v List of Tables ix List of Figures and Box xii Acknowledgements xiii Preface xv Notes on Contributors xix COST xxii Part I Agencification As a Global Phenomenon 1 Introduction 3 Koen Verhoest, Sandra Van Thiel, Geert Bouckaert and Per Lægreid 2 Comparing Agencies across Countries 18 Sandra Van Thiel Part II Agencification in Different Politico-Administrative Traditions Section 2.1 Agencification in Anglo–American Countries 3 Australia 29 Chris Aulich and Roger Wettenhall 4 Ireland 40 Muiris MacCarthaigh and Richard Boyle 5 New Zealand 51 Robert Gregory 6 United Kingdom 57 Oliver James, Alice Moseley, Nicolai Petrovsky and George Boyne 7 The United States of America 69 B. Guy Peters 8 Comparing Agencification in Anglo–American Countries 77 John Halligan and Oliver James Contents PROOF
Transcript
v
List of Tables ix
List of Figures and Box xii
Acknowledgements xiii
Preface xv
Notes on Contributors xix
COST xxii
Part I Agencification As a Global Phenomenon
1 Introduction 3 Koen Verhoest, Sandra Van Thiel, Geert Bouckaert and Per Lægreid
2 Comparing Agencies across Countries 18 Sandra Van Thiel
Part II Agencification in Different Politico-Administrative Traditions
Section 2.1 Agencification in Anglo–American Countries
3 Australia 29 Chris Aulich and Roger Wettenhall
4 Ireland 40 Muiris MacCarthaigh and Richard Boyle
5 New Zealand 51 Robert Gregory
6 United Kingdom 57 Oliver James, Alice Moseley, Nicolai Petrovsky and George Boyne
7 The United States of America 69 B. Guy Peters
8 Comparing Agencification in Anglo–American Countries 77 John Halligan and Oliver James
Contents
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vi Contents
Section 2.2 Agencification in Latin Countries
9 Belgium and Its Regions 84 Koen Verhoest, Sara Demuzere and Jan Rommel
10 France 98 François Lafarge
11 Italy 110 Edoardo Ongaro, Davide Galli, Dario Barbieri and Paolo Fedele
12 Spain 122 Salvador Parrado
13 Portugal 133 Silvia M. Mendes, Patrícia Gomes and Joaquim Filipe Araújo
14 Comparing Agencification in Latin Countries 145 Edoardo Ongaro, Salvador Parrado and Koen Verhoest
Section 2.3 Agencification in Continental Countries
15 Austria 156 Gerhard Hammerschmid, Arndt Krischok and Karin Steigenberger
16 Germany 166 Tobias Bach
17 The Netherlands 179 Kutsal Yesilkagit and Sandra Van Thiel
18 Switzerland 191 Reto Steiner and Etienne Huber
19 Comparing Agencification in Continental Countries 203 Tobias Bach and Etienne Huber
Section 2.4 Agencification in Nordic Countries
20 Denmark 212 Morten Balle Hansen and Vibeke Normann Andersen
21 Finland 223 Ari Salminen, Olli-Pekka Viinamäki and Johanna Jokisuu
22 Norway 234 Per Lægreid, Paul G. Roness and Kristin Rubecksen
23 Sweden 245 Birgitta Niklasson
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24 Comparing Agencification in Nordic Countries 259 Morten Balle Hansen, Per Lægreid, Jon Pierre and Ari Salminen
Section 2.5 Agencification in CEE Countries
25 Croatia 266 Ivan Koprić and Anamarija Musa
26 Estonia 277 Külli Sarapuu
27 Hungary 288 György Hajnal
28 Lithuania 300 Vitalis Nakrošis and Martinaitis Žilvinas
29 Romania 312 Călin E. Hinţea, Adrian V. Hudrea and Dan O. Balica
30 Slovakia 323 Juraj Nemec
31 Comparing Agencification in Central and Eastern Europe 335 Tiina Randma-Liiv, Vitalis Nakrošis and György Hajnal
Section 2.6 Agencification in Eastern and African Countries
32 Hong Kong 342 Martin Painter
33 Israel 353 David Levi-Faur and Shimon Livshitz
34 Tanzania 363 Andrew Sulle
35 Pakistan 372 Muhammad Zafar Iqbal Jadoon, Nasira Jabeen and Aisha Rizwan
36 Thailand 381 Bidhya Bowornwathana
37 Comparing Agencification in Eastern and African Countries 393 Martin Painter
Section 2.7 Agencification at Supranational Level
38 European Union (EU) Agencies 400 Edoardo Ongaro, Dario Barbieri, Nicola Bellé and Paolo Fedele
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viii Contents
