Modernization and political representation: 1927–1966

MODERNIZATION AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION: 1927-1966

Phillips Cutright Massachusetts Institute of Technology James A. Wiley University of Illinois - Chicago Circle

Generalizations relating social and economic modernization to political development have received exten- sive empirical support (Lipset, 1960: chapters 2 and 3; Almond and Coleman, 1960: conclusion; Cutright, 1963; Simpson, 1964; Olsen, 1967). This paper adds to the study of political development by considering patterns of change and stability in political representation I over time.

The dominant theoretical explanation of the observed positive relationship between levels of socioeconomic development and political representation is "'modernization" theory. From this perspective, modernized populations are more likely to demand representative political institutions and are more able to sustain representative politics once instituted (Lipset, 1960; Lerner, 1958). Modernization theory predicts that an increase in political representation will follow an increase in the level of socioeconomic development. 2 However, the theory is not specific enough to explain why some nations might fail to experience the predicted political change following a period of modernization; nor does it explain why a nation that has achieved a high level of political representation may lose it. 3

One theoretical refinement of modernization theory is offered by conflict theory. According to this view we should expect the masses to demand representation, but we should also expect the governing elite to resist these demands. This orientation suggests, in turn, that governments with high levels of political representation will be under constant threat of destruction from antidemocratic elements (not necessarily the ruling elite, however) and that the political elites of governments with lower levels of representation will be under constant threat from the masses either to liberalize their regimes or be replaced (Lenski, 1966; Dahrendorf, 1958: chapter 8). 4

In this monograph we examine a number of hypotheses derived from the assumptions of moderni-

zation and conflict theory, and then proceed to specify the conditions under which change in the level of political representation has occurred during the past 40 years.

First, as a check on the invariance of relations between modernization and political representation, we present analyses for each of four successive decades. Because much of the empirical foundation for the link between modernization and political representation is predicated in correlations from data col- lected after World War II, it is important to see whether our inferences can be sustained by data drawn from previous decades.

Second, we attempt to identify those characteristics of societies which make them vulnerable or invul- nerable to political change. It is clear that many nations maintain stable levels of political representation (high or low) while experiencing other forms of social change. We seek to account for this fact.

Finally, we advance a predictive model of the development and decay of representative politics. While modernization (as measured by the usual indicators) appears not to be subject to protracted rever- sals, the same is not true for political representation. The decay of representative politics, often ignored by theorists of political development, is a fact to be explained (Huntington, 1965; S. N. Eisenstadt, 1966).

In the following section we discuss the concepts which guide our analysis and our measures of them.

MEASURES AND DISCUSSION OF MAJOR CONCEPTS

A. Dependent Variables

1} Measurement of Political Representation

For the purposes of international comparison, political representation may be defined as the extent

24 STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

to which the executive and legislative branches of government are subject to the demands of the nonelite population. This definition implies, at the least, a stratum of political elites and a broad sector of nonelite population, both internally differentiated, and a set of institutions through which political influence is channelled. The measurement procedure used in this study focuses on these institutions, s

The political representation index is constructed by allocating points to each nation during each year it had a certain type of political party system, chief executive, and franchise requirement (source of parliament and executive branch scores: Council on For- eign Relations, 1928-1967; franchise data from The Statesman's Yearbook, 1930-1965; and The Europa Yearbook 1965). The three components of the index are not independent. The proportion of the population eligible to vote contributes to the index only if a party-based election was held and the parliament thus elected was still functioning. Executive scoring depends on the existence of a representative body and the relative strength of contending parties. The high- est scores are assigned to nations with balanced multiparty parliaments in which the chief executive is selected by parliament or direct election, and where a large proportion of the population has been extended suffrage. The lowest scores are assigned to nations with hereditary rulers and without functioning parliaments. Annual scores for each nation are cumulated for each of four decades: 1927-1936, 1937-1946, 1947-1956, 1957-1966. A nation can receive from 0 to 5 points each year, and its decade score may, therefore, range from 0 to 50 (see Appendix A for a complete description of the scoring system).

