Managers' attitudes towards industrial democracy by Chris W. Clegg, Nigel Nicholson, Gill Ursell, Paul R . Blyton and Toby D. Wall MRC Social and Applied Psychology Unit, University of Sheffield, England FEW people would deny that industrial democ- racy is a fashionable subject. The reasons are not hard to identify: a growing concern for the respon- sibilities of decision-makers and the rights of those affected by their decisions. coupled with an inten- sified search for solutions to the problems of industrial conflict and workers' dissaffection. The latest chapter in this story has been the publication of the controversial Bullock Reports1 (majority and minority) which have indeliblystamped indus- trial democracy on the agenda of industrial and political change.

Social scientists have been disappointed. if not surprised, to find that the heat of popular debate has generally tended to disregard empirical research, though equally i t could be contended that social science research has failed to offer answers to the questions thrown up by the debate. One problem has been that while we know something of workers' attitudes to participationz, we know a good deal less about the views of the other participants: managers and shop stewards. The importance of these two groups is such that the success or failure of any industrial democracy scheme may hinge upon their attitudes, through their 'management' or 'stewardship' of the partici- patory system, and in their capacity as leaders influencing the attitudes and behaviour of the workforce. This paper attempts to offer a detailed and systematic examination of the attitudes held by one:' of these groups: managers.

Before describing our survey and its results. let us, briefly review some other research that has examined managers' orientations to industrial democracy. Tabb and Goldfarb's study of Israeli employees included 36 managers. I 2 of whom were described as being in favour of 'participation' in the fo rm of worker representatives participating jointly with management in decisions covering all areas of the business enterprise. In this country Guest and Fatchett have reported that 90 middle

1 Repor t 01 the Comrnmee of Inqutry on Industrial Democracy' ,

2 See 10, example Wall, T D and Lischeron J 4 , Worker Parrrc8ppa Cmnd 6706 . HMSO London January 1977. Chairman Lord Bullock

lion a ciilrque o f lhe l i leralure and some fresh evidence 1977

3 A study 01 shop stewards attitudes 8s ~ ~ r i e i i l l ~ underway 4 Tabb J Y and Goldlarb A , Workers parlic!parron ,n Mandgemenl

MrGraw-HIII.

Expecrarmnr and E x p e r w c e , Pergamon Press. I 9 7 0

managers from a nationalised concern viewed participation "as an aid to management rather than as a desirable objective i n its own right"5, and a similar study by Farnham and Pimlott of 86 British managers working in Hampshire, revealed a preference for consultation, though most of the sample recogn ised that "collective bargaining could make a positive contribution to the exten- sion of worker participation".fi

One of the main limitations of these studies is that they fail to look for variations within their managerial samples, despite the fact that systema- tic differences are widely assumed to exist, for example, between line managers at the 'sharp end' of participation and their colleagues in functional management jobs. Two studies paying some atten- tion to differences such as these. are those by Dhingra7 and Brannen et a1.8 In both. more 'progressive' attitudes to participation were found among younger. better educated managers. But even this apparently commonsense finding is not unconrroversial. Haire et a19 in a survey of over 3000 managers from 14 countries. found that age, company size and managerial level showed relati- vely little influence on a whole constellation of motives. perceptions and attitudes. including opin- ions about participation.

Clearly reliable data is unhappily scarce in this area. a state of affairs that does nothing to counteract the widespread tendency to describe managerial attitudes in stereotypical terms. Furth- ermore. the few studies that have been reported have usually focused on small and local samples of managers, have tended not to examine the inter- relationships among the views and preferences expressed. have rarely looked for differences exist- ing within their samples. and have generally ap- proached the subject at an unrealistically high

5 Guest. D and Fatchett. D . "Worker Parlrcrpanon Indmlndl Conrrol andPedoormance". l n ~ t i t ~ t e of Personnel Management. 1 9 7 4 p 9 4

6 Farnham. D and Pmlo t l . J , 'Who wants Bullock) , New Socrery, March 3 1977 p 451

J Dhmgra. 0 P , "Partic~pative Predisposition of Managers 8 " the Indian Publvc Sector Industry ' 8 " Thakur C P and Seth,. K C IEds). "Indusrnal Democracy Some Issues and Erpenencer", Shri Ram Centre lor Industrial Relations and Human Resources 1973

8 Brannen. P , Batstone. E , Falchett. D and White P , The Worker D r e c r o r r .Hutchinson. 1976

9 Haire M , Ghiselli E E and Porter. L W , Mafiagerm/ Thmkmg An lnlern.~lmndl Sfudy':John Wilev. 1966

4 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS JOURNAL VoI 9 No 3 0 1 9 7 8 Buriners Publications Ltd London

level of abstraction and generality. Few conclu- sions of practical import have been drawn.

