Mali’s Security challenges through multi security lenses Political, Military, Economical, Societal and Environmental Security.

Jan 2015 NMBU: NORAGRIC Marius Steindal

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Table of Content

Introduction…………….…………………………………………………….2

Political security………….…………………………………………….……..3

Military security…………………………………………………………..…..7

Economical Security…….………………………………………………..…..9

Society security…………….……………………………………………..…12

Environmental security…………………..…………………………………16

Conclusion……………….…………………………………………………..19

Bibliography………………………………………………………………....22

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Introduction

After the Cold War and especially after the 9/11 attacks, and later on Madrid and London, the

way we view threats during the cold war have been challenged. In bipolar world, it is easier to

measure threats basically out from the military opponents’ relative capabilities. However,

after the fall of the Soviet Union, new threats became clearer in the Wes

Information about current situations in Mali and its long history have until now been little

known in the western population, at least in the non-French speaking one. However, after the

latest Tuareg rebellion for independence for Northern Mali, ‘The Azawad’¸ a sudden interest

started to grow. Not mainly because of the Tuareg separatists independence claim, they have

been struggling for more autonomy and independence since the Malian independence in

1963—but however over the Islamist trying to take advantage over the northern rebellion.

For the Western powers after 9/11 and former President Bush’s declaration of War on Terror,

the focus on the Islamists in Northern Mali and the Sahel are more in line with the current

‘hot topic’ of security threats.

The focus mainly on threats possessed from radical and militant Islamist often turning the

focus away from the deeper problems in the areas where also these groups operates. By

focusing on mainly fighting these groups with hi-tech weapons and Special Forces Operation

(SOFs), the underlying conditions for the emergence will as a result be ignored, and possibly

fuel a larger support for the groups being fought. Barry Buzan talks about security view

through a lens that sees security as “the pursuit a freedom from threat and the ability of states

and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against

forces of change which they see as hostile…” and “the bottom line of security is survival, but

is includes a substantial range of concern about the condition of existence.”1

Barry Buzan’s focus on security, mention five different types of security. In the context of

Mali, these five types of security are especially interesting. In this essay, I will therefore look

into how Buzan’s understanding of security can help us understand the domestic security and

the conflict lines in Mali, and how these will interact with each other. Buzan is mainly

focused on these ‘securities’ in regard to structures in international relations, I however, will

try to use his ideas about the concepts, as guidelines, and interpret them in a more local and

domestic fashion.

1 Buzan. Barry: New patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century. International Affairs (Royal Institute

of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 67, No. 3 (Jul.., 1991), pp. 431-451

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Before the 2012 northern-rebellion and the coup in Bamako, Mali had been viewed as stable

and a model for democracy in Africa. However, in only 12 months, Mali became the scene of

a coup, Islamist insurgency, political instability, social challenges, military disintegration, that

challenged the security both within Mali’s territorial borders as well as regionally and

possible internationally.2

First of all, for a conflict to emerge, two main factors must be in place, grievance and a failed

bargaining range out-of-reach. Barry Buzans’3 focus on security comes up with five different

types of security that can effect’s both the grievance and the bargaining range. In Buzans’

view on security, these are Political Security, Military Security, Economical Security, Societal

Security and Environmental Security.

Chris Fuller4 at a TED talk, mention a critical fact about the militant Islamism in Africa, that

the groups grievances is not what we typically will link to the grievances of Al Qaeda as-we-

know them, but rather focus more on locally topics as insufficient and corrupt governments

and climate change by mentioning only a few. This focus on climate change are being further

explained by a reference to the United Nations’ view on the Sahel as the ‘Ground Zero’ for

climate change. 5

In a region with the feeling of political marginalization and political instability, military

incompetence, societal competitions, and regarded as both the poorest region in the world,

and now lately as the ‘ground zero’ of climate change, Mali and the Sahel is facing challenges

at all of Buzans’ concepts or fields of security—and its therefore important to look at them all

in a comprehensive way, rather than focusing on only the War on Terror and militant

Islamists.

Political Security

When it comes to political security, Mali have been described by its’ western supporters, as ‘a

model for democracy’, however, because of mistrust by elements of the Malian army, the

2 France24: Mali’s stability still at stake ayear after coup: http://www.france24.com/en/20130321-mali-military-coup-anniversary-stability-stake-french-intervention/ [02.01.2015] 3 Buzan. Barry: New patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century. International Affairs (Royal Institute

of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 67, No. 3 (Jul.., 1991), pp. 431-451 4 How does the War on Terror ends? Chris Fuller. TEDxSWPS:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kw1vxsd_Pwc [Accessed: 20.11.2014] 5UN News Center: Sahel stands at ‘ground zero’ of climate change, top UN adviser warns:

http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=26878#.VKGZn14AKA [Accessed: 28.12.2014]

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government in Bamako witness a coup d’Etat, where the country’s democratic leader Amadou

Toumani Touré (ATT) were ousted. With the 2012 coup and several uprising by the northern

Tuareg population that also can be seen as a link or at some part the reason to the coup, Mali

faces a great challenge to its political stability, and therefore its political security.

