Israeli Foreign and Defense Policy and Diaspora Jewry (chapter in Danny Ben-Moshe and Zohar Segev,...

Danny Ben-Moshe and Zohar Segev, Israel, the Diaspora and Jewish Identity, Sussex Academic Press 2008

Israeli foreign and defence policy andDiaspora Jewry

Jonathan Rynhold*

Introduction Go to a synagogue, a Jewish youth groupmeeting, or indeed any place where DiasporaJews are gathered and one will almostcertainly find some discussion of Israel’sforeign and defence policy. The very extensivecoverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict/peaceprocess by the international media means thatIsraeli policy is the most prominent publicexpression of collective Jewish action.Consequently, it is very difficult forDiaspora Jews to ignore Israeli actions andeven assimilated Jews have felt implicated byIsraeli policies.1

* Jonathan Rynhold is a senior lecturer in the Department of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University,Israel and a research fellow at the BESA Centre for Strategic Studies.

Israeli policies affect Diaspora identity intwo main ways. First, they raise the issue ofpolitical loyalty. Diaspora Jews have a civic-national identity. As citizens of theirrespective states they owe them loyalty. Theexistence of Israel as a specifically Jewishstate presents a potential alternative locusof loyalty. Indeed, prior to the Holocaustmany Jews in the West opposed Zionism, as theyfeared that the charge of ‘dual loyalty’ wouldundermine their civic rights in the Diaspora.While Diaspora Jewry has been overwhelminglysupportive of Israel, it remains concerned bythe issue of ‘dual loyalty’ even inestablished democratic countries.Consequently, Diaspora Jews have generallystressed their fundamental political loyaltyto the states in which they live, whilesimultaneously seeking to promote goodrelations between Israel and their respectivestates. The ‘dual loyalty’ issue comes to thefore particularly when Diaspora Jews try toinfluence their countries’ policies in a pro-Israel direction. In some countries, such as

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France, such lobbying is often viewed withsuspicion. But even in the US, where suchactivities are usually viewed as legitimate,the charge of ‘dual loyalty’ remains potent.For example in 2004, the issue of ‘dualloyalty’ was raised when the FBI investigatedthe pro-Israel lobby, AIPAC, regarding thepassing of apparently classified informationby a Defence Department official whose bosswas Jewish and a supporter of Israel.2

The second way in which Israeli policiesaffect Diaspora identity relates to thespecifically Jewish aspects of identity.Zionism started off as the preserve of youngradicals, though after 1948, support forIsrael became central to the Diaspora Jewishconsensus. Most identifying Jews continue tosupport Israel, even if they are critical ofits government’s policies. Nonetheless, as theDiaspora debate over Israeli policies hasgrown, so this debate has increasingly servedas the context for wider ideological debatesover the meaning of Jewishness and Judaism.3

For some relatively marginal Jews, such as

British playwright Harold Pinter, or theDiaspora Jews involved in trying to organizean academic boycott of Israel, it seems as ifbeing critical of Israeli policies is almostthe sole expression of their Jewish identity.

From the Israeli perspective, concernregarding how its policies affect Diasporaidentity have been subordinated to its ownideological and political interests: aliya,coupled with political and financial support.Over the years, the ideology has mellowed, butstate interests remain the main determinant ofIsraeli attitudes. As will be discussedfurther on, this has led to Israeliinsensitivity regarding the civic and Jewishaspects of Diaspora identity.

The bulk of this chapter will chronologicallyanalyse the way in which Israeli policies haveimpacted on the two sides of Diasporaidentity. Subsequently, the focus will shiftto a consideration of the extent to whichIsrael takes Diaspora identity into account

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when conducting its foreign and defencepolicy.

The Impact of Israeli policies on the DiasporaThe Cautious Consensus, 1948-1966For Western Jews in this period, Israelrepresented a poor relative in mortal danger,whom one felt incumbent to assist,particularly when set against the feelings ofguilt for not having done enough to save Jewsin the Holocaust. As Thomas Friedman put it,‘Israel was nation of nebechs…the place wesent our old clothes’.4 Behind the IronCurtain, Jewish opinion was much moredifficult to gauge, but the reception given toGolda Meir by Moscow Jews, coupled with thereports of Nativ, the clandestine Israeliorganisation charged with keeping up contactswith Soviet Jewry, suggested that they weresupportive of the fledgling state, despitecontinual anti-Israel propaganda. Inideological terms, Israeli policy was notcontroversial for the Diaspora. The onlyexception being a brief hiccup over the Suez

crisis, when the Left, sided with the ‘ThirdWorld’ i.e. Egypt, while Israel was alliedwith the imperialist powers: Britain andFrance.5

In this period, Diaspora Jewish identificationwith Israel began to find practical expressionin pro-Israel lobbying. Non-Zionists began toact once they felt reasonably assuredregarding the issue of dual loyalty. InFrance, this process was aided by the virtualalliance between Israel and France.6 In theUS, such reassurance was formally provided byIsraeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion in aletter to the head of the American JewishCommittee, Jacob Blaustein, in which herecognized and accepted that ‘American Jewshave only one political attachment and that isto the USA. They owe no political allegianceto Israel’.7 Nonetheless, lobbying remainedsomewhat restrained in this period, as evenAmerican Jews still remained wary of the ‘dualloyalty’ issue and instead focused theirefforts on securing civil rights within theUS.8

