MARKET ANALYSIS IN EMERGENCIES - TEC

MARKET ANALYSISIN EMERGENCIES

SUBA SIVAKUMARAN

MARKET ANALYSIS IN EMERGENCIESA REPORT FOR THE CASH LEARNING PARTNERSHIP – CALP

SUBA SIVAKUMARAN

The Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP) aims to promote appropriate, timely and quality cash and voucher programming as a tool in humanitarian response and preparedness.

Originating from the will to gather the lessons learnt from the Tsunami emergency response in 2005, the CaLP is today composed by Oxfam GB, the British Red Cross, Save the Children, the Norwegian Refugee Council and Action Against Hunger / ACF International. The five steering committee organisations have come together to support capacity building, research and information-sharing on cash transfer programming as an effective tool to support populations affected by disasters in a way that maintains dignity and choice for beneficiaries while stimulating local economies and markets.

In 2010, the CaLP partnered with the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies (IFRC), with support from ECHO and Visa Inc.

For more information, visit: www.cashlearning.org

Published by the Cash Learning PartnershipOxfam HouseJohn Smith DriveOxford OX4 2JY

First published 2011

© The Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP) 2011

This publication is copyrighted, but may be reproduced by any method without fee or prior permission for learning purposes, but not for resale. For copying in any other circumstances, prior written permission must be obtained from the publisher.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction v

Section 1: Background 1

Current Tools 2

Section 2: Key elements of Market Analysis 7

Prices 7

Quantities 10

Trader Capacity 10

Commodity Market Chain 10

Section 3: Further Essential Concepts in Market Analysis 13

The Labour Market 13

Debt Constraints and Credit Markets 15

Political Economy Analysis 15

Market Integration 18

Supply/Demand Elasticity and Market Modelling 18

Understanding the Multiplier Effect 19

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CONTENTS

Section 4: How Market Analysis Can Inform the Project Cycle 21

Preparedness 22

Response 24

Monitoring 31

Early Recovery 32

Section 5: Future Areas of Investment 34

Data 34 34

Capacity 35

Increasing Rigour in Current Practice 36

Standards and Systems 37

Conclusion 38

Annexes 391. Review of Two Tools: Emma and MIFIRA Based on participant Feedback 402. Comparison of EMMA Responses across Different Contexts and Markets 453. DG ECHO Response Guidelines 704. Expanded Food Security Monitoring Institutions 715. Interview list 746. Bibliography 75

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research was informed and guided by the significant contributions of an active group of market analysis practitioners. Thank you to Alessandro De Matteis, Lili Mohiddin and Ben Mountfield for the invaluable comments. Thanks are especially due to Rosie Jackson and Jessica Saulle, whose intellectual

guidance was integral to this final report. Thank you to Chethana Biliyar, for research assistance with the final document. Finally, thanks are due to all the interviewees, whose experiences with market analysis were critical to this report. All errors remain the author’s alone.

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INTRODUCTION

What are markets? Markets are comprised of actors, institutions and policies that influence the production and consumption (hence the prices and quantities) of goods and services. A market for a single good can be extremely different from that for another, even if both goods are sold in the same physical market.

Market analysis is not a new phenomenon in the humanitarian world. It can be traced back to the early 1950s when some developed countries wanted to dispose of their accumulated food surpluses1. The recent emphasis on market analysis has been on its use in the relatively new modality of cash transfers, but it is relevant for all kinds of agency response. Understanding how markets are affected by crises and how agency response can both be informed by markets as well as impact markets is a fundamental part of continued development in systematic programme design.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Despite the number of tools available and the amount of innovations in programme design, the humanitarian assistance community faces a number of challenges when conducting market analysis to inform broader programme planning in

1 Recognizing the possibility that surplus disposal could displace commercial imports and discourage local production in recipient countries, the international community established in 1954 the FAO Principles of Surplus Disposal, FAO Website, Food Aid, www.fao.org/economic/est/market-analysis/food-aid/en

crises. This paper will address two key challenges arising from obstacles to more comprehensive and consistent detailed market analysis. By examining the capacity and current thinking within the sector this report discusses how we can improve the quality of market analysis, and its impact on humanitarian programmes.

The first of the two research goals is to better understand how markets can be approached in a manner that utilises their potential to ‘strengthen’ the impact of an intervention, rather than a more limited approach that is focused solely on ‘doing no harm’. At a minimum, of course, ‘humanitarian action [should] protect human life where this is threatened on a wide scale2’.

Research Question 1: How can market analysis strengthen the impact of interventions (ensuring a minimum of the do no harm principle)?

The second goal is to understand how institutions within the humanitarian sector can appropriately resource themselves to complete comprehensive market analysis well. They face not only constraints on resources, time and human capacity, but operate within an emergency context where markets, livelihoods and institutions are ruptured, baselines seldom exist and data collection can be very difficult. This report discusses ways in which investments

2 Hofmann et al, Measuring the Impact of Humanitarian Aid: A Review of Current Practice, Overseas Development Institute, June 2004

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INTRODUCTION

can be made to achieve improved markets analysis through exploring different options for institutional and sector capacity building.

Research Question 2: What resources are needed in terms of information, time and capacity to complete market analysis well, and when are they needed?

Traditionally, outcomes such as building human capital, building capacity for market participation, enabling individuals to become better able to save, etc., were considered the domain of development agencies. But as the humanitarian sector has undergone rapid transformational changes in practice, it is also considering how to strengthen humanitarian interventions to increase resilience. This is where markets can play an important role: in outlining mechanisms through which interventions can be scaled, identifying more cost-efficient/cost-effective methods of delivery, reviving local capacities to produce and consume, and in identifying more creative, refined and targeted responses.

This document represents the first phase of analysis by the Cash Learning Partnership: to understand how to strengthen interventions by using market analysis and what is needed to conduct market analysis well. The second phase is expected to be an action research phase in two to three different emergency contexts. It will use different market analysis tools and make recommendations on the value/usefulness of specific tools in different emergency contexts, different stages of the project management cycle, when they can be combined, for what purpose and how.

METHODOLOGY

This paper has relied on the analysis of existing literature on emergencies and markets, market analysis reports from the field, humanitarian programming literature and development literature.

In addition, twenty-one structured interviews with market analysis practitioners from implementing agencies, donor agencies and independent institutions were conducted, focusing mainly on the challenges with current tools and practices and understanding how responses were predominantly designed. The methodological challenges included trying to compare the results of market analyses that used a wide variety of tools at various stages of an emergency, a significant dearth of evidence and analysis on incorporating market analysis into emergency preparedness, the lack of a consensus in the field over what are ‘minimum standards’ in market analysis and whether this could be reasonably answered, and the lack of a certain sample size of rigorous studies on the issue of inflation in emergency contexts and its attributable causes.

STRUCTURE

This paper is divided into five sections. Section 1 provides a brief background to market analysis, covering a survey of current tools and practice. The purpose of Section 2 is to provide a very broad minimum of the concepts (prices, quantities, trader capacities and the market chain) that must be understood in any market analysis, whether limited or comprehensive. Section 3 elaborates on further essential concepts in market analysis, such as labour and credit markets, adopting a political economy perspective and the critical value that analysis of market integration, demand and supply elasticities and market multiplier effects can afford to program. These concepts are currently not always analysed, and represent gaps in practice. Section 4 examines different stages of the project cycle such as preparedness, response, monitoring and early recovery, to understand how market analysis can better inform these stages. Section 5 examines recommendations for future areas of investment based on the above gaps and its implications for the humanitarian sector, followed by a brief conclusion.

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SECTION 1: BACKGROUND

What are the kinds of questions that market analysis has to answer in humanitarian programming?

An example of a household, a disaster and planning questions

Consider Shan, a 32 year old smallholder farmer whose crops have been washed away by floods. His nearest livestock and produce market is 3 kilometres away, but passing the roads is only possible with a bullock cart. Two out of ten traders come from the same community as Shan and are unable to supply the market, so the market only has 60% of the rice it supplied before (and bread is 30% more expensive, for the same nutritional value). He has one goat that is still alive. He has a house of which a quarter of the roof has been damaged. The market for buying housing tools, tiles and cement is 2 hours away and has not been affected by the floods, but the suppliers there are unprepared for the large reconstruction demand. Around him are thirty families facing similar circumstances with varying assets.

Agency X has conducted a needs assessment and verified the eligibility criteria. Their objective is to ensure that consumption for Shan and his family is back to pre-emergency baseline levels or 30% more staple foods are consumed. Agency Y has determined that they will assist Shan with shelter.

Should X give Shan cash, rice or bread (locally procured or imported)? Should they use vouchers for food items or fix the roads so that he can sell goat milk and find other livelihood opportunities? Or should it be a mixture of all (and if so, how)? How long should they do so for? How frequently? Until the markets are back to normal? When will that be (what might happen between)? Will Shan use the cash or food purely for his consumption purposes or will he use the aid to pay off debt, or for his children’s education? Would that affect how much the agency should give him?

Agency Y faces a similar set of questions, including the possibility of flash inflation or longer-term inflation, and the larger amount of one-time aid transfer also likely carries different implications for Agency Y, of targeting, accessing/partnering, and monitoring that aid goes to its desired purposes.

Additionally, it is very likely there is some integration of Y and X’s markets (e.g., if it was in water, health or sanitation or food, fuel and services), which should be considered for possible increased efficiencies and other consequences. And finally, if there is a likelihood of such an emergency happening again in the same areas, how should both agencies monitor markets in an ongoing manner and use these experiences to inform their contingency planning?

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MARKET ANALYSIS IN EMERGENCIES

These questions only provide a small snapshot that shows the breadth and depth of what questions market analysis can answer. If one would attempt to visualise the range of objectives that market analysis could help meet (as one part of a larger humanitarian analysis and response), it could look like the diagram below, spanning the spectrum from a minimalistic Do No Harm approach, to one where market analysis increases efficiency and effectiveness of responses, and onward to one where market analysis is used to strengthen interventions.

Figure 1: Illustration of the range of objectives of market analysis

Current Tools

These days a variety of market analysis tools and guidance is available. A brief summary is shown below, modified from a list put together by the World Food Programme3. With the term ‘macro tools’ we refer to tools that analyse the broader economy (at the national and global level). By ‘meso tools’ we mean tools that analyse value chains, for example, or specific sectoral issues within markets. With ‘micro tools’ we refer to tools that analyse individual units, such as households and traders. These tools have all been used in the emergency sector to inform not only response, but ongoing monitoring. They have also been used in early warning systems.

3 World Food Programme, ‘Market Analysis Framework: Tools and Applications for Needs Assessments’, Food Security Analysis Service OXDF, 3 Oct 2011, Draft for Internal Guidance.

• Design responses, e.g. cash/in-kind/voucher

• For example ensure no significant long term inflation as a result of intervention (esp but not limited to non-beneficiaries)

• Ensure no disincentive effects on supply

• Ensuring minimisation of costs in delivery (cost efficiency)

• Ensuring objectives are met in a cost-effective manner (e.g. delivering nutrition cost-effectively

• Program alternative, more creative responses designed to strengthen capacities of individuals, communities and institutions, if found necessary and desirable by the market analysis

Do No Harm Strengthen interventions

Increase efficiency and effectiveness

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SECTION 1 BACKGROUND

Given the number of tools, approaches and conceptual frameworks, the task of integrating market analysis into assessment practices, let alone implementing responses, has been daunting for non-specialist personnel4. The EMMA tool has been the one most commonly used by humanitarian personnel to date, followed by the MIFIRA tool, and we turn to a brief discussion of both those tools here (a more detailed discussion is found in the annex).

SUMMARY OF CURRENT MARKET GUIDANCE TOOLS

Table 1: Summary of current market guidance tools

Scope Analysis Resources available

MICRO Farm income WFP Market Analysis Tool: How to Conduct a Food Commodity Value Chain Analysis?

Shock scenarios PDPE Market Analysis Tool: Shock Scenarios

PDPE Market Analysis Tool: Price and Income Elasticities

Trader Capacity WFP Market Analysis Tool: How to Conduct a Trader Survey?

Net buyer/seller status

WFP Market Analysis Tool: How to Estimate Household Net-Seller/Buyer Status and the Welfare Impact of Shocks?

MICRO-MESO

Country-level elasticities

USDA Economic Research Service (ERS)

Purchasing power FEWSNET Market Guidance, No. 5: Terms of Trade and Food Security Analysis

PDPE Market Analysis Tool: Terms of Trade

FEWSNET Market Guidance, No. 3: Adjusting Prices for Inflation and Constructing Price Indices

MESO SCP analysis FEWSNET Market Guidance, No. 2: Structure-Conduct-Performance and Food Security

Statistical performance analysis

PDPE Market Analysis Tool: Market Integration

IFPRI Food Security Portal: Policy Tools

Value chain analysis WFP Market Analysis Tool: How to Conduct a Food Commodity Value Chain Analysis?

Alpha analysis WFP P4P Monitoring and Evaluation

MESO-MACRO

Import Parity price analysis

FEWSNET Markets Guidance, No. 1: Import/Export Parity Price Analysis

PDPE Market Analysis Tool: Import Parity Price

4 World Food Programme, ‘Market Analysis Framework: Tools and Applications for Needs Assessments’, Food Security Analysis Service OXDF, 3 Oct 2011, Draft for Internal Guidance:

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MACRO Enabling environment

World Bank Prospects: Commodity Markets

World Bank Doing Business Reports

World Bank Indicators

Economic Intelligence Unit

WTO Tariff Profiles

IMF Country Reports

Global commodity markets & prices

WFP VAM Datastore

WFP VAM Market Monitor

FAO Global Information and Early Warning System Price Tool

Regional Agricultural Trade Intelligence Network (EAGC)

South African Futures Exchange (SAFEX) Commodity Derivatives Market

International Grain Council (IGC) Market Reports

FEWS NET Production and Flow Maps

Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) World Markets and Trade Archives

BROADER ANALYSES & RESPONSE

MIFIRA Barrett et al. Market information and food insecurity response analysis (2009)

EMMA Emergency Market Mapping and Analysis Toolkit

BELLMON Analysis Bellmon Profile Format

Food Security Analyses

WFP Emergency Food Security Assessment Handbook

WFP Comprehensive Food Security & Vulnerability Analysis Guidelines

Famine Early Warning Systems (FEWSNET)

Scenario Development

FEWS NET Scenario Development for Food Security

Summary tool Technical Guidance Sheet: The Basics of Market Analysis for Food Security

Multiplier Analysis IFPRI Social Accounting Matrices and Multiplier Analysis

Multiple Market Modelling

FAO Primer on Multi-Market Models (Agricultural Policy Impact)

Computable General Equilibirum models

IFPRI General Equilibrium Models using General Algebraic Modeling System) for Computable General Equilibrium Models

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SECTION 1 BACKGROUND

The essential scope of EMMA is to support rapid decision making for a broad range of needs5 during sudden-onset emergencies. It has also been shown to be adaptable to other slow onset contexts. To date over twenty assessments have been done in emergencies, and over 250 individuals have been trained using the EMMA tool. The use of it in various contexts has generated a wide range of practical experiences, which yield important insights for the sector. The ways in which the EMMA experience (or the current challenges of the tool) can be improved according to practitioners, are summarised below. A more detailed discussion of both tools can be found in the Annex.

• Response Choices: Results of EMMA do not always translate into agency response choices, especially when out of the norm of commodity/voucher/cash.

• Choice of critical markets: More evidence-based guidance on the selection of critical markets is seen to be needed.

• Timing: Challenges abounded in ensuring that the results of an EMMA (most often this was the case with joint-agency EMMAs) appeared in time to factor into response decisions.

• Capacity Requirement: Although originally designed for non-specialist staff, evidence suggests that EMMAs are best implemented by experienced staff (as with any assessment)6.

• Snapshot does not take into account changing market conditions: The tool itself is not designed for ongoing market monitoring and programme redesign based on changing market conditions. This is not a criticism of the tool, but it points to the lack of available guidance teams felt in general for ongoing market monitoring, etc.

• Better linkages to other assessments: The Market Analysis component needs to be better linked to the gap analysis (as well as the response analysis as mentioned above) and also, the market maps are extracted out and done in a standalone fashion (without the necessary linkages to context/response analysis) too often.

• Lack of multiple market analysis: Some practitioners felt that the tool was an intensive effort for the analysis of a single commodity. The EMMA tool, however, while designed for a single market analysis, can provide good inferences on linked commodities (e.g., those that have the same nodes – traders/suppliers – on the market chain).

• Baselines and seasonality: It was felt that the EMMA, which was initially designed for use in post-sudden onset emergencies, also has great flexibility/capability for being adapted to emergency preparation needs, particularly in predictable emergencies. The issue of creating good EMMA baseline information in predictable emergencies, and also EMMA snapshots at various points of the seasonal calendar, was brought up by one interviewee as potentially being of great value, given the increasing familiarity of personnel with the tool.

• Short term response: While the EMMA was designed as a short-term response tool, in many cases because of the intensity of resources and efforts required to apply the tool and the lack of follow-up/monitoring, its results have become applied to longer-term programming, for which it may or may not be suitable. More information and case studies are needed to understand the problems related to this point.

5 The EMMA Toolkit, Introduction and Overview, p 5. 6 Powell, Judith. EMMA Review Oxfam, Oct 2011, forthcoming

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The Market Information and Food Insecurity Response Analysis (MIFIRA) framework is a response analysis tool designed to evaluate the feasibility of transfer options given market conditions and household circumstances and preferences (Barrett et al., 2009). MIFIRA’s approach assesses how markets, consumers, and traders will respond to transfers and can be tailored for use in both chronic and emergency food insecurity crises. The MIFIRA tool is comparatively new, and as it is more frequently used will generate more insights.

• Need specialist staff to apply tool: The MIFIRA tool needs specialist staff, who are able to understand the kind of information required by the questions, as well as the limitations of the data at hand, to work with it.

• Needs a baseline: Because the tool needs a baseline, it is not applicable in all emergency situations. Additionally, while it produces a less subjective analysis than for example the EMMA, it cannot produce response analysis in as short a timeframe as EMMA.

• Pre-defined responses: The MIFIRA tool already has pre-defined response choices between cash/in-kind/voucher interventions by design, though of course the application of the tool also yields important and interesting insights into other non-traditional market interventions.

The EMMA and MIFIRA are two tools out of many that examine market analysis. Other approaches may afford greater degrees of precision by using more rigorous analysis, which refines response design (i.e., not only response choice, but also how to design and scale responses efficiently and effectively), but may not be as easily implemented. Each of these tools speak to different stages in the project cycle (some cover more than one stage, while others cover only the response stage, for example), and no single tool covers all concerns and all stages. The challenge then is not to create one tool that is applicable to all situations at all times, but to understand how to get past the limitations of existing tools, and how to re-apply them at different stages to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding.

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SECTION 2: KEY ELEMENTS OF MARKET ANALYSIS

What Kind of Market Analysis is Good Enough? This was a frequently heard imperative. Many agency staff wanted clear guidelines on what kind of market analysis was good enough, or what were minimum standards in market analysis. However, besides identifying a broad minimum of the elements that need to be analysed (without these elements being necessarily sufficient), it is impossible to prescribe a one-size-fits-all approach required for all contexts. Resource constraints on the parts of agencies and donors will inevitably shape the depth and complexity of the market analysis, and the quality of the intervention that ensues. This section provides a brief overview and introduction to some key elements, attempting to pose questions about each element that are relevant to emergency programming. (All of the tools above examine at least a few key elements of market analysis, to varying degrees of precision).

Prices

Many agencies collect price data frequently, and it represents the first point of entry for many into the realm of market analysis.

• What is the price of a good? What is the nominal price in currency or in terms of trade (when one bag of wheat is traded for five bags of rice, for example)?

• How are prices moving? Attempt to understand if there is significant inflation or deflation in key markets (this could be due to a variety of factors). The question of seasonality7 arises here. How are prices moving in comparison to something else? Attempt to understand if prices are increasing in relation to substitute goods8, and in relation to income, particularly labour income). Attention should be paid to identifying

7 Seasonality refers to the characteristics of goods to display periodic changes in prices and availability predictably, usually during the period of a year. From FEWS NET (Seasonality: For example, the number of traders and transport services tend to peak around the harvest period. The volume, origin and quality of commodities in the market change over the year. Local products are more common at harvest time and imported products are more common during the lean season. Road infrastructure becomes unusable during the rainy season in areas that do not have all-weather roads. The quality of perishable products such as vegetables and grains changes throughout the year and can influence prices. Market prices at all levels of the market also follow seasonal patterns.) FEWS NET, Market Assessment and Analysis, Markets and Food Security, FEWS NET website. 8 There is often a lack of understanding regarding how households substitute one commodity item for the other, or commodities for cash. Particularly with cash transfers, the marginal propensity to consume the commodity in question is never 1 (i.e., the proportion of an increase in income that is spent on consumption of that commodity). Even with in-kind aid, where technically households should be

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accurate substitutes for goods, capturing prices for the exact same good over time (e.g., a particular bean varietal or rice product – broken versus whole rice) so as to be able to compare apples to apples, and having a process that allows you to understand price fluctuations. In remote and rural areas, where cash is not so fluid, focus on barter prices (otherwise known as terms of trade, such as a camel for five bags of maize).

• What happens when prices become too high or too low (and when is a price too high or too low?) Many interventions experience price fluctuations during the course of the project cycle. This may be due to many factors: global/imported inflation, a lack of market integration between surplus and deficit areas in local/regional markets, and the effects of the intervention itself, when interacting with these situations which can amplify or depress prices further in certain contexts. For whatever reason the price fluctuation exists, it is important to measure/understand it and then consider how interventions will accommodate price fluctuations.

Assessing whether Interventions Will Lead to Price Fluctuations

One interpretation of the Do No Harm approach may mean that interventions should be assessed as to whether or not they lead to price fluctuations9. Isolating the causal effects of interventions can be very difficult. In the case of inflation it may be ‘imported’ from global price inflation, reflect structural asymmetries between local and regional markets, or be due to interventions themselves. The case study below shows how a humanitarian intervention experienced inflation, which researchers attributed to many different causes.

Brief Case Study of Price Inflation in a Large Scale Emergency Cash Transfer Programme10

The evidence on price inflation due to cash transfer programmes is scattered. Rigorously assessing (through econometric models for example) how much of observed inflation is attributable to cash transfer programmes can be expensive and time-consuming, not to mention inconclusive, and resources may be better allocated (depending on the context and programme) towards determining what to do instead in the situation where inflation (due to whatever cause) is observed. This presents recommendations for agencies, as they should determine what comprises threshold levels of price fluctuations and subsequent programme choices. This moves the approach away from the ‘Do No Harm’ minimum to a more consolidated approach of protecting consumption and production, and many agencies are already thinking about how to monitor prices and change programmes when market conditions change [see the section on monitoring and implementing changes further on].

consuming all items given to them if targeting is done correctly, it is rarely exactly 1). Understanding how households substitute one good over the other is important in identifying markets to assess, and also how much of certain goods/cash to give. Also see footnote 15.

9 For example, price increases (i.e., cash injections and increased demand for key commodities might lead significant price increases for such commodities where supply is not elastic) and inflation, whether they lead to disincentives on production and supply (in the case of in-kind aid, for example, where beneficiaries might sell received commodities at deep discounts as has sometimes been observed). 10 Sabates-Wheeler, Rachel, and Stephen Devereaux. “Cash Transfers and High Food Prices: Explaining Outcomes on Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme.” Working Paper 004, Future Agricultures, January 2010.

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SECTION 2 KEY ELEMENTS OF MARKET ANALYSIS

11 Kebede, E. “Moving from emergency food aid to predictable cash transfers: Recent experience in Ethiopia.” Development Policy Review 24, no. 5 (2006): 579–599 12 Ibid.13 Ibid.

In Ethiopia, researchers used a two-wave longitudinal data-based regression, to identify the effects of cash transfers versus food transfers in the context. The results determining price effects are interesting and valuable to examine for an indicative study on how price inflation can occur, and how it may be missed (or the causes of it misinterpreted).

Between 2005 and 2007, Save the Children UK implemented the Meket Livelihood Development Project (MLDP) alongside the Ethiopian Poverty Safety Net Programme. The MLDP paid public works participants Birr 5 per day, enough to buy 3 kilograms of staple grain “on the assumption that the average consumer price for grain would be Birr 1.7 per kilogram” (Kebede 2006: 58411). In the first year of implementation grain prices rose significantly higher than usual in Meket, for reasons directly related to the PSNP and MLDP. Firstly, traders failed to respond promptly to demand signals following injections of cash into local communities. Secondly, instead of being regular and predictable, cash disbursements were late and arrived in unpredictable lump-sums, resulting in price spikes due to demand surges when food supplies were scarce. Thirdly, some traders allegedly exploited cash recipients by charging excessive profit margins. Fourthly, many farmers who received cash transfers withheld their grain from the market, since they no longer needed to sell produce to meet essential expenses (Kebede 200612).

Although this evidence strongly suggests that cash transfers had inflationary consequences in rural Ethiopian markets, this was the first year of the programme and these effects could be interpreted as transitional: traders needed time and confidence to react to the demand signals associated with cash transfers – late and erratic deliveries of cash – and to problems with programme implementation. Nonetheless, “in the immediate term, the fact remains that the increase in prices has meant that cash recipients in Meket were unable to purchase the necessary food basket” (Kebede 2006: 59713).

The second source of price variability is seasonality, which is significant in rural Ethiopia, where grain prices are among the most volatile in the world – and this volatility has not reduced by much since grain markets were liberalised in the 1990s (Gabre-Madhin and Mezgebou 2006). Between mid- and late 2005, these prices varied by 39%, with the greatest variability (65%) where average prices were lowest (SNNPR), and the least variability (29%) where prices were highest (Tigray). The PSNP payment rate was set at 6 Birr per day in 2005-06, on the assumption that this could purchase 3 kilograms of staple cereal, at prices prevailing at the time. No allowance was made for price differentials between (and even within) regions, or for fluctuations that might occur in food prices during the year (specifically the likelihood that food prices would rise during the months preceding the next harvest).

In fact, significant variations were observed in prices over space and time, which means that the conversion rate of PSNP cash transfers into food staples was highly variable from woreda to woreda and from month to month. Because of this price variability, the purchasing power of the cash transfer in terms of staple cereals varied by more than 100%, from as little as 2.5 kilograms (in Tigray in mid-2005) to as much as 5.9 kilograms (in SNNPR in late 2005). On average over the year, 6 Birr could purchase more than 3 kilograms of staple food in two regions (Oromiya and SNNPR), but less than 3 kilograms in the other two regions (Amhara and Tigray).