Part III Current Challenges in Agencification in Europe and Beyond
39 Lessons and Recommendations for the Practice of Agencification 413
Sandra Van Thiel, Koen Verhoest, Geert Bouckaert and Per Lægreid
Bibliography 441
General Bibliography 441
Bibliography – Country Chapters 445
Index 467
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1IntroductionKoen Verhoest, Sandra Van Thiel, Geert Bouckaert and Per Lægreid
This book is meant as a compendium, which offers a summary overview of facts and knowledge on government agencies as one of the different forms to organize public tasks. The book describes and compares practices regarding the creation and the governance of semi-autonomous agencies by 30 different governments in Europe and beyond. It guides readers – practitioners and academics – through the crowded world of agencies.
During the last two decades the structuring and functioning of the OECD public sector has undergone major shifts (OECD 2002; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Pollitt et al. 2007). One of the most acclaimed trends in public-sector organization in OECD countries is the shift from a centralized and consolidated public sector to a decentralized, structurally devolved and autonomizing public sector, including the disconnection of policy design, implementation and evalu-ation (Christensen and Lægreid 2003, 2006a; Bouckaert et al. 2010a). According to this claim, systems of public administration all over the world have been disaggregated into a multitude of different kinds of semi-autonomous organiza-tions, denoted as agencies (Flinders and Smith 1999; Van Thiel 2001a; Pollitt and Talbot 2004).
Agencies are organizations that operate at arm’s length of the government to carry out public tasks, implement policies, regulate markets and policy sectors, or deliver public services. They are structurally disaggregated from their parent ministries, are said to face less hierarchical and political influence on their daily operations and have more managerial freedom in terms of finances and person-nel, compared to ordinary ministries or departments. Agencies usually are not totally independent, because in many cases political executives have ultimate political responsibility for their activities.
In several countries, the number of agencies has increased strongly from the 1980s on, under the influence of the New Public Management (NPM). According to the NPM doctrine, which was propagated fiercely in the eighties until the early 2000s by several international bodies (OECD, the IMF, the World Bank and to some extent the EU), the disaggregation of large, monolithic government bureaucracies into more businesslike, small and lean agencies would enhance the quality and efficiency of government interventions (Hood 1991). The creation
of single-purpose agencies, fully focused on policy implementation, with more management autonomy, combined with performance-based pressures to per-form, would induce public-sector organizations to modernize their management and orient themselves more to their customers, which will ultimately improve their performance. Indeed, agencification is to be observed in almost all develop-ing and even developed countries (OECD 2002) to such an extent that scholars in the early 2000s referred to the emergence of a contagious agency fever (Pollitt et al. 2001a).
However, as this book clearly shows, in most countries agencies were already in existence much earlier (Greve et al. 1999a; Schick 2002a; Wettenhall 2005a). Nevertheless, the NPM reforms have clearly led to a proliferation of agencies, both in terms of their numbers and in terms of the different (legal) types (James 2003). Research has shown that NPM-based agencification ideas have been translated very differently in different politico–administrative settings (Smullen 2010a).