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Affirmative Pride, 1967-1981The Six Day War was a defining moment forIsrael’s role in Diaspora Jewish identity.Prior to the war, Diaspora Jewry was grippedby the fear of a second Holocaust. This ledeven assimilated non-Zionist Jews, such as theFrench intellectual Raymond Aron, to expresshis deep sense of solidarity with the Jewishstate. Following its stunning victory, Israelbecame the major source of pride for theDiaspora; the touchstone of its Jewishidentity. 100 000 French Jews attended ademonstration to celebrate the victory.9

Israel attained an almost mythical, heroicstatus in the Diaspora. In the US, support forIsrael enhanced Jews’ civic sense of belongingbecause Americans in general were massivelysupportive of Israel since it was a strong,democratic ally. The centrality of Israel inWestern Jews’ identity inaugurated a ‘NewJewish Politics’ expressed by a moreaggressive style of lobbying that was morefocused on Israel, as the fear of the ‘dualloyalty’ issue faded.10 In the US, the mainideological exponents of this approach wereneo-conservatives, such as Norman Pordhorez,editor of the influential Commentary magazine.In organizational terms, it was expressed by

1 Bernard Wasserstein, Vanishing Diasporas, (Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 91, 228-233.2 Nathan Guttman, ‘FBI says Pentagon analyst gave secrets to Israel via AIPAC’ Ha’aretz 29 August 2004.3 Yosef Gorney, The state of Israel in Jewish Public Thought (MacMillan 1994).4 Thomas Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem (New York: Fontana, 1990), p. 454. 5 Wasserstein, Vanishing Diasporas, p. 96.6 Ibid.7 Cited in George Gruen, ‘The Not So Silent Partnership: Emerging Trends in American Jewish–Israeli Relations’, in Gregory Mahler, ed., Israel after Begin, (Albany: SUNY, 1989), p.213.8 Peter Medding, ‘The New Jewish Politics in the United States’ in Zvi Gitelman ed., The Quest for Utopia, (New York: ME Sharpe, 1992). 9 Wasserstein, Vanishing Diasporas, pp. 98-100.10 Medding, ‘The New Jewish Politics’

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the meteoric rise of AIPAC to become both thede-facto leading Jewish organisation and oneof the most powerful lobbying organizations inthe US.

Meanwhile, behind the Iron Curtain, theauthorities were concerned by their Jewishcitizens’ identification with Israel’sexploits at a time when they had cutdiplomatic relations with Israel.11A growingnumber of Soviet Jews defied the authoritiesand applied to immigrate to Israel. Thus, the‘refusenik’ movement was born. Aliya fromWestern countries also grew significantly,particularly among modern Orthodox Jews;though the absolute numbers remained low.Israel’s victory enhanced the confidence ofJews in Western democracies, a trendsymbolized by the willingness of youngreligious men to wear a kippa [traditionalhead covering] in public. The fact thatimportant religious sites were captured in

1967 included the Western Wall, also madeIsrael more central in Ultra-Orthodoxidentity, though they remained highly criticalof the secular state.12

The Yom Kippur War, while traumatic, did notchange these basic orientations. Solidaritywith Israel was at the core of Diasporaidentity, despite the fact that DiasporaJewry, particularly in Europe, began to betargeted by Palestinian terrorists. Even therise of Menachem Begin’s Likud to power in1977, which made some Diaspora leadersnervous, did not initially change thissituation, especially as Begin achieved peacewith Egypt in his first term. In sum, thisperiod represents the high watermark ofIsrael’s place in Diaspora identity. Theidealized Israel of Diaspora identity was allthings to all Jews. The hawks and thereligious lauded Israel’s victory in 1967,while the doves and liberals lauded its

11 Wasserstein, Vanishing Diasporas, pp. 190-212.12 Menachem Friedman, “The State of Israel as a Theological Dilemma” in Baruch Kimmerling, Ed. The Israeli Society and State, (Albany: SUNY, 1985).

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willingness to surrender the Sinai in returnfor peace with Egypt. Most Diaspora Jewsapplauded both the military victories and thecompromises for peace.

The Collapse of Consensus, 1982-1992The 1982 Lebanon War was the first time theinternational media generally adopted an anti-Israeli approach. It was also the first warabout which Israelis were themselves deeplydivided. As a result, Israeli policy became amajor source of ideological controversy amongmainstream Diaspora Jewry in the West, for thefirst time. Matters came to ahead followingthe massacre of Palestinian refugees in theSabra and Chatilla refugee camps by Israel’sLebanese allies. Subsequently, the leadingOrthodox Rabbi in the US, Rabbi JosephSoloveitchik and a leading Reform RabbiAlexander Schindler called for a commission of

inquiry, initially opposed by Begin.13 Themassacre represented the beginning of the endof the idealized Israel ‘that could do nowrong’ in Diaspora Jewish consciousness.Nonetheless, despite the fact that theDiaspora was generally more dovish than theLikud government14, it did not lobby againstthe Begin government’s policies. Anotherserious blow to Israel’s heroic image wasdealt by the Pollard affair. Jonathan Pollard,a Jewish intelligence officer in the US, wasconvicted of spying for Israel in 1986. USJews were extremely angry as they felt Israelhad challenged their civic identity and raisedthe spectre of an anti-Semitic backlash on thebasis of ‘dual loyalty’.15

The outbreak of the Intifada in December 1987had a more sustained and a more traumaticeffect than the Lebanon War. In Lebanon, themain point of controversy was the level of

13 American Jewish Yearbook 1984, pp. 84-90.14 Edward Tivnan, The Lobby (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), p. 206.15 On Israel’s relations with US Jewry 1980-96 see Jonathan Rynhold, ‘Labour, Likud, the Special Relationship & the Peace Process’ Israel Affairs, 3, 3 & 4 (1997).