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Quantities

The availability of goods, for cash, voucher and in-kind programmes is a key indicator of potential shortages or surpluses. Sometimes it may take time for prices to adjust to quantities available, so relying on prices alone is not enough to indicate (before an intervention) if the market will support the scale of the intervention in question. That is, if the objective is for 20,000 households to consume 2 kilograms of wheat every week, the market must then supply 20,000 x 2 kilograms (40,000 kilograms) every week for however many weeks, and perhaps from one specific locality. The problem is that information on quantities available (or exchanged) is less visible. Asking traders and trying to cross-check their responses with their suppliers is critical if the programme is attempting to directly procure from local markets without any intensive market assessment being done. This is related to also estimating the supply elasticity of the market in question, trader capacity to procure different volumes with defined time constraints, and understanding the value chain behind a specific commodity.

Trader Capacity

Traders14: Trader surveys should ‘indicate potential difficulties / capacities for stockpiling and traders’ access to working capital (credit). This will determine their capacity to expand supply, at what prices, and how long for (and how long it will take them to expand the supply, etc.), and it is also an attempt to anticipate shortages that might occur. Traders’ information is one of the main aspects in the marketing chain, because they are the main link between producers and consumers. Very often traders can give very valuable insights about the markets, which cannot be found in secondary data. Surveying traders should also reveal information about transport and transport costs. Taking into account trader needs as well is also important for ensuring this significant intermediary link of functioning markets is as stable and strengthened as possible.

Commodity Market Chain

The market chain for a particular good consists of the critical linkages between livelihoods, markets and institutions (tangible and intangible, formal and informal). An example of a market chain can be found in the EMMA mapping structure below of the rice market system in Northern Sri Lanka in early 2011, which looks at policies and institutions that influence markets, the supply and distribution chain for rice, and disruptions and critical issues for these actors/institutions. A market chain analysis can be completed for any good/service in question, including labour markets, shelter-related markets, health-related markets, etc. Within market chain analysis, there will always be questions of what to analyse and what not to analyse, which will vary on the context, the resources and constraints faced.

14 SENAC, World Food Programme Guidelines on Market Situation Analysis and Forecast and Response Protocol, Rome, August 2007

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12


For market analysis, the purpose of analysing the market chain is to understand how supply and demand are interacting and disrupted at this moment in time, what the response will be, and where interventions should be targeted to revive key market actors in order to restart market chains and the local provision of essential goods and services. Also, beneficiaries should not only be seen as recipients, but as active market actors as well.

15 Findings from a recently concluded MIFIRA study in Kenya showed that beneficiaries preferred a mix of cash and food versus cash alone or food alone, and that when these preferences were modeled (using a multinomial log regression model), market-related variables did not offer a clear signal of preference for cash over food, or vice-versa. This suggested that markets were generally perceived to effectively trade cash for food, and that preferences for food or a mix of food and cash were thus driven by non-market considerations (such as confidence of the household in participating with markets, travel times to markets, etc.) – also see footnote 8. See Mude et al. Manuscript: Responding to food insecurity: Employing the MIFIRA framework in rural Northern Kenya, 2011

Beneficiaries as market actors

There is one element of market chain analysis that is not always adequately covered, which we address here, and that is the issue of household preferences. Households have complex relationships with markets, which influence their true preferences for the type of transfer they receive. This means, for example, that household access to markets, and their confidence in participating in markets among other things, influence their preference for cash/in-kind or voucher aid. So, preferences for in-kind aid cannot be construed purely as a respondent indication of market failure, as preferences for cash cannot be construed as a respondent indication of market functioning.15

If beneficiary preferences are important to take into account for organisations in designing their transfers, more work needs to be done in isolating and revealing beneficiary preferences through careful survey work on expenditure, income and preferences. Interventions could also be designed around these preferences (as has been done in some circumstances, e.g., agencies organising transportation for beneficiaries to markets).

13

SECTION 3: FURTHER ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS IN MARKET ANALYSIS

The basic concepts above represent a broad minimum of elements that must be analysed as part of any market analysis. However, they do not always by themselves constitute a ‘good-enough’ understanding of markets for the purposes of programming. The significant prevalence of humanitarian programming in conflict and/or fragile situations, the dominance of cash-for-work as a response, and the substantial evidence that households use transfers to repay debt, necessitate a deeper investigation of these related markets and market actors. The relevance of these markets areas to humanitarian programming is examined below.

In addition, more rigorous techniques of market analysis (which involve examining basic concepts as well as additional concepts outlined above) have critical value in being able to provide greater degrees of precision and accuracy in analysis to the humanitarian programmer. In addition to more precise estimation of prices, quantities, etc., at a local/regional/global level, they can also show more accurately how interventions can be better designed to go beyond a Do No Harm approach to actively building resilience on the part of households and market actors. The value of analytical techniques that involve assessment of market integration, supply and demand elasticity, the market multiplier effect, and market modelling techniques, are briefly examined below, in an effort to provide a bridge to more technical concepts for non-economist humanitarian staff.

The Labour Market

The links between labour markets and food insecurity and livelihoods is not often understood well by analysts, who treat labour markets as independent variables, although this is changing (the World Food Programme is introducing the use of labour surveys in an integrated fashion during its emergency needs assessment phase, for example). Participation in the labour market by households affects their cash flows and assets. The inability to participate and the need for survival can thus lead to negative coping strategies, such as distress sales or participation in undesirable activities. The labour market can act as indicators of food security shocks (see below for relevant indicators), or it can act to show pockets of where markets may not be as integrated as other areas (see diagram below). Understanding the intricacies of the linkages between household labour/production and household consumption requires looking at the labour market for a given population over

14


time, in order to reflect seasonality patterns as well as migration patterns. Stand-alone post-emergency labour market assessments can of course be completed (and have been successfully done, like, for example, the EMMAs for construction labour in Haiti and for agricultural labour in Liberia). 16

From Central Afghanistan16: some labour market indicators of food security stresses or shocks in the Central Highlands include

• An unusual spike in levels of migration to Kabul, Iran, and Pakistan, especially during summer months when migration is normally less common.

• Increased numbers of labourers standing idle in the main square or at main crossroads.

• A significant decrease in daily wage rates for manual labour, especially a decrease which is not a typical seasonal pattern.

• A larger numbers of returnees to the region due to migration policies of Iran or Pakistan.

• Limited surpluses from the most recent harvest season that may reduce employment opportunities, particularly, those related to marketing and trade.

• Diminished number and magnitude of planned public works and NSP construction projects in the region.

In many instances, while a plethora of cash for work (or food for work) programmes abound, many programmes still do not conduct labour market analyses (particularly when it comes to understanding seasonality), or do not factor in population movements or labour market recovery demand17. While the objective of cash for work programmes might be food security based, for example, a labour market analysis is nevertheless still necessary to ensure that labour is not diverted away from more productive enterprises (and setting wage rates low

16 FEWS NET, Labour Markets, Livelihood Strategies and Food Security in Afghanistan, May 200717 See Pakistan Emergency Food Security Alliance, Lessons Learned May 201118 Banking with the poor network, Microfinance and Cash For Work in Livelihood Restoration following a Natural Disaster, 200619 Aheeyar. “Cash grants and microfinance in livelihodd recovery in Tsunami affected areas of Sri Lanka.” London: Overseas Development Institute, 2006

CFW and Labour Markets18

In Sri Lanka, programmatic errors came from the lack of understanding of labour market. Indeed, the wages for CFW were fixed at Rs.400 a day, compared with Rs.100 a day pre-Tsunami (Rs.100 = US$1). CFW activities included clearing debris, laying roads and de-silting ponds. This created inflation and also shortage of labour for livelihood activities, such as microenterprises and farming. CFW activities overlapped with the [peak] agriculture season and labour could not be obtained on time, since wages for farm labour were only half those for CFW. Therefore, some large farmers got bank loans and imported harvesters. Now that the CFW is over, the labourers are unemployed because the farms that engaged them before are mechanised. These landless labourers now need to start new livelihoods and require capital from the MFIs. They also require non-financial services, since they need to be trained to become entrepreneurs. A better design of the CFW by a relief team and MFIs could have minimised the distortions and linked the CFW beneficiaries with savings that could have helped them later to obtain loans (Aheeyar, 200619).

15

SECTION 3 FURTHER ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS IN MARKET ANALYSIS

enough to minimise such distortions may not always be enough, since households facing severe constraints may not self-select out of CFW programmes, despite higher-wage and/or capital-accumulating labour choices elsewhere).

This is illustrated by the example above.

Debt Constraints and Credit Markets

Cash transfers have frequently been employed by beneficiaries for debt repayment, as debt is frequently used by households as a coping strategy for shocks. This is not necessarily a negative coping strategy; debt utilisation (within a normal range) has always been used as a consumption-smoothing strategy. However, understanding the prevalence of over-indebtedness and the availability of credit (both of which necessitate an analysis of credit markets) is key. If households exhibit patterns of over-indebtedness, this could suggest that credit markets are distorted (i.e., money lending markets charge excessive interest rates, if for example other lenders do not exist). Interventions supporting microcredit or other financial institutions might thus be warranted.

Larger-amount credit (i.e., not individual consumption loans, but loans to petty traders, for example) availability is an important measure of how responsive markets can be to projected changes in demand/supply, as this kind of credit acts as a lubricant to the entire market chain. This kind of credit market analysis may already be available at microfinance institutions or banks in the region (who often do not participate in one or both of these two following segments: unsecured lending to the poor, or unsecured lending to petty traders), and may only need to be integrated into existing market analyses. More practical analyses and case studies in this important sector need to be commissioned.

An important point to be made also is that frequently household income and expenditure surveys, for various reasons, do not capture the burden of debt that households are responsible for servicing. An example of a financial diary below from the poor shows the complexity and sophistication of how households manage cash flows, which are relevant in understanding how credit markets and transfers (whether cash or in-kind) impact expenditure by the household.

Political Economy Analysis

The control of various key assets and capital by market actors in ‘normal’ emergency situations (i.e.., where goods previously flowed with ease, but are now only affected by pure market disruptions such as infrastructure breakdowns) versus complex situations (of conflict, etc.) can be extremely different. Political actors and governance issues in the latter case interact urgently with capital flows and security issues that have ramifications for market actors, and market analysis. Analysing how markets can be assessed – not only in terms of prices and good flows, but also of understanding of how powerful actors constrain market flows – can lead to important response analysis recommendations. A list of questions to ask includes20:

20 Collins et al. Portfolios of the Poor: How the world’s poor live on $2 a day. Princeton University Press, 2009

16


• Is there any overlap between the major market actors and those involved in the conflict?

• Does the market encourage links between groups separated by conflict, or does it reinforce divisions?

• Can specific groups affected by the conflict (such as ex-combatants) participate effectively in this market?

• How is the market affected by, and how does it affect, the conflict? Does it reinforce existing inequalities? Do market trends affect the dynamics of the conflict, either positively or negatively? How do changes in the conflict affect this market?

Hamid and Khadeja’s Closing Balance Sheet, November 200021

Financial Assets $174.80 Financial Liabilities $223.34

Microfinance Savings Account $16.80 Microfinance loan account $153.34

Savings with a moneyguard $8.00 Private interest-free loan $14.00

Home Savings $2.00 Wage advance $10.00

Life Insurance $76.00 Savings held for others $20.00

Remittances to home village >30 Shopkeeper credit $16.00

Loans Out $40.00 Rent arrears $10.00

Cash in hand $2.00

Financial net worth –$48.54 Annual income $840 (approx. $2 a day) Annual turnover $965

Figure 3: Sample household balance sheet

A recently concluded ICRC analysis in Gaza, for example, overlaid the vulnerability/conflict analysis map22 below onto the EMMA analysis during three periods (one prior to the blockade, one at the peak of the blockade, and one during the easing of a blockade), to understand how market flows are constrained by political activity. While these results are still forthcoming, they suggest that questions of market functioning and access, which are intricately and integrally connected to political balances, can be jointly analysed with existing tools in a rapid manner, and present opportunities for market analysis can evolve usefully.

The above analysis has shown areas that are not currently investigated well enough, and which need to inform future market analyses. Not all can be adequately analysed in all contexts due to shortages of information and timing, but recognition and awareness of their importance is essential.

These above concepts should thus be analysed where possible as part of current market analysis (together with relevant agency-objective based commodity markets). The section below examines ‘more advanced’ concepts/techniques of market analysis that are usually conducted by economists/technical specialists, but the value of which needs to be better understood by non-economist humanitarian staff, so that they can decide when to commission such an analysis and how to interpret it.

21 USAID: http://apps.develebridge.net/amap/index.php/Applyimg_a_Conflict_Lens_throughout_the_Project_Cycle22 Humanitarian Action in Conflict: Implementing A Political Economy Approach. The adaptation of this framework to the Gaza context, overlaid on the EMMA framework, was conducted by Ben Mountfield

17


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18


Market Integration

As explained in the EMMA toolkit, a market system is integrated when linkages between local, regional and national actors are working well. In simple terms, market integration assesses how well goods flow between markets and particularly between surplus and deficit areas.

In an integrated market system, any imbalance of supply and demand in one area is compensated for by the relatively easy movement of goods from other nearby or regional markets. There is therefore a re-adjustment post-emergency, and goods flow from one place to the other at various speeds, with prices reflecting the fair costs of transport, for example, and no further distortions. Complete market integration refers to the situation where a price change in one geographically different market (for good X) is transmitted completely to another geographically different market (for the same good), allowing for transport costs23. Thus, what it points to is the degree to which markets are isolated, and therefore the response capacity of markets to accommodate changing flows for example, without affecting prices disproportionately.

The implications for humanitarian interventions are therefore distinct. Assessing the level of integration in markets can lead to an understanding of whether interventions will contribute to rising or depressing prices in markets (integrated/not integrated). A high level of integration between the local market and the global market will yield insights into whether, for example, global crises (such as the 2007–8 world food price crisis) may lead to price hikes at local level.

Market integration can ultimately be seen as a measure of market functionality, and therefore it is of critical relevance to the choice of intervention strategy. In general terms: the higher the level of market integration, the more efficient and effective a cash-based strategy is expected to be.

Supply/Demand Elasticity and Market Modelling

Various models have been used in the past to assess food availability in emergency contexts, agricultural supply in response to market shocks (emergency shocks) and other market functioning parameters. These models can vary in their simplicity/complexity and have been used with varying levels of success in predicting and forecasting supply and demand changes in the past (constrained as they are by, for instance, the availability of data, and by their design assumptions which may exclude certain variables).

Two concepts of price elasticity of supply and demand (normally referred to as supply elasticity and demand elasticity), which are integral to these models, can be very useful as they can potentially estimate precisely – in percentage change – how much supply and demand will change in response to changes in price. The price elasticity of supply refers to the responsiveness of supply to price changes (the price elasticity of demand refers

23 See a fuller discussion in Rapsomanakis et al, Market Integration and Price Transmission in Selected Food and Cash Crop Markets of Developing Countries: Review and Application, Food and Agriculture Organization.

19


then to the responsiveness of demand to price changes). The correct definition of price elasticity of supply is: the percentage change in supply divided by the percentage change in price. This takes into account the availability of inputs, supply chain complexity, mobility of labour and capital, inventories and warehousing and a wealth of other important determinants.

These models are capable, therefore, of quickly assessing post-emergency (if they are built before the emergency as they would have to be) how and by how much demand and supply might change and how observed and predicted inflation will interact with interventions. They can yield adequate estimates of available commodities, prices and the timing of availability of commodities. They can also estimate how much responses themselves will affect markets (so as to estimate precisely the probability of intervention-led inflation or producer disincentives in local markets, for example), and are therefore capable of recommending more refined response options with greater certainty. For example, in Turkana, findings about the differential response capacity of small traders and large traders showed insights into the relative importance of the quality of infrastructure, prices as signals to invest and other factors24.

The EMMA and MIFIRA tools review traders and the supply chain, but they are not market models in themselves. Depending on the complexity of the context, the scale of the response to be designed, and especially if it is meant for longer-term responses, commissioning this type of market analysis can yield extremely critical insights that would not be arrived at through other tools.

Understanding the Multiplier Effect

Cash injections (and locally procured in-kind items) in particular yield larger effects on markets than the sum of the transfers themselves, through what is known as the ‘multiplier’ effect. Increased cash held by households leads to increased expenditure on food, health and education, investment into productive assets, debt repayment and savings. These in turn generate local employment and further local purchases, which lead to increased income generated in the local economy (minus of course expenditure on imports). The ‘multiplier’ effect (the amount by which an increase in cash leads to an increase in income) can be surprisingly large from context to context25. Which actors reap what kind of benefits from the multiplying effect also varies from context to context.

The value of understanding the multiplying effect of interventions in markets (a quantitative estimate can provide objective comparisons between, for example response choices, but a qualitative analysis of multiplying effects can also be extremely useful. Both can show which groups benefit most from cash injections, and which groups should be strengthened to reinforce the market system, or which groups are not benefiting as much from cash injections and need to be supported.

Additionally, the knowledge of how the market multiplies injections will have distinct relevance for choosing who to target and how to intervene, and at what times. Being able to estimate the multiplier effect ultimately leads to a more informed choice that is empirically driven and not ideologically based (reducing, for example,

24 De Matteis, A. Market Functioning in Turkana District, Kenya 25 A review of the literature on regional multipliers conducted by Concern showed estimates for multipliers, ranging from 2.94 in Malawi to 1.2–1.7 in UK regions of similar size to Malawi, to 2.24 in Portoveijo, Ecuador, to 1.25-1.69 in Nicaragua (using employment as proxies in the latter cases). The study itself found a multiplier of 2.28 and 2.79 for Dowa. See Davies, Simon. Making the Most of it: A Regional Multiplier Approach to Estimating the Impact of Cash Transfers on the Market, Concern Worldwide 2008.

20


the dependence on qualitative analysis). Understanding the estimation of the multiplier requires a very rigorous systemic market analysis, and in the end provides probably the most relevant criteria to select between response choices. While time constraints may prevent its results being fed into immediate response, it should be commissioned where possible to provide results for a later stage of emergency response.

26 Creti, P.27 Concern Worldwide Hard Cash in Hard Times: Cash Transfers Versus Food Aid in Rural Zimbabwe, April 2011

It was found in the DECT programme in Malawi by Concern, for example, that the multiplier was about 2.28, i.e., that for every dollar of injected cash, a total of $2.28 additional dollars of income was stimulated and created. (The actual value of the multiplier varied depending on the assumption of how much beneficiaries purchased within the local economy).

In Uganda, an approach attempted to trace out the multiplying effects by tracing the trajectory of the cash injections given to beneficiaries (a ‘qualitative’ multiplier analysis). It was found that ‘local traders did not benefit from the project participants’ expenditures as much as one would have expected, and that, in fact, large traders benefited from the following rounds of expenditures from medium scale farmers and local traders. Eventually, local authorities gained almost 3% of the cash injection in the form of taxes and service fees. They were planning to open new local livestock markets (Okwang) to meet future demand (and get more income from formal exchanges)26’.

Concern Worldwide’s study in Zimbabwe showed that the multiplier for cash was calculated as 2.59, compared to only 1.67 for food aid (assuming 20% was used for barter exchange). ‘Cash transfers had a much more positive impact on local markets than food aid’27.

21

SECTION 4: HOW MARKET ANALYSIS CAN INFORM THE PROJECT CYCLE

Market analysis in current practice has so far predominantly been employed only in the response stage, with a few agencies using ongoing price monitoring to tweak programmes in their second and third iterations. However, market analysis is also essential to inform preparedness (contingency and early warning stages) as well as early response, traditional response, alternative responses to transfer-based options, ongoing monitoring and adjustments, and the exit to early recovery and the development stages. In these stages, the results of market analysis can also be factored into cost-efficiency and effectiveness estimations.

Many emergency responses (if not the majority) are conducted without adequate contingency planning, early warning and lead times, or robust baseline data. In such cases, markets are limited in their ability to be deployed as an instrument in reviving livelihoods and ensuring food security, and the response approach (when it comes to being informed by market analysis) tends to be dominated by a defensive approach of attempting to limit possibilities for price inflation (though rarely are estimates on forecasted prices also conducted). The lack of early warning price signals28 (or other ‘shortage signals’ through other data), for example, limits the time available for operational responses, and limits the design of programmes, therewith ultimately constraining livelihoods resilience. The lack of robust baseline data limits the gap analysis, and can lead to inaccurate amounts of transfers, timing of transfers, scale and programme design.

It is not only the lack of actual data that is an issue, but also the lack of capacity to understand complex price and market data from early warning systems, and to be able to incorporate that into contingency planning, baseline analyses that feed into response analyses. While data can be collected by other agencies, market analysts are still needed at the operational level to translate the analysis into programme decisions. This capacity requirement is discussed later in this report. A brief overview of what needs to be done to integrate market analysis into the project cycle is outlined in the diagram below, after which we turn to each stage.

28 Of course, not all price signals are signals of shortages.

22


Figure 5: Overview of Market Analysis in the Project Cycle

Preparedness

The emergency preparedness stage encompasses contingency planning and early warning. Contingency planning using market analysis and market responses in countries that are prone to recurring disaster/conflict, or where emergencies are predictable, is an area where agencies should invest more resources and time. A corollary of this is that each agency will also have to develop, based on its mandate and objectives, a system of interpreting early warning signals (and indicators, for example, for early warning signals) through market functioning data as discussed earlier (whether these are food item price data, terms of trade of labour and commodities or labour migration, etc.). In addition, to avoid duplication and ensure a specialisation of labour, careful coordination between agencies will be critical.

The Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) has a model for contingency planning29, as shown below, which is useful for identifying when contingency planning can be triggered through early warning signals.

There are two aspects to how market analysis can be incorporated into contingency planning. The first is to ensure that systems are set up that monitor markets and are capable of generating early warning signals. The second to respond to these signals by developing contingency planning that takes into account expected changes in market functioning. Scenarios that take into account expected changes in availability and prices will be needed. For both of these steps, developing a baseline through existing data and understanding early warning triggers (as well as subsequently tracing how markets will evolve through the emergency) is critical.

29 FEWS NET The Contingency Planning Process FEWS NET website http://www.fews.net/ml/en/info/Pages/plancpp.aspx

Preparedness

Use market data to create scenarios,

particularly in predictable emergencies

Create agency-relevant early warning

indicators (prices, terms of trade, trader

signals)

Response

Design early responses based to strengthen markets and local resilience

Use market analysis to inform responses that are both market

based and non market based

Monitoring

Monitor markets (prices, quantities,

market integration) to asses how

thresholds can be set

Assess adjustments to programmes after threshold levels have

been reached

Early Recovery

Use market analysis to transition to early recovery reponses

(e.g. strengthen markets)

Use market analysis to phase in development interventions

23

SECTION 4 HOW MARKET ANALYSIS CAN INFORM THE PROJECT CYCLE

Figure 6: FEWSNET contingency planning model

For example, during emergencies, inflation is often observed due to external factors. Contingency planning for such events can include factoring in price changes and programme changes, as the example below, from Lesotho, shows.

The design document for WVI’s cash transfer pilot30 in Lesotho includes a section on contingency plans for a number of events. These include:

• Change in the price of staple food (as compared to October 2007 prices). Contingency actions are suggested for different scenarios (different levels of price increase as well as a decrease in price). Contingency options included: taking no action, increasing the cash transfer by different amounts (relative to the observed price increase), and modifying the programme based on consultations with beneficiaries (potentially switching to food).

• Distribution points targeted for robbery. Contingency options in this case might include discussing improvements to the system with the cash transfer agent, and suspension of the programme.

The contingency planning process requires sound analysis. It is important that it is periodically revisited and if necessary some indicators may need revision as the agency’s understanding of the situation develops.

Source: Lor-Mehdiabadi et al., Evaluation and Review of the Use of Cash and Vouchers in Humanitarian Crises: Part 2: Review Report, European Commission Humanitarian Aid

Scenario-based planning will take into account for example how market access might be destroyed by floods, possible price fluctuations and shortages, and prescribe counter options. As one interviewee noted about the EMMA tool: it can be used to take a snapshot of a baseline prior to an emergency (or during the early phases of a slow onset emergency), used for contingency planning purposes (that involves scenarios) and test whether markets can supply quantities needed prior to that stage of the emergency.

FEWSNET, for example, has early warning systems that are linked to both national markets and local markets, especially from a livelihoods perspective. These valuable data are also accompanied by analysis across certain regions, and do not only include price data, but also market functioning. Also, the trade communities rely on them to earn income. This should be developed further and made available in more areas and countries that are

30 Lor-Mehdiabadi et al., Evaluation and Review of the Use of Cash and Vouchers in Humanitarian Crises: Part 2: Review Report, European Commission Humanitarian Aid

Coordination and

Preparation

Analysis and Prioritization

Scenario Building

Develop Contingency

Plans

Follow Up and

PreparednessActivate

Early Warning

Early Warning

Impetus for Planning

Update Scenarios and Plans

24


prone to disaster/recurring emergencies. Below other systems (predominantly in the food security/livelihood sphere) that also collect relevant monitoring data are listed. (An expanded version of this table with countries and commodities covered is found in the Annex).

Food Monitoring and Early Warning Systems

• GIEWS – FAO Global Information and Early Warning System

• FEWS Net – USAID Famine Early Warning System

• GMFS – Global Monitoring for Food security

• VAM – World Food Programme Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping

• MARS FOOD – Monitoring Agriculture with Remote Sensing (EC/JRC)

• EARS – Environmental Analysis and Remote Sensing

• AP3A – Alerte Précoce et Prévision des Productions Agricoles (CILSS/Agrhymet – Sahel, only in some African countries)

• SADC – Regional South African Early Warning System for Food Security

• DMC – Drought Monitoring Centres (SADC/IGAD) in East Central Africa

Source: GMFS, http://www.gmfs.info

While the availability of early warning data is important and should be supported, the corresponding ability of agencies to interpret early warning information and appropriately plan for them should also be developed.

Response

In early incarnations of market analysis in cash transfer programming, as well as in-kind aid, there was a growing recognition that market analysis had revealed the viability of non-traditional humanitarian responses that were normally considered the purview of development agencies. Some examples are highlighted below:

Subsequent to the development of the EMMA and MIFIRA tools for response analyses, in the last 2–3 years until now a fair amount of market analysis has been conducted at the response analysis stage. Most of these have been applications of the EMMA tools, and most have been for the purpose of either identifying which transfer option to use (cash/in-kind/voucher). Interviews with some staff indicated that they viewed market analysis as a tool to refine responses which have already been pre-decided (such as cash/in-kind), given the agency’s mandate. However, an interesting outcome of these reports is its recommendation of alternative market-based responses, often in tandem with traditional transfer based options (even though these response options have been implemented only in a minority of cases).