Figure 1 shows the path coefficients between each of the components and the total PRIF (Political Representation Index with Franchise) score for 1930, and the correlations between each of the 1930 component scores (Duncan, 1966:8).

Since both the executive and franchise scores are partially determined by the legislative score, the positive correlations between the components are expected. However, only the legislative-executive correlation is above .90, while the correlations between legislative and franchise, and executive and franchise, are .76 and .69 respectively. This pattern of intercorrelation among the components is very similar in all time periods.

The path between the legislative and the total Political Representation score indicates that the

[ LeNslative 1930

.921

.764 I Executiv e Franchise .68919301930 y Political Representation Index, 1930

NOTE: Curved lines indicate correlation coefficients; straight lines indicate paths.

Figure 1. Decomposition of the Political Representation Index

major portion of the total score is a function of the legislative component, but the remaining two components contribute in nearly equal parts to the total score. The 1930 paths are nearly identical to those observed in the remaining three time periods.

The correlation between literacy and the total PRIF score is slightly higher than the correlation between literacy and any single component. For example, in 1930 the correlation between literacy and the total PRIF score was .837; the correlation with the legislative score was .776; with executive alone it was .798; and with franchise the correlation was .812. Much the same pattern is observed when energy consumption is substituted for literacy.

Although the correlations between the components in the Political Representation Index could have been altered by juggling the weights used for each component, and the correlations between the independent variables and the PRIF score could also have been increased slightly by altering the weighting system, the amount of explained variance added by such procedures would be relatively small and, in the opinion of the authors, would add no information of value to the study. We therefore chose to avoid further manipulation of the index.

Some shortcomings of the proposed measure of political representation should be noted. First, the index is not sensitive to the possibility for meaningful competition within single-party systems. Second, the legislative component is not influenced by differences in the powers of representative bodies, where they exist. Finally, the chances for minority parties to enter majority coalitions in parliament are only indi-

MODERNIZATION AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION: 1927-1966 25

rectly represented in the index. The solutions to these problems await the collection of data that do not presently exist in sufficient volume for international comparisons. Even within the framework of the data used in tiffs study there are many alternative scales. The scale we propose relies most heavily on the party composition and relative strength of parties in parliament.

2) Change in the Level of Political Represen ta tion between Decades

As operationalized, the PRIF score responds to two kinds of factors-the nature of the political institutions in existence and the degree to which these institutions are maintained continuously over time. An increase in political representation can come about through the extension of suffrage rights and periodic elections, the establishment of representative legislative bodies, and the entry of new parties, insofar as these represent actual changes from a preexisting state of affairs that are maintained for a sufficient period of time. A decrease in political representation can occur through suspension of elections, dissolution of representative bodies, and pro- hibitions on the entry of parties. Since the information used in the construction of the index is aggregated in ten-year intervals, yearly fluctuations in representation are masked. Any increase or decrease represents a change in the operating characteristics of political systems between decades. In this study, we examine changes from the first decade score to the second, the second to the third, and the third to the fourth. A positive change indicates an upward shift in the level while a negative change indicates a decline. 6

B. Independent Variables

1) Social Development

Social development refers to the capacity of a population to consider action, rather than traditional acceptance, to ameliorate enduring economic problems, their ability to organize to achieve such goals when existing governments do not provide solutions, and their desire to see the environment under the control of man, rather than natural forces. Moderni- zation theorists have viewed this type of development as increasing the probability that a population, taking increasing interest in its life conditions, will move the society toward political forms that parallel rising participation of the masses in political affairs. Thus they predict that increasing levels of social develop-

ment will result, other things being equal, in demands by a population for greater control of its affairs by government, and increasing participation by the masses in government.