The present investigation attempted to fill some of these gaps by pursuing three main objectives. First, we sought to describe in some detail the attitudes towards industrial democracy of a nation- al sample of managers. Secondly, we set out to examine the extent to which these views were related to situational and personal factors (for example whether there were differences i n atti- tudes between managers working in the public as opposed to the private sector). Finally, we aimed to explore what Brannen et al. have termed “the cognitive frameworks people use in approaching participation”.lo

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The sample

To identify the ‘key issues’ in the area of industrial democracy, an extensive literature search was followed by a programme of interviews with ‘experts’ from a variety of backgrounds. taking particular account of the views of practising managers and trade unionists. A pilot question- naire incorporating these issues was developed and tested on these practitioners before modification into its final form.

A national market research agency administered the survey placing 204 self-completion question- naires using fieldworkers spread over England and Wales. Each agent placed six questionnaires with managers in full-time employment. working in establishments with a minimum of 150 full-time employees. Each agent had a quota to f i l l so that we were guaranteed a spread of respondents across a number of categories thus enabling us to make certain important intra-sample comparisons (e.g. between managers from manufacturing and non- manufacturing industry). This enabled us to describe the sample according to the categories shown in Table I : organisational characteristics (e.g. company size), occupational characteristics (e.g. job level). and personal characteristics (e.g. political affiliation).

The questionnaires were distributed early i n 1977. Completed surveys totalled 185. representing a response rate of 91%.

The research instrument11 The questionnaire was organised around four

general forms of industrial democracy which the pilot interviews suggested were the most salient.

These were chosen for their intrinsic interest but also as representative of radically different ap- proaches to the practice of industrial democracy. The first two. for example, are indirect representa- tive forms. and might be characterised as ‘power oriented’. or ‘hard’, since they often focus on major organisational decisions. In contrast. the latter two forms are direct and. being primarily concerned with day-to-day operational matters. may be char- acterised as relatively ‘soft’ on power. Each form was broadly defined and presented for evaluation in separate sections of the questionnaire as fol- lows: -

Worker Directors: these are people from the shopfloor who sit on the Board of Directors of an organisation. (This section also included consideration of Supervisory Boards.) The Extension of Collective Bargaining: this approach involves no fundamental change to current machinery and procedures but the range and type of issue subject to consultation and negotiation is widened. In effect, more decisions within the organisation fall within the scope of collective bargaining (whether by trade unions. or by other worker- representative bodies.) Job Redesign: this involves reorganising jobs so as to give workers or workgroups greater control over how and when the work is done, at the same time introducing more responsi- bility and more variety into the work, and making i t more meaningful for those who do i t . Work Group Meetings: we include here any arrangements which enable all employees to talk with their immediate superior and their

1 1 The queriionnatre IS available on request from C W Clegg. Medual Research Council Social and Applied PsKhology Uni l . University of Sheflield Shelfield S I O 2TN 10 Erannen. P el at . op CII . p 30

5

Mtrnrigers' cittitirries towurdy industriui LIeinocrui y

TABLE I: A profile of the management sample

A. Orpnismional Charucrerisrics B. Occripalional Charuclerislics

(N = 185)

public sector 28% level in the organisation: private sector 72% clerical worker

head of section management advisor middle or junior manager

manufacturing industry 61% director or senior manager non-manufacturing industry 39%

I % I90 3%

50% 45%

multinational companies other companies

44% 54%

company size (by numbers employed):

600- I 199

1-349 350-599

1.200-2.999 3,000-9.999 IO.0OO-89.999 90.000 +

13% I 0% 12% 9%

I I% 2 I % 2%

managerial function: line manager y n e r a l manager unctronal manager

other

29% 25% 42% 4%

C . Personal Churuclerislics

Sex: male female

98% 2%

site size (by numbers employed): 1-249 250--399 400-599 600-899 900- I. I99 1,200-2.999 3.000-9.999 10,000 +

3 I % 15% 1 0 9 C 9??3

I 0% 14% 6% 5%

number of trade unions: 0 I 2 3 o r 4 5- 10 I I +

5% 8% 12% 18% 32% 25%

extent of unionisation: wholly mainly partly none at all

Age: 0-29 ears 30-4Jvears 40- 49 pears 50 +

4% 28% 35% 33%

trade union (or staff association)

not a trade union (or staff member 3 4%

association) member 66%

Dolitical orientation: tar right W O far left 090 right 2wo left 2% ce'ntre right 54% centre left 21%

17% 46% 2% 8%

strenth of political interest: very strong 670 fairly weak 13%

medium 52% fairly strong 26% very weak 2%

For reasons of space. this table does not include details of respondents' length of service, a e at which completed full-time education. and knowledge/experience of the different form of industrial 8ernocracy.

6

managers on a face-to-face basis in group meetings. Such groups can be used to pass information up, down or across the organisa- tion: and/or they may be used to solve problems relevant to the work of the group. These groups tend to have different names in different companies, for example, ‘briefing groups’. ‘action planning groups’, ‘production groups’. etc.. but they have the common feature of bringing the shopfloor and their management into direct contact for discussion purposes.

For each of the four forms, the questionnaire covered how much people knew about or had experience of them, how they would like them to operate, what problems they foresaw in them, and how they evaluated them (emphasizing realistic rather than utopian values).

