THE EU AND THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

Conflict resolution through Palestinian Civil Society?

Dr. Heidi Maurer Irene Marchi

Student ID Number – I6065531 June 23rd 2014 Master Thesis

Word count – 14,925 words

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr Heidi Maurer, for her precious help and advice.

I would also like to express my gratitude to my parents, Fabrizio and Susanna, and my sister Ilaria for constantly supporting and believing in me.

A final thank goes to my friends Caterina, Lia, Paulina, Serena and Sophie for always being by my side.

CONTENT

INTRODUCTION …………………………………………………………………………… 1

The EU, civil society and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict ……………………………………. 1

Literature review ……………………………………………………………………………… 4

THE EVOLVING SOCIO-POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE PALES TINIAN

TERRITORIES ……………………………………………………………………………… 6

The socio-political development of the EU involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict…. 6

A brief sketch of Palestinian civil society …………………………………………………….. 9

APPROACHES TO CIVIL SOCIETY AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION …………… 11

Conceptualising civil society and conflict …………………………………………………... 11

Civil society, conflict and peace: the key concepts …………………………………..11

Peace-building through state-building? ………………………………………………12

Civil society in conflict resolution: moving beyond the top-down approach ……….13

How to conduct research on the EU and civil society ………………………………………. 15

Europeanisation: a possible framework of analysis? ………………………………...15

Nathalie Tocci’s framework of analysis ……………………………………………..17

THE EU AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT: AN

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT EU PROGRAMMES ……… ………... 20

The EU approach to conflict resolution and civil society …………………………………… 20

The EU programmes for conflict resolution and civil society in the Israeli-Palestinian

Conflict context ……………………………………………………………………… 22

Adapting Tocci’s framework to the EU involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict …… 23

How is the EU integrating Palestinian civil society in its foreign policy programmes for the

resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict? ……………………………………………….. 26

The Liberal Peace Paradigm …………………………………………………………26

The Disembedded Civil Society Critique …………………………………………….29

The Gramscian Critique ……………………………………………………………...31

CONCLUSION ……………………………………………………………………………... 33

REFERENCES ……………………………………………………………………………... 38

APPENDIX A ………………………………………………………………………………. 44

1

INTRODUCTION

The EU, civil society and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The European Union (EU) vision for the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict is based

on

advancing the peace process and achieving the goal of coexistence of the two States through the creation of an independent, democratic, contiguous and viable Palestinian State, living side-by-side with Israel and its other neighbours in peace and security. The European Union cannot commit itself to any other path. (my emphasis; European Council, 2005, p.43)

This quote perfectly expresses the central importance of the resolution of the Conflict for the

EU and its foreign policy agenda. It also conveys the vision and hope of the EU for the

creation of a viable and democratic Palestinian state, a notion that entered the mainstream

consensus on the Conflict only in the early 1990s, after several decades of appeals to a two-

state solution by the then European Community (EC). Furthermore, despite still playing a

secondary role in comparison to the United States (US), the EU is becoming increasingly

relevant in the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, also thanks to its role as the

principal financial supporter of the Palestinian Authority (PA), the provisional government of

the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). The EU involvement, in conjunction with its

deep-rooted historical, political and economic interests in the area, explains the motivation

behind choosing this particular case study when examining the EU efforts in conflict

resolution. In addition, the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict has commonly been described as an

intractable conflict. This characteristic renders it a “critical case, which contains many of the

problems related to peace-building practices in several other peace processes” (Aggestam and

Strömbom, 2013, p.111). The study of the EU approach to this conflict can therefore provide

fruitful insights that can also be employed when analysing other violent disputes, especially in

the EU’s Neighbourhood.

The particular attention that this thesis gives to the cooperation between the EU and

local Palestinian civil society is not only a result of the current literature gap on the topic1. In

fact, it is also informed by the EU vision of the need for changes in the deep-rooted, structural

causes of conflicts and the ensuing preference for conflict resolution over conflict

1 The literature gap on the cooperation between civil society and the EU in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict is

addressed more in detail in the literature review section.

2

management, as explained in the fourth chapter of this thesis. Civil society should therefore

be analysed because of its ability to produce the deep-rooted changes needed to realise the EU

vision of a long-term and comprehensive peace. Civil society is indeed a key player in

conflict resolution and peace-building, complementing and legitimising the official peace

process. In the specific case of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, civil society’s relevance is

further accrued by the unique geo-political situation on the ground. In the absence of a

Palestinian state, the territorial division and continual occupation, civil society has come to

represent a substitute to the Palestinian state and its services in several spheres of social life

and it reaches out to a great number of people in the OPT. Palestinian civil society is hence

well placed for playing a key role in supporting the peace process.

The EU itself has recognised the important role of civil society in conflict resolution

and has developed programmes and instruments for its growth and inclusion (for example, see

the European Commission’s communication The roots of democracy and sustainable

development: Europe’s engagement with Civil Society in external Relations, 2012). The

importance of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict for the EU, the promising role of civil society

and the approach of the EU to conflict resolution and civil society thus prompt the need to

investigate the way in which the EU includes Palestinian civil society2 in its policies for the

resolution of the Conflict. A central research question guides the thesis in finding an answer

to this need for further inquiry: how does the EU integrate Palestinian civil society in its

foreign policy programmes directed at the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict? The

thesis therefore does not aim at assessing the impact of the EU support on local civil society.

It rather tries to analyse whether the EU programmes actually provide space for civil society,

and do not follow an exclusively state-centred approach to the resolution of the Conflict, that

is to say creating the Palestinians state institutions before reaching a peace agreement. The

inclusion of civil society would be in line with the literature’s recommendations for a

comprehensive approach to conflict resolution and critiques to exclusively state-centred

peace-building (for example, see Pogodda, 2012; Roberts, 2011; Tocci, 2013), as well as with

the statements of the EU itself on the topic (for example, see the European Security Strategy

of 2003 and the European Parliament’s paper on conflict resolution of 2007).

The research design adapts Nathalie Tocci’s (2008, 2013) theoretical framework: in

her work, she develops three conceptual hypotheses to describe the cooperation of the EU 2 The main focus of the thesis is Palestinian civil society, its potential for the peace process and the Palestinian

government. However, references are also made to the possible effects that the EU programmes can have on

the Israeli side, both at the governmental and civilian level, especially in the case of programmes involving also

Israeli actors.

3

with civil society in conflict resolution. From here, the thesis develops further indicators to

apply the EU programmes and instruments to each hypothesis. A successful integration of

civil society in the programmes should meet the first of Tocci’s hypotheses, the Liberal Peace

Paradigm. This would mean that the EU efforts are directed at all levels of civil society and

contribute towards the creation of an environment conducive to civil society participation.

The application of Tocci’s framework will allow the study to answer its research question by

analysing if and to what extent the EU programmes include Palestinian civil society. The EU

programmes therefore represent the independent variable of the research, whereas the civil

society integration is the dependent variable. Despite their importance in affecting local civil

society and the overall Conflict, the length and focus of this thesis do not allow for a deep

analysis of other actors such as the US, the Israeli and Palestinian governments and the other

Arab states3. Moreover, the EU is analysed as a unitary actor and attention is given to the EU-

level policies instead of the policies pursued by each Member States vis-à-vis the Conflict4.

Although European support for Palestinian civil society became increasingly institutionalised

with the First Intifada and further augmented after the beginning of the peace process of the

1990s, it was only at the Luxembourg European Council of 1997 that the EU recommended

supporting civil society as a way to further dialogue and confidence in the Israeli-Palestinian

Conflict. This appeal was actualised in 1998 with the People to People Programme, the

predecessor of the Partnership for Peace Programmes created in 2002 (Challand, 2008;

EuropeAid, 2014a). However, the time frame of the thesis is limited to the analyses of those

programmes created or revised by the reform of the Community external financing

instruments of 2007 (Bayne and Trolliet, 2009). This therefore also includes the Partnership

for Peace Programme, which despite having been created in 2002, is now part of the

European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument launched in 2007.

The rest of the paper is composed of three chapters with their respective sections and

subsections, and the conclusion. After the literature review provided in the next section of this

introductory chapter, attention is given to the socio-political development of the EU

involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and the capital relevance of Palestinian civil

society in local socio-political life. This will provide the necessary information to understand

the context of action of the EU and explain the significance of both the EU and civil society in

the Conflict. Chapter three constitutes the conceptual and theoretical explanation for the

3 For background information on the role of third actors, see for example Bickerton (2009) and Fawcett (2009).

4 For details concerning the individual Member States’ positions on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, see for

example Altunişik (2008, p.117) and Witney (2013).

4

subsequent research. It starts by clearly explaining the concepts of civil society, conflict and

peace. After that, state-building and the role of civil society in conflict resolution are

discussed in the framework of the existing general literature and the specific case of the

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Tocci’s general framework of analysis is used as the basis of this

research is discussed in details in the second section of the chapter. The last chapter

constitutes the application of the theoretical debate discussed beforehand to the case of the

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Firstly, it illustrates the EU approach to conflict resolution and the

programmes analysed in the thesis in light of their focus on civil society and the resolution of

the Conflict. Secondly, Tocci’s framework is adapted to the specific case-study under

investigation in this work. Following this part, each one of Tocci’s hypothesis is discussed in

an individual subsection. This division allows for a global analysis of all the programmes that

have been selected for the examination, hence giving a more complete picture of which

hypothesis these programmes are most in line with. This in turn will help the research

understand how local civil society is included by the EU towards the resolution of the Israeli-

Palestinian Conflict. The conclusion reviews the main findings of the analysis and presents

the evaluation of how the EU ad-hoc programmes and instruments provide for the inclusion of

local civil society in the resolution of the Conflict.