Our measure of social development is the percent of the population defined as literate. Literacy as an indicator of the sensitivity and receptivity of a population to representative government is imperfect, but it has the virture of providing us with a measure that is relatively comparable over time7 Our hypotheses concerning political change will define the literacy level (or takeoff point) required before change in political representation occurs and the expected impact of literacy gains in stabilizing governments at a given political level, or in promoting political change.

2) Economic Development

Economic development, though linked in consider- able part to social development, forces change on a population by producing new modes of organization and new bases for social cleavage. Sectoral relocation of the labor force in cities and the resulting ease of communication and organization allows the diverse interest groups created by industrialization to take political form. The emerging heterogeneity of interests may be suppressed by common goals, especi- ally in the earlier stages of economic development. But as the division of labor continues, multiple and conflicting interests assert themselves in the political life of nations. To the extent that multiple political groups are more effective in dealing with multiple interests-in harnessing the potentiality for conflict- the modernization theorist predicts that economic development will gradually move a population toward greater political representation. In short, the complexity of modern social and economic organization presents problems whose solution is best met by multiple rather than single political parties or auto- nomous elites.

We include energy consumption as a second measure of modernization. 8 Comparable data on energy consumption exist back to 1929 for the nations in this study. Energy consumption and GNP per capita share a correlation of .94 in 91 nations (late 1950 data) and energy consumption is a better indicator of wealth in a nation than is literacy. It is also more highly related than is literacy to mani- festations of modernized nations such as radio, mail, phones, cars, and railway mileage (Olsen, 1967: Table


2). Energy consumption should, therefore, have effects on political representation which are independent of the effects of literacy.

Change in the complexity and productivity of economies and the social modernization of populations tend to occur simultaneously. The extent to which they can be independent processes has real limits, so although we can distinguish the two forms of development from each other, it is difficult to demonstrate their independent effects on political representation. Since modernization theorists tend to view both economic development and social modernization as fused processes bearing the same general relationship to political representation, it seems reasonable on theoretical grounds to include both constructs in this research. Moreover, as a practical matter, the extent to which our indicators of social and economic development are not reliable would indicate that more than a single indicator should be used when an expected value of political representation is to be estimated from a nation's degree of modernization. We make no direct attempt to assess the relative importance of social versus economic development.

3) Economic Security

The level of energy consumption, as an indicator of wealth, reflects most directly on the economic security of the population in the labor force, but does not adequately cover the economic security of the population not in the labor force. The major govern- mental mechanism that has been developed to cope with economic insecurity for people out of the labor force is the insurance-based social security program.

Security programs emerge with the development of government bureaucracies whose responsibilities include monitoring the economic security and political machinations of important sectors of a population. While the growth of the economy is not entirely under the control of governments, expendi- tures by national governments are subject to manipulation and may be directed as specific target groups in order to recruit support for a regime. These alloca- tions create a tangible stake in the stability of governments rather than a commitment to specific forms of political competition.

The security level of the population is measured by determining the number of social security programs (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and

Welfare, 1964) the nation had by 1936. 9 The best single predictor of the level of government effort (measured by the percent of GNP allocated to social security programs) to provide social security coverage to the population is the number of years a nation had a program, times the number of programs (Cutright, 1967b). Nations that introduced programs early have had more years of experience, and they spend a larger share of their GNP on security programs than do nations that were late in introducing the programs. Nations with early program development also tend to have larger GNP's per capita) o Therefore, the actual benefit paid to program beneficiaries in wealthy nations is higher than the benefits paid to beneficiaries in poorer nations. Although the nations in our "high security" stratum (see Appendix C ) v a r y greatly in wealth and the size of the benefit paid, the meaning of the benefit to the recipient is probably judged in relation to the prevailing standard of living in the nation. A "small" benefit in a relatively poor nation can still be meaningful.

We expect that strong national social security programs will stabilize governments, and in the "high security" nations that the level of political representation will remain constant over time. A combination of the literacy and economic security characteristics of societies will enable us to identify nations vulnerable to political change.