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force, consequently once Israel withdrew tothe security zone, the controversy died down.However, with regard to the Intifada, theissue was not only Israel’s use of force, butalso on more core ideological issues such assettlements and Palestinian national rights.While Diaspora Jewry continued to identifywith Israel, following the trend among theIsraeli public, it became increasinglypolarized regarding the policies pursued byIsrael’s Likud-led governments. Politicallyconservative Jews and Orthodox Jews tended toidentify with Israel’s policies either on thebasis of an ideological attachment to EretzYisrael or because they viewed attacks on Israelas an expression of age-old anti-Semitism thatdemanded Jewish solidarity. Meanwhile, Jewishliberals felt increasingly alienated byIsraeli policies in the Territories, whichcontradicted their core values. One symptom ofthis was the growing public criticism of

Israel by well-known Diaspora Jews such asWoody Allen and violinist Yehudi Menuin. Theleaders of tens of Jewish organizations in theUS even went so far as to place a newspaperadvertisement informing Likud Prime MinisterShamir on a visit to the US, that while theycontinued to support Israel in general, theyopposed his policies.16

In the Soviet Union, Israeli policy appearedto have little effect on identification withIsrael. On arriving in Israel, the leadingRefusenik, Natan Sharansky, initiallyrefrained from expressing an opinion regardingIsraeli policy towards the Palestinians,professing ignorance. Subsequently, he adopteda relatively hawkish stance, as did themajority of Russian immigrants to Israel. Thissuggests that the Lebanon War or the Intifadadid not negatively affect their identitywhilst they were still in the USSR.17

16 Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, Friends in Deed: Inside the U.S.–Israel Alliance (New York: Hyperion 1994), pp.432–33.17 Ze’ev Chanin, ‘The Vision of Return: Reflections on the Mass Immigration to Israel from the Former Soviet Union’ Paper submitted as part of the research project: The Meaning of Catastrophe, Historical Knowledge, and Return of Exiles: the Predicaments of Palestinians and Jews, Philadelphia, 24-27 October 2002.

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In the West, some liberal Jews formed groupssuch as Friends of Peace Now that adopted a morecritical and dovish line than that of theDiaspora establishment. Nonetheless, theeffects of polarization were largely confinedto criticism. Thus, in the US, although alarge number of Jews were opposed to Israel’srefusal to talk to the PLO after 1988, theywere still generally unprepared to pressureIsrael to change its position. Similarly, inthe UK, the Union of Jewish Students (UJS)formally supported a two state solution thatwas opposed by the Israeli government. But, inpractice UJS continued to co-operate with theIsraeli Embassy, while engaging in campaignsaimed at defending Israel and highlightingPalestinian terrorism and anti-Zionistpropaganda.

In fact, it was not Israeli policy towards thePalestinians, but Israeli governmentinsensitivity to Jewish identity that ledmainstream Diaspora Jewish organizations, on

occasion, to refuse to assist Israel. In 1988,the Likud leader, Yitzhak Shamir agreed tochange Israel’s Law of Return to allowautomatic immigration to Israel so that itapply only to persons defined as Jewish byOrthodox Jewish Law. While millions ofDiaspora Jews are affiliated to non-Orthodoxstreams of Judaism, in practice this changewould have affected only a handful of DiasporaJews each year. However the non-Orthodox sawthe proposed amendment in terms of adelegitimization of their Jewish identity byIsrael. Subsequently, even the normallyapolitical Hadassah and the consensus-basedConference of Presidents of Major AmericanJewish Organizations (Presidents’ Conference)in the US, refused to help Israel lobbyagainst the US-PLO dialogue, unless Shamirretracted his agreement. In the end, Shamirretracted and the pro-Israel lobby didcontinue to co-operate with the Israeligovernment.18

18 Colin Shindler, Swords into Ploughshares: Israelis and Jews in the Shadow of the Intifada (London: IB Taurus, 1991), pp. 142-45.

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The second occasion when US Jews held backfrom lobbying was regarding the issue of loanguarantees 1991-2. Initially, AIPAC hadlobbied strongly for the Israeli governmentposition, with the support of Congress,against the position of the Bushadministration that sought to link thegranting of loan guarantees by the US, of $10billion, to a settlement freeze. Whilesettlements were not especially popular amongUS Jews, this did not prevent a major lobbyingcampaign against linkage taking placeculminating in a massive public demonstrationin Washington DC. However, following thatdemonstration President Bush made the loanguarantees a major issue and referred toopponents of his position as representing a‘foreign interest’. Subsequently, US Jewryrefused to continue to campaign vigorouslyagainst linkage. Although Bush later

apologized for his comment, the fact that hehad inferred that American Jews’ opposition tolinkage was symptomatic of their dual loyaltywas enough for some major American Jewishorganizations to refuse Israeli demands tocontinue to lobby vigorously.19

The Oslo Era, 1993-2000: Distancing fromIsrael?During the Oslo era, it was claimed thatIsrael and the Diaspora were growing moredistant from each other. With the peaceprocess well underway and Israel more securethan ever, the Diaspora felt able to put lessemphasis on defending Israel and more oncombating assimilation and the promotion of‘Jewish continuity’ in the Diaspora itself.20

This was reflected in a shift in funding awayfrom Israeli causes to home causes. In the UK,

20 On this issue see Steven Rosenthal, Irreconcilable Differences? The Waning of the American Jewish Love Affair with Israel (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 2001); Stephen Cohen, ‘Did American Jews Really Grow More Distant from Israel 1983-93’ in Allon Gal Ed. Envisioning Israel (Wayne State University Press, 1996); Zvi Gitelman, ‘New Jewish Identities (CentralEuropean University Press, 2003); Barry Kosmin, Anthony Lerman and Jacqueline Goldberg, ‘The attachment of British Jews to Israel’ Jewish Policy Research Report No. 5 1997.