The below table shows just the top ten of responses prescribed by three EMMA reports (see Annex for a comparison of all twenty EMMA reports available at time of publication), which show the wide range of market-

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based and non-market-based responses that a market analysis can yield, ranging from transfers to market support to policy advocacy.

A review of two MIFIRA reports from Kenya and Somalia also yielded interesting insights in a different manner, about the relative feasibility of cash transfers and food aid in different localities, with a relatively precise analysis on beneficiary preference including an estimate of the marginal propensity to consume in Kenya, trader competitiveness, supply capacities and flexibilities, the probability of price increases, and other important market insights. In the MIFIRA framework, the response options are already decided between cash and food aid (or of course, a combination) and the guiding questions are determined to assess with degrees of certainty over which response is best recommended, as well as recommendations on how to design the chosen response well (timing, amount, scale), etc.

Other emergency market studies that use econometric models that also estimate demand and supply (and sometimes cross-price) elasticities for more precise estimations of which responses to choose, for example, have prescribed both indirect support options (such as support to traders in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, as well as food aid34) as well as direct support options (such as a combination of food aid and cash transfers in Swaziland35).

31 Albu, M., & Murphy, E. (2007). Market Analysis Tools in Rapid-Onset Emergencies: Phase One Report. Warwickshire: Practical Action Consulting 32 World Food Programme, SENAC Brief, Vol. 2 July 2006 33 Harvey et al. Cash for Work: A Contribution to the International Debate based on Lessons Learnt in Afghanistan GTZ, Eschborn 2009 34 Madi et al., The Impact of Closure and High Food Prices on Performance of Imported Staple Foods and Vegetable and Fruit Markets in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, World Food Programme, Dec 200935 De Matteis, Alessandro, Feasibility Study for Cash Transfers in Swaziland: An Analysis of Market Functioning, Save the Children, Aug 2007

Early Examples of Market Analysis and Response Choices

In Aceh, Oxfam examined the impact of imported food aid on markets in Aceh shortly after the tsunami. They discovered widespread resale of food aid, and the fact that an existing grain marketing board (BULOG) had actually had sufficient surplus and capacity to address emergency needs. As a result of food aid, local traders experienced a significant drop in sales. They concluded that the commodity markets had been well established prior to the tsunami, that general rice stocks and the supply chain were largely unaffected by the disaster, and thus a cash or voucher programme would have been preferable.31

In October 2005 a powerful earthquake hit Pakistan-administrated Kashmir and the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan killing more than 73,000 people. After an Emergency Food Security Assessment was carried out, WFP decided to conduct a market assessment and trader survey in the most food insecure areas. The application of “real time” market analysis proved useful in the context of this sudden-onset emergency because some markets had been destroyed and others had already recovered. The survey helped refine the targeting and design of the PRRO, and concluded that food assistance in urban areas most likely would have hindered market recovery. Thus, WFP food aid distributions were retargeted to rural areas32.

In Northern Afghanistan, after a cash for work programme, it was realised that possibly, it was not the cash earned by CFW labourers which exerted the predominant impact on livelihoods, but the benefits of the infrastructure projects themselves, i.e., roads, bridges, wells, drinking water supplies, school buildings and flood protection, erected with their help. Transport of goods to and from local markets has improved dramatically, accompanied by a sharp drop in transport costs in many cases. Also the opening of a number of shops starting trade along the roads facilitated access to basic commodities33.

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Table 2: Top 10 recommendations for market-based responses from 3 different EMMA surveys

Market Analysis

Rice Market System, Northern Province, Sri Lanka, March-April 2011

The Market System for Construction Labor in Port au Prince, Haiti

The Market System for Corrugated Galvanised Iron (CGI) Sheet in Haiti

Time March–April 2011 February 7–17, 2010 February 7–17, 2010

Agencies USAID/OFDA for USAID/Sri Lanka

IRC, American Red Cross, Haitian Red Cross, International Federation of the Red Cross, Save the Children, Mercy Corps, Oxfam GB, ACDI/VOCA, World Food Programme and FEWS/NET.

IRC, American Red Cross, Haitian Red Cross, International Federation of the Red Cross, Save the Children, Mercy Corps, Oxfam GB, ACDI/VOCA, World Food Programme and FEWS/NET.

Response 1 Improved storage, based upon farmer preferences (communal or individual; in homes or at the village level; or housed in agricultural service centers or at MCPSs)

Coordination by stakeholders on how to address unclear land tenure

Distribution of cash to households for the self- procurement of iron sheets (and other building material)

Response 2 Provision of water pumps/irrigation inputs

Short term recruitment of diaspora civil engineers and technicians to avoid drawing skills out of local private sector

Procuring Iron sheeting on the local market and distributing to affected HH

Response 3 Land documentation support

Update curriculum for skilled and professional training to take into account impact of earthquake

Distribution of “commodity” vouchers redeemable at local retailers for CGI

Response 4 Diversification into other agricultural activities: livestock rearing; cash crops such as onions, chilli, coconut; and/or other field crops; as appropriate for the locality and as responds to market demand

Training of masons, carpenters, electricians, etc. by NGOs (VSO for instance; Habitat for Humanity International provides training) Linking training to follow-on options (apprenticeship, small business loans, etc.)

Direct re-capitalization of existing microfinance institutions

Response 5 Support to new and fledgling agro-related businesses: village-level rice mills and retail groceries, contract harvesting/machinery rental, etc.

Virtual job board for the construction sector to match local companies with both local workers and diaspora

Cash grants to small retailers who have lost their stocks and shops for shop reconstruction and business recovery

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Response 6 Reinvigoration of farmer organizations/associations (through MPCS as appropriate)

Improve communication to the public on: support for rubble removal, property rights, building permits, zoning, etc.

Advocacy towards reconstruction actors (NGOs, Government, UN....) to maximize existing market chain infrastructure

Response 7 Irrigation infrastructure rehabilitation

Support to existing training institutions: 1. Rehabilitation and reconstruction of facilities 2. Capacity building for management, faculty, and staff of local institutions (in relation to changes in application of anti-seismic norms) 3. Apprenticeship and facilitation of trainees’ entry in the labor market

Price monitoring system for building materials (cement, aggregate, sand, timber, reinforcement bars, and corrugated iron sheets at major suppliers in Port-au-Prince)

Response 8 Market facilitation to link buyers to progressive private-sector actors

Placement agency for all levels of worker in the construction sector

Micro-credit for small retailers who have lost their stocks and shops (new credit lines)

Response 9 Warehouse receipts financing

Encourage Parliament to adopt law allowing separate ownership within one building (previously in process)

Support the information sharing and negotiation between retailers and wholesalers to ensure continued supplying of small stores.

Response 10 Further investigation, including seed system security analysis (SSSA) or market analysis on alternative and diversified livelihoods

Improve access to credit for construction with appropriate terms and conditions

The above shows that alternatives to commodity/voucher/cash responses have been identified through emergency market assessments as being beneficial to restoring individuals and communities’ livelihoods and critical support systems. In many cases, these alternatives are seen as being useful in addition to commodity/voucher/cash transfers (and not instead of them). However, these alternative non-transfer based responses still seem to be in the minority when it comes to actual implementation36, even though they have critical effects on restoring markets, reducing aid dependency and strengthening interventions.

36 There has, however, been no study comparing, for example, all the implemented responses in a given emergency versus the responses prescribed by assessment. The statement is based on the impressions from interviews with humanitarian personnel.

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Agencies struggle with providing responses that run counter to their mandate (despite alternative response recommendations arising out of a market analysis framework), hence the frequent charge heard that market assessments are merely being done now to justify a pre-given response (cash, vouchers, in-kind.) As one senior market analyst said: ‘mandates are already determined by agencies. Sometimes you need access to credit for wholesale, or easing of import restrictions for others perhaps or building a road or whatever it is. We encourage our partners to fund these interventions (which rarely happen) but the truth is, we are constrained by our mandate: cash food or vouchers are the only responses’ 37.

If implementing agencies across the board are to consider a wide range of responses (transfer-based and non-transfer-based), then the requisite investments in their response capacity will also have to be made. This should be seen as an area of opportunity, and there are many agencies that have already seized this in different contexts. Agencies should also invest in some type of impact assessment activity, particularly of new modalities that are non-transfer based, so that they can also improve their delivery through documenting and analysing a critical mass of such approaches.

Response analysis and implementation in rapid-onset emergencies and slow-onset emergencies can vary, depending on the data available and the coordination of agencies. The time available, resources and agency constraints will of course affect any response.

RAPID ONSET EMERGENCIES

Rapid onset or unpredictable emergencies often necessitate rapid responses without the benefit of sufficient assessment times in order to protect lives. In this case, rapid-assessment tools that allow rough and quick response guidelines (such as the EMMA) should be used in tandem with more rigorous market analyses38 that will take more time to complete but have more robust results which can be fed into later programme adjustments. Another way of looking at the need to update information and reflect a more considered response as the situation evolves is to repeat market analyses frequently, i.e., repeat EMMAs frequently during key stages of an evolving rapid onset situation. This will also mean that flexibility in adjusting programmes to changing market conditions will need to be created: flexibility in funding as well as a recognition of that flexibility in changing responses (whether it is ‘switching’ to new responses, or refining existing responses). In addition, attention to coordination is essential (this is discussed further below).

SLOW ONSET EMERGENCIES

In slow onset emergencies, early responses can prevent, for example, destructive coping strategies that can be employed by households. Market analysis has a part to play in this, as households depend upon markets for survival strategies. Market-based early responses can preserve livelihoods39, and at very limited cost. Save the Children, for example, found that it cost US$1 to link a pastoralist to a trader for destocking, and the transaction provided food for two months, which would otherwise have cost US$97–165 through a food aid programme (Abebe et al, 2008)40. Sometimes early responses are market-based responses, such as the example above. In other cases, early responses may involve non-market based responses, but to decide which response will still necessitate sufficient market analysis. In addition, early response may not always prevent a full scale emergency

37 Senior market analyst, large international agency38 Alessandro De Matteis39 ‘Innovative use of markets to meet the needs of still-mobile pastoralists, pastoralist ‘drop outs’ and other peri-urban destitute people can reinforce the links between these groups, in a win–win situation’. See ALNAP, Humanitarian Responses in Drought, Oct 201140 ALNAP, Humanitarian Responses in Drought, Oct 2011

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from happening, in which case market analysis conducted at the early stages can help design comprehensive response strategies at different periods of time.

Additionally, the view towards maintaining cost efficiency and cost effectiveness during a response (for example, when choosing between transfer-based responses) is also essential, even if full cost analyses cannot be carried out. As one interviewee said, ‘being cost-ineffective and inefficient is harmful, because it ties up donor money in the short term (during the response) and it can lead to incorrect analyses and incorrect responses that harm others’.

41 Hodges et al., Guidance for DFID Country Offices on Measuring and Maximizing Value for Money in Cash Transfer Programmes., October 201142 Audsley et al, Comparing Cash and Food Transfers: A Cost-Benefit Analysis from rural Malawi. World Food Programme

Increasing Cost Efficiency and Cost Effectiveness

While cost-based analyses are difficult to prioritise in the wake of a sudden onset emergency given the level of time and resources it requires, and it is difficult to generalise results across contexts (that is to say, one response that is cost-efficient and effective in one context is not necessarily so in another context), understanding the market-based concepts of cost efficiency or effectiveness allows agencies and donors to start thinking about how to incorporate cost-based questions into market analysis (whether done stand-alone or not). Recently published guidelines by DFID, for example, show the importance of understanding market functioning in determining cost analyses41.

The examples below show that depending on the level of market integration, the point of time in the seasonal calendar and the location of procurement (national or local markets), cost efficiency and effectiveness varies between (usually between commodity/voucher/cash) response options.

Cost Efficiency in Rural Malawi42

Table 7.2: Costs of increasing food security indicators by 1 percent

Transfer Food consumption Food diversity Consumption group

Food $46 230 $622 726 $84 099

Cash $19 451 $40284 $37 698

Mixed $31 844 $86 753 $50 952

Table 7.3: Alpha-values under different scenarios

Transfer Observed No food pipeline break No food or cash pipeline break

Food 1.35 0.93 0.87

Cash 0.99 0.86 0.76

Mixed 0.98 0.88 0.78

“Despite the fact that cash is more cost effective in raising consumption and nutrition for example, food is more cost-efficient. The authors say that the reasons for this are as follows. The lack of price co-movement [between international and local markets for example] – the poor integration – particularly at the beginning/end of the year, means that under the right conditions, agencies can buy low and transfer high. If non-local

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Current market analysis tools do not provide substantial guidance on determining rapid cost-efficiency/effectiveness analyses. A good understanding of the key concepts of market analysis (prices, quantities available, trader capacity, and commodity market chains), however, will provide the analyst with a good understanding of the relative cost efficiency/effectiveness between options. 43444546

Market analysis is thus essential to response analysis, and this section has attempted to outline two aspects of response analysis are informed by market analysis, but which have not been widely practiced as yet. The first is to use market analysis to design alternatives to transfer-based interventions which evidence already indicates as being critical to shoring up resilience, and the second is to use market analysis to inform cost considerations in response. We turn now to the ongoing monitoring stage and the linkages with early recovery.

43 Ibid.44 Concern Worldwide Hard Cash in Hard Times: Cash Transfers Versus Food Aid in Rural Zambia April 2011 45 Research has noted in the case of food aid, that ‘a practical method for ration basket analysis – one that goes beyond the simplistic alpha ratio to incorporate market considerations – is lacking. It becomes rather complicated to integrate nutritional concerns (e.g., ensuring a diet with the right nutrient balance) with cost-efficiency and dietary/preference concerns in a single index. This is another area where academics and practitioners must come together to develop approaches that are both practical and robust.46 De Matteis, A. Market Functioning in Turkana District, Kenya, Oxfam, May 2006

purchase is mandated because local prices exceed import parity, the price for which commodity is procured FOB may differ greatly from the commodity’s value on the local market at certain times of the agricultural cycle. If the difference between the WFP purchase value and the recipient transfer value is large enough, such price differences can negate the operational cost savings that make cash attractive”43.

A recent study by Concern Worldwide in Zimbabwe (which had completed a market assessment) showed that ‘providing people with cash instead of food as a response to localised food insecurity’ was viable. The organisation provided cash and a combination of cash and food to affected households. In doing so, the organisation also measured cost effectiveness (the amount of staple food provided by the transfer (after sharing, milling, spending patterns and prices were accounted for, was compared with the total cost of providing the transfer). Cash was 167% more efficient than food (compared to wards which received the usual WFP food ration, (Concern was a WFP implementing partner)), and 134% more efficient than cash plus food at increasing recipients’ ability to obtain 1 kilogram of staple food44.

Market analysis should be carefully applied to cost efficiency/effectiveness estimates, particularly as it is important to understand what prices to benchmark against45. For a more extensive discussion on this issue, a report completed in the Turkana district provides different cost efficiency estimates when prices are benchmarked against local prices and national average prices (as programmes can choose to for example, locally procure food on national markets if the option is viable)46.

To summarise, market data can provide interesting and useful estimates of cost-efficiencies and cost-effectiveness which may not always be intuitively evident. Even undertaking brief cost-based analysis may sometimes provide good-enough guidance on response design.

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Monitoring

The issue of market monitoring, setting thresholds and adjusting programmes drew a lot of responses in interviews. Many programmers and advisors said they felt frustrated by the lack of guidance on market monitoring and setting price thresholds. Others have said that funding focused towards monitoring of markets is especially important as local and regional procurement (LRP) funding grows, and LRP is used in longer-term settings47. Important questions have been posed by others in evaluations of cash transfer programmes, such as: Can cash transfers be agile enough to respond to dramatic price rises (or even regular food price seasonality)? Do policy-makers have the budgetary flexibility to index-link cash transfers and adjust them frequently – perhaps even monthly? What is the appropriate mix of cash and food transfers in contexts of unpredictable and volatile food prices48? These questions necessitate the collection of market monitoring data (which is not limited to simple price monitoring data, but also relates to market chain functioning).

On the issue of collecting data and ‘mainstreaming’ data, one interviewee said, ‘we need “eyes and ears” of data collection at tiny levels to large [levels], as well as macro analysis. A bridge needs to happen between highly local analysis (and understanding) and the macro analysis. Doing price monitoring and analysis is a lot of work; and we need to strike the right balance between the efforts of data collection and the substantialness of it. But mainstreaming is important for price monitoring’. The ongoing experiences of the Local and Regional Procurement Learning Alliance49, which coordinates monitoring of price data to ensure that LRP programmes do not negatively affect local and regional markets, and also coordinates data analysis among the various programmes50, will be extremely useful for the field in general: providing information on what kind of indicators are most relevant and useful, as well as on what kind of systems are best suited to yield relevant data that have a feedback loop into programme design and ongoing improvement.

Some NGOs, such as Save the Children, have an approach where price increases are fed into HEA baselines, triggering thresholds on minimum needs met. While no standardised monitoring, thresholds and adjustment guidance exists across the field, many agencies have nevertheless been responsive in making adjustments, as seen by the examples in the box below in the case of food price variability. Price-linked adjustments to transfers or switching to in-kind or other alternatives can be carried out for all sectors, not just food.

47 Wei, Emily. Local and Regional Procurement: A Case Study of Mercy Corp’s programming in Haiti, Kyrgyzstan and Niger, June 201148 Sabates-Wheeler, R. and Devereaux, S. Cash Transfers and High Food Prices: Explaining Outcomes on Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme January 2010, Working Paper 004 Future Agricultures49 A partnership between Cornell University and a group of NGOs that receive funding for Local and Regional Procurement programmes, such as Mercy Corps. Under this alliance, a market monitoring mechanism is currently being tested with indicators developed along monitoring indicators, pre-procurement indicators, post-procurement indicators and post distribution indicators. A strong toolkit on market monitoring guidelines has been developed, and is available at their website. 50 LRP Learning Alliance https://sites.google.com/site/lrplearningalliance/home

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Early Recovery

Many of the responses advocated by the EMMA tool in its twenty or so applications have advocated for responses ranging from increasing market information systems, coordinating transport, improving infrastructural obstacles and promoting small trader access, to credit and a variety of ‘indirect’ responses that conceivably would be part of an early recovery programme. As these distinctions between early response, emergency response and early recovery begin to break down it is possible to use market-informed programme responses to generate long-lasting effects on livelihoods, production and consumption. Recognising this may mean that teams within agencies that are responsible for traditional ‘development’ may also start to get involved in market analysis, resulting in a more seamless programme delivery.

This could include things like providing other business enabling services for traders, instituting farmer outgrower schemes with agricultural business, policy advocacy on market information schemes, etc. Another area of integration which is also overlooked is the linkage with social protection programmes. The Roundtable on Responding to Emergency Food Insecurity through Cash Transfer and Food Voucher Interventions, held by USAID to better understand the use of cash and vouchers as emergency responses to food insecurity, recommended the linking of emergency cash transfers to social protection programmes, or other longer-term development initiative; a recommendation which was also made in the Good Practice Review52 by the Overseas Development Institute. Such linkages should be explored for other types of emergency LRP as well, as LRP has the potential to have longer-term development impacts53.

Finally, there is a distinct need for coordination amongst agencies and donors during all of these stages, at field, regional and headquarter levels, and particularly in the area of coordination of the collection of data. For all types of response, the value of long-term data in contributing to the development of baselines and pattern identification should not be underestimated. Questions must be “answered both at the national and

51 Sabates-Wheeler, R. and Devereaux, S. Cash Transfers and High Food Prices: Explaining Outcomes on Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme January 2010, Working Paper 004 Future Agricultures52 Harvey, P. and Bailey, S. Good Practice Review: Cash Transfer Programming in Emergencies, Overseas Development Institute, June 2011.53 Wei, Emily. Local and Regional Procurement: A Case Study of Mercy Corp’s programming in Haiti, Kyrgyzstan and Niger, June 2011

The evidence also shows that several innovative responses to food price variability have been observed in recent cash transfer programmes in Africa51.

• In Swaziland’s Emergency Drought Relief (EDR) programme in 2007/08, social transfers were delivered half in cash and half in food.

• In Lesotho’s Cash and Food Transfers Pilot Project (CFTPP) in 2007/08, a lag between price monitoring and response resulted in declining transfer value, until a once-off adjustment of 25% was made towards the end of the five-month intervention.

• In Malawi’s Food and Cash Transfers (FACT) project in 2005/06 and Dowa Emergency Cash Transfers (DECT) project in 2006/07, transfers were index-linked to local food prices, and were adjusted before each monthly disbursement (Devereux 2008).

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regional (macro) levels and at local market shed (meso) levels, while others must be answered at the household (micro) level. Thus one approach to implementing the framework is to consider the data collection and analysis processes at these three distinct—micro, meso, and macro—scales of analysis. This raises the possibility of division of labour according to the comparative advantage of different agencies involved in the response to a given [emergency]54”. Since this is a public good (i.e., not agency-specific), it is best suited to be supported by a collective effort, led by donors. Also, it is not the case that entirely new data collecting institutions should be born in regions that do not have them. Implementing agencies that have continued field level presence in these areas can frequently be supported in collecting such micro-market level data. 55

54 Barrett, C. B., Bell, R., & Lentz, E. C. (2009). Market Information and Food Insecurity Response Analysis. Springer.55 The following section is taken from Michelson et al. Cash, Food or Vouchers in Urban and Rural Kenya? An Application of the Market Information and Food Insecurity Response Analysis Framework, Draft, Forthcoming, 2011

The need for better coordination:

Source: Michaelson et al, 200555

Finally, increased response choice requires greater cross-institutional coordination among governments and agencies. Without careful coordination, institutions’ response choices can work at cross-purposes. For example, within recipient communities, transoceanic or regionally procured food aid distributions are supply-side interventions that increase the amount of food available.

In contrast, cash and voucher distributions are demand-side interventions that lead to increased spending by recipients. Both types of interventions can impact local prices, consumers and producers, but in opposing directions. The combination, particularly without coordination, has the potential to create price volatility and instability. Response analysis can guide agencies selecting between demand and supply side interventions, or can assist agencies determining if an intervention combining or sequencing supply and demand components is warranted.

Moreover, understanding the scope and scale of current and planned interventions across institutions can help analysts more accurately assess the additive effect of a prospective intervention. Evaluating likely total effects is of special concern when multiple institutions seek to procure food aid and/or deliver cash and vouchers within the same marketshed. One agency’s assessment may indicate that a certain tonnage of food can be procured from a region without inducing inflation. If a second agency fails to incorporate the first’s intent to purchase into its own analysis, it may proceed with local purchases or distributions of cash and voucher transfers that it otherwise would not. The net effect in the market could be increased prices, harming food purchasers and potentially decreasing the value of distributed cash and voucher transfers. Thus, there is growing need for locally-based coordination across operational agencies.

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SECTION 5: FUTURE AREAS OF INVESTMENT

The discussion above both on areas of market analysis that are currently not conducted well, and stages of the project cycle where market analysis needs to be better integrated have thus identified areas of investment that the humanitarian sector must seriously consider if systematic progress is to be made. Recommendations for investment have been made in four areas: data, capacity, increasing rigour and standards and systems.

Data

Data Collection: In many countries and regions within countries, external institutions like FEWS NET and others collect relevant market data (mainly concentrated on food security and livelihood support). This needs to be supplemented by long-term monitoring in regions and localities where such data is not always collected, or where national institutions are not always robust. This also needs to be collected at the level of different markets (national and regional, which services like FEWS NET may cover, but also highly local markets that agencies have chosen to intervene in, in which data must be collected by field office staff by default).

Long term data collection: Emphasis should also be made in maintaining long-term field teams, particularly in field areas that are not covered by external data collecting institutions. These field teams would be integral to maintaining good quality data that would enable better price modelling, better forecasting and more accurate targeting and designing of interventions. Finally, creating low cost market information systems in areas where data are currently difficult to obtain is not impossible. Examples from the development sector abound (e.g., local information systems using rural radios, mobiles and others have kept market information circulating, reducing transaction costs and integrating economies). Interesting advances have been made in technology that allow/facilitate market performance, which is an area too for donors and agencies to examine56.

56 For example, in Niger, it was found that the introduction of mobile phones is associated with a 20-percent reduction in grain price differences across markets, with a larger impact for markets that are farther apart and those that are linked by poor-quality roads. Cell phones also have a larger impact over time: as more markets have cell phone coverage, the greater the reduction in price differences. This is primarily due to changes in grain traders’ marketing behaviour: cell phones lead to reduced search costs, more market information and increased efficiency in moving goods across the country. See Aker, J. Does Digital Divide or Provide? The impact of cell phones on grain markets in Niger, Center for Global Development, Working Paper, Oct 2008

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SECTION 5 FUTURE AREAS OF INVESTMENT

Also, increasing data collection capacity will ensure that impacts along the entire value chain and importantly, seasonally relevant impacts and functions, can be documented57. Such monitoring would include not only local market informant monitoring, but also related value chain elements such as weather and crop conditions, trade flows, labour market flows and even household expenditure.

Capacity

While there has been increasing recognition of the role that markets play, agencies have been slow in building market analysis capacity within their organisations. Interviews with donors have said that only about 30–40% of proposals submitted to them for emergency response funding have any sort of real market analysis in them (this includes EMMA type assessments but frequently just includes less rigorous market assessments).

Capacity: While donors have recognised the dearth of market analytical capacity in country offices, regional offices and headquarters and taken active steps to remedy the situation by increasing their technical capacity, the sense that was received from interviews with practitioners was that more can be done to increase analytical capacity on this end. There are two aspects to this. The first is increasing the general awareness of the value of market analysis (and a broad understanding of what that would entail) throughout donor agencies. The second is to increase the availability of technical capacity (particularly two types of technical capacity: field specialists with deep contextual understandings of markets and analytical capabilities, and technical specialists who can assess elasticities, etc.) throughout regions. For regions where predictability of emergencies is high specialist (economist) market analysts will be particularly useful to understand a complex market picture. They will be capable of determining market integration, demand and supply elasticities and capable of building basic market models (or understanding them) to assess the viability of interventions.