The other central theme in the questionnaire was embodied in a list of seven objectives of participation that emerged repeatedly from our literature review12 and our prior discussions with academics and practitioners. These objectives ranged from the highly pragmatic (e.g. increasing efficiency) to the openly ideological (e.g. changing industry along socialist lines), and are listed in Table 2. Respondents were asked their views on these objectives as well as the perceived likelihood of each of the four forms achieving them.

Other parts of the questionnaire sought more general views on the subject of industrial democ- racy, preferred approaches to i t ( i f any) and details of respondents’ characteristics.

FINDINGS’3 To correspond with the objectives specified in

our introduction. we report our findings under three headings: I . Attitudes towards industrial democracy. 2. Attitudes as correlates of sample

3. Cognitive frameworks. characteristics.

I 2 Far example see Walker K F Workers P a r t c i p i i o n in Manage- lnremarronalInrf~fule a! Labour

13 The authors w u l d like to acknowledge the help given b y Jackbe

ment - Problems Practice and Prospects Studres Bullelm 1974 1 2 p p 2 - 3 5

Lubbock m the analysis of these findings

1. Attitudes towards industrial democracy

While the views expressed by these managers varied, we shall see that most of them were broadly in favour of industrial democracy, and that almost all the sample valued ‘pragmatic’ objectives which the majority believed could be met through the direct forms of participation.

In order to describe their attitudes, we attempted to answer three questions: ‘which features should each form of industrial democracy incorporate?; ‘which objectives are sought and which outcomes are expected?’: and. ‘how is each form evaluated?.

Desired features of each form Respondents’ opinions about these features were

elicited because i t makes little sense to ask for an evaluation of say. worker directors, without some specification of how they were elected or appoint- ed, and how much power and responsibility they holdl4.

Looking first at Worker Direcrors then. it emerged the majority of the sample (77%) would want them to be elected by all employees, alth- ough some (10%) would want them appointed by the existing board of directors. Very few thought they should be either appointed by the trade union (3%). or elected by trade union members only (2%)). There was almost universal agreement (9%) that they should constitute a minority of the board. Regarding their links with the workforce, most (79%) wanted them to “represent in a general sense a worker’s point of view”, the rest saying “they should be directly responsible to and for their particular workforce”. The sample were split on whether worker directors should share financial responsibility with other directors (51% vs 49%). but only a minority wanted them to have equal power on all issues (35%). Many (51%) wanted them to have an advisory function only. and some ( I 1%) equal power but only on personnel issues.

Turning to the problems typically anticipated with this form. there was more optimism than might be expected. Most (55%) said they thought worker directors would be able to keep in touch

14 In fact. 11 was no1 attempted for lob redesign as 8 1 was assumed the features of such schemes would be highly situation specific

7

Do,i~i i r rhink:

I . organisations need to be more socially responsible? Yes

2. -organisations need to strive to reduce conflict Yes

e.g. over issues such as redundancy and pollution

between management and the shopfloor?

neutral no

neutral n o

3. organisations need to be more efficient? Yes neutral

n o

4. organisations need to strive to increase the j o b satisfaction of their employees?

54% 8%

3 890

97% 2% I%

(see below)

neutral no 3%

5. the current system o f industrial organisation Yes needs changing along socialist lines? neutral

no

6. organisations shnuld share power and res onsibility Yes neutral

n o more democratically amongst employees. .p

8% I 1% 82%

48% 13% 3990

7. the interests o f employees’should be defended and Yes promoted to a greater extent than is the case at present? no

neutral

with the people they represented and a larger proportion (65%) felt they would have the know- ledge and skills necessary to make an effective contribution to the board. with the almost univer- sal qualification that prior training would be necessary. This confidence is perhaps not too surprising in view of the highly circumscribed nature of the role most respondents obviously envisaged for them. There was however. less optimism about the ability of worker directors to handle the conflicfs that might arise between organisational profitability and employee welfare (567L were pessimistic on this point. 38% optimis- tic).

Concerning the extension of collective bargain- ing, respondents were asked to distinguish between ‘negomrion’ and ‘consultat~on’. Many (43%) en- dorsed more of the former. usually along with more of the latter. although an equal number

8

56% 16% 29%

(41%) favoured more consultation only. Many ( 5 5 % ) also viewed the distinction between consul- tation and negotiation as becoming irrelevant.

O n the form and functions o f work group meetings. very few (4%) thought these should only exist to pass information ‘downwards’ from man- agement to workers. Most (60%) thought their purpose should be to pass information in both directions. A smaller number (17%) thought they should also have decision-making powers.

Objectives and outcomes The objectives this sample were asked to consid-

e r a re listed in Table 2a. Respondents were first asked how much they were in favour of each objective in general terms (see Table 2a), and then whether each form could meet each of the seven objectives (see Table Zb).

Examination of Table 2a clearly reveals that

TA

BL

E 2

b: O

utco

mes

of

the

vari

ous

form

s

I. or

gani

sati

ons b

c m

ore

soci

ally

resp

onsi

ble?

e.