Literature review

The important role of the EU in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict5 has brought scholars to study

the topic in great detail. Researches cover the whole spectrum of EU engagement. For

instance, some scholars (Bouris, 2012; Hollis, 2004; Peters, 2010) investigate the reasons

behind the EU interest in playing an active role in the peace process and explain that the main

way through which the EU is working is as a supporter (both financially and politically) of the

PA. Tocci (2009) is instead an example of a critique of the EU approach towards the two

sides. Finally, the level of actorness and influence of the EU has also been investigated by

Altunişik (2008), Miller (2011) and especially Müller (2013).

Regarding the specific interest of this paper, namely the role of the EU in conflict

resolution and its involvement with civil society, a specific gap appears in the existing

literature. A complete appraisal of the first topic is still mostly missing from academic

research. Apart from the detailed work of Tocci (2005, 2007), only Stivachtis, Price and

Habegger (2013) have focused exclusively on the EU conflict resolution capacity. Other

5 Please refer to the next chapter for a brief socio-historical overview of the Conflict and the EU involvement.

5

researchers (Stivaktis and Georgakis, 2013; Youngs, 2004) have considered conflict

resolution in the wider EU democratisation efforts. Moreover, the predilection for studying

the EU as a democratising actor in the MENA region (for example, see Bicchi, 2011; Hollis,

2012; Pace, 2009) leaves the scholars interested in the EU conflict resolution role to

extrapolate this particular role from the broader discourse on democratisation. The second

topic, the EU cooperation with and support to civil society, is limited as well. In this case

again, the work of Tocci (2008, 2013) sets an important example for further research,

especially through her analytical framework (adapted from Lederach) to analyse the EU

impact on local civil society. Other scholars (Irrera, 2009, 2013; Joachim and Dembinski,

2011) have explored the broader role of NGOs in European foreign policy. The only two

papers that deal specifically with the involvement of the EU with the civil society in the

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict are by Challand (2010) and Voltolini (2012). Nevertheless,

Challand limits its analysis to European aid to civil society, while Voltolini studies the input

side of non-state actors (NSAs) in EU policy formation.

This paper therefore tries to make a contribution to the existing literature on the

conflict resolution role of the EU through its support to local civil society. The first novelty of

this study is that it tries to connect the existing literature on conflict resolution and on civil

society since, as showed by the above mentioned review of the currently published research,

only few scholars have concentrated on the potential of the EU involvement with local non-

state actors (NSAs) in conflict situation. Secondly, it links the literature relating to the EU

role to the literature pertaining Palestinian civil society. In fact, several researches have

explored the impact of international aid on Palestinian NSAs (Anderson, 2004; Challand,

2005, 2008; Weisman, 2012) and the potential role that civil society can play in the resolution

of the Conflict (Daiq, 2005; Golan, 2012; Kassis, 2001; Maoz, 2004). However, none of them

makes a specific connection between Palestinian civil society and the EU role. This research

can therefore be understood as an enrichment of the current literature on the topic and a

synthesis of the EU role in working with Palestinian civil society. Furthermore, the special

focus given to the integration of NSAs in EU programmes provides a useful addition to the

study of Voltolini concerning the lobbying efforts of civil society in Brussels. Finally, by

applying Tocci’s framework of analysis in examining the EU involvement with Palestinian

civil society, this research can be considered a contribution to Tocci’s (2008, p.33) call for

more empirical research in the EU conflict resolution role through civil society in the

Neighbourhood.

6

THE EVOLVING SOCIO-POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

This first chapter provides a brief explanation of the role played by the EU in the Israeli-

Palestinian Conflict and the function of civil society in the Palestinian community. This

necessary account is needed to better understand the socio-political relevance of the EU and

civil society in the Conflict and provide detailed information on their involvement since these

facts are not ordinarily part of the general knowledge on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. The

two sections thus not only provide the necessary background needed to understand the central

research of the thesis, but also substantiate the focus on the EU and civil society in the

Conflict by showing their importance in reaching a peace agreement. In the case of the EU, its

role has historically developed towards greater political involvement, mainly through its

financial support to the PA. On the other hand, the section on Palestinian civil society

illustrates the central role played by local civil society, especially as a substitute of the

Palestinian state, and its potential to implement a deep-rooted peace, tackling and altering the

structural causes of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict6.

The socio-political development of the EU involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict has been one the main foreign policy interests of the EU since

the very beginning of its embryonic common foreign policy (Peters, 2010). Moreover, the EU

declaratory policy has been fairly consistent over time, also with regard to what Tocci (2009)

defines as the two normative pillars informing the EU’s position: firstly, respecting Israeli and

Palestinian self-determination, including the right to a viable state, and secondly respecting

human rights, democracy and international humanitarian law, hence condemning all kinds of

violence (Asseburg, 2003). Nevertheless, this historical interest has not translated into a

prominent role for the EU. Numerous observers (Miller, 2011; Peters, 2010; Tocci, 2007)

indeed point out that despite some improvements the EU still covers a secondary role, unable

to be the deciding factor in the peace process, because still not perceived on an equal footing

to the US.

In light of the historical, political and economic ties with the Middle East, including

the Arab oil crisis of 1973 and fear of growing violence, a European consensus started

6 For the theoretical discussion over the importance of civil society in conflict resolution, please refer to the

first section of the third chapter.

7

developing in the early 1970s over the need of a bigger role for the EC in the Conflict. This

resulted in the Brussels Declaration of November 1973, the first official declaration on the

Conflict in the common European Political Cooperation (EPC) framework, demanding Israel

to end the occupation of the OPT. Other declarations followed, including the 1977 London

Declaration calling for the first time for the inclusion of Palestinian representatives in future

negotiations and for the creation of “a homeland for the Palestinian people” (Peters, 2010,

p.512). The Venice Declaration in 1980, considered as the basis of the EU’s stance on the

Conflict, stated that the Conflict was to be intended as a problem of self-determination instead

of the issue of Palestinian refugees. It also explicitly voiced for the inclusion of the

Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) in future negotiations and proclaimed Israeli

settlements to be in breach of international law (Altunişik, 2008).

As explained by Müller (2013), the EC declarations gradually shifted the international

consensus towards the normative understanding of the need of a two-state solution and the

direct inclusion of the Palestinians in the peace talks, as actualised in the Oslo Accords in

1993. The Oslo Accords also signal the beginning of the direct involvement of the EU in the

peace process, thanks to the financial and institution-building support offered to the

Palestinians, including both an aid package covering a quarter of the total funds directed to

Palestinians and the Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on Trade and

Cooperation signed with the PLO in 1996 (Peters, 2010). Being the principal donor for

Palestinians7, the EU now also had more material interests in the resolution of the Conflict,

which was included as one of the initial priorities of the nascent Common Foreign and

Security Policy’s (CFSP) conflict prevention tasks. Despite the setbacks in the peace process

caused by the mid-1990s resurgence of violence, the decade culminated with the creation of

the position of Special Envoy to the Peace Process in 1996 and the Berlin Declaration of 1999

stating the EU’s willingness to recognise a Palestinian state (Altunişik, 2008; Müller, 2013).

The mid-1990s thus witnessed the emergence of the search for a more political role for the

EU, for example through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) launched in 1995 as part

of the Barcelona Process. Despite not openly addressing the Conflict, the EMP distinct

multilateral process was supposed to enhance trust and mutual recognition, but it eventually

failed after the return to violence and the unwillingness of the parts to collaborate (Asseburg,

2003).

7 In the period between 1994 and 2008, the EU disbursed €3,230,002,683, more than double the amount of aid

granted by the US, the second largest donor. If the donations by the single Member States are also included,

the total amount of EU aid comprises 54 per cent of international aid for the OPT (de Voir and Tartir, 2009).

8

The eruption of the Second Intifada and the re-occupation of the OPT in September

2000 represented a turning point for the EU crisis management role, coupled by an increase in

aid (from €30 million in 2001 to €37 in 2003) to sustain the PA and humanitarian aid for the

population (Manners, 2008, p.34). The EU’s role hence shifted “from diplomatic and financial

support of the peace process to largely crisis management and the promotion of conflict

resolution” (Altunişik, 2008, p.110). The EU became one of the partners in the Quartet,

whose multi-phased plan, the Road Map of 2003, was grounded on the Seville Declaration of

2002 calling for the creation of a viable Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with

minor adjustments (Peters, 2010). In addition to this multilateral programme, the EU also

implemented its own project in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)

of 2004. The 2005 Action Plan with the Palestinians, mainly concerned with economic issues,

however played a limited role in furthering conflict resolution (Müller, 2013). In the eleven

pages of the document, the principal efforts are geared towards Palestinian state-building and

only indirectly towards the Conflict or contact between Palestinians and Israelis (ENPI,

2005). Other EU actions were initiated in the field of judicial and security sector reform, a

topic that has been well analysed by Bouris (2012) and that represents an important element

of state-building. At the request of the PA, a CSDP mission for support to Palestinian civil

police (EUPOL COPPS) was launched in 2005 and then expanded to a rule of law component

in 2008. In agreement with Israel too, the EU Border Assistance Mission Rafah (EUBAM

Rafah) was signed in 2005, whereby the EU conciliated Israel’s security needs and

Palestinians request of autonomous border control. EUBAM was suspended in 2007 after

Hamas’s take-over of the Gaza Strip. The Seyada programme for judiciary sector reform was

implemented from 2005 to 2009, but it only had a limited success.

