Outlook

The UK is the hub of Islamic financial activity in the West and I also

discover that UK based conventional Banks with Islamic banking window

providing best services in compliance with Shariah law that fulfill the

requirements of Muslim community in different sectors especially in Ijarah

(leasing), Takaful (insurance) Sukuk (bond) and also provide services in

home finance, personal loan, current and saving accounts. In the UK Islamic

Banking have great opportunities to growth because a large number of

Muslims from all over the world living in the UK, they are playing their role

effectively in country’s economy. Islamic banking has also great challenges

due to lack of awareness about Islamic banking by its customers and as well

as some other issues related to UK Regulatory Authority, structure of

Islamic Shariah Board and its implementation.

Figure 29 -- Regulatory initiative in the United Kingdom (Financial Services

Authority 2007)

200

8.3.2. France

France has a Muslim population of around 6 million. However, authorities and

regulators have been slow to introduce changes in the regulatory framework to

accommodate Islamic financial products. Finally in 2007, France announced

reforms to adapt its banking legislation to allow more traditional banks to engage in

Islamic products.139

In April 2008 the French Government asked to the Paris

Europlace, the Paris financial markets organization, to produce a report analyzing

the necessary measures in order to make this marketplace a competitive one

worldwide in the provision of Islamic products and services. In May 2008 France’s

Upper House of Parliament – the Senate – hosted roundtable discussions with

politicians, bankers and Shariah scholars to discuss how to support Islamic finance

by raising awareness and changing the legal and fiscal framework.140

In July 2008

the Financial Markets Authority (AMF) requested the Paris Europlace to establish a

working group composed of representantives of the financial industry to give

market participants a clear picture of the legal and transparency requirements for

listing Sukuk in France.141

The findings of the Paris Europlace report (known as “the Jouini-Pastre report142

”)

concluded that France provides a welcoming environment for Islamic finance

subject to certain legal and tax adjustments. This statement is based on the cultural

similarities between France and the Muslim countries. Therefore the report said that

France could be among the world leaders in providing Islamic financial products if

the country made a small number of legal reforms. To reach this objective it would

be necessary to attract an important amount of capital to the Paris Europlace. The

report estimates that this sum should be around EUR100 billion. These conclusions

complement the recommendations presented by the Chairman of the Paris

Europlace Islamic Finance Committee Gilles Saint Marc143

to the Senate. In his

139 adnmundo.com 2007. 140 Ramadier 2008. 141 Gordon 2008. 142 The Jouini-Pastre report provides 10 proposals to reach the abovementioned objectives –Paris Europlace 2008 143 Gilles Saint Marc is the Chairman of the Paris Europlace Islamic Finance Committee. He presented his recommendations to the Senate

on 14 May 2008. See Saint Marc 2008a for the French presentation and Saint Marc 2008b for the English version.

201

recommendations, he provides a study on the compatibility between Islamic finance

and the French law.

The Islamic finance represents an opportunity for France and it is necessary to make

some reforms. These reforms include the enactment of a law modifying the French

Monetary and Financial Code and to include adequate regulatory provisions in the

next finance bill and the enactment of appropriate tax instruction.144

In addition,

these modifications will benefit from other reforms currently underway (trust

(fiducie) and civil transfer of receivables as security). The study states that Islamic

finance will bring the following advantages to the French financial system:

1. Access to new liquidity;

2. Positive external factors such as the integration of Muslims in France; and

3. Proof of the modernity of French law and its capacity for adaptation.

As a result of the abovementioned studies’ conclusions, three measures were

adopted in 2008 related to the conditions for issuing Sukuk in Euronext-

Paris – the French securities market; the elimination of double taxation on

registration rights in Murabaha contracts and implementation of the tax

deduction on capital earned from Sukuk.

In February 2009 the Paris Europlace Islamic Finance Committee published a 2009

program, which defines 8 action points to pursue in-depth the development of

Islamic finance in France.145

These actions show that there is a clear political will to

change the French financial regulatory framework to include the offer of Islamic

products.

Concerning the French financial actors, some French banks have Islamic investment

portfolios that operate through their branches in Muslim countries.146

Only a

handful of French banks, such as Société Générale or BNP and its subsidiary BNP

Paribas Najmahis, currently offer Islamic products based on “Murabaha”. This

product is a form of credit that enables customers to make purchases without taking

an interest bearing loan. The bank buys the goods for the customer and re-sells them

144 Saint Marc 2008b. 145 Further details of this plan are provided in Paris Europlace (2009). 146 Fulconis-Tielens 2007.

202

to the customer on a deferred basis, adding an agreed upon margin of return. The

customer then pays the sale price for the goods in installments, effectively obtaining

credit without paying interest. The contract and the liquidation date of the Murabaha

are fixed, and the payment to the bank is settled directly after a Murabaha

liquidation.

There is a potentially one Islamic retail bank – Tayseer Bank – going through the

authorization process with regulators. Negotiations began at the end of 2005 and it

should be operational after the French Government carries out the necessary

regulatory reforms.147

At the end of 2008, Qatar Islamic Bank, Kuwait Finance

House and Al-Baraka Islamic Bank (Bahrain) requested licenses to operate in

France, which could be possible before the end of 2009.

France started in retail and expansion with reduced speed:

Tax and legislative changes in support of Islamic finance (in particular

regarding ijarah, istisna’ and murabahah)

French government hopes to take 10% of the global Islamic market by 2020

Graduate degree programs in Islamic Finance at the universities of Paris and

Strasbourg

AAOIFI approved sukuk structures which are in accordance with French law

(2010), framework for sukuk issues ready by early 2011 – but no issue so far

AAOIFI standards translated into French

No Islamic windows of conventional banks

Moroccan Chaabi Bank (in France since 1972) first to offer licensed Islamic

retail banking products; Al Baraka Bank announced market entry 2012

IDB Group’s Islamic Corporation for the Development of the Private Sector

(ICD) French partner Islamic financing tools for SMEs

Public opinion not in favor of Islamic peculiarities (see ban on burqa)

147 Saddy 2007.

203

8.3.2.1. Government Initiatives

Given the possible market potential, Paris “aims at competing with London

as European hub for Islamic finance” (Moody’s Investors service 2008) by

establishing an Islamic financial services sector. For the time being the

political and governmental authorities have already launched several

initiatives to support this development. Initially the French Financial

Markets Authority (FMA) issued a note in 2007, comprising among others

the authorization of Shariah compliant collective investment schemes and

specific criteria charactering Islamic funds (according to the screen process

of the two major index suppliers, please refer to 1.2.4.1). Moreover the Paris

Europlace Committee, a French financial think tank, carried out a study on

necessary technical adjustments for a level playing field of conventional and

Islamic financial products in the French legal and tax framework. It has to be

mentioned that only Islamic wholesale business was subject to this research.

In the result the French economy minister Christine Lagarde concluded that

“French law already offers the best flexibility and adaptability to welcome

Islamic financial operations”. (Terdeyet 2008) Nevertheless there are still

new measures and tax incentives for Islamic financial services in

preparation. The support of the French state is regarded as indispensable for

the development of the financial service industry, according to Moody’s

Investors Service.

Currently the governmental efforts concentrate on investment and corporate

banking, in particular on the issuance of Sukuk (please refer to 1.2.4.2) by

private sector companies in order to raise funds in Middle East. The process

for the development of Islamic retail banking is in a much earlier stage and

the establishment of a French fully-fledged Islamic retail bank is not

foreseeable in the near future. (Moody’s Investors Service 2008)

204

8.3.2.2. Future Prospect Outlook

In the coming weeks, Bank Chaabi148

will open its Shariah compliant

deposit account to SMEs, thus addressing a latent need of small businesses

for Islamic banking products. SMEs have voiced an important demand for

Islamic products, as French Muslims are known for their entrepreneurship

and represent an interesting customer base for Islamic banking. Hopes are

now high again that France will develop a sound Islamic finance market. But

much remains to be done.

First, the French AAOIFI standards have yet to be distributed and spread.

Second, Chaabi Bank is not yet offering the most complex products:

corporate funding and mortgages. Chaabi says it is aiming at a full set of

products by the end of 2012, which seems realistic in light of the recent 10-

year Murabahah home fi nuancing product.

Third, wholesale banking and capital markets are yet to be developed.

Chaabi’s first French Islamic window should pave the way for international

Islamic investment banks willing to penetrate the French market. The Sukuk

market may also benefit from the current funding difficulties experienced by

French international corporations, which could take advantage of the

comprehensive French framework for Sukuk issuance and listing.

Fourth, Takaful is not yet a mature topic in France, even though synergies

will appear evident with the rise of distribution networks for Islamic banking

products.

Finally, among the key 2012 drivers are the coming presidential and

legislative elections in May and June. But no matter what the results will be,

the industry will keep developing in France thanks to sound foundations and

strong potential. The election result only effect will be to influence the pace

of the industry’s growth.

148 http://www.chaabibank.fr

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8.3.3. Germany

Although it has an important Muslim population, Germany has not adopted its

regulatory framework to allow for the offer of Islamic products and services in the

country. Two factors can explain this situation. First, the development of Islamic

finance in the country has not received the necessary political support. Second, the

Muslim population of Germany is essentially composed of ethnically Turkish

people (second or third generation), which in general have shown less interest in

Islamic finance than other Muslims. The Deutsche Bundesbank argued that there are

still some challenges confronting the financial community with regard to Islamic

finance. Among the most significant factors which directly affects Germany is that

the supply of Islamic products is still largely geographically constrained in the

Middle East, Malaysia and London. This makes it difficult for a large number of

Muslims who live in Germany and in Europe to access these services.

The products are still aimed at a limited demographic target, designed for wealthy

private and institutional investors. The German financial institutions that offer

Islamic products do not advertise them and the product information is mostly only

written in English since it is aimed at investors from Islamic countries abroad and

not at the German Muslim population.149

In spite of this, some Governmental

initiatives can be observed. For example, in June 2004, the federal state of Saxony-

Anhalt issued a EUR 100 million Sukuk to Middle-eastern institutional investors

and also to attract Muslim investors to invest in their state.

The Sukuk launched was structured by Citigroup’s Islamic division and was backed

by real estate owned by the Ministry of Finance. The rights of use of this real estate

were transferred to a Dutch foundation which was offering the Sukuk. Saxony-

Anhalt therefore became the first state government in Germany and Europe to issue

a sub-sovereign bond under Islamic principles.150

There are some Muslims banks such as the Irani Bank Sepah established in the

country which have the largest share of the Islamic banking market in Germany.

149 Further information in Böhmler (2007). 150 IslamicFinance.de 2004.

206

Recently KuveytTurk announced its interest in establishing a branch in Germany in

the coming years to satisfy the financial needs of the Muslim Turks. Among

conventional commercial banks, Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank

have experience offering Islamic products and services, however they are

concentrating their Islamic operations on extending their presence in Islamic

countries. Deutsche Bank offers Islamic products thanks to an agreement with the

National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia that allows them to provide a unique

class of investment products – the Islamic EquityBuilder CertificatesTM. The

Certificates, which are all in compliance with Shariah principles and approved by

the highly esteemed and regarded Shariah Board of National Commercial Bank of

Saudi Arabia, use an objective and transparent quantitative strategy rather than an

active management type of strategy. With these Certificates, investors have a choice

to invest in one or more regions or globally, and are able to use them as portfolio

building blocks, with the objective of building long term wealth and diversifying

risk. In 2008 Deutsche Bank received the go ahead from the Bank Negara of

Malaysia to set up a dedicated Islamic banking subsidiary in Malaysia. The

Commerzbank focuses on Islamic investment products, however also offers a

variety of interest-free competitive products meeting Islamic finance requirements

such as Murabaha deposits. Commerzbank has a presence in Dubai, Cairo, Beirut

and Singapore.

Continued talks, little action:

German banks, wealth managers and insurance companies active abroad

(mostly out of London and Dubai) for Middle Eastern and Asian markets but

not in Germany;

First sovereign sukuk: Saxony-Anhalt (2004-2009), no successor;

BaFin (= German regulator) conferences 2009 and 5/2012 to signal

openness, but no comparable signal from tax authorities;

Growing interest of insurance brokers in takaful products, but so far no

active distribution;

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Kuveyt Türk’s application for full banking license pending;

Two Shariah compliant investment funds terminated/liquidated:

Commerzbank’s “Al Sukoor” (2000-2005), Meridio’s “Global Islamic Multi

Asset Funds” (2010-2011);

2012: WestLB launched Islamic Strategy-Index-Certificate (open ended

index tracker certificate with a stop loss mechanism) sold through savings

banks.

8.3.3.1. Future Prospect Outlook

The nucleus of Islamic banking in Germany is the Kuveyt Türk Beteiligungs

bank, a subsidiary of the Turkish member of the Kuwait Finance House

Group. Established in 2010 in Mannheim, it started operations on a modest

scale in 2011. To become the first Islamic bank in Germany, Kuveyt Türk

has to extend its present license for the brokering of deposits with

enterprises outside the European Economic Area into a full banking license.

An application has been made, and it seems possible it can meet the

regulatory requirements. However, the unsolved (or even untouched) legal

and tax issues make it doubtful that the full banking business can start early

in 2012. Other Islamic banks (including some with European passports)

have verbally expressed their interest in operations in Germany, but none

have taken concrete steps. It seems that Kuveyt Türk has to prepare the

ground alone. It may benefit from the growing interest from German

business associations, legal and tax consultants and academics, who produce

an increasing number of studies, articles and conference papers on specific

topics of Islamic finance under the German corporate law and tax regime.

The Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) will organize a follow-

up to its 2009 conference on Islamic finance in May 2012. This could place

Islamic finance (once again) on the political agenda. Another noteworthy

event in Germany, although not restricted to the German market, is a

Workshop on “Islamic Finance and Financial Stability”, jointly organized by

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the Islamic Financial Services Board and the European Central Bank in

Frankfurt by the end of January 2012. The German market will see the

introduction of a new savings product for Muslims: At roughly the same

time in December 2011, when the “Meridio Global Islamic Multi Asset

Funds”, launched only in May 2010, was liquidated, WestLB151

opened the

subscription for its “Islamic Strategy-Index-Certificate”. In the past, WestLB

had structured a number of Shariah compliant deals as an investment bank.

This time it acts in its retail capacity as the central institution for the savings

banks in two German states (North Rhine-Westphalia and Brandenburg).

The savings banks will become the main distribution channels for WestLB’s

open ended index tracker certificate with a stop loss mechanism.

The new “WestLB Islamic German Index” comprises the largest German

(DAX and MDAX) companies whose businesses and financial ratios meet

the criteria of Shariah compliance. Initially, the certificates will represent a

basket of 10 stocks that will be purchased physically. The issuing date for

certificates (with an issue price of 10.00 Euros) is the 17th January 2012,

and trading will start on the Frankfurt and Stuttgart exchanges on the 20th

January 2012.

The stop loss mechanism of the certificate will be triggered by a loss of 8%

(or more): In this case the stocks will be sold and the proceeds will be kept

on an interest-free money account until the index has reached or exceeded its

previous level. Since the new retail product differs from the liquidated one

in all relevant respects – portfolio composition, distribution channel, risk

limitation and Shariah certification —, its prospects may be much better.

151 WestLB AG is a European commercial bank based in Düsseldorf in Germany which is partly owned by the German state of North Rhine Westphalia. The letters LB in the name stand for Landesbank. The Landesbanken are a group of state owned banks unique to

Germany. They are regionally organized and their business is predominantly wholesale banking, however today the WestLB is no longer

a Landesbank.

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8.3.4. Other European Countries

Spain: The Spanish central bank, Banco De España remarks in one of its “Financial

Stability” reports that Islamic finance offers clear opportunities for the Spanish

banking sector. First, the Spanish retail banking sector could diversify their business

and find new commercial opportunities thanks to the economic relationship of Spain

with the Magreb (Northwest Africa) region and also, because these countries’

financial markets have a low correlation with the international financial markets.

Second, there is an interesting possibility of accessing the abundant Islamic savings

through the issuing of Sukuk, which can be used for financing banks or providing

credit to clients. In addition, the growth of the Muslim population in Spain could

mean an extra source of funds for expanding the Spanish retail banking sector. As

this population is consolidated in Spain and they increase their purchasing power,

the Spanish financial institutions could extend their customer base if they are able to

respond to the needs of this population. However, apart from these positive

possibilities, the Banco of España provides a list of arguments remarking several

risks surrounding the Islamic finance in a similar way that Germany does. The

national Islamic authority in Spain, “La Junta Islamica” has begun a process for

creating an Islamic Bank in Spain. The first phase of this process consists of

creating Islamic window facilities in one Spanish bank “Bancorreos” to sell Islamic

financial products such as current accounts and mortgages. Currently they are

offering just information and they have designed some brochures for the public in

order to educate potential customers about these products. Other Spanish banks such

as Santander and the Spanish savings bank “Caixa Bank ” announced their

intentions of entering in the Islamic market.

However, IRB is still relatively unknown in Spain and there is very little Spanish

language information available. Current situation:

Islamic finance is seen as a vehicle to promote employment generating

investments from Muslim countries (in particular GCC)

Conference of Madrid Stock Exchange to explore Islamic finance (2010)

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Exploring in particular sukuk as an alternative vehicle for corporate and

infrastructure finance

Establishment of the Center for Islamic Economics and Finance (CIEF) by

Instituto de Empresa business school and King Abdulaziz University, Saudi

Arabia; re-named November 2011 as Saudi-Spanish Center for Islamic

Economics and Finance (SCIEF)

Cooperation of Dubai International Financial Center (DIFC) with Madrid

Financial Center (MCF) for investment promotion

No Islamic financial institution, no sukuk issuance

Problems with racism and Islamophobia

Luxembourg: Has not been recognized in the world of Islamic finance for a long

period but it has a recent history of innovation in this field. Sukuks and products

structured on contracts such as Mudaraba, Musharaka, Murabaha, Istisna and Ijara

can in principle be set up within the existing legal framework of Luxembourg. Local

financial institutions are increasingly entering the Sukuk market and Shariah

compliant investment funds are being launched under Luxembourg law. In 1983,

Luxembourg was the chosen domicile of the first Shariah compliant insurance

company in Europe. The Luxembourg Stock Exchange was the first European stock

exchange to enter the Sukuk market, having listed Sukuks since 2002. In September

2008, 14 Sukuks with a combined value of USD 5.5 billion were listed and traded

on the Luxembourg Stock Exchange. In September 2008 there were 31 Shariah-

compliant investment funds held in 17 Luxembourg domiciled investment

vehicles.152

Malta: In 2008 the Malta Financial Services Authority (MFSA) launched a

consultation to analyze conventional Islamic funding structures and financing

vehicles vis-à-vis the Maltese regime applicable to collective investment schemes,

152 Source: Luxembourg for Finance (2008). Luxembourg for Finance is an agency for the development of the financial sector and is a

public-private partnership between the Luxembourg Government and the Luxembourg Financial Industry Federation.

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investment service providers, credit and financial institutions. At the end of 2008

and beginning of 2009 the MFSA launched two consultations related to Islamic

bonds and Shariah insurance. The feedback from the first consultation was very

positive and the MFSA envisages a number of opportunities for the setting up of

Malta-based Islamic financial institutions as fully fledged banking institutions, as

well as a number of opportunities for the setting up of Shariah-compliant funds in

Malta. In fact, despite the current global financial troubles, in March 2009 investors

from Dubai have started negotiations with government officials in Malta on a

number of assets and projects. Malta, which joined the European Union in 2004, has

also become part of the Schengen visa regime, which it makes it easily accessible,

especially for investors from the Persian Gulf.

Austria: Among 8.2 million people in Austria, over 450,000 belong to the Muslim

faith in 2001, constituting 4.1 percent. In the early 20th century, when Bosnia-

Herzegovina was annexed by Austria-Hungary, a significant number of Muslims

was ruled by the Austrian government. Later on large immigrations flows from

Turkey and the Balkans arrived during the world wars. Islam is recognized as

official religion in Austria, meaning that it is taught in schools, for example. (BBC

2008) Walker, et al. (2007) state that the Muslim population in Austria will grow by

10 to 15 percent per annum in the next years and Philipp Wackerbeck (2008)

assigns around €230 million market potential to this target group. Alexander von

Pock (2007) estimates that 20 to 30 percent of Austrian Muslims would prefer a

Shariah compliant financial product to a conventional one, even to worse

conditions. Around one third would prefer it for the same conditions (compared to a

conventional product) and for additional 33 percent the religious orientation is not

relevant. There might emerge new market opportunities for Austrian financial

institutions, as Muslims in Austria are in general younger and save more (savings

rate around 18 percent). Of special interest are mortgage financing solutions,

insurance products and mutual funds, according to Mr. Wackerbeck (2008). The

regulatory and fiscal framework conditions have to be adapted in advance in order

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to provide a suitable market environment. For instance, the double stamp duty for

Islamic mortgage financing has to be abolished, like in other European markets. In

establishing itself in the Islamic financial market, Austrian institutions should base

on cooperation’s with Middle Eastern partners for example in the United Arab

Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia or Pakistan in order to obtain knowledge in

product development, operations, IT and sales. At the same time the local banks can

provide market knowledge and a distribution network. (Wackerbeck 2008 and

Walker et al. 2007) Looking at suitable distribution strategies, Walker, et al. (2007)

suggest to have employees from the same ethnical and religious background to

advise customers in their mother tongue. Furthermore a sensitive marketing strategy

is of utmost importance in order to approach the target group effectively.

There are already some banks in Austria that offer tailor-made products and services

for ethnic minorities. (Walker, et al. 2007) In this way several Turkish and

Slovenian banks cater their customers with export financing solutions and other

services destined towards their home country. However it is not apparent whether

those banks offer Shariah compliant services. The only Austrian financial institution

that offers Shariah compliant services to a small extent, is the Raiffaisen

Zentralbank 153

. According to the institution’s website (RZB 2009), it provides an

interest free Euro clearing account for Islamic financial institutions satisfying the

requirements of the Shariah. Furthermore Islamic financing solutions and structured

products are apparently offered on demand, according to an interview of

“diewirtschaft” with Tarek Mourad (2007) from RZB. He stated that the current

demand for their offerings concentrates on the GCC countries, only. Austrian

companies show interest only in case their business partners are provided by an

Islamic bank. RZB’s customers for Shariah compliant products are majorly

institutions. Shariah compliancy is ensured by the Shariah Supervisory Boards of

the respective Islamic partner bank on customer side and only in case of project

financing solutions RZB refers to external Shariah scholars. Mr. Mourad (2007)

153 The Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG (RZB) is headquartered in Vienna and belongs to the leading commercial and investment

banks in Austria. It is the third largest national institution.

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admitted that it would not be recommendable to concentrate on the Austrian market,

only (for example by offering an Islamic fund exclusively equipped with Austrian

securities). The demand for such a product would not be sufficient (Mourad 2007).

Switzerland: In 2008 the Islamic Bank of Britain (IBB) announced a plan to capture

part of the European market through the opening of branch offices in Germany and

Switzerland. However the results of these negotiations have not yet seen the light.

In 2006 Faisal Private Bank opened in Geneva, becoming the first in the country to

operate according to Shariah principles. In 2008 the National Bank of Kuwait

announced that they applied for regulatory approval to set up an Islamic bank with a

Saudi partner in Switzerland. In 2009 however, due to the financial crisis, the bank

stated that the process is still ongoing but has slowed. Switzerland given the good

international reputation of Swiss financial institutions, especially in private banking,

wealthy individuals from Muslim majority countries might become increasingly

interested in their Shariah compliant product offerings as this trend proceeds.