It is not only the lack of actual data that is an issue, but also the lack of capacity to understand complex price and market data from early warning systems, and to be able to incorporate that into contingency planning, baseline analyses that feed into response analyses. While data can be collected by other agencies; market analysts are still needed at the operational level to translate the analysis into programme decisions. It is important to be clear that for the majority of the market analysis (with the exception of estimating multipliers, supply and demand elasticity formally) no technical (e.g., economic/econometric) knowledge is required. FEWS NET who provide widely well-regarded market analyses, said that the vast majority of their staff are non-economists, for example. But importantly, they have many years of experience interacting with markets, observing markets and analysing data. Investing in market analysis capacity by agencies is thus going to be a long-term effort. While stand-alone rigorous market analysis can be extremely useful, it cannot always be relied upon if agencies are not capable of interpreting it well.

Utilising knowledge of local staff: Many agencies also report the presence of local staff with often very good knowledge of local markets and contexts in country offices, but they may not always be fully used in market assessments and responses. These staff should be identified whichever element they are part of (in logistics teams, for example, or finance teams as well as programme teams) and their knowledge used as much as possible. As has been said, “local analysts with experience can provide background on what has happened in the past. This institutional memory is often lacking in humanitarian agencies that change/ Wei, Emily. Local and

57 Wei, Emily. Local and Regional Procurement: A Case Study of Mercy Corps’ programming in Haiti, Kyrgyzstan and Niger, June 2011

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Regional Procurement: A Case Study of Mercy Corps’ programming in Haiti, Kyrgyzstan and Niger, June 2011 move staff frequently. Local analysts also have the personal contacts with traders, trader associations, farmer associations, and other interest groups to assess conditions and provide recommendations on actions.”58

Early-onset situations: Along the lines of the recommendations made to donors, in regions/countries where there is a recurring likelihood of emergency, agencies should step up their market analysis capacity. This involves raising the level of awareness about the methods and value of market analysis (how it feeds into all stages of the project cycle and not just the response stage) across the office, as well as commissioning specialist market analysis and working actively to ensure that the recommendations of specialist market analysis are fed through implementation.

Increasing Rigour in Current Practice

Updating assessments in a rapid onset situation: Rapid onset or unpredictable emergencies often necessitate rapid responses without the benefit of sufficient assessment times in order to protect lives. In this case, rapid-assessment tools that allow rough and quick response guidelines (such as the EMMA) should be used in tandem with more rigorous market analysis that will take a longer time to complete but have more robust results. Another way of looking at the need to update information and reflect a more considered response is to repeat market analyses frequently (i.e., repeat EMMAs periodically during key stages of an evolving rapid onset situation). This will also mean that flexibility in adjusting programmes to changing market conditions will need to be created: flexibility in funding as well as a recognition that flexibility in changing responses (whether it is ‘switching’ to new responses, or refining existing responses) need to be created.

Increased flexibility in alternative responses to transfer-based options: Donors such as ECHO and USAID have in fact been responsive to funding alternatives to cash/in-kind/vouchers when presented with such options. Donors have indicated a willingness and flexibility when presented with well-thought-out proposals to consider a wide range of responses. However, official guidelines (see annex) may still present a bias towards choosing between commodity/voucher/cash modalities, which may prevent agencies from venturing too far outside of a comfort zone.

If implementing agencies across the board are to consider a wide range of responses (transfer-based and non-transfer-based), the requisite investments in their response capacity will also have to be made. This should be seen as an area of opportunity and there are many agencies that have already seized it in different contexts. Agencies should also invest in some type of impact assessment activity, particularly new modalities that are non-transfer based, so that they can also improve their delivery through documenting and analysing a critical mass of such approaches.

Changing the proposal cycle: Donors should also communicate what type of market analysis they are willing to fund. This has two aspects: the rigour of market analysis and the stage in the project cycle. While specialist market analysis might be more expensive as a line-item, the overall reduction in costs that they may introduce through informing a more cost-efficient/cost-effective response will generate significant benefits. In a predictable emergency with longer timelines donors can also allow perhaps longer proposal times that reflect

58 Donovan, C., & McGlinchy, M. (2006). Market Profiles and Emergency Needs Assessments: A Summary of Methodological Challenges. Rome: World Food Programme.

37

SECTION 5 FUTURE AREAS OF INVESTMENT

the time necessary to conduct such rigorous market analysis for a response analysis. Regarding market analysis for monitoring, subsequent programme adjustments and linking it to early recovery and contingency planning: the willingness to support such initiatives should also be communicated by donors.

The need for coordination: As has been mentioned, the need for coordination during the early phases of a slow onset emergency (for example, in collecting and analysing relevant data), as well as during the response stage, is critical. Coordination is possible through the cluster approach, for example. Sectoral clusters should also be coordinated, particularly for multiple cash transfer programmes (that may have different objectives) since evidence indicates that unless there is strong conditionality, households spend cash in consistent ways, despite it being given for different objectives.

Standards and Systems

Creating a baseline and updating market analysis: In a rapid onset emergency, time is often spent creating a baseline (e.g., an EMMA baseline) retrospectively. As one interviewee said, because this is done under necessary conditions of speed, the quality of the baseline, the response analysis and the outputs are also limited. Creating EMMA maps that are then updated as emergency progresses is thus useful to map rapidly changing conditions. They also have the added benefit of acting as a preparation for indirect responses (i.e., alternatives to transfers for where such responses are appropriate) so that once the work is underway, these options do not come as such a shock to implementers and funding partners.

Contingency planning using market analysis and market responses in countries that are prone to recurring disaster/conflict or where emergencies are predictable is an area in which agencies should invest more resources and time. A corollary of this is that each agency will also have to develop, based on its mandate and objectives, a system of interpreting early warning signals (and indicators for example, for early warning signals) through market functioning data as discussed earlier (whether these are food item price data, terms of trade of labour and commodities or labour migration, etc.).

Communicating a message regarding standards: Because of the influence that donors command in being able to set standards and guide humanitarian aid,, they should communicate a message that more rigorous market analysis that informs responses will be ‘rewarded’, particularly in complex situations. In countries that are prone to repeated emergencies or protracted conflicts, or that are undergoing transition into early recovery/development situations,, the relative abundance of data, relative stability of at least some market functions and the ability to conduct more rigorous market assessments necessitates a more intensive focus and funding of thorough market analysis. It is difficult to apply broad guidelines on what ‘more rigorous’ is, besides the obvious recommendation that certain methods and models of market analysis present more objective analyses and recommendations than others (such as market models). Donors can also work with agencies on refining their proposals and refining their interventions along these lines.

Awareness of components of market analysis that are not always considered: As mentioned earlier, this includes work on integrating labour market assessments with traditional emergency response assessment and analysis (especially as cash for work programmes continue to dominate the cash portfolio59). Regarding credit

59 Initial data also suggests that the majority of cash/voucher programmes funded are in cash for work programmes (for example, 147 projects funded out of the 189 of ECHO’s portfolio after 2000 in cash and voucher programmes were for cash for work programmes). See

38


market assessments: it also includes working with banks and microfinance agencies in areas to understand the credit situation in the local context (and have rough estimates of available credit, interest rates, prevalence of over-indebtedness, etc.). Finally, conflict-sensitive market analysis should also be conducted, with the assistance of well-informed neutral local staff, for example.

In complex contexts (e.g., conflict contexts): the importance of conducting market analysis alongside a good recognition of country-specific political economy analysis should be considered and emphasised by donors, both in their guidelines and in their technical assistance.

Ongoing monitoring frameworks: Market monitoring guidelines should be assessed within each agency’s capacity and mandate in both slow and rapid onset emergencies. Guidelines for assessing thresholds and a range of possible programme adjustments or switching to new responses should also be collectively discussed within agencies, with a view towards institutionalising what is relevant for each agency’s mandate and modus operandi.

Conclusion

Today’s emergencies have shown the need for increasingly complex humanitarian assistance. And donors and agencies alike work together in the context of increasing demand for constrained resources. There is thus an urgent impetus and responsibility to create high-impact responses, based on the best possible information.

Market information and analysis are critical instruments in an arsenal of instruments available to the programmer. Their usefulness is determined by their quality and timeliness at each stage: from preparedness to response, to monitoring and early recovery. Information and analysis that embrace the complexity of markets while generating useful recommendations are thus essential. Gaps that are evident now in understanding labour, credit and political perspectives should be paid attention to. More rigorous market analysis should also be understood and commissioned by programmers. There is, as mentioned, an important aspect of urgency and timeliness in ensuring that market analysis remains relevant to programmers. Investing in systems, capacity and data collection is of paramount importance. Doing so will ensure that agencies respond with increased agility, flexibility and continued innovation in emergency situations.

There is great promise, change and responsiveness within the field of humanitarian practice at this juncture. Donors and agencies alike are responding to emergencies with a constant eye towards piloting improved approaches in order to take the field forward. Market analysis is being conducted by an increasing number of practitioners, and awareness of its critical importance in protecting lives is growing by leaps and bounds. It only remains to close existing gaps as outlined by this report, collectively by donors, agencies, policymakers and practitioners.

Lor-Mehdiabadi, W. and Adams, L. Evaluation and Review of the Use of Cash and Vouchers in Humanitarian Crises, European Commission for Humanitarian Aid (ECHO), 2008

39

ANNEXES

40

ANNEX 1: REVIEW OF TWO TOOLS: EMMA AND MIFIRA BASED ON PARTICIPANT FEEDBACK

The perception of current market analysis theory and practice seemed to reflect two main strands of thought. The first was that current market analysis tools (such as EMMA or MIFIRA) were more than capable of providing good enough analysis of markets in emergency, but that how these tools were used left a lot to be desired, and in the end, provided analysis that sometimes was not sound, or sometimes not useful. Examples were cited particularly with inter-agency coordination that took weeks to complete and often provided responses far later than programme decisions were actually made, using critical markets that were not chosen well. In addition, many markets were left out of these assessments as well. And individuals who took part in market assessments were frequently not the same individuals making programme design decisions. In this analysis, where uniformly adequate market awareness capabilities at the country programme level did not exist, some agencies have tried to develop or adapt market tools that required less pre-training and that could be almost adopted as an off-the-shelf tool for explicitly emergency purposes.

The second strand of thought is that current market analysis tools for emergency purposes do not go far enough in their rigour, which is especially important either for large scale programmes (such as large scale cash transfers or large scale procurement) and for longer-running programmes (in situations of chronic insecurity, etc.). For these situations, market analysis that relies on quality data (e.g., long-term series data), simulation modelling and some level of econometric analysis (to produce technically robust analyses with small margins of error) is necessary. In an ideal situation, these ‘models would be updated continuously throughout the emergency to make more explicit errors in assumptions [i.e. to highlight what kinds of assumptions are used in modelling, and where they could be erroneous (due to changing situations etc.] and lack of data, and to also allow the necessary adaptation of the aid programme’60. This was seen as particularly important for large scale programmes (and debate does exist around what constitutes “large-scale”. It has been suggested, for example, that if the given collective amount of a transfer programme exceeds 10% of the market, it constitutes a large-scale programme and hence should follow certain standards of rigour), but it is also important for those seeking cost-efficiency in programmes.

60 Benjamin Watkins, World Food Programme

41

ANNEX 1 REVIEW OF TWO TOOLS: EMMA AND MIFIRA BASED ON PARTICIPANT FEEDBACK

We turn now to the results of a brief survey and review of the EMMA approach, and then the MIFIRA approach, as the two most oft-cited tools used by humanitarian agencies.

The Emergency Market Mapping Assessment (EMMA)

Linking Emma To Gap Analysis and Response Analysis: While the EMMA tool has a gap analysis component and a response analysis component, frequent observations have been made to the following effect:

• ‘Linking the gap analysis and market analysis is very difficult’

• ‘Critical markets are not selected well’

• ‘It seems as though using the EMMA is mainly to justify using cash; what’s the point of using EMMA to come up with other responses when we all know we’re either doing cash or in-kind?

• ‘Markets change but EMMA does not’.

The comparison of response options that EMMAs have made across the twenty assessments is available in this document below. It is useful because it shows the wide variety of responses prescribed by any EMMA. However, despite the high feasibility of many indirect responses (that were not cash, vouchers or in-kind distribution), the responses that were implemented ranged – for the majority- in the cash, vouchers and in-kind area. This has been due to many reasons.

• Timing of EMMAs: The timing and coordination issues, particularly with the joint-agency EMMAs, frequently took much longer to be resolved than expected; and their results may not have come in time to feed into project design recommendations (on the timing of the response, for example, or on the appropriate transfer rates, as well as on the indirect responses or even a mix of responses, such as cash AND in-kind, which is increasingly proving to be effective).

• Lack of donor guidance: Many practitioners mentioned that in order to submit a proposal to donors, the proposal should already reflect market analysis in support of response recommendations. There are, however, no funding or resources to do that, so what happens is that ‘cash or food distribution is proposed, then the donor funds the proposal for market analysis, and then market analysis is used to justify cash or food distribution.’ Clear guidance on how donors expect agencies to fund market analysis (and what level of market analysis) at the proposal stage might be useful.

• Lack of expertise in implementing indirect responses and a fear they are encroaching into early recovery/development territory: This brings about the central question practitioners are grappling with: if the market analysis is neutral (i.e., approached with no bias towards any response choice), as it is meant to be, and – assuming the market analysis is accurate – it becomes clear that a different intervention is prescribed to reduce aid dependency, promote livelihoods and sustain survival mechanisms of the affected, then what should we do? Currently the response to this is varied across the field: in some cases, alternative responses such as providing credit to traders are being made, but the vast majority will continue to struggle with the reach of their mandate, the needs of the affected, and the capacity of their organisations to deal with this.

• Choice of markets: It was expressed with many joint agency EMMA efforts that the choice of critical markets was not always relevant for each agency. This lead, for example, to some agencies thinking about adapting EMMA to create similar tools for their own needs. Certain EMMA reports have also been criticised for not selecting the right markets.

42


• Capacity and the EMMA: The success of EMMAs seemed to depend on the quality of the leaders and the staff implementing it. Leaders who were experienced and who had staff with good local knowledge produced the best results.

• Linking Markets in Analysis: One frustration that some practitioners felt was that EMMA was a relatively intensive exercise that yielded analysis of only one commodity market. Other EMMA implementers said that while it was designed for a single commodity market, many inferences about other markets could be drawn from the EMMA process itself, through a narrative that could inform a multi-market approach.

1a. Are food insecure households well connected to local markets?

1b. How well will local demand respond to transfers?

1c. How much additional food can traders supply at or near current costs

1d. Do local traders behave competitively?

1e. Do local populations have a preference over the form of aid they they receive?

Consider distributing at least some cash Consider distributing at least some food or other goods

Yes ***

Increase ***

Yes In Jowhar*

Cash or a mix

In Jowhar* In Adanyabal**

Minimal price increase expected Moderate price increase likely*

No

No impact

Food

Not in Adanyabal**

Excessive price increases expected

***High confidence **Medium confidence *Low confidence

Figure 7: USAID/FEWS NET MIFIRA analysis Somalia 2011

43

ANNEX 1 REVIEW OF TWO TOOLS: EMMA AND MIFIRA BASED ON PARTICIPANT FEEDBACK

• EMMA and the Short Term: One interviewee said that EMMA should be a rapid response (a response that does not use technical skills) for an intervention not designed to be more than 6 months. After we use EMMA, we should be planning for MIFIRA or a stronger analysis for the 6 months to 2 years phase.

• EMMAs not implemented fully: While the tool has wide potential, interviewees mentioned that only the market maps were used frequently in a stand-alone fashion; and so the linkages to the gap analysis and response analysis were not as strong as they could have been. Market mapping is extracted out, and poorly linked to gap analysis or response analysis (even though those tools exist within EMMA; most just extract and use the visual mapping).

Market Information and Food Insecurity Response Analysis: MIFIRA

The Market Information and Food Insecurity Response Analysis (MIFIRA) framework is a response analysis tool designed to evaluate the feasibility of transfer options given market conditions and household circumstances and preferences (Barrett et al. 2009). MIFIRA is organised around two questions. First, are local markets functioning well? Second, if local markets are not functioning well enough to supply aid, is there sufficient food available nearby to meet the shortfall? For example, if markets cannot meet increased demand generated by cash or vouchers without increases in prices, delivering these forms of transfers will not support the targeted population as well as in-kind transfers of food. In addition to this analysis, MIFIRA has been field tested in Somalia (FEWS NET 2011) and northern Kenya (Ouma et al. 2010). Forthcoming MIFIRAs have been recently concluded in other locations, though at the time of this study the results were not available.

Each MIFIRA question is subdivided into a set of sub-questions to focus and facilitate analysis. The first question, which examines whether local markets are functioning, is analysed in five dimensions: (1a) to what degree are food insecure households connected to markets, (1b) what is the estimate of increased demand on food markets generated by the proposed intervention, (1c) are local traders able to meet such an increase in demand without increasing food prices, (1d) is there sufficient competition among traders in local markets, and (1e) do households have a preference over the form of aid. The second MIFIRA question – is there sufficient food available nearby to meet the shortfall? – examines the potential effect of agency food purchases on source markets.)61.

Although there has only been a limited subset of experiences with the MIFIRA tool, compared to the EMMA tool, the initial responses to the tool may suggest future avenues of evolution.

• Requires a baseline for it to be implemented, which presents challenges in countries that do not have these baselines. However, the corollary benefit is that there is significant value in ongoing monitoring of markets and developing baselines, which the MIFIRA necessitates.

• Requires specialist and experienced staff and takes a much longer time to implement than, for example, the EMMA. While the results are less captive to subjectivity than the EMMA, the MIFIRA is still not a market model, and not as objective as such a model might be. The tradeoffs between the quality, timing, and resource constraints of the MIFIRA tool versus other tools need to be considered.

61 Michelson et al. Cash, Food or Vouchers in Urban and Rural Kenya? An Application of the Market Information and Food Insecurity Response Analysis Framework, Draft, Forthcoming, 2011

44


• MIFIRA’s questions do not assess if traders can supply quantities at prices other than current or near current prices. This is seen as a limitation to understanding, for example, supply elasticity and the relative costs of procuring at different levels of quantities.

• Pre-defined responses: The MIFIRA tool has pre-defined response choices between cash/in-kind/voucher interventions already by design, though of course the application of the tool also yields important and interesting insights into other non-traditional market interventions.

45

ANNEX 2: COMPARISON OF EMMA RESPONSES ACROSS DIFFERENT CONTEXTS AND MARKETS

Table 3: EMMA response comparison

46


EMM

A R

ESPO

NSE

CO

MPA

RIS

ON

Mar

ket

and

Cou

ntry

A

sses

sed

TH

E M

AR

KET

FO

R A

GR

ICU

LTU

RA

L LA

BOR

IN S

UD

-ES

T D

EPA

RTM

ENT

OF

HA

ITI

TH

E M

AR

KET

FO

R B

EAN

S IN

SU

D-E

ST D

EPA

RTM

ENT

OF

HA

ITI

Tim

e pe

riod

of a

sses

smen

t (N

OT

E, N

OT

T

IME

OF

PUBL

ICAT

ION

)

Mar

ch–A

pril

2010

Mar

ch–A

pril

2010

Age

ncie

s In

volv

ed in

C

arry

ing

Out

A

sses

smen

t (n

ot in

clud

ing

fund

er o

f as

sess

men

t if

appl

icab

le)

The

SEE

P N

etw

ork,

AC

DI/V

OC

A, I

RC

, Sav

e th

e C

hild

ren,

D

iako

nie

The

SEE

P N

etw

ork,

AC

DI/V

OC

A, I

RC

, CRO

SE, S

ave

the

Chi

ldre

n

Gap

Ana

lysis

Beca

use

of t

he fr

eque

ncy

of e

cono

mic

cris

es in

Hai

ti, t

he Ja

nuar

y 12

ear

thqu

ake

cann

ot b

e tr

eate

d as

a o

ne-t

ime

cata

stro

phe

caus

ing

star

k be

fore

-and

-afte

r di

ffere

nces

in e

xpen

ditu

re a

nd

cons

umpt

ion.

Hou

seho

lds

in S

ud-E

st h

ad a

lread

y de

velo

ped

an

arra

y of

cop

ing

stra

tegi

es, s

uch

as c

onsu

min

g m

ore

hom

egro

wn

prod

uce

such

as

star

chy

tube

rs, a

nd s

pend

ing

dow

n ca

sh a

nd

asse

t re

serv

es. T

his

resu

lts in

a g

radu

al d

eclin

e of

qua

lity

of

life,

rat

her

than

a la

rge,

sud

den

drop

. The

refo

re, it

is d

ifficu

lt to

qua

ntify

the

exa

ct g

ap o

f mee

ting

basic

nee

ds, a

nd m

ore

effe

ctiv

e to

exa

min

e no

rmal

ver

sus

affe

cted

inco

me

leve

ls.

Res

torin

g no

rmal

inco

me

leve

ls sh

ould

res

ult

in a

sim

ilarly

gr

adua

l inc

reas

e in

qua

lity

of li

fe (

e.g.

star

ting

to p

urch

ase

mor

e nu

triti

ous

food

s) a

nd a

bui

ldup

in s

avin

gs t

o m

itiga

te t

he im

pact

of

the

nex

t cr

isis.

A d

eman

d fa

ilure

is t

he m

ajor

con

stra

int

in t

he b

eans

mar

ket

in S

ud-E

st.

Hou

seho

ld in

com

e ha

s de

clin

ed p

ost-

eart

hqua

ke, a

nd o

ne c

opin

g st

rate

gy is

to

purc

hase

few

er b

eans

. If f

arm

ers

are

not

able

to

acce

ss s

eeds

and

gat

her

suffi

cien

t la

bor,

fam

ilies

that

pre

viou

sly p

lant

ed b

eans

may

sw

itch

to le

ss e

xpen

sive

crop

s, sh

rinki

ng d

omes

tic s

uppl

y an

d in

crea

sing

impo

rts.

Thi

s co

uld

lead

to

smal

ler

harv

ests

and

shr

unke

n in

com

es fo

r be

an g

row

ers,

as w

ell a

s pr

ice

incr

ease

s. U

nsaf

e st

orag

e fa

cilit

ies

and

inse

curit

y in

Cro

ix-d

es-B

ossa

les

in P

ort-

au-P

rince

ne

ed t

o be

add

ress

ed, h

owev

er s

uppl

y se

ems

adeq

uate

in e

nd m

arke

ts; t

here

fore

th

is is

not

the

key

cons

trai

nt in

the

mar

ket.

Food

aid

has

dou

bled

or

trip

led

in

som

e ar

eas

of S

ud-E

st a

nd m

ay b

e re

spon

sible

for

part

of t

he d

eman

d fa

ilure

. H

owev

er, h

ouse

hold

s’ dr

op in

inco

me

is th

e st

rong

er in

fluen

ce.

47

ANNEX 2 COMPARISON OF EMMA RESPONSES ACROSS DIFFERENT CONTEXTS AND MARKETS

EMM

A R

ESPO

NSE

CO

MPA

RIS

ON

Mar

ket

and

Cou

ntry

A

sses

sed

TH

E M

AR

KET

FO

R A

GR

ICU

LTU

RA

L LA

BOR

IN S

UD

-ES

T D

EPA

RTM

ENT

OF

HA

ITI

TH

E M

AR

KET

FO

R B

EAN

S IN

SU

D-E

ST D

EPA

RTM

ENT

OF

HA

ITI

Tim

e pe

riod

of a

sses

smen

t (N

OT

E, N

OT

T

IME

OF

PUBL

ICAT

ION

)

Mar

ch–A

pril

2010

Mar

ch–A

pril

2010

Age

ncie

s In

volv

ed in

C

arry

ing

Out

A

sses

smen

t (n

ot in

clud

ing

fund

er o

f as

sess

men

t if

appl

icab

le)

The

SEE

P N

etw

ork,

AC

DI/V

OC

A, I

RC

, Sav

e th

e C

hild

ren,

D

iako

nie

The

SEE

P N

etw

ork,

AC

DI/V

OC

A, I

RC

, CRO

SE, S

ave

the

Chi

ldre

n

Gap

Ana

lysis

Beca

use

of t

he fr

eque

ncy

of e

cono

mic

cris

es in

Hai

ti, t

he Ja

nuar

y 12

ear

thqu

ake

cann

ot b

e tr

eate

d as

a o

ne-t

ime

cata

stro

phe

caus

ing

star

k be

fore

-and

-afte

r di

ffere

nces

in e

xpen

ditu

re a

nd

cons

umpt

ion.

Hou

seho

lds

in S

ud-E

st h

ad a

lread

y de

velo

ped

an

arra

y of

cop

ing

stra

tegi

es, s

uch

as c

onsu

min

g m

ore

hom

egro

wn

prod

uce

such

as

star

chy

tube

rs, a

nd s

pend

ing

dow

n ca

sh a

nd

asse

t re

serv

es. T

his

resu

lts in

a g

radu

al d

eclin

e of

qua

lity

of

life,

rat

her

than

a la

rge,

sud

den

drop

. The

refo

re, it

is d

ifficu

lt to

qua

ntify

the

exa

ct g

ap o

f mee

ting

basic

nee

ds, a

nd m

ore

effe

ctiv

e to

exa

min

e no

rmal

ver

sus

affe

cted

inco

me

leve

ls.

Res

torin

g no

rmal

inco

me

leve

ls sh

ould

res

ult

in a

sim

ilarly

gr

adua

l inc

reas

e in

qua

lity

of li

fe (

e.g.

star

ting

to p

urch

ase

mor

e nu

triti

ous

food

s) a

nd a

bui

ldup

in s

avin

gs t

o m

itiga

te t

he im

pact

of

the

nex

t cr

isis.

A d

eman

d fa

ilure

is t

he m

ajor

con

stra

int

in t

he b

eans

mar

ket

in S

ud-E

st.

Hou

seho

ld in

com

e ha

s de

clin

ed p

ost-

eart

hqua

ke, a

nd o

ne c

opin

g st

rate

gy is

to

purc

hase

few

er b

eans

. If f

arm

ers

are

not

able

to

acce

ss s

eeds

and

gat

her

suffi

cien

t la

bor,

fam

ilies

that

pre

viou

sly p

lant

ed b

eans

may

sw

itch

to le

ss e

xpen

sive

crop

s, sh

rinki

ng d

omes

tic s

uppl

y an

d in

crea

sing

impo

rts.