The claim that agencies increase quality and efficiency of service delivery has been often assumed but seldom well documented (Pollitt 2004; Verhoest et al. 2004; Christensen and Lægreid 2006a; Verhoest and Lægreid 2010a; and Boyne et al. 2005 on public-sector performance in general). Irrespective of its merits in terms of service quality, agencification has created new problems for governments, in particular a fragmentation of the public sector which makes coordination and control very difficult (Bouckaert et al. 2010a). In addition, questions have arisen about the accountability of agencies; ministerial accountability has been reduced, leading to a democratic deficit (Flinders 2001). In the face of global crises (for example, security, environment and economic crises) and the increasing demand by citizens for integrated service delivery, a countertrend can be observed in many countries – labelled the post-NPM movement – in which politicians aim to restore central control and coordination through mergers and reshuffling of agencies (Gregory 2003a; James 2004; 2007a; Christensen and Lægreid 2008; Lodge and Gill 2011a). To what extent the post-NPM movement also encompasses processes of de-agencification is an empirical question, which is answered in several coun-try chapters in this book.
This book describes such trends in 29 countries all over the world and one supranational authority, the EU, by discussing similar issues such as the agency landscape, history and drivers, autonomy and control and recent debates and chal-lenges. The countries belong to different politico– administrative traditions and cultures, which allows us to compare similarities and difference within and across groups of countries. This book offers a rich overview of empirical information for researchers interested in comparing agencies and agencification in different coun-tries, and for practitioners looking for practices and experiences in other coun-tries. Moreover, the final chapter of this compendium formulates evidence-based lessons and policy recommendations that political leaders and high civil servants in countries across the world might consider in order to formulate or improve a policy on agencification for their country.
1.1 The CRIPO research network and the COBRA survey
This book is a result of joint efforts within the Comparative Research into Current Trends in Public Sector Organization (CRIPO) network, funded between 2007 and 2011 by the EU Cost Action program (IS0601, see www.soc.kuleuven.be/io/cost for more information on the Action and its members1). In this network, public-management research teams from 22 European countries, together with colleagues from six non-European countries have joined forces in a common research project on public sector organizations, focusing on the changing autonomy, control and coordination of public agencies, as well as on the explanations and consequences of this trend. The main objective of this network is to increase knowledge of current trends in public-sector organization in Europe from a European perspective, in an international context, in order to deepen theoretical rigour and optimize methodologies, which will inspire sound and policy-relevant research conclusions. The CRIPO network partners use one or more of the following core methodologies. First, several partners used longitudinal and dynamic mapping tools based on document analysis and common coding schemes, allowing them to map the evolution of agencification over time. Second, some partners used case-study designs for which joint proto-cols were developed. Third and most important, in a majority of the countries under study a similar survey was carried out, allowing the researchers to present data in several of the country chapters included in this book, in a more or less comparable way.
This survey was initially developed by Geert Bouckaert, Koen Verhoest and Bram Verschuere of the Public Management Institute (KULeuven) in collabora-tion with B. Guy Peters. The initial survey was further refined and streamlined within the Comparative Public Organization Data Base for Research and Analysis (COBRA) network (http://www.publicmanagement-cobra.org/) and from 2007 onwards in a joint CRIPO–COBRA effort. Surveys based on a core set of common questions and targeting similar respondents (the CEOs of state agencies) have been replicated in different countries. By collecting similar survey data on agency autonomy and control in these countries, the COBRA network allows for a com-parison of agency types and features operating in different politico–administra-tive cultures. At the time of writing (Spring 2011), this survey has been replicated in 19 out of the 30 governments involved in this book. Table 1.1 provides more information per country about the COBRA survey (online or postal), the types of agencies surveyed (see for the typology, Chapter 2 in this book) and the number of agencies which have responded is compared to the total number of agencies which have been addressed (Verhoest et al. 2010a). The COBRA questionnaire, including definitions, and related information is to be found at the COBRA web-site (http://soc.kuleuven.be/io/cost/survey/index.htm).
Involved country teams used the data from this survey to write the country chapters in this book, along with other data from case studies and document analysis. In addition, a number of researchers from other countries were invited
to contribute to this volume, because they had carried out similar research in or outside the COBRA and CRIPO networks.
1.2 Outline of country chapters
Each country chapter is structured around four issues. The extent to which each issue is handled may differ to some extent between country chapters, how-ever, since the available information and status of agency research varies across countries.