The victory of Hamas at the polls in 2006 was met by the EU’s refusal to enter into

dialogue and financially support its government. Instead, the EU created the Temporary

International Mechanism (TIM) to bypass the Hamas government while still delivering aid to

the population directly through the Palestinian Presidency. The combined amount of the

different EU assistance programmes to Palestinians went from €340 million in 2006 to €550

million in 2007 (Altunişik, 2008, p.114). The delivery of aid through the Presidency is

indicative of the change in the EU policy towards the PA and of the “strong executive

emphasis” (Youngs, 2004, p.538) in the EU institution-building programme. In fact, as

highlighted by Pogodda (2012), the state-building effort of the EU has changed over time. It

has gone from support of the authoritarian state-building agenda of Arafat from 1993 to 2002,

hence favouring the centralisation of executive power, to a shift towards diffusing the

9

executive power to other institutions from 2002 to 2006. It reversed againin 2006 to support

the centralisation of power over the president of the PA as a counterweight to the Hamas

government. The international donors also have failed in using their leverage in asking the PA

to hold democratic elections. In fact, PA President Mahmoud Abbas’s term expired in 2009

but it was indefinitely extended. No political elections have been held yet. The West Bank has

therefore been labelled a “not free” country (Freedom House, 2013).

This outline of the EU involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict demonstrates

that the EU has focused its attention mainly to the sphere of state- and institution-building. Its

missions for PA reform in the security, judiciary and financial sector are mostly directed to

governance and reinforcing government institutions. Unfortunately, the EU mainly technical

approach to the Conflict has incurred in a democratic and accountability deficit of the

institutions, which coupled with the reversal of its policies since 2006, shows “the flaws

inherent in a policy aimed primarily at unilaterally ending Palestinian violence and securing

an agreement with Israel” (Bouris, 2012; Tocci, 2007, p.123). Exclusive attention to state- and

institution-building “has diminished the PA in the eyes of its own people” (Witney, 2013,

p.58-59), hence undermining the very goal of creating a credible, democratic Palestinian state.

A brief sketch of Palestinian civil society

Without attempting to create a complete mapping of Palestinian civil society, this section

provides a brief background to understand its importance in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

and Palestinian politics8. Palestinian civil society is highly institutionalised and lively, with

each Palestinian citizen participating on average in at least one civil society organisation’s

(CSO) activity per year, and enjoys a high level of public confidence, unlike the PA (Daiq,

2005; Kassis, 2001). Although the creation of the first CSOs is to be found as early as in the

1920s, it was later in the 1970s that peace activists started to organise themselves, whereas the

notion of a Palestinian “civil society” was introduced in academic literature only with the

beginning of the peace process in the early 1990s (Challand, 2005, 2010; Salem, 2012).

Palestinian civil society is mainly oriented towards the provision of services to the

population9, especially in the “C areas” under exclusive Israeli control10, hence acting as a

8 For further information on Palestinian Civil Society, please refer to the works cited in this section.

9 Palestinian NGOs account for 70 percent of the services provided in the OPT (Daiq, 2005).

10 The Interim Agreement between the PLO and Israel divided the West Bank into three groups: the PA is in

almost full governmental control of Area A, in Area B the PA has civilian powers while Israel retains security

control, Area C is under full Israeli control except for education and medical services to the population which

are delivered by the PA. The areas comprise respectively 18, 22 and 60 per cent of the West Bank (B’Tselem,

2014).

10

substitute to the state (Fuqaha, 2012). In addition, some CSOs direct their activities to culture

and dialogue, also in cooperation with Israeli CSOs, as illustrated by Maoz (2004) and

Aggestam and Strömbom’s (2013) examples.

The particular situation of the OPT sets Palestinian civil society apart from the societal

structures that can be found in other places. In fact, it faces the challenge of daily occupation,

in material as well as psychological terms, it is affected by both Israeli and Palestinian

politics, and the absence of a real state means that CSOs act as “the bearer of the burdens of

the Palestinian state in its absence” (Kassis, 2001; Salem, 2012, p.19). Furthermore, as

highlighted by Weisman (2012), the local culture and the complex kinship and religious

networks make it difficult to apply the notion of civil society as being voluntary, but it should

consider also family and religious organisations. Palestinian CSOs are highly dependent on

external financing. This dependency however creates two negative outcomes: firstly, there is

great competition over the allocation of funds, both among CSOs and between CSOs and the

PA, and secondly civil society risks being depoliticised and converted to short-term relief

work in order to accommodate the needs of the donors (Challand, 2008; Kassis, 2001).

11

APPROACHES TO CIVIL SOCIETY AND CONFLICT

RESOLUTION

Conceptualising civil society and conflict

Civil society, conflict and peace: the key concepts

Before further delving into this thesis, it is important to clarify the meaning of two key

concepts: civil society and the interlinked notions of conflict and peace. The first essential

term is that of civil society. Researchers (Challand, 2008; de Weijer and Kilnes, 2012;

Voltolini, 2012; Wanis-St. John and Kew, 2008) have provided a wide array of definitions. In

general, civil society can be described as being formed by those voluntary organisations that

represent the citizens, are not officially part of the state institutions, and do not represent the

interests of a particular economic or family group. CSOs’ goal is to represent and advance the

interests of the people of their constituency through a wide variety of actions and activities.

Moreover, they act as intermediaries between the state and the population. This role is of

fundamental importance as it can help the state and governmental institutions as well as the

population. In this way CSOs can bolster the state’s legitimacy, create a political environment

closer to the citizens and act as “transmission belts” ensuring that the voice of the people is

heard by the political elites. The EU itself has recognised the complexity of civil society, as

exemplified by the Commission’s communication in 2012 (p.3):

The EU considers CSOs to include all non-State, not-for-profit structures, non-partisan and non-violent, through which people organise to pursue shared objectives and ideals, whether political, cultural, social or economic. Operating from the local to the national, regional and international levels, they comprise urban and rural, formal and informal organisations.

Jünemann (2002) has however pointed out that these definitions usually reflect a European

concept of civil society based on the Enlightenment believe of the separation between the

state, economic and civic spheres. This critique appears all the more important when

compared to the nature of civil society in the Middle Eastern and Arab culture, where many

religious and family-based organisations play an important role in local civil society and do

not assume the same structure as their Western counterparts (Challand, 2008). The EU official

definition can therefore be criticised for the absence of religious organisations, whereas it

correctly identifies the need to work also with informal organisations. Last but not least, it is

important to avoid the equation between civil society and non-governmental organisations

12

(NGOs), which are professional organisations and are part of the wider civil society, unlike

the smaller and more informal CSOs (Challand, 2010).

The second concept of central importance is that of conflict and peace. Conflict is

defined as “the violent expression of perceived incompatibilities between subject positions,

including both interests and identities” (Diez and Cooley, 2011, p.188). On the other hand, the

present research is based on the idea that conflict resolution should be geared towards real,

long-term peace. This means that peace is not only realised when there is freedom from

physical violence, but also that the population is free from the fear of returning conflict,

economic deprivation and both physical and psychological coercion. Frozen conflicts with a

“no-peace-no-war” (Tocci, 2007, p.8) status quo are in fact free from active violence, but the

developments on the ground incubate instability that is constantly ready to resurface. This

coincides with what Groom and Hoffman (in Tocci, 2004) define as “positive peace”, which

unlike “negative peace” goes beyond a legal deterrent system for personal violence and calls

for the extirpation of structural violence through deep-rooted changes. Positive peace hence

needs a conflict resolution approach that addresses the root causes of conflict, since peace is

“achieved when the basic human needs of all people are respected” (Marchetti and Tocci,

2009, p.211). Conflict resolution contrasts with conflict management and settlement

approaches that only focus on the armed side of conflicts without touching upon the

underlying causes (Müller, 2013).

Peace-building through state-building?

The existing literature on conflict resolution mostly asserts that a functioning state is an

essential prerequisite to reach international peace agreements (Stivachtis and Georgakis,

2013). However, “building states does not lead, directly and unproblematically, to peace”

(Call, 2008, p.366) since this process often foments further violence and armed confrontation,

“especially if the emergent state is endowed with too many powers too quickly” (p.378). The

creation of the PA and the powers conferred upon it do indeed seem to match this problem,

although the Authority is far from being a sovereign state. Secondly, state-building often

seems to work against the domestic democracy of the new state when security is given

precedence over the state’s democratic development. The peace process hence becomes

trapped in a conundrum: the new state is not a democracy and does not enjoy the support of

its own citizens, consequently putting at risk both the state and the peace process (Call, 2008).

At the theoretical level, this problem finds its explanation in the Democratic Peace Theory

affirmation that democracies are unlikely to enter into conflict with each other (Dunne, 2005).

13

From here it logically follows that if the new state is not democratic and accountable, a true,

long-lasting peace is unlikely to materialise.

As indicated in the previous chapter covering the historical involvement of the EU in

the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Pogodda, 2012), the international efforts towards the PA have

concentrated mainly on state- and institution-building at the expense of greater domestic

democracy. The growingly shady and authoritarian nature of PA and the continual occupation

of the Palestinian territories have increased the population frustration over state-building. The

institutions that have been created lack sovereignty and have failed bringing to life a viable

state. They have rather “eroded domestic support for the PA and thus undermined the

Palestinian state-building project” (Pogodda, 2012, p.546), which resulted among other things

in the Second Intifada in 2000 and the election of Hamas in 2006. This discussion thus

supports the idea that state-building does not rigorously need to precede peace and that a top-

down approach to conflict resolution, led by a security and state-centred wisdom, displays the

tendency to further reduce the possibility of a peaceful settlement (Aggestam and Strömbom,

2013). Moreover, this strategy often equates with a bureaucratic and liberal market peace that

ignores the local specificities and preferences, further increasing the risk of estrangement of

the population from the peace process (Goetschel and Hagmann, 2009).