We defer the discussion of a predictive model of the development and decay of representative politics until we have examined the implications of the concepts presented above.

In the analyses to follow we compress our measures into four time periods. This allows us to examine the level of political representation in four decades, and the correlates of political change between decades. The annual political representation scores were aggregated within each of four ten-year periods (defined above). The dates of measdrement for literacy were approximately 1930, 1940, 1950, and 1960. Energy consumption data were available for 1929, 1937-1938, 1947-1956, and 1957 through 1964. Where energy consumption scores for more than one year were available, the mean consumption for the period was used. 11

We will occasionally refer to the first time period measures as "1930," the second as "1940," the third as "1950," and the fourth as "1960," although only the literacy measure is fitted to this single year.


Our universe of 40 nations includes all nations that were self-governing and continued to be self-governing during the period from 1927 to 1966.12 Former colonial nations that achieved independence later in this period, and all nations that were occupied by a foreign power during the time period are excluded) ~ Very small principalities and states of dubious independent status are omitted. The criteria for inclusion in the study attempt to control the effects of exoge-

nous factors on our dependent variables. The advan- tages of having a larger number of nations for study are cancelled by the problems introduced if we attempt to add exogenous factors, like the occupation of Eastern Europe in determining the post-war level of political representation of nations in the Soviet block.l 4

ANALYSIS OF THE LEVEL OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

Our first group of working hypotheses specify two assumptions basic to modernization theory:

(1) The level of political representation is dependent on the levels of social and economic development.

(2) The effects of social and economic development on political representation are stable over time.

Characteristics of the Sample and Explained Variance

Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations for literacy, energy consumption (log scale) and political representation in each time period. Comparison of the standard deviations to their means indicates

that the assumption of approximate normal distribu- tions for all variables is not violated. Linearity of the relationship of independent to the dependent variable was checked with scattergrams and by inspecting the errors of prediction. Both tests were satisfactory. 1 s

Comparison of the literacy means over time shows a rather even rise in literacy levels, but since six nations had reached the 95% level in 1930 and nine had reached this level by 1950, there is a slight bias against high gains between the latter time periods.

The mean raw energy consumption, decade by decade, was 78, 79, 111, and 130 kilograms per capita, with standard deviations ranging from 144 in the first period to 180 in the last. The log transformation produces a linear relationship between energy consumption and political representation.l 6

The mean level of political representation dropped slightly from 1930 to 1940, remained steady between 1940 and 1950, and then increased by four points between 1950 and 1960. Analysis of the relationship between the changing m e ans for all nations of literacy, energy consumption, and political representation is pointless, since the factors affecting political change do not apply equally to all nations, but have different effects on nations with certain characteristics.

Finally, Table 1 shows the amount of variance in political representation scores for each decade that is explained by both literacy and energy consumption

TABLE 1

MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND VARIANCE IN POLITICAL REPRESENTATION EXPLAINED BY INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (N=40)

Date o f Measurement

1930 1940 1950 1960

Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.

Literacy 48.4 31.1 53.0 31.8 56.6 31.7 61.3 31.0

Energy Consumption (log lO scale) 1.28 0.79 1.31 0.76 1.58 0.68 1.73 0.62

Political Representation 26.1 16.7 24.5 18.1 24.6 17.2 28.7 16.7

R2y. XZ .72 .68 .71 .53

R2y. XYZ- 1 NA .85 .86 .74

NOTE: R 2 is the multiple coefficient of determination; Y = political representation; Y- l is po/itical representation in the previous time period; X is literacy; Z is energy consumption (loglo scale).


and, for the last three decades, the total variance explained when the previous decade's political representation scores are added to the prediction equation.17 The amount of variance explained by literacy and energy consumption is rather constant (around 70%) for the first three periods, but drops to 53% in the last period (this is not evidence of a change in the slope of regression lines, however). The addition of information on the previous decade's political representation scores increases the explained variance by 15 to 21% but this increase simply reflects the impact of political stability in certain types of nations, and has little theoretical value (it cannot be interpreted, for example, as a measure of the effect of "tra- dition").