Some direct and explaining factors for the military coup can, and must be viewed out from the

poor condition of the military and therefore it will fall under the next part of this paper, but

however, as we can see, these different types of security often prove to overlap. As a reason

for the military coup by the army, the army said it took power because of the governments’

“incompetence” in handling the northern rebellion from the Tuaregs.6

As the coup were conducted by the army as a consequence of what they saw as a

incompetence in support of the army’s effort in the north, the long time conflict in the north

will give an even grimmer picture of the underlying political instability in the country.

As mention, Mali also consists of different identities and groups. Especially in the northern

parts of Mali, we can find different population groups that have been able to live relatively

peaceful side-by-side for many years, but at least in the latest uprising by the Tuaregs, some

of these northern groups might have felt that an independent Azawad-tuareg-dominated state

would challenge the power-balance in the north. Since the Malian independence in the 60s,

the government in Bamako has been view by the northern Tuareg as unfair, and the

governments’ actions have been view as a threat towards the nomadic lifestyle of the Tuaregs.

According to Buzan7, African governments can no longer excuse their shortcomings in either

political or economical on their colonial past, as this is no longer lays in the recent history, but

rather after more than two generations—now is regarded as old history. With different

populations’ groups inside Mali, the Malian state might also find it difficult to legitimate and

uphold the old colonial borders drawn in the ‘Scrabble for Africa’, as parts of the population

does not identifies themselves as one national identity. This is especially evident in regard to

the Tuareg uprisings and the claim and proclamation of the independent Azawad state in

northern Mali by the MNLA.

6 PoliSciZurich: Jonathan van Eerd: Gaddafi’s Demise Is Not The Only Reason for The Military Coup in Mali http://poliscizurich.wordpress.com/2012/03/30/gaddafis-demise-is-not-the-only-reason-for-the-military-coup-in-mali/ [Accessed: 02.01.2015] 7 Buzan. Barry: New patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century. International Affairs (Royal Institute

of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 67, No. 3 (Jul.., 1991), pp. 431-451

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When talking of Mali, we often also tend to talk of northern and southern Mali, in this way,

we have already created a division between north and south. As in the broader Sahel belt, we

can see a general picture of two cultures meeting. This, A meeting between the “white”

northern population and the “black” Africans and the Islamic north and the Christian south.

This is also something we can see in Sudan, as it resulted in a split between Sudan and South

Sudan.

Even though the majority of Malians are Muslims, they do however practice a more

traditional African Sufi style of Islam, rather than the one we often think of when talking of

Islamic extremism. Therefore, with the introduction of the more radical groups in northern

Mali, following the 2012 Tuareg rebellion, the new type of Salafi Islamism came in conflict

with the traditional Islam practiced in Mali.

As Mali were view as a ‘model for democracy’, this is often viewed by more traditionalist as

a western phenomenon, and in this way, there might be a challenge toward the political

security, by those groups who seek to mobilize and enforce political Islam as a defense

against what they view as secular threat against their religious belief.

In Mali however, if the religious or spiritual opposition to established political structures are

based on, in fact religious or region-political elements, or on self-interest in terms of profit

from the ‘business’ of some of the groups in the north is hard to say. There are numerous

rumors of collaboration in some ways between the old Bamako government and groups

regarded as terrorist groups like AQIM, in terms of financial benefits to the government and

free operation areas for the militant groups. If these rumors seem to be true, this can then be a

way for the government to balance against a confrontation with the ‘radical’ militant groups,

and instead use them against what they view as a more threatening enemy, the separatist

MNLA.

With a population in northern Mali that feels marginalized by the central government—and

with numerous agreements for more autonomy for the north being signed, but not followed

through—the central government may therefore have lost parts of it legitimacy—resulting in

jeopardizing their political security.

When the Malian army was to fight back the Tuareg rebellion in 2012, parts of the army

meant that the government did not support the operation as much as they should. As the

soldiers who were stationed to fight the militants in northern Mali were ill equipped and

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poorly trained, they meet a better trained and armed opponent in the MNLA and different

Islamist groups. Within some ranks of the Malian army, there was a feeling of little support

from the Bamako government, and the situation resulted in a coup and military takeover. For

Western supporters of the ‘model for democracy’ saw their project falling for a coup, this was

of course seen as a tragedy, however, it seem to be welcomed by the majority of Malians.

This then give us an idea about in what extent of legitimacy the former government had.

Without a transparent and including political government that can protect its citizens from the

security threats or ensure “freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to

maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change

which they see as hostile”8, the political security for the government will be under threat from

within. If the Malian state are to implement a ‘western’ dominated system too rapid this can

as in the case of borders and forced inclusion be viewed as a threat against the nomadic

tradition and way of life, and thus create some sort of conflicting environment. Can western

thought and interference that seems for the westerns as the best solution for Mali in fact

challenge and threaten the local culture and traditions, and therefore causing this interference

to be view as alien and threaten the Malian state legitimacy? In this way, the Malian

government needs to balance between the western powers and its own populations in a quest

to achieve both international and domestic legitimacy.

With many different groups within its territory and with different identities that might not

represent one national unit, and with a poor security force, risk of drought that might pose a

threat against food supply, and a poor economy—efforts to uphold political legitimacy, and

therefore political security in Mali is and will be difficult. With reports9 of abuse from most

sides in the last conflict, all parts have some grievance against each other, and for that reason

compromises and a restoration of stable organization and structure of governance with

legitimacy in Mali, do face large challenges.