Therefore it seems likely that Switzerland establishes itself as center for Shariah

compliant private wealth management in Europe. The Swiss financial institutions

will thereby cater their international clients in Switzerland and, via respective

subsidiaries, in Middle East. However, due to the fact that neither initiatives from

the Swiss government are known nor Swiss banks have made advances in this

respect, it can estimated that the local Muslim community might not be targeted due

to the low socio-economic status.

Ireland: Ireland has launched a bid to become the home of Islamic finance in

Europe as it seeks to rebuild its once dominant financial services sector. Ireland is

already a significant location for Islamic funds with an estimated 20% of the Islamic

funds market outside the Middle East located in Ireland. The Financial Regulator

can and does authorize Shariah compliant investment funds under collective

investment scheme legislation.

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The Revenue Commissioners issued an e-brief in October, 2009 that clarifies the tax

treatment of Shariah compliant funds, leasing and insurance services in Ireland.

The technical changes provided in Finance Bill 2010 will give equality of treatment

to Islamic financial products as compared to conventional financial products.

Opportunities for Ireland

The Government has highlighted the Gulf Region as an area of growth for

Irish businesses and investors. The Region is also home to large numbers of

Sovereign Wealth Funds and large Regional Banks and finance houses with

access to significant investment capital. Ireland has recently concluded four

Double Taxation Agreements with Gulf States (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain,

Kuwait and UAE) – significant opportunities for investment are now

available provided the necessary framework is in place for Islamic financial

products. There are opportunities for Islamic financial services institutions to

establish EU headquarters locations here. As is currently the case with

conventional financial services products the majority of business activity

associated with Islamic financial products can be ‘pass-ported’ from Ireland

into the EU in accordance with the relevant EU Directives.

Aside from opportunities associated with headquarter operations Islamic

finance also offers a wide range of retail and commercial products, which

would be of interest in Ireland. This includes products such as a sukuk (the

Islamic equivalent of a bond), Murabaha (this financial product could be

used as a replacement for a term loan) and a Diminishing Musharaka

(Musharaka means partnership in Arabic and this arrangement can be used

to craft a mortgage or asset backed loan). These products will open new

sources of capital for Irish businesses from Islamic finance houses.

Conventional equity backed assets have fallen out of favor for some

investors. The ethical approach and the physical nature of the traded asset in

Islamic finance is an opportunity that the Irish Financial Services industry

would be in a strong position to promote to Muslim and Non-Muslim

clients.

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There are about 30,000 Muslims living in Ireland. The Muslim Community,

through the Islamic Cultural Centre of Ireland and the Immigrant Council of

Ireland, as well as through initiatives with individual lenders, has indicated a

demand for Shariah compliant finance.

From a tax perspective, the groundwork has now been laid for the

introduction of such products in that part of the payments made by a person

paying a mortgage may be treated as interest for tax purposes thus qualifying

for mortgage interest relief. However, further changes are required to Stamp

Duties to enable the purchase of an Irish property pursuant to a Shariah

compliant mortgage to come fully within current tax arrangements.

The Netherlands: In 2008, the Dutch supervisory authorities, De Nederlandsche

Bank, and the Autoriteit Financiële Markten carried out a study with respect to

Islamic finance. The conclusion of this study was positive. Demand for Islamic

finance exists in the Netherlands as a result of the substantial number of Muslims in

the country. Dutch central bank reported that although a few domestic banks already

offer Islamic investment products in the Netherlands, the largest demand for Islamic

banking actually exists for Islamic retail finance and mortgages. The authors of the

study point out that important regulatory changes still have to be made to facilitate

Shariah compliant retail banking. Islamic mortgages, for example, are currently not

competitive vis-à-vis conventional mortgages as tax advantages are not applicable

and transfer taxes are charged twice.

Belgium and Italy (Italy is questioned deeply in the next chapter) are examples of

countries where the financial regulatory framework has not been adapted to allow

for the offer of Islamic products and services. The Islamic financial activities in

these countries are based on investment operations carried out by subsidiary

companies of Islamic banks from outside Europe – mainly in the Middle East.

However, Islamic finance has not been developed in this country. Belgium has an

important Muslim population – mainly of Moroccan origin – who are interested in

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Islamic finance. However, the Belgian financial sector estimates that this demand is

not solid enough to develop a whole new Islamic retail banking activity. Banks such

as Fortis and ING have some Islamic financial activities but based in Malaysia.

The Governments of these countries have two alternatives.154

The first is to address

the current regulatory challenges that Islamic financial services have by law. This

involves adapting the regulatory framework for the entire banking sector in order to

support the expansion of the Islamic finance industry. The second alternative is to

address the growth of Islamic finance by separately regulating unique aspects of

Islamic banking. For instance, this would involve regulating how Shariah

Supervisory Boards should work in the country. In parallel, Governments should

keep in mind the rules introduced by the Islamic regulatory authorities that have set

Islamic Shariah rules for finance and accounting (among other standards).

8.3.5. Future Prospects for Islamic Finance in Europe

Although Islamic banking and financial services have been offered from Europe for

almost three decades in many respects the industry is still in its infancy. Much of

the business activity has been focused on shariah compliant institutions from the

Gulf and Muslim investors of high net worth, but this has resulted in activity being

somewhat cyclical and linked to oil market developments.155

The impact on

Europe’s resident Muslim population has been marginal, and mostly confined to the

United Kingdom, even though France and Germany have much larger Muslim

populations, with that of France exceeding five million. The Gulf and wider Muslim

world is likely to continue to generate substantial Islamic finance business for

London as an international financial center and Europe’s leading investment banks

and asset managers, but the longer term prospects are more likely to be shaped by

developments within Europe and further European Union enlargements. There are

two major issues, the first being whether retail Islamic banking services can be

provided for continental Europe’s Muslim population and if this is desirable.

154 Islam 2008. 155 Farmida Bi, ‘The global development of Islamic finance’, Business Islamica, Dubai, September 2007.

217

Secondly there is the issue of European Union enlargement to encompass countries

and regions with long established Muslim populations in the Balkans, and Turkey,

the most populous state in Europe, with over 72 million Muslims.

Although the European Union functions as a single market, banking and financial

regulation is devolved to member states. In the United Kingdom the Financial

Services Authority has played a proactive role with respect to Islamic banking and

finance and been broadly supportive, but that has not been the position elsewhere in

Europe, where central banks and other regulatory authorities have shown little

interest. There is also a negative perception of shariah, especially amongst right

wing and nationalist politicians, which potentially inhibits the spread of Islamic

banking and finance. What is not always appreciated is that shariah compliance in

finance is a choice, and not about the imposition of shariah on those, including

Muslims, who want to lead secular lives and manage their financial affairs in a

conventional manner. Some critics assert that Islamic finance is simply another

facet of segregation and places Muslim banking in a ghetto, but those who rebut this

argument point out, as shown earlier, that many leading European banks are now

heavily involved in Islamic finance. There

is certainly potential to develop more shariah compliant savings and financing

products for Europe’s Muslim community, as well as distribute Islamic takaful

insurance which remains in its infancy in Europe, despite the involvement of firms

such as Allianz and Prudential in the takaful industry in the Gulf. At present the

worldwide value of takaful premiums amounts to $1.7 billion, but less than one

percent of this is spent in Europe.156

The greatest potential for Islamic finance in Europe is undoubtedly in Turkey where

Islamic banking has been established since the 1980s although it remains on the

fringes of the financial system, accounting for less than five percent of deposits, and

opinions on its merits are politicized as already indicated. Turkey currently has six

special finance houses, as Islamic banks in the country are designated, most being

156 Susan Dingwall and Ffion Flockhart, ‘The potential for takaful in Europe’, Business Islamica, Dubai, September 2007.

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under joint Gulf and Turkish ownership. The largest shariah compliant bank, Ihlas

Finance House, collapsed during the financial crisis of 2001-2002, but depositors

were compensated through Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance which helped

maintain public confidence in the special finance houses. The leading institutions

are Kuveyt Turk Participation Bank, which was established in 1989, and is majority

owned by Kuwait Finance House and the Kuwait Social Security Fund,92 and Bank

Asya, which is under majority Turkish ownership, and dates from 1996.157

Kuveyt

Turk has a network of 79 branches while Bank Asya has 111 branches spread

throughout the country, but with the largest number in Istanbul and Ankara. Both

banks receive most of their deposits through profit sharing mudaraba accounts, and

Kuveryt Turk, like its Kuwait parent, is heavily involved in leasing finance using an

ijara structure.

Turkey has the greatest potential for expansion of banking in Europe, including

Islamic banking, as the fastest growing economy, with GDP growth averaging 7.5

percent over the period from 2004 to 2006; and although this slowed to 5.7 percent

in 2007, growth is expected to accelerate to 6.2 percent for 2008.94 Turkey of

course starts from a low base given its per capita GDP of under $8,000, but it has

attracted foreign direct investment of almost $10 billion annually since 2005 and

remittances, mainly from Turks working in the European Union, average almost $ 1

billion annually.158

Turkey can serve as a bridge between the European Union and

the wider Muslim World and in the longer term it is likely to be Istanbul, not

London, which becomes Europe’s leading center for Islamic banking and finance.

157 www.kuveyturk.com.tr/en 158 www.asyafinans.com.tr/en

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IX. ITALY A POTENTIAL MARKET FOR

ISLAMIC BANKING ACTIVITIES

9. Islamic Finance Growing, But Not In Italy Islamic finance is growing at an annual rate of 10%-15%. It has a global value of 1.7

trillion USD and counts 400 institutes with their offices. But the system is not breaking

through in Italy, but according to Hatem Abou Said of Al Baraka Banking Group (Bahrain)

''it could be useful also to support SMEs, which have limited access to credit through the

traditional systems, with their internationalization process." Abou Said spoke during a

conference in Milan on the issue, saying that the crisis in the West and the Arab Spring

''there is complementarity''. It would be useful, in his view, to ''attract the attention of

Islamic finance to help Italian companies that could be active in the re-launch of the

countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean Sea." ''Islamic finance,'' Abou Said

continued, ''is determined to help the European economies that are in difficulties. But I'm

afraid that people in Italy have wrong ideas about these instruments, which are meant for

everybody, not only for Muslims." In this context, Pierfrancesco Gaggi, head international

relations of Italian Banking Association ABI admits, ''little has changed since a few years

ago'' and the debate that was opened to change regulations to allow the introduction of

'sukuk' and other Islamic instruments in Italy as well has been halted by the crisis. ''The

banking sector had to deal with more urgent issues,'' Gaggi confirmed.

I will summarize the previous chapters before I start analyzing the Italian market. The

Islamic Finance Service Industry (IFSI), which has marketed itself as being an alternative

to the conventional financial system, has come a long way from its rather modest and

relatively recent beginnings. Islamic finance requires all transactions to comply with

Shariah principles (The term “Shariah” refers to Islamic law and principles). The most

important principles of Islamic finance include a prohibition on earning interest (Riba), on

uncertainty/speculation (Gharar) and investment in ‘unethical’ businesses, products or

220

services (such as alcohol, tobacco, pork, gambling, adult entertainment, and weapons).

Shariah compliant products are typically backed by or based on an identifiable and tangible

underlying asset; it is also important that the investor and investee share the risk of all

financial transactions. Under Shariah law money is used to measure value and is not an

asset in itself.

Islamic finance is considered to be the fastest growing sector of finance in the world,

growing at roughly 10%-15% per annum. Approximately one quarter of the world’s

population is Muslim, yet according to recent evidence less than 1% of global financial

assets are Shariah compliant. It has been forecast that the industry could potentially have

assets totaling $4 trillion under control.

Islamic Financial products, while they are faith based, are not limited to Muslims but are

available to everybody. The legislation is necessary, without this legislation certain Islamic

finance transactions may incur a higher tax charge or different VAT treatment, or may not

fall within the charge to tax. These changes will ensure equality of treatment between

Islamic financial products and their conventional counterparts. These products are the

same in substance as conventional financial products.

The UK introduced legislation on a phased basis. In addition to the UK, France, Ireland,

Russia, the Netherlands and in particular Luxembourg have introduced or are planning to

introduce legislation that allows for Islamic finance transactions.

Italy remains one of the few major European countries had not yet implemented the Islamic

financial system. Italian banks are, in fact, slowly becoming aware of the opportunities that

the implementation of the Islamic sector offers competitive terms, including increased bank

deposits, the potential synergies with the entire Arab world, the greater capacity of

internationalization of firms and The strong message of social integration. However, in this

regard it is noted a recent significant interest from both the market and the political system

in general.

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The Recent growing interest bred because Italy is a privileged partner in trade with the

Mediterranean states and the Arab Gulf and also considering the presence in Italy of

citizens of Muslim religion now have business activities and financial assets available. On

September 25, 2007 Adnan Yousif, Chairman of the Union of Arab Banks, has signed a

memorandum of understanding with the Italian Banking Association to open in Italy by

2008 of a bank based on the principles of the Quran, in line with as already happens in

other European countries. To date, this understanding has remained only a declaration of

intent.

The spread of Sharia-compliant financial instruments in Italy is definitely a need for the

country's competitiveness and adaptation to the international trend, but their introduction

and their use requires proper management and supervision, for the many difficulties and

their of interpretation and implementation. The issues related to the opening of an Islamic

bank in Italy concerning different areas. From a statutory point of view, the essential

problem is the collection scheme and the Islamic bank loan that requires no repayment

obligation, but a most in the conventional banking systems. The English model, have

already faced and solved these problems. The British choice wasn’t to define separate

legislation but seeking, instead, with flexibility to frame the phenomenon of Islamic

banking in the existing regulatory framework, it seems, in fact, the most appropriate for

European countries. For an initial analysis of existing conditions, implementation of an

Islamic bank in Italy can greatly promote the country as an additional channel for economic

development and finance available to the population growth in its economic relations with

the neighboring Arab world. It seems necessary, in fact, given the global liquidity crisis,

promote investment in both directions and intercept a portion of surplus savings from the

Islamic world.

Islamic finance has entered a bright new stage of development, emerging after the global

financial crisis as a more equitable and efficient alternative to the Western approach." The

widely read Arabic daily Asharq Al Awsat opined, "Islamic banks are untouched by the

current crisis due to the nature of Islamic banking especially that it does not deal in debt

trading and distances itself from market speculation that takes place in European and

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American banks." The question that arise, does Islamic banks have a solution for the Italian

current economic and financial crisis?

9.1. The European Experience: A Message to Italy

Recently it seems to be random coming to light of funding Shariah-compliant

banking products in several European countries. The institutional response from

both governments and the authorities control of the banking system has been very

different in various countries. United Kingdom, France, Ireland and Germany

responded with varying intensity, to those needs. In other situations, the great

interest in the field has been vulnerable by the attitude of cautious waiting, as in

Italy, the development of this alternative financial system is almost completely

limited.

The future growth of this application are based on the fact that Islam today is the

fastest growing religion in the world, especially in European countries, also an

increase in the Muslim middle class. Therefore, it is difficult not to assume Islamic

finance in Europe for the future growth.

Currently more than 18 million Muslims across Europe, the strong liquidity

available to Arab countries and the very positive response of Islamic banks to the

recent crisis makes the development of Islamic finance a necessity for Europe.

Islamic Finance Begins to spread among the European public financial system,

considerations made on the economic relations regulated by Islamic law as a solid

and workable alternative, or rather an alternative to the conventional financial

system. In this regard, the traditional banking lobby is particularly strong and closed

in some countries, and has no interest in losing market share, neither its

monopolistic position in the European financial markets in favor of Islamic

financial institutions.

UK remains the nation to have gained the most significant experience in the field,

representing a model to follow. It has been able to attract more Islamic banks in

addition to the large resident Muslim population, a result of the strong historical

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relations with Eastern countries, thanks to the remarkable ability of the financial

industry and the importance of the international English market. Geographically, the

English alternative is attractive when compared with that of America, also favored

by the current political relations with Islamic countries. The sum of all these

variables has led to a naturally address the Muslim world to Great Britain.

Over the years, the British have dealt with the implementation of Islamic finance

while avoiding any discussion of religious or cultural. The Islamic banking was

regarded simply financial innovation, emerged in the financial services industry. It

is, in fact, avoided legislation that was tied to a specific religious belief, maintaining

the important principle of the one banking license, unlike other countries which

have opted instead for a dual banking system. In the United Kingdom has decided

not to introduce the category of the Islamic bank but only amend existing legislation

to allow it to operate:

Particular issues have catalyzed the attention, the fiscal neutrality of Sharia

compliant products and the principle of protection of deposits.

On the first point, without ever mentioning the names of Islamic contractual

structures, the British legislature has defined the general concepts, however,

specifying precise conditions under which it is possible to include the main Islamic

contracts. Regarding the protection of deposits, the English law requires the

mandatory redemption. However, as stated in the text, which is inconsistent with

basic principles of Islamic finance, which makes the reimbursement of business

related to the result. The problem was easily overcome by the inclusion, in the

English law, for certain specific clauses in the contract of deposit.

The current objectives of the British Government on Islamic finance are clear and

are to maintain the leading position of London as an international financial center,

continuing to expand the range of financial products available to consumers and

ensuring that no one is denied to undertake any financial asset, because of religious

discrimination.

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The legislative choice in UK, about the principle of single banking license, seems to

have indirectly affected the common choice, the adoption of "Islamic windows".

These handy windows on the world of Islamic banking allows, in fact, an initial

analysis of the real sector demand Islamic. The working formula has been a key

factor in the recent development of Islamic finance in the United Kingdom.

France Despite the financial leadership of London, France is the first European

country in terms of Muslim residents, These peculiarities that increase exponentially

the needs of financial services required, especially in real estate. The French

government's stated aim is to vigorously implement the Sharia-compliant system,

with particular attention to the wholesale segment, which is the main business of the

Islamic sector globally, and only later, will develop the attractive retail segment.

This plan aims to bring France a significant share of liquidity East to compete in the

long run, with London, for the leadership of the sector at European level.

The objective of the European leadership might seem feasible, given the current

significant french disadvantage French approach to Islamic banking, but with a

more careful evaluation, considering the starting positions and the potential, if it re-

evaluates the credibility, at least for the long-term goal. In this way, France is

working hard to regain lost ground trying to stimulate interest in the French

financial community by developing a deeper knowledge on the subject.

Currently the French debate has focused on policy issues and regulations, to make

possible the necessary technical adjustments to the French legislation to reduce the

typical tax and legal impediments to the development of Islamic finance. From a

technical point of view, the square of Paris seems to provide the necessary skills to

be able to create great synergies between the Islamic and the conventional system.

The speed with which Islamic banking will grow will depend a lot on French

territory, then, by the work of government and how this innovative sector will be

perceived by the population.

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Germany, which works typically with Islamic windows, was the first in Europe to

issue, in 2004, a sovereign Sukuk. Investments in the Gulf countries of Europe into

the most important applications are facilitated by the first financial structures

compatible with sharia as is already done for some years in the United Kingdom.

Ireland has made some important improvements to facilitate Islamic finance

transactions in Ireland over the past number of years. Under Finance Bill 2010159

,

the Irish Government160

introduced significant amendments to Irish tax legislation

to further facilitate Islamic finance transactions in Ireland. These amendments were

supplemented by detailed guidance notes which were issued by the Irish tax

authorities in November 2010. Recent activity in Islamic finance in Ireland

includes the listing on the Irish Stock Exchange of a US$2 billion Goldman Sachs

backed Sukuk on 19 October 2011.

Spain, Islamic banks are not yet present, although there are ongoing negotiations

and agreements. The Banco de Desarrollo Islamic, based in Saudi Arabia, is the

institution most affected and is currently studying a series of agreements in the

industrial and financial sectors. It is, however, no activity directed at private

customers, but at least for the first phase, companies and entrepreneurs.

9.1.1. Europe’s Countries Market Players

In the last decade, the European Union became an attractive market for expansion

for the Islamic banks, due to its big potential. Following the Statistics provided by

the Pew Research Center (see figure 31), there are about 18 million of the Muslim

inhabitants in the European Union, most of them living in United Kingdom, (2.8

mln, about 4.6% of total population), France (5 mln, 8% of total population),

Germany (4.1 mln, 4% of total population). Also, following these statistics, a great

percent of Muslims, live mainly in the big cities of the mentioned countries.

159 http://taxpolicy.gov.ie/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Information-Note-on-Islamic-Finance-in-Ireland-March-2010.pdf 160 Political Support from the Irish Prime Minister pledged his full support to ‘ensure’ that Dublin becomes a ‘Centre of excellence for Islamic finance’ in an address to the Irish Funds Industry Association in June 2011. This commitment was further underpinned by

highlighting Islamic finance as a key opportunity for growth in the “Strategy for the IFSC in Ireland 2011-2016” published by the Irish

government in 2011.

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The United Kingdom, where the Muslim population is one time less than in France,

is home to five licensed Islamic banks, the only licensed ones in the European

Union, and lists £5.5bn in sukuk, or Islamic bonds, on its stock exchange. Since

2003 the United Kingdom has been reforming laws to ensure that Shariah compliant

investments are not prone to higher levies than their conventional equivalents.

Up to 2012 in France, several financial institutions seem to be willing now to enter

into a licensing process for this purpose, the development of Islamic finance has

concerned mainly investment banking and not retail banking, but this situation

could evolve: even though France has a Muslim population of about 6m, only a

handful of French banks, such as BNP Paribas and Société Générale currently offer

wholesale Islamic services. These types of structures are called ‘Islamic windows’.

These windows have contributed significantly to the development of Islamic

finance, although the French Islamic windows do not provide retail products at all.

However, France is taking a significant step towards establishing Paris as a western

center for Islamic finance. Generally speaking, France’s goals are to attract global

funds, and, particularly, to make France more competitive in the area of Islamic

finance since France, being an international finance center, has to handle the

phenomenon of forum shopping within Europe and the rest of the world.

Germany, the country with the second largest Muslim population in Western

Europe, is among the least developed European markets for Islamic Retail Banking

(IRB).

It is noteworthy that the short supply of IRB in Germany cannot simply be

explained by a lack of interest among the 3.5 million Muslims living in the country.

A recent study among German Muslims conducted by the Institute for Islamic

Banking and Finance and published in a major German newspaper reported that 66

per cent are interested in Shariah-compliant investments, 19 per cent are, maybe,

interested and only 15 per cent are not interested. In a similar poll, two thirds of the

Muslim respondents expressed interest in Islamic mortgages and about 40 per cent

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were interested in Islamic consumer credits, insurance products and mutual funds.

IRB is prospering in the UK with 2.8 mln Muslims resident while being largely

stagnant in Germany with 4.1 mln Muslims resident.

Many large German banks offer Islamic banking solutions to wealthy customers in

the Middle East but no institution in Germany currently makes a similar offer to

local German customers. In 2004, the federal state of Saxony-Anhalt issued a 5-year

Sukuk (a Shariah-compliant equivalent of a bond) with a volume of S 100 million.

This was the first Sukuk issued in Europe, but again with focus on investors from

the Gulf States. Only a few Middle Eastern banks offer to German customers a

small range of Islamic banking services through their branches in Frankfurt. The

Kuwait Turkish Participation Bank KFHTurkey recently obtained a license from the

German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) allowing the bank to

introduce Islamic banking services to the German banking system. The bank

announced to open the first Islamic bank in Germany in 2010. This will, however,

only be an indirect offer of Islamic finance in Germany, as all collected money will

be transferred to Shariah-compliant accounts in Turkey.

Islamic finance had a considerable growth in EU, both in the presence of

immigrants and for increasing opportunities for cooperation between Europe and the

Middle East. In many European nations, the Islamic banks coexist with other

commercial banks. The models can be two:

Specialized Islamic banks, which are structured on the basis of Islamic

principles and offer only compatible with these services;

Islamic windows, doors or offices specialize in offering Islamic finance

products in the context of conventional banks.

The most common are now the second, in fact, the major European banks offer to

their domestic branches and dedicated products, such as current accounts and

investment funds. It is still almost no diffusion of products of business financing

after the pattern of Mudarabah and Musharakah.

