ABSTRACTWith domestic political cultures in which the values of solidarity, equityand social justice figure large and a long history of internationalism in foreign policy, the Nordic states offer themselves as prototypical ‘goodinternational citizens’. Danish foreign policy long had a passive quality toit, nonetheless it has been broadly consistent with the Nordic internation-alist tradition, especially with the adoption of ‘active internationalism’after 1989. Since the 2001 Election of the first Fogh Rasmussen govern-ment, however, the ethico-political rationales underpinning Danish internationalism appear to be changing at the same time as Denmark hasenacted a controversially much more restrictive and,critics argue, stronglyculturally framed immigration and refugee policy. Although the FoghRasmussen governments have not abandoned internationalism, and keyaspects of current Danish foreign policy resonate fully with the Nordicinternationalist tradition, Denmark is now much more closely alignedwith the US and the muscular internationalism that it promotes. It maynow be the case that a normatively re-jigged internationalism helps tolegitimate an overtly exclusionary Danish national narrative. Since the‘cartoon crisis’, however, there are signs of a greater sensitivity to culturalpolitics in Danish foreign policy, but it remains moot whether this will flowthrough into the government’s handling of the relationship between thepeoples that comprise contemporary Denmark.
One of the features of the Nordic states in recent decades has been theintertwining of a strong sense of collective national identity, a high level ofpublic antipathy to the European integration project, and a long-standing,widely supported, normatively infused foreign policy internationalism centred on the expression of ‘solidarity’ with distant others (Bergman inthis issue). On their own, the first two tendencies constitute a plausible cou-pling; it is the third feature that jars with the others.
In its general character, the Nordic foreign policy internationalism thathas evolved over the past four decades or so chimes with elements of
Kantian moral cosmopolitanism. But it more fully resonates with the moremodest ‘Grotian’ notion, most famously developed within The EnglishSchool of International Relations, that there exists a sui generis ‘interna-tional society of states’.1 While largely eschewing cosmopolitan aspirationsfor the realization of a post-international world, for many contemporaryscholars working within this intellectual tradition the idea of an interna-tional society depicts its members as obliged to look beyond selfish‘national’ interests, recognize duties beyond themselves, and to act as ‘goodinternational citizens’ (Linklater, 1992; Linklater and Suganami, 2006:223–58). At a minimum, this requires a commitment to secure the develop-ment of an institutionalized, strongly law-governed pluralist internationalorder. On the ‘solidarist’ wing of the English School, which has becomemarkedly more prominent in the post-Cold War era, good international citizenship is understood in more cosmopolitan terms and, consequently, aspractically more demanding of states. Thus, it depicts the members of international society as having an ethical obligation to address questions ofuniversal human rights, global economic and social injustices, and, mostcontroversially, to contemplate breaching the principle of non-intervention— traditionally seen by the English School as a cornerstone of a pluralistinternational order — in the name of emerging universal norms (Wheelerand Dunne, 1996; Wheeler, 2000; Linklater and Suganami, 2006: 242–58).
In their long-standing commitments to such things as a UN-centredworld order, the development of a robust international legal regime, thepromotion of mediation-based conflict resolution, and, perhaps most dis-tinctively, the provision of overseas development assistance (ODA), theNordic states present themselves as archetypal good international citizenswith sometimes markedly solidarist leanings. This is not to suggest that theNordic states are radically different from other Western states — they arenot; but it is to suggest that they appear to have consistently given greaterweight to overtly normative and ethical considerations in the formulationand conduct of their foreign and security policies than most other devel-oped states. Key to any explanation of Nordic internationalism has to betheir shared history as social democratic welfare states, in which the valuesof solidarity, egalitarianism and social justice have loomed comparativelylarge by Western standards (Heclo and Madsen, 1987; Esping-Andersen,1990;Tilton, 1991; Lawler, 1997; Ingebritsen, 2002;Trägårdh, 2002; Bergman,Kuisma in this issue). Although the normative internationalist and cosmo-politan dimensions of its foreign policy have been perhaps less visible, orperhaps just less well known, in comparison to that of its neighboursNorway and Sweden, Denmark has, until recently at least, largely fitted theNordic foreign policy mould.
The distinctiveness of the Nordic brand of normative internationalism,while readily apparent during the Cold War era, has begun to fade consider-ably in recent years. A number of reasons for this suggest themselves. First is the emergence of overtly normatively infused internationalist themes in virtually all Western national foreign policies in recent years, and mostnotably in the foreign policies of the UK and the US, rendering the depic-tion of overtly internationalist foreign policies as somehow exceptional
virtually redundant (Lawler, 2005: 427–35). Second, the perception that theNordic region ‘no longer stands out as previously as a much heralded eco-nomic and social paragon’ (Archer, 2003: 1) or that Nordic social democracyis in crisis has become widespread, especially since the economic stricturesof the 1980s.2 Third, there is the impact of the EU to consider. Denmark hasof course been joined by Sweden and Finland as a member state, but the EUitself arguably casts an ever larger shadow over the Nordic region in itscapacities as an international, and internationalist, actor in its own right(Laatikainen, 2003).
These are all large issues which can only be touched upon in this discussion.The key focus of the article is on a fourth reason for Nordic internationalism’spossibly fading star: recent developments in Denmark give rise to speculationthat the history of commonality between Nordic foreign policies, especially intheir internationalist dimensions, might be giving way to differentiation. Justas the overt normative dimensions of their foreign policies that historicallymarked the Nordic states out from the Western norm have now given way toa plurality of Western internationalisms, so too might the hitherto singularityof Nordic internationalism be challenged by the emergence of significant vari-ations between the Nordic states, with Denmark as the key player in this.
The 2001 general election certainly disrupted the received image ofDenmark. Much of the international media coverage — and previousDanish elections rarely attracted outside attention — focused precisely onthe contrast between Denmark’s progressivist reputation, of which its inter-nationalism has been a key part, and the election campaign’s general tone.Particularly attention-grabbing was the issue of immigration, and Muslimimmigration in particular, which figured very large in an overwhelminglynegative election campaign. The election produced an historic outcome: theelection of the most conservative government in Denmark since 1929, on ahigh turnout moreover. Dependent upon the parliamentary support of apopulist, far-right party, the new government rapidly enacted widely criti-cized restrictions on refugee entry and immigration. However, to muddythe waters, Denmark went on to hold the EU presidency in a much-praisedfashion and has retained its place as one of the world’s two most generousproviders of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) — the other beingNorway — even though its direct and enthusiastic participation in the 2003US-led invasion of Iraq signalled that in other respects Danish internation-alism had decisively shifted direction.
As its re-election in 2005 showed, none of this has harmed the FoghRasmussen government or helped its social-democratic opponents whohave in most key respects adopted the new toughened stance towardsimmigrants and asylum-seekers and signalled support for the retention of aDanish military presence in Iraq. Furthermore, the 2005 Danish generalelection was marked as much by the absence of significant outside com-mentary as the previous election was notable for attracting it. HasDenmark’s new internationalist posture therefore become normalized?More pointedly, is Danish internationalism now less about responding to amoral imperative arising from a commitment to externalizing the principleof solidarity — as social-democratic rhetoric has long claimed — and more
about helping distant and culturally distinct others in order to shore up apolicy of preserving a distinctive Danish identity and way of life? What follows is admittedly somewhat speculative in tone. The key claim that willbe advanced is that the recent rightward turn in Danish politics does notsignal Danish internationalism’s demise; rather, it suggests that a process ofreconfiguring the ethical and political rationales for sustaining it is under-way. Furthermore, if successful, such a process may well provide a definitivechallenge to established Nordic internationalist tradition.
The Nordic Internationalist Tradition
For over three decades, the Nordic states have led a small group of Westernstates that have established a reputation for having foreign policies that were‘more responsive to cosmopolitan values and internationalist considerationsthan … those of many other states’ (Pratt, 1989: 7). They have long beennoted for their overt activism in favour of a multilateral, robustly law-gov-erned and UN-centred international political order.They can plausibly claimto have made exceptional contributions in such areas as peace-keeping, theinternational UN-centred civil service, the provision of development assis-tance in its quantitative and qualitative dimensions, international environ-mentalism, and conflict mediation and resolution. For these reasons they allacquired reputations as archetypal internationalist states prior to the ColdWar’s end. This could be seen to make sense solely in power political terms.Given that the Nordic states are small to medium powers and militarily weak,their playing the role of international ‘norm entrepreneurs’ can be construedas a form of soft, ‘social power’ which has been ‘consciously cultivated anddeepened as a cornerstone of Scandinavian diplomatic relations’(Ingebritsen, 2002: 13). But as Ingebritsen rightly also notes, and I haveargued elsewhere (Lawler, 1997), the answer to the question ‘whyScandinavia?’ cannot be sufficiently answered solely with reference to theirperipheral geo-political position. Their shared social democratic institutions,their ‘ideologies of social partnership’ and a consensus-based policy-makingapproach ‘enable these states to maintain consistency as they seek to exporttheir model abroad — in environmental policy-making, peace-keeping andinternational aid policy’ (Ingebritsen, 2002: 13).As various studies have noted(Stokke, 1989; Lumsdaine, 1993; Hook, 1995; Führer, 1996; Lawler, 1997;Schraeder et al., 1998; Sellström, 1999; Ingebritsen, 2002), Nordic ODA hasbeen historically driven comparatively less by strategic and economic concerns in contrast to that of other key ODA donors and more by an ideo-logical commitment to global welfare as a ‘logical extension’ of the Nordicemphasis on ‘social solidarity at home’ (Ingebritsen, 2002: 20; Bergman in thisissue).