Human Right Watch10

, sent a letter to the new president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, and

advised him to strengthen the rule of law, fight corruption, and hold former abusers

accountable for their actions. This is something that will help restore some sort of political

8 Buzan. Barry: New patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 67, No. 3 (Jul.., 1991), pp. 431-451 9 Situation in Mali. Article 53(1) Report.” 16. JAN. 2013. International Criminal Court. The Office of the Prosecutor 10

HRW: Collapse, Conflict and Atrocity in Mali. (2014) Human Rights Watch Reporting on the 2012-13 Armed Conflict and Its Aftermath.

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security, however the HRW report also acknowledge the tremendous challenges the new

government face in regard to culture impunity, corruption within government ranks, a poor

trained and disciplined security force, ethnic tensions, and a high degree of poverty. However,

focusing on these elements through a more comprehensive approach might help the Malian

state to achieve a more secure political security.

The fundamental element for political security must be that the government is able to rule

with legitimacy. A legitimate rule should therefore be achieved if the people that are being

ruled feel that the ruler has the right to rule, and that the laws are being followed also by the

rulers.11

The best guarantee to an effective and stable political security should therefore be the

feeling of a legitimate government amongst the people. 12

Where Hudson13

talks about the

Arab nations’ heritage from the colonial era, this is also something we can see in Africa. With

new borders and systems of government being implemented, these new ideas did not

correspond well with the population of identity that was affected by these borders. In this

way, building a state have been difficult. As seen also in Mali, the idea of a Malian state and

territory has been contested from the different ethnic/local groups who differ in the idea of

territory and rule. This is then one element that can challenge the political security in Mali.

The Malian state has been engaged in talks with the Tuaregs in northern Mali over more

autonomy; however, these agreements have had little real effect and therefore worsened the

legitimacy for the Malian state.

Military Security

Military threat’s is probably the most discussed topic when it comes to traditional security

studies and especially within realism. When it comes to military security, it should be the

states’ ability to protect its citizens and interest from military threats within the anarchic

environment.14

In a modern era, were wars usually are fought through proxies, or through

local groups, this might then also be the case for Mali, and can be seen in alignment in the

north, from both the former Malian government who were seeking to suppress the Tuaregs

11 Stensli. Stig & Selvik. Kjetil: Stabilitetens pris; Stat og Politikk i Midøsten.2007. Fagbokforlaget Vigmostad & Bjørke AS. Bergen 12

Weber Max: The Theory of Social and Economic Organization.1947. New York: Oxford –University Press

13 Hudson. Michael C: Arab politics: The search for Legitimacy. 1977. New Haven & London. Yale University Press. 14

Stone. Marianne: Security according to Buzan: A comprehensive Security Analysis. 2009. Security Discussion Papers Series 1. Spring 09. Groupe d’Etudes et d’Expertise “Sécurité et Technologies” GEEST- 2009

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separatist claims, as well as possibly through criminal or fundamentalist groups operating in

northern Mali and the broader Sahel.

When talking of the military security in Mali, we can immediately see some fundamental

risks, something that were proven in the Malian army’s inability to suppress the Tuaregs’ and

later Islamic militants’ rebellion and take-over in the north. If we could see military security

as the states’ offensive and defensive capability of an armed combat, the Malian army failed

quite miserably. According to Jonathan van Eerd15

, the Malian army was both poorly trained

and equipped, as well as they did analyze the situation after Qadaffi’s downfall poorly as they

relied on the former peace agreements.

The Sahel have for a long time been a difficult area to control, leaving it a good place for

smuggling operations of different types of goods, be it drugs, people, food, or weapons. As

long as the armies and governments in the Sahel are unable or unwilling to combat the threat

posed towards the states and the people in their countries, both the political, military and

possible societal and economical securities in the area will be threatened. This because the

divided non-state groups are able to be better armed and organized than the state’s security

forces, and therefore, the enabling of smuggling operation in the Sahel, will result in a high-

risk threat for the securities—also in Mali.

If the rumors of Bamako’s collaboration with some of the militant groups in the north, in a

covert fight against separatist elements of the Tuaregs, this has possibly created an even worse

environment for the Malian army to operate in. With kidnapping for ransom and smuggling

operations in the Sahel, the militant groups in the northern borderlines of Mali have

accumulated a great economical capita—that can be canalized in operations’ that will threaten

the government and the general security in the area in a long-term perspective.

Mali is one of the poorest countries in the world and with an annual spending of about 1,44%

of GDP16

on its armed forces, the military security of Mali, must said to be in quite bad

condition. With little support from the government, resulting in bad and out of date

equipment, insufficient supplies, something resulting in bad moral and a feeling of betrayal—

15 PoliSciZurich: Jonathan van Eerd: Gaddafi’s Demise Is Not The Only Reason for The Military Coup in Mali http://poliscizurich.wordpress.com/2012/03/30/gaddafis-demise-is-not-the-only-reason-for-the-military-coup-in-mali/ [Accessed: 02.01.2015] 16

CIA WORLD FACTBOOK (2012 numbers) https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ml.html [Accessed: 10.11.2014]

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ended as a consequence in lower political- and military security. This lack of support for the

Malian army and different thinking on how to handle the situation in the north, caused

frustration and can also be some of the reason some low level officers in the Malian army

engaged in a coup—overthrowing the sitting government in Bamako.17

With the 2012 coup,

and the northern take-over by armed rebel-groups, the Malian army’s ability to control the

Malian territory has proven to poor, and resulted in the quest for support from the outside to

be able to handle the situation, as they themselves were insufficient.