Civil society in conflict resolution: moving beyond the top-down approach

If, as explained by Roberts (2011), conflict resolution consists of more than the mere

construction of state institutions, but rather is founded on long-term structural changes and the

legitimacy of the peace process and of the state, how can we bring these requirements into

reality? The present thesis believes that civil society is the most promising actor in achieving

these two main needs. Although the contribution of civil society to legitimacy and deep-

rooted changes are inextricably connected, they are here presented in two different parts for

the sake of a clearer analysis.

Civil society can play a key role in legitimising the peace process between Israelis and

Palestinians, as well as the PA. At the theoretical level, this is explained by Wanis-St. John

and Kew (2008) when affirming that greater participation by a wider variety of actors in the

peace process is directly linked to greater approval and support for the agreed decision, also

thanks to the greater accountability and focus on the people’s needs that civil society can

ensure. The bottom-up approach of involving civil society would thus create a stable, long-

term peace that is “socially owned”. Stronger participation of civil society obviates the lack of

attention and obligations towards the citizens that is typical of not fully democratic states (de

14

Weijer and Kilnes, 2012). Civil society would hence act as a positive, peaceful counterweight

to the formal state powers that are less keen on creating durable peace conditions (Donais,

2009). This is of particular importance in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict where several

governmental and political actors, both on the Palestinian and Israeli side, have clearly stated

their opposition and scepticism to the continuation of peace talks and continuously undermine

the efforts to create more favourable conditions for peace. Entities like Hamas and other

terrorist organisations, as well as pro-settlements and extremist Israeli politicians, would be

less capable of imposing their views and of making them appear as the only opinion present

among the population. The PA too could enjoy further legitimacy through civil society. In

fact, civil society can help strengthen the vertical and horizontal bonds between state

institutions and the population, as well as the international community. By reinforcing intra-

society ties thanks to increased popular legitimacy, “the central institutional pillars of a liberal

democratic state [would] rest upon solid foundations [and be] adjusted to local conditions”

(de Weijer and Kilnes, 2012; Donais, 2009, p.14).

Civil society is also instrumental in contributing to changes in the structural, deep-

rooted causes of the Conflict. Not only does civil society help provide the necessary

knowledge of the local reality for the technical aspects of the peace settlement, but it also

works “to address deeper ontological components of the conflict, and in the process, to

legitimize the ‘other side’ as a partner” (Herzog and Hai, 2005, p.9). The transformation of

subjective perceptions is important because in the so-called intractable conflicts, that are

conflict with a high degree of distrust and deadlocked issues, the negative anticipation of the

action of the counterpart usually makes it more difficult to continue negotiations and

cooperate (de Weijer and Kilnes, 2012; Tomlinson and Lewicki, 2006). Numerous scholars

like Galtung, Kriesberg, Lederach and Miall (all in Strömbom, 2014, p.172) have pointed out

that identity transformation is an essential step for successful and deep conflict

transformation. The changed perspective of the opponent hence allows for a more rational and

serious dialogue. This is useful to both Palestinian and Israeli CSOs, as noted also by Maoz

(2004, p.564) when affirming that formal agreements need to be “accompanied by dynamics

of social and psychological change at the grassroots level of populations at both sides, so that

these agreements can be implemented successfully”. This argument is also in line with the

theory of contact and cognitive paradigms: the first argues that conflict transformation can

improve through dialogue between the antagonising groups, while the cognitive paradigm

suggests that peace is reached also by the exchange and recognition of the conflicting ideas

(Challand, 2010).

15

The theoretical arguments over the impact of civil society are also supported by more

practical researches. In the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict framework, it has been reported that

workshops between Israeli and Palestinians have indeed improved the reciprocal perceptions,

hence improving mutual trust and consideration (Dessel and Ali, 2012; Maoz, 2004). Even the

most sceptical observers, like Liel (2005), recognise the need to maintain these channels of

communication between the two parts, especially because they provide informal networks of

communication that have become more difficult after the election of Hamas. Moreover, the

important quantitative research of Wanis-St. John and Kew (2008) established a direct

causation between the involvement of civil society and the creation of sustainable, long term

peace or a return to violence. Out of the examined 25 peace processes concluded since the

beginning of the 1990s, they found that “all negotiations characterized by high civil society

involvement have resulted in sustained peace in the peacebuilding phase” (p.27). Clearly,

given the complexity of the peace processes, this research does not mean that civil society is

the sole factor impacting on the quality of peace, but it creates a “testable hypothesis: the

absence of civil society groups from the peace process significantly undermines the chances

that an agreement will lead to sustained peace” (p.30). Indeed, the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

has been characterised by a small role for civil society and a cyclical return to violence.

These theoretical and empirical conclusions therefore illustrate why civil society is

needed in the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and why the EU should collaborate

with CSOs. Furthermore, civil society can act as a connection between the EU and its staff

and the local community, hence building trust and legitimacy for the EU work, while

providing the necessary knowledge of the local situation (Irrera, 2010, 2013). Civil society

therefore complements and balances the institution-building efforts (Youngs, 2004). In fact, it

should be reminded that support to civil society and state-building go hand-in-hand and are

mutually reinforced, as civil society can provide the initial input for the peace process that

then needs to be formalised at the higher level (de Weijer and Kilnes, 2012; Kassis, 2001;

Tocci, 2013). As noted also by Dessel and Ali (2012), only a combination of bottom-up and

top-down approaches can create a sustainable peace.

How to conduct research on the EU and civil society

Europeanisation: a possible framework of analysis?

The concept of Europeanisation, that is the “external projection of internal solutions”

(Schimmelfennig, 2007, p.9) and the “process of political and economic development in line

with West Europe” (Tocci, 2004, p.11) has traditionally been applied to Central, Eastern,

16

Balkans and Neighbouring European countries. However, it is slowly being utilised in the

field of the EU’s relations with countries that have no perspective membership and are outside

of the European continent. Europeanisation explains that non-members adopt rules, norms

and values that are closer to those of the EU in two ways: conditionality and socialisation.

Tocci (2007, p.10) defines conditionality as “a strategy whereby a reward is granted or

withheld depending on the fulfilment of an attached condition”, hence the change is brought

upon by external EU pressure. Conditionality works by altering the cost-benefit structure of

domestic adaptation, mainly thanks to the reward of EU assistance. Despite the increased

leverage given to the EU by the pressure of a globalising world on third countries, researchers

are still sceptical of the EU’s capacity to secure reform in non-member states that do not have

the perspective of becoming part of the EU even in the future, like the Southern

Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries (Stivachtis and Georgakis, 2013; Tocci, 2007;

Tovias and Ugur, 2004). The demands of domestic reform are clearly directed at the

countries’ governments, hence adopting a top-down approach to reform, which does not suit

this thesis’s central interest on civil society. Indeed, the EU’s limited conditionality potential

seems to point to the need of broadening the understanding of how the EU can work in

conflict resolution beyond the government level.

The second process through which states Europeanise is socialisation. Socialisation is

explained as when “actors seek to meet social expectations in a given situation. Processes of

socialisation often result in complex learning by which actors redefine their interests and

identities” (Börzel and Risse, 2011, p.7). Another strand of literature also links socialisation

to the notion of the EU bargaining power since all actors behave rationally and the primary

source of influence always remains the national level (Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel,

2006). A more constructivist approach to social learning points out the potential of the

internalisation of EU norms and values by third countries’ actors, a process that in the long

term is conducive to the alteration of perceived interests and hence to the resolution of

conflicts. Despite its potential for the present thesis, the current literature on the topic has

highlighted that this social learning process is almost completely confined to the elites levels

of third countries (Tocci, 2007). This is however a natural outcome of the intergovernmental

nature of the ENP bilateral framework of cooperation between the EU and third countries.

This brief section has therefore shown how the classic application of the concept of

Europeanisation, with its particular attention to the processes at the state level, is not a

convenient lens of analysis for the thesis’s focus on civil society. However, the concepts of

conditionality and socialisation that have just been discussed should be retained as forming

17

the underlying logic of the framework of analysis developed by Tocci and explained in the

following section.

Nathalie Tocci’s framework of analysis

This thesis believes that the most suitable framework to answer the research question of how

the EU integrates Palestinian civil society in its programmes to promote the resolution of the

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict is provided by the work of Tocci (2008, 2013) and her adaptation

of the societal pyramid previously elaborated by Lederach. Three different, but not mutually

exclusive, hypotheses can be tested. The first hypothesis, the Liberal Peace Paradigm

(represented in Figure 1), posits that EU involvement reinforces both the structure and agency

of civil society working towards conflict resolution. Moreover, the EU actions don’t affect or

alter the very nature of local civil society. The EU thus positively affects civil society and the

peace process. For the second hypothesis, the Disembedded Civil Society Critique (Figure 2),

the EU negatively affects local civil society because it changes its characteristics, hence

undermining peace. CSOs are transformed in more technical and depoliticised instruments

adapted to the donors’ needs, distant from the needs of the local population that they are

supposed to represent. Coupled with the risk of rendering civil society completely dependable

18

on its donors, this hypothesis warns of the danger of alienating the population and reinforcing

undemocratic and violent groups. While responding to the short-term accountability needs of

the donors, this approach is not conducive to lasting long-term improvements. The last

hypothesis, the Gramscian Critique (Figure 3), presumes a link between state11 and civil

society actors, making it impossible to consider civil society as an isolated actor. The EU

needs to work on the civil society as well as the state level and its elites, following a dual

bottom-up and top-down approach to conflict resolution, as explained by Dessel and Ali

(2012) and Wanis-St. John and Kew (2008) in the previous section of this chapter. However,

the EU policies focus chiefly on official negotiations and are unable to connect the top-level

of civil society with the other levels.

11

In the specific case analysed by this thesis the Palestinian state however does not exist. Therefore, this

analysis will focus on the PA level as a substitute to the state level in light of its governing nature of the OPT.