Thi

s co

uld

lead

to

smal

ler

harv

ests

and

shr

unke

n in

com

es fo

r be

an g

row

ers,

as w

ell a

s pr

ice

incr

ease

s. U

nsaf

e st

orag

e fa

cilit

ies

and

inse

curit

y in

Cro

ix-d

es-B

ossa

les

in P

ort-

au-P

rince

ne

ed t

o be

add

ress

ed, h

owev

er s

uppl

y se

ems

adeq

uate

in e

nd m

arke

ts; t

here

fore

th

is is

not

the

key

cons

trai

nt in

the

mar

ket.

Food

aid

has

dou

bled

or

trip

led

in

som

e ar

eas

of S

ud-E

st a

nd m

ay b

e re

spon

sible

for

part

of t

he d

eman

d fa

ilure

. H

owev

er, h

ouse

hold

s’ dr

op in

inco

me

is th

e st

rong

er in

fluen

ce.

Res

pons

e 1

Unc

ondi

tiona

l cas

h tr

ansf

ers

for

the

mos

t vu

lner

able

.Sc

ale

back

bea

ns fo

od d

istrib

utio

n to

min

imal

leve

ls (e

.g. f

or h

ospi

tals)

, and

tr

ansit

ioni

ng t

o lo

cal p

rocu

rem

ent

for

the

rem

aini

ng d

istrib

utio

ns .

Res

pons

e 2

Cas

h-fo

r-wor

k (t

imed

and

str

uctu

red

so a

s no

t to

har

m p

lant

ing

and

harv

est

activ

ities

).If

not

alre

ady

done

, pub

licize

the

Mar

ch 3

1 “s

urge

” en

d da

te t

o re

taile

rs.

Res

pons

e 3

Dist

ribut

ing

(con

tinui

ng d

istrib

utio

n of

) qu

ality

(ce

rtifi

ed,

germ

inat

ion-

tes

ted)

see

ds, id

eally

thr

ough

loca

l pur

chas

e pr

ogra

ms,

seed

loan

/see

d m

ultip

lier

prog

ram

s, et

c.

Unc

ondi

tiona

l cas

h tr

ansf

ers

for

the

mos

t vu

lner

able

.

Res

pons

e 4

Gra

nts

or lo

ans

to la

rger

farm

ers.

Cas

h-fo

r-wor

k (t

imed

and

str

uctu

red

so a

s no

t to

har

m p

lant

ing/

har

vest

ac

tiviti

es)*

.

Res

pons

e 5

Stim

ulat

ion

of e

xist

ing

finan

cial

inst

itutio

ns, o

r es

tabl

ishm

ent

of

new

faci

litie

s, to

pro

vide

agr

icul

tura

l fina

nce

(cre

dit,

insu

ranc

e).

Dist

ribut

ing

(con

tinui

ng d

istrib

utio

n of

) qu

ality

bea

n se

eds.

Res

pons

e 6

Stim

ulat

ion

of a

ltern

ativ

e ru

ral e

mpl

oym

ent

oppo

rtun

ities

.Fa

cilit

atin

g th

e es

tabl

ishm

ent

of a

priv

ate-

sect

or s

eed

mar

ket

syst

em fo

r qu

ality

se

eds.

Res

pons

e 7

Prep

arat

ion

for

resp

onse

s fo

r 20

10 h

urric

ane

seas

on.

Stim

ulat

ion

of e

xist

ing

finan

cial

inst

itutio

ns, o

r es

tabl

ishm

ent

of n

ew fa

cilit

ies,

to

prov

ide

agric

ultu

ral fi

nanc

e (c

redi

t, in

sura

nce)

.

Res

pons

e 8

Impr

ovin

g se

curit

y in

Cro

ix-d

es-

Boss

ales

.

Res

pons

e 9

Disa

ster

-risk

- re

duct

ion

resp

onse

s

Res

pons

e 10

Res

pons

e 11

Res

pons

e 12

Res

pons

e 13

Res

pons

e 14

Res

pons

e 15

Res

pons

e 16

Res

pons

e 17

Res

pons

e 18

Res

pons

e 19

Res

pons

e 20

*EM

MA

did

not

diff

eren

tiate

whe

ther

res

pons

es w

ere

high

, mod

erat

e or

low

feas

ibilit

y

48


EMM

A R

ESPO

NSE

CO

MPA

RIS

ON

Mar

ket

and

Cou

ntry

A

sses

sed

The

Mar

ket

Syst

em fo

r Be

ans

in H

aiti

The

Mar

ket

Syst

em fo

r C

onst

ruct

ion

Labo

r in

Por

t au

Prin

ce, H

aiti

Tim

e pe

riod

of a

sses

smen

t (N

OT

E, N

OT

T

IME

OF

PUBL

ICAT

ION

)

Febr

uary

7–1

7, 2

010

Febr

uary

7–1

7, 2

010

Age

ncie

s In

volv

ed in

C

arry

ing

Out

A

sses

smen

t (n

ot in

clud

ing

fund

er o

f as

sess

men

t if

appl

icab

le)

IRC

, Am

eric

an R

ed C

ross

, Hai

tian

Red

Cro

ss, I

nter

natio

nal

Fede

ratio

n of

the

Red

Cro

ss, S

ave

the

Chi

ldre

n, M

ercy

Cor

ps,

Oxf

am G

B, A

CD

I/VO

CA

, Wor

ld F

ood

Prog

ram

and

FEW

S/N

ET

IRC

, Am

eric

an R

ed C

ross

, Hai

tian

Red

Cro

ss, I

nter

natio

nal F

eder

atio

n of

the

Red

C

ross

, Sav

e th

e C

hild

ren,

Mer

cy C

orps

, Oxf

am G

B, A

CD

I/VO

CA

, Wor

ld F

ood

Prog

ram

an

d FE

WS/

NET

.

Gap

Ana

lysis

Disc

ussio

ns w

ith k

ey in

form

ants

in c

amps

and

in m

arke

ts

indi

cate

d a

signi

fican

t de

crea

se in

bea

n co

nsum

ptio

n fo

llow

ing

the

eart

hqua

ke.

A b

rief s

urve

y of

vul

nera

ble

hous

ehol

ds in

dica

tes

that

inco

me

of t

he a

vera

ge h

ouse

hold

has

falle

n by

60-

70%

as

a di

rect

re

sult

of t

he e

arth

quak

e. B

efor

e th

e sh

ock,

food

acc

ount

ed fo

r ap

prox

imat

ely

35%

of t

otal

exp

endi

ture

. With

the

sig

nific

ant

decr

ease

in in

com

e, fo

od c

osts

now

acc

ount

for

appr

oxim

atel

y 85

% o

f tot

al e

xpen

ditu

re. T

his

mea

ns t

hat

any

envi

ronm

enta

l sh

ifts

that

may

incr

ease

the

pric

e of

bea

ns w

ould

hav

e m

ore

signi

fican

t im

plic

atio

ns o

n ho

useh

olds

.

To c

alcu

late

the

gap

in b

ean

dem

and

vers

us r

esou

rces

ava

ilabl

e to

pur

chas

e de

man

ds, m

ore

accu

rate

inco

me

and

expe

nditu

re

data

wou

ld b

e re

quire

d. T

he g

roup

face

d sig

nific

ant

chal

leng

es

gath

erin

g qu

antit

ativ

e in

com

e in

form

atio

n, d

ue t

o di

fficu

lties

in

accu

rate

ly s

trat

ifyin

g th

e af

fect

ed p

opul

atio

n in

Por

t au

Prin

ce.

We

know

from

FEW

S/N

ET b

asel

ine

surv

ey o

f 200

9 th

at t

he v

ery

poor

est

have

an

aver

age

inco

me

of 9

500-

1250

0 G

ourd

es p

er m

onth

, and

tha

t th

ey d

o pa

rtic

ipat

e in

ca

sual

con

stru

ctio

n la

bor. T

his

is lik

ely

to e

quat

e w

ith t

he u

nski

lled

wor

kers

iden

tified

in

our

mar

ket

map

ping

. Poo

r ho

useh

olds

in P

ort

au P

rince

mak

e 12

500–

17,5

00 G

ds

per

mon

th a

nd a

lso p

artic

ipat

e in

cas

ual c

onst

ruct

ion

labo

r. Thi

s is

also

like

ly t

o be

re

pres

ente

d in

our

map

s in

the

uns

kille

d la

bor

cate

gory

. Mid

dle

inco

me

hous

ehol

ds,

acco

rdin

g to

FEW

S/N

ET m

ake

17,5

00–2

5,00

0Gds

per

mon

th, a

nd a

re li

kely

to

hold

po

sitio

ns c

ateg

orize

d as

sem

i-ski

lled

on o

ur m

aps.

Whi

le n

early

31%

of t

he H

aitia

n po

pula

tion

rece

ives

rem

ittan

ces,

in fa

ct, t

he p

oore

st a

re t

he le

ast

likel

y to

rec

eive

the

m

beca

use

they

hav

e ne

ver

been

abl

e to

affo

rd t

o ed

ucat

e fa

mily

mem

bers

abr

oad

or

send

the

m o

vers

eas.

Initi

al e

stim

ates

sho

w t

hat

hous

ehol

ds a

re fa

cing

is a

60-

70%

dr

op in

the

ir in

com

e. T

his

gap

will

obvi

ously

con

tinue

unt

il ho

useh

old

livel

ihoo

ds c

an

be r

enew

ed, w

hich

will

depe

nd u

pon

how

qui

ckly

hou

seho

lds

are

able

to

rebu

ild t

heir

asse

ts, a

nd t

he s

tren

gth

of t

he

mar

ket

over

all. O

nce

the

situa

tion

has

stab

ilized

it w

ill be

impo

rtan

t to

do

a fu

ll H

EA

or b

asel

ine

stud

y to

gat

her

mor

e in

dep

th in

form

atio

n on

the

hou

seho

ld in

com

e,

expe

nditu

res,

copi

ng m

echa

nism

s, an

d re

cove

ry s

trat

egie

s.

*EM

MA

did

not

diff

eren

tiate

whe

ther

res

pons

es w

ere

high

, mod

erat

e or

low

feas

ibilit

y

49


Res

pons

e 1

Imm

edia

te u

ncon

ditio

nal C

ash

Tran

sfer

s an

d/or

vou

cher

s to

co

nsum

ers

Coo

rdin

atio

n by

sta

keho

lder

s on

how

to

addr

ess

uncl

ear

land

ten

ure

Res

pons

e 2

Shor

t to

long

ter

m c

reat

ion

of In

com

e G

ener

atin

g A

ctiv

ities

Shor

t te

rm r

ecru

itmen

t of

dia

spor

a ci

vil e

ngin

eers

and

tec

hnic

ians

to

avoi

d dr

awin

g sk

ills o

ut o

f loc

al p

rivat

e se

ctor

Res

pons

e 3

Imm

edia

te P

rovi

sion

of c

ash/

vouc

hers

/cer

tified

see

ds t

o sm

allh

olde

r fa

rmer

s in

mou

ntai

nous

reg

ions

Upd

ate

curr

icul

um fo

r sk

illed

and

prof

essio

nal t

rain

ing

to t

ake

into

acc

ount

impa

ct o

f ear

thqu

ake

Res

pons

e 4

Publ

iciz

ing

dem

and

stim

ulat

ion

prog

ram

sTr

aini

ng o

f mas

ons,

carp

ente

rs, e

lect

ricia

ns, e

tc. b

y N

GO

s (V

SO fo

r in

stan

ce; H

abita

t fo

r H

uman

ity In

tern

atio

nal p

rovi

des

trai

ning

) Li

nkin

g tr

aini

ng t

o fo

llow

-on

optio

ns

(app

rent

ices

hip,

sm

all b

usin

ess

loan

s, et

c.)

Res

pons

e 5

Cas

h fo

r Wor

k to

rep

air

irrig

atio

n sy

stem

sV

irtu

al jo

b bo

ard

for

the

cons

truc

tion

sect

or t

o m

atch

loca

l com

pani

es w

ith b

oth

loca

l w

orke

rs a

nd d

iasp

ora

Res

pons

e 6

Med

ium

ter

m p

urch

ase

of t

ools

in P

ort

au P

rince

for

dist

ribut

ion

to s

mal

lhol

der

farm

ers

in t

he s

outh

Im

prov

e co

mm

unic

atio

n to

the

pub

lic o

n: s

uppo

rt fo

r ru

bble

rem

oval

, pro

pert

y rig

hts,

build

ing

perm

its, z

onin

g, et

cR

espo

nse

7Im

med

iate

Rep

arat

ion

of p

orts

– G

over

nmen

t of

Hai

ti or

oth

er

prog

ram

min

gSu

ppor

t to

exi

stin

g tr

aini

ng in

stitu

tions

:

1. R

ehab

ilitat

ion

and

reco

nstr

uctio

n of

faci

litie

s

2. C

apac

ity b

uild

ing

for

man

agem

ent,

facu

lty, a

nd s

taff

of lo

cal i

nstit

utio

ns (

in r

elat

ion

to

chan

ges

in a

pplic

atio

n of

ant

i-sei

smic

nor

ms)

3. A

ppre

ntic

eshi

p an

d fa

cilit

atio

n of

trai

nees

’ ent

ry in

the

labo

r m

arke

tR

espo

nse

8Im

med

iate

ly e

nsur

e po

rts

are

open

for

trad

e –

Gov

ernm

ent

of

Hai

tiPl

acem

ent

agen

cy fo

r al

l lev

els

of w

orke

r in

the

con

stru

ctio

n se

ctor

Res

pons

e 9

Ref

rain

from

food

aid

unt

il it

has

been

det

erm

ined

tha

t th

e m

arke

t sy

stem

can

not

be r

esto

red

by o

ther

inte

rven

tions

.En

cour

age

Parli

amen

t to

ado

pt la

w a

llow

ing

sepa

rate

ow

ners

hip

with

in o

ne b

uild

ing

(pre

viou

sly in

pro

cess

)R

espo

nse

10If

food

aid

is fo

und

to b

e ne

cess

ary,

cons

ider

loca

l pro

cure

men

t.Im

prov

e ac

cess

to

cred

it fo

r co

nstr

uctio

n w

ith a

ppro

pria

te t

erm

s an

d co

nditi

ons

Res

pons

e 11

Imm

edia

tely

pro

vide

bus

ines

s su

ppor

t gr

ants

of $

100–

$500

for

smal

l tra

ders

Build

soc

ial h

ousin

g

Res

pons

e 12

Imm

edia

tely

pro

vide

bus

ines

s su

ppor

t gr

ants

of $

500

to $

1,50

0 fo

r m

ediu

m t

rade

rsIn

spec

tion

and

enfo

rcem

ent

of b

uild

ing

perm

its a

nd a

nti-

seism

ic c

onst

ruct

ion

norm

s

Res

pons

e 13

Imm

edia

tely

inst

itute

cas

h fo

r Wor

k to

rep

air

road

s, irr

igat

ion

syst

ems

and

stor

age

depo

tsR

espo

nse

14In

the

sho

rt t

erm

, impl

emen

ting

agen

cies

sho

uld

look

for

crea

tive

mea

sure

s to

pro

vide

sec

urity

to

mar

kets

.R

espo

nse

15be

fore

pro

gram

impl

emen

tatio

n, o

rgan

izat

ions

mus

t do

th

orou

gh a

naly

sis o

f the

spe

cific

tar

gete

d po

pula

tion,

with

a

focu

s on

inco

me/

expe

nditu

re.

Res

pons

e 16

Trac

k D

omin

ican

Rep

ublic

Impo

rts/

Expo

rts:

volu

mes

tra

ded,

am

ount

of r

egul

atio

n, a

mou

nt e

xpor

ted

whi

ch r

etur

ns t

o H

aiti,

ef

fect

s of

dem

and

surg

esR

espo

nse

17Ke

ep s

tron

ger

base

line

data

: vol

umes

impo

rted

/exp

orte

d, p

rices

, nu

mbe

rs o

f tra

ders

and

the

ir in

tera

ctio

nR

espo

nse

18C

ondu

ct a

mor

e th

orou

gh a

naly

sis o

f for

mal

cre

dit

to v

endo

rs,

and

info

rmal

cre

dit

to M

adam

e Sa

ras

Res

pons

e 19

Res

pons

e 20

50


EMM

A R

ESPO

NSE

CO

MPA

RIS

ON

Mar

ket

and

Cou

ntry

A

sses

sed

The

Mar

ket

Syst

em fo

r C

orru

gate

d G

alva

nise

d Iro

n (C

GI)

Shee

t in

Hai

tiT

he M

arke

t Sy

stem

for

Ric

e in

Hai

ti

Tim

e pe

riod

of a

sses

smen

t (N

OT

E, N

OT

T

IME

OF

PUBL

ICAT

ION

)

Febr

uary

7–1

7, 2

010

Febr

uary

7–1

7, 2

010

Age

ncie

s In

volv

ed in

C

arry

ing

Out

A

sses

smen

t (n

ot in

clud

ing

fund

er o

f as

sess

men

t if

appl

icab

le)

IRC

, Am

eric

an R

ed C

ross

, Hai

tian

Red

Cro

ss, I

nter

natio

nal

Fede

ratio

n of

the

Red

Cro

ss, S

ave

the

Chi

ldre

n, M

ercy

Cor

ps,

Oxf

am G

B, A

CD

I/VO

CA

, Wor

ld F

ood

Prog

ram

and

FEW

S/N

ET.

IRC

, Am

eric

an R

ed C

ross

, Hai

tian

Red

Cro

ss, I

nter

natio

nal F

eder

atio

n of

the

Red

C

ross

, Sav

e th

e C

hild

ren,

Mer

cy C

orps

, Oxf

am G

B, A

CD

I/VO

CA

, Wor

ld F

ood

Prog

ram

an

d FE

WS/

NET

.

Gap

Ana

lysis

8 to

9 C

GI s

heet

s pe

r ho

useh

old

is re

pres

enta

tive

of t

he t

otal

de

man

d un

able

to

be m

et b

y cu

rren

t ho

useh

old

mea

ns. A

s sh

own

in t

his

tabl

e, t

he t

otal

CG

I nee

d fo

r fa

milie

s di

spla

ced

from

the

ir ho

mes

in P

ort

au P

rince

is 1

.4 t

o 2.

7 m

illion

she

ets

of C

GI.T

his

gap

in C

GI c

over

age

exist

s pr

inci

pally

bec

ause

the

fa

milie

s w

ho n

eed

CG

I to

erec

t an

ade

quat

e tr

ansit

iona

l she

lter

befo

re t

he r

ainy

sea

son

do n

ot h

ave

the

purc

hasin

g po

wer

to

buy

it o

n th

e lo

cal m

arke

t. Se

cond

ly, e

ven

if th

is pu

rcha

sing

pow

er e

xist

ed, a

s m

any

as 5

0% o

f the

loca

l har

dwar

e re

taile

rs

wer

e ei

ther

des

troy

ed, le

ft PA

P fo

r th

e co

untr

ysid

e, o

r do

not

ha

ve t

he c

apita

l to

keep

the

sto

re o

pen.

From

Janu

ary

to Ju

ne, 2

milli

on h

ouse

hold

s in

PaP

and

Pro

vinc

e la

cked

the

equ

ival

ent

of 1

7,00

0 C

erea

l- Eq

uiva

lent

Tonn

es (

CET

)per

mon

th. F

rom

June

to

Dec

embe

r, 2

milli

on in

PaP

and

the

pro

vinc

es la

cked

9,0

00 C

ET p

er m

onth

. In

add

ition

to

supp

lyin

g th

is vo

lum

e of

food

aid

, the

CN

SA r

ecom

men

ded

that

an

emer

genc

y st

ock

of 9

0,00

0 C

ET b

e co

nstit

uted

from

July

to

Nov

embe

r w

ith u

p to

53%

of l

ocal

ly p

rodu

ced

food

(d

epen

ding

on

loca

l foo

d pr

oduc

tion

leve

ls)

From

Janu

ary

to Ju

ne t

he C

NSA

rec

omm

ende

d th

at t

he fo

od a

id b

e of

102

,000

TEC

(e

quiv

alen

t to

4.8

% o

f the

200

8 ov

eral

l foo

d co

nsum

ptio

n fo

r H

aiti)

. Thi

s m

ust

be

com

pare

d w

ith t

he 2

008

food

aid

vol

ume

(116

,063

TEC

), an

d al

so c

onsid

er t

he fa

ct

that

aid

vol

umes

in 2

010

will

be c

onsid

erab

ly h

ighe

r as

Por

t-au

-Prin

ce w

as n

ot t

ypic

ally

an

are

a re

ceiv

ing

food

aid

.

51


Res

pons

e 1

Dist

ribut

ion

of c

ash

to h

ouse

hold

s fo

r th

e se

lf- p

rocu

rem

ent

of

iron

shee

ts (

and

othe

r bu

ildin

g m

ater

ial)

Cre

atio

n of

Nat

iona

l Foo

d R

eser

ve (

Stoc

k de

Sec

urite

)

Res

pons

e 2

Proc

urin

g Iro

n sh

eetin

g on

the

loca

l mar

ket

and

dist

ribut

ing

to

affe

cted

HH

Esta

blish

com

mun

icat

ion

betw

een

aid

agen

cies

and

priv

ate

sect

or (

impo

rter

s in

pa

rtic

ular

)

Res

pons

e 3

Dist

ribut

ion

of “

com

mod

ity”

vouc

hers

red

eem

able

at

loca

l re

taile

rs fo

r C

GI

Ensu

re in

crea

sed

secu

rity

on m

arke

ts

Res

pons

e 4

Dire

ct r

e-ca

pita

lizat

ion

of e

xist

ing

mic

ro-

finan

ce in

stitu

tions

Targ

eted

dist

ribut

ions

with

mor

e co

mpl

ete

food

bas

kets

+ s

imul

tane

ous

CFW

or

FFW

Res

pons

e 5

Cas

h gr

ants

to

smal

l ret

aile

rs w

ho h

ave

lost

the

ir st

ocks

and

sh

ops

for

shop

rec

onst

ruct

ion

and

busin

ess

reco

very

Mon

itorin

g of

mar

ket

syst

em r

ecov

ery

and

follo

w u

p of

sec

uriz

atio

n m

easu

res

Res

pons

e 6

Adv

ocac

y to

war

ds r

econ

stru

ctio

n ac

tors

(N

GO

s, G

over

nmen

t, U

N....

) to

max

imize

exi

stin

g m

arke

t ch

ain

infr

astr

uctu

reIn

fras

truc

ture

rec

over

y

Res

pons

e 7

Pric

e m

onito

ring

syst

em fo

r bu

ildin

g m

ater

ials

(cem

ent,

aggr

egat

e, s

and,

tim

ber,

rein

forc

emen

t ba

rs, a

nd c

orru

gate

d iro

n sh

eets

at

maj

or s

uppl

iers

in P

ort-

au-

Prin

ce ..

.)

Port

s : e

nsur

e pr

iorit

izat

ion

of c

omm

erci

al a

ctiv

ities

Res

pons

e 8

Mic

ro-c

redi

t fo

r sm

all r

etai

lers

who

hav

e lo

st t

heir

stoc

ks a

nd

shop

s (n

ew c

redi

t lin

es)

Ensu

re a

cces

s to

cre

dit

and

mic

ro-

cred

it to

sm

all b

usin

ess

owne

rs a

nd t

rade

rs

Res

pons

e 9

Supp

ort

the

info

rmat

ion

shar

ing

and

nego

tiatio

n be

twee

n re

taile

rs a

nd w

hole

sale

rs t

o en

sure

con

tinue

d su

pply

ing

of s

mal

l st

ores

.

Feas

ibilit

y st

udy

on lo

cal p

urch

ases

of r

ice

Res

pons

e 10

Con

tinue

d ta

rget

ed d

istrib

utio

ns w

ith m

ore

com

plet

e fo

od b

aske

ts

Res

pons

e 11

CFW

/ FFW

Res

pons

e 12

Food

vou

cher

s

Res

pons

e 13

Cas

h gr

ants

Res

pons

e 14

Res

pons

e 15

Res

pons

e 16

Res

pons

e 17

Res

pons

e 18

Res

pons

e 19

Res

pons

e 20

*EM

MA

did

not

diff

eren

tiate

whe

ther

res

pons

es w

ere

high

, mod

erat

e or

low

feas

ibilit

y

52


EMM

A R

ESPO

NSE

CO

MPA

RIS

ON

Mar

ket

and

Cou

ntry

A

sses

sed

Cem

ent

Mar

ket

Syst

em, K

yrgy

zsta

nC

orru

gate

d G

alva

nize

d Iro

n (C

GI)

Mar

ket

Syst

em, K

yrgy

zsta

n

Tim

e pe

riod

of a

sses

smen

t (N

OT

E, N

OT

T

IME

OF

PUBL

ICAT

ION

)

July

23–

28, 2

010

July

23–

28, 2

010

Age

ncie

s In

volv

ed in

C

arry

ing

Out

A

sses

smen

t (n

ot in

clud

ing

fund

er o

f as

sess

men

t if

appl

icab

le)

IRC

IRC

Gap

Ana

lysis

If po

litic

al s

tabi

lity

is m

aint

aine

d, t

he c

emen

t m

arke

t is

fully

ca

pabl

e of

res

pond

ing

quic

kly

to a

rise

in d

eman

d. T

he s

uppl

y ch

ain

is su

ffici

ently

func

tiona

l tha

t re

taile

rs h

ave

the

abilit

y to

incr

ease

the

ir st

ock

of p

rodu

cts

– w

ithou

t sig

nific

antly

ra

ising

pric

es in

the

mar

ket

– if

dem

and

does

incr

ease

. The

in

tern

atio

nally

-man

aged

con

stru

ctio

n of

2,0

00 t

rans

ition

al

shel

ters

will

requ

ire u

p to

15,

000

tons

of c

emen

t, w

hich

can

be

cove

red

entir

ely

by lo

cal r

etai

lers

as

it re

pres

ents

onl

y a

smal

l pe

rcen

tage

of t

he t

otal

loca

l pro

duct

ion

capa

city

. Eve

n w

hen

fact

orin

g in

add

ition

al d

eman

d fr

om s

elf-h

elp

and

reco

nstr

uctio

n of

bus

ines

ses,

the

cem

ent

prod

uctio

n ca

paci

ty o

f Kyr

gyzs

tan

is am

ple

to s

ervi

ce a

ll re

cons

truc

tion

need

s.

In o

rder

to

pres

erve

the

live

lihoo

ds o

f cem

ent

mar

ket

acto

rs,

it is

best

to

proc

ure

cem

ent

from

con

stru

ctio

n m

arke

ts r

athe

r th

an t

o by

pass

the

val

ue c

hain

and

sou

rce

dire

ctly

from

the

ce

men

t fa

ctor

ies.