Economic Security

Mali is on the low end of the list when we talk about GDP per capita, and according to the

CIAs World factbook numbers from 201318

Mali, ends up as 216-out of 228 countries. By no

surprise, Mali joins its regional neighbor’s on the low-end on this list.

According to Buzan19

, economic security is about the access to the resources, finance and

markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. In a state sense,

Mali is a landlocked country; who mainly are dependent on mineral and agricultural export in

acquiring revenue.20

The country’s ability to produce revenue is also critical in the quest to

secure political-, military and societal security. According to Stone21

, “the economic security

can be considered a key indicator as to the general security of a state. This is especially

evident, looking in the failing of the military security, be it equipment or training, that again

threaten the moral and fighting capabilities that must be uphold to secure the state.

Mali’s informal economy is challenging the economical- and political security as it

undermines the legitimacy of the state, and is strengthening oppositional groups like both the

MNLA and radical Islamic groups. With many reports of criminal gangs engaged in illegal

smuggling operation in the Sahel, as well as kidnapping for ransom, the revenue acquired

through this forms of informal economies are undermining the security of the states in the

region. With some rumors, who claim the Bamako government involvement in the informal

17

Paulette Meyitang Ngachoko: What the Coup d’etat in Mali teaches us. April 09. 2012. International Institute for Justice and Development: http://iijd.org/news/entry/what-the-coup-detat-in-mali-teaches-us [Accessed: 02.01.2015] 18 CIA World Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ml.html 19 Buzan. Barry: New patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 67, No. 3 (Jul.., 1991), pp. 431-451 20 CIA World Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ml.html [Accessed: 10.11.2014] 21

Stone. Marianne: Security according to Buzan: A comprehensive Security Analysis. 2009. Security Discussion Papers Series 1. Spring 09. Groupe d’Etudes et d’Expertise “Sécurité et Technologies” GEEST- 2009 (Page: 5)

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economy by cooperating in some part of the kidnapping industry to gain some financial from

it, if true, it will not be helping the state in the long term.

One reason for the military coup in 2012 were conducted by junior officers and not the

seniors, might be view as a class difference, where the senior officers were closer to the elite

in Bamako, and therefore gained more by being allies with ATT rather than challenge the

government and president.

Some criticize the former government of being corrupt and that the money being transferred

into Mali or acquired internal is being kept in the pockets of the elite. Corruption and lack of

transparency will therefore be a challenge and threat to political stability, as also mentioned in

the HRW report mentioned earlier22

.

On macro level, with entry of radical Islamists in cities like Gao in 2012, they were seeking to

implement a radical form of Sharia, and enforce it in a way that was meant to fight corruption.

However, this also took away some incentive for gaining better profit for some salesmen as it

were viewed un-Islamic.23

In this way, the Ansar al-Dine disrupted the ability to collect

revenue by the same groups, and therefore challenged the groups/peoples’ economical

security.

Mali’s main export revenues are collected through its export of cotton and gold, acquire about

80% of its export income. With about 80% of the population engaged in farming or fishing,

and another 10% engaged as pastoral nomads24

, environmental changes can hit the country’s

economy heavily. If famine, disease or factors that will worsen the soil fertility, the Malian

economy would get hit by a hard stroke. Counter this should also be an important task and

must be addressed properly to avoid unnecessary risk towards the economical security.

Looking at access to the international market, Mali is in direct need for both aid, and

investment. However, with corruption claims, threatening of societal security for some

groups, and division in regard to groups who claim independence— causing political

instability and uncertainty, external investment will look at Mali as a risk, resulting in less of

the needed investment.

22 HRW: Collapse, Conflict and Atrocity in Mali. (2014) Human Rights Watch Reporting on the 2012-13 Armed Conflict and Its Aftermath. 23 Azawad News Agency- Furasan AL Balagh Media; Eye on Azawad 1: Meeting the Mujahideen of Ansar-Dine in Mali: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oAq3GT_3Htk [Accessed: 25.11.2014] 24

CIA World Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ml.html [Accessed: 10.11.2014]

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Most of Mali’s population is, as mention, living in the southern parts of Mali, and aid directed

to Mali would therefore logically go to the most populated areas in the south. However, this

has been used as grievance for those in the north, feeling marginalized. In this way, the

distribution of aid money has been used as a political argument. In the ‘War on Terror’,

money have also been invested in Mali to counter Al Qaeda linked terror groups, however,

these money might have been used to fight the more secular MNLA, and can out from this be

analyzed in terms of how Bamako defines threats in the area. For Bamako, keeping the

control out of the separatist hands are more important than fighting AQ.

Northern Mali is said and believed to hold a great amount of energy supplies. If the MNLA

are able to fulfill its claim of an independent Azawad state in the north, these supplies will be

lost for Bamako. Therefore in a long-term strategy, Bamako should engage in trustworthy

reconciliation with the Tuaregs in a way so they can counter a separation like in Sudan.

With almost 60% of Mali’s population under the age of 2425

, and a median age of only 16, the

Malian workforce who is to acquire the nations’ capita is very young. With international

norms and laws that prohibit child labor, this will put an even harder burden on Mali with

47.6% under the age of 14.