Causal Priorities in the Relation Between Socioeconomic Development and Political Representation

The first hypothesis states that the level of political representation in societies is causally dependent on social and economic development. To examine this assumption we apply a variation of Pelz and Andrews' (1964) cross lagged correlation method. 18

When time 1 and time 2 measures are available for both the assumed independent and dependent variables, a comparison of the cross lagged correlations may lead to an inference of causal priority. The procedure is to compare the correlation between the independent variable measured at time 1 and the dependent variable measured at time 2 against the correlation between the dependent variable measured at time 1 and the independent variable measured at time 2. If the comparison between these correlations shows little difference, then the direction of causality is unknown. But if one variable's time 1 predictive power is significantly better than the predictive power of the other variable, then it is assigned causal priority.

When the correlations between variables measured at time 1 and the same variables measured at time 2 are high, the cross lag comparison described above is ambiguous. 19 A variation on Pelz and Andrews' approach used here involves comparisons of the ne t

effects of one variable on another variable measured at a later time.

Table 2 presents a cross lag analysis on the 40 nations for four periods of measurement. The difference, RzYt,.XtYt-R2Yt,.Y t, is the effect of early liter-

acy (Xt) on late political representation (Yt') with

the effects of previous political representation (Yt)

partialled out - the net effect of X t on Yt" A positive

difference is possible only when some change in political representation scores has occurred between time periods. The net effect of X t on Yt' expresses the

strength of the relation between early literacy (Xt)

and the component of later political representation scores (Yt,) produced by change in the scores be-

tween periods. If X causes Y we expect the net effect of X t on Yt' to be posi t ive 2° and statist ically signifi-

cant. 21 Similar interpretations and expectations apply to the remaining net effects given in Table 2.

Panel A shows the cross lagged net effects between literacy and political representation. The F-ratios are significant only in three of twelve possible cases. The net effects of early literacy (Xt) on late political

representation (Yt,) are significant in the ten-year

time lag from 1940 to 1950 and in the 20-year time lag from 1930 to 1950. The net effects of early political representation (Yt) on late literacy (Xt,) are

significant only in the ten-year time lag from 1950 to 1960. The predicted positive relationship between literacy and political representation holds only for the net effects of early literacy on late political representation, as indicated by the columns denoted "sign."

Panel B presents a cross lag analysis for energy consumption and political representation. With only one exception, the net effects of early energy (Zt) on

late political representation (Yt,) are significant for

all time lags, while the net effects of early political representation (Yt) on late energy (Xt,) are insignifi-

cant for all time lags except the ten-year lag from 1950 to 1960. The signs of the net effects of energy consumption on political representation scores are positive for all time lags, but negative for the net effects of early political representation on late energy consumption.

These results give some limited support to the hypothesis of causal priority of social and economic development. For the relation between literacy and pol i t ica l representation causal priorities remain ambiguous, although the direction of the net effects favors literacy as a determinant. Cross lag comparisons involving energy consumption and political representation suggest the causal priority of the economic indicator.

MODERNIZATION AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION: 1927-1966

TABLE 2

CROSS-LAG ANALYSIS (N=40)

29

Panel A Early Literacy (X~ on

Late Politieal (Y tr )

Early Political (Yp on

Late Literacy (Xtr)

Time Net Effect of X t on Ytr

-R 2 Sign b Lag (R2ytr" XtYt Yt" Yt )

Net Effect of Yt on Xt,

_R 2 (R2xtr. XtY t Xt~. X t) S/gn

10 years 193~40 .010 + .001 1940-50 .022 a + .000 1950-60 .000 + .003 a

20 years 1930-50 .042 a + .001 1940-60 .023 + .002

30 years 1930-60 .013 + .003

Panel B Early Energy (Zp on

Late Political (Y tr )