19

The previous paragraph has briefly summarised Tocci’s framework of analysis, which up to

today is the only theoretical tool available for the assessment of the EU cooperation with civil

society in conflict transformation. Her framework has been chosen for this thesis also

because, as stated by Tocci (2008, p.33) herself, “its purpose is to guide future empirical

research into the EU’s role, through civil society, in five conflicts in the neighbourhood”, the

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict being one of them. The present study hence adapts one of the

possible avenues of further research outlined by Tocci by scrutinising the EU involvement

with civil society, its priorities and goals. This framework of analysis will allow the thesis to

investigate and answer its research question of the way in which EU programmes and

instruments have integrated local civil society in reaching a peace agreement in the Israeli-

Palestinian Conflict. However, Tocci’s theoretical and conceptual framework needs to be

complemented by concrete indicators to transfer the EU programmes in the three hypotheses.

The method to execute this operation is discussed in the second section of the next chapter.

20

THE EU AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE ISRAELI-

PALESTINIAN CONFLICT: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF

THE CURRENT EU PROGRAMMES

The last chapter empirically investigates the way in which the EU integrates Palestinian civil

society in its foreign policy programmes for the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.

However, before examining the EU programmes and applying Tocci’s framework, it is

important to understand the approach and vision of the EU in the field of conflict resolution.

Particular attention is here given to the balance between state-building and the inclusion of

civil society.

The EU approach to conflict resolution and civil society

The EU approach to conflict is largely informed by its values and norms, which can be

considered both as identity-definers of the EU and as a mean to achieve the EU objectives

abroad. Furthermore, by expanding its values to third countries, the EU can ensure that such

values and preferences are respected and protected (Cremona, 2011; Laïdi, 2008). European

values such as democracy, freedom, human rights and the rule of law have in fact explicitly

been included in Article 21(1) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) as the requirement

for the EU when advancing relations with non-member states (in Cremona, 2011). This

appeal to norms and values has thus brought scholars to identify the EU with a Kantian model

of civilian power, rejecting pure realpolitik but indeed striving to find non-military solutions

to conflict (Laïdi, 2008; Stivachtis, Price and Habegger, 2013).

The EU has become increasingly involved in conflict resolution since the 1990s:

Article 3 (1) and Article 21 (1) of the TEU distinctly declare that the EU’s objective is the

promotion of peace and that its actions at the global level should reflect this principle,

whereas the Treaty of Lisbon (Title V, Article 2c) designates peace and conflict prevention as

one of the EU’s major foreign policy priorities (Diez and Cooley, 2011; Tocci, 2008, 2013).

This attention to conflict resolution reflects the strategic and political goals of the EU but also

the fact that peace has been the historical raison d’être of the EU project (Manners, 2008).

The EU’s Kantian view “that violent conflict is [not] endemic to human nature and […] that

conflict resolution is possible through the search for mutually beneficial solutions” (Tocci,

2008, p.3) leads the EU to work towards conflict transformation instead of conflict

management and settlement. The EU thus tries to alter and eliminate the underlying structural

21

reasons of the conflict through aid, trade and dialogue rather than working exclusively

through military and coercive means and high-level peace settlements (Manners, 2008; Tocci,

2007, 2013).

The European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003 is the document that spells out most

clearly the EU vision and commitment to a peaceful world. In the document, the Council

states that “security is a precondition of development” (p.2) and that conflicts need both

military and political solutions. The ESS also explicitly indicates the Israeli-Palestinian

Conflict as a strategic priority for the EU since without a peace settlement “there will be little

chance of dealing with other problems in the Middle East” (p.8). This view is reiterated also

in other documents and by other EU institutions, for example the European Parliament’s

paper on conflict resolution in the Southern Neighbourhood (2007). The document specifies

that the EU policy goals should follow long-term and structural change objectives and that

frozen conflicts in the neighbourhood can provoke instability for the EU as well. The EU

stated objectives in the realm of conflict resolution can therefore be described as searching to

create the long-term “positive peace” discussed before in this thesis.

According to Youngs (2004, p.527), the EU approach to conflict resolution is

primarily focused on “power-sharing democracy” rather than “general support for potentially

destabilizing civil society dynamics”, as demonstrated by the strengthening of the executive

power of the PA. Yet, he also explains that “the most notable feature of European policy has

been its strong orientation towards civil society actors and rights-based initiatives” (p.536), an

effort pursued in order to reinforce democracy at the social level beyond the exclusive

elections level12. The attention given to civil society is explained by the Commission’s (2012)

recognition that civil society “is a crucial component of any democratic system” (p.3) and has

“an essential role […] in the peace and security agenda, particularly in conflict prevention,

peace-building and state-building” (p.9). The EU itself hence acknowledges the central role of

civil society in reaching “positive peace”. Today, the potential of civil society in the

Neighbourhood has become even more important in light of the critiques to the EU after the

Arab Spring, since the EU was not supportive enough of “local democratic forces” (European

Parliament, 2012, p.8). Moreover, the EU also recognises the possible contribution of civil

society to the local ownership of the peace process.

Despite the formal appeal for greater inclusion of civil society in conflict resolution,

the EU still appears to favour cooperation with it in the realm of governance and

12

For a brief, general historical background on the EU-civil society cooperation in peacebuilding, please refer to

Bayne and Trolliet (2009, pp.18-19).

22

accountability for domestic budgets, the provision of social services and the support of a

social economy, as it is observable in the Commission’s communication on civil society of

2012. Moreover, the EU still seems to prioritise institution-building, as it emerges from the

joint communication of 2011 by the Commission and the High Representative Catherine

Ashton concerning the review of the ENP. In spite of the greater access to EU support by

CSOs through “a dedicated Civil Society Facility” (p.4), which remains nevertheless rather

undefined, they state that “in particular, […] the EU will offer to back partner countries’

efforts to reform their justice and security sector reforms with rule of law missions or other

Common Foreign and Security Policy instruments” (p.6). The EU thus still prefers a state-

centred approach to conflict resolution in its Neighbourhood, whereby showing a gap between

its rhetoric and recognition of the civil society’s potential and the little space for civil society

in its policies.

The EU programmes for conflict resolution and civil society in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

context

The empirical analysis of the EU effort in conflict resolution focuses on those programmes

that Bayne and Trolliet (2009) and the European Parliament (2012) recognised as being

specifically directed at supporting civil society in the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian

Conflict. They are the geographic instrument European Neighbourhood and Partnership

Agreement (ENPI), and the thematic instruments Non-State Actors and Local Authorities in

Development Programme (NSA-LA in Development Programme), the European Instrument

for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), and the Instrument for Stability (IfS). The

decision to focus on these four instruments is taken in light of the short space available in this

thesis, and also because their focus on civil society and conflict resolution makes presume

that they are better designed to include civil society in the EU efforts for the resolution of the

Conflict. The limited number of projects analysed also helps creating a clearer picture of the

current EU programmes and instruments, since a larger quantitative analysis would have

included programmes that are not related to civil society in conflict resolution. Nevertheless,

it is important to understand that all EU programmes13 directed at the Palestinians, as well as

to Israel, can contribute towards a peaceful change of the Conflict.

13

For an overview of the EU programmes in the field of aid, development and human development for the

Palestinians and in Israel, please refer to http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/country-

cooperation/palestine/palestine_en.htm,

http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/westbank/projects/overview/index_en.htm and

http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/israel/projects/list_of_projects/projects_en.htm.

23

The ENPI is the main financial instrument through which the aforementioned

objectives of the ENP are funded and concretely implemented. The ENPI has been

operational since 2007, replacing and increasing the scope of the previous programmes for

Eastern Europe (TACIS) and the Mediterranean countries (MEDA). Its broad scope of action

includes conflict resolution as one of the components of it strategic objective of developing

common policies with the partner countries. A first problem of the ENPI vis-à-vis the

inclusion of Palestinian civil society is the fact that the EU has not produced any Country

Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for the OPT, but only Annual Action

Programmes14, thus complicating the long-term planning needed for conflict resolution

(EuropeAid, 2014b). The ENPI includes the specific Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP)

which supports “civil society initiatives that promote peace, tolerance and non-violence” in

the Middle East Peace Process (Delegation of the EU to Israel, n.d.). Because of its central

importance for the EU approach to civil society and the Conflict, the analysis of the ENPI will

concentrate on the PfP. The second programme, the NSA-LA in Development Programme,

directly targets local NSA and LA to involve them in the development of their country

through their own initiatives. It has been operational since 2007 and it aims at strengthening

the involvement of civil society in policy making. The third instrument, the EIDHR, launched

in 2006 to replace the European Initiative, supports the promotion of democracy and human

rights “with, for and through civil society organisations” (European Parliament, 2012, p.16).

Finally, the IfS was created in 2007 and it operates in the field of conflict prevention, peace-

building and crisis management. In particular, its Peace-building Partnership aims at

increasing cooperation between civil society and the EU (EEAS, n.d.).

Adapting Tocci’s framework to the EU involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The empirical analysis will be conducted by applying the framework elaborated by Tocci

discussed in the previous chapter. Each one of her hypothesis (the Liberal Peace Paradigm,

the Disembedded Civil Society Critique, and the Gramscian Critique) can be used as the

frame of reference for the analysis of the programmes developed by the EU. Similarly to the

suggestion of Tocci (2008, p.33), the empirical study examines which civil society actors and

structures the EU programmes engage with and what EU priorities are pursued. Tocci’s work

provides the theoretical and conceptual framework to be used for the analysis of the EU 14

The Country Strategy Papers present the priorities for a seven-year period and are the main indicative

framework of ENPI actions, the National Indicative Programmes determine the funding allocations for each

priority identified in the Strategy Papers, whereas the Annual Action Programmes designate the projects to be

financed and the necessary allocation (Tessier-Stall and Gumeniuk, 2010).