?. o

ver i

ssue

s su

ch a

s re

dund

ancy

and

2. o

rgan

i\at

ions

rrdu

ce c

onfl

ict b

etw

een

nian

agcm

ent

and

the

shop

floo

r?

pollu

lion

Do

you

thin

k th

is fo

rm w

ould

hel

p:-

yes

49%

n

o e

ffec

t 38

%

the

oppo

site

13

%

yes

55%

no

eff

ect

22%

th

e om

osit

e 19

%

Wor

ker

3. o

rpni

sati

ons

be m

ore

effi

cien

t?

4. o

rpni

snti

ons

incr

ease

the

job

hatis

fact

ion

01' th

eir e

mpl

oyee

s?

.~

~

~~

yes

39%

47

%

no e

ffec

t 28

%

28%

th

e op

posi

te

30%

22

%

45%

29

7r

1 40%

yes

no e

ffec

t 60

%

the

oppo

site

8%

I I

%

exte

ndin

g C

olle

ctiv

e B

arga

inin

g

3 8%

44

%

14%

ye$

no e

ffec

t th

e op

posi

te

yes

no

eff

ect

the

oppo

site

Ye5

no

eff

ect

the

oppo

site

65Q

14

%

I 8%

~~

61%

46

%

26%

39

9 10

%

9%

45%

46

%

36%

3 5

%

17%

I45

7

75%

68

%

18%

18

%

I 0%

5. c

hang

e in

dust

rial

org

anis

atio

n al

ong

soci

alis

t lin

es?

6. o

rgan

isat

ions

shar

e po

wer

and

res

pons

ibili

ty

mor

e de

moc

rati

call

y am

ongs

t em

ploy

ees?

7. i

n th

e de

fenc

e an

d pr

omot

ion

of e

mpl

oyee

s'

inte

rest

s?

66%

64%

90

%

27%

69%

84

%

17%

12

%

I I%

I 84

%

I 83V

9%

15%

48%

4U

%

61%

79

%

32%

1 1;;

1 3%

Managers’ ottituLies towords industrial tiemoo-rrc v

“reducing conflict between management and the shopfloor” and “increasing employees’ job satis- faction” were almost universally valued by this sample.1“

The results in Table 2b display two distinct patterns. First. there was considerable optimism that ‘reducing conflict’, ‘increasing efficiency’ and ‘increasing job satisfaction’ could be achieved through work group meetings. and there was nearly as much confidence in Job redesign. Ex- tending collective bargaining and worker directors. on the other hand. were not. in the main, viewed as achieving these last two objectives. although both these forms were Seen by many as helpful in reducing conflict. The second pattern reveals that for all four forms across most of the objectives, the number of respondents predicting negative effects were outnumbered both by those with positive views and those anticipating ’no effects’. This is consistent with Tabb and Goldfarb’s conclusion that “only very few of the working Population expected negative results from participation”.“ The major exception to this Pattern concerns worker directors. Most Of this Sample (82%) were opposed to changing industry along socialist lines. yet the majority (61%) believed this would be one of the outcomes of this form. We shall see the lelevance of this below.

Evaluations of the four forms

of each of the four forms.

allowed). I n item 3. respondents were asked whose objectives they thought each form would further. T’he two direct forms of participation which we have characterised as ‘soft on power’, were the most popular. and were widely seen as furthering the objectives of the organisation. managers and workers. but no[ the trade unions. A! the Same time. the two ‘power oriented’ indirect forms were noticeably less popular and seen by most as furthering only the objectives of workers and trade unions. From these results, i t may be inferred that the unpopularity of worker directors is partly due to this form being seen as a step towards socia- lism. The majority of respondents (63%) expressed opposition to Supervisory Boards.

to industrial democracy were the two direct forms where it was anticipated this might be most controversial (see i t e m 4). Few managers saw the direct forms as ‘irrelevant’, though more saw them as ‘side’ rather than as ‘central’ issues. Further- more. most of this sample (72%) agreed with the statement “In the final analysis industrial democ- racy is about power”. These findings support the interpretation that many managers expect a numb- er of p o t e n t i a l highly benefits to flow from the direct forms. while acknowledging (rather ruefully?) that the debate and the practice of industrial democracy revolves around the issue of power.

Most managers were in favour of indus t r ia l democracy and virtually the entire sample valued cpragmaIic. objectives w h i c h t he majority believed

The sample was also asked how

Table 3 summarises respondents’ evaluationsl7

The first item in the table confirms the populari- tY Of work group meetings and job redesign. Less expected. perhaps* was t h e apparent popuiarity Of

could be met through the direct forms ofparticipa- tion, These were seen as furthering the objectives

extending collective bargaining. The second item shows, for those people in favour of industrial

they would prefer (combinations of choices being

of the organisation. management and workers but not trade unions. A t t h e Same t i m e , recog-

were. however, groups i n favour of

democracy generally (72%)* I h e approaches lo i t nised that power is central to this debate, There

more ‘ideological’ goals: for example. 48% of this

vkewng managers IS that ef fcterry IS one of their primary obiectwes power and responsibility more democratically