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The largest Islamic banks are mainly present in four countries: France, Germany,

Switzerland and United Kingdom:

United Kingdom: the Islamic Bank of Britain (IBB), the European Islamic

Investment Bank (EIIB) – first Islamic investment bank from Europe, the

Bank of London & the Middle East (BLME), Securities House (UK), the

European Finance House (EFH);

France opened doors to the for Islamic banking: : National Bank of Kuwait

(NBK), Tejerat Bank (TB), Qatar National Bank (QNB) etc.;

Germany opened doors for the Irani Bank Sepah, KuveytTurk.

In Switzerland, the first Islamic bank license was given in 2006, Faisal

Private Bank Switzerland Ltd. is the first private banking institution

operating in Helvetian territory. It offers asset management services to a

clientele of high-end products compatible with Islamic law.

From a regulatory and policy framework, the Italian market suffers delays in

relation to other European countries that are adapting to hospitalize the Islamic

Banks. The question, therefore, arises can Italy open doors for IRB with 1.5 mln

Muslim resident? Is IRB only for Muslims? Does IF has a solution for Italian rises?

In the next chapters I will shed light on this question.

9.2. Italy A Potential Market For Islamic Banking?

The Muslim population in Europe is over 18 million and in Italy there are over 1.5 million

Muslims (2011), who represent about one third of foreign residents and 2.8% of Italy’s

population. Islamic Banks are 26 in Europe. As for Italy, currently no Islamic Banks. Apart

from the Iranian Bank Sepah, which has a branch in Rome but it only elaborate transaction

with Italian companies, and that is the only Islamic bank operating in Italy according to the

principles of Islamic finance, to date there are very few Italian institutions that have been

responsive to this type of finance.

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One of the traits that distinguish the Muslim population in Italy from other European

countries, characterized by two or three nationalities clearly prevalent, is the number of

countries of origin. The main countries of origin are basically nine: Albania, Morocco,

Tunisia, Egypt, Bangladesh, Senegal, Pakistan, Algeria and Turkey. To mention that there

are 121,000 Indian in Italy, Islam is India’s second largest religion.

According to Istat161

for the year 2011 the number of residents by origin are the

following:

Albania 482.627 Morocco 452.424 Tunisia 106.291 Egypt 90.365

Bangladesh 82.451 Senegal 80.989 Pakistan 75.720 Nigeria 53.613

Algeria 25.935 Turkey 19.068 Somalia 8.112 Iran 7.444

Syria 4.029 Lebanon 3.981 Afghanistan 3.811 Iraq 2.812

Jordan 2.544 Sudan 2.398 Indonesia 1.924 Libya 1.516

Uzbekistan 1.221 Niger 1.131 Mali 1.263 Kazakhstan 743

Mauritania 566 Yemen 214 Saudi Arabia 107 Total 1.513.299

Italy’s geographical distribution per region of Muslim population in 2011 (own

illustration):

Lombardy 32,8%

Emilia Romagna 12,8%

Piedmont 10,1%

Veneto 10,0%

Tuscany 7,3%

Lazio 4,6%

Marche 3,7%

Sicily 3,5%

Liguria 2,7%

Campania 2,5%

Trentino Alto Adige 2,2%

Umbria 2,1%

Puglia 2,1%

Calabria 1,5%

Friuli Venice Giulia 1,3%

Abruzzo 1,3%

Sardinia 0,8%

Valle d'Aosta 0,3%

Basilicata 0,3%

Molise 0,2%

161 www.istat.it/ see also http://www.tuttitalia.it/statistiche/cittadini-stranieri-2011/

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The Muslim present are mainly in the north of Italy where industrial areas exist. The Pew

Research Center predicts for 2030, that the Muslims resident in Italy will reach the 3.1

million (see figure 31).

Figure 31 - EUROPE -- Number of Muslims in Western Europe, 2010-2030 (Pew

Research Center)

The financial behavior of Muslim immigrants in Italy represent a very important market

segment. The financial habits of foreigners in Italy vary depending on country of origin:

More than 80% of Albanians using the ATM. The sample number takes into

account a high incidence of young students;

Almost 50% of the citizens of Bangladesh are using the ATM;

Almost a fifth of the Egyptian community detected, live in Italy for over ten years.

The 74% of Egyptians use the ATM but the degree of use of other financial

instruments is still immature;

Ghanaians, the borrowing is high (mortgages and personal loans):

For the Moroccan population credit is a tool to start on a productive activity and

integration in Italy;

Senegalese, relationship with banks it seems dynamic: the incidence of outstanding

loans to purchase durable goods is very high.

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Figure – 32 Degree of use of banking services by Nationality (percentage of total

bankerized by country)

Italy's 1.5 million Muslims could be among the first customers of a Shariah-compliant

finance structure in Italy as they wait for the peninsula to give them the opportunity to

invest, finance projects and create wealth. There are some 70,000 Arab holding companies

in Italy, companies seem to resort to banks in the Middle East to obtain Shariah-compliant

finance.

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9.2.1. Islamic Finance In Italy: “how much Potential in terms of Euros?”

In 2008 a study was conducted by Monte dei Paschi di Siena Bank, estimated that

the collection of potential Muslim clients may reach EUR 4.5 billion in 2015, with a

potential revenue for Islamic banking over EUR 170 million. The study was

conducted considering 829,849 Muslims resident in Italy. The Muslim presence

since 2008 has doubled so far and may double within the next 5 years.

Islamic finance is now worth between 800 and 1,200 billion, about 1% of bank

assets worldwide. With an estimated upward, given that Islamic banks, since they

were born, grew at a rate of 10%-15%.

The potential demand for Islamic financial products and services mentioned above

does not take in consideration the fact that such products and services may be

requested by the non-Muslim population because of their background and their

strong link with the real economy and, therefore, demand could be much higher

than expected.

I analyzed the market appeal by questioning Muslims, non-Muslim and companies

resident in Lombardy:

Muslims and non-Muslims in Lombardy:

First phase: In Italy doesn’t exist Islamic Banks neither Islamic windows,

anyway will you access a loan with interest? (question made to 100 person

from both origins)

233

Figure – 33 Muslims and non-Muslims considerations towards Islamic Banking

(own illustration)

Muslims: This question raises the core question of the acceptance of immigrants of

Muslim origin in the Western financial system based on the loan with interest. Of

the 100 subjects who responded to the question, 52 percent said that religious

beliefs do not allow them to address to a bank that apply interest rate. Therefore,

more than half of migrants of Muslim origin, refuses to interact with the normal

financial channels of the territory. Also note that this behavior is not usually

connected with a low educational level: in fact, 4 out of 5, are individuals who have

an education at least equal to bachelor that corresponds to Laurea triennale in Italy.

Italy should respect the demand of the market otherwise the "unwanted" so-called,

could be a number of negative consequences, summarized in the following three

points. In the first place could slow the integration process, making it difficult

interaction, especially the business, including the migrant and host communities.

Secondly, it could intensify problems with liquidity constraints of the migrant, and

create problematic for reasons like socio-cultural. In particular, the difficulty that

migrants generally found is to access credit, because loan based on Riba, which is

prohibited by the Quran. This has a major impact both on the ability of the migrant

to do business, and on its capacity to consume, given the impossibility of having

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recourse to consumer credit. Finally, at worst, the cash flows beyond the official

circuits may take courses in the borders of legality or even illegal.

The 48% of those who say that they would accept a loan with interest. This behavior

could be a sign of deeper integration of migrants, which accepts and uses the rules

of the host community even at the cost of violating a requirement of the Shariah.

This interpretation finds support of those who say that they would accept a loan

with interest is resident in Italy for at least 10 years.

As for Italians, many of them don’t know what is Islamic Banking but in general

their consuming behavior may shift towards Islamic instruments if it is more

profitable. Other group has a wrong perception on Islamic Banking due to the

political situation. However, 60% don’t have problems to use Islamic instruments.

Second phase: To have a better understanding of the 48% of Muslim community

who said that they would accept a loan with interest. I asked the following question:

If in Italy exists Islamic Banking will you choose Shariah or traditional banks?

Figure – 33 Muslims considerations towards Islamic Banking (own illustration)

The 80% said they will shift to Islamic Banking, 10% said maybe yes, and 10% will

choose traditional banking.

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The 48% of Muslim community who said that they would accept a loan with

interest:

What do you think of the loan with interest? % out of 48 person Not good but - I have to adopt 80%

I should be able to give the poor Zakat (alms for

poor)

99% yes

Should open an Islamic Bank 80% would be great

What are you doing to support this entry? Question asked to the 100 person

100% what should I do

it’s the job of the Italian

government

Italians, 100 person:

What perception you have on Islamic Banking? % out of 100 person Islam religion and culture fits well into Italy 30% yes – 70% No

Are you favor in opening an Islamic Bank in Italy 60% yes, if create wealth

and jobs

Will you open a current account in IB 60% No

Will you use its instruments 60% yes, if it’s

convenient

Islam is a religion of intolerance 70% yes

Italian companies:

The characteristics of the Italian economy that could help the country overcome the

downturn are the SME’s. More than 95% of Italian companies are small or medium

sized. Their contribution to the growth of the national economy is outstanding.

Although their revenue might not be high, they are the main suppliers to larger

companies, contributing to their growth. Large, medium, and small companies are

all necessary to each other, and they have to develop together and in harmony. If the

large businesses are not supported in their productive process by the small ones, the

overall national economy will not recover.

Islamic finance will support Italian SMEs (see Annex 4), which have limited access

to credit through the traditional systems. Islamic finance will also be the reason to

active the re-launch of Italy in the Mediterranean Sea and enhance the financial

relation between Italy and the Gulf.

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The following question was asked to 100 companies located in Lombardy: Will you

use Islamic instruments to finance your business and use Islamic banks during

trades between the Italy and Middle East?

Figure – 34 Italian Companies considerations towards Islamic Banking (own

illustration)

From the figure you can understand that companies has no problem to shift to

Islamic Banking. Italian SMEs need access financing form to enhance its

productivity and to operate in international markets.

It should not really have been a surprise when the ratings agencies downgraded

Italy, as macro-economic performance has been poor for a long time.

Italy’s core macro-economic problem is its low productivity growth rather than its

budget deficit. Since 2005, productivity per hour worked has increased by only

0.8% compared with 5% for the Eurozone overall. In turn poor productivity

performance has constrained output growth, so that despite running primary budget

surpluses Italy have been unable to make any progress in reducing its historically

high public debt/GDP ratio.

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Islamic finance is able to offer – on one side to savers, and on the other to

corporations and SMEs involved in trading. In addition to the strategic positioning

of Italy, its dense network of small financial institutions throughout the territory and

the most powerful movement of business ethics in Europe make Italy a natural

candidate for the development of the Islamic sector. Once solved the problems of

fiscal and regulatory, Italy will play a central role in the Mediterranean. In fact,

apart from having a trade balance of several billions of dollars with the countries of

the Gulf Cooperation Council, Italy plays a key role in the Euro-Arab dialogue,

representing the G7 country closer to the Arab world. The interest in Islamic finance

arises, therefore, as a matter of strategic and political positioning, even in relation to

the birth of the Union for the Mediterranean, which aims to involve the cost of the

43 southern and eastern Mediterranean countries, through their cooperation specific

activities in public and private.

In short, Italians have wrong perception on Islamic finance considering that it is

only for Muslims and on the other hand Muslim community is not a strong

community in Italy and their integration with the Italian community is limited and

they are not debating how they can develop this work and repair the Muslim image

in Italy.

The Muslim presence in the demographic expansion of the second generations of

immigrants and the widespread tendency to maintain the original cultural matrix

generate strong growth prospects and an expected increase in demand for

products/services that meet the commands of Islamic law (Sharia compliant).

Italy is a potential market for Shariah instruments from Muslims and non-Muslims.

The Italian market compared to other European countries, despite the potential

demand for Shariah compliant financial services in the retail field, there are has

been minimal attempts to meet the potential demand. The outstanding delays to

open doors to Islamic Banks are from both regulatory and attempting real

significant strategies.

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Suggestions, Italy with Islamic financial services may potentially cover the

following areas:

The use of available cash: In many foreign markets has spread the use of

Islamic Bank Cards through special measures (reduction of fees charged)

seek to induce use aware of the credit.

Investment: Sukuk are Shariah-compliant investment certificates and can be

considered as bonds for Islamic finance. These should correspond to a given

project, usually a building project or infrastructure to match gains and profits

that the project generates. A well-structured Sukuk limits the debt issued to

the value of the underlying asset. The Sukuk market could represent a viable

alternative not only for Italian banks in looking to diversify funding sources

as well, but also a good alternative for governments. For Italy, the issuance

of Sukuk will target at institutional investors from Islamic countries could be

a source of funding for future public expenditure particularly related to

infrastructure investment. If we consider the fixed investment spending by

the government, Italy is among the last places among European countries

(2.2% compared to gross fixed investment to GDP from 2.5% the average of

euros). After an upswing in spending on new infrastructure from 1997 to

2004, the public resources available for new infrastructure are gradually

decreased.

Financing: in a first stage one can refer to simple structures and experienced

as the Murabaha and Ijara, which cover the financial needs of families

(Mortgages, personal loans) or small business (see ANNEXES 4) (for the

purchase of goods instrumental). At a later stage can be introduced more

complex shapes such as the Musharaka where it gives rise to a kind of joint

venture between customer and bank. The products offered may be the bank's

own or be acquired by third parties, Depending on whether you create an

Islamic body or a subsidiary of the bank such as conventional.

Investment Consultancy: many Italian banks offer to foreign customers

tailor-made products. However, isn’t it an offer that could be made to

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include Islamic finance products? Transactions consist principally of

accounts turned indifferently to all religions and ethnic groups of

immigrants, which offer accounts "all inclusive" relatively low to a monthly

or quarterly period. These accounts give, usually, facilitations on granting

loans or a rent guarantor or fees discounted for cash remittances to countries

of origin. They aim lower-end customers, typically holders of only current

account and the banks are more active in offering Cooperative Banks and

Rural Banks, the aptitude is closed to this target.

On the contrary, as regards to the medium-high range of clients within Italy,

the offer is very poor. There is no service from Italian banks advisor, namely

stock selection, which gives indications of investment compatible with

Islamic law, neither asset management, or, again, the placement of bonds

complying with Islamic prescriptions.

The only product currently placed is an investment fund proposed by BNL

BNP Paribas: BNP Paribas Islamic Fund - Equity Optimizer. It’s an equity

fund originally placed in France and Bahrain, also in Italy later proposed by

BNP, the French bank is also present in Italy through the doors of BNL.

I estimated the potential growth in the number of Muslim and non-Muslim clients in

Italy, the total revenues and the potential collection, relating to years 2015 and

2030. It is estimated that the amount of customers in 2015 will amount to over 2

mln, increasing by 60% in 2020 to reach over 5 mln units in 2030.

The potential revenues will amount to € 300 mln in 2015 to reach € 800 mln by

2030. It is also estimated that the collection will record a total amount of € 8 billion

in 2015, increasing to rely almost € 25 billion in 2030, with a potential collection

average per customer € 5,000.

Faced with all these multiple opportunities objectively, will Islamic Finance have a

solution for Italian crises? what are the constraints of the spread of Islamic finance

in Italy?

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9.2.2. A Solution to the Italian Economic Crisis?

From the previous discussion of trying to answer the question: "Islamic banks have

a solution for the current crisis"?

The financial crisis which is nowadays afflicting most European countries has had a

significant impact on the real economy and on the society itself. Particularly, a

growing number of people are marginalized within the Italian society (not only

migrants but also the so called “new poor”) as well as within financial circuits and

last but not least are prevented from accessing credit. Islamic finance, which is

already operational in several European countries, can provide solutions

complementary to those advanced by the social and ethical finance to foster a more

inclusive development. In this way, it will be contributing to strengthen the Italian

society at large.

The Daily Vatican newspaper, ‘L’Osservatore Romano , recently reported that

Islamic banking system may help to overcome global crisis. The Vatican said banks

should look at the ethical rules of Islamic finance to restore confidence amongst

their clients at a time of global economic crisis. Indeed, the ethical principles on

which Islamic finance is based may bring banks closer to their clients and to the true

spirit which should mark every financial service. Western banks could use tools

such as the Islamic bonds, known as sukuk, as collateral. Sukuk may be used to

fund Greece's lack of liquidity and structural investments. Profit share, gained from

sukuk, may be an alternative to the interest and support investments in infrastructure

area.

However, the debate on the relationship between Islamic finance and stability

during the period of subprime crisis is with double edge. On the one hand, several

financial analysts consider that the Islamic finance, by its nature, is more stable than

the conventional finance (Moody’s (2008), Bouslama.G (2008), Drown.C (2009).

Indeed, in conventional finance, the proliferation of financial innovations in

deregulated markets has led to a massive monetary creation with a very thin real

basis. The excessive use of models of securitization made difficult to understand the

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characteristics of new products in terms of risk. The central bank may also play a

crucial role in financial instability if it allows an expansion of the credit not

sustained by adequate resources, i.e. a credit growth without a sufficient growth of

the saving in the system. So the central bank allows, through its monetary policy,

the banks to be involved in an expansion of credit without counterpart (in terms of

savings). In fact, it is not the expansion of the credit which can result in a crisis

situation, but it is the expansion of credit without counterpart which leads to a

diversion of the real saving from the productive activities towards the non-

productive activities, which in its turn weakens the creative process of real wealth.

The absence of these devices in Islamic finance made this type of financing a more

stable system. The prohibition of interest and devices of sharing profits and losses

create a financial system based on reel assets. Consequently, banks cannot initiate or

accentuate a speculative process. The credit is based on real savings and this one

can release an output only if it is directly invested in productive activities. The

banks are competed only for the real investment and their resources are reinvested

in real activities. As a result, economic growth is durable and does not contain

negative impact on social justice since inflation cannot be used to impoverish

creditors and employees and to enrich debtors and speculators.

In addition, deposits in a bank cannot be transformed into loans or used to buy

financial assets and become reserves or a base for a new loan at another bank,

contributing thus to a creation of purchasing power and to inflation. The deposits

must be reinvested directly by the bank in production and trade activities. The

Islamic financial system is a system where there are no assets without risk and

where all the transactions are based on the sharing of profits or losses. The contracts

like futures, options, swaps are prohibited because their realizations are

characterized by an obvious uncertainty. However, the operations and the products

of Islamic finance are not only strongly leaned and closely related to the real

economic sphere but also completely independent and are disconnected from the

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traditional financial sphere. This has the effect of reducing uncertainty, duct savings

distort economic predictions, skew the prices of goods and inflate the consequences

of a possible crisis.

In Islamic finance, interest rate is not used as monetary policy instrument. The

central bank does not refinance the banks, and does not provide financial

instruments to the banks as it is the case in conventional finance. The central bank

applies quantitative ceilings on the monetary aggregates. Such a policy was

effective in maintaining financial stability and in the exclusion of speculative booms

and inflation.

The sources of financial instability of the conventional system, i.e. the abundance of

liquidities, the credit without counterpart, the speculation and the fixing of interest

rate by the central bank are absent in Islamic finance, ensuring, thus, the stability of

this system. A finance based on the rules of Shariah condemns the interest which

encourages the polarization of money in the hands of minority, but institutes, in

compensation, the sense of sharing and equitable redistribution of wealth.

The prohibition of interest may result in the underdevelopment of funding sources.

Thus, Islamic banks face specific obstacles in the management of liquidity.

Moreover, as indicated by Noyer.C (2009), the weakness of standardization of the

products and the lack of harmonization of Islamic norms, due to differences

between the interpretations of the Shariah specialists, may increase the operational

risk and legal uncertainty making, thus, the follow-up of the sharing of profits and

losses principle much more complex as the volume of the bank transactions

increases. (see chapter 4, 5 and 6)

Similarly, the prohibition to finance certain sectors limits the categories of assets

eligible for investments, which contributes to increase the risk of concentration in

sectors more sensitive to the conjuncture. In the same context, Cihák.M and

Hesse.H (2008) show that the more the size of the Islamic banks increases, the more

they find difficulties of adjusting their monitoring systems of the credit risk. They

243

also note that the market share of Islamic banks has no significant impact on the

financial strength of other banks.

The analysis of the principles of Islamic finance does not allow, alone, resolving the

question of the relationship between Islamic finance and financial stability. It is

necessary to supplement them by an empirical analysis. (see chapter 2)

Islamic finance has a role to play in the world of finance. But to do so, the IFSI will

have to de-emphasize its innovations based on Shariah-arbitrage and engage in

developing a more holistic vision that will resonate with all people of conscience,

not just Muslims. Islamic mutual funds, for instance, will have to beyond the

negative screens it primarily imposes in selecting stocks to developing positive

screens that steer investments towards those opportunities that can lead to

sustainable development strategies. Islamic finance must also promote the highest

ethical standards and the most transparent disclosure rules, enabling a healthy dose

of sunshine into the complex world of financial engineering (responsible for the

now infamous credit default swaps that produced the toxic home loans). Islamic

banks must also provide a positive vision of efficient and effective distribution of

zakat wealth. Islamic financial institutions must develop innovative programs to

produce equity based partnerships with small and medium enterprises, which are

often the forgotten sector in the world of high finance. The Islamic financial service

industry can truly differentiate itself by adopting a more socially conscious role that

will enable them to not only fulfill the objectives of Shariah but also inject an

alternative vision into the world of global finance allowing a necessary paradigm

shift if only to avoid another global economic crisis.

In conclusion, I think that today a larger number of banks in Islamic law can be a

safe solution to the crisis, I am sure, however, that a better alignment with their

principles, which ultimately are moral norms that aim at achieving the common

good through prudence and common sense in managing the economy, and a good

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and impartial advice to clients in finance, surely they would have avoided a crisis of

this magnitude.

To promote the above vision to the Italian community, some marketing is needed to

be done to influence Italian banks to develop corporate and retail products.

However, the culture is changing fast and in many European States, governments

now have think-tanks to assess how to attract Islamic investors in their market and

create a shariah-friendly regulatory environment.

However to do so there are challenges for the propagation of Islamic finance outside

the Muslim world are the culture and the legal environment.

In Italian system, like other European countries there are tax and regulatory nodes

that require careful examination and commitment by the legislature and regulatory

bodies (such as Bank of Italy) so that implementation can be the best. Nodes such as

tax registration tax and the issue of tax deductibility of financial costs are significant

in the possibility of introducing traditional Islamic retail products. However nodes

regulations as the amendment of the definition of a Tub162

banking / financial,

capital adequacy criteria / standards of risk management / accounting are crucial

points to be resolved today. In Italy, taking into consideration only the side of bank

loans, the contracts may enforce the prohibition of interest posed by the Quran are

the operations related to factoring, leasing and mortgage transactions free of charge

and legally applied by Islamic banks to circumvent the prohibition of Riba (interest)

such as brokerage operations in easy movement of goods does not seem to respect

the dictates of the Tub.

9.3. Obstacles And Hindrances Facing Italy

There are several obstacles I will mention the most important in my point of view. The first

obstacle and the most important is the Italian banks point of view as in this regard, the

162 Consolidated Law on Banking -- Decreto legislativo 1° settembre 1993, n. 385 -- Testo unico delle leggi in materia bancaria e

creditizia

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Italian traditional banking lobby is particularly strong and closed in the territory, and has no

interest in losing market share, neither its monopolistic position in the Italian/European

financial markets in favor of Islamic financial institutions.

They consider the Muslims immigrants coming mainly from North Africa, and that is for

them a significant seeing that the areas in which Islamic finance is most widely diffused are

the Gulf and the Far East and that the banking practices and customs of the North Africans

home countries are on the European pattern. The supposition of those banks is that Italy’s

Muslims immigrants, once integrated into the economic and social structure, could well be

much readier than in other European countries to use the conventional banking circuit and

less inclined to demand special Islamic financial services.