After an annual economical growth between 1996 and 2011 of about 5%, this growth, decline

as the political situation in the country worsen. With political violence in Mali, the tourism

industry also faced a hard blow, and with continuous attacks in the north, the near future does

not look very bright for attracting tourist to the area. For western tourist, the possible highest

risk when it comes to the security situation in northern Mali is the likelihood to be kidnapping

for ransom. With the situation in Syria and Iraq, tourists hearing about risk of kidnapping or

radical Islamist would most likely create images of ISIS and beheading. The groups in

northern Mali could however not be easily identified with ISIS , as they work more in the

borderline of organized crime, and if caught, you are more likely to be treated as a valuable

bargaining tool for money instead of beheaded for a political statement. However, with the

media focus on ISIS, this can possibly cause a long-term famine in the tourism industry in the

area.

For Mali, the long-term threat against the country’s economical security will most likely be;

corruption, a too high population growth with a young population, weak infrastructure, and

25

CIA Factbook https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ml.html [Accessed: 10.11.2014]

12

political instability. With the threat towards the economical security in the domestic level,

because of risk of conflict and political instability, foreign investors will likely hesitate and

abstain from investment, causing it harder for Mali to enjoy a full membership in the

international marked, and thus be lagging behind in the periphery—as Buzan26

puts it.

With a dependency on foreign aid, and no sufficient military capacity to enforce its ways into

the global market, the Malian economical security can be said to be threaten. Mali is still one

of the 25% poorest countries in the world, and with internal political instability, a very young

population, and some risk connected to the ecological swings, Mali risk being stuck in what

Buzan27

call the periphery for some time.

Societal Security

For the neorealist, identity are already set and therefore also the interests of the groups or state

will be set, and when states goes into relations with each other, they therefore tend to know

what they want before the actual interaction. However, according to Wendt28

, it is the very

intervention that creates the structures of identities and therefore, the interest is not given

before an interaction. This is interesting in Mali as elsewhere, but especially in the Sahara. As

according to Baz Lecocq29

, the information and situation in the Sahara is shrouded like in a

haze of dust. Just like the sand blows through the vast desert and the dunes reshape, so does

the situation in the area. Allies work together one day, and the next day they are bitter

enemies.30

Also when looking at the founder of Ansar al-Dine in northern Mali, Iyad Ag

Ghali, tracing his steps backwards we can see he has gone from a guy keen on alcohol and

woman, and with Tuareg sentiments, but after interaction with different people in Libya,

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, he became more radicalized with a Salafi Islamism ideology31

26

Buzan. Barry: New patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 67, No. 3 (Jul.., 1991), pp. 431-451 27

ibid 28

(Wendt 1992:394) in Jackson. Robert & Sørensen Georg: Introduction to International Relations; Theories and Approaches. 5

th Ed. 2013. Oxford University Press. UK

29 Lecocq. Baz: Northern Mali; The things we Assume. (April. 5. 2013) E-International Relations. http://www.e-ir.info/2012/04/05/northern-mali-the-things-we-assume/ [Accessed: September. 08.2014] 30 Steindal. Marius: Friends or Foes: MNLA and Ansar al-Dine in the 2012 Northern Mali Rebellion. 2014. NMBU. Ås 31

Lebovich. Andrew & Thurston. Alexander: “A Handbook on Mali's 2012-2013 Crisis” Working Paper No. 13-001. September 2, 2013. The Roberta Buffett Center for International and Comparative Studies. Northwestern University

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Mali consists’ of a 94.8 %32

Muslim majority, and hosted some of Africa’s oldest and most

known Islamic cultural sites. The Malian Islamic community, have been based more on the

Sufi tradition and Malians have practices a more tolerant form of Islam. With the latest

MNLA and Islamist take-over attempt in northern Mali, Islamist from Ansar al-Dine,

MUJAO and AQIM, and later the Al-Murabitoun, were reported to introduce a less tolerant

form of Islam. This they did through an old model, were they were shifting out the Imams in

the Mosques and establish new one—and where they preached a more radical Islamic

thought. For regular Malians, this new form of Islam were seen as alien, however, if they are

attending these Mosques over time, they might be radicalized and create a more violent

environment for those who seek to oppose. Therefore, it is important for Malian societal

security as well as political security that the military security is uphold, and able to counter

the radicalizing elements introduced by groups with Jihadi and radical Islamic ideology—if

failed, the societal security will be at stake.

Radical Islamism is not the only threat against societal security in Mali, as Mali has different

groups within its territory, with different identities and aims. According to CIAs33

, Mali’s

ethnic composition consist of approximately 50% Mande (Bambara, Malinke, Soninke),

17% Fulani, 12% Voltaic, 6% Songhai, 10% Tuareg and Moor and 5% other.

This ethnical composit ion can and has cause d problems and conflicts in Mali.

However, they have been living side-by-side for a long time as well, and in this

way been able to funct ion together, longer than Mali’s independence in the 60s.

However, when a conflict breaks out, and clash between groups or ident it ies

happens, they interact in Wendt’s way, and can therefore galvanize and the

ident it ies might become stronger. This can then, either widening the gap between

two groups, or close it in alliance. Malis’ majority are living in the southern part

of the country. In older Malian history, the Tuaregs of the Sahara often

dominated the southern people and kept them as slaves. In a more modern t ime,

the table has turned, and this can therefore been seen as some of the reasons the

Tuareg’s have opposed the southern rule and the conflict ing sent iment between

the north and the south.