The

inte

rnat

iona

l com

mun

ity s

houl

d be

ext

ra

sens

itive

to

com

mitt

ing

to t

heir

orde

r of

cem

ent

in o

rder

to

mak

e su

re t

hat

they

do

not

defa

ult

on t

he o

rder

the

y ha

ve

com

miss

ione

d w

hich

wou

ld c

reat

e a

larg

e fin

anci

al b

urde

n on

the

fact

orie

s w

ho c

anno

t st

ore

prod

uced

cem

ent

for

long

pe

riods

of t

ime

with

out

it lo

sing

its q

ualit

y. C

emen

t sh

ould

not

be

impo

rted

from

out

side

the

coun

try

as t

his

wou

ld fu

rthe

r im

pact

the

alre

ady

decr

ease

d de

man

d in

the

cem

ent

mar

ket.

Dire

ct in

terv

entio

n to

at

the

hous

ehol

d an

d re

tail

leve

ls w

ill st

imul

ate

the

func

tiona

l m

arke

t sy

stem

. The

str

engt

h of

the

mar

ket

syst

em n

otw

ithst

andi

ng, it

is c

ritic

al t

hat

inte

rnat

iona

l org

aniz

atio

ns c

lose

ly c

oord

inat

e th

e as

pect

s of

the

ir re

spon

se t

hat

deal

w

ith t

he p

urch

ase

and/

or d

istrib

utio

n of

CG

I.

The

key

disr

uptio

ns t

o th

e C

GI m

arke

t sy

stem

are

the

dec

reas

ed im

port

of C

GI a

nd

CG

I raw

mat

eria

ls an

d lo

cal p

roce

ssin

g ca

paci

ty. W

ith t

he c

ontin

ued

clos

ure

of t

he

Kaza

kh b

orde

r, th

e su

pply

cha

in h

as lo

st im

port

ant

inpu

t of

CG

I and

raw

mat

eria

ls.

Ret

aile

rs r

epor

t a

30 t

o 70

% d

rop

in s

ales

sin

ce t

he e

mer

genc

y, as

con

stru

ctio

n ac

tiviti

es s

low

ed o

r st

oppe

d in

rea

ctio

n to

the

vio

lenc

e.

Alth

ough

the

re is

var

iatio

n ac

ross

the

geo

grap

hic

mar

ket

area

s in

Kyr

gyzs

tan,

sto

cks

and

prod

uctio

n le

vels

are

suffi

cien

t to

con

tinue

mee

ting

the

redu

ced

leve

l of

dem

and

for

som

e w

eeks

. How

ever

, sto

cks

will

quic

kly

be d

eple

ted

as s

elf-h

elp

and

inte

rnat

iona

lly fi

nanc

ed r

econ

stru

ctio

n be

gins

in e

arne

st. W

ithou

t re

-est

ablis

hing

the

flo

w o

f CG

I and

raw

mat

eria

ls fr

om im

port

mar

kets

to

leve

ls th

at m

eet

or e

xcee

d th

ose

befo

re t

he e

mer

genc

y, an

d en

surin

g ad

equa

te p

roce

ssin

g ca

paci

ty t

he m

arke

t sy

stem

will

not

be a

ble

to s

ervi

ce a

ntic

ipat

ed r

econ

stru

ctio

n ne

eds.

The

sub

sequ

ent

scar

city

wou

ld m

ost

likel

y dr

ive

up p

rices

and

pus

h co

nsum

ers

into

see

king

alte

rnat

ive

roofi

ng m

ater

ials

such

as

corr

ugat

ed a

sbes

tos

or m

akes

hift

solu

tions

.

Nin

e ou

t of

14

CG

I pro

cess

ors

rem

ain

clos

ed. A

s a

cons

eque

nce

ther

e m

ay b

e a

bott

lene

ck in

the

mar

ket

chai

n th

at li

mits

the

abi

lity

of t

he m

arke

t to

mee

t th

e in

crea

se

in d

eman

d fr

om r

econ

stru

ctio

n. T

he c

apac

ity o

f the

5 o

pera

ting

proc

esso

rs w

as n

ot

dete

rmin

ed b

y th

e EM

MA

, but

sho

uld

be q

uant

ified

at

the

earli

est

poss

ible

opp

ortu

nity

.

53


Res

pons

e 1

Mak

e bu

lk p

urch

ases

at

fixed

pric

e fr

om lo

cal v

endo

rs.

Vouc

hers

to

vuln

erab

le h

ouse

hold

s

Res

pons

e 2

Issue

vou

cher

s to

tho

se w

ho h

ave

had

hom

es/b

usin

esse

s da

mag

ed o

r de

stro

yed.

Mak

e bu

lk p

urch

ases

at

fixed

pric

e.

Res

pons

e 3

Vouc

hers

to

prod

ucer

s fo

r hi

ring

tem

pora

ry la

bor.

Res

pons

e 4

Res

pons

e 5

Res

pons

e 6

Res

pons

e 7

Res

pons

e 8

Res

pons

e 9

Res

pons

e 10

Res

pons

e 11

Res

pons

e 12

Res

pons

e 13

Res

pons

e 14

Res

pons

e 15

Res

pons

e 16

Res

pons

e 17

Res

pons

e 18

Res

pons

e 19

Res

pons

e 20

54


EMM

A R

ESPO

NSE

CO

MPA

RIS

ON

Mar

ket

and

Cou

ntry

A

sses

sed

Early

Pot

ato

Mar

ket

Syst

em, K

yrgy

zsta

nW

heat

Flo

ur M

arke

t Sy

stem

, Kyr

gyzs

tan

Tim

e pe

riod

of a

sses

smen

t (N

OT

E, N

OT

T

IME

OF

PUBL

ICAT

ION

)

July

23–

28, 2

010

July

23–

28, 2

010

Age

ncie

s In

volv

ed in

C

arry

ing

Out

A

sses

smen

t (n

ot in

clud

ing

fund

er o

f as

sess

men

t if

appl

icab

le)

IRC

IRC

Gap

Ana

lysis

The

ear

ly p

otat

o m

arke

t sy

stem

has

frac

ture

d. T

he li

nkag

e of

bul

k tr

ansp

ort

from

pro

duce

rs t

o la

rge

baza

ars

is gr

eatly

di

min

ished

. The

dam

age

to la

rge

mar

ket

area

s lik

e th

e gr

and

baza

ar a

nd O

sh h

as p

ushe

d a

cert

ain

volu

me

of c

omm

erce

to

seco

ndar

y an

d te

rtia

ry m

arke

t ar

eas.

For

exam

ple,

a s

igni

fican

t am

ount

of b

usin

ess

has

been

pus

hed

to Z

apod

niy

Baza

ar a

nd

Frun

zens

kiy

whe

re t

he n

umbe

r of

ven

dors

is s

uch

that

man

y ar

e se

lling

on t

he r

oads

ide

by t

he m

arke

t, a

prac

tice

that

was

le

ss c

omm

on b

efor

e th

e em

erge

ncy. V

endo

rs s

ellin

g th

ere

ofte

n ob

tain

the

ir go

ods

by m

akin

g da

ily t

axi t

rips

to p

rodu

ctio

n ar

eas

to p

urch

ase

the

good

s fo

r th

e da

y’s s

ales

. In

turn

, the

se n

ewly

en

liven

ed m

arke

t ar

eas

are

the

sour

ce o

f goo

ds fo

r an

othe

r re

tail

phen

omen

on c

reat

ed b

y th

e cr

isis

– th

e m

any-

fold

ed

incr

ease

of p

rodu

ce v

endo

rs in

mah

alas

. Fea

r ha

s pr

even

ted

man

y pe

ople

from

ven

turin

g ou

tsid

e th

e re

lativ

e se

curit

y of

the

ir ne

ighb

orho

ods,

and

mar

kets

hav

e sp

rung

up

to s

ervi

ce h

yper

-lo

cal d

eman

d. In

Uzb

ek m

ahal

as in

Osh

city

, the

long

-sta

ndin

g m

odes

t co

llect

ions

of k

iosk

s th

at r

epre

sent

a n

eigh

borh

ood’

s co

mm

erci

al c

ente

r ar

e no

w o

ften

crow

ded

with

pro

duce

ve

ndor

s sq

uatt

ing

on t

he r

oads

ide.

1) W

eath

er c

ondi

tions

are

cau

sing

an e

xpec

ted

yiel

d lo

ss o

f up

to 4

0% o

f the

whe

at

harv

est.

2) L

ong-

term

pro

blem

s lik

e in

adeq

uate

/age

d m

achi

nery

, poo

rly fu

nctio

ning

irrig

atio

n sy

stem

s ar

e co

mpo

unde

d by

the

risi

ng c

ost

of fe

rtiliz

er a

nd p

estic

ides

as

a re

sult

of t

he

emer

genc

y, ne

gativ

ely

affe

ctin

g w

heat

pro

duce

rs.

3) M

any

high

-pro

duct

ion

bake

ries

are

clos

ed –

bre

ad r

etai

l out

lets

are

clo

sed

and

tran

spor

t lin

kage

s be

twee

n ba

kers

and

ret

aile

rs a

re b

roke

n.

4) D

roug

ht, w

ildfir

es, R

ussia

’s ba

n on

whe

at g

rain

exp

orts

and

hoa

rdin

g w

ill lik

ely

crea

te s

carc

ity a

nd d

rive

up w

heat

pric

es a

cros

s th

e re

gion

.

5) R

ising

flou

r pr

ices

will

affe

ct b

aker

s, es

peci

ally

the

sm

all, m

argi

nal b

aker

ies

oper

atin

g in

mah

alas

.

6) It

is li

kely

tha

t so

me

of t

he s

mal

l bak

ers

and

mar

ket

acto

rs w

ho lo

st b

usin

ess,

or

who

se s

tore

s w

ere

dam

aged

will

be n

ot a

ble

to r

e-en

ter

the

mar

ket

chai

n. W

ithou

t st

imul

atin

g de

man

d at

the

ret

ail l

evel

, som

e re

tail

outle

ts w

ill ei

ther

not

reo

pen,

or

thos

e th

at a

re c

urre

ntly

ope

n m

ay c

lose

dow

n be

caus

e of

low

rev

enue

and

hig

h op

erat

ing

cost

s.

7) D

istrib

utin

g flo

ur d

irect

ly t

o ho

useh

olds

will

mea

n th

at n

o ca

pita

l will

ente

r th

e lo

cal

valu

e ch

ain

beyo

nd t

he im

port

er/w

hole

sale

r, fu

rthe

r w

eake

ning

crit

ical

par

ts o

f the

m

arke

t ch

ain.

55


Res

pons

e 1

Cas

h al

loca

tion

to m

ost

affe

cted

farm

ers

Cas

h al

loca

tion

to m

ost

affe

cted

farm

ers

Res

pons

e 2

Cas

h fo

r w

ork

for

farm

ers

to c

lear

irrig

atio

n an

d ot

her

farm

sy

stem

s, an

d cr

ews

to c

lean

up

mar

kets

and

bus

ines

ses

Cas

h fo

r w

ork

for

farm

ers

to c

lear

irrig

atio

n an

d ot

her

farm

sys

tem

s, an

d cr

ews

to

clea

n up

mar

kets

and

bus

ines

ses

Res

pons

e 3

Subs

idize

d tr

ansp

orta

tion

linki

ng fa

rms

and

mar

kets

Publ

ic in

form

atio

n sy

stem

for

crop

s an

d m

arke

ts

Res

pons

e 4

Publ

ic in

form

atio

n sy

stem

for

crop

s an

d m

arke

tsVo

uche

rs fo

r ba

kers

, ret

aile

rs a

nd/o

r vu

lner

able

hou

seho

lds

Res

pons

e 5

Vouc

hers

for

reta

ilers

to

purc

hase

from

mid

dlem

enA

dvoc

acy

with

Kyr

gyz

gove

rnm

ent

to p

urch

ase

cert

ain

volu

me

of w

heat

from

fa

rmer

sR

espo

nse

6A

dvoc

acy

with

Kyr

gyz,

Kaza

kh, U

zbek

and

Rus

sian

gove

rnm

ents

to

reop

en b

orde

rs fo

r tr

ade

Res

pons

e 7

Res

pons

e 8

Res

pons

e 9

Res

pons

e 10

Res

pons

e 11

Res

pons

e 12

Res

pons

e 13

Res

pons

e 14

Res

pons

e 15

Res

pons

e 16

Res

pons

e 17

Res

pons

e 18

Res

pons

e 19

Res

pons

e 20

56

MARKET ANALYSIS IN EMERGENCIESEM

MA

RES

PON

SE C

OM

PAR

ISO

N

Mar

ket

and

Cou

ntry

A

sses

sed

Rep

ort

on t

he W

heat

Flo

ur a

nd To

mat

o M

arke

t Sy

stem

s: Ea

ster

n Li

bya

Paki

stan

Flo

od R

espo

nse:

KPK

FI

NA

L R

EPO

RT

Paki

stan

Flo

od R

espo

nse

Tim

e pe

riod

of a

sses

smen

t (N

OT

E, N

OT

T

IME

OF

PUBL

ICAT

ION

)

May

23–

-June

7, 2

011

7-28

Sep

tem

ber

2010

Age

ncie

s In

volv

ed in

C

arry

ing

Out

A

sses

smen

t (n

ot in

clud

ing

fund

er o

f as

sess

men

t if

appl

icab

le)

WFP

, IR

C, F

AO

AC

F, A

CT

ED, C

AR

E, IR

C,

Oxf

am, S

ave

the

Chi

ldre

n

Gap

Ana

lysis

Whe

at:

1. M

arke

ts fo

r st

aple

food

s ar

e fu

nctio

ning

suf

ficie

ntly

tha

t an

y w

heat

or

food

-orie

nted

inte

rnat

iona

l int

erve

ntio

ns s

houl

d be

mar

ket-

orie

nted

.

2. T

here

is e

noug

h w

heat

and

flou

r in

eas

tern

Lib

ya u

ntil

appr

oxim

atel

y th

e en

d of

July.

3. H

ouse

hold

s in

eas

tern

Lib

ya h

ave

not

suffe

red

signi

fican

t di

srup

tion

of t

heir

acce

ss t

o an

d ab

ility

to p

urch

ase

brea

d,

past

a an

d co

usco

us.

4. W

heat

flou

r is

not

wid

ely

used

at

the

hous

ehol

d le

vel a

nd s

houl

d no

t be

dire

ctly

dist

ribut

ed t

o fa

milie

s. St

rate

gies

of

dire

ctly

sup

port

ing

bake

ries

with

flou

r, ye

ast

and

salt,

com

bine

d w

ith v

ouch

ers

for

iden

tified

vul

nera

ble

hous

ehol

ds

(ong

oing

in M

israt

a) s

houl

d be

rep

licat

ed in

any

con

tinge

ncy

plan

ning

. War

ehou

sing

capa

city

is o

nly

enou

gh fo

r th

ree

mon

ths

of fl

our

cons

umpt

ion.

A r

esul

t of

lim

ited

stor

age

capa

city

is r

elia

nce

on c

ontin

uous

impo

rtat

ion,

and

tha

t flu

ctua

tions

in t

he p

rices

of f

orei

gn w

heat

with

out

dom

estic

res

erve

s ca

n be

ver

y co

stly

to

the

PSF.

Thi

s is

a w

eakn

ess

in

the

mar

ket

syst

em t

hat

unde

rmin

es fo

od s

ecur

ity.

5. T

he E

MM

A w

as n

ot a

ble

to c

olle

ct a

dequ

ate

data

on

whe

at fa

rmin

g ou

tsid

e ea

ster

n Li

bya.

It is

reco

mm

ende

d th

at

furt

her

stud

y of

the

dom

estic

pro

duct

ion

capa

city

be

unde

rtak

en, w

ith t

he u

ltim

ate

goal

of s

uppo

rtin

g an

d in

crea

sing

the

role

of l

ocal

pro

duct

ion

in t

he p

roce

ssin

g an

d co

nsum

ptio

n of

whe

at.

Tom

atoe

s:

1. T

he e

aste

rn L

ibya

mar

ket

has

larg

e vo

lum

es o

f im

port

ed t

omat

oes,

whi

ch h

as k

ept

pric

es r

elat

ivel

y st

able

and

low

for

cons

umer

s.

2. L

ibya

n to

mat

o fa

rmer

s’ m

arke

t sh

are

has

been

red

uced

by

the

rise

in im

port

s.

3. T

he lo

ss o

f for

eign

labo

rers

, incr

ease

d co

st o

f inp

uts,

susc

eptib

ility

to b

light

and

blo

cked

acc

ess

to m

arke

ts in

the

wes

t ha

s lo

wer

ed y

ield

s an

d re

duce

d to

mat

o ac

reag

e pl

ante

d in

the

firs

t tw

o gr

owin

g cy

cles

4. A

lthou

gh t

omat

oes

are

an im

port

ant

sour

ce o

f inc

ome,

it is

not

the

ir on

ly s

ourc

e of

inco

me.

How

ever

, the

pro

blem

s lis

ted

in t

he p

revi

ous

poin

t ar

e al

so a

ffect

ing

plan

ting

and

yiel

ds fo

r ot

her

crop

s pl

ante

d by

tom

ato

farm

ers.

1. A

roun

d 60

% o

f cas

ual

labo

ur w

ho u

sed

to w

ork

in t

he a

gric

ultu

re fi

elds

(se

e th

e se

ason

al c

alen

dar)

hav

e lo

st m

ore

than

50%

of t

heir

expe

cted

inco

me.

2. T

he d

eman

d fo

r la

bour

in

the

agric

ultu

ral a

reas

dep

ends

on

farm

ers

bein

g ab

le t

o cu

ltiva

te, w

hich

is in

tur

n de

pend

ant

on t

he s

tate

of t

he

land

and

the

irrig

atio

n sy

stem

, th

us t

he s

ituat

ion

is ve

ry

unce

rtai

n fo

r no

rmal

sea

sona

l la

bour

dem

and.

57


Res

pons

e 1

Vouc

her

prog

ram

for

farm

ers

to p

urch

ase

seed

s, fe

rtiliz

er,

and

pest

icid

eTa

rget

ed C

ash-

base

d liv

esto

ck fo

dder

/she

lter

prog

ram

mes

(fo

dder

& s

helte

r in

pla

ins,

shel

ter

in m

ount

ains

)R

espo

nse

2Vo

uche

r pr

ogra

ms

for

vuln

erab

le h

ouse

hold

s to

pur

chas

e Li

bya-

grow

n to

mat

oes

and

othe

r ve

geta

bles

Live

stoc

k pr

ogra

mm

es t

hat

cont

ribut

e to

the

sur

viva

l of r

emai

ning

ani

mal

s

Res

pons

e 3

Deb

t re

lief f

or fa

rmer

s vi

a ca

sh g

rant

s or

dire

ct r

epay

men

t of

ou

tsta

ndin

g lo

ans

Mix

ed fo

dder

, tim

ber

and

fuel

woo

dlot

s an

d fie

ld e

dge

plan

ting

Res

pons

e 4

Del

iver

y of

bi-l

ater

ally

don

ated

whe

at v

ia c

argo

shi

p, fo

r m

illing

and

dist

ribut

ion

Qui

ck s

helte

r so

lutio

ns fo

r liv

esto

ck in

mou

ntai

ns

Res

pons

e 5

Adv

ocac

y fo

r re

inst

atem

ent

of b

orde

r ta

riffs

for

impo

rted

fr

uit

and

vege

tabl

esC

ash

gran

ts/v

ouch

ers

for

shel

ter

– in

corp

orat

ing

priv

ate

sect

or w

here

pos

sible

(co

nditi

onal

on

tra

inin

g in

saf

er c

onst

ruct

ion

and

vouc

her

base

d fo

r qu

ality

tim

ber)

Res

pons

e 6

Cas

h fo

r w

ork

for

repa

ir of

bas

ic fa

rm s

uppo

rtin

g in

fras

truc

ture

Age

ncie

s pu

rcha

se t

imbe

r ou

tsid

e KP

K an

d/or

Pak

istan

Res

pons

e 7

Cro

p in

sura

nce

agai

nst

natu

ral h

azar

dsIn

crea

se a

cces

s to

cre

dit

for

smal

l tim

ber

reta

ilers

Res

pons

e 8

Adv

ocac

y fo

r sh

ippi

ng li

ners

to

call

in E

aste

rn L

ibya

Inco

rpor

ate

lives

tock

she

lter

into

all/

mos

t sh

elte

r pr

ogra

mm

ing

Res

pons

e 9

As

an IO

U: B

i or

mul

tilat

eral

pro

visio

n of

whe

at v

ia c

argo

sh

ips

for

milli

ng a

nd d

istrib

utio

n, t

he v

alue

of w

hich

is t

o be

pa

id b

ack

by T

NC

whe

n ac

cess

to

cred

it is

unfr

ozen

Whe

at s

eed

pack

age

prov

ision

in m

ount

aino

us a

reas

(an

d pr

ovisi

on o

r ca

sh g

rant

s fo

r in

puts

and

too

ls)

Res

pons

e 10

Cas

h tr

ansf

er t

o sm

all f

arm

ers

in p

lain

s an

d lo

wer

upl

ands

for

seed

and

inpu

ts (

cons

ider

ne

ed fo

r 2n

d in

stal

men

t at

mai

ze p

lant

ing

time

thro

ugho

ut K

PK)

Res

pons

e 11

Cas

h Tr

ansf

ers

for

smal

l far

mer

s (fo

r ag

ricul

tura

l & L

/S in

puts

)

Res

pons

e 12

Incr

ease

acc

ess

to c

redi

t fo

r sm

all a

g in

put

reta

ilers

Res

pons

e 13

Impr

oved

acc

ess

to m

echa

nisa

tion

(thr

ough

dra

ught

pow

er in

upl

ands

whe

re a

cces

s is

diffi

cult)

Res

pons

e 14

Red

uctio

n or

rem

oval

of i

rrig

atio

n ch

anne

l fee

s

Res

pons

e 15

Som

e ro

om fo

r C

FW in

upl

ands

for

reha

bilit

atio

n, a

nd c

onsid

er in

tw

o m

onth

s in

pla

ins

afte

r in

itial

reh

abilit

atio

n co

mpl

ete

Res

pons

e 16

Iden

tify

new

inco

me

stre

ams

for

wom

en

Res

pons

e 17

Live

stoc

k an

d po

ultr

y su

ppor

t

Res

pons

e 18

Seed

and

Fod

der

stor

es o

r gr

ain

bank

s (s

eed

stor

es a

t H

H le

vel &

com

mun

ity s

eed

and

fodd

er s

tora

ge fa

cilit

ies)

Res

pons

e 19

Impr

oved

Fod

der

Stor

age

and

fodd

er s

eed

bank

s

Res

pons

e 20

Adv

ocac

y fo

r im

port

res

tric

tions

on

timbe

r to

be

rela

xed

Res

pons

e 21

Mix

ed t

imbe

r, fo

dder

and

fuel

woo

dlot

s an

d fie

ld e

dge

plan

ting.

*EM

MA

did

not

diff

eren

tiate

whe

ther

res

pons

es w

ere

high

, mod

erat

e or

low

feas

ibilit

y

58


EMM

A R

ESPO

NSE

CO

MPA

RIS

ON

Mar

ket

and

Cou

ntry

A

sses

sed

Paki

stan

Flo

od R

espo

nse:

Whe

at S

eeds

and

Flo

ur F

inal

Rep

ort

Tim

e pe

riod

of a

sses

smen

t (N

OT

E, N

OT

T

IME

OF

PUBL

ICAT

ION

)

7–28

Sep

tem

ber

2010

Age

ncie

s In

volv

ed in

C

arry

ing

Out

A

sses

smen

t (n

ot in

clud

ing

fund

er o

f as

sess

men

t if

appl

icab

le)

AC

F, A

CT

ED, C

AR

E, IR

C, O

xfam

, Sav

e th

e C

hild

ren

Gap

Ana

lysis

The

sto

cks

of w

heat

gra

in fo

r fa

rmer

s an

d ru

ral c

onsu

mer

s ha

ve b

een

lost

due

to

dest

ruct

ion

of s

tora

ge fa

cilit

ies.

Thi

s ha

s in

crea

sed

hous

ehol

d de

man

d fo

r w

heat

con

sum

ptio

n. W

hile

the

re is

an

avai

labl

e su

pply

of w

heat

gra

ins

at P

ASS

CO

and

DFC

, the

mai

n co

nstr

aint

for

the

poor

hou

seho

lds

is ho

w t

o ac

cess

the

whe

at fl

our

as m

ost

of t

hem

lost

the

ir in

com

e.

The

Gov

ernm

ent

has

not

yet

fixed

the

pric

e of

whe

at g

rain

s th

us t

he p

rice

of fl

our

in g

ener

al r

emai

ned

the

sam

e. T

he g

over

nmen

t re

gula

tion

on q

uota

sy

stem

as

wel

l as

the

stan

ding

ban

for

impo

rtat

ion

of w

heat

is y

et t

o be

rev

iew

ed b

y th

e go

vern

men

t.

Larg

e m

illers

are

faci

ng p

robl

ems

in t

erm

s of

tra

nspo

rtin

g flo

ur t

o th

e ru

ral a

reas

due

to

the

dest

roye

d ro

ads

and

brid

ges.

Larg

e m

illers

can

not

chan

ge t

he

pric

e as

the

y ar

e co

ntro

lled

and

regu

late

d by

the

gov

ernm

ent.

Fuel

pric

e in

crea

se h

as s

igni

fican

tly a

ffect

ed t

he s

mal

l mille

rs in

rur

al a

reas

. The

vol

ume

of m

illing

has

also

dec

reas

ed fr

om 6

00kg

per

day

to

arou

nd 2

80kg

pe

r da

y du

e to

the

disp

lace

men

t of

the

rur

al p

opul

atio

n, lo

ss o

f whe

at fr

om h

ouse

hold

sto

rage

and

diffi

culty

of a

cces

s by

roa

d.

Stan

ding

cro

ps s

uch

as r

ice,

cor

n, v

eget

able

s an

d fr

uits

hav

e al

so b

een

dam

aged

, thu

s cr

eatin

g a

very

low

sup

ply

food

ava

ilabl

e in

the

nex

t co

min

g m

onth

s.

59


Res

pons

e 1

Cas

h su

ppor

t (c

ash

gran

ts o

r vo

uche

rs)

to s

mal

l far

mer

s in

pla

ins

and

low

er u

plan

ds o

f KPK

and

Pun

jab

and

in t

he c

amps

.