What especially marked Nordic internationalism out, especially at itspeak in the 1970s, was its commitment to solidarity with developing statesand its invocation of the values of national self-reliance and national auton-omy. Such a stance allowed for the relatively easy co-existence of their self-interests as independently minded trading states and an overtly progressive
ethical standpoint which chimed with the hegemonic domestic value-amal-gam that underpinned their national state-society complexes. Indeed, it isprecisely the emphasis on national autonomy, be it for the beneficiaries ofNordic ODA or the donor states themselves, that seemingly helps explainthe co-existence of internationalism and a nationalistic euroscepticism inNordic political cultures.
Nordic internationalism’s reputational claims rest largely upon the histor-ically more visible reputations of Sweden and Norway compared toDenmark. Sweden is perhaps the most famously internationalist Nordicstate and has been the original source of much of the region’s international-ist narrative. In 1962, the Swedish Riksdag declared that Sweden’s setting upof an international aid programme recognized that ‘peace, freedom and wel-fare are not exclusive national concerns, but rather something universal andindivisible’ (Hook, 1995: 98). Sellström (1999) reminds us of the path-breakingdimensions of Swedish internationalism and the quite rapid transformationof Swedish public consciousness from insularism to greater worldliness fromthe mid-1950s onwards. It is a complex, largely untold story of the rapidemergence of a public narrative around the issue of African liberation whichintertwined the ‘Swedish model’, orthodox foreign policy discourse, and theidea of international development cooperation.3 Trägårdh (2002: 131) con-vincingly argues that the commingling of society, nation and state that lies atthe heart of folkhemmet (‘the peoples home’ — a common synonym for theNordic welfare state) rapidly generated a specific form of national narrativesuch that Swedish nationalism became bound up with ‘being intrinsicallydemocratic and freedom loving, as having democracy in the blood’. Equallyimportant in the creation of the Swedish model, Trägårdh (2002: 131) goeson to argue, was an extreme form of statism ‘built on a social contractbetween a strong and good state, on the one hand, and the emancipated andautonomous individual on the other’. It was the duality of social equality andindividual autonomy within a cohesive outward-looking state that under-pinned the ideological conception of Sweden as prototypically modern andprogressive. The combination of a collective sense of extraordinary economic prowess, a belief that the success of Swedish neutrality exhibited‘special diplomatic skills’ and an internationalism ‘informed by a superiormoral sensibility’, led to what Trägårdh (2002: 132) acidly describes as a ‘holymission to spread the Good Message of Swedish Social Democracy to theWorld’.The charge is perhaps exaggerated, but such missionary zeal pales inany case when compared to the ambitions of more recent and more muscu-lar varieties of internationalism and interventionism that currently threadthrough the foreign policies of key Western states, notably the USA, UKand, now, Denmark.
Although real controversies surround Nordic ODA (Pratt, 1989; Stokke,1989; Holm, 1992; Schraeder et al., 1998), if it is taken as a basic measure ofa substantive commitment to solidarity with the Third World then the sustained international exceptionalism of the Nordic states is undeniable(Lumsdaine, 1993; Hook, 1995; Schraeder, et al., 1998). In 1970, the UN rec-ommended a target of 0.7% GDP in ODA and this remains a spectacularlyunrealized benchmark for most Western states. In contrast, Norway,
Sweden, Denmark (and The Netherlands) were the first members of theOECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) to meet the targetand by 1980 they had all comfortably exceeded it. Since then, the ODA disbursements of those states have fluctuated, but they have never droppedbelow the recommended level. More than three decades since the targetwas set — and in spite of the formal commitments of the other 20 DACmembers to meet it — those four states (along with Finland briefly in theearly 1990s and Luxemburg very recently) remain the only states to haveever reached the target and stick with it (Führer, 1996; OECD, 2005). Thedistinctiveness of Nordic ODA has also been evident in its qualitativedimensions — the explicit norms governing aid programmes, the relativelylow degree to which ODA is tied to national commercial and strategicinterests, the relative weighting of multilateral and bilateral aid, the target-ing of recipient countries and so on (Lumsdaine, 1993; Hook, 1995). Notsurprisingly then, Mouritzen (1995: 10–11) has suggested that in addition to‘peacefulness’ and ‘the egalitarian society’, a generic Nordic progressivismis associated with: internal and regional ‘peacefulness’; ‘environmentalism’;‘solidarity with the Third World’; and ‘hospitality to refugees and migrants’.On face value, Mouritzen’s identification of the latter two key attributes ofNordic progressiveness appears consistent with the notion that the Nordicstates can claim the status of norm entrepreneurs who have long been at thecutting edge of Western state activism in the name of global egalitarianismand justice. It would be otiose, of course, to claim that their multifariousactivities in this respect have always been perfect or without inconsistenciesand contradictions; the image is in part mythical.Writing some 7 years later,however, Ingebritsen briefly puts her finger on an emerging issue areawhich may present a larger challenge than most to the central place of solidarity as a value in the received image of Nordic progressivism:
As the populations of Northern European states have become more diversi-fied, Scandinavian governments have confronted an internal conflict overcultural preservation versus multiculturalism. Even though Government goalspromote equality, many citizens are sceptical about the effects of immigrationon Scandinavian societies. How will Scandinavian welfare systems survivewith a new class of participants who do not share a common religion, lan-guage, or understanding of widely held social norms? (Ingebritsen, 2002: 21)
This issue has become starker, of course, since the events of 11 September2001 in New York and the subsequent prominence of public, intellectualand governmental preoccupations with all manner of tensions between theWest (understood as an amalgam of values and a particular expression ofmodernity) and the non-West, notably the Islamic world.
We can get some insight into what might be at stake from a commentaryby Hansen on the relationship between Nordic scepticism towardsEuropean integration and Nordic national identity. Hansen (2002a: 1–2) sug-gests that the Nordic states are characterized by ‘dual nationalisms’: ‘a “statenationalism” which fears the demise of the Scandinavian welfare state …alongside a traditional “cultural nationalism” centred on the concern for
national identity’. This ‘produces a political terrain where opposition to theEU has been argued mostly from the parties at the two ends of the politicalspectrum’. By implication, the Right favours a cultural nationalist discourseand the Left prefers the statist variety. In her analysis of Denmark specifi-cally, Hansen, like myself (Lawler, 1997) and others (for example, Larsen,1999; Trägårdh, 2002; Kuisma in this issue), depicts an unusually tight cou-pling between state and nation. However, she also goes on to note that theheart of the nation has also come to be seen to be constituted by folket (thepeople) and the relationship between ‘the people’ and the state is thereforeboth ‘potentially closely linked’ but also ‘potentially in tension’ (emphasisadded) especially if the state becomes too closely equated with the elite andthereby becomes an ‘apparatus of power and ambition’ (Hansen, 2002b: 61).Recent events in Denmark suggest that her depictions of ‘dual nationalisms’and the potential tension between folket and an overly presumptive state orpolitical elites are insightful and worth exploring beyond the confines of thecontroversies surrounding the EU.
Danish Internationalism
It has been commonplace to depict Danish foreign policy prior to the endof the Cold War as primarily pragmatic and reactive, in contrast to the‘active internationalism’ (Holm, 1997) overtly adopted after 1989, under thefirst conservative-led government for almost a century moreover. The term‘activism’, widely used in the literature on Danish foreign policy, can per-haps serve to obscure a continuity in the values and long-term prioritieswhich have underpinned Danish foreign policy and which also give cre-dence to the depiction of Denmark as having a ‘Nordic foreign policy iden-tity’ (Wivel, 2005). The former Foreign Minister Per Hækkerup (1962–66)emphasized the power-political constraints upon small states but he alsoexplicitly rejected the view that this absolved Denmark from exercisingmoral responsibility where and whenever it could (Due-Nielsen andPetersen, 1995: 12–13). Danish membership of NATO could be read as aninstance of pragmatic adaptation by a small state to power political reali-ties, but it was also a low-key commitment constrained by a policy of no for-eign troops or nuclear weapons on Danish soil.4 As Holbraad (1991: 109)notes, Danish divergence from the mainstream of NATO policy thinkingbetween 1949 and 1989 revealed ‘underlying neutralist tendencies whichseem to have been inspired to a large extent by the same ideological influ-ences that were behind the policies of neutrality in earlier periods, namelyinternationalism and determinism’. Note also that Holbraad goes on toidentify a third influence emerging in recent decades, namely, ‘a new formof nationalism’, notably on the left of the Danish political spectrum. Notsurprisingly then, Danish–US cooperation during the Cold War while moreextensive than that of non-aligned Sweden shared much of its secretive andinformal nature (Zakheim, 1998).5 In 1969 a public debate erupted aroundthe possibility of Denmark opting out of NATO, an option available after20 years membership. The likelihood of Denmark actually exercising the
option was improbable, but the debate itself highlighted the particular fea-tures of ‘the Danish way of alignment’ (Heisler, 1985).