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it led to the closing of pro-Israel lobby:BIPAC. While the majority of Diasporas Jewssupported the Oslo process, many pro-Israelactivists felt lost or even somewhat used, asIsrael reversed long standing policies againstnegotiating with the PLO and giving up theGolan Heights, which they had spent a lifetime defending. They became annoyed at some ofthe declarations of the Labour governmenttelling them that their help was no longerrequired. Meanwhile, the Orthodox became verycritical of Israel’s dovish policies underLabour, which they often referred to as Post-Zionist or even post-Jewish.21

However, the advent of the Oslo process didnot really distance Diaspora Jewry fromIsrael; it merely altered the nature of therelationship. Instead of focusing on defending

Israel, the Diaspora gave Israel a centralplace in ‘Jewish continuity’, most obviouslyby promoting peer group visits to Israel, forexample within the Birthright Israel program.Indeed, increasing amounts of Jewish youth inthe UK were contemplating aliya.22 In addition,criticism of Israeli policies did not affectthe underlying identification with Israel.After all, those most critical of Israel’sdovish policies, the Orthodox, were also thegroup that visited Israel the most and weremost likely to make aliya. Overall, theDiaspora did not distance itself from Israelrather it adopted a new more pluralistic formof engagement, in which it tried to influencethe nature of Israeli society and politics.23

With the demise of the mythological ‘perfect’Israel, Diaspora Jews began trying to pushIsrael in their preferred ideological

19 Rynhold, ‘Labour, Likud,’21 Jewish Press, 15 September 1995, p.14; 6 October 1993, p.16; Jerusalem Report, 19 October 1995, p.38; Yediot Aharonot, 11 September 1995, p.1; Jerusalem Post, 17 November 1995, p.11. For polls see Mideast Mirror, 13 September 1995; Jewish Chronicle, 13 September 1995, p.822 Kosmin, Lerman & Goldberg, ‘The attachment of British Jews to Israel’.23 Yossi Shain, ‘Jewish kinship at a crossroads: Lessons for homelands and diasporas’ Political Science Quarterly 117, 2 (Summer 2002).

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directions. As a result, the character ofIsrael became the main ideological battlefieldof Diaspora Jewry.

The combination of ideological fracture andpolitical activism found practical expressionin the Diaspora’s approach to the Oslo processitself. Instead of focusing on general supportfor Israeli policies, Diaspora Jews organizedto lobby in favour of their particularideological approach to the peace process. Forthis first time this included significantlobbying against the policy of the Israeligovernment. Thus, between 1993 and 1996 theZionist Organization of America (ZOA) andother politically conservative organizationssuch as JINSA (Jewish Institute for NationalSecurity) lobbied against Israeli policies inthe US. Later 1996-99, Americans for Peace Nowlobbied for US pressure to be applied on theNetanyahu government. In this context, for the

first time, a majority of American Jews alsobacked US pressure on Israel.24

Yet the peak of the disjuncture betweenIsraeli policies and Diaspora identity camewhen the left-wing government of Ehud Barakproposed unprecedented concessions to thePalestinians. The majority of US Jewry did notsupport some of Barak’s concessions regardingJerusalem. Subsequently, mainstream Diasporaleaders took part in a large demonstration inJerusalem to protest against such plans.25

Important Diaspora leaders, who usuallyemphasized Israel’s right to decide itsforeign and security policies alone, spoke ofJerusalem as being an issue on which theJewish people worldwide should have a say,given its central importance to Jewishidentity worldwide.26 This, more than anythingelse, symbolized that while the Diaspora stillidentified strongly with Israel, it no longerexpressed that identification through

25 Shlomo Shamir, ‘Survey: 35% of U.S. Jews favor dividing capital’ Ha'aretz 7 March 2001.26 Yossi Shain and Barry Bristman, ‘Diaspora, kinship and loyalty: the renewal of Jewish national security’ International Affairs 78, 1 (2002) p. 75.

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subservient support for Israeli governmentpolicies, but rather active ideologicalengagement to affect Israeli policies, even oncore issues related to the peace process.

The Collapse of the Oslo Process 2000-2004,Pluralistic SolidarityThe collapse of the Oslo process coupled witha massive wave of suicide terrorist attacksagainst Israelis was greeted by Diasporasolidarity with Israel. According to a 2003survey three-quarters of US Jews felt close toIsrael.27 Some Jews in Europe felt that theheavy criticism of Israel’s behaviourheightened their sense of Jewish identity,separating them off from their fellowcitizens.28 Despite Prime Minister Sharon’snegative image among large sections of theDiaspora, Israel’s policies were generally not

blamed by the Diaspora for the collapse of theprocess due to the unprecedented concessionsagreed to by Barak. In Europe, anti-Semitismrose sharply in response to Israeli policies.Despite recognizing this connection, DiasporaJews did not generally blame Israel for thesituation. In fact, the rise in anti-Semitismin Europe led to a doubling of the number ofFrench Jews making aliya from 1000 to 2000 ayear, while other European Jews referred toIsrael as a potential refuge, if things gotworse. Nonetheless, French Jews were verycritical of Sharon for telling them to makealiya because of anti-Semitism as it raised,once again, the vexed issue of ‘dualloyalty.29’ In the US, solidarity with Israelwas evident at the 2001 AIPAC conference thatset new records for attendance and moneyraised for Israel.30 European Jews alsodemonstrated solidarity with Israel, as big