32

Cia World factbook: 2009 Consus: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ml.html [Accessed: 10.11.2014] 33 Ibid

14

Northern Mali is however not composed by only the Tuaregs, but also the

Songhai and Fulani people to ment ion some. With the Tuaregs claim for

independence, these other groups then fear dominat ion by the Tuaregs , and

therefore seek a closer cooperation with Bamako.

When seeking to form a nat ion; a state’ need to try to form a nat ional ident ity.

With the ‘Scrabble for Africa’ dived -rule-tactics, this would have made it harder

for the independent states in Africa to form this nat ional ident ity. To form this

type of nat ion with a common ident ity, a state should use common history,

language, religion etc. However, in Mali, as well as other parts of Africa, the

borders were drawn in regard to the colonial masters, not in line with the social

realit y on the ground. This is now evident in many of the conflicts in Africa, as

ethnic groups consist across state borders. When these ethnic groups fe el

betrayed by the state who is challenging their old tradit ions, and their lo ng

established ident ity, they disregard the states’ legit imate claim for rule—

result ing in a rebellion.

Some of the old Malian history is often about the conflict between or the contest

of conquest for the power in empires in the area. Where the Tuareg se es their

history of plunder as a warrior tradit ion to be proud of, other groups might link it

to barbarism—result ing in a possible conflict of ident ity.

15

Racism might also be one element that is splitt ing the Mali. Not that it is

intent ional racism, but as seen also in the split and creat ion of South Sudan, there

were an element of the ‘Arab north’ meet ing the ‘black south’, and in that way

created a division in the ident it ies. Many of the same features might be the case

in Mali, as geography, they both lays in the Sahel belt, and were pastoral nomad

often had to travel southwards for grazing, during periods of draught. This might

then create conflict with the farmers in the more southern areas. However, it need

to be ment ion that so far, it seems that this is not a large conflict element in

Mali. However, with separat ist claims by the Tuaregs, that challenge the

sent iments of the farmers in Niger Delta, this can be a result.

According to Barry Buzan34

, societal security is about the ability for societies to reproduce

their traditions, being; language, culture, associations, as well as their religious and national

identity. For a state like Mali, who consists of many different ethnic groups and face problems

both financial and possible environmental, they Mali might be quite ill-equipped to deal with

the differences in identity and culture if it first breaks out a larger conflict between the

different groups. As in Marianne Stone’s35

example of Afghanistan, where differences in

culture, ideology and ethnicity might challenge a unity of the state as a “western construct”,

Mali is also prone to some of the same challenges. As where in Afghanistan we have seen the

Pashtos in the borderland between Afghanistan and Pakistan, in Mali different ethnic groups

like the Tuareg and Fulani people, as well as other groups, are living in a vast area in north

and western Africa across state borders, and in this way, the loyalty is not necessary towards

the central government, but lays in the traditional tribe. It is like Stone36

says, that it is a clear

link between the political- and military security, and this can be read out of the states’ ability

to create a national unit out of its population. If the military is used against one portion of the

population, this will challenge the legitimacy of both the state and its armed forces.

With ethnic groups spread across territorial borders, an action from the state against that

specific ethnic group might escalate to be a regional conflict, and thus invite a foreign

intervention. In this way, a small local conflict can result in a more regional and ideological

conflict, than first intended.

34 Buzan. Barry: New patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 67, No. 3 (Jul.., 1991), pp. 431-451 35

Stone. Marianne: Security according to Buzan: A comprehensive Security Analysis. 2009. Security Discussion Papers Series 1. Spring 09. Groupe d’Etudes et d’Expertise “Sécurité et Technologies” GEEST- 2009 36 Ibid

16

Many of the countries in non-western world must be understood differently than the western

ones, or “north” as Buzan call it. The reason for this is, because the social communities and

the construct of their societies are different in nature. As in most part of the ‘western world’, a

country is a unified entity, constructed by a people who share one common national identity.

However, in many countries in Africa, identities can be formed around other and stronger

identity markers than nationality. This be; religion, tribe, ethnicity, etc. For this reason, the

societies’ security does not necessary mean the security for the population against another

nationality, but also between rival groups internal in the country. If the state challenges the

ability to uphold the identity for one group, the societal security for that group can be

understood as threatened. If the state seeks to challenge this by assimilation of one minority,

and if this minority holds great power in a neighboring country, this may therefore escalade.

In Mali, the return of the Tuaregs who worked for former Colonel Qadaffi in Libya, have

showed how one group seek to fight for their identity, culture and therefore societal security,

can challenge the political- and military security, and perhaps in the future if successful also

the economical one.

Environmental Security

After the fall of the Soviet Union and therefore the end of the Cold War, there was an

emergence within the academia and in policy statements that the environmental change would

be a threat towards global security.37

This because of the possible consequences of climate

change, like; disruption of human systems, armed conflicts over scarce resources, conflicts

that might arise of interaction caused by climate migration, were seen as possible triggers for

armed conflicts.

As seen in regards to the economic security, Mali’s revenues that could produce Mali’s

ability to uphold the political-, military- and in that way also the societal security, depends

heavily on Mali’s agricultural capabilities. A threat against Mali’s environmental security will

also be a threat towards Mali’s general security, and beyond, as this can cause climate

migration. According to Buzan38

, environmental security is about the maintenance of both the

local-, as well as the planetary biosphere, and how this will be a key component in a support

system that all humans depend upon.