In the years that followed, Denmark’s reputation as a ‘not-quite-free-rider’reflected what Heisler identifies as two key features of the ‘conditioningcontext’. The first was the emergence of a post-materialist orientationwhich ‘tends to emphasise confidence-building paths to security more thanmilitary preparedness’, which in Denmark’s case became expressed in ‘con-cern with development assistance to the Third World, impatience not onlywith American foreign policy … but also with regard to American compet-itive armaments policies and nuclear weapons in particular, and similar values’ (Heisler, 1985). Heisler notes that this was not peculiar to Denmark,but it was ‘particularly pronounced there’ just as it was in the other Nordicstates. Reinforcing this were ‘problems of governance’, notably the preva-lence of fragile coalition governments (see also Holbraad, 1991: 143–6).What emerged as a consequence of the intersection of these two phenom-ena was a form of ‘consensus’ on the substance, or lack of it, of DanishNATO membership.
Heisler’s account is compatible with the view that understanding Danishforeign policy requires significant reference to the particularities of Danishpolitical culture. Key here is the pre-eminence of folkstyre (literally, rule bythe people) in Danish political discourse.That it should constrain foreign pol-icy to the degree that it has done speaks volumes about the distinctiveness ofDenmark (and the other Nordic states) when compared to many of theirEuropean neighbours, let alone states elsewhere. The deeply sedimentedNordic values of egalitarianism and popular democracy permeate bothDanish political culture and the policy process and help nurture a sense ofnational exceptionalism. Holbraad concurs with the common depiction ofDenmark as having a historically deep-seated aversion to internationalengagement. Yet in identifying ‘circumspect pragmatism and hopeful ideal-ism’ as the ‘twin marks of Danish foreign policy’ (Holbraad, 1991: 185) healso recognizes that the relationship between Denmark’s non-engagementand internationalism is not one of simple opposition but a reflection of thecomplex currents of Danish political debate in which varieties of interna-tionalism (conservative, liberal and socialist) and nationalism (both of theRight and Left) intersected. In the post-1945 period, Danish circumspection,or, in Holbraad’s terms, its ‘latent neutralism’, cannot be fully understoodsimply as an adaptive reaction of a small state to the external environment.It requires reference also to the specificities of Danish political discourse andpractice — not least the democratization of foreign policy formulation.
The history of Danish ODA also reinforces an image of policy continuityrunning alongside any shift from reactive pragmatism to active international-ism. Although 1989 saw the introduction of a greater emphasis on humanrights and democratization as preconditions for the disbursement of DanishODA, Denmark’s development-centred internationalism was already firmlyin place, as were the ‘striking differences in volume, channels and recipientsof aid between Denmark and the majority of OECD states’ (Svendsen, 1989).There was a ‘high degree of continuity’ in Danish ODA policy between 1975and 1989 and the permanent features of Denmark’s ODA policies were
‘a product of Danish society, and notably of its high level of internal-incometransfers, with aid being the international equivalent of the welfare societyand its emphasis on equality of opportunities’ (Svendsen, 1989). Holm (2002:24–5) notes, however, that during this period when it came to choosing whichdeveloping states to assist or what human rights abuses to condemn Danishgovernments were careful not to antagonize the US. Indeed, Holm (1997: 71)has captured well the mix of continuity and change, pragmatism and activism,as well as the intersection of internal and external determinants in the devel-opment of Denmark’s foreign policy identity:
The Danish world view is based on a consensual and pragmatic type of socialdemocracy where homogeneity is highly valued and the sense of social respon-sibility is highly developed. This world view shapes the type of initiatives thatare undertaken in foreign policy as well as their specific content. It is a signif-icant reason why Danish foreign policy has traditionally spoken softly andavoided confrontational clashes of interests. Internationally Denmark has thusoften chosen to act as the arbiter — rather than the advocate — of more spe-cific values. However … events since 1989 (have) allowed the Danish worldview to become more acceptable internationally and, consequently, the Danishway of advocating it stronger and more active.
Not surprisingly, Denmark’s UN activism and voting record has also tradi-tionally reflected close coordination with the other Nordic countries(Haagerup and Thune, 1983). The post-1989 policy of ‘active international-ism’ was certainly followed by greater assertiveness, including the occa-sional flexing of what little military muscle Denmark possesses, leadingsome to assert that since 1989 a more active internationalism has beenaccompanied by ‘militarization’ (Heurlin, 1994). Nonetheless, as Wæver(1995: 281–2) points out, this apparent stepping away from a tradition ofanti-militarism verging on pacifism and a long-standing public suspicion ofanything smacking of power politics, was not as large a move as it mightseem. Danish activism, including recourse to military instruments, hadalways been ‘quite sensitive to its organisational context’. After 1989,the Danish military were always deployed in an overtly UN or OSCE context, or at least one that could be construed as such, that is as somehowconnected with peace-keeping.
Denmark’s internationalism, both before and after 1989, has thus beenlargely consistent with the wider Nordic tradition. It has been characterizedby a financially very well-supported and comparatively long-standing com-mitment to providing assistance to the developing world as well as a set ofnormative preferences that emphasize the virtues of multilateralism gener-ally and international organization in particular, the need to furtherdevelop the international legal order, strong support for the UN system andactivities such as peace-keeping, a discomfort with power politics, and a ret-icence on the part of the political elite to challenge embedded social andpolitical values in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy. However,in placing a greater emphasis on human rights and in being willing todeploy Danish armed forces at the sharper end of peace-keeping-relatedactivity, Danish governments since 1989 did prepare some of the ground for
the sharper break with some key elements of the wider Nordic foreign policy tradition initiated by the Fogh Rasmussen governments after 2001.
Is There ‘Something Rotten in the State of Denmark’?
Writing in the mid-1990s, Wæver identifies other developments and themesemerging particularly during the 1990s’ Danish EU debates with implica-tions for the relationship between internationalism and the issue of national,collective identity. In this respect, Wæver’s insights gel with Hansen’s com-ments on nationalism referred to above. Wæver (1993, 1995) argues that theidea of society has become discursively ‘securitised’ independently of thestate, and this gives insight into Danish disquiet about Europeanization, hisspecific focus. Whereas the security of the state is expressed in terms of sov-ereignty, the security of society is articulated in the language of identity. It isthe latter that Wæver claims now primarily exercises the Danish publicmind, hinting at a darker side to public loyalty towards the Danish versionof the Nordic state-society-nation complex. Recent events suggest that manyDanes construe both the State’s promotion of EU membership and, morelatterly, the perception that it has failed to curb sufficiently the immigrationof overly culturally distinct people (regardless of the facts of the case) as acts of disloyalty to the community. In other words, they constitute a directchallenge to the synthesis between nation, society and state that is, as notedearlier, so central to understanding the Nordic state form.
As with the other Nordic states, the often very visible expressions ofDanish national identity (notably the popular affection for the national flag)have been underpinned by comparatively high levels of public consensusover core values, including internationalism, and sustained high levels ofdemocratic participation. Thus, in contrast to the common juxtaposition of nationalism and internationalism as being inherently in tension, the Nordicstates have shown that a collective identity as a domestically progressive,internationalist state is something which a putatively nationalist loyalty canembrace. By extension, it can reinforce a public attachment to a particularunderstanding of national sovereignty as a value. Internationalism mayindeed help to shape public understandings of sovereignty but it does notnecessarily signal the erosion of sovereignty itself. Of course, as social and his-torical phenomena, such understandings are not set in stone.
Nationalism Ascendant?
The European debates of the 1990s exposed some clear tensions withinNordic national political discourses and with hindsight provided signs of apotential reformulation of Nordic progressivism in a manner which mightcast the nationalist–internationalist relationship in a somewhat differentlight. Especially on the ‘no’ side of the EU debates, there was the uncomfort-able co-existence of scepticism on the Left about the neo-liberal dimensionsof European integration and the threat it posed to a more globally oriented
internationalism with an exclusionary and culturally suffused nostalgia for aprogressive national past seen to be under threat from a neo-liberal Europeanjuggernaut. However, there has always been a conservative, even reactionary,current within the Nordic anti-EU movements which, importantly, has beenwilling to deploy select elements of the progressivist tradition in the service ofa more exclusionary nationalism (Christiansen, 1992; Ostergård, 1992; Holm,1993; Lawler, 1997: 574–8). In the Danish case, after the EU referenda debatesof the 1990s and especially in the run up to the 1998 Danish general election —which saw the return of a social-democratic-led coalition — this currentmoved more into the foreground. Playing upon reports in the tabloid pressthat immigrants were responsible for an increase in crime while supposedlyexploiting the welfare state, the Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti orDF) — which under the charismatic leadership of Pia Kjærsgaard had justbroken away from the radical right Progress Party — came from nowhere toattract 7.4% of the vote. DF campaigned on a populist ‘vote Danish’ platform:‘no’ to immigration, ‘no’ to the EU, and ‘yes’ to the protection of the weakestin society (Aylott, 1999: 70; Polokaw-Suransky, 2002).6 Central to their campaign was a strong anti-establishment theme in which the social democ-rats were portrayed as out of touch ‘academic theorists’ and woolly-mindedliberals (Rydgren, 2004) that did not want to understand the legitimate wor-ries of ordinary Danes — the folk.As the Prime Minister acknowledged at thetime, it was a tactic that succeeded in attracting blue-collar voters away fromhis own Social Democratic Party (Polokaw-Suransky, 2002: 2).