A first issue is what the current landscape of agencies in the country under review looks like in the wider context of the public sector in that country. As mentioned above, in this book we apply a broad definition of agencies. In Chapter 2 , a typol-ogy of agencies is developed which guides the country analyses (Van Thiel and CRIPO team 2009a). The purpose is to get a view on the extent of proliferation of agency-like bodies in general, but if possible also in different policy fields, or with different tasks. What types of (semi)-autonomous agencies exist in the coun-try under study, and what is the legal framework for agencification, if any? What does the institutional design of these different agency types look like? What is, for example, their importance in the total central-state apparatus in terms of staff or budget share?
Second, the history of agencification is discussed. When was the autonomous-agency model (or models) introduced in the country under study? What are the characteristics of this model? How did the number of agencies evolve over time and why? Can waves of agencification be observed throughout recent history? Are the drivers for agencification related to that history? How can we explain the adoption of the semi-autonomous-agency model in this coun-try, at that time? For example, what was the political and economic context at the time? Did NPM ideas or Europeanization play a role? To what extent does agencification fit with existing politico– administrative traditions? Next to the official motives, mentioned in the policy documents underlying the decisions to establish agencies, other motives have been ascribed to politicians as well, such as blame avoidance, imitation and looking for political gains (Van Thiel 2004a). Country chapters focus on both official and informal motives.
When creating and managing agencies, governments always have to balance the level of autonomy that agencies have and the level and kind of control exer-cised by the government upon these agencies. In most countries under study in this book, control and oversight are exercised by (parent) ministries or depart-ments. The country chapters discuss how and what kind of control is carried out, and how much autonomy agencies (can) have. The conceptualizations of auton-omy and control have been taken from the COBRA survey (see information on the survey at the COST-CRIPO/COBRA website2).
We define autonomy as the level of decision-making competency (discretion) of an organization (Verhoest et al. 2004; Verhoest et al. 2010a). In this book, we dis-tinguish between managerial autonomy and policy autonomy, each on a strategic or operational level.
An agency has managerial autonomy when it has the right to take decisions about managerial matters (concerning personnel management and financial management) independently, that is without needing approval of the parent department, or ministers, at the level of individual transactions or employees (operational) or at the level of the general rules and criteria that apply regarding the use of these resources (strategic).
Policy (implementation) autonomy refers to the discretionary authority of agencies to decide on certain aspects of the implementation of policies, without needing approval of the parent department or minister, like the prioritization of activities to be performed (operational), the delineation of the target group of the policy implementation, the quality or quantity of outputs and the policy instruments to be used (strategic). Distinct from this is the policy influence that agencies can have, which is understood as the involvement of agencies in the development of new policies (Verschuere 2009a).
In the country chapters, authors have tried to sketch the level of autonomy that (different types of) agencies have in their country, the variety between different types of agencies within the country, offering potential explanations if available. Research has shown that formal autonomy, which is the decision-making com-petences allocated to an agency by the law and regulations, might differ from the actual autonomy agencies have or perceive to have (Verhoest et al. 2004; Yesilkagit and Van Thiel 2008).
When agencies (want to) use their autonomy, they might be curbed by con-trol of a parent department, their minister or other governmental actors. Control focuses on the constraints that parent ministers/departments can impose to influ-ence the actual use of autonomy, or influence agency decisions. Control is thus used in a broad sense, encompassing guidance, control in a strict sense (moni-toring), and evaluation of an agency’s actions. The cabinet, ministers and parent departments may exercise control on agencies in several ways.
First, control can be ex ante or ex post, as well as mainly oriented on input or on results. Both ex ante and ex post control may have their principal focus on the choice and use of inputs, or the delivery of the results, although in practice they mostly appear in pairs (ex ante on inputs, ex post on results). Traditionally in many countries, control of public-sector organizations was mainly ex ante and input oriented. Ex ante control emphasizes the before-the-fact formulation of detailed rules, regulations, standard operating procedures and approval requirements that give directions to actors so that the desired objective (from the viewpoint of the ministers/departments) will be achieved. Other forms are the right of ministers or parent departments to veto or annul decisions by agencies, before they take effect. The intention is ‘to minimize risks and to increase certainty of perfor-mance processes before they begin’ (Wirth 1986). Ex ante control mechanisms mainly focus on the legality of agency actions and compliance with rules and regulations. In contrast, ex post control emphasizes whether the intended organi-zational goals and the targets set have been achieved by the agency and whether there is a need for corrective future action. Elements of ex post control are objec-tive setting, monitoring, evaluation, audit and sanctions. Ex post result control
manifests itself in the use of performance contracts and objectives, performance reporting and evaluation, and the use of performance-related sanctions for agen-cies. The NPM doctrine claims that a shift from detailed ex ante control on inputs to strategic ex post control on result will increase the performance of public sector organizations, including agencies.