37

Dalby. Simon (in) Williams.Paul, D: Security Studies an introduction. 2nd

ed. 2013. Routledge. New York. 38

Buzan. Barry: New patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 67, No. 3 (Jul.., 1991), pp. 431-451

17

According to UNs Secritary-Generals special advisor, Jan Egeland39

, the Sahel is the

‘Ground-Zero’ for climate change. That the people living in the semi-arid belt just south of

the Sahara, is living on the edge, with multiple security challenges, and that a threat to the

environment, might throw the people in the area over the edge. With speculations concerning

climate change and its effect on conflicts, it may be easy to conclude that the warmer climate

will result in more famine and drought in the area, that can cause a humanitarian disaster,

mass migration and therefore also confrontations causing violence. If this is the case, both

political-, military-, and economical security will be put under pressure, however, according

to a Norwegian study—looking at the relationship between climate change and armed conflict

in the area concludes with a different conclusion. This conclusion challenge the thinking and

fear from the early ‘environment security’ debate after the Cold War, were numerous analyst

and academics have linked climate change as a trigger-point or a main factor in armed

conflicts in the Sahel.

The ‘Climate Change’ thinking, alarms the public of the danger that we will see millions of

climate refugees, food insecurity and linking it up with how this is likely to cause more

conflicts40

. With a ‘Ground Zero’ in the Sahel, this thinking indicates that a lot of conflicts

caused by climate change will occur in the Sahel, or that the conflicts seen in Mali can be

explained out from the absence of environmental security. Tor A. Benjaminsen41

, criticized

this argument, saying even though drought might be one of the factors, the key triggers of

conflict in Mali are not mainly rooted by environmental challenges, but by historical and

political ones.

The Niger River is a crucial source when it comes to agriculture production and therefore,

both food and economic security. About 25 billion m3 of water is consumed in the Niger

inland Delta, and flooding from the river is an important factor in the production, since this

enables both the production of crops, but also the reconstitution of grazing grounds for

millions of animals in the area. 42

Drought can be a tremendous challenge towards the

39 http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=26878#.VKGZn14AKA 40 Dalby. Simon (in) Williams.Paul, D: Security Studies an introduction. 2nd ed. 2013. Routledge. New York. 41 Benjaminsen. Tor, A: Klima og konflikter i Sahel- eller politikk og vitenskap ved klimaets nullpunkt. Internasjonal Politikk. Årgang 67. Nr2. 2009. pp.151-172. Universitetsforlaget. NUPI. www.idun.no/ip 42

Samuel Diarra, Marcel Kuper and Gil Mahé: MALI: FLOOD MANAGEMENT - NIGER RIVER INLAND DELTA. 2004. WMO/GWP Associated Programme on Flood Management (APFM)

18

production and the environmental security in the area, as seen in 1984 when the flood only

inundated about 3,600 km2 of the land—in comparison to 20,000km

2 in the wet years.

43

According to Benjaminsen, the main reason for the drought could not be blaming climate

change, but rather human actions as dam building. The 80s drought, is according to

Benjaminsen44

, most likely an effect of the building of the Sélingué dam in southern Mali,

that opened in 1982. This dam, then blocked much of the water that would be flooding

northwards, and as an effect—the drought farther north. In this way, the reasons for the

drought and famine in Mali in the 80’s, might actually be more locally created and therefore,

the solutions should also be addressed and implemented more locally at political levels in

Mali. Conflict over water management is not a new phenomenon in Africa, as we also can

trace difficulties when it comes to ownership of the Nile in Eastern Africa.

Many have stressed the danger of desertifization in the Sahel, but according to Benjaminsen45

,

the quite opposite is observed happening in parts of Mali. When looking at drought in the

Sahel as threats from global climate change, he view the situations more as historical and

natural swings that happens over and over again. In this way, drought in the Sahel can be

understood in more local and historical terms, than something new in line with the larger

‘Global warming’ and ‘climate change’ debate.

When it comes to energy consumption in Mali, according to 2010 numbers46

, 48,4%

electricity are made from fossil fuel and 51,6% from hydro electric plants. To develop and

create more industry, Mali will need more electricity. Therefore, smart solutions that will be

manageable and with a low risk for the environmental security, need to be addressed when it

comes to where this energy should come from, be it fossil or hydro, or other renewable

sources.

So therefore, when it comes to Mali and Buzan’s thinking of environmental security as the

maintenance of local and planetary biosphere, as the main support system for human

existence, in the Malian context, it is according to Benjaminsen47

not as bad and global as the

43

Ibid. 44 Benjaminsen. Tor, A: Klima og konflikter i Sahel- eller politikk og vitenskap ved klimaets nullpunkt. Internasjonal Politikk. Årgang 67. Nr2. 2009. pp.151-172. Universitetsforlaget. NUPI. www.idun.no/ip 45 Benjaminsen. Tor, A: Klima og konflikter i Sahel- eller politikk og vitenskap ved klimaets nullpunkt. Internasjonal Politikk. Årgang 67. Nr2. 2009. pp.151-172. Universitetsforlaget. NUPI. www.idun.no/ip 46

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ml.html [Accessed: 10.11.2014] 47