As with other European populist parties, DF’s significance lies not just inits electoral success but also in its capacity to induce more mainstream par-ties to adopt, in part at least, its policies. DF’s recent prominence also high-lights already existing but hitherto little remarked upon features ofDenmark’s stance towards migrants. Although often perceived as tradition-ally a welcoming state for refugees and asylum-seekers (note here the quotefrom Mouritzen above), a corollary of its internationalist status, Denmark infact put a formal stop on immigration in 1973 (although family reunificationand refugees and asylum-seekers have ensured a continuing flow of immi-grants) and did not have a comprehensive immigration policy until the late1990s. Denmark has not in fact been a popular destination for migrants.Prior to 1960, immigration was largely from the Nordic region. Althoughbetween 1960 and 1974 Danish governments permitted companies to recruitworkers from countries such as, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Pakistan to addresslabour market shortages, since 1985 it was the flow of de facto refugees andasylum-seekers that became significant producing the current situation in which immigrants and their descendants comprise approximately 8.4% of the total population (Roseveare and Jorgensen, 2004: 11–12; Ministry ofForeign Affairs, 2006: 1). In terms of the number of foreigners as a percent-age of the total population, this now places contemporary Denmark aroundthe middle of the range of OECD countries. Note, however, that more thanhalf of Denmark’s immigrants and descendants are still from otherEuropean countries (Danmarks Statistik, 2005: 43).
Efforts to promote actively the integration of immigrants had also beengenerally slow and hesitant until the late 1990s, when the then Social
Democratic-led government started to respond to the rapidly growing public debate.7 Furthermore, the concept of multiculturalism has beennotably absent from Danish political discourse, even if there was a wide-spread public perception that in practical terms the state agencies took anexcessively culturally relativist view of migrants (Østergaard-Nielsen,2003). Given this long-standing policy vacuum, equally unsurprising hasbeen a visible lack of public empathy towards ‘foreigners’ (udlædninger)the latter noun being that favoured by both the tabloid press, initially by theFogh Rasmussen government itself (INM, 2002), and DF, and which forms theDanish name of the Danish Immigration Service (Udlædningstyrelsen).8DF’s policies did not fully square with other far right European politicalparties; there were no traces of anti-Semitism or neo-Nazism to be found(Bjørklund and Andersen, 1999; Polokaw-Suransky, 2002; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003: 449). Indeed, DF advocates a form of welfare nationalismwith ‘green’ tinges, and in that sense is in tune with key aspects of Danishpolitical tradition (Andersen, 2006: 21; see also endnote 7), but this is com-bined with strident opposition to anything smacking of multiculturalism:
Denmark is not an immigrant-country and has never been so. Therefore, wewill not accept a transformation to a multiethnic society. Denmark belongs tothe Danes and its citizens must be able to live in a secure community foundedon the rule of law, developing only along the lines of Danish culture. (DanskFolkeparti, undated)
The programme goes on to note that ‘it ought to be possible to absorb for-eigners into Danish society’ but this must not ‘put security and democraticgovernment at risk’. Furthermore, ‘foreign nationals should be able toobtain Danish citizenship’ but ‘only to a limited extent and according tospecial rules and in conformity with the stipulations of the Constitution’.
Blunt policy statements have been matched by various equally blunt elec-toral stunts, especially in the run-up to the 2001 general election that sawDF’s vote rise to 12%, making it Denmark’s third largest parliamentaryparty.These included an advertisement in the best-selling Sunday newspaperJyllands-Posten in August 2001 naming all of the 4743 immigrants who hadreceived Danish passports that year — the majority of whom were PakistaniMuslims — and the towns where they had settled. Nonetheless, whileDenmark’s political elite expressed shock at such tactics, DF’s depiction ofDenmark being under threat of some kind of culturally threatening invasionhad acquired a currency beyond its immediate constituency and arguablyreflected the cumulative build-up of highly negative images of immigrants,especially Muslims, in the Danish media in preceding years (Dindler andOlesen, 1988). In 2000 the centre–left government appointed a ‘formerMarxist turned immigrant-bashing’ (Qvortrup, 2002: 18) Minister of theInterior, Karen Jespersen, in a clear response to the rise of anti-immigrantsentiment, and various MPs from the centre and centre–left of the politicalspectrum also saw fit to ride the anti-immigrant and anti-multicultural polit-ical wave (Qvortrup, 2002; Polokow-Suransky, 2002).9 The current PrimeMinister’s own Liberal Party (Venstre) also resorted to tabloid-like tacticsduring its 2001 electoral campaign, most notably by using pictures of angry
immigrants outside a court protesting the sentencing of relatives for rapeunder the headline ‘Time for Change’ (Andersen, 2006: 12)
Central to Venstre’s electoral campaign was a commitment to pass newimmigration and refugee laws, and two months after the election the newlyformed Ministry for Refugees, Immigration and Integration (INM) pub-lished its ‘New Policy for Foreigners’ (En Ny Udlændingepolitik), whichsubsequently became law (INM, 2002). A key component was the abolitionof ‘the concept of de facto refugees’ and the restriction of refugee entrystrictly to those whom Denmark was required to admit by internationalconvention. For those who are admitted, a permanent residence permit willonly be granted after seven years, in contrast to the previous three-yearwait. The statutory right to reunification with distant family members wasrevoked, marriage rights became much stricter especially regarding over-seas spouses (there is now a minimum age requirement of 24), and anyfuture social benefits would be provided at 50–70% of previous rates (INM,2002). Consequently, Denmark is now at Europe’s cutting edge not only indevelopment assistance for the developing world but also in the develop-ment of more restrictive immigration policies (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003:453–4).
That the new government was entitled to address as a matter of urgency theissues of immigration and integration cannot be gainsaid, given the level andheat of public debate preceding the election which the Director of AalborgUniversity’s Academy for Migration Studies described as ‘acrimonious, bor-dering on vengeful; immigration was presented as the most imminent and serious threat to the history, culture, identity and homogeneity of “littleDenmark” ’ (Hedetoft, 2003: 1). What is at issue, however, is the manner inwhich the Fogh Rasmussen governments have gone about it, particularly inactively contributing to the radical shift in the tone and terms of public debateabout migration and asylum. Hedetoft (2003: 2–3) argues that one of the keytransformations in Danish public debate is:
… the gradual replacement of humanitarian and compassion-basedapproaches to the question of asylum and refugees, by discourses and policiesof national interest and utility (‘what’s the benefit for us?’); of identity scares(‘Can Danishness survive the religious and civilisational challenge?’); of socialcohesion (‘How can we deal with criminal immigrants and ethnic ghettoes?’);and of welfare-state policies and political participation (can the universalistwelfare model survive?).
If Hansen (2002b: 61) is right in emphasizing the contingency of the rela-tionship between the Danish people, nation and state, then the risingsalience of immigration in Danish public discourse, especially during the1990s, might be best understood as a popular challenge to a dominant butlargely elite-held national narrative in which foreign policy internationalismand the treatment of migrants and refugees were seen as largely cotermi-nous and co-contributors to Denmark’s reputational status as a prototypicalNordic progressive state.
Of course, changing public demands for a more restrictive policy onimmigrants and refugees are not confined to Denmark. But it is precisely
Denmark’s reputational status that makes its enactment of an immigrationpolicy that has produced multiple expressions of concern from the UNHCR(UNHCR News, 22 January 2002, 11 April 2002 and 5 May 2002; UNHCR,2002), extensive criticism from the Council of Europe Human RightsCommissioner (Gil-Robles, 2004), criticism from the leaders of the threeother Nordic Liberal Parties (Norden This Week, 26 February 2002) and ajoint open letter from labour and immigration ministers in Belgium, Franceand Sweden (Nordic News, 9 April 2002, Svenska Dagbladet, 4 April 2002)seem so strange. That Denmark was moving beyond the Nordic progres-sivist pale was underscored by the exchange of views between the Swedishand Danish governments after the 2001 election, which have been unchar-acteristically sharp (Norden This Week, 21 November 2001 and 27 May2002; Copenhagen Post, 9 February 2004); the Swedish government has consistently declared its intention not to follow Denmark’s lead (Polokov-Suransky, 2002; BBC News, 21 November 2001; Daily Telegraph, 22November 2001; Helsingen Sanomat, 6 November 2002).
Any apparent strangeness dissipates somewhat if the rise in public concernabout immigration and asylum policy in Denmark is understood as con-founding rather than confirming orthodox left–right distinctions in publicpolitical discourse. Thus, it perhaps is best reflected upon against multiplebackdrops: the ‘dual nationalisms’ displayed in the 1990s EU debates asargued by Hansen; the continuing public attachment to the universalist welfare state, which DF understands so well and deploys to drain away work-ing class support from the Social Democrats (Andersen, 2006: 21); and someof the key features of the Danish progressivist tradition, notably the long-standing emphasis on universal human rights and the rights of women in particular.
With regard to the latter point, Norwegian public debate — which hasmuch in common with that in Denmark given that it too has a large, elec-torally successful anti-immigration populist party — provides suggestivepointers to some of what is arguably at stake in the Danish immigrationdebate. An example is the praise heaped on Denmark’s immigration minis-ter Bertel Haarder in 2003 by the Norwegian feminist human rights thinktank Human Rights Service (HRS), ostensibly established to help immigrantwomen and children. Although by no means representing the views ofNorwegian feminists more generally, HRS’s position points up the theme ofopposing the immigration of certain peoples in defence of the progressive,modern welfare state. HRS’s founders invoke an understanding of theNorwegian folkhem that is at the same moment progressivist (its co-founderand information director, Hege Storhaug, is a former journalist on theNorwegian Marxist newspaper Klassekampen) and resolutely monocultural.HRS explicitly rejects multiculturalism and focuses particularly on exposingthe supposed incompatibility of Islam, even its moderate variants, and mod-ern Western rights-based democracies from a feminist perspective (seewww.rights.no). They explicitly demand that state immigration and integra-tion policy should overtly address Islam’s ‘gender-fascism’ to the extent thatrealizing full integration into Norwegian society should take clear priorityover immigration.