My aim in the previous chapter is to demonstrate that Italy's Muslims could be among the

first customers of a Shariah-compliant finance structure in Italy as they wait for the

peninsula to give them the opportunity to invest, finance projects and create wealth. Non-

Muslims are willing to shift towards IF and Arab countries are looking ahead to invest in

Italy’s economic system. April 16, 2012 - The Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) published

that Qatar is looking for ways and methods to invest in Italy: these are the words of Emir

Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani after meeting the Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti in

Rome. Isn’t it the time that the Italian government work, promote more efficiently and

facilitate the ways for such investments to penetrate the country??? And isn’t it the time

that the Muslim community start a serious work to promote Islamic Banking and Finance

and organize conferences/meetings to repair the Muslim image within the country??? All

this will bring benefits for Muslims and non-Muslims.

At present, the discussion as to the compatibility of Islamic activities with the current

Italian banking regulatory system is focused on the important interpretative issues

concerning the legal classification of those activities. More precisely, it aims to determine

whether the current legal structure can encompass the Islamic model of banking activity or

whether it is more appropriate to identify other regulatory provisions which may permit the

legal regulation of the Islamic model. Specifically, the debate focuses on the difference in

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the level of risk that the depositor undertakes in the Islamic vs. the conventional system and

the fact that the Islamic model does not permit interest when providing financing. At stake,

the first applicable solution is the use of the so-called ‘‘EU pass-porting’’ in which an

institution authorized in a EU country may offer products throughout the EU without the

need to have separate authorization in each member country.

9.3.1. Main Challenges For Islamic Institutions Wishing To Set Up In Italy

The main challenges for Islamic institutions wishing to set up in Italy is that the

Italian banking system must overcome the merging of the models of credit

brokerage based on religious principles. The development of Islamic finance in Italy

is mainly prevented by the fact that financial products and concepts that are behind

Islamic finance are basically unfamiliar to both regulators and the business

community. Clients still have difficulty understanding Islamic banking. Also the

need to have a Shariah Supervisory Board as a sole authoritative body to advise the

central bank on Islamic Banking is most likely still seen as an obstacle. Although

there is growing interest in Shariah compliant investment funds in Italy, the

economic climate has seen investors look for safety in conservative assets. The

typical Italian investor is very conservative and volatility averse and hence the first

and superficial perception is that Islamic funds would not fit this outlook.

From a mere accountability approach, incompatibilities arise where the national and

international accounting principles are not apt to find the operative technicalities of

the Islamic model. Moreover, the rules issued by the Shariah Boards are sometimes

not homogeneous, existing different opinions, and as a result it is difficult to

standardize the offering of products.

The UK experience shows that the setting-up of an Islamic bank is admissible in a

context where there are supervisory rules based on EU directives. The obstacle may

be found in the fact that operations of Islamic financial institutions may also involve

the application of local private law and commercial law, which may reveal

differences in the operating conditions granted to Islamic financial institutions in

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other countries. The perspective for considering the possible entry of Islamic

finance in Italy departs from that used to study conventional banking. The religious

ban on the payment or charging of interest means that Islamic banks must resort to

models of fund raising and lending that are different from the ones used by

conventional banks (i.e. loans and deposit agreements). However, the fact that the

economic function of Islamic finance remains financing economic activity answers

to the query whether it could be admitted in Italy. Since, however, the risks are

those that characterize financial intermediation, prudential supervision results to be

a key issue.

What concrete steps is Italy taking? Currently a specific committee has been set up

by ABI to study and investigate on the compatibility between Italian banking

system and Islamic Finance. Up to date, Italy has had no direct practical expertise

with Islamic financial institutions. In order to investigate whether these institutions

are compatible with the Italian system, we must consider the standards and basic

supervisory rules that cannot be altered at the national level because they are

established at the EU level. It is worth noting that the entry of Islamic finance

cannot be accomplished by building a specific regulatory discipline either for or

against. Its entry must rather be considered and treated as integration with, rather

than separation from, conventional finance.

The government has produced a series of detailed market studies to promote Italy as

a viable market for Islamic finance. The First European Forum on Islamic

Finance163

was held in Milan in December 2009. This two-day event was designed

to kick off a series of conferences in European capitals aimed at the creation of a

European platform for Islamic finance. But still few has been done.

9.3.2. Islamic Banking and Prudential Supervision in Italy

This chapter analyses the operations of Islamic financial institutions from the

perspective of a conventional financial supervisor, as the bank of Italy is, in order to

163 http://www.financial-events.ch/downloads/EB-Islamic-Finance-Milan2009.pdf

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establish whether and to what extent they could participate in the Italian market.

Before entering into the details of this issue some preliminary considerations are

needed. On the one hand there is a limit to the analysis stemming from the fact that

to date Italy has had no direct, practical experience with Islamic financial

institutions. As a result the analysis and the conclusions necessarily suffer from

some degree of abstractness. This limitation can be overcome, at least in part, by

drawing on the experience of other national markets with a regulatory framework

similar to Italy’s.

Supervision is no longer conceived as a set of strictly domestic arrangements but as

part of a boarder system in which the basic rules are European or international.

What happens within this global supervisory system can certainly help us in

understanding phenomena, such as Islamic Finance, that are concretely present at

the national level.

On the other hand there is a secure point of reference that consists of the standards

and basic supervisory rules that cannot be altered at the national level because, as

noted, they are founded at the EU level or higher. The regulatory framework

governing financial activities in Italy and Europe rests upon objective rules whose

purpose is to ensure the prudent management of intermediaries and the stability of

the system as a whole, absolutely without prejudice to entrepreneurial independence

and a level playing field for intermediaries.

In any event, the entry of Islamic finance cannot be dealt with by imagining the

creation of a special regulatory regime (adoption of ad hoc rules), either for or

against. Against this background the issue must be dealt with in terms of integration

with, rather than separation from, conventional finance. Any setting of the two

financial systems in opposition to one another would be not only anti-historical but

also irrational, in that it would be a source of conflict, of impediment to economic

integration, and instability. The work of the Islamic Financial Services Board –

especially the rules on capital requirements – testifies the effort being made by

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Islamic Finance to operate on the basis of standards, internationally accepted and

comparable to those that apply to conventional financial institutions (IFSB 2005)164

.

The UK experience, which proves how the setting-up of an Islamic bank is possible

in a background characterized by the enforcement of supervisory rules based on EU

directives, might be the starting point to verify the compatibility of such a bank with

the Italian regulatory system (FSA-UK 2007)165

.

However, it must be noted that the operations of Islamic financial institutions may

also involve the application of laws that are not subject to EU or international

harmonization, such as private law and commercial law. This may produce

differences in the operating conditions granted to Islamic financial institutions in

different EU countries.

Finally it must also be considered that Islamic finance is considered a complex

phenomenon for non-Muslims. In the countries in which they are active, Islamic

financial institutions in banking, insurance and financial services offer a well-

ramified set of products ranging from micro-credit to the issue of complex bond-like

securities, from small deposits to personalized portfolio management for prime

customers. Even without considering insurance products and matters related to

trading in financial instruments, it is plain to see that Islamic financial

intermediation departs from the classical commercial banking model specifically in

the area of fund-raising and lending alternative to the deposit and loan contracts that

conventional banks ordinarily use. It follows that one must examine the

phenomenon from a broader perspective that used to study conventional banking,

considering Islamic financial institutions as operating primarily along lines that can

be linked to those of investment banking, asset management or collective

investment schemes.

164 The IFSB has also adopted guidelines on risk management (2005), corporate governance (2006), transparency and market discipline

(2007), supervisory review process (2007), and recognition of ECAIs (2008). 165 As at November 2007 three Islamic banks were licensed by the UK FSA. The Islamic Bank of Britain initiated its operations as an authorized institution in 2004; the European Islamic Investment Bank and the Bank of London and the Middle East were licensed

respectively in 2006 and 2007. The first of these is retail, while the other two are wholesale. At the end of 2007 other applications for

license by Islamic banks were under consideration by the UK financial supervisory authority.

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The economic function of Islamic finance nevertheless remains financing economic

activity by employing surplus funds in investments that reward the most meritorious

initiatives. The risks are those typical of financial intermediation and imply the

necessity of applying forms of prudential supervision over intermediaries and over

activities, to safeguard their proper management and prevent any crisis from having

systemic repercussions (Iqbal 2003; El Hawary, Grais and Iqbal 2004).

The statistics and likely future developments suggest that the issue of Islamic

finance needs very careful consideration in countries not currently hosting Islamic

intermediaries. This is the frame in which to set the prospect for the demand for

Islamic financial products in Italy.

9.3.3. Islamic Banking: Impression of an Italian Jurist: Pietro Abbadessa

The banking model is totally different from the one adopted in non-Islamic

countries, but does not lack an adequate competitive force on this account. Maybe it

is true that ideally the object to be pursued is the development of a dualistic banking

system, in which Islamic banks may co- exist with conventional banks and compete

with them. Dr Fahim Khan (1986) has shown that it cannot be taken for granted that

the outcome of this competition would weigh in favor of non- Islamic banks. At any

rate, in order to compare these two banking models – if it is necessary to clearly

distinguish one from the other – two different institutional frameworks should also

exist, both at the primary level and at the regulatory level, valid for the banks

operating under the Islamic and the traditional paradigm respectively. Currently,

however, this condition does not exist; therefore, reasoning about Islamic banking

today forces us to constrain this experience within the cultural, juridical and

technical categories which belong to conventional banking. And this is no easy task.

From juridical perspective, this chapter will try to explore to what extent, within the

Italian legal system, it is possible to constitute a bank that, even though not aiming

to fully implement the program traced by Dr Fahim Khan, internalizes, at least to

some extent, the objectives characterizing Islamic banking.

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With regard to this issue, Alessandro Nigro (2006) has proposed a radical theory,

according to which, in its present state, the Italian banking system would not

tolerate a credit institution governed by the principles of Islamic banking. The

reason lies in the fact that, under Italian law, an institution can operate as a bank

only if it exercises an activity which combines collecting money on deposit from the

public, without having the saver run any risk, and granting credit: operational

patterns both forbidden to Islamic banks. In fact, on the basis of the Riba

prohibition, banks are neither allowed to offer a fixed rate of return on deposits nor

to charge interests on loans.

Surely, it would be very difficult to disagree with the premise from which this

observation stems. Nevertheless, the conclusion at which Nigro arrives does not

take into due consideration the circumstance that if, on the one hand, the

Consolidated Law on Banking still defines banking activity in traditional terms, on

the other, it has given banks the chance to exercise other financial activity in

addition to banking (complying with the respective discipline) without prescribing

that the second (banking) should be prevalent over the others (financial). That is

precisely where the flourishing of new banks in the Italian market comes from.

Sometimes they are a result of the transformation of pre- existing investment

institutions which keep the denomination of bank because of the pull that it still

possesses over the public, and most of them are focused in the field of financial

activities other than banking, in the first instance, financial services.

On the other hand, it has been argued that the Consolidated Law on Banking would

legitimate the existence of banks which exclude, ex ante, the exercise of banking

activity or which, even though such activity is stated in their own corporate objects

and programs, do not in fact pursue it. This reconstruction is in sharp contrast with

both a traditional opinion and art. 10, paragraph 3, of the Consolidated Law on

Banking. This article clearly states that the above mentioned financial activities may

be exercised ‘in addition to the banking activity’, leaving no doubt that this element

cannot be set aside.

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The circumstances that Supervisory Instructions do not specify (so far) as being the

minimum requirements in order to qualify as banking activity, are not enough to

modify the conclusion reached above, therefore authorizing an expansion of the

bank paradigm beyond the boundaries which the law draws. In addition, it would

not be difficult to find out the possible sanctions enforceable against a bank that

does not comply, in its bylaws or in its program, with the legal provisions

(withdrawal of banking license, loss of authorization on account of failure to start

the activity, extraordinary administration).

This might be the juridical framework which it is necessary to examine in order to

examine the acceptability of Islamic banking within the Italian system. On this

issue, it is widely known that collecting savings without charge accompanied by an

unconditioned repayment right is common in the Islamic banking context. The

existence of these kinds of savings, which are not unknown in European practice,

makes it possible to think that one of the essential conditions that needs to be

fulfilled in order to constitute a bank (the collection of deposits without any

assumption of risk by the saver), the remuneration of the deposit, is not necessary.

Vice versa, it is not required that the bank collect money in forms that imply some

risk for the saver (for example, direct collecting, obtained through the issue of the

peculiar kind of securities called ibridi (hybrid) in the Italian system – and now after

the 2003 company law reform strumenti finanziari partecipativi or indirect

collecting, where the bank operates as a simple intermediary between the saver and

the investment), which is the core feature of Islamic banking.

In both cases, we are faced with absolutely legitimate operations, widely practiced

in the Italian context, but which are not able to qualify an institution as a bank. In

order to constitute a bank, collecting activity which does not involve the saver in

any corporate risk is a prerequisite.

Therefore, in order to exist, under Italian law, an Islamic bank will have to combine

the collection of reimbursable funds with credit- granting activity, using contracts

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that, by their specific nature, put the bank in a risk- free position, with the sole

exemption of pure factual risk associated with creditor insolvency. Keeping in mind

the riba prohibition, the contracts which, in Italian banking practice, can be used as

vehicles for this specifi c kind of activity are free loans (the so- called mutuo a titolo

gratuito) and, above all, leasing contracts which, on one side, do not envisage strictu

sensu interest payments (even though the observation smacks of formalization, the

last word on the subject belongs to Islamic law scholars) and, on the other, can be

brought back to the credit- granting paradigm, as Renzo Costi (2007) has

demonstrated.

Secondly, all the operations in which the bank operates as a simple intermediary in

the circulation of goods (largely performed, in practice, by Islamic banks in order to

bypass the Riba prohibition) are surely not part of it. These operations cannot be

considered to be credit granting activities as defined by the Consolidated Law on

Banking (in fact they lack the quid proprium of these operations that consist in a

temporary increase of wealth for the credited party accompanied by a duty of

reimbursement towards the crediting party) or the financial activities that banks are

allowed to perform. Therefore, they are absolutely forbidden to credit institutions

regulated by Italian law.

However, the restrictions imposed by Italian law on the constitution of Islamic

banks could not be bypassed through the incorporation of the bank in a more

tolerant European country, with the objective of operating in Italy later on under the

shield of the mutual recognition principle. European law guarantees, in fact, such

benefit only to enterprises whose activity consists in receiving deposits or other

reimbursable funds from the public and granting credit. It follows that, if these

requirements are not met (the same ones that Italian law provides for in order to be

able to speak of a bank), the communitarian enterprise even qualified as a bank

under the law of the country of incorporation could never be allowed to operate in

Italy, given the principle of home country control.

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If Italian law gives enough space for the incorporation of banks that follow Islamic

principles, it should not be overlooked that, under the Supervisory Instructions in

force, such a bank would be subject to relevant restrictions in the specific kind of

activity that, as a consequence of the Riba prohibition, is practiced more. In

particular, resources collected from the public could not be used to assume

participation implying subjection to corporate risk, such as shares or other financial

instruments (under different names), and that do not guarantee the reimbursement of

capital.

In fact, the use of these instruments is allowed under Islamic law because the return

of the investment is justified in terms of risk rather than simple interest revenues,

which are forbidden by the Riba prohibition. That having been said, at present, the

only chance available for the development of Islamic banking in Italy is to

concentrate operations in the financial services market, once all the minimum

requirements in order to obtain and keep the banking license are met. This option

would make it possible to offer the clients the services of negotiation of financial

instruments, portfolio management on an individual basis and, above all, to foster

the institution of Islamic- characterized investment funds through the constitution of

investment management companies (SGR).

A possible alternative would be to appeal to the new instrument of separate

financial patrimony, but at present this is an unexplored track. Under this kind of

reconstruction the space available for Islamic banks is very distant from the

ambitious banking model described by Dr Fahim Khan. In any case, if the

regulatory system has been correctly considered, today, in Italy, Islamic banking

could not be much further removed from what Italian banks born at the end of the

transformation from investment companies do. They do not hesitate to squeeze

banking activity in favor of indirect collecting and financial services.

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9.4. Prospect for Islamic Finance and Banking in Italy

The success and spread of a product or of an institutional operational model for the

financial industry must not be allowed to depend on the rules. It is not the regulator’s

supervisor’s job to determine the economic needs of the market, the products and services

that firms and households need. Selection of the enterprise that offer financial services and

products is up to the market. Market participants, for their part, must observe the rules,

whose objective in the financial sector is to ensure stability, transparency, investor

protection, and hence a level playing field among financial institutions.

It will therefore be the market itself that determines whether or not Islamic banks will enter

the Italian financial system and stay there.

Their presence will be weighted by the same general rules applicable to all intermediaries

operating in Italy and that guarantee financial stability and a level playing field. The offer

of Islamic products must also comply with standards of contractual and market

transparency and with investor protection legislation.

In general, Islamic financial institutions may enjoy two sources of attraction for customers:

the awareness that they are investing their savings without violating religious precepts and

higher yields in return for forgoing the right to immediate restitution of the money lent. In

theory, this second feature could attract funds from non-Muslim investors as well.

The problem of protecting savers for whom profit is not the root of their investment choices

has already been pondered by the supervisory authorities in relation to initiatives of ethical

banking and the offer of ethical saving and investment products. The solution was to

recognize the legitimacy of motivations different from the mere search for the highest

return, but to concede no derogation from the rules on financial intermediation that would

result in disparities in guaranteeing the interest that it is the supervisors’ duty to safeguard:

of intermediaries and investor protection.

Allowing lower prudential standards for Islamic banks than those required of conventional

banks would not only discriminate against Islamic customers in terms of safeguards for

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their economic interests but also give those institutions an unfair competitive advantage

over their conventional counterparts, the price of whose products incorporates the cost of

complying with the supervisory requirements (FSA-UK, 2007).

As for the second potential point of attraction for Islamic banks, we have seen that in

general the relationship between savers and the bank cannot be simply reduced to the

‘deposit’ scheme of conventional banking. Rather it is more comparable to other kinds of

fund- raising and, especially, to collective asset management. But especially when we are

dealing with persons long since integrated into the economic and social life of non- Muslim

countries and used to conceiving the relationship with their bank the way Europeans do, we

must wonder how far this aspect, which sets Islamic banking sharply apart from

conventional banking, can be truly perceived by the saver and hence accepted in the event

of a negative investment outcome. For that matter, the experience indicates that Italian

investors themselves are hardly inclined to accept negative financial events, and not only

when the responsibility lies with the issuers or sellers of financial products.

Actually, the Islamic financial institutions themselves and some supervisory authorities

implicitly recognize that savers have a ‘right’ to the expected profit. It is therefore

important, in order among other things to contain ‘displaced commercial risk’, that in

application of the Consolidated Law on Banking and the Consolidated Law on Finance

customers be given all due information and fully transparent contractual conditions.

9.5. Results: The Determinants of IRB in the Italian Context

After a deep study of understanding Islamic Finance and covering all the important topics,

an important conclusions can be drawn for the Italian system. In this thesis, I therefore used

the insights gained from this cross-country comparison to develop a framework that

identifies the most important determinants of IRB in the Italian context. My approach is

based on archival research, using multiple sources of information:

First, I reviewed the IRB in Europe and its historical experience.

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Second, I conducted analysis of Italy’s potential market for Islamic Banking

Third, I conducted a thorough search of newspaper and web articles to cover the

latest developments, current opinions and ongoing controversial discussions on this

topic in Italy.

Fourth, I reviewed a number of industry publications and company brochures.

Owing to the novelty of the topic, so far few academic articles have been published

in this area and none of them provide an overall picture of the IRB drivers in

Europe, neither a future prospect for Italy’s possible IRB.

Figure 35 -- The determinants of Islamic retail banking (IRB) in Italy. (own

illustration)

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However, in thesis, I attempt to fill this gap by proposing a systematic framework that

illustrates the embeddedness of IRB in Italian socio-economic context, which shows how

these environmental factors are interrelated and demonstrates how they determine IRB

systems.

Based on my research, I identified four major attributes of a nation’s socio-economic

environment that individually and interactively determine the evolution of a domestic retail

market for Islamic finance in the Italian context. These connections are depicted in Figure

35. Already from viewing Figure 35 it will become apparent that my framework is modeled

on Porter’s diamond of national competitive advantage166

. The arrows indicate that the four

determinants are interdependent and mutually reinforcing in their impact on the respective

IRB system and the circles are the support that should be made to promote the four

determinants.

For example, favorable supply conditions can only exist in a country if there are supportive

government regulations, which, in turn, depend on societal support for IRB.

9.5.1. Demand Conditions

Although the focus of Islamic wholesale banking is on international institutional

investors, IRB is largely driven by domestic demand of local consumers and small

businesses. The first important determinant of the development of IRB is, therefore,

the level of domestic demand, which depends, in turn, on the size of the relevant

market segment. Apart from a small segment of non-Muslim consumers who

perceive IRB as an ethical investment opportunity, as it avoids engagements in

areas such as alcohol, tobacco or weapons production, most consumers choose IRB

for religious reasons. The most important target group for IRB in European

countries is, therefore, the local Muslim community. The size of this community is,

accordingly, a first indicator of the potential of a nation ’ s IRB market.

166 It recognizes four pillars of research (factor conditions, demand conditions, related and supporting industries, firm structure, strategy

and rivalry) that one must undertake in analysing the viability of a nation competing in a particular international market, but it also can be

used as a comparative analysis tool in recognising which country a particular firm is suited to expanding into.

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However, the UK ’ s leading position in IRB cannot be explained by the size of its

Muslim community alone, as it is significantly smaller than the Muslim

communities of other European countries such as Germany or France.

A more exact indicator of the demand for IRB might therefore be the number of

Muslims actually interested in Shariah-compliant banking services. This, in turn,

could be a function of religiosity and of how strictly Muslims interpret the Shariah.

The majority of Italy’s 1.5 million Muslims are of North Africa and Albania origin,

indeed be described as somewhat less strict in religious terms than the 2.5 million

British Muslims of mainly Indo-Pakistani descent. Recent studies, however, show

that the lower degree of religiosity does not translate automatically into a lower

interest in IRB among Italian Muslims. I can, therefore, conclude that despite a

higher degree of secularization among Italian Muslims, there is an equal demand for

IRB compared with British Muslims. Given the above mentioned larger Muslim

population in Italy, the demand conditions appear to be not very decisive in

explaining the more developed IRB market in the UK. This indicates that there is an

unmet demand for IRB in Italy and that it is the supply side forming obstacles

factors.

9.5.1.1. Challenges and opportunities for IRB from a demand perspective

It appears that in Italy, as in other European countries with a significant Muslim

population, a considerable demand for IRB exists. This demand will create a strong

pull effect, which Italian banks cannot ignore for long. This effect will be further

reinforced by the strong growth of Muslim communities in many European

countries creating ample opportunities for IRB. However, conventional banks in

Italy are still concerned about their image among non-Muslim customers. This is a

major challenge for IRB as Italian banks do not offer an Islamic banking window

out of a fear of losing more conventional customers than gaining new ones.

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9.5.2. Supply Conditions

The second determinant of the development of IRB is the nature of domestic supply.

The colonial legacy of the UK has helped British banks to gain competence and

experience in dealing with Muslim clients. This experience, paired with the

knowledge and skills available in Europe’s financial capital, London, has fostered

the development of a wide range of Shariah-compliant retail banking products and

services that appeal to local customers. Major British qualified accountancy bodies

and British universities offer courses in Islamic finance, including a “Scholar

Professional Development Program” that trains Shariah scholars in conventional

finance. These courses have helped to substantially improve Islamic finance

qualifications in the UK. Furthermore, the high level of competition in the British

banking market is likely to stimulate product and process innovations as banks

struggle to gain an edge over their rivals. Until today in Italy few has been done!!