Besides ex ante and result control, governments can also use other forms of con-trol. Governments can exercise influence by appointing, steering and evaluating the senior management of the agency as well as the members of the board (if it exists). Influence by the appointment, composition, control and accountability, good governance of top governance structures is what we call ‘structural control’. Also governments can exercise financial control on the use of autonomy by the agency by granting or refusing the agency financial resources or allowing the agency to have its own resources. A last form of control we take into account is control by formal and informal contacts between agency management and their political and administrative principals. Related to this is the way agencies account for their actions towards government, parliament and the citizen, and the quality of control and accountability mechanisms.
Questions that are discussed in the country chapters focus on the capacity of the cabinet, the minister and the parent ministry or department to control agencies. How do politicians and parent departments steer/control/manage autonomous agencies? What kind of steering instruments are used or have been developed for this purpose (ex ante, ex post, performance indicators, contracts, and so on)? How well do these control instruments function? How do agencies and parent departments balance the trade-off between autonomy and control (accountability, steering, audit, board, patronage)? What (new) instruments have been developed for this purpose (for example, new forms of accountability)?
A final set of issues discussed in the country analyses focus on the impact of agencification, and recent debates and challenges. What is known about the effect of agencification, for example, on the performance of agencies in terms of good management and performance (innovation, quality, efficiency) in a country? Is agencification indeed endangering the transparency and cohesion of policies, as some critics claim? Are there any measures to enhance transparency and coordination within the state administration, through what mechanisms (like joined-up government, de-agencification, rationalization, centralization of control) and how do these affect the agency landscape and control? Are recent crises (for example, the economic crises of 2008–2011) changing agencification policies?
1.3 Outline of the book
This book consists of 39 chapters, including this introduction. There are 29 chapters on agency creation in a single country and one chapter on agencies in a supranational organization (the EU). The country contributions have been grouped into six clusters; each cluster ends with a comparative summary in which the most important similarities and differences between the countries
are discussed and explained. Finally, there are three more general chapters: the introduction (Chapter 1), a chapter on the possibilities to compare agencies between countries (Chapter 2) and the concluding chapter which offers lessons and recommendations for policy makers.
There are many different ways in which we could have clustered the countries under study in this publication, for example, based on culture, politico–admin-istrative system, type of state, level of state development, size, state tradition, and so on. Table 1.2 offers an overview of some relevant characteristics. In this book, we have chosen to cluster countries primarily on the basis of their politico–administrative culture, taking their geographical dispersion into account as a secondary criterion. This leads to the following six clusters: Anglo–American countries, Latin or Napoleonic countries, Continental countries with a Rechtsstaat tradition, Nordic countries, a Central and Eastern European (CEE) cluster and a final cluster of Asian, Middle Eastern and African countries.
The Anglo–American countries share a Westminster model of parliamentary democracy: United Kingdom, Ireland, New Zealand, Australia and the United States of America. They are generally characterized by a majoritarian govern-ment, a strong executive, and a professional civil service (Lijphart 1999). Their administrative culture is characterized by individualism and masculinity, leading to a high willingness to take risks and be innovative or entrepreneurial (Hood 1998; Hofstede 2001). Their administrative culture is typically a ‘public interest’ system, in which the development and enactment of legislation is less problem-atic and lengthy than in countries with a legalistic tradition (see the Latin or Napoleonic cluster). Decisions can be taken and implemented swiftly. However, not all countries in this cluster fit in this picture equally well. For example, the spoils system in the USA creates a highly politicized civil service, contrary to the other countries in this cluster. Moreover, the USA and Australia are federal coun-tries while the UK has in recent years devolved much of its competencies in the different parts (Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland). Only two countries (Ireland and UK) are member of the EU.