15 Unfortunately. there 15 no data on the efficiency’ oblectwe due to a pr,nt,ng ,n the quest,onnalres However. our impression from Inter- sample were in favour of ~rganisations “sharing

16 Tabb. J Y and Goldlarb. A , op cat , p 199 1 7 Respondents were asked to evaluate each form as an approach to

industrial democracy This presents problemsol interpretation lor the m u l l s on worker dtractorr in particular. as one cannot be sure 11 the evaluation

the Bullock Malority Report I t 4s probably sales1 10 assume ewaluattons were tn terms of the former and that they would have been more negative 10

amongst S imi l a r ly . t he con- tained advocates of the indirect forms. especially

the Form as they would ideally eovlsage ,t. I t Is proposed In of collective bargaining. There were fewer sup-

table version of this form would have to he a long porters of worker directors and any widely accep-

relation to Bullock style proposals

10

TA

BL

E 3: V

arious Evaluations of the 4 form

s of industrial democracy

Item:

I. In general term

s what is your opinion

In favour N

eutral of this approach to Industrial D

emocracy?

Against

2. *Approaches m

ost promising to prom

ote . C

hosen by

3. *W

hose objectives do you think this W

orkers

Industrial Dem

ocracy

approach would further?

Trade U

nions M

anagement

Central issue

Side issue

Irrelevant

OrLganisation

4. How

central do

you think this form is

to the promotion of Industrial D

emocracy?

Extending

Worker

Collective

Directors

Bargaining

35% 66%

16%

I 4%

44%

15%

33%

35%

61%

5(rL 57%

61%

128

2 7%

28%

3 174

Not

N ot asked

asked

Work G

roup

I

649 1

73%

31%

47'Z 63%

52%

60%

3w4 4 I8

way removed from that proposed in the Bullock Majority Report.

2. Attitudes as correlates of sample charac teristics’8

The second objective was to identify which. if any, of the organisational. occupational or person- al characteristics listed in Table I , were related to the attitudes expressed by this sample, thus reveal- ing any systematic differences within the group and indications as to their origins.

In fact. we shall see that while attitudes tended not to vary systematically across most of the characteristics examined, four significant patterns of relationship did emerge from the analysis.

The major factor proved to be respondents’ political affiliation which was interesting in view of the limited range of political opinion expressed. For example, those of the left advocated greater influence for employees than did those of the right, and were also much more likely to believe that “organisations should share power and responsibility more democratically amongst em- pIoyees”. Left-inclined managers also took a more favourable and optimistic view of the worker director approach to industrial democracy than did managers on the right. They were more confident that worker directors would be able to handle conflicts between organisational profitability and workers’ welfare. They were also more prepared to say worker directors should hold some real power. At a more general level. left-inclined managers wanted more industrial democracy as well as anticipating that i t would have a more direct impact on them in their jobs than did right- inclined managers. Finally, managers o n the left were more likely t o agree that “We should be decentralising so that decisions are made as near the shopfloor as possible”. and less likely to hold the view that “Industrial democracy is a pipe- dream encouraged by leaders far removed from where the actual work is done”.

18 The I8ndmgr reparled 8n this section are suppried by ~ l a l i s l i ~ a l analyses using chi square and Pearson corielalton lechniquer In a l l carer ~lalislical ~ignilirance levels exceed 5 pi cenl and In moil cases the lee1 01 rignilicance IS very m u h greater

I2

Secondly. whether the managers worked i n the public o r private sector appeared to have some impact on their attitudes to worker directors. Those working in the public sector were generally more optimistic about this form than those in the private sector. and were, for example, more likely to believe worker directors would help organisa- lions become more efficient. The reason for such optimism may plausibly be attributed to an aware- ness of the various experiments in workers’ repre- sentation on the board, of nationalised industries. or perhaps to some democratic ethos engendered by nationalisation.

Comparing respondents from manufacturing and non-manufacturing enterprises revealed that the former generally knew more about and had had more experience of the various forms of industrial democracy. They also tended to attach more importance t o the subject than did those working in non-manufacturing industry. Why this should be the case is not clear from o u r data, although i t is probably relevant that the debate on industrial democracy has usually centred on the problems faced by manufacturing firms.

Turning to respondents’ knowledge and exper- ience of the different forms. several interesting findings emerged. First. people knowing more about one form also tended to know more about the others. However. knowledge and experience proved surprisingly independent of most other characteristics. such as managerial status or func- tion. the sole exception being knowledge of collec- tive bargaining which was positively related to the deeree of unionisation existent in the respondent’s organisation. Of particular note is the finding that knowledge and ‘optimism’ about industrial democ- racy were positively related. especially for collec- tive bargaining and work group meetings. Greater experience of each was accompanied by expres- sions of favourable attitudes and preferences for them over other forms and. in the case of work group meetings, experience was also directly relat- ed to a desire to expand this form to include decision-making functions.