Early Political (Y~ on

Late Energy {Z t, )

Net Effect of Z t on Yt' Net Effect of Y t on Zt, Time

-R 2 Sign (R 2 -R 2 Lag (R2ytr" ZtYt Ytr" Yt } Ztr" ZtYt Zt'" Zt) Sign

10 years 1930-40 .017 a + .000 1940-50 .038 a + .001 1950-60 .000 + .004 a

20 years 1930-50 .063 a + .000 1940-60 .059 a + .004

30 years 1930-60 .044 a + .004

a The net effect is significant at the .05 level. F95=4.1 df 1.38.

b The sign is taken from the net regression coefficient of the regression of Ytt on X t and Yt (bYtt Xt " Yt )'The signs for the other three columns are obtained in the same way.

Stability of Correlation and Regression Coefficients Over Time

Figure 2 shows the results of correlation and re-

gression analyses for four decades with political repre-

sentation as the dependent variable, zz Since the re-

gression coefficient is less subject to fluctuations due to measurement error in the dependent variable and

changing variability in the independent variables, we use this statistic for our comparisons. 23 The regres-

sion coefficients provide us with a test of the second hypothesis: the effects of literacy and energy consumption on political representation are constant over time.

The zero-order correlation between literacy and political representation is stable for the first three periods but drops in the last period. Similar results

are obtained for the correlation between energy con-

sumption and political representation, and for the

multiple correlation between political representation

and both predictors (see Table i) . Hence from the

correlations alone we might infer that the effects of

social and economic modernization on political representation have declined in the most recent decade.

A test of the equality of the coefficients derived

from the regression of political representation scores


XI--(-99) ) X2--(.99) >X 3 (.99) ) X 4

i . O0 )~f2 0 , 8 6 ) Y3 0,83 )'/4

(.76 6.0 (.79)//18.8 (.79 9.9 (.6 .7

z~("99) )z~. (97) )z3 (.ga) )z4

NOTE: X = percent literate; Z = energy consumption (loglo scale); Y = political representation. Subscripts 1, 2,

3, 4 refer to 1930, 1940, 1950, and 1960 scores. Numbers in parentheses axe correlation coefficients; numbers not in parentheses axe unstandardized zero order regression coefficients. All correlations are significant beyond the .05 level.

Figure 2. Zero Order Correlations and Regression Co- efficients for Literacy, Energy Consumption and Political Representation Levels: 1930, 1940, 1950, 1960. (n = 40).

on literacy and energy consumption is accomplished by comparing the residual errors of prediction from the four-decade regressions against the errors of prediction for a common regression which pools all the data ignoring time periods.24-The null hypothesis tested is that the decade regression coefficients are equal. Distinctly different regression coefficients will generate significant F-ratios.

Ignoring the intercept parameter, one common regression minimizes the errors of prediction as well as three separate regressions.

These two findings, the causal dependence of political representation and the stability of the effects of literacy and energy consumption, support two basic assumptions of modernization theory. Problems arise, however, if we generalize these findings to the data on political change. If the regression equations are interpreted as summary statements of a theory of political development, then predictions about political change follow which do not agree with the facts. First, the theory cannot account for stability of political representation in the face of social and economic change; increases in literacy or energy consumption should consistently produce more representative political structures. Second, since literacy and energy consumption do not generally decrease over time, the theory cannot explain the occurrence of declines in political representation. In the next section we turn to an analysis of political change which seeks to explain these deviant patterns.

ANALYSIS OF CHANGE IN POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

For the regressions of political representation scores on literacy alone, application of this test results in a non-significant F-ratio (F = 0.339), indi- cating that the "effects" of literacy on political repre- senlation, as measured by the slopes of the regression lines, are stable over time. A gain of 10% in literacy should be followed by a gain of about 4 points in political representation.