Traditionally, the Anglo–American countries, in particular New Zealand, are known as the first to adopt the NPM-style agency model, and create agencies on the most extensive scale (Boston 1995; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). Recently, however, these countries have also been among the first to call for a return to the ‘whole of government’ and a restoration of coordination that has been lost due to the fragmentation caused by agencification (Gregory 2003a; Christensen and Lægreid 2008; Bouckaert et al. 2010a). Whether this has indeed led to a sizeable reduction of the number of agencies remains to be seen, however (Lodge and Gill 2011).
The Latin or Napoleonic countries in this book – France, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Belgium – share a legalistic tradition which has its origins in the Napoleonic occupation and the administrative concepts introduced under this occupa-tion (Peters 2008; Ongaro 2009). The unitary states among them (France, Italy, Portugal) have recently implemented large-scale decentralization, while the fed-eral states (Belgium, Spain) have devolved numerous tasks in their regions or
member states. Most countries in this cluster are run by coalition governments (except France), with a system of collective responsibility of the ruling govern-ment (not individual ministerial accountability). Traditionally, government and private-sector organizations cooperate in the delivery of public services such as transport and utilities. There is also a strong involvement of the civil soci-ety, as for example the church, in public tasks such as education. Typically, the civil service is politicized, at least at the top (see Piattoni 2001 for a comparative overview).
Agencification in these countries is often hindered by the need for legal frame-works and the legal basis that is required for all decisions (Kickert 2007). The aver-age pace of agency creation, or NPM reforms in general, is therefore somewhat lower than in other clusters (Van Thiel and CRIPO team 2009a) – except perhaps in Belgium, or at least its member states, where agencification has coincided with the reform of the state as a whole.
The Continental cluster consists of four countries with a predominantly Rechtsstaat tradition: Austria, Germany, Switzerland and The Netherlands, although one might question whether The Netherlands fits really well here (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). These countries all share a strong corporatist tradition, with a preference for consensual political-decision making. All have a highly profes-sionalized and neutral civil service, following the traditional Weberian model, with permanent appointments (no spoils system). Two countries are federations (Switzerland and Germany) and two are unitary, decentralized states (Austria and The Netherlands).
The Rechtsstaat tradition implies that agencification is – at least in part – a legalistic matter, which has led to a proliferation of legal types and forms. Some authors even speak of a ‘zoo’ of agencies (Bach and Jann 2010). Its legal basis is an important determinant of agency existence, as it will determine agency autonomy and its relationship with the parent ministry. The pace of reform has been mostly incremental in these countries, except perhaps in The Netherlands, although agencification has not been as slow as some authors have predicted (Van Thiel and CRIPO team 2009; see also Chapter 2 of this book). Because of the focus on agencification at the national (federal) level in this book, we will not be able to ascertain the level and intensity of agency creation by regional and local governments, but given the strong decentralized nature of the Continental clus-ter countries we would expect many agencies to be established at the sub-national level – perhaps even more than at the national level.
The Nordic countries traditionally practised agencification most extensively (Christensen and Lægreid 2003, 2006a). In fact, Sweden is reputed to have ‘invented’ the agency model well before the advent of the British Next Steps agencies model (Smullen 2010a; Pollitt et al. 2004). The countries in this clus-ter are characterized by a large public sector, but within that public sector you will find small core governments and numerous (large) agencies, and large-scale decentralization of tasks and competencies to the subnational levels of govern-ment. The relatively small size of these states creates an informal administra-tive culture (see low scores on power distance and masculinity in Table 1.2),
high trust and extremely low corruption figures. Recent changes in agencifica-tion have been brought about by external forces; see, for example, the splitting up of agencies into single-purpose organizations in Norway (Christensen and Lægreid 2006a).