Benjaminsen. Tor, A: Klima og konflikter i Sahel- eller politikk og vitenskap ved klimaets nullpunkt. Internasjonal Politikk. Årgang 67. Nr2. 2009. pp.151-172. Universitetsforlaget. NUPI. www.idun.no/ip

19

many academics, think tanks and politicians would say it is. Some of the environmental

problems and how this effect’s the other securities are more based on mismanagement and

bad policies. This can be seen as how the dam projects in the 80’s resulted in drought, and

with new plans of dam projects, this risk disruption of the ecosystem in the Niger Delta, and

challenges to the farming system.48

It is therefore a dire need to balance the different policies

in the planning of future energy need in Mali, so it is to uphold environmental security. If the

government fails to do this, this might then result in a more conflicts that are either based

because a threat of political or societal security. However, as research in the 1990’s found

out, likeliness of conflicts are not based on environmental scarcities, but rather it seemed that

conflict is more likely when there are present more resources, but limited economic options.49

Political decisions like opening a dam might result in grievance for those being direct

effected, and in this way, if not helped and compensated, cause dissatisfaction that can harm

the political security. If a decision like this effect one type of people, this can also then

possibly be used as leverage in a groups’ claim of marginalization, and result in polarization.

This can then result in a greater conflict and claims like the agricultural and land reforms have

threatened the nomadic life of the pastoral nomads in northern Mali.50

When it comes to establishing the environmental security, both political and economical

issues need to be addressed to counter the threats. Because of the inter-link between the

securities, there is a need to address the environmental challenges with a strong and united

front and therefore include both economical and political solutions.51

Conclusion

As seen, the general security of Mali is not based only on threat from terrorist that wish to

wage Jihad against western ideas and modernization. Mali’s general security is based on

different types of security concepts that are each interlinked to each other, and affect each

other in symbioses. Therefore, addressing security challenges in Mali simply out from a

typical military approach against a human enemy, will not only fail in the long-term, but also

likely to be counter-productive. Therefore, in addressing security challenges a broader picture

48 Samuel Diarra, Marcel Kuper and Gil Mahé: MALI: FLOOD MANAGEMENT - NIGER RIVER INLAND DELTA. 2004. WMO/GWP Associated Programme on Flood Management (APFM) 49 Dalby. Simon (in) Williams.Paul, D: Security Studies an introduction. 2nd ed. 2013. Routledge. New York. 50 Benjaminsen. Tor, A: Klima og konflikter i Sahel- eller politikk og vitenskap ved klimaets nullpunkt. Internasjonal Politikk. Årgang 67. Nr2. 2009. pp.151-172. Universitetsforlaget. NUPI. 51

Stone. Marianne: Security according to Buzan: A comprehensive Security Analysis. 2009. Security Discussion Papers Series 1. Spring 09. Groupe d’Etudes et d’Expertise “Sécurité et Technologies” GEEST- 2009

20

of security threats need to be analyzed and a more comprehensive approach needs to be

implemented. By only focusing on one threat, we risk elevating the risk in another sector, and

therefore a more comprehensive approach that take on all types of threats to ensure long-term

security on the broad range is needed. Only in this way will the domestic security with

political stability, contribute to ensure regional and a more international security.

For Mali to ensure their ‘national’ security, it needs to understand that all its inhabitants, the

states and its system, is all playing a part in the greater picture. Economical-, social- and

environmental factors are as Buzan52

explains, as important as the political and military ones

that are usually focused on.

For Mali, a blow against one sector because of environmental changes can result in a great

blow against the economical sector that again will affect the security forces offensive and

defensive capabilities. As a result, the political security of the country will be more vulnerable

for both internal and external threat to the political stability. With corruption in the state and

law apparatus, this can also challenge the general societal security.

One great challenge towards Malian national security might also be the fact of the low median

age of the population. With a very young population, it faces risks in both workforce and the

loss of a well trained population that are better able to handle the risks that the population will

face in the future.

In the case of securitization, the Malian state, should seek to find a common security threat

that appeal to the whole Malian population, and that’s cooperative within its border—rather

than conflicting ones. In this way, the whole Malian population and the Malian government

should be working together, rather than fighting each other, This, can only be done if Mali

achieve political stability with an uncorrupt and legitimate government that respects the whole

population.

One thing that needs to be done is to achieve political stability, and the strengthening of a

legitimate government, that seek to understand the collective needs for the whole population

and groups within the country, and that are able to achieve consensus between these groups.

To achieve this, the government need, as mention, to first be legitimate. To achieve this, it

needs a broad representation of the groups within its borders. This again will pressure the

52 Buzan. Barry: People, States and Fears. 1983. Weathsheap Books LTD. John Spiers. Sussex. UK

21

government to address the real security challenges the population faces, and not just

imaginary threats constructed to achieve short terms gains.

By focusing on the underlying challenges, be it food security, violence, or other types of

marginalization from either other groups or the State itself, and implement a real long-term

comprehensive strategy, unity within Mali and security for the people can be achieved.

As seen, Mali are facing challenges, however, fighting Ansar al-Dine or AQIM in northern

Mali will not fix the problem, there is a greater need to view the security challenges in Mali in

a broader picture. By looking at the different ‘sectors’ of securities, we will be enabled with a

better understanding of the underlying causes of conflicts in both Mali and problems in the

broader region. This because we will be able to observe the problem from multiple angles,

and therefore enabled to find more sustainable solutions to establish national security. .

22

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