The Nordic states enjoy reputations as comparatively ‘women-friendly’states, a key component of their widespread image as bastions of a pro-gressive, secular modernity. The HRS’s approval of Denmark’s stance onimmigration and Karen Jespersen’s break with Social Democratic ortho-doxy highlight, perhaps in extremis, the emergence of immigration and asylum policy as an issue area that cuts across traditional left–right Nordicideological divisions. Furthermore, as the Danish debates around Europeanintegration and the Euro foreshadowed, the terms of debate are predomi-nantly cultural and focused on the challenges of an external other — be itin the form of immigrants and asylum seekers, a regional integration proj-ect or a new currency — to Danish national identity (Lawler, 1997; Bering,2001; Hansen, 2002b). Thus, different political starting points can lead toshared conclusions about the perceived challenges that immigration pres-ents to the preservation of the progressive, egalitarian, gendered and universalist features, both formal and informal, of the Nordic welfare state.Not surprisingly, then, the Danish press has carried heated exchanges about Women, Islam and the wearing of the veil (see, for example, Politiken,15, 21, 22 and 23 December 2003).
The government’s publicity surrounding the various immigration andintegration acts enacted since 2001 draws upon long-standing Danish socialvalues and makes frequent reference to the general goals of equal treat-ment for all, anti-racism and anti-ghettoization (see, for example, INM,2005). Equally, it is made clear that immigrants must subscribe to these values, and proactively moreover. Following on from Fogh Rasmussen’spost-election comment in 2001 that ‘immigrants must conform to theDanish way of life’ (BBC News, 21 November 2001), the 2004 Aliens(Consolidation) Act states that a permanent resident permit will be grantedto non-Danish spouses or co-habitants if they are over 24 years old andhave ‘obtained essential ties with Danish society’ (INM, 2004a: para 11[4]).To this end, the applicant must, unless they have been legally residing inDenmark for 28 years, fulfil the ‘attachment requirement’ and sign a‘Declaration of Integration’ which includes declaring that ‘I will makeactive efforts to acquire an understanding of the fundamental norms andvalues of Danish society’ (Danish Immigration Service, 2005). Presumably,those who were born and raised in Denmark or are exempted for havinglived in Denmark for the requisite 28 years or more acquire these normsand values as a matter of course.
In spite of the legitimating rhetoric of ‘equal treatment for all’, the raft ofDanish legislation since 2001 and the ‘attachment requirement’ seem togive credence to Hedetoft’s claim that the ‘assimilationist discourse’ —which he claims has ‘near-total political hegemony’ — has undergone achange from a ‘defensive to an offensive “cultural struggle” … charac-terised by national self-assertiveness and carried by the conviction that“our” values and culture are indisputably superior’ (Hedetoft, 2003: 3).Hedetoft goes on to argue that migration politics in the West has ‘for rea-sons of high politics become linked with security concerns and the need tomonitor and control the flow of people’. By high politics, Hedetoft means‘the cultural and political absolutism accompanying the victory of the west
in the cold war, the “clash of civilisations” discourses of the 1990s and the“war on terror” following 9/11’ (2003: 3). Certainly, it is not hard to detect apreoccupation with Muslims in the Danish government’s current promo-tion of its integration policy and also, perhaps, the impact of sustainedexternal scrutiny and criticism especially after the ‘cartoon crisis’.10 Thusthe Factsheet Denmark on ‘Integration in Denmark’ opens with the numberof ‘immigrants and descendants in Denmark’ — 8.4% of the population —going on immediately to note that Statistisks Danmark has not apparentlycarried out calculations on the number of Muslims in Denmark (no othergroup is mentioned) since 1999 — when it estimated that there were120,000 — but ‘researchers currently estimate that there are currently some210,000’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006a: 1), which would translate tojust 3.8% of the total national population of 5.4 million.
For all of its efforts with integration, however, a 2004 OECD report oninternational migration trends suggests that the Danish government has a longway to go. Noting that only 52% of Denmark’s immigrants either held a jobor were willing to take one — compared to figures of 75–80% in Switzerland,Portugal and Spain — the report assessed Denmark to be the worst OECDstate at integrating its immigrants. It remained an unattractive destination forhigh-skilled immigrants; high minimum wages disadvantaged the unskilledand high social benefits acted as a disincentive to seek work. Furthermore, therequirement that immigrants remain in the same city for their first three yearsin Denmark — a policy intended to prevent ghettos forming — also preventedthem from going to where work might better be found. The report also notesthe continuing difficulties immigrants faced in integrating into Danish societyand the social tensions that resulted (Roseveare and Jorgensen, 2004;Copenhagen Post, 23 March 2005). If, as critics such as Hedetoft allege, thegovernment is actively contributing to the continual presentation of immi-grants and ‘new Danes’ as problems and actual or potential challengers to thepurity and cultural homegeneity of the ‘Danish Tribe’ (Politiken, 18 January2002), to what extent does this inhibit rather than enhance the ‘incentive formigrants to engage themselves in Danish society’ (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003:454), supposedly a key government objective?
The Fogh Rasmussen government was comfortably re-elected in February2005 and the Social Democrats suffered their worst vote since 1973 in spiteof the fact that it had endorsed the tightening of immigration and familyreunification policies and had come round to supporting the maintenance ofa military presence in Iraq. It should be noted that the party that maintaineda more traditional progressivist internationalist and pro-immigration stance— the Social-Liberals (Radikale Venstre) — also had a very successful elec-tion, jumping from 8 to 17 seats. However, it remained a comparativelyminor player with only just over 9% of the popular vote. DF saw its vote riseto 13.3% of the popular vote producing 24 parliamentary seats and PiaKjærsgaard’s personal vote ranked her as the second most popular Danishpolitician. Perhaps more significant, however, was DF’s increasing focus onthe preservation of the welfare state, traditionally the core of the social dem-ocratic platform, to a degree that apparently normalized what many had
seen as an exceptional vote in 2001 and rendering it ‘a significant competi-tor to the Social Democratic Party’ (Knudsen, 2005: 3). Some of the moreradical policies of the liberal–conservative coalition government haveclearly divided the Danish people, but it went into the 2005 election havinglowered personal taxation and presiding over one of the lowest unemploy-ment rates in Europe and one of Europe’s most successful economies.Although the government still requires the parliamentary support of DF, itwould be otiose to suggest that its policies simply mirror those of DF. Inmost respects the Danish government’s reform proposals are visibly moremoderate, albeit with distinct, and often jarring, neo-liberal and national-ist–populist tinges.The government’s general stance indicates an intention totrim down the welfare state without in fact challenging its fundamentals(Andersen, 2006). Fogh Rasmussen has also, on occasions, directly invokedDenmark’s progressivist, liberal traditions and expressed his wish for ‘aDenmark that is spacious, liberal-minded and tolerant’ (Copenhagen Post,19 August 2004).11
Danish Internationalism Re-Jigged?
The Fogh Rasmussen government’s immigration policies have divided theDanish people, but far from fatally so.The government has been perhaps onshakier ground regarding its foreign and security policy but, again, not deci-sively so. Danes remain quite evenly divided over Danish involvement inthe invasion of Iraq. Although support for the government has fluctuatedon this issue, there have not been signs of the overwhelming public opposi-tion that was evident in many other European states or the level of publicopposition found in Denmark’s Nordic neighbours. Similarly, Denmark’sevidently closer relationship with the Bush administration also dividesDanes, but, again, almost evenly; a 2005 poll indicated that 46% of Danesthought that Denmark was ‘too friendly’ or ‘much too friendly’ towards theUS (Copenhagen Post, 29 June 2005). Certainly, the Prime Minister hasmade his outlook on the US abundantly clear from the outset. In his 2001opening address to the Danish parliament he deployed a key trope ofDanish and Nordic internationalism — solidarity — in referring to the USand its ‘war against terror’, a solidarity that he noted would be ‘with thesame fervour and consistency as the previous Government’ (FoghRasmussen, 2001). Speaking a few months later in the US on his ‘vision ofglobal goals for the 21st Century’, Fogh Rasmussen’s personal affinity withwhat he saw as the prevailing US world-view was abundantly clear: in theaftermath of 9/11, to Danes, as to other Europeans, he declared, ‘the UnitedStates of America represents a cause more than a country’. He went on tosay that ‘we are fortunate indeed that such an awesome power is wielded ina benign and generous way’ (Fogh Rasmussen, 2002).
For Knudsen (2004), Denmark’s participation in the invasion of Iraq inspite of the absence of explicit UN authorization leads him to ask if Denmarkis now ‘losing sight of Internationalism’. There are a number of factors,
however, suggesting that the Fogh Rasmussen governments’ foreign policystance is not about abandoning a long-standing internationalist tradition perse. Certainly the Prime Minister sees ‘a Denmark … with a pronouncedinternational profile’ as a key goal for his new government (Fogh Rasmussen,2005). Rather it might best be understood as entailing a reconfiguring ofDanish internationalism in a fashion that does exhibit real continuity withsome key aspects of the Nordic region’s internationalist traditions, especiallyits relationship with the developing world, while clearly striking out in newdirections. Denmark was elected to the UN Security Council from January2005 and has declared its intention to ‘bring to the Council the perspective ofa small country deeply committed to international cooperation’ (Ministry ofForeign Affairs, 2006b). While Denmark’s Iraq policy clearly signals an affin-ity with the ‘muscular humanitarianism’ (Orford, 1999) now promoted by theUS and UK and marks Denmark out from the other Nordic states, because itis framed in the language of human rights and democratization it can still bepresented as ostensibly still commensurate with both Nordic internationalisttradition and core Danish social values.