9.5.2.1. Challenges and Opportunities for IRB from a Supply Perspective

With most European banks not yet providing IRB in their home markets,

opportunities for a better supply of Shariah-compliant financial retail products arise

from non-European banks and investors. In particular financial institutions from the

Middle East are willing to bear the risks and costs involved in developing the

European market. The first Islamic retail bank in the UK, the Islamic Bank of

Britain, was founded, for example, by investors from Qatar. Similarly, the first

Islamic retail bank in Germany opened by the Kuwait Turkish Bank KFH-Turkey

and the first Islamic retail bank in France will be founded by investors from

Bahrain. It is likely that these institutions will pave the way for other financial

institutions seeking to participate in the European market of Islamic retail finance.

The strategic positioning of Italy, its dense network of small financial institutions

throughout the territory and the most powerful movement of business ethics in

Europe make Italy a natural candidate for the development of the Islamic sector.

Lately the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) published that Qatar is looking for

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ways and methods to invest in Italy: these are the words of Emir Hamad bin Khalifa

Al Thani after meeting the Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti in Rome.

9.5.3. Societal Conditions

The third determinant of the development of IRB is a society’s attitude towards

Islamic culture in general and Islamic banking in particular. In fact, a considerable

part of public opinion in Europe has some concerns with the open expression of the

Muslim faith in their countries, as indicated by the dispute over wearing the

headscarf in schools in France and Germany a couple of years ago or, more

recently, the referendum about building Mosques in Switzerland, and Islam is not

an established religion in Italy and there is only one official mosque in the country,

Rome's Grand Mosque. A large-scale study of attitudes towards Islam in European

countries found considerable prejudice against Muslims.

According to this study, 70% per cent of Italians do not believe that Muslim culture

fits well into their country. Furthermore, 70% believe that Islam is a religion of

intolerance. Such a strong public disapproval of Islam creates a major challenge for

IRB in the European context, in particular because there is no such thing as

Christian or Jewish banking.

Societal conditions seem also to be a major part of the explanation as to why the

Europe is ahead and Italy behind in the implementation of IRB. The IRB sector in

the UK appears to have greatly benefited from the British society’s tradition of

tolerance towards religious and ethnic minorities. For example, 30% of the British

respondents in the above mentioned survey agreed that Muslim culture fits well into

their country, Italy’s had the same percentage 30% of the Italian respondents were

of the same opinion.

Moreover, the Muslim community in Italy is not a strong community and is doing

almost nothing to promote the Islamic Finance or to repair the Muslim image. As a

Muslim, I started promoting Islamic Finance and repair within my community the

Muslim image, my initiatives started November 2010 through a small business to

262

help Italian companies to access the Middle East market (KS Italia167

), and creating

a group for Islamic Finance on the biggest social business network in Italy

(Innovazione di officina Italiana168

) to explain the growing phenomenon. All this

led to be invited the 4th

of July 2012 to speak to over 200 business about this

argument. Individual Initiative is needed too.

The UK government has placed considerable emphasis on the need to combat social

and financial exclusion in the population as a whole. More specifically, the UK

government has wanted to give the 1.8 million Muslims (approximately 3 per cent

of the population) in the UK access to financial services consistent with their

religious beliefs. This has been demonstrated by tax and other changes to encourage

the development of a retail market. The above comments illustrate the important

role political debates have played in the past for the divergent development of IRB

in the UK, France, Ireland and Germany. Favorable political attitudes towards IRB,

for example, were at the core of the implementation of the necessary legal and

regulatory framework in the UK.

9.5.3.1. Challenges and Opportunities for IRB from a Societal Perspective

Shariah conform savings plans, endowment insurances and above all schemes

leading to homeownership can potentially greatly assist Italian Muslims to live their

lives in accordance to their religious beliefs and at the same time manage their lives

in accordance to the demands of a modern life in a Western country, thus

strengthening simultaneously their religious identity and their inclusion and

participation in the society they live in. In this sense, IRB could be understood as an

opportunity to facilitate the integration of Muslims in Italian society. However,

there is still substantial public disapproval of and resistance against the inclusion of

Shariah-based law into the Italian legal system. This antagonism paired with

virulent Islamophobia creates a major challenge for IRB in the Italian context.

167 www.ksitalia.com 168 http://www.officineinnovazione.it/group/finanza-islamica

263

9.5.4. Regulatory Conditions

The fourth determinant of the development of a retail market for Islamic finance in

Italy is the respective national regulatory framework.

There are now 79 foreign banks with branches in Italy, accounting for 8.2 per cent

of all banking activity, and more than 500 other foreign intermediaries operate

without permanent establishments or branches. There are also 22 subsidiaries of

foreign banks, accounting for about 11 per cent of the total assets of units doing

business in (Bank of Italy 2008; Saccomanni 2008).

My analysis has found no legal impediment to authorization of a bank whose

bylaws specify that it will conduct its banking business according to Islamic

principles. At the same time, there is no getting around the existing rules, nor is

there any possibility of an easing of the prudential and investor- protection rules vis-

à-vis such a bank.

In practice, the Bank of Italy will not evaluate the Islamic banking model in general;

rather, individual applications will be examined on a case-by-case basis and

determination made according to their specific characteristics. Prudential

supervision is already conducted on the basis of general rules over a wide range of

intermediaries that no longer conform to standard, predetermined legal and

operational models.

The past differences in the supervisory rules for banks and non-bank intermediaries

have themselves been attenuated. The composition of the assets and liabilities of an

Islamic bank would not therefore seem to constitute a serious problem in assessing

the institution’s risk and setting the capital requirements accordingly. And the

organizational standards laid down by supervisors are also adequate.

Finally, the means of information and instruments of intervention available to the

authorities are flexible enough to apply to these new intermediaries. This, then, is

the course that Italian supervisors will follow in considering the application of an

264

Islamic bank, from the phase of rule-making to that of authorization and that of

controls. The fate of any such initiative, in any case, depends in equal measure on

the skill of its promoters and on the response of the market.

In short, I will summarize the insights gained from this analysis, develop a number of

suggestions for Italy and financial institutions seeking to open doors to Islamic retail

finance and suggest directions for future research.

If we assume the general willingness of the Italian population and their political system to

support the entry of IRB, a change of the regulatory systems would be required: first, to

allow the implementation of various IRB schemes and second, to assure equal treatment of

IRB in comparison to conventional banking, for example with regard to taxation. Although

in the paper provided only a broad overview of regulatory challenges, future research may

pay closer attention to the consequences of country specific differences in regulatory

conditions, tax regimes and legal environments for the evolution of IRB in the Italian

context.

Assuming the societal and regulatory environment would be in place for IRB to expand,

Italian banks would have to offer the various Islamic banking products that meet the

demand of their Muslim customers.

Conventional banks concerned about their image among non-Muslim customers might

refrain from advertising the religious component and focus on the financial performance of

Islamic banking, the high ethical standards, the risk sharing principle and the avoidance of

highly speculative investments. Future studies should therefore continue to investigate

ways to improve the marketing effectiveness of Islamic banks and conventional banks with

an Islamic banking window in non-Muslim countries. Ultimately, also potential customers

of IRB in Italy would need to voice their interests. This would concern, in their role as

citizens, the political lobbying for IRB and, in their role as customers, their preparedness to

choose IRB products. Future research might also help to establish the true potential of IRB

in Italy by investigating the demand for Islamic financial services among Italy’s Muslims.

265

In conclusion, in this chapter I have identified and described the key determinants of IRB in

Italy and highlighted opportunities and challenges for IRB. In doing so, I provided strong

evidence for the fact that the establishment of IRB in Europe is not a mere technical

implementation problem, but also an economic, legal, political and ultimately a

fundamental societal issue that touches upon the question in which kind of society Italians

want to live in.

9.6. Conclusion

The purpose of this thesis has been to identify major challenges and opportunities for

Islamic Finance and IRB in the Italian context. To this end I developed a framework

identifying four main determinants of IRB in the Italian context: demand conditions, supply

conditions, regulatory conditions and societal conditions. Subsequently, I demonstrated

how each of these attributes can either be an opportunity or a challenge for IRB in Italy.

It can hardly be disputed that the growth of Islamic banking and finance in Europe is not a

welcome development, in fact it is effectively contributing to increase penetration of

financial services and hence contributing to what is being referred to as ‘social inclusion’.

The members of the large Islamic community in Europe, who refrained from benefiting

from financial services on religious grounds, are now able to benefit from the financial

market without violating religious norms.

Islamic finance. "An ethical way of doing business", where the interest is considered usury,

derivatives are banned and the bank shares with its clients, risks and profits. A system that

can move even heavy economic interests and as a driver for internationalization process of

capital in Italy. In addition of course to meet the needs (integration) of the million and 500

thousand Muslim immigrants living in Italy, which would gain by using instruments that

conform to their culture.

However, Italy remains one of the few major European countries had not yet implemented

the Islamic financial system. Italian banks are, in fact, slowly becoming aware of the

opportunities that the implementation of the Islamic sector offers competitive terms,

including increased bank deposits, the potential synergies with the entire Arab world, the

266

greater capacity of internationalization of firms and The strong message of social

integration. However, in this regard it is noted a recent significant interest from both the

market and the political system in general.

An Islamic bank, unlike in all of Europe, is far from appearing in Italy, despite the fact that

investors are saying they are ready for it and that Italy shares ethical and religious

principles with the Islamic world. For example, Italy has anti-usury laws including limits

and disincentives to gaming and betting as well as sanctions applicable to certain

transactions which may involve speculation or non-transparency. As a result, although not

entirely free of obstacles, the adaptability of the Italian system to Islamic principles of

financing renders Italy a fertile and flexible legal environment. Meanwhile, since a

dedicated tax law in respect to finance products does not exist yet, it is necessary to tailor

transactions on a case-by-case basis to properly respect and meet the interests of both

investors and related regulatory and supervision authorities. In doing that, a good guide or

at least inspiration could be found in the solutions set forth by the legal system of other

European countries referring specifically to banking and investments. One should not

however forget that a dedicated banking law and regulation in respect of Islamic finance

products is still missing in Italy and that the current Italian legal banking framework is not

yet suited for fully harmonized Islamic banking. Nevertheless, provided that there are no

insurmountable barriers to establishing an affiliate of a EU Islamic bank in Italy, basically

thanks to EU regulations, the concrete way to foster the entry of Islamic Finance into the

Italian context is to sponsor the in-depth analysis of the Italian legal system to find

alternative forms of contractual models.

Other than Societal, Regulatory and tax obstacles, the main challenges for Islamic

institutions wishing to set up in Italy is that Italian traditional banking lobby is particularly

strong and closed in the territory, and has no interest in losing market share, neither its

monopolistic position in the Italian/European financial markets in favor of Islamic financial

institutions.

267

In my opinion, the success of a financial model in a market must not be allowed to depend

on market rules. Market participants must observe market rules but it will be the market

itself that decides whether or not a kind of institution may enter into the market, providing

that its products are complying with standards of contractual and market transparency as

well as investor protect legislation.

Italy should look with interest to the Islamic world, like UK, Ireland, Germany, Spain,

Luxemburg, Netherland and France, which have already taken steps to engage in

institutional relations with Islamic countries. Italy should move faster and investigate the

matter and propose appropriate changes to government regulations that allow to increase

exports, attract investment and ensure to Islamic banks to operate freely in Italy.

Islamic finance will bring new opportunities for Italian banks and firms. Strengthen the

economic cooperation with the Gulf countries to develop trade and grab investment

opportunities and financing in Italy, through the Sharia compliant instruments: the Sukuk,

or investment certificates in accordance with the principles of the Quran, the Islamic

instruments for the collection of funds, up-to Islamic finance products for the retail sector.

The key message of this thesis is that there is definitely a potential for IRB market in Italy,

waiting to be fully exploited. If this has occurred so far only to a limited extent and only in

a few countries (mainly the UK), the reasons clearly lie more on the supply than the

demand side. The supply side is, in turn, as I have demonstrated, strongly affected by

regulatory and societal conditions.

Owing to the socio-economic complexity of this issue and the multidimensionality and

interrelatedness of various contextual factors, for IRB to expand in Italy an equally

complex, multidimensional and interrelated approach would be required. I would argue that

the first important step in this direction would be to reach a consensus in society that IRB

should be regarded as a sign of religious tolerance, a means to facilitate the day to day life

for Muslims in Italy and, in addition, as a facilitator of integration. If, however, societies

came to the conclusion that IRB disrupted societal integration and opened the doors to

parallel legal systems, IRB would survive in Italy only in small niches. I therefore

268

encourage more research on the potential consequences of IRB for societal integration of

Muslims in Italian societies.

9.6.1. Suggestions:

I suggest as a first step, better to focus on an Islamic investment bank, which allows

to gather savings in Muslim countries with products conforming to Shariah, then

using these resources to finance Italian firms. This is a viable option who has two

partners: one Arab and one Italian.

In addition, there is considerable interest in the purchase of shares in Italian

companies by institutions or sovereign funds belonging to Islamic States, because of

the liquidity available by the Gulf countries today thanks to the oil transactions. The

sharp decline in equity prices, in many cases even higher than 50% year to date, can

make an affordable long-term investment. In few words, Islamic Banking will be a

new engine for finance in Italy.

There are two other ways of entering the Italian market in order to perform banking

activities of an Islamic character: opening a branch of an Islamic bank established in

a non- EU country, and opening the branch of an Islamic bank already constituted in

another EU Member State. The procedure for establishing the branch of an Islamic

bank located in a non-EU country is basically similar to that for constituting a new

bank.

The requirements are an endowment fund of €6.3 million, submission of the

business plan, and experience and integrity requirements for the managers.

Authorization is issued by the Bank of Italy after consulting the Ministry for

Foreign Affairs. In considering the application, account is also taken of several

specific factors: the existence of adequate supervisory rules in the bank’s home

country; the absence of impediments to information exchange with the home-

country supervisors; advance permission of the latter to open the branch in Italy; the

attestation of the home-country supervisors to the financial soundness and to the

adequacy of the organization, administration and accounting arrangements of the

269

bank and of any group to which it may belong; and conditions of reciprocity

(Article 14(4) of the Banking Law). (see ANNEX 7)

The final possibility is entry into Italy as the branch of an EU Islamic bank. The

procedure for establishing the branch of a Community bank is fast and simple,

requiring only notifi cation on the part of the supervisory authorities of the home

EU country. The procedure reflects the ‘single passport’ and recognition of

supervision over the parent bank, which are the foundations of the European single

market in banking services.

However, the established practice of supervisors is to deny permission for a newly

formed bank to expand abroad. This position reflects supervisors’ concern for the

stability, for the sound and prudent management, of the newly formed bank. There

is a natural path of expansion for any enterprise, and to expand, especially beyond

national borders, a bank’s capital situation and organizational and internal control

arrangements must be consistent with the plan to move into foreign markets. The

home country authorities, even more than the host country authorities, may

therefore oppose the plan being notifi ed where it sees a risk for sound and prudent

management. But where an Islamic bank – like any other – is demonstrably sound

in all technical respects in one EU member country, it can perfectly well expand

into others; and the host country authorities have no power to prevent it.

270

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Interviews and indications from:

1. Prof. Dr. Volker Nienhaus

Tel: +49 (0) 201 8695750

Fax: +49 (0) 201 8695752

Mobile Germany: +49 (0) 176 63755466

Mobile UK: +44 (0) 7787 049649

[email protected]

2. Dr. Zamir Iqbal

Lead Investment Officer with the Quantitative Strategies, Risk and Analytics department in the Treasury of

the World Bank in Washington, D.C

Tel: +1-202-458-1700

3. Prof. Dr. Rodney Wilson

Emeritus Professor at Durham University.

Visiting Professor, Qatar Faculty of Islamic Studies

Mobile: +44 776 877 4676

Email: [email protected]

4. DR. AKMAL HANUK

Chief Executive Officer at Islamic Banking & Financial Center UK

[email protected]

5. FAZL SYED

Senior Consultant, International Business & Finance

• Europe

• Asia

• America

Attorney at Law, New York, USA

Solicitor, Supreme Court of England & Wales

Advocate, Supreme Court of India

Email: [email protected]

Tel. +44 77 93 822 922

Tel./Fax.: +44 7092 88 77 88

282

6. ZAID EL-MOGADDEDI

Founder & Managing Director

Institute for Islamic Banking and Finance (IFIBAF)

Rheinstr. 21, D - 60325 Frankfurt

Fon: +49 (0)69-7430 6847

Fax: +49 (0)3212-1038752

Mail: [email protected]

Web: www.ifibaf.com

7. Dr. Alberto Brugnoni

Alberto G. Brugnoni runs ASSAIF, a think tank for Shariah compliant financial engineering based in Milan.

Mail: [email protected]

www.assaif.org

Phone +39 02 365 217 05

Mob (I) +39 339 617 42 82

Mob (UK) +44 7 932 922 114

Skype albertobrugnoni

Fax+39 02 659 75 44

A special thanks for Prof. Dr. Volker Nienhaus and Dr.A lberto Brugnoni.

283

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1 Islamic Banking Structures Within The Conventional Banking

System

Introducing Islamic banks into conventional banking systems

Islamic financial institutions can be divided into two types:

1. Those institutions whose entire business is conducted in compliance with the Shariah law

and are full Islamic financial institutions;

2. Those institutions that offer Shariah compliant products and/or services, but whose

business is not conducted in compliance with the Islamic law and are ‘conventional’

financial institutions.

Islamic window structures

An increasing number of commercial banks around the world are considering the

possibility of offering Islamic financial products. At first, a commercial bank may only

want to probe the potential of this market, and thus may be interested in launching a pilot

project. The bank can

take advantage of its existing branch network to open an ‘Islamic window’, through which

it can reach potential new customers.

An Islamic window is simply a special facility offered by conventional banks to provide

services to Muslims who wish to have an Islamic banking service. At the inception of the

Islamic service, the products typically offered are deposits on the liability side of the bank

and Islamic trade-finance products for small and medium sized companies on the asset side

of the bank.169

Where it is necessary to deal with sources of capital, many Shariah Boards have recognised

that it is acceptable for financial institutions to ‘cleanse’ these sources by donating the

proportion of the funds derived from non-Shariah-compliant sources to charity. This is

169 Sole 2007.

284

despite the fact that, under the equivalent secular law principles, only a portion of these

funds may be

”cleansed” in this way. This process of cleansing funds has been approved by the

Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) in its

Shariah Standard on Conversion of a Conventional Bank to an Islamic Bank.170

In order to

ensure compliance with Islamic principles, conventional banks wishing to offer Islamic

products must guarantee and publicize that the sources of capital devoted to conventional

activities will not be mixed with those destined for Islamic activities.171

Other ways of separating Shariah-compliant and non-Shariah-compliant business have been

guided by best practice guidelines published by other industry bodies such as the Islamic

Financial Services Board (IFSB). At the same time, a number of financial services

regulators (mainly the Governors of central banks of Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Qatar, Bahrain,

Indonesia and Malaysia) are beginning to introduce formal regulatory rules on the subject.

As the activities of the Islamic window expand, a bank may consider fully segregating the

window into a separate subsidiary. The use of Islamic windows as a take-off platform for

moving into the Islamic financial industry has been a more common practice in South East

Asia and Western countries than in the Middle East, where the tendency has been to

establish stand-alone Islamic banks.

Possibility of offering Islamic funds

Any financial institution is permitted to offer Islamic investment products, unless it is

prohibited from doing so for regulatory reasons. A non-Islamic bank or a non-Muslim can

engage in trading or investing in a Shariah compliant manner. A conventional financial

institution in London or New York is permitted, therefore, to promote an Islamic private

equity fund that caters to the needs of its Muslim investors.

In many instances, this does not require the creation of an independent subsidiary.

Typically, a separate department within an institution can develop and offer Shariah

compliant products.

170 Motaleb 2008. 171 Sundararajan and Errico 2002.

285

Establishing an Islamic bank

Once a conventional bank has operated an Islamic window for some time and has gathered

a sizeable customer base for its Islamic activities, it may decide to establish an Islamic

subsidiary, or even convert into a fully-fledged Islamic bank. By following either of these

two routes, the bank may benefit from economies of scale and concentration of knowledge

and expertise. The bank will be able to offer, under one roof, a wider range of Shariah-

compliant banking products than through the Islamic window alone.

The advantage of opening a subsidiary over a full conversion is that, with the former, the

parent bank may continue servicing its conventional customers, while the subsidiary

expands its Islamic activities in clear separation from the conventional business. Normally,

in the case of Islamic windows, the treasury department of the parent bank is typically in

charge of managing the liquidity requirements of the bank as a whole, which poses the

threat of mixing conventional and Islamic funds. On the other hand, a full conversion

signals the bank’s firm commitment to operate under Shariah principles, thus enhancing its

credibility.

Although it does not seem to be a widespread concern within the industry, it must be

mentioned that some Shariah scholars have raised concerns regarding the legitimacy of

establishing Islamic subsidiaries or banks using capital from conventional banks. The

concern arises because it is not guaranteed that the funds provided by the parent bank will

originate from Islamic compliant sources. Hence, the subsidiary’s initial capital may be

unacceptable from an Islamic point of view. Although there is an ongoing debate over this

matter, one of the proposed solutions is to allow the formation of the new Islamic

institution, if it commits to making future charitable donations as a way to purify the

original funds.

Be that as it may, the transition from a conventional to an Islamic bank also presents

operational challenges, as a number of items in the conventional bank’s existing balance

sheet are tied to interest-bearing transactions. The financial institution must ensure that all

the items on its balance sheet are compatible with the Shariah. Probably, it will be

necessary to transform all of its loans and deposits into non-interest bearing assets and

286

liabilities - such as Murabaha contracts (in the case of assets) or Mudarabah deposits (in the

case of liabilities). Annex 2 provides an example of how to transform a conventional loan

into an Islam compatible instrument and the UK example in Annex 3.

287

ANNEX 2: Example: The use of Tawarruq172

to make the transition from

conventional to Islamic balance sheets

When a conventional bank decides to fully convert into an Islamic institution, it must

ensure that all the items on its balance sheet are compatible with the Shariah. Therefore, it

will have to transform all its loans and deposits into non-interest bearing assets and

liabilities. For instance, in the case of assets, this would mean converting them to murabaha

(cost plus financing) contracts. For liabilities, this means converting conventional deposits

to mudarabah (profit-and-loss sharing) deposits. The bank could use a Tawarruq instrument

in order to convert an existing loan (bearing interest) into an Islam compatible instrument.

A Tawarruq

is a contract whereby a customer requests a bank to acquire a specific commodity (e.g.

metal or wool) on his behalf. The customer will repay the bank the cost of the commodity

plus an agreed margin in installments. The customer then requests that the bank sell the

commodity right away in the commodity spot market. Hence, through this transaction, the

customer can obtain immediate financing (via the spot sale of the commodity) which will

be repaid at a later date (via the installment payments to the bank).

A Tawarruq can be used to transform an existing debt contract into an Islamic instrument.

The procedure is best explained with an example (see Figure -- below). Suppose that some

years ago, the bank had extended a loan for an amount of $100 to be repaid over 10 years at

a 5 percent interest rate. Suppose also that at the time of the bank’s conversion, the

customer had already paid half of the loan principal, and so s/he has a remaining debt of

$50 with the bank. The bank and the customer then enter into a Tawarruq contract by which

the bank will buy

$50-worth of commodities for the customer and then sell them on his behalf. The customer

then uses the $50 received from the spot sale to cancel its loan with the bank. Note that at

this point the customer owes the bank $50 by virtue of the Tawarruq contract, but not as an

interest bearing loan. In repayment for the bank’s purchase of the commodities, the

customer will include in the installment payments to the bank an amount commensurate

172 The purchase of goods on deferred payment and their subsequent sale (to raise cash)

288

with the forgone interest on the loan. It must be acknowledged that, although the Tawarruq

accomplishes the goal of transforming interest bearing contracts into interest-free

instruments, it is seen as controversial by some Shariah scholars.