24 Jonathan Rynhold ‘Israeli-American Relations and the Peace Process’ Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) 4, 2 (2000).27 http://www.ajc.org/InTheMedia/PubSurveys . asp?did=1030 28 Author interviews in the UK and Daniel Ben Simon, ‘Notes from a French anti-Semitic heartland’ Ha’aretz 22 July 2004. 29 Author Interviews in the UK; ‘Sharon urges French Jews to leave `as soon as possible’ Ha’aretz 19 July 2004.30 Shain & Bristman, ‘Diaspora, kinship and loyalty’ p. 85

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http://www.ajc.org/InTheMedia/PubSurveys.asp?did=1030


pro-Israel rallies in Washington and New Yorkwere accompanied by rallies of around 50 000Jews in both London and Paris in 2002 and2003. In France, well-known Jewishintellectuals such as Bernard Henri Levi,defended Israel against the generally anti-Israel public, and even less-identifyingFrench Jews were drawn to Israel’s defence; aswere the representatives of ProgressiveJudaism in the US and the UK, who hadpreviously adopted a more critical dovishline.31 In fact, 63% of US Jews thought thatthey should continue to support Israel, evenif they disagreed with its policies.32

Nonetheless such expressions of solidarity didnot represent a return to the 1970s. Membersof the Israeli left began to promote analternative narrative, which put the blame forthe collapse of the Oslo process on bothsides. This began to impact on liberals in theDiaspora, especially after Labour left

Sharon’s government in the autumn of 2003.Subsequently, liberal Diaspora Jews formed theBrit Zedek organization that collected over 10000 signatures of support for the Geneva draftpermanent status agreement negotiated by YossiBeilin and Yasir Abd Rabbo, which wasvigorously opposed by the Israeli governmentand Israeli centrists in general.33 Believingthat there was a realistic chance for peace,liberal Jewish support for Sharon’s policiesbecome more equivocal. At the solidarity rallyfor Israel held in London, a group of formermembers of the left-wing Habonim youthmovement left the rally when Netanyahuspoke.34 British Friends of Peace Nowpublished a petition signed by 300 prominentJews against Sharon’s policies, while BritishChief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, whilst generallydefending Israel in the media, also warnedthat without an end to the occupation Israelwould lose its soul.35 Meanwhile, in the USeven some mainstream organizations were

31 Daniel Ben Simon, ‘Notes from a French anti-Semitic heartland Ha’aretz 22 July 2004; Daniel Ben-Simon The price of brainwashing’ Ha’aretz 6 July 2004; Simon Rocker ‘“We back Israel” say Liberal rabbis’ Jewish Chronicle 15 February 2002.32 http://www.ajc.org/InTheMedia/PubSurveys . asp?did=1030

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http://www.ajc.org/InTheMedia/PubSurveys.asp?did=1030


publicly critical of Israeli policiesregarding the separation barrier andsettlements.36 Overall then the increasedexpressions of Diaspora solidarity with Israeldemonstrated the continued identification ofDiaspora Jews with Israel, but in practicalterms that identification was expressed in amore pluralistic manner than simply supportfor Israeli policies.37

The Future The trend in the Diaspora is that the oldergenerations and the Orthodox identify mostwith Israel. While, the younger generation ofnon-Orthodox Jews identify far less withIsrael. The situation is particularly evidentin the US where surveys suggest that onlyabout a third of Jewish students identify

clearly with Israel. Of the children of mixedmarriages, (roughly 50% of Diaspora Jews marrynon-Jews) only a tiny minority identify withIsrael. According to one extensive study,aside from the 10-15% who are actively pro-Israel via traditional communityorganizations, another 35% of young US Jews(classed as members of the tribe and membersof the tribe lite) are open to greateridentification and engagement with Israel.However, the traditional institutions oforganized Jewry, including AIPAC and Hillel,turn them off and they are not receptive tothe traditional ‘clichéd’ ways of relating toIsrael. Their postmodern38 attitudes are moresimilar to American non-Jews their age, thanthey are to their parents’ attitudes. They arepositive regarding ‘peace’ and ‘democracy’,

33 http://btvshalom.org/34 Author interview with participants.35 ‘UK Jewry split over Peace Now petition’ Jewish Chronicle 5 April 2002; Jonathan Freedland, ‘Prophet of Hope’ The Guardian 27 August 2002.36 Shlomo Shamir, ‘Bronfman: Jewish leaders creating rift between Israel, U.S.’ Ha’aretz July 2004; Shlomo Shamir, ‘ReformMovement rabbis set to condemn house demolitions’ Ha’aretz; 24 June 2004; ‘Reform head blasts settlements’ Jerusalem Post 13November 2003.37 For example the 2004 survey of British Jews Jewish Chronicle September 2004.