24

programmes. However, in order to use it empirically, specific indicators need to be created to

examine and transpose the programmes into the three hypotheses. This exercise hence allows

to assess the EU consideration of local civil society in its programmes through three main

questions: if the EU is aware of the important role that civil society can play in the resolution

of the Conflict; if the EU then attempts to involve civil society in its conflict resolution

programmes; and whether this cooperation with civil society is concrete or is more of a

buzzword giving the appearance of a comprehensive, not exclusively state-centred approach

to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.

The analysis is based on the most recent version of the lists15 of ongoing projects of

the abovementioned EU programmes, since the research does not study the evolution of the

EU programmes over time but wants to provide an analysis of the current EU practice of civil

society inclusion. Moreover, Calls for Proposals were not issued every year, as in the case of

the Non-State Actors and Local Authorities in Development Programme where the 2012 and

2013 budgets were pooled together. Nevertheless, the ongoing projects also include those

multi-annual plans that started receiving EU funds as early as 2009. A table16 has been

elaborated by the author to examine the lists of projects according to the indicators in order to

determine which of the three hypotheses the EU programmes seem to follow the most. This

method of analysis obviates the problem of the lack of access to the involved actors and

CSOs, both at the European and local level, who can provide direct evidence regarding the

level of inclusion of civil society in the EU programmes. Additionally to the specific EU

programmes, the thesis bases its study also on other EU documents and on secondary

literature which has conducted field research on the topic.

The Liberal Peace Paradigm, focusing on both the agency and structure of CSOs, is

assessed by two indicators. Agency can be evaluated by indicating at which level of

Lederach’s pyramid the CSOs working with the EU are positioned. This is in line with

Tocci’s (2013, p.34) conceptualisation of agency being enhanced when the EU engages with

mid-level CSOs through dialogue and funding. On the other hand, the EU contribution to

strengthening the structure of Palestinian civil society is measured by looking at whether EU

programmes facilitate connections between the different levels of civil society. This indicator

does not however aim at showing when the CSOs work directly in contact with the

population, but only with other CSOs. Furthermore, in light of the previously discussed

potential of civil society in contributing to identity transformation and dialogue across the

15

The references for these lists can be found in Appendix A. 16

Table 1 is included in Appendix A.

25

groups, the table includes whether the projects envisage cooperation between Israeli and

Palestinian civil society17. Despite not being part of Tocci’s framework, the thesis supports

the idea that particular attention should nevertheless be given to this type of connections

exactly because of the potential for conflict transformation of transnational projects. The

inclusion of this indicator provides an additional nuance to the understanding of the EU

programmes and whether they attempt working towards greater conflict resolution. This

column also shows if the contractors and partners of the projects are local or international18

(either from one Member State or from an international organisation) CSOs. This is an

important indicator, since greater involvement of local actors is supposed to enhance the

legitimisation of the projects and the peace process.

The indicator for the second hypothesis, the Disembedded Civil Society Critique,

looks at the field of activity of the CSOs working with the EU. Their activities will be

classified as assisting “service delivery” or “structural changes”. This division is based on the

descriptions of the projects provided in the lists. The classification helps understand if CSOs

are mainly technical instruments of the donors, since this type of CSOs are often guided by

the needs and demands of the donors and the top-level rather than by the needs of the

population. Moreover, the assumption that service delivery CSOs tend to function as the

instruments of the donors goals can be further reinforced by combining these findings with

the third column of the first hypothesis. In fact, it can be presumed that service-oriented CSOs

acting as partners to contractor CSOs from Member States need to adapt their work to the

modalities of the contractor CSOs that was awarded the grant by the EU. Should this be the

case, CSOs would lose public legitimacy and support, hence further undermining the local

ownership of the peace process. The second column of this hypothesis analyses if the funded

projects are directly tackling the causes and development of the Conflict or if they work in the

more general context. The activities that directly work in the field of conflict resolution can

include projects aimed at promoting dialogue and a culture of peace, monitoring the Conflict

and the occupation or form future policy-makers. A division is also made between those

projects working more indirectly towards the resolution of the Conflict, for example by

reinforcing cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians through common economic or social

17

This cooperation can take the form of Israeli and Palestinian CSOs being partners in the project, or CSOs from

one group working with the population of the other group, or again CSOs from one group working with the

population of their same nationality but in projects aimed at increasing the understanding of the other national

group. 18

Cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians is indicated by a 1, cooperation between the local and

international level by a 2.

26

projects, and those projects that focus more on Palestinian economic development,

democracy, human rights and social welfare. The latter category includes the projects that,

notwithstanding their great importance for the Palestinian population, do not include the

resolution of the Conflict among their priorities19.

The descriptions of the projects are additionally employed for the indicators of the last

hypothesis, the Gramscian Critique, which asses if the EU programmes envision creating an

enabling environment for civil society activities. The indicator, similarly to the structure

column of the first hypothesis, will evaluate if the programmes create working relationships

between the top- and the mid-level of the civil society pyramid. Additionally, the programmes

should also include provisions for the EU to pressure the top-level to engage with civil society

in the peace process, a parameter indicated in the second column. This connection is

important because it fosters the combination of the bottom-up with the top-down efforts for

conflict resolution.

How is the EU integrating Palestinian civil society in its foreign policy programmes for

the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict?

The last section of the thesis applies the methodological framework of analysis elaborated by

the author in the previous section. Each one of Tocci’s hypothesis is analysed according to the

abovementioned indicators developed to concretely implement her theoretical framework.

This part hence answers the research question of how the EU integrates Palestinian civil

society in its foreign policy programmes for the resolution of the Conflict.

The Liberal Peace Paradigm

According to the first hypothesis, agency of peaceful CSOs is increased by the EU

cooperation with mid-level CSOs and by altering the views of uncivil society (Tocci, 2013,

p.34). Of the 86 projects included in the four lists of the EU programmes, a majority of them

see cooperation between the EU and exclusively mid-level CSOs (6020 projects, that is 69.77

per cent of the total). The other levels of civil society are far less represented, with grassroots

organisations being the only partner or beneficiary of the grants in 6 projects (6.98 per cent)

and the top-level CSOs only in 3 projects (3.49 per cent). Furthermore, 17 projects (19.77 per

cent) include CSOs belonging to different levels of Lederach’s pyramid. This distribution is

19

The first category of projects is indicated by a 1, the projects indirectly working towards conflict resolution by

a 2, whereas the last category is indicated by a 3. 20

All data were elaborated by the author on the basis of Table 1 in Appendix A.

27

also mostly reflected across the four programmes, except for the IfS, with the mid-level CSOs

being the largest category of beneficiaries, followed by cases of cooperation among CSOs

from different levels. The difference can be explained by the high-politics nature of the IfS

and its focus on security and stability which traditionally allows for a smaller place for mid-

level and grassroots civil society.

The level of inclusiveness of civil society however increases if the projects

implemented by CSOs from different levels of Lederach’s pyramid are considered together

with the projects realised only by one level of CSOs. In this case, grassroots level

organisations participate in 22 projects (25.58 per cent21), mid-level CSOs in 77 projects

(89.53 per cent) and top-level organisations are involved in 4 projects (8.14 per cent). The

breakdown of the programmes hence fosters the view that the EU is indeed supporting CSOs’

agency “by engaging directly with mid-level CSOs […] and by indirectly reaching out to

peace-oriented grassroots CSOs” (p.34). However, the percentage of involvement of

grassroots organisations is still largely inferior to the number of mid-level CSOs.

Furthermore, it is not clear how the EU tries to transform the views of uncivil CSOs. Except

for those programmes directly tackling the conflict that will be discussed in the Disembedded

Civil Society Critique part, the descriptions in fact do not indicate how the projects can

positively influence the most destabilising elements of civil society, for example through

dialogue. Indeed, the categorical exclusion of uncivil society from the EU programmes means

that the potential for the funded projects to reach and influence the destabilising elements of

civil society is only minimal and dependent on the participation of the individuals in the

funded activities. This preference was clearly expressed by the Commission (2012, p.3) when

affirming that it “engages with accountable and transparent CSOs which share its

commitment to social progress and to the fundamental values of peace, freedom, equal rights

and human dignity”. The EU’s preferred method to strengthen local civil society’s agency

therefore seems to be the inclusion of mid-level CSOs in its programmes, as advocated by

Tocci. The analysis also shows that the EU tends to allow only a secondary role to grassroots

organisations, and even less projects aim at encompassing the top-level of civil society.

The second way in which the EU can support local civil society in conflict resolution

is by reinforcing its structure. The increased influence of civil society on the conflict is thus

achieved by strengthening the connections between mid-level CSOs with the CSOs of the 21

The total sum of the percentages of this calculation is higher than 100 because the projects including more

than one level of CSOs are included in two calculations. The figure therefore represents the percentage of the

86 projects that include CSOs from that particular level, either being the only level taking part in the project or

a cooperation between different levels.

28

level above and below (Tocci, 2013, p.33). The connection is realised not only when CSOs

from different levels collaborate on the same project, but also when the contractor and partner

CSOs from one level work to help and influence organisations in other levels. The number of

17 projects including CSOs from two different levels is therefore increased to 19 (22.09 per

cent). Of these 19 projects, 17 link grassroots with mid-level CSOs whereas only 2 projects

are aimed at strengthening the relationship between the mid- and the top-level. The EU efforts

appear rather dissonant from the approach outlined by Tocci as facilitating civil society’s

structure. In fact, mid-level CSOs working in direct contact with the population do not include

grassroots organisations in their activities, hence risking undermining the ability of the latters

to influence the Conflict. Secondly, the majority of connections are between the grassroots

and mid-level. As it will be discussed more in detail in the Gramscian Critique section, this

clearly indicates the difficulty to engage with the national actors, who perceive CSOs as a

threat to their stability and a rival in the allocation of funds from the EU.