Figure Transforming conventional assets and liabilities into Shariah-compliant assets

and liabilities

289

ANNEX 3 The UK Example

Licensing and compliance

Licensing Islamic banks and windows will increase the supervisory burden on the regulator

since there would then be a new type of institution/activity that requires its own legislation

such as the regulatory framework. In other words, in the case of Europe, in addition to the

Basel III International Framework, supervisors will have to be familiar with the application

of the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) standards for Islamic banks. The national

requirements to grant an Islamic license vary depending on the country where the financial

institution wishes to operate.173

The UK Example174

The first Islamic bank in Europe: the Islamic Bank of Britain, was created in the UK in

August 2004. This process helped the Financial Services Authority (FSA) to redefine the

authorisation requirements for the creation of a bank in the UK, including Islamic banks.175

These are:

The firm must provide a credible business plan.

The firm must have the appropriate legal status for the activities it wishes to

undertake.

For a firm in the UK, its head office and mind and management must also be in the

UK.

If the firm has close links with another firm, these should not prevent the effective

supervision of the firm

The firm has adequate resources, both financial and non-financial, for the activities

which it seeks to carry on.

173

Please note that there are no cases of licensed Islamic banks in Europe except in the UK. Conditions in Muslim countries vary according to the national central bank requirements. Therefore, in this study the UK case is shown as the most relevant European example. 174

Information provided in Ainly et al. 2007. 175 Ainly et al. 2007.

290

The capital requirements for an Islamic and a conventional bank are applied on the same

basis. Operations performed by traditional banks through Islamic windows do not require

separate authorization.

The process of establishment of the Islamic Bank of Britain raised new questions and it

took 18-24 months to complete. Areas where there was a need for more research and work

were:

Regulatory definition of products: firms need to be sure they apply for the correct

range of permission for the regulated activities they wish to undertake.

The role of Shariah scholars, which examine each new product or transaction and, if

satisfied that it is Shariah-compliant, issue an approval.

Financial promotions: especially important in Islamic finance since the products are

new and differ from traditional products.

The European Islamic Investment Bank was established in London in January 2005 and

received authorisation to operate from the FSA in March 2006. The bank’s aim is the

provision of Sharia-compliant investment banking products and services. In general terms,

a financial institution wishing to open an Islamic bank/window should consider the

following issues related to corporate governance and regulatory requirements in order to

ensure compliance with Shariah and national rules:176

Corporate governance issues:

- Establishment of a Shariah Board

- Internal coordination of the administrative board’s work with the new supervisory

Shariah Board

- Rewording of the financial institution objectives: including clear definition (in the

case of an Islamic bank) or segregation (in an Islamic windows structure) of the

bank’s funds and of its uses

- Integration of Shariah standards (e.g. AAOIFI) in business policy (code of

conduct, board regulation, etc.)

176 See “Islamic Banking: Issues in Prudential Regulation and Supervision” by Errico, Luca and Mitra Farahbaksh. IMF Working Paper

WP/98/30 (March 1998).

291

Regulatory requirements:

- To offer products and services that are considered as banking activities in order to

receive a national banking license.

- To fulfill the capital adequacy requirements (national and international

requirements suggested by the IFSB)

- To fulfil liquidity requirements, subsequent to national regulation It is clear that in

many countries there is still an inadequate legal and regulatory framework. That is

true in some parts of the Islamic world, but it is certainly true in the U.S. and in

Europe (with the exception of the UK). There are other European countries with

larger Muslim populations than the UK, yet where the regulators have not yet come

to grips with the issues in the way that the Financial Service Authority (FSA) has

done.

The IFSB has provided some guidance notes on capital adequacy and risk management

which are very useful, but they are not applied everywhere. Concerning capital adequacy,

the IFSB suggests national supervisors should follow their recommendations when

determining which external credit assessment institutions ratings may be used to calculate

capital adequacy ratios under the IFSB’s December 2005 Capital Adequacy Standards

(CAS). The CAS of December 2005 addresses the structure and contents of Shariah-

compliant products and services that

are not specifically addressed by Basel II and seeks to standardise the approach to risk

weighting such products and services.

The IFSB in its guidance note on capital adequacy asserts that Shariah compliant financial

assets should be regarded as a set of asset classes with distinct characteristics, and that

consequently credit rating agencies (CRAs) should incorporate in their rating

methodologies an explicit understanding of these distinct features, including clear

explanations of

how these are addressed.

292

Rating analysis of Shariah-compliant assets may differ from analysis of conventional

assets, both in terms of the general principles that govern Shariah-compliant finance (for

example, the concept of default) and in terms of the features of specific financial

instruments (for example the concept of displaced commercial risk (DCR) when dealing

with returns on investment accounts that are based on a Mudarabah contract).

In Islamic finance, assets may be:

a) such that periodic payments are due contractually

b) based on return and loss-sharing or return-sharing and loss-bearing contracts where the

obligation to make a payment and the maintenance of capital are subject to investment

performance. In terms of capital adequacy calculations, the principal areas where

Shariah-compliant finance may differ from conventional finance include, though are not

limited to, the following:

a) Different meanings of ratings and the concept of default: as a result of the different

natures of default considered, the meaning of ratings may differ depending on the type of

instrument being rated.

b) Priority of claims: in conventional finance, priority of claim is defined in the loan

documentation and by local laws. However, within Shariah compliant finance, additional

factors may come into play – such as Shariah requirements for equitable treatment of

creditors.

c) Corporate governance and the role of the Shariah Board: governance standards

applicable to Islamic financial institutions are set out in the IFSB’s “Guiding Principles on

Corporate Governance” for Islamic financial institutions. These principles include all those

that are applicable to conventional banks, as well as principles related to compliance with

Shariah rules and principles. This may have implications for credit characteristics,

especially as issues of reputational risk assume greater importance for Shariah compliant

issuers of financial instruments than for conventional issuers.

d) Risk mitigation techniques to cater for displaced commercial risk (DCR): DCR

derives from competitive pressures on the Islamic financial institution to attract and retain

293

investors. It may respond to these pressures by creating reserves. The existence or non-

existence of such reserves could have a significant impact on the creditworthiness of the

institution.

e) Definition of capital: an Islamic financial institution uses capital to protect the

depositors and some classes of investor from losses. Therefore it is necessary that external

credit assessment institutions make clear what constitutes capital in an Islamic financial

institution

and the extent to which depositors and certain classes of investors are protected against

losses.

f) Trading in Sukuk does not involve trading in debt (unlike conventional bonds):

Sukuk holders derive their returns either from an underlying real asset(s) or the usufruct of

such assets, which is fractionally owned by the Sukuk holders rather than being collateral

for a debt as with conventional asset-backed securities; or from a securitised partnership in

an underlying business venture.

g) Asset valuations: many of the Islamic financial instruments used by Islamic financial

institutions for financing working capital or projects have particular risk characteristics that

need to be understood. For example, a Murabahah contract requires an Islamic financial

institution to have ownership of assets as part of asset-based financing activities on its

balance sheet for a short period of time pending resale. Such assets may be subject to

substantial market risks if the contract is non-binding in nature. As a result, the risks

associated with these

assets are not confined to credit risk.

h) Loss given default: the IFSB recognises that statistics on loss rates of defaulted

Shariah-compliant instruments are at a very early stage of compilation. This may put

investors in a stronger position to attach assets in the event that the issuer defaults than the

investor would be

if they were holding conventional instruments. In fact, this may or may not be the case,

depending on the applicable legal system.

294

The IFBS recognises that national supervisors retain the ultimate authority in determining

both recognition criteria and the recognition process.177

177 Further information about regulatory capital requirements, risk management and corporate governance is available through IFSB

2007.

295

ANNEX 4 Islamic banking for Italian SMEs

Within Islamic finance there is a wide range of financial instruments, each with a specific

purpose. When considering Islamic finance, it is important to ensure that the instrument

used is suitable for the economic purpose that a company seeks to achieve.

There are two main categories of transaction types:

Profit- and loss-sharing partnership methods which can be compared with equity

investments; and

Transactions with a predictable or fixed return structure.

Other financial instruments such as foreign exchange, letters of credit, agency contracts and

guarantees are also available. This chapter is takes up four categories of instruments:

partnership contracts, structures with predictable returns, other contract types and Sukuk.

Partnership contracts

There are two types of partnership transactions: joint venture (Musharakah) and passive

partnership (Mudarabah). The main difference between the two structures relates to what

the partners contribute to the partnership.

Joint venture

The Arabic term “Musharakah” means sharing and is used in financial transactions

to identify joint ventures or partnerships. More than two parties can be involved,

and generally each provides knowledge and skill as well as a share of the capital.

Knowledge and skill can take the form of management or advisory services or even

doing the actual work itself. It is possible for one of the partners only to provide

capital, in which case he or she becomes a sleeping partner. The profit ratio is pre-

agreed in the contract and reflects the level of capital provided, effort, skill and

expertise the partners bring to the joint venture. Losses are borne by the partners in

proportion to the capital they have provided. The liability of the partners is

technically unlimited.

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Once the contract has been agreed between the partners, the process can be broken

down into the following two main components:

Cash and expertise

All partners contribute to the capital and expertise of the business or project. They

do not have to provide equal amounts of capital or equal amounts of expertise.

Profits and losses

Any profit earned from the joint venture is to be shared between the partners

according to the ratios agreed in the original contract. Any losses borne by the

partners are strictly in proportion to the amount of capital they have contributed. It

is not permissible to fix a lump-sum profit for any single partner.

Diminishing Musharakah

Diminishing Musharakah is a variation of partnership in which it is agreed

between the parties at the start that one partner will, over time, purchase

units in the joint venture from the others at a pre-agreed unit price. At the

start of the agreement, the project is divided into a number of equal units

(shares) that are bought by one of the partners over the life of the

transaction. In a diminishing Musharakah, the repurchasing agreement is

part of the contract.

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The purchasing party will gradually own a larger share of the joint venture

and, as a result, his or her share of the capital increases. With this increase in

capital, the purchasing party will be liable for a larger proportion of any loss.

Profit ratios will be revised either with each purchase or on a periodic basis

as agreed between the partners.

Passive partnership

The Mudarabah transaction is a partnership transaction in which only one partner

contributes capital (the capital providing investor or Rab al maal), and the other (the

business manager or Mudarib) contributes skill and expertise.

The investor has no right to interfere in the day-to-day operations of the business,

although the contract between the partners can contain mutually agreed conditions

the business manager has to abide by. The relationship between the partners is

founded upon trust, with the investor having to rely heavily on the business

manager, his or her ability to manage the business and honesty when it comes to

profit share payments.

The passive partnership transaction can be used for private equity investments, but

is also often used when clients deposit money with a bank. When used for deposits,

the bank contributes its skill and expertise in identifying appropriate investment

opportunities.

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Once the contract has been agreed between the partners, the process can be broken

down into the following main components:

Capital injection

The investor provides capital to the project or company. Generally, an investor will

not provide any capital unless a clearly defined business plan is presented. In this

structure, the investor pays 100% of the capital.

Skill and expertise

The business manager’s contribution to the partnership is his or her skill and

expertise in the industry or area.

Profit and loss

As in the joint venture, profits are shared according to a pre-agreed ratio; losses are

distributed in proportion to the capital provided. Since only one party provides all

the capital, this party bears all the loss.

In the event of a loss, the business manager does not receive any compensation for

his or her efforts. The only exception to this is if the business manager has been

negligent, in which case he or she will be liable for the total loss.

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The investor is liable only for the amount of capital provided, which means that the

Mudarib cannot commit the business to any sum that is over and above the capital

provided.

Instruments with predictable returns

These are favoured by banks and their regulators as reliance on third party profit

calculations is eliminated. There are four main instruments in this category: Murabahah,

Ijarah, Istisna and Salam.

Deferred payment sale

Deferred payment sale or instalment credit sale transactions are known as

Murabahah. They are mainly used for the purchase of goods for immediate delivery

with payment to be settled at a later date. In its most basic form, this transaction

involves the seller and buyer of the merchandise as illustrated below:

As part of the contract between the buyer and the seller, the price of the goods,

markup, delivery date and payment date are agreed. The seller takes immediate

possession of the goods, against future payment. The buyer has full knowledge of

the price and quality of the goods purchased. In addition, the buyer is aware of the

exact amount of markup paid for the convenience of paying later. In the context of

trading, the advantage to the buyer is that

he or she can use the goods to generate a profit and use this profit to pay the original

seller.

Example of a deferred payment sale

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KS imports linen from Italy on a wholesale basis and sells it to local shops in the

region. One of its clients, newly incorporated Beds Inc., has purchased 500 sets of bed

linen at a price of EURO 25 each. Beds Inc., having just started operating, needs to

generate a profit from selling the linen to clients and has requested that payment to KS

be made in three months’ time. Asian KS agrees, and charges Beds Inc. a fixed markup

of EURO 160.

KS delivers the linen today and, three months later, receives EURO 12,500 for the bed

linen supplied, plus a markup of EURO 160. The payment from Beds Inc. totals EURO

12,660.

The underlying asset can vary, and can include raw materials and goods for resale.

In Islamic finance, the Murabahah transaction can, for instance, be applied to trade

finance and working capital financing.

Leasing

An Ijarah transaction is a lease in which one party (lessor) allows another party

(lessee) to use an asset against the payment of a rental fee. As with conventional

finance, two types of leasing transactions exist: financial and operating.

In a financial lease (Ijarah wa Iqtina or Ijarah Muntahiya bi Tamleek), the lessee

provides a purchase undertaking at the start of the transaction, stating that he or she

will buy the asset at the end of the lease period.

In an operating lease, such a purchase undertaking is not included and the lease

cannot be conditional on a purchase undertaking.

Not every asset is suitable for leasing. The asset needs to be tangible, nonperishable,

valuable, identifiable and quantifiable.

In an operational lease, depicted in the figure 4 below, the lessor leases the asset to

the lessee, for a pre-agreed period and the lessee pays pre-agreed periodic rentals.

The rental or lease payments can either be fixed for the period or floating with

periodical re-fixing. The latter is usually done by linking it to a conventional index

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such as the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), which represents the cost of

capital.

At the end of the period, the lessee can either request to extend the lease or hand the

asset back to the lessor. The lessor takes a view of the residual asset value at the end

of the lease term, and takes ownership risk. When the asset is returned to the lessor

at the end of the period, he or she can either lease it to another party, or sell the asset

on the open market. In the case of a sale, the lessor may offer the asset to the lessee.

A financial lease, as depicted in figure 5, has an additional step, which is the sale of

the asset to the lessee at the end of the period.

As with an operating lease, rentals can be fixed for the period or floating based on a

benchmark. As part of the lease agreement, the lessee provides the lessor with a

unilateral purchase undertaking which specifies the amount at which the lessee will

purchase the asset upon expiry of the lease.

Three options are possible:

Gift. In this case, the lessor has gradually paid for ownership of the asset during the

lease period, as part of the rental fee. Once all rentals are paid, there is no further

payment required from the lessee to obtain the asset.

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Against fixed payment. At the end of the lease, the lessee becomes the owner of the

asset once he or she has paid the purchase amount agreed in the contract.

Against market value. At the end of the lease, the lessee becomes the owner of the

asset once he or she has paid the market value to the lessor.

In practice, options 1 and 2 are the most common.

In both cases, the lessor owns the asset and runs all risks associated with ownership.

He or she is also responsible for major maintenance and insurance. Because the

lessee is using the asset on a daily basis, he or she is often better positioned to

determine maintenance requirements, and is generally appointed by the lessor as an

agent to ensure all maintenance is carried out. In addition, the lessee is, in some

cases, similarly appointed as an agent for the lessor to

insure the asset.

In the event of a total loss of the asset, the lessee is no longer obliged to pay any

rentals. The lessor, however, has full recourse to any insurance payments.

Example of a lease

KS Transport is looking to extend its distribution network and wants to invest in new

delivery trucks. Instead of tying up a significant amount of money in new trucks, it

decides to lease them instead from Lease A Truck on an operational lease basis.

Lease-A-Truck provides Early Bird with two trucks against a monthly rental fee, which

covers maintenance, depreciation and insurance. Lease-A-Truck retains ownership

throughout the duration of the transaction, and informs Early Bird which garage to

take the trucks to for maintenance and repairs. Lease-A-Truck settles any bills directly

with the garage.

At the end of the lease period, Early Bird has one of the following choices:

Extend the lease for a further period;

Purchase the trucks at current market value from Lease-A-Truck; or

Hand the trucks back to Lease-A-Truck.

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Short-term production finance

Short-term production, construction and agriculture contracts can be financed using

a Salam contract.

In this type of contract, a payment is made today against future delivery of the asset.

As the purpose of the funding is to construct or produce the asset, the asset itself

does not have to be in existence, and the seller does not need to have ownership. In

its simplest form, Salam is a contract between a buyer and a seller as shown below:

The contract is typically short term (one to three months in duration), but could be

entered into for longer periods. The type, quality and quantity of the asset need to be

clearly specified in the contract. Any asset that cannot be specified in this way, such

as precious stones, cannot be made the subject of a Salam transaction.

The seller has a contractual obligation to deliver the specified quantity and quality

at the agreed delivery date. If the seller cannot deliver from his or her own

production, he or she will have to buy the remaining quantity to fulfill the

contractual obligation. The goods involved must be commodities that are freely

available.

The seller receives the funds to enable production of the underlying asset, while the

buyer obtains an asset in the future with the expectation that the eventual price will

be higher than the original payment. Because the buyer takes a business risk, the

transaction is not subject to any of the prohibitions on uncertainty and gambling.

Example of short-term production finance

Farmer Mario has noticed a substantial demand for pumpkin seeds and wants to enter

this market. In order to be able to harvest the pumpkins in November of the following

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year, extract the seeds and package them, he requires an up-front investment of EURO

2,500.

Mario comes to an agreement with Super Duper Supermarkets, which wants to buy

100 kg of quality.

A pumpkin seeds, packaged in 100 g bags for EURO 2,500, for delivery in November.

Mario receives the

EURO 2,500 and starts the process of making the soil ready and planting the seeds.

Come November, Mario harvests the pumpkins, extracts 150 kg of seeds and packages

100 kg of quality.

A seeds, which he delivers to Super Duper. The seeds are sold for EURO 3 a packet,

generating revenue of EURO 500 (EURO 3,000 – EURO 2,500) for Super Duper.

The remaining 50 kg varies in quality from A to C, which Mario then sells for a total

amount of EURO 1,000.

Long-term production finance

Like a Salam contract, Istisna is a purchase contract for future delivery of an asset.

It is exempt from the same two conditions regarding the asset, ownership and

existence.

The contract is typically for a longer term, and payment to the producer or

contractor of the asset does not have to be in full in advance. Payment is likely to be

in various installments in line with the progress made on the development of the

asset and is, therefore, well suited to project finance and construction.

The asset typically needs to be manufactured, constructed or processed, and is of a

significant size and capital outlay.

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Under the simple structure shown in figure 7, it is assumed that the buyer will have

the money to pay for the asset during its construction. However, this is not

necessarily the case and a financier could be involved. The financier will finance the

construction and consequently sell or lease the asset to the buyer for a pre-agreed

period.

As in a Salam transaction, the buyer takes a business risk in this transaction. It is

therefore not subject to any of the prohibitions on uncertainty and gambling.

Example of long-term production finance

KS is expanding and in need of a new manufacturing plant with a total cost of EURO

500,000 which will be built by Considerate Builders Inc. KS negotiates the following

payment schedule and pays Considerate Builders upon completion of each phase:

EURO

10% of the amount to be paid up front to prepare the site . . . . . . . . . . . 50,000.00

10% once the foundation is laid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50,000.00

25% once the walls are built. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .125,000.00

20% once the roof is finished and the windows are put in. . . . . . . . . . .100,000.00

15% once the plumbing and electricity are finished. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75,000.00

15% when the interior decorating is completed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75,000.00

5% when the final issues are resolved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25,000.00

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Total paid at end of construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 500,000.00

Other instruments

Besides the profit- and loss-sharing instruments and the financing options with a

predictable return outlined above, there are other financial structures that do not necessarily

fall into either of these categories.

Foreign exchange

Foreign exchange, or Sarf, is a transaction in which one person buys an amount of a

specific currency against an equivalent amount in another currency. This is similar

to foreign exchange contracts offered by conventional banks and money changers.

Within Islamic finance, only spot transactions are currently permissible and

forwards, options and futures are deemed to be

speculative.

Letters of credit

Islamic letters of credit are similar to conventional letters of credit and are an

undertaking by a bank to make a payment to a named party against the presentation

of the stipulated documents.

Letters of credit are often used in combination with trade-type transactions such as

Murabahah and Salam. Depending on which party requests them, the letters of

credit provide certainty that the goods will be delivered prior to payment being

made, or transfer the risk of non-payment to the financial institution issuing or

confirming the letters.

Letters of credit are highly standardized and typically subject to international

regulations. These regulations are described in detail in the Uniform Customs and

Practice for Documentary Credits issued by the International Chamber of

Commerce.

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Different types of letters of credit exist, such as irrevocable, confirmed and stand-

by.

Guarantee

A financial guarantee is a guarantee provided by one party (the guarantor) to cover

any payment default by another party. An example of a guarantee is when parents

provide a guarantee to the bank for their child’s payments under a home purchase

plan. In the event the child misses a payment, the parents will automatically be

liable.

In Islamic finance, unlike in conventional finance, guarantees cannot be used to

assure profits or to guarantee business performance. They can only guarantee

payment in the event of a shortfall or default by a named counterparty. In Islamic

finance, the guarantor cannot charge a fee for providing the guarantee.

Unilateral promise

A Waad is a unilateral promise from one party to another, and can, for example, be

structured along the lines of “I promise to pay you EURO 15 next week if you help

me organize my brother’s birthday party.” Acceptance by the other party is not

required, since this is not a bilateral contract. The conditionality in this phrase is

also acceptable for the same reason. However, in order for this to turn into a

contract, the second party needs to accept.

Down payment

A Bai al Arboon represents a non-refundable down payment on a purchase which

signifies the buyer’s intent to buy the asset and is typically made toward goods that

will be delivered at a later date. It is depicted in its most simplistic form in figure 8

below.

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The down payment forms part of the overall price agreed between the buyer and the

seller, but is non-refundable in the event the buyer later does not take delivery of the

asset.

Simplified, the steps are as follows:

Buyer and seller agree on a price and the buyer makes a down payment (e.g.,

20% of the purchase price). The asset is specified and the delivery date is

agreed;

On the agreed delivery date, the seller delivers the asset to the buyer, or the

buyer collects it from the seller;

On the agreed delivery date, after inspecting the asset, the buyer pays the

balance of the purchase price (e.g., 80% of the original purchase price).

Example of Bai al Arboon

My brother agrees to buy a motorbike from Biker’s Best, a specialist motorbike

garage, for EURO 4,995. The motorbike is not new, and has been in the showroom

for a few weeks. The seller needs to check the motorbike before it is collected and

service it to ensure that it is roadworthy.

Although the deal is done, the seller would like some sort of guarantee, and does not

want to be in a position where he has done all the work only to find the buyer has

changed his mind. The seller requests a down payment and they agree on EURO 995.

When my brother goes to collect the motorbike, he pays the remaining EURO 4,000.

If he had pulled out of the purchase, the EURO 995 would have been forfeited by the

seller to cover the cost of work he had done in getting the motorbike ready for sale.