Con

sider

2nd

inst

alm

ent

for

mai

ze p

lant

ing

Res

pons

e 2

Cas

h fo

r Wor

k (li

nked

to

land

-pre

para

tion

or r

epai

r of

irrig

atio

n ch

anne

ls; li

nk t

o ot

her

CFW

pro

gram

s re

late

d to

live

lihoo

ds r

ecov

ery;

link

to

impr

ovem

ent

of r

oad

dam

aged

by

flood

s)

Res

pons

e 3

Dire

ct F

ood

Dist

ribut

ions

for

IDPs

in a

reas

whe

re p

hysic

al a

cces

s to

mar

ket

is no

t po

ssib

le o

r is

proh

ibiti

vely

diffi

cult.

Res

pons

e 4

Iden

tify

& d

evel

op a

ltern

ativ

e in

com

e so

urce

s fo

r fa

rmer

s un

able

to

plan

t th

is ye

ar

Res

pons

e 5

Impl

emen

t as

sess

men

t of

cre

dit

avai

labl

e to

hou

seho

lds

and

smal

l ret

aile

rs a

nd r

ole

of M

FIs

and

bank

s in

add

ress

ing

cred

it ne

eds

Res

pons

e 6

Adv

ocac

y to

gov

ernm

ent

on t

empo

rary

cha

nges

in im

port

pol

icie

s an

d in

ter-

prov

ince

tra

de

Res

pons

e 7

Don

ors

supp

ort

shor

t-te

rm a

nd lo

ng-t

erm

rec

over

y (in

cl. D

RR

)

Res

pons

e 8

Cre

ate

HH

leve

l & c

omm

unity

see

d an

d fo

dder

sto

res

(KPK

)

Res

pons

e 9

Prov

ision

of w

heat

see

ds t

o sm

all f

arm

ers

in P

unja

b an

d KP

K

Res

pons

e 10

NG

Os

to c

ondu

ct fu

rthe

r N

eeds

Ass

essm

ent

on F

ood

Secu

rity

and

Early

Rec

over

y

Res

pons

e 11

Res

pons

e 12

Res

pons

e 13

Res

pons

e 14

Res

pons

e 15

Res

pons

e 16

Res

pons

e 17

Res

pons

e 18

Res

pons

e 19

Res

pons

e 20

*EM

MA

did

not

diff

eren

tiate

whe

ther

res

pons

es w

ere

high

, mod

erat

e or

low

feas

ibilit

y

60

MARKET ANALYSIS IN EMERGENCIESEM

MA

RES

PON

SE C

OM

PAR

ISO

NM

arke

t an

d C

ount

ry A

sses

sed

Paki

stan

Flo

od R

espo

nse:

Sin

dh F

inal

Rep

ort

Tim

e pe

riod

of

asse

ssm

ent

(NO

TE,

N

OT

TIM

E O

F PU

BLIC

ATIO

N)

7–28

Sep

tem

ber

2010

Age

ncie

s In

volv

ed

in C

arry

ing

Out

A

sses

smen

t (n

ot

incl

udin

g fu

nder

of

ass

essm

ent

if ap

plic

able

)

AC

F, A

CT

ED, C

AR

E, IR

C, O

xfam

, Sav

e th

e C

hild

ren

Gap

Ana

lysis

Whe

at:

1. A

sig

nific

ant

port

ion

of w

heat

gra

in s

tock

s of

“ru

ral c

onsu

mer

s” (

pred

omin

antly

sm

all a

nd m

ediu

m fa

rmer

s) h

ave

been

lost

in t

he fl

oods

. The

loss

of s

tore

d w

heat

gr

ain

in r

ural

are

as w

ill re

sult

in a

n in

crea

sed

dem

and

for

whe

at fl

our

from

urb

an m

arke

ts in

the

com

ing

mon

ths.

2. C

urre

ntly,

a t

otal

of 4

0,00

0 M

T is

ava

ilabl

e at

PA

SSC

O in

Suk

kur

whi

le t

he D

istric

t Fo

od C

ontr

olle

rs o

f Suk

kur

and

Shik

arpu

r ha

ve s

tock

s of

110

,000

MT

and

20,

000

MT,

resp

ectiv

ely.

Whi

le t

his

supp

ly a

ppea

rs

adeq

uate

to

mee

t th

e im

med

iate

flou

r de

man

d fo

r th

e ne

xt c

oupl

e of

mon

ths,

it is

not

adeq

uate

to

mee

t a

sust

aine

d an

d in

crea

sed

dem

and

over

tim

e.

3. A

17%

rise

in w

heat

flou

r pr

ice

at t

he r

etai

l lev

el h

as b

een

note

d in

Suk

kur

mar

kets

(fr

om P

KR 2

40 t

o PK

R 2

80 p

er 1

0 kg

). In

crea

ses

in w

heat

pric

e at

the

ret

ail l

evel

ar

e lik

ely

to c

ontin

ue, a

ddin

g an

add

ition

al fi

nanc

ial b

urde

n to

floo

d af

fect

ed h

ouse

hold

s.

4. S

tand

ing

flood

wat

ers

and

flood

deb

ris (

incl

udin

g sil

t an

d sa

nd)

on a

gric

ultu

ral l

and

will

likel

y ca

use

dela

ys in

pla

ntin

g of

nex

t ye

ar’s

whe

at c

rop,

as

wel

l as

low

er y

ield

s.

Agr

icul

tura

l Lab

our:

1. E

mpl

oym

ent

oppo

rtun

ities

for

man

y ag

ricul

tura

l lab

oure

rs a

re li

kely

to

be r

educ

ed in

the

com

ing

mon

ths.

Supp

ort

for

long

er-

term

land

and

irrig

atio

n re

habi

litat

ion

proj

ects

is n

eede

d.

2. W

age

rate

s, ar

e un

der

thre

at b

y th

e in

crea

se in

the

sup

ply

of w

orke

rs.

3. S

ome

land

less

labo

urer

s ar

e ex

pect

ed t

o be

rel

ucta

nt t

o re

turn

to

thei

r ru

ral o

rigin

s if

no in

com

e op

port

uniti

es o

r sh

elte

rs /

hous

ing

is m

ade

avai

labl

e. A

n in

crea

se in

ru

ral t

o ur

ban

mig

ratio

n ra

tes

is a

poss

ible

con

sequ

ence

.

Fodd

er:

1. F

lood

dam

ages

to

stan

ding

cro

ps o

f gre

en fo

dder

and

sug

ar c

ane

are

likel

y to

be

high

, and

will

exac

erba

te t

he a

nnua

l “fo

dder

gap

” th

at e

xist

s in

late

win

ter.

Loss

es o

f st

ored

whe

at s

traw

, a lo

w c

ost

fodd

er m

ater

ial, a

re a

lso a

ssum

ed t

o be

sig

nific

ant.

2. M

ain

anim

al lo

sses

wer

e w

ith s

mal

ler

rum

inan

ts a

nd p

oultr

y.

3. R

ough

ly h

alf o

f disp

lace

d sm

all-s

cale

live

stoc

k ow

ners

rep

ort

havi

ng t

o se

ll on

e or

tw

o an

imal

s to

mee

t em

erge

ncy

need

s fo

r ca

sh.

4. L

ives

tock

ow

ners

who

do

sell

repo

rt t

hat

they

rec

eive

30-

50%

less

tha

n w

hat

they

wou

ld e

xpec

t to

rec

eive

.

Bam

boo

and

Tim

ber

Pole

s:

1. E

xist

ing

supp

lies

of b

ambo

o &

tim

ber

pole

s ar

e N

OT

ade

quat

e to

mee

t th

e hu

ge n

eed

for

emer

genc

y or

tra

nsiti

onal

she

lters

in S

indh

.

2. T

he r

eady

ava

ilabi

lity,

low

cos

t, an

d fib

rous

com

posit

ion

of m

anjh

anda

ri po

les

pres

ents

an

alte

rnat

ive

to b

ambo

o fo

r su

ppor

ting

tent

s, pl

astic

she

etin

g, or

as

roof

fram

e fo

r lig

htw

eigh

t m

ater

ials

(pal

m t

hatc

h).

3. B

y th

e be

ginn

ing

of t

he y

ear,

the

abilit

y of

the

bam

boo

and

man

jhan

dari

mar

ket

to m

eet

the

incr

ease

d sh

elte

r de

man

d w

ill de

pend

s up

on t

wo

mai

n va

riabl

es: t

he

capa

city

of N

GO

s to

sca

le u

p th

eir

emer

genc

y / t

rans

ition

al s

helte

r su

ppor

t op

erat

ions

; and

cla

rity

abou

t th

e pr

opos

ed g

over

nmen

t re

cons

truc

tion

polic

y, es

peci

ally

in

defin

ing

wha

t ty

pes

of c

onst

ruct

ion

mat

eria

ls w

ill be

rec

omm

ende

d.

4. A

shi

ft in

dem

and

from

bam

boo

and

timbe

r po

le fr

amed

she

lters

to

mas

onry

hou

ses

is lik

ely

to o

ccur

dur

ing

the

first

qua

rter

of 2

010.

61


Res

pons

e 1

Cas

h Tr

ansf

ers

or F

ood

Vouc

hers

to

mee

t em

erge

ncy

need

s of

mos

t vu

lner

able

hou

seho

lds

Res

pons

e 2

Cas

h Tr

ansf

ers

or V

ouch

ers

to s

mal

l sca

le li

vest

ock

owne

rs /

vuln

erab

le h

ouse

hold

s to

pur

chas

e fo

dder

or

feed

con

cent

rate

s an

d ot

her

agric

ultu

ral i

nput

s.

Res

pons

e 3

Inst

itutio

nal S

uppo

rt fo

r ve

terin

ary

serv

ices

and

lady

live

stoc

k or

gani

zatio

ns fo

r ou

trea

ch a

nd e

duca

tiona

l wor

k, fo

cusin

g on

pro

mot

ing

high

er m

ilk y

ield

s

Res

pons

e 4

Enco

urag

e re

gion

al p

rocu

rem

ent

of b

ambo

o / t

imbe

r po

les

for

emer

genc

y an

d tr

ansit

iona

l she

lter

cons

truc

tion

for

the

next

thr

ee m

onth

s.

Res

pons

e 5

Cas

h fo

r Wor

k fo

r ru

ral l

ivel

ihoo

d re

cove

ry a

nd r

ehab

ilitat

ion

of a

gric

ultu

ral l

ands

, irrig

atio

n ch

anne

ls, a

nd r

oads

.

Res

pons

e 6

Dist

rict

leve

l Foo

d Se

curit

y A

sses

smen

ts t

o he

lp in

form

rec

over

y ag

enda

, and

iden

tify

pote

ntia

l foo

d in

secu

rity

popu

latio

n.

Res

pons

e 7

Dist

ribut

ion

of g

reen

fodd

er s

eeds

and

fert

ilizer

s fo

r ra

bi s

easo

n pl

antin

g, fo

cusin

g on

cro

p la

nds

that

are

reh

abilit

ated

too

late

to

perm

it w

heat

pla

ntin

g.

Res

pons

e 8

Cas

h G

rant

s to

sup

port

live

lihoo

d as

set

repl

acem

ent

and

mat

eria

ls fo

r ar

tisan

s an

d sk

illed

craf

ts p

eopl

e (e

.g., c

arpe

nter

s, m

ason

s; m

echa

nics

).

Res

pons

e 9

Supp

ort

for

wom

en-fo

cuse

d ag

ricul

tura

l opp

ortu

nitie

s in

side

and

outs

ide

of t

he h

ome

(e.g

., pou

ltry-

rai

sing;

lives

tock

re-

stoc

king

; kitc

hen

gard

ens)

.

Res

pons

e 10

Disc

oura

ge u

se o

f bam

boo

/ tim

ber

pole

s fo

r w

all c

onst

ruct

ion

afte

r 3

mon

ths

to a

void

dep

letin

g st

ockp

iles.

Res

pons

e 11

Furt

her

rese

arch

on

fired

bric

k m

arke

t sy

stem

s pr

oduc

ed in

loca

l / r

egio

nal k

ilns

to h

elp

iden

tify

oppo

rtun

ities

to

supp

ort

incr

ease

d pr

oduc

tion.

Res

pons

e 12

A t

echn

ical

wor

king

gro

up s

houl

d be

set

up

with

in t

he E

mer

genc

y Sh

elte

r C

lust

er t

o pr

ovid

e gu

idan

ce o

n ve

rnac

ular

bui

ldin

g m

ater

ials

for

disa

ster

re

sista

nt h

ousin

g.

Res

pons

e 13

Res

pons

e 14

Res

pons

e 15

Res

pons

e 16

Res

pons

e 17

Res

pons

e 18

Res

pons

e 19

Res

pons

e 20

62


EMM

A R

ESPO

NSE

CO

MPA

RIS

ON

Mar

ket

and

Cou

ntry

A

sses

sed

IMPO

RTED

RIC

E A

ND

AG

RIC

ULT

UR

AL

LABO

R M

AR

KET

S IN

LI

BER

IA –

GR

AN

D G

EDEH

CO

UN

TY

The

pig

and

chi

cken

mar

ket

Lê. T

hu’ y

Dist

rict,

Qua

’ ng

Bình

pro

vinc

e, V

iet

Nam

Tim

e pe

riod

of a

sses

smen

t (N

OT

E, N

OT

T

IME

OF

PUBL

ICAT

ION

)

Apr

il 12

–20,

201

111

–14t

h D

ecem

ber

2010

Age

ncie

s In

volv

ed in

C

arry

ing

Out

A

sses

smen

t (n

ot in

clud

ing

fund

er o

f as

sess

men

t if

appl

icab

le)

Oxf

am G

BO

xfam

, DM

C, U

N-V

ietn

am

Gap

Ana

lysis

The

mar

ket

seem

s to

hav

e a

limite

d ca

paci

ty t

o re

spon

d to

the

incr

ease

of

man

pow

er w

ith t

he in

flux

of r

efug

ees.

Ana

lysis

of f

arm

ers’

capa

city

sho

ws

that

sm

all/m

ediu

m fa

rmer

s ha

ve

bene

fited

from

incr

ease

of m

anpo

wer

’s av

aila

bilit

y. H

owev

er, s

mal

l vu

lner

able

farm

ers

have

ver

y fe

w a

gric

ultu

ral i

nput

s an

d a

very

low

ca

paci

ty t

o hi

re m

anpo

wer

for

thei

r lo

w la

nd r

ice

farm

s. T

heir

livel

ihoo

d w

ill be

affe

cted

on

the

long

ter

m, w

ith d

ecre

ase

of fo

od s

elf-s

uffic

ienc

y, in

crea

se d

epen

denc

e on

the

mar

ket,

heav

ier

inde

btne

ss a

nd u

se o

f ne

gativ

e co

ping

str

ateg

ies.

The

stu

dy d

idn’

t al

low

est

imat

ion

on n

umbe

r of

ref

ugee

s w

ho a

re

farm

ing

or w

ho a

re w

orki

ng o

n ric

e fa

rms.

Som

e ar

e w

illing

or

star

ted

to fa

rm o

n up

land

or

low

land

, and

req

uest

agr

icul

tura

l inp

uts.

In

addi

tion,

the

ir so

urce

of i

ncom

e is

limite

d an

d do

n’t

allo

w t

hem

to

mee

t th

eir

basic

nee

ds a

nd t

o st

art

livel

ihoo

d ac

tiviti

es.*

Pig

Mar

ket:

Out

of t

he t

otal

of 2

5,80

0 fa

rmer

s in

volv

ed in

pig

bre

edin

g, six

wee

ks a

fter

the

flood

s ar

ound

18,

000

of t

hem

hav

e no

t ye

t re

cove

red

and

are

still

in n

eed

of

supp

ort.

It w

as e

stim

ated

tha

t on

ave

rage

30%

of t

heir

lives

tock

has

bee

n lo

st,

the

maj

ority

of w

hich

has

not

yet

bee

n fu

lly r

epla

ced.

It w

ill ta

ke s

ix t

o tw

elve

m

onth

s in

ord

er fo

r th

e fa

rmer

to

have

the

ir to

tal l

ives

tock

bei

ng r

esto

red.

So

far,

farm

ers

in L

ê . Thu

’ y h

ave

been

sup

port

ed w

ith V

ET k

its a

nd a

nim

al s

helte

r m

ater

ials

since

the

end

of N

ovem

ber. T

his

supp

ort

will

cont

inue

unt

il th

e en

d of

Ja

nuar

y 20

11. W

hen

aske

d fo

r th

eir

pref

eren

ce fo

r su

ppor

t, ho

useh

olds

opt

ed

for

cash

sup

port

.

Chi

cken

Mar

ket:

Six

wee

ks a

fter

the

flood

s, 8,

600

out

of a

tot

al o

f 25,

900

farm

ers

invo

lved

in

chic

ken

raisi

ng a

re s

till i

n ne

ed o

f sup

port

. On

aver

age,

30

to 4

0% o

f the

tot

al

num

ber

of c

hick

ens

per

hous

ehol

d w

as lo

st, m

eani

ng fr

om 5

to

8 ch

icke

ns

per

farm

er. S

ome

of t

he fa

rmer

s w

ere

alre

ady

able

to

buy

new

chi

cken

s, bu

t ot

hers

wer

en’t.

Cur

rent

ly, t

he g

ap is

est

imat

ed a

t ar

ound

150

,000

chi

cken

s. T

he

timef

ram

e fo

r fa

rmer

s to

res

tock

the

ir liv

esto

ck w

ithou

t an

y ex

tern

al s

uppo

rt is

six

to

nine

mon

ths.

Farm

ers

have

a s

light

pre

fere

nce

for

chic

ken

supp

ort

rath

er

than

pig

s as

inve

stm

ent

and

mai

nten

ance

cos

ts fo

r pi

gs is

con

sider

ed h

ighe

r th

an fo

r ch

icke

n.

63

ANNEX 2 COMPARISON OF EMMA RESPONSES ACROSS DIFFERENT CONTEXTS AND MARKETSR

espo

nse

1U

ncon

ditio

nal c

ash

tran

sfer

for

food

Pigl

et/c

hick

en p

rovi

sion

to (

fem

ale)

farm

ers

Res

pons

e 2

Food

vou

cher

sC

ash

gran

t to

(fe

mal

e) fa

rmer

s

Res

pons

e 3

Dire

ct fo

od d

istrib

utio

nC

ash

vouc

her

to a

ffect

ed (

fem

ale)

farm

ers

to b

uy p

igle

ts/c

hick

en fr

om m

ediu

m-

scal

e fa

rmer

s

Res

pons

e 4

Com

bina

tion

of d

irect

food

dist

ribut

ion

+ fo

od v

ouch

ers

+ li

velih

ood

cash

gra

ntM

icro

-cre

dit

or lo

ans

to m

ediu

m-

scal

e fa

rmer

s

Res

pons

e 5

Labo

r vo

uche

rC

rop

supp

ort

(sw

eet

pota

toes

, cas

sava

, ban

ana,

etc.

) fo

r pr

omot

ion

and

incr

ease

of c

rop

fodd

er

Res

pons

e 6

Adv

ocac

y to

war

ds G

over

nmen

t, W

FP, U

NH

CR

, and

don

ors

to

1/ in

crea

se c

over

age

and

favo

ur c

ombi

ned

appr

oach

es in

pro

gram

min

g (fo

od a

id a

ssoc

iate

d to

cas

h tr

ansf

ers)

2/ p

riorit

ize a

lso h

ost

com

mun

ities

affe

cted

by

the

refu

gees

influ

x

Adv

ocac

y an

d su

ppor

t fo

r flo

od-

proo

f ani

mal

hou

sing

Res

pons

e 7

Adv

ocac

y to

war

ds G

over

nmen

t, N

GO

s an

d W

FP o

n ne

gativ

e im

pact

on

loca

l mar

kets

of p

ure

dire

ct fo

od d

istrib

utio

n to

favo

ur c

ombi

ned

type

of r

espo

nses

inte

grat

ing

CT

mod

aliti

es

Trai

ning

VET

age

ncie

s an

d fa

rmer

s

Res

pons

e 8

Mon

itorin

g of

impo

rted

ric

e m

arke

t an

d ag

ricul

tura

l lab

or a

s up

date

of

pres

ent

EMM

A a

sses

smen

t, to

ext

end

to o

ther

are

as a

ffect

ed b

y in

flux

of r

efug

ees

Res

pons

e 9

Mar

ket

chai

n an

alys

is fo

r se

eds

Res

pons

e 10

Mar

ket

chai

n an

alys

is fo

r hy

gien

e ite

ms

(sug

gest

ed s

oap,

as

it is

also

tr

aditi

onal

loca

lly p

rodu

ced)

Res

pons

e 11

Ass

essm

ent

of o

ther

mar

ket

syst

ems

(sug

gest

ed m

arke

t sy

stem

: cas

sava

, pa

lm o

il)

Res

pons

e 12

Con

sulta

tion

and

colle

ctiv

e ag

reem

ent

with

con

cern

ed a

ctor

s on

pa

ymen

t fe

es fo

r ca

sh fo

r w

ork

Res

pons

e 13

Supp

ort

loca

l ric

e pr

oduc

tion

and

mar

ketin

g to

incr

ease

sel

f suf

ficie

ncy

and

redu

ce e

xter

nal d

epen

denc

y

Res

pons

e 14

Adv

ocac

y G

over

nmen

t re

habi

litat

ion

cons

truc

tion

tow

ards

for

road

and

Res

pons

e 15

Supp

ort

acce

ss t

o cr

edit

and

mic

ro-c

redi

t to

sm

all b

usin

ess

owne

rs a

nd

trad

ers

Res

pons

e 16

Res

pons

e 17

Res

pons

e 18

Res

pons

e 19

Res

pons

e 20

*EM

MA

did

not

diff

eren

tiate

whe

ther

res

pons

es w

ere

high

, mod

erat

e or

low

feas

ibilit

y

64


EMM

A R

ESPO

NSE

CO

MPA

RIS

ON

Mar

ket

and

Cou

ntry

Ass

esse

dR

ice

Mar

ket

Syst

em, N

orth

ern

Prov

ince

, Sri

Lank

a, M

arch

-Apr

il 20

11

Tim

e pe

riod

of

asse

ssm

ent

(NO

TE,

N

OT

TIM

E O

F PU

BLIC

ATIO

N)

Mar

ch–A

pril

2011

Age

ncie

s In

volv

ed

in C

arry

ing

Out

A

sses

smen

t (n

ot

incl

udin

g fu

nder

of

ass

essm

ent

if ap

plic

able

)

USA

ID/O

FDA

for

USA

ID/S

ri La

nka

Gap

Ana

lysis

Padd

y fa

rmer

s:

The

pro

fits

from

pad

dy c

ultiv

atio

n th

is se

ason

(as

sum

ing

full

sale

or

coun

ting

the

valu

e of

ow

n co

nsum

ptio

n) w

ould

pro

vide

for

less

tha

n on

e m

onth

. Fe

mal

e-he

aded

hou

seho

lds,

in p

artic

ular

, str

uggl

e to

affo

rd t

he n

eces

sary

labo

r an

d in

puts

, so

they

may

fare

eve

n w

orse

.

How

ever

, thi

s ou

tcom

e ca

n be

impr

oved

. If t

he s

ame

farm

er c

an s

tore

his/

her

padd

y an

d w

ait

to s

ell, o

r po

ols

reso

urce

s w

ith o

ther

farm

ers

to

tran

spor

t th

e pa

ddy

at lo

w c

ost

to a

hig

her-

payi

ng b

uyer

else

whe

re, h

e co

uld

earn

mor

e. It

is c

lear

how

ever

tha

t ev

en u

nder

ver

y go

od c

ondi

tions

, pa

ddy

farm

ing

cann

ot o

n its

ow

n pr

ovid

e fo

r fa

milie

s’ ne

eds,

and

mus

t be

sup

plem

ente

d by

oth

er li

velih

ood

activ

ities

.

Labo

rers

:

At

the

peak

of t

he s

easo

n, m

ale

labo

rers

can

ear

n 20

% a

bove

the

pov

erty

line

for

a fa

mily

of fi

ve. H

owev

er, r

ates

and

ava

ilabl

e ho

urs

at o

ther

tim

es

of t

he y

ear

forc

e la

bore

rs t

o liv

e m

ore

than

40%

bel

ow t

he p

over

ty li

ne fo

r a

typi

cal f

amily

. For

farm

ers

who

labo

r pa

rt-t

ime,

the

inco

me

pote

ntia

l is

low

er s

ince

pea

k de

man

d fo

r la

bor

is w

hen

they

mus

t th

emse

lves

be

harv

estin

g.

Ric

e co

nsum

ers:

Food

ava

ilabi

lity

does

not

see

m t

o be

a m

ajor

con

cern

. Diff

eren

t ty

pes

of fo

odst

uffs

wer

e w

idel

y av

aila

ble

in t

owns

and

villa

ges

thro

ugho

ut t

he

prov

ince

, alth

ough

for

thos

e liv

ing

in m

ore

rura

l are

as, lo

ng a

nd u

npre

dict

able

tra

nspo

rt m

akes

pur

chas

ing

food

diffi

cult.

WFP

has

est

imat

ed fo

od

assis

tanc

e ne

eds

decr

easin

g st

eadi

ly, fr

om n

early

19,

000

hous

ehol

ds in

Feb

ruar

y 20

11 t

o le

ss t

han

10,0

00 in

Apr

il, an

d ju

st 3

,292

hou

seho

lds

by Ju

ly.

The

maj

or c

halle

nge

to n

orth

ern

cons

umer

s is

econ

omic

acc

ess

to fo

od. A

s of

fall

2010

ben

efici

arie

s re

port

ed t

hat

a m

ajor

ity o

f the

ir ric

e co

nsum

ptio

n w

as fr

om fo

od a

id. B

enefi

ciar

ies

larg

ely

resp

onde

d th

at t

hey

are

copi

ng fi

nanc

ially

, but

just

bar

ely.

Peop

le a

re n

ot c

urre

ntly

sav

ing

and

are

afra

id o

f une

xpec

ted

expe

nses

. Pric

es fo

r m

any

com

mon

typ

es o

f foo

ds (

part

icul

arly

coc

onut

s, im

port

ant

in lo

cal c

uisin

e) h

ave

also

bee

n ris

ing.