None of the other Characteristics was associated with systematic differences in the attitudes ex- pressed by this sample. although there were some

weakly significant. scattered relationships. Since we are only concerned with sytematic and reliable patterns of relationships, these will not be report- ed.

Our earlier description of managers’ attitudes suggested that while certain commonalities existed. there was also considerable variety in the opinions expressed. Our analysis has revealed that these variations were not associated with major occupa- tional or organisational characteristics, and were only strongly related to managers’ political orien- tations and their knowledge and experience of the forms of industrial democracy.

It would be wrong to conclude that occupational and organisational characteristics exert no in- fluence on attitudes, but these findings do suggest that any relationships which may exist are more subtle and indirect than can be discerned by this method of inquiry. Questionnaires are well-known for their tendency to elicit generalised responses and it was lo counteract this that respondents were instructed to consider industrial democracy from a short-term perspective rather than in abstract and idealised terms. Nevertheless, we appear to have learned more about managers’ value systems than more particular influences on their attitudes. At this stage. i t is useful to assume that political orientations underpin attitudes towards industrial democracy, but that these orientations may be influenced by work experiences and situations which are in turn rooted in the characteristics of respondents’ occupations and organisations. In this way. knowledge and experience of industrial democracy schemes can be seen to have an impact on attitudes. Unravelling the complexities of these inter-relationships is a task awaiting further research.

3. Cognitive frameworks

Our third objective was to reveal major perspec- tives on industrial democracy and to speculate on the cognitive frameworks underlying them. The results of our analysis suggest that three distinct groups of managers. each holding quite different views on industrial democracy. may be identified. Initially. the sample may be dichotomised into those respondents in favour of industrial democ-

racy (73%) and those opposed to it (27%). The former group may further be divided into two sub-groups favouring different approaches to in- dustrial democracy, one group opting for the direct (‘soft’) approaches (34%). and the second favour- ing combinations of direct (‘soft’) and indirect (‘hard’) approaches (34%). (A very small sub-group endorsed the indirect approaches onlylg). We looked at the three major groups in some detail to identify profiles of their attitudes and characteris- tics.

Table 4 shows items that revealed systematic differences across the three groups.

Looking first at those against industrial democ- racy, most of them were to the ‘right’ politically and opposed to sharing power and responsibility more democratically amongst employees. Even over the ‘soft’ issue of the organisation of emplo- yees’ own jobs, most believed that they should only be consulted rather than have any stronger in- fluence. Similarly. on the ‘hard’ issue of how much power should be vested in worker directors, most felt their role should be advisory only. Most saw industrial democracy as no more than a side issue, some of the reasons for this being apparent in other items. Thus. most believed industrial democ- racy was a ‘pipe-dream’ and not ‘essential’. Their philosophy was evident in the belief that “Indus- trial democracy is irrelevant because people are predominantly working for money”. It is also captured by some of their own comments: “We are in danger of spending all our time ‘talking’ and no time ‘doing”’; “I think an extension of industrial democracy is inevitable - but i t will not improve efficiency or productivity”: and, “In terms of regenerating British Industry there are far more relevant issues: - profit incentives. management incentives. investment incentives”. In short, this group came closest to holding the dichotomous perspective in which the interests and motives of ‘us’ and ‘them’ are clearly differentiated.

The second group, those favouring the ‘soft’ approaches towards industrial democracy, were also mainly to the right politically. but they were

19 The fourth group. those choosing the ‘hard’ approaches only. account for 576 of this sample The data lor ihts group 15 presented but not discussed separately. as !heir views were not rignhcantly different from those favouring combinations of ‘hard’ and ‘salt’ farms

13

Item

:

I. H

ow w

ould

ou d

escr

ibe

YO

UF

ow

n i litical views{

Rig

ht

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tre R

ight

;:;[re

Left

J

1 2 D

o yo

u th

ink

orga

nisa

tions

sho

uld

shar

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wer

and

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ore

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ocra

tical

ly a

mon

gst e

mpl

oyee

5’

3 H

ow m

uch

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ence

sho

uld

empl

oyee

s ha

ve o

ver t

he w

ay th

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own

job

ic o

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vour

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st

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tral

Non

e C

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ltatio

n rig

hts

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ower

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eto

hual

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plet

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6 ln

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32 7

pipe

-dre

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far

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oved

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whe

re t

ie a

ctua

l I work

is do

ne.

1

29

43

4d

f 6

22

15

Xz

= 2

5.78

2

II

5 p<

.oO

l I

? In

dust

rial D

emoc

racy

is

not j

ust

ic

ing

on th

e ca

ke - in

our

cur

rent

ec

onom

ic d

iffw

zulti

es i

t is

abs

olut

ely

esse

ntia

l

8 In

dust

rial D

emoc

racy

is

irrel

evan

t be

caus

e pe

ople

are

pre

dom

inan

tly

wor

king

for

mon

ey

4. H

ow m

uch

pow

er s

houl

d w

orke

r D

irect

ors

have

?