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Agency agreement

Wakalah is the agreement that governs the principal-agent relationship between two

parties, where one party is requesting another to act on its behalf. The application of

the Wakalah is varied and can range from appointing an agent (wakil) to purchase

or sell an asset, to the investment of funds. The agent is entitled to a fee for services

provided. In addition, he can keep any profit he makes over and above a pre-agreed

anticipated profit rate as an incentive. In Islamic finance, the agency agreement is

often used to govern restricted and unrestricted investment accounts.

Investment certificate

Sukuk is probably the most well-known instrument in Islamic finance and is most

correctly identified as an investment certificate. It is often called a bond type

instrument because it has some similar characteristics.

Unlike the holder of a conventional bond, however, a Sukuk holder also owns a

proportional part of the underlying asset. Sukuk is not a separate instrument in

itself, but more like a structure facilitating the funding of large projects that would

be beyond the capabilities of an individual or a small group of investors.

Sukuk can be listed on recognized exchanges and is, with a few exceptions,

generally tradable. In its simplest, generic form, Sukuk can be depicted as follows:

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The special purpose vehicle (SPV) purchases the asset from the original owner on

behalf of the Sukuk holders. The SPV is often set up as part of the group of

companies selling the asset and hence raising the funds.

In the interest of the Sukuk holders, it needs to be ensured that the SPV is

bankruptcy–remote, which means that insolvency of the original seller of the asset

will not affect the SPV. In addition, the SPV should not be subject to any negative

tax implications and will need to be established in what is known as a tax-friendly

jurisdiction.

Like conventional bonds, Sukuk can be bought from the issuer or on the secondary

market. Unlike in the conventional bond market, however, Sukuk tends to be held to

maturity and the secondary market is not very active.

Although quotes are provided by some market makers, the spreads between bid and

asking price are particularly wide and availability of issues is still thin.

The Sukuk holder owns a proportional share of the underlying asset and has a

financial right to the revenues generated by the asset.

However, as mentioned before, the holder is also subject to ownership risk, which

means that he or she is exposed to any risk associated with the share of the

underlying asset. Conventional bonds, on the other hand, remain part of the issuer’s

financial liability.

Sukuk always has one of the following underlying transaction types as a basis:

Mudarabah – Musharakah – Ijarah – Salam – Istisna

The Murabahah transaction is generally not deemed feasible for securitization since

it would be akin to debt trading. Arguably the most well-known Islamic investment

tool, Sukuk might not be suitable for smaller businesses. The cost of setting up and

managing the SPV, the legal documentation and issuance process can be prohibitive

for relatively small amounts of funding.

Which transaction type?

With the exception of Sukuk, the examples provided in the previous section are based on

two organizations or individuals dealing directly. As companies grow, their financial

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requirements go beyond what can be arranged between parties, and financial institutions

become involved to provide the funding. Each of the transactions mentioned can also have

a bank or financial institution involved, which will then act as an intermediary to mobilize

funds and apply

them to investments in businesses.

When considering Islamic finance as an alternative funding source, a company needs to

take the business requirement into account. The following are examples of the different

ways Islamic financial structures can be applied to SMEs:

Partnership contracts. Joint ventures or passive partnerships can be applied for

private equity participations. The bank takes a share of the ownership of the

organization and shares in the profits and losses. Partnership transactions are

favored by scholars because they are designed to share risk and reward, which is in

line with Islamic economic thought. From the bank’s perspective, the disadvantage

lies in the effort required to ensure that all partners are comfortable with the way the

project or company is run and its profitability. Regulators in some countries prefer

banks not to take equity positions in companies because of the potential additional

risk associated with non-arm’s length trading.

Deferred payment transactions. When including a financial institution in a

deferred payment transaction, the bank purchases the asset against a cash payment

from the seller and subsequently sells the asset to the buyer against future payment

of the principal, plus a pre-agreed markup to be paid on a pre-agreed date.

Typically, the bank instructs the seller to deliver the asset direct to the buyer

although ownership is transferred to the bank before the asset is passed on to the

buyer. This transaction type is particularly suited for working capital and export

finance.

Leasing. Leasing transactions are suitable when there is a need for a particular asset

such as vehicles or equipment, but the company prefers to rent or lease the

equipment rather than owning it outright with all the associated ownership risk. The

bank purchases the asset and acts as the lessor. The client is the lessee and pays for

the use of the asset.

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Production finance. Production finance transactions are suitable for financing

assets that need to be manufactured or built. The bank in this case acts as an

intermediary between the contractor and the ultimate buyer and facilitates the

payments. Long-term production finance is usually applied to construction and

project finance transactions of a huge scale and is often combined with a lease.

The last three of the above can also be classified as predictable return structures and are

preferred by banks and regulators because they do not require significant monitoring to

ensure they receive the correct profit share. Which mode is most suitable is, in addition,

guided by taxation and legal issues in the jurisdiction where a company is operating.

When Islamic finance may or may not be the best choice for Italian

SME’s

Parallels are often drawn between Islamic finance and socially responsible investing, which

is also referred to as sustainable or ethical investing. Socially responsible investing

encompasses an investment strategy that seeks to maximize both financial returns and

socially responsible or ethical behaviour. Generally, people who make such ethical

investment decisions rely on their faith and conscience.

Socially responsible investors also favour investments that promote environmental

stewardship, consumer protection, human rights and diversity. In addition, some investors

actively avoid investing in businesses that involve alcohol, tobacco, gambling, and

weaponry and defence. Sharia acknowledges the right of an individual to create wealth, but

discourages hoarding, monopolistic activities and excessive materialism. Generally, sharia

encourages social justice without hampering entrepreneurship.

Investors do not always have to be Muslim. The principles of sharia tend to fit in very well

with non-Muslim investors seeking socially responsible investment opportunities and offer

a viable alternative to other means available in the market. SMEs seeking funding do not

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have to be owned by Muslims either. However, the principles regarding the strength of the

business plan and the value of the underlying assets do apply.

This section will review what SMEs need to be aware of if they are considering using

Islamic financial services.

Prohibited industries

Within the framework of sharia, a number of industries are prohibited, and any

SME which is involved in these industries will not be able to attract Islamic finance.

Islamic finance is not available for the following industries:

Conventional banking and insurance. Conventional banking and insurance are

associated with interest and are therefore not permissible.

Alcohol and alcohol production. This includes any distilling, marketing and sales

activities.

Pork-related products and non-compliant food production. Noncompliant food

production covers everything which is not prepared in a halal way and includes

meat which is not slaughtered in a fashion acceptable under halal.

Gambling. This covers casinos and betting shops, but also bingo halls and online

betting.

Tobacco. As with alcohol, this includes the production, marketing and sales of

tobacco and associated products.

Adult entertainment. Any activity associated with adult entertainment, including

escort services, brothels and movies with explicit sexual content, is prohibited.

Weapons, arms and defence manufacturing.

In addition, Islamic financial institutions typically do not invest in the equity of

companies that are highly leveraged using conventional financial instruments because

of the interest component associated with the debt.

Transaction-type considerations

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Given the size of an SME, its requirement for financing is typically not very high, and

the issuance of corporate bonds or its Islamic finance alternative Sukuk would generally

not be recommended.

The types of Islamic financial transactions that would be most suitable for an SME are

detailed above in the section “Which transaction type?” An SME would benefit most

from a standard financial solution, occasionally coupled with minor amendments to

cater for specific company requirements. Although it is the bank’s responsibility to

ensure that the client is provided with all the required information to enable him to

make the right decision regarding the transaction type, the level of funding, cost and

other elements, the SME has also to take its own responsibility for ensuring the

recommended financial solution is the right one.

As long as the company is not satisfied with the solution offered, the level of

information provided or any element of the transaction or relationship, it will need to

address the problem before entering into any contractual arrangement.

Other general considerations

Many of the reasons why Islamic finance might not be the right opportunity for an

SME, or any other company, are very similar to the reasons for rejecting a conventional

product offering.

Cost

The financing arrangement offered by any financial institution should not be prohibitive

in cost. Whether it is a conventional or an Islamic bank offering, the cost should be

competitive given the investment opportunity, size of the transaction, the bank’s cost of

funds and the level of perceived risk. While SMEs typically require smaller financial

solutions that are generally more expensive than larger transactions, bank charges

should be competitive for the service the bank provides.

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Purpose

The financial institution has a duty to ensure that the instrument offered is suitable for

the purpose and meets the business requirements of the SME.

However, if the SME feels that the product offering does not meet its purpose, it has the

responsibility for questioning the financial institution and ensuring that it becomes

comfortable that its purpose will be met.

For example, a suggestion from a bank for an SME to issue a Sukuk as an instrument

for raising EURO 500,000 in financing would not be suitable. Sukuk are generally

highly individual and geared to larger transaction sizes of EURO 10 million and over.

Not only would this transaction type not be fit for purpose, but it would also lead to an

unacceptable increase in cost.

Information

The relationship between bank and client is two-way. Just as the bank requires the

client to provide information about its business, so should the bank provide clear and

sufficient information on charges, structures and the most appropriate transaction type.

If the bank declines to provide this information, the client should consider changing to a

financial institution it will be more comfortable with. The fact that an SME is small is

not a valid reason for the bank to withhold information.

Legal and tax requirements

Legal and tax requirements that unnecessarily increase the cost of funding should in any

case be avoided. Because Islamic finance is still a relatively young industry, the legal

and tax frameworks do not always cater for Islamic transaction types. If the legal and

tax framework do not facilitate such transactions, the SME is better guided to apply a

conventional financial structure.

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ANNEX 5 Determinants of Islamic Bank Profitability: Evidence from

Jordan

In order to show the Determinants of Islamic Bank Profitability, there are two categories,

namely internal and external factors that effects on Islamic Bank Profitability.

Internal determinants of profitability, which are within the control of bank management,

can be broadly classified into two categories, i.e. financial statement variables and

nonfinancial statement variables. While financial statement variables relate to the decisions

which directly involve items in the balance sheet and income statement; non-financial

statement variables involve factors that have no direct relation to the financial statements.

External factors are those factors that are considered to be beyond the control of the

management of a bank. This study comes to examine and analyse the factors that might

affect on the Jordanian Islamic bank profitability during the period from 2005 through

2009.

This study applied a version of the model developed by Demerguç-Kunt and Huizingha

(1999), Haron, Sudin (2004 ) , Toni Uhomoibhi, ( 2008 ), Athanasoglou , Panayiotis P. and

et al, ( 2008 ), and Ben Naceur and Goaied (2010).) by using Multiple Linear Regression

Model.

The analysis revealed that there are significant and positive relationship between Return on

Assets (ROA) and Provision for Credit Facilities + Interest in Suspense)/Credit

Facilities(PRFCFI/CF) , Total Equity/ total Assets (TE/TA) and total income / Total Asset

(TI/TA) of the Islamic Banking , and there are significant and negative relationship

between ROA and the Bank size (Log TA), Total liabilities/ Total Assets (TL/ TA) Annual

Growth Rate for Gross domestic product( GDPGR), Inflation Rate (INF) and Exchange

Rate (ERS) of the Islamic Banking.

Also this study found that there are significant and positive relationship between Return on

equity (ROE) and Log TA, TL/ TA, TI/TA and ERS of the Islamic Banking , and there are

significant and negative relationship between ROE and PRFCFI/CF, TE/ TA, GDPGR and

INF of the Islamic Banking.

Keywords: Islamic Bank Profitability Return on Assets, Return on equity, Provision for

Credit Facilities, Inflation Rate and Exchange Rate.

1. Introduction

The objective of this study is to examine and analyze the factors that might effect on the

Jordanian Islamic bank profitability during the period (2005-2009). During the last decade

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of the 21st century, Islamic banks currently play a fundamental role in the financial

markets. They are the principle source of credit for millions of individuals and families and

many governments and businesses sectors. More than 60 countries and an asset base of

more than $500 billion, Islamic banks are now playing an increasingly significant role in

their respective markets.

Based on their charters, Islamic banks have the flexibility of becoming share holders and

creditors of firms, as well as the advantage of providing investment-banking services. A

comprehensive evaluation of the performance of Islamic banks is, therefore, essential for

managerial as well as regulatory purposes. From managerial perspective, interactions

between different performance measures must be taken into consideration in order to

maximize the value of the bank.

Relative to the above, the primary objective of this study is to provide answers to the

following questions:

1. What are the measures which used in Islamic bank profitability ?

2. What are the factors that effect on the Jordanian Islamic bank profitability ?

3. How can the managers of Islamic banks reduce the credit risk through enhancing

the performance of their firms?

This study was selected for many reasons:

1. Most studies are concentrate on conventional banking and eccepted the Islamic bank .

2. There are few studies on the Islamic bank profitability.

3. The researchers believed that there are no any studies to determine the profitability of

Islamic bank in Jordan.

4. The banking sector in Jordan is one of the vital economic sectors, It is contributed around

40% from Gross Domestic Product (GDP)at year of 2007/2008, and the islamic bank in

Jordan contributes about 5% (Central Bank of Jordan, annual report, 2009).

5. This study attempts to fill the gap between on conventional banking and Islamic banking.

Accordingly, this study is divided into five sections. The Background and literature review

of the determinants of Islamic Bank Profitability is highlighted in Section 2. Section 3

examines the methodology used in analyzing the relationship between the variables used in

this study and the Islamic Bank Profitability. Section 4 elaborates on the findings and

Section 5 conclusion.

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There are three Islamic Banks in Jordan. These banking are: Jordan Islamic Bank for

Finance and Investment, International Arab Islamic Bank, and Dubai Jordan Islamic Bank.

Also there are about fourteen conventional banks.

2. Methodology and Data Description

The study follows a functional model which was already employed earlier by Demerguç-

Kunt and Huizingha (1999), Haron, Sudin (2004), Toni Uhomoibhi, (2008), Athanasoglou,

Panayiotis P. and et al, (2008), and Ben Naceur and Goaied (2010). The study model is

tested on time series cross-sectional bank level data in the context of Jordan over the 2005-

2009. The empirical specification focuses on the reported determinants of Islamic Bank

profitability which is assumed to be a function of a set of bank characteristics. To control

for the effect of the internal and external factors on Bank profitability, we use Pooled

Ordinary Least Squares ( OLS ).

For the determinants testing purposes, we used two models:

Model 1: ROA = c + b1 size + b 2TL /TA + b3 TE/TA +b4 PRFCFI/CF+ b5 TI /

TA + b6 GDPGR + b7 Inf + b8 ERS + e (1)

Model 2: ROE= c + b1 size + b2 TL /TA + b3 TE/TA +b4 PRFCFI/CF + b5 TI /

TA + b6 GDPGR + b7 Inf + b8 ERS + e (2)

Where:

ROA = Return on Assets

ROE = Return on equity

C = constant term

Size = the Bank size

TL /TA =Total liabilities/ total Assets

TE/TA = Total Equity/ total Assets

PRFCFI/CF=(Provision for Credit Facilities + Interest in Suspense)/Credit Facilities

TI / TA = total income / Total Asset

(GDPGR) =Annual Growth Rate for Gross domestic product

Inf = Inflation Rate

ERS= Exchange Rate

e= the error term

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Data

The sample of this study consists of panel data for all Islamic banks listed in the

Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) for the sample period (2005-2009) and available

continuous series of accounting and financial information. The study sample

consists of 3 banks. These selected banks must then meet the following filtering

conditions:

* The shares of Islamic banks have been traded in the Amman Stock Exchange in

the period 2005-2009.

** Trading has not been interrupted in those banks’ shares which have not been

merged or liquidated through out the period of study.

*** Data have been available about those banks throughout the period of study.

The study depended on the following sources for collecting the data needed:

Annual reports issued by Jordanian Islamic banks.

Annual report issued by Amman Stock Exchange.

Annual reports issued by the Central Bank of Jordan.

Some statistics issued by the Jordanian General Statistics Departments.

Explanatory Variables

Dependent Variables

Independent and dependent variables of the current study have been determined

according to the results reached by previous studies and how far data have been

available for measurement purposes. There are two measures used to identify the

dependant variables. These measures are:

1. Return on Assets (ROA)

Return on assets is the ratio of Net Income After Taxes/Total Assets. The rate of

return secured on a bank's total assets indicates the efficiency of its management in

generating net income from all of the resources (assets) committed to the

institution,Rose ,Peter S., (2008), Hempel, G. and Simonson, D., (1999), and

Hudgins, Sylvia C. (2006).

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It is measured by Net income to total assets. It is argued by Demerguç-Kunt and

Huizingha (1999), Cavallo and Majnoni (2001), Bashir, Abdel Hamid M., (2003).

Laeven and Majnoni (2003), Ben Naceur (2003), Davis and Halbin, Bikker and

Metzemakers (2004), Davis and Zhu (2005) and Aburime, Toni Uhomoibhi (2008).

This ratio demonstrates the relationship between net income and total assets.

Selecting this measure is attributed to the fact that using net income for funding

purposes within the financing structure constitutes an incentive and target for many

companies to increase their return on investment. Meanwhile, the capital structure

policy involves venture and returns trade-off simply because using debt extensively

increases the risks faced by the banking, but amplifies total invested funds and

expected return.

2. Return on Equity (ROE)

Return on equity capital is the ratio of Net Income After Taxes/Total Equity Capital.

It represents the rate of return earned on the funds invested in the bank by its

stockholders. Nonbank financial firms have stockholders, too who are interested in

the return on the funds that they invested, Rose, Peter S. And Hudgins, Sylvia C.

(2006).

It is measured by Demerguç-Kunt and Huizingha (1999), Cavallo and Majnoni

(2001), Bashir, Abdel Hamid M., (2003). Laeven and Majnoni (2003), Ben Naceur

(2003), Davis and Halbin, Bikker and Metzemakers (2004), Davis and Zhu (2005)

and Aburime, Toni Uhomoibhi (2008).

ROE, on the other hand, reflects how effectively a bank management is using

shareholders’ funds. A bank’s ROE is affected by its ROA as well as by the bank’s

degree of financial leverage (equity/ asset). Since returns on assets tend to be lower

for financial intermediaries, most banks utilize financial leverage heavily to increase

return on equity to a competitive level. This ratio is intended to measure the risks to

which the Islamic banking and conventional banking are subjected through

depending on money borrowed for financing its assets. A lower index in this regard

means that the bank depends on borrowed money for financing its assets, thereby

exacerbating capital risks.

Independent Variables

Independent variables of the study on which data were collected include the

following:

1. Bank size

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It is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. It is argued by Demerguç-

Kunt and Huizingha (1999), Haron, Sudin (2004), Toni Uhomoibhi, (2008),

Athanasoglou, Panayiotis P. and et al, (2008), and Ben Naceur and Goaied (2010).

They found a significant positive relationship between Return on Asset and Return

on Equity and size of the banking. They have been selected the size of the banking

as an independent variable because Large size is expected to promote economies of

scale and reduce the cost of gathering and processing information. In general, large-

sized banks have the advantage of providing a larger menu of financial services to

their customers, and hence mobilize more funds (Bashir, 1999).

2. Total liabilities/ Total Assets (TL /TA )

Some Researchers, Bashir, Abdel Hamid M. , (2003 )and Haron, Sudin (2004 ) used

the ratio of total liabilities to total assets (TL / TA) as a proxy for risk, because there

are some deposits of Islamic banks include investment, saving, and demand

deposits. Investment deposits are not exactly liabilities to the bank since their

nominal value is not guaranteed. Hence, the ratio LATA should generally be lower

than it appears to be. So, It is using TL /TA adds a greater depth in understanding

the risks a bank takes when trying to obtain higher returns. First, a higher risk ratio

is an indicator of lower capital ratio or greater leverage. A lower capital ratio may

trigger safety and public confidence concerns for the respective bank. Besides, a

lower capital ratio indicates less protection to depositors whose bank accounts are

not fully insured. Second, when a bank chooses to take more capital risk (assuming

this is allowed by its regulators), its leverage multiplier and return on equity, will

increase. In the absence of deposit insurance, high risk-taking will expose the bank

to the risk of insolvency. Therefore, the sign of coefficient of LATA may be

negative or positive.

3. Total Equity/ Total Assets (TE/TA)

There are many Researchers, Demerguç-Kunt and Huizingha (1999), Haron, Sudin

(2004), Toni Uhomoibhi, (2008), Bashir, Abdel Hamid M., (2003), used Total

Equity/ total Assets (TE/TA) as Independent variables that affecting on ROE and

ROI because the large size of equity is expected to reduce the risk (capital risk) and

a lower capital ratio may trigger safety and public confidence concerns for the

respective bank. In general, the large size of equity have the advantage of providing

a larger menu of financial services to their customers, and hence mobilize more

funds (Bashir, 1999). It is expected a significant positive relationship between

TE/TA and Return on Asset and Return on Equity.

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4. (Provision for Credit Facilities +Interest in Suspense)/Credit Facilities

(PRFCFI/CF)

This ratio, known as the Provision for Loan Losses, it is used the allowance for loan

losses and it is built up gradually over time by an annual non cash expense item that

is charged against the bank's current income. The dollar amount of the annual loan-

loss provision plus the amount of recovered funds from any loans previously

declared worthless (charged off) less any loans charged off as worthless in the

current period is added to the allowance-for-loan-losses account, Rose ,Peter S. And

Hudgins, Sylvia C. (2006).

There are many Researchers, Demerguç-Kunt and Huizingha (1999), Haron, Sudin

(2004), Toni Uhomoibhi, (2008), Bashir, Abdel Hamid M., (2003), used Total

Equity/ total Assets (TE/TA) as Independent variables that affecting on ROE and

ROI because the Provision for Loan Losses is expected to reduce the risk (credit

risk). It is expected a significant positive relationship between PRFCFI/CF and

Return on Asset and Return on Equity.

5. Total income / Total Asset (TI / TA)

Total Income includes the revenues of banking .The revenues of banking includes

the many items, these items are: 1.Loan Income, 2.Security Income, 3.Service

Charges on Deposit and Other Deposit Fees, 4.Other Operating Revenues.

There are many Researchers, Haron, Sudin (2004), Toni Uhomoibhi, (2008), Bashir,

Abdel Hamid M., (2003), used total income/Total Asset (TI/TA) as Independent

variables that affecting on ROE and ROA because the total income is used in the

Islamic banking for reduced the risks of Investment Financing which includes

Musharaka and Mudarabha ( Karema, 2009). So, It is expected a significant positive

relationship between TI / TA and Return on Asset and Return on Equity.

6. Annual Growth Rate for Gross domestic product (GDPGR)

There are many Researchers, Haron, Sudin (2004), Toni Uhomoibhi, (2008), Bashir,

Abdel Hamid M., (2003), used Annual Growth Rate for Gross domestic product

(GDPGR) as Independent variables that affecting on ROE and ROA because the

high of Annual Growth Rate for Gross domestic product (GDPGR) means the

increased of investment (Chan andGemayel, 2004; Singh and Jun, 1995). So, There

is a direct impact between GDPGR and on ROE and ROA as soon as, It is expected

a positive relationship between GDPGR and ROE and ROA.

7. Annual Inflation Rate (AIR)

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This is another important environmental condition which may effect on ROE and

ROA. This factor represents the changes in the general price level or inflationary

conditions in the economy. The impact of inflation rates on on ROE and ROA

depend on its effect on the investor’s return. Nonnenberg and Mendonca (2004)

investigated that the on ROE and ROA is correlated to level of economy’s degree of

openness, risk and variables related to macroeconomic performance like inflation,

risk and average rate of economic growth. The results also show that the on ROE

and ROA has been closely associated with stock market performance. Lastly, a

causality test between on ROE and ROA and GDPGR is performed.