Danish development assistance policy also suggests continuity with Nordicinternationalist values and practices, yet here too new emphases and objec-tives signal real change. Danish ODA was cut from 0.96% of GNI to 0.84%between 2002 and 2003, in reflection of the Prime Minister’s commitment tofreeze ODA at 1999 levels pending a thorough efficiency review (FoghRasmussen, 2001). Nonetheless, Danish ODA volume remains comfortablyabove the UN recommended level of 0.7% GNI and this remains policy(Danida, 2004). Danish financial support for the UNHCR (a body to whichDenmark had been the second largest per capita contributor) has also beencut, perhaps not surprising given the UNHCR’s criticism of its immigrationpolicy, but Denmark clearly continues to see it as a site for promoting its pre-ferred ‘regions of origin’ approach to refugees (INM, 2004b). In 2005 theimmigration Minister Haarder announced that Danish ODA would become‘an active instrument of foreign policy’, signalling an intention to link aid disbursements with the transfer of the refugee burden to states in the devel-oping South. The Danish government is unlikely to comply with DF’sdemand that states that do not take back failed asylum-seekers should bedirectly punished through cuts in ODA, preferring instead a more subtleapproach, in conjunction with some other EU states, centred on ‘regions oforigins measures’.These refer to a plan offering financial incentives to devel-oping countries in the regions of origin of asylum-seekers and refugees tohost facilities for the warehousing of refugees from conflict zones until theyare able to return to their home states (Fekete, 2005).
Through its development agency, Danida, the Ministry for ForeignAffairs continues to promote Danish internationalist exceptionalism via anactive development policy that is focused on poverty reduction in the leastdeveloped countries and based upon a ‘foundation of values concerningfreedom, democracy and responsibility for helping the weakest, which alsois the foundation of our own Danish society’ (Danida, 2004: 6). Thisincludes an ambitious and comprehensive programme for developmentcooperation with Africa, the principle element of which is declared to be
‘strong international engagement that is based on fundamental humanitar-ian principles and values’ (Danida, 2005: 5). The new priorities include thestrengthening of the Regions of Origin initiative, greater emphasis uponprivate sector development, Danish cooperation in the establishment of aGlobal Repatriation Fund, funding for ‘anti-terrorism initiatives … to coun-teract the emergence of religious radicalism in Niger and Kenya’, and anemphasis on countries and areas ‘where developments point to a possibleradicalisation of society’ (Danida, 2005: 20–1).
Perhaps most indicative of the new Danish internationalism was the 2004‘Wider Middle East Initiative’, where the connections between domesticpolicy (especially integration policy) and foreign policy are starkest. Theinitiative focused on the promotion of ‘progress and reform’ in MiddleEastern states and was overtly political in its ambition: ‘By means ofstrengthened contacts with moderate forces, we must simultaneously con-tribute to combating religious and political extremism and to promotingtolerance across the lines of religion and culture’ (Danida, 2004: 10).Promoting new education policies in the target states was to be key in this:
There will be special emphasis on strengthening broader and more equalaccess to secular education and the possibility of the wider Middle East coun-tries developing into knowledge societies. Access to non-religious educationand information are [sic] an important part of increased tolerance and democ-ratisation. If intolerant and extremist groups succeed in controlling schoolsand the public arena, there is a great risk of the level of knowledge beingreduced, prejudices and stereotypes thriving, and cultural patterns beingfrozen in a reactionary battle against modernisation and progress. (Danida,2004: 10)
Whereas it could be argued that Nordic development policy has always hadits proselytizing dimensions (recall Trägårdh’s comment on Sweden’s foreignpolicy cited above), Denmark’s Middle East initiative arguably pushed thisto a higher and more overt level and, again, lines Danish internationalism upwith the foreign policy objectives of those Western countries openly pro-moting muscular liberal internationalism and the fundamental transforma-tion of the Middle East. With the eruption of the ‘cartoon crisis’ in late 2005and early 2006, however, the initiative was effectively sunk and reference toit was subsequently removed from the Ministry’s website.According to FoghRasmussen, ‘the Arab initiative was supposed to accelerate economic andsocial reforms in the region so now it’s a shock to be so severely criticised.At the time, we felt we were at the forefront of modernisation’ (SpiegelOnline, 2006: 2). Opening a workshop in Copenhagen on ‘Moving BeyondStereotypes’, sponsored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in June 2006, theDanish Foreign Minister, Per Stig Møller, said:
During the (cartoon) crisis the brand of ‘Denmark’ most likely moved frombeing a positive stereotype among Muslims — an image of the friendlyScandinavian Welfare State — to being more firmly associated with a negativestereotype of the ‘West’. But let me assure you, Denmark is still the same coun-try — a small, tolerant, liberal Welfare State, member of the EU, member of
NATO and a good ally of the United States. Denmark is still one of the world’slargest per capita contributors of Official Development Assistance, includingto the Palestinians, and a strong supporter of international law. (Stig-Möller,2006a)12
Conclusions
Polakow-Suransky (2002: 5) succinctly identifies what is at stake in con-temporary Danish politics: ‘it’s a debate, ultimately, about what it means tobe Danish — about whether Denmark’s is an ethnic community or a civicone, an exclusionary body politic or an inclusive one’. For a long timeDenmark’s strong civic culture and generous internationalism seemed toindicate on which side of those two divides Denmark ultimately fell. Recentevents invite a more circumspect judgement.The political centre has largelyand successfully adopted the exclusionary and monocultural discourse ofthe populist margins minus the extreme rhetoric. For those immigrantsalready settled in Denmark, the government’s message — and, by exten-sion, its representation of immigrants to the wider Danish public — treatsthem as a homogeneous and inherently problematic sector of Danish soci-ety: ‘We … must not shy away from making demands on immigrants. Theymust learn Danish! They must get an education! They must get a job!’(Fogh Rasmussen, 2005). This message from the political centre is softenedwith the acknowledgement that in return:
[I]n Danish society we must be prepared to take a critical look at ourselves.We must fight prejudices; dismantle barriers; and altogether give new Danesa chance to show that they have much to contribute. This will, in all sorts ofways, lead to a richer sort of society for all of us. (Fogh Rasmussen, 2005)
The Danish government’s assimilationist approach to immigration, in whichthe concept of Danishness remains essentially fixed, appears to reflect anunwillingness to consider two countervailing arguments. First, most multicul-turalist policies adopted in Western states are themselves integrationiststrategies which, importantly, are delivered through ‘common institutions’,such as schools, and are themselves intended over time to produce ‘pluralis-tic integration’ (Kymlicka, 2001: 162–76). This does of course entail not onlyimmigrants adapting and integrating to the cultural mores and social normsof their new country, but also the residents of the host country accepting thatthose same mores and norms will also modify over time. Multiculturalism may appear as integrationist to immigrants, but if perceived by native-borncitizens as somehow divisive or threatening they can produce a backlash andthat seems to have been the case in Denmark. But here a second argumentcuts in. As Kymlicka reminds us, key to overcoming such tensions is the roleof government in addressing the attitudes of native-born majorities, a role towhich one might suppose that the paternalistic Nordic welfare states wouldbe especially attuned. In this respect, the proactive response of Swedish gov-ernments to the dilemmas arising from an increasingly culturally diverse
population and early signs of a populist backlash over the past two decades,while hardly problem-free themselves, provide a marked contrast to the more recent and reactive stance in Denmark (Demker, 2002). Denmark’spreference for strong cultural assimilationism also jars with its government’sprofessed commitment to re-fashion Denmark in a more overtly liberaldirection centred on the values of individual autonomy and tolerance, one ofthe dominant themes in the Prime Minister’s address to the Folketing afterre-election (Fogh Rasmussen, 2005).
Returning to Hansen’s two kinds of nationalism, are we now seeing inDenmark signs of them fusing together within the mainstream of Danishpolitical discourse? It seems plausible to read into the current debates sur-rounding immigration in Denmark the dis-embedding of a long-standingsubordination of cultural nationalism within a dominant statist and pro-gressivist discourse and the development of a revisionist social imaginary ofthe Danish state as kulturnation. Indeed, it is in the relationship betweencontemporary Danish internationalism and the present trajectory of theDanish folkhem that we can detect an emergent challenge to Scandinavia’sinternationalist reputation. If the Nordic welfare state becomes increasinglyassociated with the preservation of a monocultural haven for only certainclasses of person, and internationalism becomes increasingly seen as ameans for legitimating a highly restrictive immigration and refugee policy,this could arguably pose a challenge to the plausibility and legitimacy ofNordic internationalism traditionally understood. Such a development,were it to become as socially embedded as its predecessor, would not onlywarrant critical reflection on the changing character of Nordic nationalismsbut provide a rather different basis for the claim that the Nordic states wereexceptional in their internationalism. The signs remain mixed, however.Opening a three day Islamic arts and culture festival in Copenhagen —Islam Expo — in June 2006, the Danish Foreign Minister remarked that:
[i]t is no coincidence that the most pioneering and ground-breaking advancesin human development originate from cultures that embrace diversity as apositive challenge rather than as a threat. If we think that differences makethe cultures of the world richer, then it is not in our interest to let anybodygive up their culture or their identity. (Stig Møller, 2006b)
If such sentiments will indeed frame Denmark’s relationship with the out-side world, it remains moot as to whether the Danish government works tosee them frame also the relationships between the peoples that comprisethe Danish nation today.