Connections are not only important across the levels of Lederach’s pyramid, but also

across frontiers. As discussed in the previous theoretical chapter, CSOs can positively impact

the Conflict by making the different parts enter into contact with each other and thus altering

the degree of mutual distrust and negative anticipation. A total of 20 projects (23.25 per cent

of the 86 projects) provide for the participation of both Israeli and Palestinian CSOs or target

a public issued from both national groups. However, the percentage is not uniform across the

four different programmes. The PfP in fact includes the almost absolute majority of these

cross-national projects. 19 out of its 36 projects (52.77 per cent) involve exclusively Israeli

and Palestinians CSOs, a sum that increases to 27 (75 per cent) if the projects working with

international, Israeli and Palestinian organisations are included. The IfS too includes a project

for the cooperation between the two nationalities and another project encompassing the Israeli

and Palestinian governments together with the EU. The situation appears less promising in the

other programmes: nor the NSA-LA in Development Programme neither the EIDHR in fact

include projects across the Israeli-Palestinian divide. The majority of projects in the NSA-LA

in Development Programme (32 projects, 84.21 per cent of the total 38 projects) are

constructed around the cooperation between international (both at the level of EU Member

States and international organisations) and Palestinian CSOs. The remaining 6 projects (15.79

per cent) only have Palestinian organisations as their contractors and partners. The EIDHR

comprises 4 projects (44.44 per cent of the total 9 projects) in the international-Palestinian

category and 5 projects (55.55 per cent) implemented solely by Palestinian CSOs.

29

When compared to the PfP, in which case the projects of each of these categories are

respectively 3 (8.3 per cent) and 6 (16.67 per cent), the analysis of the EU programmes seems

to indicate a level of discontinuity in the EU approach to civil society inclusion in conflict

resolution. Firstly, it shows that the potential for deep-rooted changes and enhanced mutual

understanding through CSOs is supported only in the PfP Programme. A greater level of

cross-national cooperation might be of particular help especially in the framework of the

EIDHR, uniting human rights defenders in problems that afflict both national communities,

for instance the protection of children from sexual abuse or freedom of information.

Secondly, the preponderant presence of projects led by external contractors risks undermining

local legitimisation of such projects, as local CSOs could be perceived only as implementing

the wishes of the donors as well as their cultural preferences. This is especially visible in the

NSA-LA in Development Programme and the EIDHR, despite their particular focus on local

civil society and the relevance of the projects to Palestinian CSOs and population. Greater

local control over the projects, similarly to the case of the PfP, would help reinforce the

legitimacy of the projects working toward the resolution of the Conflict.

The Disembedded Civil Society Critique

The second hypothesis outlined by Tocci (2013, p.35) suggests that the EU involvement with

local civil society negatively impacts conflict resolution. As indicated in Table 1, 59 projects

(68.60 per cent) out of the total 86 work towards the creation of deep, structural changes in

the OPT. On the other hand, projects whose descriptions indicate a service delivery focus are

27 (31.40 per cent). This division therefore seems to connote a good level of support by the

EU for CSOs that are not only technical instruments working on the symptoms of the

Conflict. Similarly to the previous hypothesis, the programmes do not share the same

distribution of ‘structural changes’ and ‘service delivery’ projects. The projects of the PfP and

EIDHR programmes appear better equipped at tackling structural changes, with 32 projects

(88.89 per cent) of the former and two thirds of the EIDHR projects being in the ‘structural

changes’ category. Interestingly, the NSA-LA in Development Programme, despite its

specific focus on development and strengthening of CSOs capacity, divides its projects fairly

equally between the two categories. 20 projects (52.63 per cent) are aiming at structural

changes, while 18 (47.37 per cent) are more concerned with providing services to the

population.

The central focus of this thesis on conflict resolution however necessitates of a second

indicator. This is used to clarify if the programmes are actually directly intervening in the

30

resolution of the Conflict, or if the structural changes they envision are in the economic and

social sphere. The analysis of the projects in fact indicates that the majority of them are

directed towards Palestinian economic, social and democratic advancement (48 projects,

equalling 55.81 per cent of the total 86 projects). Regarding the resolution of the Conflict,

only 21 projects (24.42 per cent) can be classified as straightforwardly working towards it.

Even if the 17 projects (19.77 per cent) that indirectly contribute to conflict resolution are

added, most projects still shy away from openly supporting CSOs active in the sphere of

conflict transformation. As indicated by Marchetti and Tocci (2009) and Aggestam and

Strömbom (2013) the preference for organisations active mainly in the sphere of humanitarian

relief and service provision can be detrimental to the peace process. Their work risks

supporting the status quo by mitigating the costs of the Conflict, the occupation and the

absence of a democratic Palestinian state that would be the guarantor of security and services

to the population. This indeed took place in the years of the Oslo process when the

burgeoning of CSOs for conflict relief, combined with the political evolution of the conflict,

delayed the peace settlement. Furthermore, differences among the four programmes are

particularly pronounced. Of the 21 projects trying to directly improve the Conflict, 20 are part

of the PfP Programme, as well as 16 of the 17 projects indirectly tackling the Conflict. The

NSA-LA in Development Programme includes only one project of the second category, while

the rest of its projects focus on the OPT development. All of the EIDHR projects and two of

the IfS are part of this last category.

The combination of these findings with the previous division between ‘service

delivery’ and ‘structural changes’ projects thus provides a more nuanced picture of the EU

programmes supporting local civil society in conflict resolution. The EU support seems in fact

to be concentrated towards more technical and depoliticised CSOs that work in less politically

sensitive fields, for example poverty alleviation and women rights. However, the analysis of

the projects does not disclose if the CSOs involved are what Tocci (2013, p.35) defines as

“non-grassroots organizations”, that is those organisations that have been created to represent

personal and/or illegal interests rather than the advancement of the population’s well-being.

This shortcoming could be overcome by further field research and analysis of the origins of

each organisation, an endeavour that is however outside the scope of the present thesis.

Secondly, little continuity exists among the programmes, since the almost entirety of the

projects related to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict is being financed exclusively through the

PfP (36 of 38 projects, that is 94.74 per cent). The potential for conflict resolution of the other

programmes hence seems to be still poorly developed. Rather, this supports the Disembedded

31

Civil Society Critique that the EU engagement renders CSOs technical instruments of the top

levels.

The second hypothesis is further supported when cross-checking the field of activity of

the projects with the nationality of the CSOs involved. This comparison shows that most of

the projects (36 projects, 41.86 per cent of the total 86 projects) are implemented by

international organisations in cooperation with Palestinian CSOs in the third field of activity

(i.e. Palestinian development). Despite their smaller number, a positive note should be

mentioned for those projects working towards conflict resolution. Table 1 indicates that most

of the projects are implemented by either international and local CSOs (10 out of 38 projects,

26.32 per cent) or exclusively by the local organisations (26 projects, 68.42 per cent). This

result reflects a better level of control and responsibility over the projects by local civil

society, which in turn seems to undermine the central premise of the Disembedded Civil

Society Critique postulating that CSOs are turned into a mere instrument of the donors.

Nevertheless, this correlation is only an indication of the level of actorness of local

organisations vis-à-vis the EU and the EU goals for the Conflict. Further field research is in

fact needed to prove that the CSOs supported are indeed designing projects that respond to the

needs of the population and conflict resolution rather than the EU preferences.

The Gramscian Critique

The last hypothesis, the Gramscian Critiques, postulates that the support to civil society

should be matched by the improvement of a favourable context at the state and top-level.

Tocci (2013, p.37) explains that this is achieved when the EU pressures state actors to

democratise and collaborate with civil society. It could therefore be expected that the EU

programmes for conflict resolution and civil society create direct links between the mid- and

top-level. Secondly, they should also include measures for the EU to urge the state level to

cooperate. The descriptions of the projects clearly indicate that connections between the mid-

and top-level are created in a minority of cases. Only 7 projects (8.14 per cent) in fact aim at

enhancing partnership between civil society and actors of these two levels or at reinforcing

the advocacy power of mid-level CSOs towards the top-level. This circumscribed result

makes the EU efforts appear further limited when the individual programmes are analysed.

The projects creating the link are in fact concentrated in the NSA-LA in Development

Programme (5 projects) and the EIDHR (2 projects). No project in the PfP links the mid- and

top-level of civil society, despite the programme’s central goal of resolution of the Conflict.

The EU hence seems to prefer funding projects contacting the top-level only in the area of

32

Palestinian development. Similarly to the second hypothesis, the EU programmes are more

successful in the less politically sensitive areas of civil society activity.

The second indicator in Table 1 shows that direct pressure of the EU on the top-level

is even more limited than the number of connections created between the mid- and top-level.

Only one project in the NSA-LA in Development Programme and another one in the IfS are

specifically including the PA and other state-level actors. One project of the PfP Programme

considers the formation of the future cadre to be involved in the peace process. Furthermore,

none of the projects attempts pressurising the Israeli government despite the obvious

importance that more exhortation on it and its members has on the improvement of the

situation in the OPT and the peace process.

The analysis of the EU programmes through the lens provided by the Gramscian

Critique hence disclose a substantive gap between the top-level of civil society and the

organisations of the other levels. The lack of pressure on and cooperation with the top-level

therefore limits to the capacity of civil society to positively affect the Conflict. It also reveals

the small capacity of the EU to constructively engage and affect the state-level actors both in

Israel and the OPT. This in turn supports the views expressed by a large number of observers

(Miller, 2011; Peters, 2010, Tocci, 2007), discussed in the second chapter of the thesis, that

the EU still plays only a secondary role in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Moreover, the little

contact with the top-level diminishes the opportunity to Europeanise them through both

conditionality and socialisation, the latter being the main process to express the bottom-up

influence exerted by civil society.