8. Exchange Rate Stability (ERS)

The exchange rate may have a direct impact on ROE and ROA given a favorable

movement in exchange rates; the expectation is that the coefficient of this variable

will be positive on ROE and ROA Haron, Sudin (2004). Description of Variables

Table (2) summarizes the statistics for the various explanatory dependent variables

(ROA and ROE ) for the entire sample of Jordanian Islamic Banks.

Mean Std.

Deviation

ROA 1.33 .546

ROE 14.17 5.483

Table (2): Descriptive Statistics for dependent Variables(2005- 2009)

From these results, it can be seen that Jordanian Islamic Banks (ROA) have a low mean of

1.33. This ratio is quite low compared with the Mean of Conventional banking in Jordan. It

is reached about 2.2%. Also the mean ratio of ROE in the Jordanian Islamic Banks is

acceptable (14.17) when we compared it with the Mean of ROE for Conventional banking

in Jordan which be reached 16.3% (Annual report of Guide Industry in Jordan 2010).

Apparently the standard deviation for both ROA and ROE indices are extremely .546 and

5.483. This ratios are a high for both ratios because the Jordanian Islamic Banks depends

on its financing on Investment Financing which includes Musharaka and Mudarabha

instead of debts (Karema, 2009).

Table (3) summarizes the statistics for the various explanatory independent variables for the

entire sample of Jordanian Islamic Banks.

Mean Std. Deviation N

Log TA 5.455.851 4.6983561 10 10

TL/TA .895631 .0215029 10 10

TE/TA .059238 .0526757 10 10

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PRFCFI/CF 37.28 28.166 10 10

GDP growth (annual %) .037253 .0116287 10 10

Inflation 2.887.407 1.7179311 10 10

Exchange Rate 1.42 .020 10 10

Table (3): Descriptive Statistics for independent Variables (2005- 2009)

From these results, it can be seen that the Mean of Jordanian Islamic Banks of Log TA

(0.058), TL/TA rate on average is .895631 TE/TA is .059238, PRFCFI/CF is 37.28, GDP

growth Rate is .037253, inflation is 2.887407 and the Exchange Rate is 1.42. Table (3)

shows also the Std. Deviation for these Variables are Apparently 4.6983561, .0215029,

.0526757, 28.166, .0116287, 1.7179311 and .020. These Variables are similar the Std.

Deviation for Conventional banking in Jordan. Karema (2009).

Table (4) presents a correlation matrix of the ROI and explanatory variables.

Table (4): Correlation matrix of the ROA and explanatory variables

From these results, it can be seen that TI/TA, GDPGR and INF are positively related to

ROA while PRFCFI/CF, Log TA, TL/ TA and ERS are negative relationship with ROA.

This means, that TI/TA, GDPGR and INF are will rise relative to the ROA and net interest

margin will rise. Because the Jordanian Islamic Banks depends on Musharaka and

Mudarabha instead of debts.

Table (5) presents a correlation matrix of the ROE and explanatory variables.

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Table (5): Correlation matrix of the ROE and explanatory variables

From these results, it can be seen that PRFCFI/CF, Log TA, and TE/TA are negative

relationship with ROE while TL/ TA, TI/TA, GDPGR, INF and ERS are positively related

to ROE. This result means that PRFCFI/CF, Log TA, and TE/TA will be fall more than

interest paid on liabilities and net interest margin will fall because the Jordanian Islamic

Banks not depends on debts instead of Musharaka and Mudarabha.

Hypotheses

Based on the above discussion it can form the hypotheses as follows:

1. Size: Ho1: There is a significant positive relationship between ROA and ROE ratios and

size of the Islamic Bank.

2. PRFCFI/CF: Ho2: There is a significant positive relationship between ROA and ROE

ratios and . PRFCFI/CF of the Islamic Bank.

3. Log TA: Ho3: There is significant positive relationship between ROA and ROE ratios

and Log TA of the Islamic Bank.

4. TL/ TA: Ho4: There is a significant positive relationship between ROA and ROE ratios

and TL/ TA of the Islamic Bank.

5. TE/TA: Ho5: There is a significant positive relationship between ROA and ROE ratios

and TE/TA of the Islamic Bank.

6. GDPGR: Ho6: There is a positive relationship between ROA and ROE ratios and

GDPGR of the Islamic Bank.

7. INF: Ho7: There is a positive relationship ROA and ROE ratios and INF of the Islamic

Bank.

8. ERS: Ho8: There is a positive relationship ROA and ROE ratios and . ERS of the Islamic

Bank.

3. Results and Discussion

Table (6) shows the results of regression analysis of the (ROA) model used to explain

determinants of the Jordanian Islamic Bank Profitability.

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Table (6): Regression Results of ROA (2005 - 2009)

* Significant at the 1 percent level

** Significant at the 5 per cent level

*** Significant at the 10 per cent level

Table (7) shows the results of regression analysis of the (ROE) model used to explain

determinants of the Jordanian Islamic Bank Profitability.

Table (7): Regression Results of ROE (2005 - 2009)

* Significant at the 1 percent level

** Significant at the 5 per cent level

*** Significant at the 10 per cent level

Tables 6 and 7 present the results of regressing ROA and ROE on bank characteristics and

the rest of the control variables. As expected, the coefficient estimates of PRFCFI/CF,

TE/TA and TI/TA are significant and positive relationship (Table 6). This result is similar

to those results that are obtained Bashir, Abdel Hamid M., (2003), Haron, Sudin (2004),

and Ben Naceur and Goaied (2010). As well as, these results are similar to those of the

expected hypotheses: Ho2, Ho3, and Ho5. Also, Table (6) shows, the coefficient estimates

there are significant and negative relationship between ROA and (Log TA, TL/ TA,

GDPGR, INF and ERS) of the Islamic Banking. This result is similar to those results that

are obtained Bashir, Abdel Hamid M., (2003), Haron, Sudin (2004), Demerguç-Kunt and

Huizingha (1999), Toni Uhomoibhi, (2008), and Ben Naceur and Goaied (2010). As well

as, these results are different to those of the expected hypotheses: Ho1, Ho4, Ho6, Ho7, and

Ho8.

The different between these results and the expected hypotheses is return to: The

interaction between market capitalization, and these variables (Log TA, TL/ TA, GDPGR,

INF and ERS) has a strong negative effect on ROA (table 6 ) because the bank estimates

the expected rate of return on the specific project. It asked to finance and provides

financing on the understanding that at least that rate is payable to the bank (Perhaps this

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rate is negotiable.) If the project ends up in a profit more than the estimated rate the excess

goes to the client. If the profit is less than the estimate the bank will accept the lower rate.

In case a loss is suffered the bank will take a share in it. So, the risk of Jordanian Islamic

Banks is more than Conventional banking because there are no constant of profits.

Table (6) shows also, the DW statistic is substantially (DW =3.002) It means there is

evidence of positive serial correlation. As a rough rule of thumb, if DW is less than 1.0,

there may be cause for alarm. F Change for ROA is < .001 It means there is evidence of

positive serial correlation over the period (2005 - 2009).

Table (7) shows, the coefficient estimates Log TA, TL/ TA, TI/TA and ERS are significant

and positive relationship with ROE. This result is similar to those results that are obtained

Bashir, Abdel Hamid M., (2003), Haron, Sudin (2004), Demerguç-Kunt and Huizingha

(1999), Toni Uhomoibhi, (2008), and Ben Naceur and Goaied (2010). As well as, these

results are similar to those of the expected hypotheses: Ho1, Ho3, and Ho4.

Also, Table (7) shows, the coefficient estimates PRFCFI/CF, TL/ TA, GDPGR and INF are

significant and negative relationship with ROE. This result is similar to those results that

are obtained Bashir, Abdel Hamid M., (2003), Haron, Sudin (2004), Demerguç-Kunt and

Huizingha (1999), Toni Uhomoibhi, (2008), and Ben Naceur and Goaied (2010). As well

as, these results are different to those of the expected hypotheses: Ho2, Ho4, Ho6, and Ho7.

The different between these results and the expected hypotheses is return to: The

interaction between market capitalization, and these variables PRFCFI/CF, TL/TA,

GDPGR and INF has a strong negative effect on ROE (table 7) because the Jordanian

Islamic Banks depends on Musharaka and Mudarabha. So, The risk of Jordanian Islamic

Banks is more than Conventional banking because there are no constant of profits .

Table (7) shows also, the DW statistic is substantially (DW =3.002) It means there is

evidence of positive serial correlation. As a rough rule of thumb, if DW is less than 1.0,

there may be cause for alarm. F Change for ROE is < .004 It means there is evidence of

positive serial correlation over the period (2005 - 2009).

4. A Summary and Conclusions

The primary objective of this study is to examine and analyze the factors that might effect

on the Jordanian Islamic bank profitability during the period from 2005 through 2009.

More than 60 countries and an asset base of more than $500 billion, Islamic banks are now

playing an increasingly significant role in their respective markets. To this end, Islamic

banks are rapidly gaining market shares in their domestic economies and their presence in

highly sophisticated markets exemplifies the empirical success of the viability of

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eliminating fixed interest payments from financial transactions. So, consolidation among

banks, rising competition and continuous innovation to provide financial services, all

contribute to a growing interest in a detailed critical evaluation of Islamic banks.

Islamic Banking is working in accordance with the rules of Islamic low. The main source of

Islamic religion is the Quran. Islamic banks obtain their main sources of funding from

clients out of three different kinds of accounts: savings deposit accounts, current deposit

accounts and investment deposit accounts. Islamic banks adopt several modes of financing.

But they can be broadly categorized into three areas: investment, trade and lending.

The main different Characteristics between Islamic and Conventional Banking is: Profit-

and-Loss Sharing (PLS) principle is applied in Islamic Banking but it is not applied in

Conventional Banking .So ,the rate of return of deposits is uncertain and not guaranteed in

Islamic Banking but it certain and guaranteed in Conventional Banking.

The study follows a functional model which was employed earlier by Demerguç-Kunt and

Huizingha (1999), Haron, Sudin (2004), Toni Uhomoibhi, (2008), Athanasoglou,

Panayiotis P. and et al, (2008), and Ben Naceur and Goaied (2010). The study model is

tested on time series cross-sectional bank level data in the context of Jordan over the 2005-

2009. The empirical specification focuses on the reported determinants of Islamic Bank

profitability which is assumed to be a function of a set of bank characteristics. To control

for the effect of the internal and external factors on Bank profitability, we use Pooled

Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).

The analysis revealed that there are significant and positive relationship between Return on

Assets (ROA) and Provision for Credit Facilities + Interest in Suspense)/Credit

Facilities(PRFCFI/CF), Total Equity/ total Assets (TE/TA) and total income/Total Asset

(TI/TA) of the Islamic Banking, and there are significant and negative relationship between

ROA and the Bank size (Log TA), Total liabilities/ Total Assets (TL/ TA) Annual Growth

Rate for Gross domestic product (GDPGR), Inflation Rate (INF) and Exchange Rate (ERS)

of the Islamic Banking.

Also this study found that there are significant and positive relationship between Return on

equity (ROE) and Log TA, TL/ TA, TI/TA and ERS of the Islamic Banking, and there are

significant and negative relationship between ROE and PRFCFI/CF, TE/ TA, GDPGR and

INF of the Islamic Banking.

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ANNEX 7 The Constitution Of An Islamic Financial Institution In Italy

The Italian financial legislation, like the European framework from which it derives,

consists in a consistent, complete set of rules under which a variety of forms of

intermediation, including Islamic finance, can be conducted. In addition to banks the Italian

and European financial system comprises other types of financial institution that could

serve as a point of reference for operators interested in marketing Islamic financial products

in Italy: for instance, SGRs (società di gestione del risparmio – asset management

companies), which under the Consolidated Law on Finance may provide individual

portfolio management services or institute collective investment funds, and SICAVs

(società di investimento a capitale variabile– open- end investment companies).

Despite the many significant analogies between asset management and the type of

intermediation exercised by Islamic banks, however, in their home countries the latter as

‘banks’ are not required to keep customers’ managed assets separate from their own capital,

as asset management companies must do in the Italian system (Article 22 of the

Consolidated Financial Law ).

Transposing the Islamic banking model to Europe as a non- bank intermediary may be

feasible, therefore, perhaps even easy, but it would not seem to be the exhaustive answer to

the question of the possibility of constituting an Islamic bank in Italy. If anything, it is a

reasonable alternative to such constitution (Castaldi 2003).

The opening of an Islamic bank in Italy is possible provided that the ordinary rules and

controls applying to the constitution of a new bank or the establishment of a foreign bank

branch are complied with.

The minimum capital required for a new bank is €6.3 million. The application must be

submitted to the Bank of Italy, accompanied by the act of incorporation, the bylaws and

documentation attesting to the existence of this capital, the integrity of the shareholders,

and the competence and integrity of the management. In addition, the applicant must

present a business plan in which the founders demonstrate the future capacity of the bank to

take part in the market and to operate in sound and prudent fashion. In considering the

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application, the Bank of Italy weighs the business plan, the origin of the initial capital, the

quality of the shareholders, their financial capacity and their ability to sustain the bank in

the delicate start- up phase, the administrative organization, and the internal control system

(Banking Law, article14; Bank of Italy, Supervisory Instructions for Banks, Title I, Chapter

1).

For an Islamic bank, to avoid opaque governance, there must be explicit definition of the

role and responsibilities of the Shariah board, which must not in any case be empowered to

exercise any of the functions that are performed by the management and control bodies of

ordinary banks (FSA- UK 2007).178

To be authorized, a bank must also join a deposit guarantee scheme. Membership in the

Interbank Deposit Guarantee Fund should not be excessively burdensome for an Islamic

bank, as both regular and extraordinary contributions are proportional to the volume of

deposits guaranteed, which for these banks is likely to be small in relation to their overall

business, if not entirely absent.

One key strategic theme for Islamic banks is certainly the Italian law on corporate purpose.

There is, in fact, a sort of paradox in the fact that the authorization envisaged in Article 14

of the Italian Banking Law concerns the exercise of conventional banking business, while

the very definition of Islamic banking seems to preclude it.

In current law, however, the scope of the authorization to engage in banking is not strictly

limited, in practice, to the mere traditional notion of banking as the taking of deposits and

lending. Unquestionably, there are intermediaries in Italy which, though authorized as

banks, do not perform both of these typical banking functions at once or in significant

volume; for instance, they may specialize in investment services. Even if it could appear as

a paradox, often for these banks there is not a perfect consistency between the scope of

authorization (banking business) and the activities actually carried out (financial services).

In fact, in Italy authorization allows a bank to engage in a vast range of activities that are

financial in the broad sense; they may include a certain percentage of banking business in

178 The role of the Shariah Board in the governance of Islamic financial institutions is also debated by supervisors of Islamic countries.

331

the strict sense, but they do not necessarily have to. Though it may sound paradoxical,

authorization and effective carrying out of activities are often disconnected.

Truth of the matter is that in Italy the concept of ‘bank’ accepted for supervisory purposes

is broader than the one proposed by traditional theories dealing with banking

intermediation. In our legal system, both concepts of ‘bank’ and ‘banking activity’ coexist,

though neither defines the other. Banking activities are made up of savings collection and

credit granting, whereas banks are those bodies carrying out such activities (and allowed to

carry out others as well). ‘Banks’ are not identified as the bodies that carry out that

activities, but as the intermediaries ‘authorized’ to carry out banking business and/or other

financial activities, if not reserved by the law to the exclusive exercise by other

intermediation groups (such as insurances, reserved to insurance companies, and collective

management funds, reserved to SGRs and SICAVs), otherwise there would be no legal

difference between so- called de facto banks, that is, unauthorized bodies which unlawfully

collect reimbursable funds and grant credit, and de jure ones – as they also are the

intermediaries authorized to carry out banking activities. Article 10, paragraph 3 of the

Italian Banking Law, when dealing with banks carrying out financial activities, in addition

to banking ones, might seem to consider illegitimate all those banks whose activities are not

significantly, or even predominantly, traditional. However, such provision may easily be

interpreted as a set of operational faculties, and not as the preordained constraint on the

carrying out of a predominant activity. Authorizations to banks, as envisaged here, allow

them to carry out a wide range of financial activities which may include a certain amount of

banking activities (in the strict sense of the word).

Furthermore, an absolute coincidence between the concepts of ‘bank’ and ‘banking

activity’, based on the hypothesis that the authorization is no longer in force, should be

excluded; as a matter of fact, the Italian Banking Law, article 14, paragraph 2 bis, and the

Bank of Italy’s Supervisory Instructions (Bank of Italy, Supervisory Instructions for Banks,

Title I, Ch. 1, sec. VI, par. 5) generally mention the hypothesis that an ‘activity’ has not

been carried out, such provisions aim either at preventing authorizations from being frozen

for too long and used only when initial circumstances have changed; or making sure that

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authorizations are not requested in order to hand them over to others afterwards. It is then

fundamental that authorized bodies begin to operate quickly; after all, it would not be

possible to put supervision into effect and carry out interventions on inoperative banks. For

example, it appears difficult to assume an administrative compulsory winding- up, based on

the existence of certain requirements (such as administrative irregularities and extremely

serious breach of provisions and estimated losses) which may be linked to operating

enterprises; and that explains why paragraph 2 bis of article 14 was added to the Italian

Banking Law by Legislative Decree 4 August 1999, n. 342.

The concrete notion of ‘bank’ on which supervisory activity rests thus refers to a universal

intermediary free to choose its particular entrepreneurial vocation. There is no banking

supervisory rule setting a minimum amount of deposit- taking or lending in order to be a

‘bank’. In any case, any such threshold limits would require prior classification of all

transactions on the asset and on the liability side in order to define them as ‘banking’ or not,

the sort of archaic regulatory approach that has long since been abandoned. Of course, a

banking charter might seem to be oversized for the type of business planned. But from the

standpoint of prudential supervision this choice certainly does not conflict with the

principle of sound and prudent management. Let us mention the recent inclusion within

banking law of the institution of loan consortiums, that is institutions whose main business

is collective loan guarantees (Law 326/2003). This activity can be performed by financial

intermediaries or ‘consortium’ guarantee banks. And the latter, which must engage

primarily in the collective guarantee of loans to their members, can engage in ordinary

banking only residually. Surely this weakens the narrow definition of the bank as an

enterprise that engages in banking business.

The financial industry scenario seems consistent with a no-longer traditional concept of

banking. The legislative framework for financial institutions allows banking and financial

intermediaries to easily shift from one institutional form to the other; a non- bank financial

intermediary may become a bank and vice versa, by modifying the corporate purpose

according to market needs. After all, the 1993 Banking Law has definitely done away with

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the institutional and operational specialization constraints, which characterized the previous

legislation: the law no longer makes a

distinction between commercial banks (aziende di credito) and investment ones (istituti di

credito), and a wide range of operational schemes is now available, including ‘universal

banks’, ‘specialized banks’ and banking groups, within which different financial companies

(investment companies, asset management companies, leasing companies) may operate on

a variable scale (Castaldi 1997).

In fact, the broad notion of ‘bank’ that is now enshrined, in practice, in Italian legislation

can be highly significant for Islamic banks, whose specific operating characteristics are

such that even without engaging in traditional banking business on a large scale they could

be part of the Italian financial system.

As for the asset and liability composition that is likely to characterize Islamic banks in

practice, let us examine the indications of the Bank of Italy on ‘associazione in

partecipazione’ (Article 2549 of the Civil Code), set out in the Bollettino di Vigilanza of

January 2003. In several respects the type of association in participation considered by the

supervisors resembles the investment deposit (based on mudaraba) practised by Islamic

banks. These are initiatives whereby, via association in participation (partnership)

contracts, the bank as associate conventionally assigns to third parties as associates the

possibility of participating in the profits deriving from banking activity, in exchange for an

economically measurable contribution.

The Bank of Italy dealt with two potential problems. One is that the association in

participation contract could lead to interference in the management of the bank by non-

banking persons, which would result in unauthorized persons engaging in banking activity.

In this regard the Bank of Italy holds that association in participation as regulated by the

Civil Code does not give associates any decision- making or managerial power, and thus

does not violate the terms for the exercise of banking as long as there are no additional

contract clauses giving non- banking third- party associates the right to take part in

management.

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The second problem concerns the possibility that, through the mechanism of transfer of

profits and losses, non- financial third- party associates may acquire a position of control in

the form of dominant influence (Article 23(2) of the Banking Law), in violation of the

national law requiring separation between banking and all non- financial business

enterprises (Article 19(6) of the Banking Law). To obviate the risk that association in

participation could be used to circumvent the limits to the acquisition of equity by non-

financial persons, the Bank of Italy recalled the need for such initiatives to be submitted in

advance to the Bank of Italy for an assessment of all the elements relevant to banking

supervision.

The recent reform of company law (Capolino and Donato 2004) has enriched the variety of

business opportunities available and can offer Islamic banks ways to couch contracts in

terms compatible with the Shariah. The reference here is to new financial instruments

which, though covered in the rules on bonds, nevertheless make the timing and amount of

redemptions conditional upon the economic performance of the company (Articles 2346

and 2411(3) of the Civil Code), and to the rules on capital allocated for a specific

transaction (Articles 2447- bis et seq. of the Civil Code), which may enjoy contributions

from third parties (Article 2447- ter.1(d) of the Civil Code).

As to corporate assets, a limitation laid down in the regulations that could prove significant

for Islamic financial institutions is the requirement that banks’ fixed assets in equity and in

real property must not exceed their supervisory capital.

To conclude, the scenario holds a wealth of possibilities for the activity of Islamic banks,

and obviously poses an equally vast array of questions for the application of Civil Law and

supervisory regulations.

The Riba Prohibition And Payment Institutions

The legal framework would not be exhaustive without considering the up-to- date Directive

2007/64 EC (OJEC of the 5.12.2007, L 319/1), which will be amending national banking

laws not later than November 2009. Some European countries have already implemented it

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(for example, the United Kingdom and France), while some others, like Italy, are still at the

preliminary stages.

The Directive has provided for the ‘payment institution’ (PI),1 a new financial intermediary

authorized to perform, as well as credit institutions and post offices, payment services

throughout the European Community (Mancini and Perassi 2008). We wish to offer some

comments on payment institutions discipline and the riba prohibition in order to assess the

kind of legal obstacles Islamic intermediaries can meet.

The Italian Case

Directive 2007/64 EC refrains from making a precise choice on both issues, giving space to

national regulators. Turning to the Italian legal framework, the Directive has not been

implemented yet.

We can assume that the payment institutions are in charge of providing a series of services

(payment services) and, in order to fulfill its own task, a sum of money is placed on the

payment account or is delivered to the payment account. Under the Italian Civil Code, the

payment services contract might be considered as a contract of mandato in which the

account holder will play the role of the mandante, while the payment institution will be

considered as the mandatario who is a natural or a legal person entitled to perform one or

more juridical acts (for example, arrangements or contracts) in his own name but in the

interest of someone else, the so called mandante.

Under the Italian discipline of mandato, no interest is to be paid on the funds delivered to

the mandatario for executing the order received. Some problems might arise under article

1714 of the Italian Civil Code which will compel the mandatario to pay an interest rate on

the sum of money received in the following situations: (a) he did not obey the mandante’s

instructions; (b) he did not deliver the sum of money to the mandante or from the mandante

to a third party. Instead, it would be different if, following the rule provided by article 1714

of the Italian Civil Code, payment institutions were required to pay legal interest for the

money received for the benefit of the user or otherwise provided by the user, whenever

these sums of money are not given back within a reasonable length of time. Such an

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approach should defer payment institutions from paying back money to their customers.

The intermediaries are allowed to store the money only for the time necessary to perform

the transactions. In such circumstances, the payment of interest would be in direct conflict

with Riba prohibition.

However, the nature of Islamic intermediaries should prevent payment institutions from

taking any speculative initiative while the supervisory authorities could address sanctions

of a different nature, for example administrative sanctions, to deter this kind of conduct.


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