Notes
1. Definitive English School texts include Bull (1977), Wight (1991), Dunne(1998), Wheeler (2000) and Linklater and Suganami (2006).
2. The literature on the actual or impending demise of the Nordic welfare state is voluminous. For an illuminating and critical discussion, see especially Ryner(2002).
3. In 1959, Sweden was the first Western state to vote in the UN General Assemblyin support of Algeria’s self-determination. In 1964, it was the first Western state torespond to the UN’s Anti-Apartheid Committee’s appeal for legal assistance to SouthAfrican political prisoners. Tage Erlander met with the ANC’s Oliver Tambo in 1962,the year direct bilateral relations between Sweden and South Africa were also termi-nated and it was 25 more years before Tambo was similarly received by the SovietUnion, France, Britain, or the US (Sellström, 1999: 507). In 1969, Sweden became the first Western country to endorse a policy of direct official assistance to the nationalliberation movements in southern Africa, including the MPLA in Angola, FRELIMOin Mozambique, SWAPO in Namibia and the ANC in South Africa. In 1974, Swedenwas the first Western state to reach the UN target of 0.7% GDP in ODA. In 1979,Sweden, under a minority liberal government, moreover, became the first Westernstate to impose sanctions on South Africa in the form of an investment ban.
4. Although Denmark did permit US bases to be established in Greenland.5. In other respects, the US also saw the Nordic states as of a kind. Henry
Kissinger was incensed by Olof Palme’s overt castigation of US foreign policy, buthe also disapprovingly noted Danish (and Finnish) disquiet about the prosecutionof the Vietnam War (Zakheim, 1998: 122).
6. On this point, note the current Danish Prime Minister’s response to a ques-tion on the alleged xenophobia of staunchly anti-EU DF in a recent interview withDer Spiegel centred on the recent ‘cartoon crisis’: ‘Xenophobic is your word. The(DF) has a firm stance on immigration and crime. In other areas such as social pol-icy, it’s further to the left than my party and even the Social Democrats. It’s not aclassic right-wing party’ (Spiegel Online, 2006).
7. For a critical overview of the debate during the 1990s and the rise of ‘culturalracism’ in Denmark, see Wren (2001).
8. In 1997 the Danish tabloid Exstra Bladet ran a controversial print and televi-sion series entitled ‘The Foreigners’ which focused particularly on claims of welfareabuse by large Somalian families and proposed a two-tier benefit system entailinglower benefits for migrants, which the Social Democrat-led government enacted intolaw in 1998. After being challenged by the UNCHR the law was repealed in 1999.
9. Jespersen caused considerable controversy in 2000 when she suggested iso-lating refugees with criminal records on a ‘deserted island’ and declared that shehad no wish to live in a multicultural nation ‘where the cultures were consideredequal’ (cited in Bering, 2001: 4). Jespersen quit the Social Democrats in 2004 inprotest at their policy-line on immigration.
10. The ‘cartoon crisis’ refers to the consequences of the decision by the Danishnewspaper Jyllands-Posten to commission and then publish 12 cartoon depictions ofthe Prophet Mohammed on 30 September 2005, purportedly to explore the issue of‘self-censorship’ surrounding the problems a Danish author had experienced infinding an illustrator for a children’s book on the Prophet. In the months that fol-lowed, demonstrations and riots protesting the publication of images of the prophettook place in various states with large or majority Islamic populations as well asamong the Muslim populations of many Western states. Danish goods were boy-cotted throughout the Middle East, the Danish flag burned and its embassiesattacked. The newspaper subsequently apologized for causing offence but not forpublishing the cartoons in the first place.
11. The wish was expressed after receiving an award from the Danish NationalGay and Lesbian Association in 2004 for his public remarks in favour of gay mar-riages within the Lutheran Church.
12. Stig Møller went on to announce that Denmark would henceforth supportthe new UN initiative — ‘Alliance of Civilisations’ — co-sponsored by the primeministers of Spain and Turkey.
Andersen, J. G. (2006) Immigration and Legitimacy of the Scandinavian WelfareState: Some Preliminary Danish Findings, AMID Working Paper Series 53/2006.Aalborg: Academy for Migration Studies in Denmark (AMID), AalborgUniversity.
Archer, C. (2003) ‘Still Nordic After All These Years: Nordic Security in the Post-Cold War Period’, Security Dialogue 36: 397–401.
Aylott, N (1999) ‘Paradoxes and Opportunism:The Danish Election of March 1998’,Government and Opposition 34: 59–77.
Bering, H. (2001) ‘Denmark, The Euro, and Fear of the Foreign’, Policy Review 104:63–74.
Bjørklund, T. and Andersen, J. G (1999) ‘Anti-Immigration Parties in Denmark andNorway: The Progress Parties and the Danish People’s Party’, Arbejdspapirer fraInstitut for Økonomi, Politik og Forvaltning Aalborg Universitet, 1999: 4. Aalborg:Aalborg Universitet.
Bull, H. (1977) The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. London:Macmillan.
Christiansen, N. F. (1992) ‘ The Danish No to Maastricht’, New Left Review 19: 97–100.Danida (2004) Security, Growth — Development: Priorities of the Danish
Government for Danish Development Assistance 2005–2009. Copenhagen:Danida, Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
Danida (2005) Africa — Development and Security: The Government’s Priorities forDanish Cooperation with Africa 2005–2009. Copenhagen: Danida, Royal Ministryfor Foreign Affairs.
Danish Immigration Service (2005) ‘Declaration of Active Participation in DanishLanguage Learning and Integration Into Danish Society’. Available at:http://www.udlst.dk/english/publications/ThePublications/intgr_erkl.htm;accessed on 20 June 2006.
Danmarks Statistik (2005) Statistisk Årbog 2005. Copenhagen: Danmarks Statistik.Demker, M. (2002) ‘Möjligheten för ett Högerpopulistiskt Parti att Vinna
Framgångar i Sverige är Små’ (The Chance of a Right-Wing Populist PartyBecoming Successful in Sweden is Small). Dagens Nyheter, 15 June 2002, p. 6.
Dindler, S. and Olesen, A. (1988) Islam och Muslimer i de danske medier. Århus,Århus Universitetsforlag.
Due-Nielsen, C. and Petersen, N. (1995) ‘Denmark’s Foreign Policy Since 1967: AnIntroduction’, in C. Due-Nielsen and N. Petersen (eds) Adaptation and Activism:The Foreign Policy of Denmark. Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing.
Dunne, T. (1998) Inventing International Society: A History of the English School.London: Macmillan.
Esping-Andersen, G. (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity.Fekete, L. (2005) ‘New Danish Government will Link Development Aid to Asylum’,
IRR News 17 February 2005. London: Institute of Race Relations. Available at:http://www.irr.org.uk/2005/february/ak000017.html; accessed on 21 June 2006.
Fogh Rasmussen, A. (2001) ‘Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s OpeningAddress to the Danish Parliament (the Folketing) Tuesday 4 December 2001’.Copenhagen: Statsministeriet.
Fogh Rasmussen, A. (2002) ‘A Vision of Global Goals for the 21st Century’. Lectureby Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, George Washington University, 27March 2002. Copenhagen: Statsministeriet.
Fogh Rasmussen, A. (2005) ‘Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s OpeningAddress to the Folketing (The Danish Parliament) on Tuesday 4 October 2005’.Copenhagen: Statsministeriet.
Führer, H. (1996) The Story of Official Development Assistance: A History of theDevelopment Assistance Committee and the Development Co-operationDirectorate in Dates, Names and Figures. Paris: OECD.
Gil Robles, A. (2004) Report by Mr Alvaro Gil-Robles, Commissioner For HumanRights, on His Visit to Denmark 13–16 April 2004. Strasbourg: Council of Europe(8 July).
Haagerup, N. J. and Thune, C. (1983) ‘Denmark:The European Pragmatist’, in C. Hill(ed.) National Foreign Policies and European Political Cooperation. London:Allen and Unwin.
Hansen, L. (2002a) ‘Introduction,’ in L. Hansen and O. Wæver (eds) EuropeanIntegration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States, pp. 1–19.London: Routledge.
Hansen, L. (2002b) ‘Sustaining Sovereignty: The Danish Approach to Europe’, in L.Hansen and O. Wæver (eds) European Integration and National Identity: TheChallenge of the Nordic States, pp. 50–87. London: Routledge.
Heclo, H. and Madsen, H. (1987) Policy and Politics in Sweden: PrincipledPragmatism. Philadephia, PA: Temple University Press.
Hedetoft, U. (2003) ‘Cultural Transformation: How Denmark Faces Immigration’,openDemocracy.net. Available at: http://www.opendemocracy.net/articles/ViewPopUpArticle.jsp?id�10&articleId�1563; accessed on 10 June 2006.
Heisler, M. O. (1985) ‘Denmark’s Quest for Security: Constraints and Opportunitieswithin the Alliance’, in G. Flynn (ed.) NATO’s Northern Allies: The NationalSecurity Policies of Belgium, Denmark, The Netherlands, and Norway, pp. 57–112.Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld.