Dis

agre

e (D

on’t

know

)

(Don

’t k

now

)

Adv

isor

y fu

nctio

n E

qual

pow

er o

n rs

onne

l iss

ues

onl]

6 u

al

pow

er o

n a

issue

s (O

ther

or d

on’t

know

)

App

roac

hes

App

roac

hes

0

5. To

you

pers

onal

ly is

Indu

stria

l D

emoc

racy

a c

entra

l iss

ue o

f m

ajor

im

porta

nce.

a s

ide

issu

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ong

man

v ot

hers

. or a

n irr

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ant i

ssue

? ~

~~

$~

~

An irre

levant

I2

19

I 0 3

I2

19

16

Xz =

16.83

2

Foot

note

: th

e st

atis

tical

ana

lyse

s ref

er to

diff

eten

ces

betw

een

the

first

thre

e gr

oups

onl

y. T

he fi

nal g

roup

of 9

resp

onde

nts

was

co

nsid

ered

to

o s

mal

l to c

ompa

re in

this

way

. Oth

er a

naly

ses

reve

aled

this

gro

up w

as n

ot c

igni

fican

tlv d

iffer

ent

to th

e th

ird

grou

p.

fairly evenly split on the issue of whether power and responsibility should be shared more democ- ratically amongst employees. Regarding the level of influence employees should have over the organisation of their own jobs, a majority favoured consultation rights. but there were substantial groups approving greater employee influence than this. Similarly. while most envisaged worker direc- tors in a purely advisory role, there was a sizeable minority who felt that workers on the board should have equal power to other directors. Like the first group, most of them felt industrial democracy was a side issue, but differed in believing i t to be ‘essential’ and not a ‘pipe-dream’ or ‘irrelevant’. Typical comments from this group were: “lndus- trial democracy need not necessarily mean worker directors but could perhaps require more open communication to achieve the same hopefully harmonious results”; and, “The workers them- selves must become more involved in order that they can be made more aware of their own responsibilities and contribute their know-how to the efficient running of the firm”. We interpret this group’s dominant frame of reference as the ‘uni- tary’ one.20

Before passing on to the next group, it is worth noting that direct forms of participation need not necessarily be ‘soft’ on power. For example. a job redesign project may lead to shopfloor workers having considerable autonomy over a wide range of decisions up to departmental level. This may stimulate further shared decision-making. as in the Norwegian Industrial Democracy Programme.21 where job redesign is seen as a necessary educa- tional precursor to successful ‘hard’ changes. Nevertheless. the evidence discussed above does indicate that the second group favoured these direct approaches because they are ‘soft’ on power (e.g. See Table 4 item 3).

The third group comprises managers favouring combinations of both ’soft’ and ‘hard’ approaches. Most of the politically ‘left’ managers fell within this category. although i t also included some of the

20 See For, A , “Managenal Ideology and labour relations”. brlrsh Journalof Indusrralllelalronr. 1966. 4. pp 366-378

2 1 See Emery. F and Tharsrud. E , “Democracy af Work”. Australian National Uniwrrity, Canberra. 1976

‘right’. They also differed from the other two groups in that a clear majority advocated the sharing of power and responsibility more democ- ratically amongst employees - what we termed earlier an ideological objective. i.e. industrial democracy is valued as an end in its own right. This group advocated more influence for emplo- yees over the organisation of their own jobs ( a ‘soft’ issue) than the group we have described as favouring ‘soft’ approaches only. They also advo- cated more power for worker directors than did the other two groups. and were the only group in which a majority felt industrial democracy was a central issue to them personally. Like those favouring ‘soft’ approaches, most thought indus- trial democracy ‘essential’, and disagreed that it was either a ‘pipe-dream’ or ‘irrelevant’. Whilst the- perspective held in this group cannot by any means be described as radical, there is considerable support for real changes in the extent of employee involvement in decision-making. For example, half of the group felt worker directors should have equal powers and voting rights to other directors on all issues, this group substantiating our characterisation of the indirect forms as more power-oriented or ‘hard’ than the direct forms. Again, two quotes from respondents within this group show the tenor of their views: “On balance I’m pro-industrial democracy provided it recog- nises all employees in that particular organisa- tion”: and, “Industrial democracy should be con- cerned predominantly with joint decision-making on nearly all aspects of industrial concern.”

Three groups of managers of approximately equal size have been identified each holding a distinct perspective on industrial democracy. The first group rejected i t on the grounds that it was neither a means of achieving sought-after pragma- tic goals, nor a human right per se. T o these managers the concept was ‘irrelevant’, employees being seen as instrumental in their behaviour at work. The second group, interpreted as holding the unitary frame of reference. were in favour of the ‘soft’ forms of participation. which were seen as means to certain pragmatic ends. The third group also favoured industrial democracy, but sought combinations of both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ forms. Their

Managers’ attitudes towards industrial democ~racy

view of the subject was more complex insofar as they saw it in both pragmatic and ideological terms. This was the only group prepared to accept some devolution of power.