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while being more negative regarding organizedreligion & ‘security’, including Israelisecurity. While their negative perception andeven embarrassment at hawkish Israeli policiesis not the main reason for this alienation, itis something that discourages people frombecoming actively supportive of Israel.39 Inorder for Israel to harness the practicalsupport of this crucial group, its foreign anddefence policy must be viewed as gearedtowards peace and as expressing democraticvalues. In particular, the on-going Israelioccupation of the Territories deepens theiralienation from Israel. More generally, Israel’s on-going occupationhas the potential to irreparably damagesupport for Israel among the majority ofDiaspora Jews in the medium-term. This doesnot mean that the Diaspora blames Israel for

the situation, nor than it expects Israel towithdraw to the pre-1967 borders in the nearfuture. However, by 2010 there are likely tobe more Arabs than Jews within the area ofIsrael, the West Bank and Gaza combined. WereIsrael to pursue a policy of ruling over aPalestinian majority without full civil rightsindefinitely, this would contradict coreJewish and democratic values. Such a situationwould generate the most serious ever crisis ofDiaspora Jewish identification with Israel.Recognition of this threat may be leading to asignificant shift in Israeli thinking vis avis the importance of the Diaspora in Israeliforeign and defence policy.

38 Steven Cohen and Arnold Eisen, The Jew Within: Self, Family, and Community in America (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,2000).39 Comprehensive Report on the 1995 CJP Demographic Study (Boston: Combined Jewish Philanthropies, 1997); Frank Luntz ‘Israel in the age of Eminem’ (Bronfman Philanthropies, 2003); Nathan Gutman, ‘Israel not high on young US Jews' agenda’ Ha’aretz 1June 2003; Author interview with Roger Bennett, Vice President, Bronfman Philanthropies; National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS) 2001; Kosmin, Lerman & Goldberg, ‘The attachment of British Jews to Israel’.

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The Israeli Perspective: Diasporaidentification as a Strategic Asset

‘We have to consider the interests ofDiaspora Jewry… But there is one crucialdistinction – not what they think theirbest interests are but what we regard astheir interests’.40

David Ben-Gurion

Israeli leaders generally understood Ben-Gurion’s dictum as meaning that the interestsof world Jewry are equivalent to the interestsof the State of Israel as interpreted by itsgovernment. Thus, Israel policymakers havebeen concerned by the impact of their foreignand defence policy on Diaspora identityprimarily when it is perceived to haveimportant ramifications for Israeli interests.Classic Zionist ideology proposed to ‘negatethe Diaspora’. It denigrated any form ofDiaspora Jewish identity and focused on

promoting aliya. After 1948, these ideologicalattitudes softened. Although aliya remained acore objective, the State of Israel preferredto develop relations with the Jewishcommunities as a whole, including non-Zionists, rather than with Zionistorganizations alone.41 Ideologicalconsiderations came second to the need tomaximise the financial and political supportof the Diaspora, which was especiallyimportant in the early years of statehood.

While Israel was happy to reap the materialbenefits of Diaspora assistance, it was lesskeen to recognize this, for ideologicalreasons. Nor was Israel willing to give theDiaspora a say in Israeli foreign policy, asNahum Goldman, head of the World JewishCongress, wanted. Indeed, Israeli policymakersretained a disdain for Diaspora lobbying –Shtadlanut -- as symptomatic of the ‘old Jew’

40 Michael Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972) p.232.41 On Israeli policy towards the Diaspora see, Alan Dowty, ‘Israeli Foreign Policy and the Jewish Question’ MERIA 3, 1 (1999); Dov Waxman, ‘The Jewish Dimension in Israeli Foreign Policy’ Israel Studies Forum 19, 1 (2003); Gabriel Sheffer ‘The Elusive Question: Jews and Jewry in Israeli Foreign Policy’ Jerusalem Quarterly 46 (Spring 1988).

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that Zionism sought to replace. This attitudewas most apparent during the ‘Who is a Jew’crisis of 1988. Both Labour and Likud wereprepared to change the Law of Return such thatit would alienate non-Orthodox Diaspora Jewsin order to obtain the backing of thereligious parties in Israel to form agovernment.42 Shamir only reversed the policywhen American Jewry refused to lobby againstthe US dialogue with the PLO. In other words,Israel only really took Diaspora identity intoaccount when it made political sense in termsof Israeli state interests.

In this vein, from the late 1980s onwards theIsraeli Left and Right sought to takeadvantage of ideological splits in theDiaspora to build up support for theirpreferred policies towards the peace process.The Right was more effective in this regard.Subsequently, in the 1990s the Israeli Left

tried to minimize Diaspora involvement in thepeace process. Beilin saw AIPAC as right wing;Rabin disliked the whole concept of Shtadlanutin any case, while Peres viewed Diasporaassistance in the realm of Hasbara (spindoctoring) as unnecessary in the era ofpeace.43 While, this approach alienated manyin the Diaspora, it was accompanied with agreater concern, for the first time, forDiaspora Jewish identity in of itself. Beilin,in particular, was keen to expand the culturaland social links between Israel and theDiaspora, irrespective of aliya or Israel’spolitical interests.44

The Diaspora has, generally speaking, onlybeen a minor consideration in the making ofIsraeli foreign policy. Relations with theDiaspora have been handled primarily by theForeign Ministry, which has very littleinfluence over major foreign and defense

42 David Landau, Who is a Jew: A Case Study of American Jewish Influence on Israeli Policy, (New York: American Jewish Committee and The Argov Centre, Bar Ilan University 1996).43 David Horowitz, ed., Yitzhak Rabin: Soldier for Peace (London: Halban, 1996), pp.157-59.44 Yossi Beilin, His Brothers Keeper (New York: Shocken 2000). See also comments by Peres, Jerusalem Post, 9 April 1996, p.7