Heurlin, B. (1994) ‘Nye prioreteringer i dansk undenrigspolitik’ (New Priorities inDanish Foreign Policy), in N. Petersen and C.Thune (eds) Dansk UdenrigspolitiskÅrbok 1993 (Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 1993), pp. 30–50. Copenhagen:Jurist og Økonomforbundet.
Holbraad, C (1991) Danish Neutrality:A Study in the Foreign Policy of a Small State.Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Holm, E. (1993) ‘It’s Make Up Your Mind Time’, The European, 15–18 April.Holm, H.-H. (1992) ‘The Myth of the Responsive North’, Journal of Peace Research
29: 115–20.Holm, H.-H. (1997) ‘Denmark’s Active Internationalism: Advocating International
Norms with Domestic Constraints’, in B. Heurlin and H. Mouritzen (eds) DanishForeign Policy Yearbook 1997, pp. 52–80. Copenhagen: Danish Institute ofInternational Affairs.
Holm, H.-H. (2002) ‘Danish Foreign Policy Activism: The Rise and Decline’, in B.Heurlin and H. Mouritzen (eds) Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2002.Copenhagen: DUPI.
Hook, S. (1995) National Interest and Foreign Aid. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.Ingebritsen, C. (2002) ‘Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia’s Role in World Politics’,
Cooperation and Conflict 37: 11–23.INM (2002) En Ny Udlændingepolitik. Copenhagen: Ministry of Refugee,
Immigration and Integration Affairs.INM (2004a) Aliens (Consolidation) Act (No. 808 of 14 July 2004). Copenhagen:
Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs. Available at:http://www.inm.dk/Index/dokumenter.asp?o�25&n�0&h�25&t�3&d�2841&s�5; accessed on 15 June 2006.
INM (2004b) ‘Danish Comments on Asylum and Migration’. Copenhagen: Ministry ofRefugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs. Available at: http://www.inm.dk/Index/dokumentoversigt.asp?s�5&t�1&n�3&o�2; accessed on 5 December 2005.
INM (2005) A New Chance for Everyone — The Danish Government’s IntegrationPlan. Copenhagen: Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs.
Knudsen, T. B. (2004) ‘Denmark and the War Against Iraq: Losing Sight ofInternationalism?’, in P. Carlsen and H. Mouritzen (eds) Danish Foreign PolicyYearbook 2004, pp. 49–89. Copenhagen: DIIS.
Knudsen, A.-C. (2005) ‘Election Briefing No. 19. The Danish General Election ofFebruary 2005’, University of Sussex: Sussex European Institute-EPERN.Available at: http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/epern_eb_19_denmark.pdf;accessed on 5 December 2005.
Kymlicka, W. (2001) Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism andCitizenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Laatikainen, K. V. (2003) ‘Norden’s Eclipse: The Impact of the European Union’sCommon Foreign and Security Policy on the Nordic Group in the UnitedNations’, Cooperation and Conflict 38: 409–41.
Larsen, H. (1999) ‘British and Danish European Policies in the 1990s: A DiscourseApproach’, European Journal of International Relations 451–83.
Lawler, P. (1997) ‘Scandinavian Exceptionalism and European Union’, Journal ofCommon Market Studies 35: 565–94.
Lawler, P. (2005) ‘The Good State: In Praise of “Classical” Internationalism’, Reviewof International Studies 31: 427–49.
Linklater, A. (1992) ‘What is a Good International Citizen?’ in P. Keal (ed.) Ethicsand Foreign Policy. St. Leonards, NSW: Allen and Unwin.
Linklater,A. and Suganami, H. (2006) The English School of International Relations:A Contemporary Assessment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lumsdaine, D. H. (1993) Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign AidRegime 1949–89. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (2006a) ‘Integration in Denmark’, FactsheetDenmark. Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (2006b) ‘UN Security Council’.Available at:http://www.um.dk/en/menu/ForeignPolicy/PeaceSecurityAndInternationalLaw/UNSecurityCouncil/?wbc_purpose�bas; accessed on 22 June 2006.
Mouritzen, H. (1995) ‘The Nordic Model as a Foreign Policy Instrument: Its Riseand Fall’, Journal of Peace Research 32: 9–21.
OECD (2005) OECD Statistics Browser, ‘Development, Aid from DAC Members,DAC1 Official and Private Flows’. Available at: http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/default.aspx?DatasetCode�TABLE1; accessed on 12 September 2006.
Orford, A. (1999) ‘Muscular Humanitarianism: Reading the Narratives of the NewInterventionism’, European Journal of International Law 10: 679–711.
Ostergård, U. (1992) ‘Danish Identity: European, Nordic or Peasant?’ in L. Lycke(ed.) Denmark and EC Membership Evaluated. London: Pinter.
Østergaard-Nielsen, E. (2003) ‘Counting the Cost: Denmark’s Changing MigrationPolicies’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 27: 448–54.
Polokow-Suransky, S. (2002) ‘Fortress Denmark?’, The American Prospect Online,13(10). Available at:http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section�root&name�ViewPrint&articleId�6289, 6 pp. accessed on 12 December 2005.
Pratt, C., ed. (1989) Internationalism under Strain: the North–South Policies ofCanada, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. Toronto: University of Toronto.
Qvortrup, M. (2002) ‘The Emperor’s New Clothes: The Danish General Election of20 November 2001’, European Political Science 1: 17–22.
Roseveare, D. and Jorgensen, M. (2004) ‘Migration and Integration of Immigrantsin Denmark’, OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 386, Paris:OECD.
Rydgren, J. (2004) ‘Explaining the Emergence of Radical Right-Wing PopulistParties: The Case of Denmark, West European Politics 27: 474–502.
Ryner, M. J. (2002) Capitalist: Restructuring, Globalisation and the Third Way:Lessons from the Swedish Model. London: Routledge.
Schraeder, P., Hook, S. and Taylor, B. (1998) ‘Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle’,World Politics 50: 294–324.
Sellström, T. (1999) Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa. Vol. 1:Formation of a Popular Opinion. Copenhagen: NIAS.
Spiegel Online (2006) ‘A Scene in the Wrong Movie’, Spiegel Interview with DanishPrime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Spiegel Online, dated 13 February.Available at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,400526,00.html;accessed on 15 June 2006.
Stig Møller, P. (2006a) ‘Moving Beyond Stereotypes’. Address by Dr. Per StigMøller, Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the workshop ‘Moving BeyondStereotypes’ in Copenhagen, 16–18 May 2006. Cophenhagen: Ministry forForeign Affairs. Available at: http://www.um.dk/en/menu/AboutUs/TheMinister/SpeechesAndArticles/MovingBeyondStereotypes.htm; accessed on 21 June 2006.
Stig Møller, P. (2006b) ‘Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller’s opening statement at IslamExpo, 19 June 2006’. Copenhagen: Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Available at:http://www.drawings.um.dk/en/menu/News/IslamExpo.htm; accessed on 22 June 2006.
Stokke, O., ed. (1989) Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty. Uppsala:Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.
Svendsen, K. E. (1989) ‘Danish Aid: Old Bottles’, in O. Stokke (ed.) Western MiddlePowers and Global Poverty: The Determinants of the Aid Policies of Canada,Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, pp. 91–115. Uppsala:Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.
Tilton, T. (1991) The Political Theory of Swedish Social Democracy: Through theWelfare State to Socialism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Trägårdh, L. (2002) ‘Sweden and the EU: Welfare State Nationalism and the Spectreof “Europe” ’, in L. Hansen and O.Wæver (eds) European Integration and NationalIdentity: The Challenge of the Nordic States, pp. 130–77. London: Routledge.
UNHCR (2002) UNHCR Comments on the Draft Bill on Amending the Aliens Act,The Marriage Act and Other Acts. Geneva: UNHCR (18 March).
Wæver, O. (1993) ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’, Working Papers 5/93.Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research.
Wæver, O. (1995) ‘Danish Dilemmas: Foreign Policy Choices for the 21st Century’,in C. Due-Nielsen and N. Petersen (eds) Adaptation and Activism: The ForeignPolicy of Denmark, pp. 269–301. Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing.
Wight, M. (1991) International Theory: The Three Traditions. Leicester: LeicesterUniversity Press.
Wheeler, N. (2000) Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in InternationalSociety. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wheeler, N. and Dunne, T. (1996) ‘Hedley Bull’s Pluralism of the Intellect andSolidarism of the Will’, International Affairs 72: 91–108.
Wivel, A. (2005) ‘Between Paradise and Power: Denmark’s Transatlantic Dilemma’,Security Dialogue 36: 417–21.
Wren, K. (2001) ‘Cultural Racism: Something Rotten in the State of Denmark?’,Social and Cultural Geography 2: 141–62.
Zakheim, D. S. (1998) ‘The United States and the Nordic Countries During the ColdWar’, Cooperation and Conflict 33: 115–29.
PETER LAWLER is Senior Lecturer in International Relations.His current research and publications centre on varieties of Westerninternationalism and the concept of ‘The Good State’.Address: Politics, School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester,Manchester, M13 9PL, UK.[email: [email protected]]
![[emuch net][1421928]Janus particle synthesis, self-assembly and applications](https://static.documents.pub/doc/80x56/63141c453ed465f0570afd1e/emuch-net1421928janus-particle-synthesis-self-assembly-and-applications.jpg)