In trying to understand the commonalities and differences of these perspectives, we have identi- fied three dimensions22 which are intended as useful descriptive summaries of the cognitive frameworks underlying the views expressed. The first dimension, ‘Pragmatism’, is shared by all our sample and reflects the nature of managerial jobs. The second, ‘Ideology’, relates to the perceived legitimacy of the rights of employees to have a say in the running of their organisation (at whatever level). People accepting this orientation value participation for its own sake and not solely as a means to practical ends. The final dimension. ‘Optimism’, encapsulates the belief that industrial democracy is relevant to industrial life because i t capitalises on employees’ supra-financial motiva- tions: the Theory Y23 belief in the potency of workers’ needs for involvement and responsiveness to responsibility. All the managers in our sample who favour industrial democracy may be described as ‘optimists’.

While such a framework is inevitably somewhat simplistic. i t nonetheless offers a more complex account of contrasting managerial views than has hitherto been attempted from empirical studies. Its significance lies in its potential for capturing the enduring features which underlie particular atti- tudes, which themselves may not be particularly stable i n such a topical and volatile area as this.

OVERVIEW This paper has argued that the attitudes of

managers toward industrial democracy. along with those of the other active participants. are of real practical significance for the operation of partici- patory systems.

I n this sample of managers, we have found that while there are certain recurring common atti-

22 We stress here that these dimansons are ollered as ratentially uaelul ways 01 conceptleltang the commonslities an4 dillerenccs betmen the three groups The dimensions themselves m a y not be independent In this context they are used as dicholomous variables

23 See McGregor. D M , “The Human Dde a t fnlerprrse”, McGraw- Hill, 1960

tudes, there is also considerable variety in the views expressed. The most important factors in understanding these variations have proved to be respondents’ political affiliation. and their know- ledge and experience of various forms of industrial democracy. Three distinct perspectives on indus- trial democracy have been identified in terms of pragmatism. ideology and optimism.

We close this paper with a brief review of some implications arising from this study. First, i t is clear that there is a need for future studies which attempt to isolate the critical factors that have an enduring influence on attitudes, and tell us more about the nature and diversity of important cogni- tive frameworks held by shop stewards and ‘workers’, as well as managers. There is also a need for longitudinal studies in organisations to test the stability of results such as those obtained here, and to tell us more about the effects of experience on the character of peoples’ perceptions and evalua- tions of forms of industrial democracy.

Looking at the current proposals for industrial democracy in the shape of the Bullock Report. i t is striking that all but a small number of these managers would disagree with its assertion that “ a wide range of participation already exists below board leve1”.24 Indeed, 49% of this sample thought either “only a very little” or “no” industrial democracy existed, while a further 42% believed a “moderate amount” pertained. Clearly this leaves considerable scope for change. In this context. there would be substantial support for the imple- mentation of work group meetings and job rede- sign. for their perceived virtues of increasing efficiency and job satisfaction. at the same time as reducing conflict. On the other hand, there would be widespread

opposition from managers to the implementation of worker directors as conceived in the Bullock Majority Report, though equally, a watering down of this form to make i t less threatening to manag- ers would probably so emasculate i t as to render i t unacceptable to other interested parties. However, there is room to experimentation on the efficacy (according to a number of criteria) with which

24 Bullock Repart op CII , pp 41 - 4 2

16

different systems can achieve the meaningful shar- ing of power in the board room. Progress towards the democratisation of power would be most happily achieved for this sample of managers by extending the range of decisions encompassed by collective bargaining. Whether this represents recognition of an irreversible trend, or preference for ‘the devil one knows’ is not clear. What can confidently be asserted is that many managers favour heterogeneous approaches to industrial democracy. and that there would be opposition to the development of the ‘hard’ forms in isolation.

An important truth to have emerged here is that there is no ‘universal managerial’ view on partici- pation any more than there is a single trade union viewpoint.25 Attitudes range from open hostility towards what is regarded as an unnecessary sur- render of managerial prerogatives offering no progress towards valued practical ends, to the view that industrial democracy offers a positive oppor- tunity to attain various material and nonmaterial goals.

One important implication of this diversity of opinion is that progress will not be achieved by searching for a national consensus. Current political debate has tended to portray the options open to us in terms of two needlessly extreme alternatives:

25 Widely differing tmde union attitudes MI^ expressed m submissions to the Bullock Committee

on the one hand, a universal edict forcing highly specific systems on organisations; on the other. a policy of complete permissiveness and piecemeal development. If one accepts the need for some legislative framework to encourage and develop industrial democracy, then it seems that social science may be able to contribute to the formation of guidelines that fall between these extremes to meet the diverse needs of different interest groups.

Our results show that, even among management. no single form of industrial democracy could command majority support, while there is a wides- pread belief in its necessity for our industrial future. This evidence shows that indirect or ‘hard’ forms of participation are only likely to be accep- table in combination with more direct forms of employee involvement. Of the particular options discussed here, the most favoured combination would appear to be the extension of collective bargaining along with the development of work group meetings, two forms enabling the involve- ment of the shop floor in information and decision-making systems. Whether these options are ones that could attract the support of trade union opinion remains to be seen from the results of our continuing research programme.

17