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policy decisions. Even within the ForeignMinistry, the Diaspora has not been a majorconsideration. Thus, in 1986 Foreign MinisterShimon Peres sent a document to all Israeliembassies that defined the relativesignificance of various interests, theDiaspora was ranked only fourth or fifth.45

The relative unimportance of the Diaspora inIsraeli foreign policy was also apparent in2002, when following cutbacks in its budget,the Foreign Ministry closed a number of itsconsulates and embassies. In making thedecisions regarding where to cut, the Diasporadid not hold a privileged position. Forexample, Israel closed its Sydney consulatedespite a major campaign by the Jewishcommunity to keep it open.46

As Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin sought tominimize any consideration of the Diaspora inIsraeli policymaking. On coming into office in

1992, he publicly lambasted AIPAC forinterfering in the US-Israeli relationship.47

Subsequently, he did not bother to appoint anadvisor for Diaspora affairs until 1995. Heonly relented when US Jews opposed to hispolicies began to cause Israel problems in theUS Congress. In 1995, Rabin received a letterexpressing concern at Israeli policies from avery prominent British Rabbi known as ageneral supporter of the peace process.Nonetheless, Rabin’s initial reaction wasterse: Israeli foreign policy is not thebusiness of Diaspora Jews. (In the end he waspersuaded by Embassy officials to send a morediplomatic response).48

While Rabin is an extreme example, the state-centric approach has dominated Israeli policyunder every government. The fact is that theDiaspora variable has not had a significanteffect on any major Israeli decision in the

45 Sheffer ‘The Elusive Question’, p. 105.46 Jerusalem Report 21 October 2002 p. 56.47 Ibid.48 Author interview with Embassy official.

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realm of foreign and security policy. The onlysignificant exception to this state-centricapproach, relates to aliya. On occasion thedesire of Israeli governments to encouragealiya has affected Israeli policies. Onereason Israel initially adopted a neutralpolicy in the Cold War, and that it laterrestrained its pro-American stance up to 1967,was its desire to maintain relations with Jewsbehind the Iron Curtain in order to facilitatetheir future aliya.49 After the Soviets brokediplomatic relations with Israel in 1967,Israel worked very closely with Diaspora Jews,particularly in Britain, to maintain contactsindirectly with Soviet Jews. Israel alsodeveloped a close relationship withCeausescu’s Romania in order to facilitate thealiya of Romanian Jews, despite the dictator’sclose ties to the PLO, which at that stage wasstill openly committed to the destruction ofIsrael. Similarly in the mid 1980s Israelipolicy towards the civil war in Ethiopia, was

determined less by ideology or geo-strategicconsiderations and more by theZionist/Humanitarian aim of bringing EthiopianJewry to Israel.50 However, not all Israelileaders thought aliya should take precedenceover state interests. Yitzhak Rabin stands outin this regard. Thus in 1973, he opposed theJackson-Vanit amendment whereby Congresslinked Détente with the USSR to a Sovietwillingness to let Jews immigrate freely toIsrael. Rabin feared it would damage Israel’sclose strategic relationship with the Nixonadministration that opposed the amendment.51

Even when Israel assumes the mantle ofofficial representative of the Jewish people,it often does so in order to further its owndistinctive state interests. Thus, when Ben-Gurion accepted reparations for the Holocaustafter from West Germany in the name of theJewish people, he did so, in large part,because he believed the money, as well as the

49 Shain & Bristman, ‘Diaspora, kinship and loyalty’.50 Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy A Prince (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1990), pp. 225-227.51 Horowitz, Rabin p. 157.

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political support of West Germany, would bevery important to the security and developmentof the fledgling state.52

Israel has taken a consistent interest inhelping Diaspora Jews combat anti-Semitism. Inthe 1950s covert Israeli operations helpedprotect North African Jews. By the 1960s mostof these Jews had made aliya and so theactivity waned.53 After 1967 Palestinian andIslamic terrorist began to target Jews inWestern countries whom they perceived as partyto the conflict.54 In democratic countries,Israeli activities were more much restricted,consisting of liaison with the localauthorities and the provision of training tocommunity security services. On the otherhand, Israel has maintained close relationswith authoritarian regimes that took severemeasures against Jewish communities or againstliberal elements within those communities, forexample its relations with the military Junta

in Argentina and with the Pinochet regime inChile, in the late 1970s and early 1980s.55

Furthermore, with the onset of Israeli-Palestinian violence again in September 2000,anti-Semitic attacks against Jews in Europerose dramatically. There was a clearcorrelation between Israeli military activityand attacks on Diaspora Jews. While Israel wasconcerned by this phenomenon and sought toassist local communities by raising the issuewith foreign governments, there is no evidencethat it canceled or scaled back any militaryoperation. Israel’s assassination of a leadingHamas figure in Damascus in autumn 2004 wascarried out in the knowledge that by strikingat Hamas outside of the Territories, Hamasmight change its policy and retaliate byattacking Jewish or Israeli targets outsideIsrael.56 Ultimately, the State of Israel actsprimarily on the basis of its interests as astate not out of concern for the Diaspora.

52 Lillian Feldman The Special Relationship Between West Germany & Israel (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1984).53 Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy A Prince.54 Wasserstein, Vanishing Diasporas, pp. 228-233.