65


Res

pons

e 1

Impr

oved

sto

rage

, bas

ed u

pon

farm

er p

refe

renc

es (

com

mun

al o

r in

divi

dual

; in h

omes

or

at t

he v

illage

leve

l; or

hous

ed in

agr

icul

tura

l at

MC

PSs)

Res

pons

e 2

Prov

ision

of w

ater

pum

ps/ir

rigat

ion

inpu

ts

Res

pons

e 3

Land

doc

umen

tatio

n su

ppor

t

Res

pons

e 4

Div

ersifi

catio

n in

to o

ther

agr

icul

tura

l act

iviti

es: li

vest

ock

rear

ing;

cash

cro

ps s

uch

as o

nion

s, ch

illi, c

ocon

ut; a

nd/o

r ot

her

field

cro

ps; a

s ap

prop

riate

for

the

loca

lity

and

as r

espo

nds

to m

arke

t de

man

d

Res

pons

e 5

Supp

ort

to n

ew a

nd fl

edgl

ing

agro

-rel

ated

bus

ines

ses:

villa

ge-le

vel r

ice

mills

and

ret

ail g

roce

ries,

cont

ract

har

vest

ing/

mac

hine

ry r

enta

l, etc

.

Res

pons

e 6

Rei

nvig

orat

ion

of fa

rmer

org

aniz

atio

ns/a

ssoc

iatio

ns (

thro

ugh

MPC

S as

app

ropr

iate

)

Res

pons

e 7

Irrig

atio

n in

fras

truc

ture

reh

abilit

atio

n

Res

pons

e 8

Mar

ket

faci

litat

ion

to li

nk b

uyer

s to

pro

gres

sive

priv

ate-

sect

or a

ctor

s

Res

pons

e 9

War

ehou

se r

ecei

pts

finan

cing

Res

pons

e 10

Furt

her

inve

stig

atio

n, in

clud

ing

seed

sys

tem

sec

urity

ana

lysis

(SS

SA)

or

mar

ket

anal

ysis

on a

ltern

ativ

e an

d di

vers

ified

live

lihoo

ds

Res

pons

e 11

Faci

litat

ion

of h

ighe

r-val

ue r

ice

prod

uctio

n, in

clud

ing

of g

over

nmen

t-ce

rtifi

ed s

eed

padd

y, tr

aditi

onal

/ org

anic

var

ietie

s, an

d/or

impr

oved

bra

ndin

g of

ric

e by

ar

ea o

f orig

in

Res

pons

e 12

Res

pons

e 13

Res

pons

e 14

Res

pons

e 15

Res

pons

e 16

Res

pons

e 17

Res

pons

e 18

Res

pons

e 19

Res

pons

e 20

66


EMM

A R

ESPO

NSE

CO

MPA

RIS

ON

Mar

ket

and

Cou

ntry

Ass

esse

dR

epor

t fo

r th

e A

byei

Cris

is

Tim

e pe

riod

of

asse

ssm

ent

(NO

TE,

N

OT

TIM

E O

F PU

BLIC

ATIO

N)

20th

–28t

h Ju

ne 2

011

Age

ncie

s In

volv

ed

in C

arry

ing

Out

A

sses

smen

t (n

ot

incl

udin

g fu

nder

of

ass

essm

ent

if ap

plic

able

)

Mer

cy C

orps

, Nor

wei

gan

Ref

ugee

Cou

ncil

Gap

Ana

lysis

Iron

Roo

f She

ets:

The

clo

sure

of r

oads

from

Kha

rtou

m h

as c

ompl

etel

y cu

t th

e su

pply

cha

in fr

om K

hart

oum

to

impo

rter

s, re

gion

al t

rade

rs a

nd lo

cal t

rade

rs. M

any

regi

onal

tra

ders

are

un

able

to

tran

spor

t st

ocke

d iro

n sh

eets

.

For

impo

rter

s, th

e cl

osur

e of

nor

ther

n ro

ads

has

resu

lted

in t

hem

brin

ging

in a

sec

ond

orde

r fr

om C

hina

and

Dub

ai (

repr

esen

ted

on t

he m

ap b

y an

incr

ease

in t

he

thic

knes

s of

the

line

con

nect

ing

the

acto

rs).

Dem

and

for

thes

e iro

n sh

eets

has

incr

ease

d fo

ur fo

ld s

ince

the

roa

ds c

lose

d. T

hese

iron

she

ets

from

Chi

na a

nd D

ubai

are

m

ore

expe

nsiv

e an

d so

few

er r

egio

nal a

nd lo

cal t

rade

rs a

re a

ble

or w

illing

to

purc

hase

the

se ir

on s

heet

s fr

om im

port

ers,

mea

ning

tha

t th

is lin

e is

part

ially

disr

upte

d.

Reg

iona

l tra

ders

hav

e a

slow

ly d

eple

ting

stoc

k of

iron

she

ets

and

mos

t ar

e re

luct

ant

to lo

ok fo

r al

tern

ativ

e su

pply

rou

tes

beca

use

they

bel

ieve

the

roa

ds K

hart

oum

will

reop

en s

oon.

Mos

t re

spon

dent

s be

lieve

tha

t iro

n sh

eets

from

oth

er s

ourc

es w

ere

of a

n in

ferio

r qu

ality

and

are

the

refo

re n

ot in

dem

and.

Loca

l tra

ders

in t

he t

arge

t ar

eas

now

hav

e no

sto

ck o

f iro

n sh

eets

and

the

ir ab

ility

to r

esto

ck fr

om W

au is

less

ened

by

prob

lem

s in

tra

nspo

rtat

ion

such

as

high

fuel

co

sts

and

the

onse

t of

the

rai

ny s

easo

n m

akin

g ro

ads

diffi

cult

to t

rave

l on.

The

dem

and

for

iron

shee

ts fo

r co

nstr

uctio

n of

hou

seho

ld s

helte

r re

mai

ns u

ncle

ar b

ut g

iven

tha

t th

ere

is no

gra

ss fo

r tr

aditi

onal

she

lter

cons

truc

tion

seve

ral

hum

anita

rian

agen

cies

are

inte

rest

ed in

look

ing

into

as

an o

ptio

n. A

side

from

dem

and

issue

s a

maj

or o

bsta

cle

is la

ck t

he t

echn

ical

cap

acity

to

build

with

iron

she

ets

as

wel

l as

the

avai

labi

lity

of o

ther

com

pone

nts

nece

ssar

y fo

r a

shel

ter.

Mal

oda

Met

al S

heet

s:

Dem

and

for

mal

odas

has

rem

aine

d st

eady

as

it is

such

a b

asic

nec

essit

y fo

r fa

rmin

g. Pr

ior

to t

he c

risis

it w

as c

omm

on fo

r fa

rmer

s to

pro

vide

scr

ap m

eal t

o bl

acks

mith

s w

hich

the

y w

ould

the

n m

ake

into

a m

alod

a (t

his

is in

clud

ing

the

east

Afr

ican

hoe

s di

strib

uted

by

NG

Os)

. It

was

also

foun

d th

at it

is c

omm

on t

o ha

ve o

ne m

alod

a pe

r ho

useh

old

mem

ber

as a

ll m

embe

rs a

re e

xpec

ted

to w

ork

on t

he la

nd d

urin

g pl

antin

g se

ason

. NG

O d

istrib

utio

ns r

arel

y ta

ke t

his

in t

o ac

coun

t m

eani

ng t

hat

mos

t ho

useh

olds

reg

ular

ly p

urch

ase

new

mal

odas

in t

he le

ad u

p to

the

pla

ntin

g se

ason

. The

ass

essm

ent

ther

efor

e fo

und

that

tho

ugh

a sig

nific

ant

num

ber

of m

alod

as a

re

dist

ribut

ed b

y N

GO

s th

ere

cont

inue

s to

be

a m

arke

t fo

r m

alod

as in

the

tar

get

area

s.

Okr

a Se

eds:

Seed

sel

lers

in Ju

ba h

ave

incr

ease

d th

eir

orde

rs fo

r se

eds

com

ing

from

Eas

t Afr

ica

but

unfo

rtun

atel

y th

ere

is no

mar

ket

link

from

Juba

to

our

targ

et p

opul

atio

ns.

Reg

iona

l tra

ders

in W

au h

ave

cont

inue

d to

pur

chas

e th

eir

okra

see

ds fr

om K

hart

oum

sup

plie

rs b

ut h

ave

them

flow

n in

inst

ead

of b

y ro

ad. T

his

crea

tes

an e

xtra

cos

t w

hich

the

onl

y se

ed t

rade

r in

Wau

sai

d he

did

not

pas

s on

to h

is cu

stom

ers

(pric

e re

mai

ns 1

6SD

G/K

g) b

ecau

se h

e kn

ew t

hey

coul

d no

t af

ford

it (

emph

asiz

ing

how

m

uch

of h

is tr

ade

is to

loca

l far

mer

s).

Befo

re t

he c

risis

it is

estim

ated

tha

t th

ere

wer

e ov

er 5

see

d tr

ader

s in

Wau

but

at

the

time

of t

he E

MM

A t

here

was

onl

y on

e, s

ugge

stin

g th

at t

hey

have

bee

n sig

nific

antly

affe

cted

by

the

road

clo

sure

s.

At

the

time

of t

he a

sses

smen

t th

e ro

ad fr

om S

outh

Dar

fur

to A

wei

l in

Nor

ther

n Ba

hr e

l Gaz

al r

eope

ned

in a

lim

ited

capa

city

. A r

egio

nal t

rade

r in

Aw

eil c

onfir

med

tha

t he

is n

ow r

ecei

ving

see

ds fr

om K

hart

oum

via

the

roa

d th

roug

h D

arfu

r. M

ost

of h

is se

eds

are

sold

to

loca

l far

mer

s bu

t a

loca

l tra

der

was

foun

d in

Ago

k w

ho h

ad ju

st

purc

hase

d hi

s se

eds

from

Aw

eil. T

he lo

cal t

rade

r m

ade

clea

r th

at h

e pu

rpos

ely

choo

se n

ot t

o st

ock

okra

see

ds b

ecau

se h

e kn

ew h

e co

uld

not

sell

them

in t

he t

arge

t ar

ea b

ecau

se N

GO

s di

strib

ute

okra

see

ds r

egul

arly.

67


Res

pons

e 1

Vouc

hers

for

farm

ers

to p

urch

ase

okra

see

ds fr

om lo

cal t

rade

rs

Res

pons

e 2

Gra

nts

to lo

cal t

rade

rs t

o pu

rcha

se o

kra

seed

s fr

om s

uppl

iers

Res

pons

e 3

Agr

icul

ture

tra

inin

g in

see

d se

lect

ion,

qua

lity

and

hand

ling

for

farm

ers

Res

pons

e 4

Vouc

hers

to

hous

ehol

ds t

o pu

rcha

se ir

on s

heet

s fr

om lo

cal t

rade

rs

Res

pons

e 5

Con

stru

ctio

n of

sto

rage

war

ehou

ses

for

loca

l tra

ders

Res

pons

e 6

Tran

spor

tatio

n se

rvic

es fo

r tr

ader

s

Res

pons

e 7

Vouc

hers

to

bene

ficia

ries

to g

et m

alod

a’s fr

om lo

cal t

rade

rs o

r di

rect

from

bla

cksm

iths

Res

pons

e 8

Prov

ision

of g

rant

s to

bla

cksm

iths

to p

rocu

re n

ew m

etal

she

ets

Res

pons

e 9

Gra

nts

to lo

cal h

ardw

are

stor

es t

o pr

ocur

e m

etal

she

ets

from

sup

plie

rs in

Wau

Res

pons

e 10

Mic

ro fr

anch

ising

of s

eed

trad

ers

to p

rom

ote

linka

ges

betw

een

Juba

and

Wau

and

sm

alle

r m

arke

ts in

War

rup

Stat

e an

d A

byei

Res

pons

e 11

Info

rmat

ion

serv

ices

for

trad

ers,

run

by t

rade

rs o

r by

gov

ernm

ent

exte

nsio

n w

orke

rs

Res

pons

e 12

Loan

s to

tra

ders

to

enab

le p

rocu

rem

ent

of ir

on s

heet

s fr

om im

port

ers

in W

au

Res

pons

e 13

Res

pons

e 14

Res

pons

e 15

Res

pons

e 16

Res

pons

e 17

Res

pons

e 18

Res

pons

e 19

Res

pons

e 20

68


EMM

A R

ESPO

NSE

CO

MPA

RIS

ON

Mar

ket

and

Cou

ntry

Ass

esse

dKe

nya

2011

Dro

ught

Res

pons

e W

ajir

Cou

nty

Tim

e pe

riod

of

asse

ssm

ent

(NO

TE,

N

OT

TIM

E O

F PU

BLIC

ATIO

N)

2nd–

6th

Aug

ust

2011

Age

ncie

s In

volv

ed

in C

arry

ing

Out

A

sses

smen

t (n

ot

incl

udin

g fu

nder

of

ass

essm

ent

if ap

plic

able

)

Mer

cy C

orps

Gap

Ana

lysis

Com

mun

ities

thr

ough

out

the

coun

ty r

epor

ted

a de

crea

se in

wat

er a

nd p

astu

re a

cces

sibilit

y an

d in

ran

gela

nd q

ualit

y du

e to

red

uced

rai

nfal

l. All

inte

rvie

wed

hou

seho

lds

have

lost

mos

t if

not

all o

f the

ir he

rds.

Man

y he

rder

s ar

e w

aitin

g un

til t

heir

anim

als

are

on t

he b

rink

of s

tarv

atio

n be

fore

se

lling.

A h

andf

ul o

f com

mun

ities

rep

orte

d in

cide

nts

of h

uman

-wild

life

confl

ict

as h

erde

rs fi

ght

for

thei

r liv

esto

ck t

o ac

cess

lim

ited

rang

elan

d an

d w

ater

res

ourc

es. T

he m

ain

livel

ihoo

d gr

oups

in W

ajir

are

past

oral

, with

hou

seho

ld in

com

e pr

imar

ily c

omin

g fr

om li

vest

ock

sale

s. Li

mite

d w

ater

an

d ra

ngel

and

has

not

been

abl

e to

sus

tain

pre

viou

s he

rd s

izes,

and

loss

of l

ives

tock

has

res

ulte

d in

lost

inco

me.

With

out

lives

tock

sal

es, p

urch

ases

be

com

e di

fficu

lt or

impo

ssib

le. F

ew in

num

ber,

the

maj

ority

of h

ouse

hold

s en

gage

d in

farm

ing

activ

ities

pro

duce

sta

ple

food

cro

ps a

nd p

ulse

s fo

r ho

useh

old

cons

umpt

ion.

Ver

y fe

w h

ave

exce

ss p

rodu

ce t

o se

ll in

loca

l mar

kets

thi

s se

ason

. Rai

nfed

farm

s w

ere

not

plan

ted

durin

g th

e la

st s

easo

n.

Rec

ent

past

oral

dro

pout

s w

ho h

ave

star

ted

farm

ing

by ir

rigat

ing

land

from

sha

llow

wel

ls ha

ve li

mite

d ag

ricul

tura

l kno

wle

dge

and

skills

.

The

sho

rt r

ains

are

exp

ecte

d to

brin

g ki

ddin

g, ca

lvin

g, bi

rthi

ng a

nd m

ilk p

rodu

ctio

n fr

om r

emai

ning

live

stoc

k th

at a

re h

ealth

y en

ough

. Nov

embe

r is

usua

lly t

he p

eak

lives

tock

tra

ding

sea

son,

alth

ough

thi

s w

ill be

lim

ited

due

to r

educ

ed h

erd

sizes

. Fai

lure

of a

noth

er r

ainy

sea

son

will

seve

rely

lim

it ho

useh

old

capa

bilit

y to

rec

over

. A

ccor

ding

to

hous

ehol

ds, r

educ

ed in

com

es a

nd in

crea

sing

food

pric

es w

ere

iden

tified

as

the

core

res

tric

tions

to

food

acc

ess.

Cur

rent

ly, m

ost

poor

and

ver

y po

or h

ouse

hold

s ar

e re

liant

on

food

aid

, eith

er t

hat

is di

strib

uted

to

them

dire

ctly

or

shar

ed w

ith t

hem

by

othe

rs. L

eade

rs in

mul

tiple

loca

tions

com

plai

ned

that

tar

getin

g fo

r fo

od a

id h

as n

ot b

een

upda

ted

since

the

influ

x of

new

des

titut

e ho

useh

olds

. The

di

strib

utio

n qu

antit

ies

are

also

low

and

mon

thly

dist

ribut

ions

usu

ally

last

aro

und

a w

eek

whe

n sh

ared

with

oth

er fa

milie

s an

d liv

esto

ck. C

ompa

red

to s

ix m

onth

s ag

o, h

ouse

hold

s ar

e ea

ting

low

er q

uant

ities

of f

ood.

Hal

ima

Issa

in B

ute

had

not

been

abl

e to

feed

her

fam

ily fo

r tw

o da

ys w

hen

she

was

inte

rvie

wed

. Fat

uma

Ras

hid

in G

urar

had

lost

her

five

-mon

th-o

ld d

augh

ter

to s

tarv

atio

n. D

ieta

ry d

iver

sity

is ex

trem

ely

limite

d. H

ouse

hold

s ar

e pr

imar

ily c

onsu

min

g ric

e, m

aize

and

sor

ghum

. Milk

pro

duct

ion

is lo

w d

ue t

o th

e re

duce

d nu

mbe

r of

ani

mal

s an

d an

imal

hea

lth, s

o av

aila

bilit

y an

d co

nsum

ptio

n ha

s re

duce

d ov

er t

he p

ast

six m

onth

s. Ve

geta

bles

and

frui

ts a

re a

vaila

ble

in la

rger

tow

ns –

like

Waj

ir, H

abas

wei

n an

d Bu

te –

but

are

onl

y co

nsum

ed b

y w

ealth

ier

hous

ehol

ds a

nd a

re r

arel

y av

aila

ble

in s

mal

ler

loca

tions

.In a

dditi

on t

o w

ater

and

food

nee

ds, le

ader

s in

Waj

ir N

orth

str

esse

d th

e im

port

ance

of i

mpr

oved

infr

astr

uctu

re fo

r tr

ade

and

serv

ices

. Com

mun

ities

in W

ajir

Sout

h st

ress

ed t

he im

port

ance

of s

uppo

rtin

g ho

useh

olds

to

rest

ock

thei

r he

rds.

69


Res

pons

e 1

Unc

ondi

tiona

l cas

h tr

ansf

ers

to m

eet

the

emer

genc

y ne

eds

of v

ulne

rabl

e ho

useh

olds

Res

pons

e 2

Cas

h-fo

r-wor

k fo

r liv

elih

ood

reco

very

and

reh

abilit

atio

n of

agr

icul

tura

l lan

d an

d m

arke

t in

fras

truc

ture

(e.

g. ro

ads,

mar

kets

)

Res

pons

e 3

Food

vou

cher

s to

div

ersif

y di

ets

(e.g

. veg

etab

les,

frui

ts, m

ilk)

of p

asto

ral d

ropo

uts

and

thei

r ho

sts

Res

pons

e 4

Tran

spor

tatio

n su

bsid

ies

to s

uppo

rt t

rade

rs a

nd r

etai

lers

to

incr

ease

and

ext

end

supp

ly o

f veg

etab

les

and

frui

ts

Res

pons

e 5

Fodd

er v

ouch

ers

to h

erde

rs t

o pu

rcha

sefo

dder

or

supp

lem

enta

ry fe

ed fo

r liv

esto

ck

Res

pons

e 6

Res

pons

e 7

Res

pons

e 8

Res

pons

e 9

Res

pons

e 10

Res

pons

e 11

Res

pons

e 12

Res

pons

e 13

Res

pons

e 14

Res

pons

e 15

Res

pons

e 16

Res

pons

e 17

Res

pons

e 18

Res

pons

e 19

Res

pons

e 20

*Whe

re a

gap

ana

lysis

was

not

cle

arly

dist

ingu

ishab

le, I

use

d ex

cerp

ts fr

om t

he “

key

findi

ngs”

sec

tions

of r

epor

ts.

**In

cas

es w

here

4 fe

asib

ility

optio

ns w

ere

pres

ente

d, I

com

bine

d ca

tego

ries

such

as “

feas

ible

” an

d “m

oder

atel

y fe

asib

le”

for

exam

ple

(sin

ce I

was

inst

ruct

ed t

o w

ork

with

thr

ee le

vels

of fe

asib

ility

rath

er t

han

four

).**

**W

here

rec

omm

enda

tion

tabl

es w

ere

grou

ped

sepa

rate

ly fo

r di

ffere

nt li

velih

oods

/issu

es, I

con

solid

ated

for

this

spre

adsh

eet

and

grou

ped

all t

oget

her

and

then

ran

ked

acco

rdin

g to

feas

ibilit

y.**

***W

here

feas

ibilit

y an

d tim

ing

wer

e ad

dres

sed

simul

tane

ously

on

a do

cum

ent

and/

or fe

asib

ility

itsel

f was

not

cle

arly

defi

ned,

I di

d no

t co

lor-c

ode

for

feas

ibilit

y.**

****

In s

ome

case

s, th

ere

was

bot

h a

resp

onse

rec

omm

enda

tions

and

res

pons

e fin

ding

s ta

ble

(or

som

ethi

ng li

ke th

at),

only

one

of w

hich

men

tione

d fe

asib

ility.

In th

ese

case

s, I o

nly

used

info

rma-

tion

tied

to fe

asib

ility.

*EM

MA

did

not

diff

eren

tiate

whe

ther

res

pons

es w

ere

high

, mod

erat

e or

low

feas

ibilit

y

70

ANNEX 3: DG ECHO RESPONSE GUIDELINES

Have the humanitarian needs of the affected population been identified?

Do not fund

Can these needs be met through specific commodities and/or services?

Consider alternatives to resource transfers

Is there an established local market economy? Consider IN-KIND aid

Are the markets easily accessible to the targeted population?

Consider IN-Kind aid and/or measures to remove constraints to market access

Are the markets functional?Consider IN-KIND aid and/or support to traders

and infrastructure to re-establish markets

Are the necessary commodities or services available in sufficient quantity and quality on the

local market?

Consider IN-KIND aid and/or support to traders to adjust to demand

Are prices forecast to inrease rapidly due to the project or other factors?

Consider VOUCHERS or IN-KIND aid

Is it important to restrict spending? Consider VOUCHERS or IN-KIND aid

Can cash be distributed safely in the target areas? Consider VOUCHERS or IN-KIND aid

Are targeted people able to work? Without competing with their own productive activities? Are

there feasible work projects?Consider CASH FOR WORK

Consider UNCONDITIONAL or other TRANSFERS

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

YES

NO

YES

Figure 1: DG ECHO funding guidelines for cash based interventions

71

ANNEX 4: EXPANDED FOOD SECURITY MONITORING INSTITUTIONS

Table 4: Country locations of expanded food security monitoring locations

Food Monitoring and Early Warning Systems

Countries Covered Commodities/markets covered

GIEWS – FAO Global Information and Early Warning System

Algeria, Egypt, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Morocco, Tunisia, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, India, Indonesia, Japan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Viet Nam, Afghanistan, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, Yemen, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Belarus, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Ukraine

n/a (general guidelines for many markets/commodities provided)

72


FEWS Net – USAID Famine Early Warning System

Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Haiti, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Burkina Faso, Chad, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Yemen

Bananas, beans, cassava, cooking oil, cowpea, fish, groundnut, livestock, maize, millet, palm oil, plantain/banana/matoke, potato, pulses, rice, rice (imported), sorghum, sorghum millet, sweet potato, teff mix, tubers, wheat, yams

GMFS – Global Monitoring for Food security

national partners: Senegal, Niger, Mali, Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe; vegetation productivity measured in: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Congo (DRC), Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Reunion, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe

not specified

VAM – World Food Programme Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping

Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Congo, Congo DRC, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rice, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Occupied Palestinian Territories, Tajikistan, Sudan

not clearly listed

MARS FOOD – Monitoring Agriculture with Remote Sensing (EC/JRC)

EU. Regarding food security, cooperates with other initiatives to monitor food insecure areas outside EU. Many special bulletins produced on areas like Niger and Sudan on case by case basis.

wheat, barley, rice, maize, rapeseed, sunflower, sugar beet, potato and pastures

EARS – Environmental Analysis and Remote Sensing

Global potato, wheat, maize, sorghum, millet, coffee

73

ANNEX 4 EXPANDED FOOD SECURITY MONITORING INSTITUTONS

AP3A – Alerte Précoce et Prévision des Productions Agricoles

Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Chad

not clearly listed

Agrhymet Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Chad

not clearly listed

SADC – Regional South African Early Warning System for Food Security

Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe

includes maize and maize flour, rice, cassava, sorghum, millet, groundnuts, soya, fruits, vegetables, potato and roots, coffee, wheat and wheat flour, edible oil and oil seed, tobacco, cotton, live animals, beef, chicken, dairy, spices, sugar, peas

IGAD Climate Change Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC)

Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda

Monitors climate

74

ANNEX 5: INTERVIEW LIST

1. Emma Delo, ICRC

2. Emily Henderson, Oxfam

3. Jessica Saulle, Oxfam

4. Miles Murray, Save the Children

5. Erin Lentz, Cornell

6. Megan McGlinchy, Catholic Relief Services

7. Issa Sanogo, World Food Programme

8. Christopher Hillbruner, FEWS NET

9. Benjamin Watkins, formerly WFP

10. Fabian Tondel, FEWS NET

11. Blake Stabler, FEWS NET

12. Jude Powell, Consultant conducting Review of EMMAs

13. Karri Byrne, IRC

14. Sigrid Kuhlke, ECHO

15. Sara McHattie, ECHO

16. Devrig Velly, ECHO

17. Laura Meissner, USAID

18. Alessandro De Matteis

19. Ben Mountfield, Independent Consultant

20. Nick Maunder, formerly ECHO

21. Lili Mohiddin, Oxfam

75

ANNEX 6: BIBLIOGRAPHY

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This research was commissioned by the Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP), in partnership with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). CaLP is supported with funds from the European Commission’s Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) and Visa Inc.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection

© Tom Pietrasik

MARKET ANALYSIS IN EMERGENCIESDespite the number of tools available and innovations in programme design, there are a number of challenges for the humanitarian assistance community when conducting market analysis to inform broader programme planning in crises. This document represents the first phase of analysis by the Cash Learning Partnership to understand how to strengthen interventions by using market analysis and what is needed to conduct market analysis well. By examining the capacity and current thinking within the sector this report discusses how we can improve the quality of market analysis and its impact on humanitarian programmes.

Date post:	29-Apr-2023
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