The CEE cluster is characterized by important similarities – in particular the transition from communism to democracy – but also by important differ-ences that each country has its own legacy and history (Meyer-Sahling 2009). These countries have only recently (re)-gained their independence, and even more recently joined the European Union. The politico– administrative systems of these countries are difficult to compare as they differ in structure, size and way of accountability (Table 1.2). All are unitary states, relatively small both in terms of population and size of the core government. The countries differ, however, in terms of the kind of executive government (coalitions, majority rule, semi-presidential) and ministerial accountability (collective, individual, or both). As far as data are available on the administrative culture, there seems again little homogeneity between the countries. However, all countries do share some of the negative remnants of communist rule: politicization and cor-ruption of the civil service. Whether and how agencification is linked to such practices is a matter for further research – although there is some anecdotal evidence about appointments and financial scandals as the chapters on these countries will show.
One of the most dominant influences on agencification in these countries is the accession process to become a member of the EU (Bouckaert et al. 2009). Beblavý (2002) concludes that the speed of reforms has been very high; in fact, changes to agency status and existence can happen almost overnight (see the chapter on Romania and Hungary in this book). The size of agencification, that is the numbers of agencies combined with this speed, has led to steering problems because of a lack of matching administrative capacity to oversee the agencies (Beblavý 2002).
The final cluster consists of a number of countries which are all outside the European continent. These countries have had turbulent periods before (re)-gaining their independence; either because of colonialism (Tanzania, Thailand, Pakistan, Hong Kong) or war (Israel). This means that the process of democratization is a relatively recent one. However, each country has its own his-tory and legacy, determining their current politico–administrative systems and cultures. The differences are therefore probably larger than the similarities. As former colonies of the UK, the administrative tradition and hence the style of agencification is somewhat similar in three out of the five countries in this cluster (Thailand, Hong Kong and Pakistan), and with some (but not full) resemblance to the UK agency model (see the country chapters for more specificities). The same three countries have also been influenced by donor organizations like the IMF or World Bank; such influence usually leads to more agencification for two reasons. First, economic progress leads to expansion of the (semi)-public sector as the number of people, businesses and government activities increase. A similar development can be seen in Hong Kong. Second, the propagation of the agency
model by international organizations leads to agency proliferation – just like the EU influence in the CEE cluster.
The country chapters will clearly show that there are many differences in agencification between countries. However, there are also several similarities. By using the same categorization of agencies – explained in Chapter 2 – we will be able to compare experiences in the cluster summaries, and use these to draw les-sons for policy-makers in the final chapter.
Notes
1. Besides the authors involved in this book, there are some other researchers who have been very active in the COST-CRIPO_COBRA networks, and who should be acknowl-edged for their engagement: Tom Christensen, Christian De Visscher, Julia Fleischer, Mihaly Högye, Peter Humphreys, Erkki Karo, Riccardo Mussari, Christoph Reichard, and Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan, Prof. Jørgen Grønnegaard Christensen, Krisztiàn Kàdàr, Dr. Vidar Rolland and John-Erik Ågotnes.
2. The information on the survey as the questionnaire itself is to be found at http://soc.kuleuven.be/io/cost/survey/index.htm
agencification in, 38–9agency landscape, 29–30agency policy development, 38autonomy and control, 34–7Commonwealth of, 31–4history and drivers of agencification,
30–4, 157recent debates, developments, and con-
clusions, 37–9Australian Public Service (APS), 35Austria, 11, 156–65
agency landscape, 157–9autonomy and control, 159–63history and drivers of agencification, 157public administration in, 156recent debates and developments, 163–4
Napoleonic countries, 10–11National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), 69–70National Performance Review, 72nationwide services, in France, 100–2Netherlands, 11, 179–90
agency debate in, 184agency landscape, 179–82agency networks, 185–6agency reforms in, 23–4autonomy and control, 183–9history and drivers of agencification,
182–3recent debates and developments, 189
New Deal, 71–2, 79New Public Management (NPM), 3–4, 25,
agency landscape, 57–60autonomy and control, 63–5history and drivers of agencification,
60–3recent debates and developments, 65–7
United States, 10, 69–76, 78, 79agency landscape, 69–71autonomy and control, 72–6Congress, 73–4executive branch, 74–5history and drivers of agencification,