33

CONCLUSION

The thesis has provided an analysis of the EU programmes aimed at the resolution of the

Israeli-Palestinian conflict that incorporate Palestinian civil society. As explained in the

second chapter, the EU potential role in the Conflict, despite still being marginal, has

increased over the decades. The EU has moved from a purely declaratory positioning to

performing a more financial and political role, being the largest financial donor to the PA.

However, the EU approach towards the Conflict, in line with the EU support for the creation

of a Palestinian state, has concentrated mainly on Palestinian state- and institution-building,

with a particular focus to the security, judiciary and financial sector reform. Coupled with the

still existing democratic deficit in the OPT, this special attention has created a democratic and

accountability deficit of exactly those institutions supported by the EU efforts, as estimated by

Call (2008) when discussing the risks of exclusively state-centred strategies. As explained by

Tocci (2007) and Witney (2013), the EU therefore seems answering only short-term and

security-led priorities.

Civil society has the potential for overcoming these problems, also in light of the

special role it holds in Palestinian society and the OPT. A large number of researches have

pointed out the importance of civil society in conflict resolution. Firstly, it can help increase

the legitimacy of the peace process by ensuring that the agreed decisions reflects the need of

the people, while also acting as a positive counterweight to those actors undermining peace

(Donais, 2009; Wanis-St. John and Kew, 2008). Secondly, civil society can impact and

transform the deep-rooted causes of conflict and create bridges between the warring parts in

order to transform the mutual perceptions and increase trust in one another (Challand, 2010;

Herzog and Hai, 2005; Tomlinson and Lewicki, 2006). This contribution is thus necessary to

complement and better implement the formal elite-level peace agreements (Maoz, 2004).

Furthermore, cooperation with Palestinian civil society can provide the EU with the necessary

knowledge of the local reality to improve its programmes, enhance the acceptance of its

projects and balance the institution-building efforts (Irrera, 2010, 2013; Youngs, 2004). The

central importance of civil society has also been recognised by the EU in its vision for a long-

term “positive peace” and has been included in a variety of documents issued by several EU

institutions (for example, the documents by the Commission and the Parliament of 2012

discussed before).

34

The relevance of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict for the EU and the potential of civil

society in conflict resolution are therefore been the main motivation for undertaking this study

and answer its research question of how the EU integrates Palestinian civil society in its

foreign policy programmes for the resolution of the Conflict. The analysis of the EU

programmes has followed and adapted Nathalie Tocci’s conceptual framework by creating

indicators to test each of her hypothesis. Moreover, to have a clearer analysis, only the four

programmes that authors have recognised as having an impact on the Conflict through civil

society engagement have been considered.

The first hypothesis, the Liberal Peace Paradigm, demonstrates that the EU

programmes work mainly with mid-level CSOs and only in a few cases the EU projects do

include the other levels of Lederach’s societal pyramid. This brings to the conclusion that the

EU programmes have a medium positive impact on CSOs agency, despite the fact that they do

not clearly state how they can affect the destabilising elements of uncivil society, since the

EU cooperates with mid-level CSOs. On the other hand, the hypothesis indicates that the EU

instruments are not veritably considering strengthening the structure of civil society. This is

caused by the small number of connections created between CSOs from different levels of the

societal pyramid. Furthermore, the almost exclusive concentration of funds destined to mid-

level CSOs risks incentivising the burgeoning of professional NGOs that are not anchored in

and representative of the population. This scenario would void CSOs of its potential over the

resolution of the Conflict and alienate the citizens, as Challand (2005) has warned. Finally, a

third indicator has highlighted how only slightly less than a quarter of the projects include

cross-national participation between Israeli and Palestinian actors. This indicates that the EU

is not investing in the potential for deep-rooted subjective and ontological changes that the

literature has recognised in civil society. The formulation of this indicator is also an important

contribution of the thesis to the existing literature and future empirical research on EU

conflict resolution since it adds a dimension that was partially overlooked in Tocci’s

hypothesis but is important to understand the potential for reconciliation of the funded

projects. Overall, it can be affirmed that the Liberal Peace Paradigm is only partially

representative of the EU engagement with civil society in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. In

fact only the agency of Palestinian CSOs is enhanced, whereas structure and the possibility of

increasing mutual understanding between the parts are still largely neglected.

At a first glance, the Disembedded Civil Society Critique seems to illustrate a

considerate support for CSOs that are not only service providers. However, a closer analysis

discloses a more complex situation. The research has in fact highlighted that only a minority

35

of the projects are actively working towards the resolution of the Conflict, either by directly

tackling its root causes or by improving the general context. Most of the EU support is

directed towards less politically sensitive CSOs that work in the field of human and societal

relief. Although these projects go beyond the simple provision of services but strive to impact

on the causes of the problems, they do not aim at transforming the Conflict, the mutual

perception of Israelis and Palestinians or influence the elite levels. The second of Tocci’s

hypothesis hence indicates that less than half of the EU-funded projects are working towards

conflict resolution. The finding not only shows that the EU is not fully exploiting the civil

society potential for engaging citizens in Conflict-related activities, but it also proves that the

EU still has a secondary role in the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, confined to a

more supportive role of the Palestinian population rather than being considerably engaged in

high politics. However, the analysis does not fully show if the EU depoliticises CSOs and if it

co-opts the organisations into becoming a mere representative of European preferences. Even

when combining the indicators of this hypothesis with the local-international divide of the

previous hypothesis, the thesis can only provide a description of the number of projects that

see participation of local CSOs, but it cannot indicate if they are co-opted by the international

counterparts. The second hypothesis, to be fully tested as envisioned by Tocci, thus

necessitates further field work through which it will be possible to understand whether

Palestinian civil society is dominated by EU preferences instead of local needs.

The last hypothesis, the Gramscian Critique, provides an insight into how the projects

supported by the EU also aim at including the top-level of the societal pyramid in order to

create a context favourable to civil society. The analysis of the projects reveals that only a

very small number of cases create connections between the mid-level CSOs and the top

levels. Secondly, the EU instruments do not consider exerting pressure over the Palestinian

and Israeli elites. The Gramscian Critique hence well represents the separation and little

degree of cooperation between the grassroots and mid-level of civil society on one hand and

the top-level on the other. However, the projects under scrutiny in this thesis do not include

the top-level, as represented by the top arrow in Figure 3. Moreover, the hypothesis correctly

shows that the EU is still unable to firmly exert influence on the governments in the field of

conflict resolution.

As recognised by Tocci herself, the three hypotheses are not mutually exclusive but

coexist to varying degrees. A fourth pyramid has therefore been elaborated by the author to

better illustrate the EU intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict through civil society

(Figure 4). The EU instruments analysed in the thesis are represented by the square on the left

36

side of the picture: they directly involve the mid-level of civil society, whereas grassroots

CSOs are supported only in a smaller number of cases and more indirectly. Connections

however do exist between these two levels, unlike with the top-level. The top-level is

however the focus of the attention of other EU programmes and policies. As discussed in the

second chapter, these different EU efforts are mainly aimed at state- and institution-building

and creating a “good general operating environment for civil society actors” through public

statements, reporting and political dialogue (European Parliament, 20121, p.10). The pyramid

is therefore a synthesis of the first and third of Tocci’s hypothesis, whereas the thesis has

showed that the second hypothesis is only partially testable. Moreover, the thesis has found

significant differences among the EU instruments, with the Partnership for Peace Programme

scoring the best results for support to civil society in the resolution of the Conflict.

In conclusion, the research has shown that the EU, at least at its declaratory level, is

generally aware of the importance of civil society in conflict resolution activities. However,

its inclusion in the EU programmes is still limited and cooperation is often not in the sphere

of the resolution of the Conflict. Most importantly, the EU efforts to include civil society

37

appear to be undermined by the lack of connection with the top-level which makes it more

difficult for civil society actors to influence policy-making and the peace process. There is

therefore a gap between the programmes aimed at civil society and those designed for the top-

level and state-building which goes contrary to the literature supporting the view that civil

society, peace- and state-building should proceed hand in hand. The programmes considered

here are nevertheless of capital importance for the EU approach to the Israeli-Palestinian

Conflict since they at least partially counterbalance the traditional attention to state-building,

security and judiciary reform. Hopefully, this thesis has provided an important theoretical and

empirical contribution to the discussion of the EU activities in conflict resolution and of its

cooperation with civil society, helping filling the literature gap on the topic and providing a

practical set of indicators for the study of other conflicts. Civil society represents an

important, indeed essential, asset for the EU in conflict resolution and the EU should learn

how to further improve its cooperation with these national actors. Only then the EU will be

able to play a more influential role in creating peace, both in the Middle East and in the rest of

the world.

38

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APPENDIX A Table 1 – Analysis of the EU programmes

The analysis is based on the following documents: - Delegation of the European Union to Israel (2013). EU Partnership for Peace Programme

– List of ongoing projects; - EU Assistance to the Palestinians (2012). Non-State Actors and Local Authorities in

Development – List of awarded grants; - EU Assistance to the Palestinians (2014). The European Instrument for Democracy and

Human Rights (EIDHR). Country-based support scheme (occupied Palestinian Territory); - European Commission (2013). 2012 annual report on the Instrument for Stability. Vol. 2.

SWD(2013) 292 Final.

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1 - The EU projects are listed in this table in the same order in which they are presented in the list of EU projects, with 1 being the first

project presented in the list. 2 - The EU cooperates with UNRWA and UNICEF, but it is not specified whether it also cooperates with local CSOs.

3 - For this project, the EU cooperates with the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority.

4 - Unlike the previous projects for the democratic and economic development of the OPT, this project aims at strengthening the PA

security.