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In fact, despite Israel-Diaspora solidarity,anti-Semitism can be a source of tension inthe relationship. When Sharon’s told FrenchJews in 2004 that they should respond to anti-Semitism by making aliya, he raised the spectreof ‘dual loyalty’ and made Diaspora Jews feelmore vulnerable rather than safer. Formally,Israel recognized that Diaspora Jews oweloyalty only to the countries of which theywere citizens. However, in practice, ideologyand realpolitik combine to make Israeli policyinsensitive to the civic identity of DiasporaJews. The ideological component was apparentin Shamir’s address to the Presidents’Conference in 1988 when he declared, “Jewsabroad have a moral duty to support theIsraeli government, never a foreign governmentagainst Israel”.57 Subsequently, members ofthe Shamir government attributed US Jewry’srefusal to campaign on loan guarantees as

emanating from a typically weak Diasporamentality.58 The most glaring example of thisinsensitivity was the Pollard Affair.Similarly, in 2004, members of the Jewishcommunity in New Zealand were arrested forassisting Israeli Mossad agents. Nonetheless,despite the impression made by this case andoccasional sensationalist reports in themedia, the Mossad has generally been sensitiveregarding the dual loyalty issue.59

With the collapse of the Oslo process and theonslaught of attacks on Israel’s legitimacy atthe UN Conference on Human Rights in Durban,and in Europe more generally, Israel began toattach a greater emphasis than ever before onthe Diaspora. For the first time Israel hascreated a Minister for Diaspora Affairs, whois charge, amongst other things, of ‘TheGlobal Forum against Anti-Semitism’. In

55 Sheffer, ‘The Elusive Question’, p. 111.56 Khaled Abu Toameh ‘Hamas split over exporting terror campaign’ Jerusalem Post 26 September 200457 Gruen, ‘Not So Silent Partnership’, p.217.58 Jerusalem Post, 31 January 1992; Glen Frankel, Beyond the Promised Land, (New York: Simon and Schuster 1994) p.306.59 Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy A Prince, pp. 323; Israel Foreign Intelligence and Security Services: A Survey (Washington DC: CIA, 1979).

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addition, Israel’s National Security Councilis dealing with the issue of Diasporarelations, because it views the Diaspora asone of Israel’s most important strategicassets.60 Against this background, Jewish PolicyPlanning, a Jewish Agency think tank,recommended consulting the Diaspora regardingIsrael’s foreign and defence policy,recognizing that the results of Israeli policyaffect Jews worldwide. They feared thatwithout consultation, ideological divisionsand the ambivalence of younger Jews wouldprevent the Diaspora from actively supportingIsrael in its battle to protect the legitimacyof the Jewish state. Indeed, Israeli leaders61

want to strengthen Diaspora Jewish identity,even if it does not result in aliya, in orderto sustain a strategic asset, which they tookfor granted for many years. The most importantexample of the Diaspora influencing Israelipolicy relates to the Sharon government’s

decision to unilaterally withdraw from Gazaand four settlements in the West Bank, whichwas announced in December 2003. For accordingto the then Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert,who was very close to Sharon, one of thereasons for adopting the measure was thebelief that Israel if Israel continued tooccupy the Territories indefinitely it wouldlose the support of Diaspora Jewry.62 Whatbothered Olmert and Sharon was less theemotional state of Diaspora Jewry and rathermore the financial and political ramificationsof such a situation for the State of Israel.In other words, even if the Diaspora isbecoming more important, Israeli policymakersstill view it primarily through the prism ofstate interests.

60 Author conversations with Israeli officials; Yossi Shain and Barry Bristman, "The Jewish Security Dilemma," Orbis 46 (Winter 2002).61 Yair Sheleg, ‘American Jewry high up on Sharon's agenda’ Ha'aretz 13 February 2001; Horowitz, Yitzhak Rabin, pp. 163-64.62 ‘Interview with Ehud Olmert’ Yediot Achronot 5 December 2003 [Hebrew].

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ConclusionThe Diaspora is generally only a minorconsideration in the formation of Israeliforeign and defence policy. When it does playa role, it is primarily because Israelipolicymakers view it as in Israel’s stateinterest or Zionist interest in aliya, ratherthan out of some sort of pan-Jewish altruism.Israeli foreign and defence policy hasimpacted on both the civic and the Jewishidentity of Diaspora Jews. Israeli behaviourhas, on occasion, left Diaspora Jews feelingtheir civic identity threatened by charges of‘dual loyalty’. Nonetheless, prior to the1980s Diaspora identification with Israel wasexpressed in unwavering support for Israelipolicies. Since then Diaspora support forIsraeli policies cannot be taken for granted.Mirroring the trend within Israel itself, theDiaspora has become increasingly divided overIsraeli policy and increasingly willing toopenly criticize and act against policies theyoppose. Yet criticism has not translated intoalienation from Israel, rather it represents amore pluralistic expression of identification.

In practical terms this situation constrainsIsrael’s ability to effectively mobilizeDiaspora support over contentious issues, suchas settlements. Only an Israeli policy clearedaimed at indefinite occupation of theTerritories would lead to a major crisis ofDiaspora identification with Israel. On theother hand, Israel can still count on wide-ranging support for its policies on consensusissues, such as Israel’s Jewish identity. Fromthe Israeli strategic perspective, theDiaspora is more important than ever, as ithas great potential to assist Israel in itsstruggle to protect its legitimacy as a Jewishstate in Western public opinion and in otherinternational non-governmental arenas.However, to succeed, Israel will have to adopta more sophisticated, pluralistic and openform engagement with the Diaspora, than hasbeen the case in the past.

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Israeli Foreign and Defense Policy and Diaspora Jewry (chapter in Danny Ben-Moshe and Zohar Segev,...

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