The results for the regressions of political representation on energy consumption are essentially the same. Although the correlation between energy consumption and political representation drops in the last decade, there are no significant differences (F = 0.361) among the four regression coefficients. Again, a single regression coefficient for all time periods suffices to minimize the errors of prediction. Since the energy data are logged to the base 10, the interpretation of the regression coefficient is that for every increase in energy by a factor of 10 we can expect an increase of 16.0 to 19.9 points in political representation scores.

Finally, over the last three decades the two net coefficients from the regressions of political representation scores on literacy and energy consumption (not shown in Figure 1) are practically constant. 2s

Absolute Political Change Between Decades

The next three hypotheses are concerned with the socioeconomic conditions that are associated with large or small political changes between decades, regardless of the direction of change.

Increases in literacy expand the politically relevant sectors of the population and multiply the demands for government services. The provision for the economic security of the population through redistribution of the national product is at least one measure of government response to demands for services, regardless of whether responsiveness flows from competitive politics or from skillfully ruled authoritarian regimes. The extension of government services may represent a political victory for groups which are not formally represented in the political system. Mainte- nance of low levels of literacy or high levels of economic security should be related to stability of political structure. The conjunction of a literate population with an absence of institutionalized means of ensur- ing economic security should increase the potential for political change. 26 Our hypotheses follow:

(3) The amount of political change is l ow in nations maintaining high literacy and economic security levels.


(4) The amount of political change is high in nations maintaining high levels of literacy, but low levels of economic security.

(5) The amount of political change is low in nations maintaining low levels of literacy.

If these last three statements are supported by our data, then the analysis of the direction of political change must be within the stratum of high literacy/ low security nations.

(a ) The high security/high literacy stratum

Table 3 divides nations into three strata as suggested by the hypotheses relating to absolute political change. The first stratum consists of nations that are high (over 20%) on literacy in 1930 and the following years, and are also high (three programs operating) on national social security effort by 1936. Fourteen nations are in this stratum, and they show measurable absolute change between the first and second decades.27 However, in these nations the correlation between 1930 and 1940 political representation is .92, in spite of what may appear to be sizable changes in the scores; the correlation between 1940 and 1950 rises to .99 (an inevitable result of very little absolute change), and the correlation is also .99 between 1950 and 1960 scores. 28

(b ) The high literacy/low security stratum

The middle column of Table 3 shows the mean absolute change in political representation for those 19 nations that are above 20% in literacy (in 1930) but

TABLE 3

MEAN ABSOLUTE CHANGE IN POLITICAL REPRESENTATION BY STRATUM AND CHANGE PERIOD

Stratum

Political High Literacy High Literacy Low Literacy Change Period High Security Low Security Low Security

1927-1936 to 1937-1946 3.8 a 7.3 0.7

1937-1946 to 1947-1956 1.6 7.9 0.7

1947-1956 to 1957-1966 0.6 11.4 1.8

Number of Nations (14) (19) (7)

NOTE: High literacy nations had 20% or more literate in 1930. Low literacy nations remained below this level during the 40-year period. High security nations had three or more national social insurance programs started by 1936. Using these definitions for the strata, the low literacy/high security stratum is a null class.

Decade to decade mean net shift (the mean of the signed change scores) was between +-1.8 in all the above cells, with the exception of a shift of -3.7 in the high literacy-low security stratum in the first change period, and a shift of 7.9 in this same stratum in the last time period.

a The entry in each cell of tbds table is the average of the absolute political change scores ([Yt+l - Yt I) for the nations within that cell.

are low in economic security. The most striking find- ing is the high level of absolute political change, and continued increases in the absolute amount of change over time. 29

(c) The low literacy/low security stratum

The third stratum is composed of seven nations that were below 20% literate during the entire 40- year period and also maintained a low level of social security program development. These nations are characterized by very little absolute political change. They are below a takeoff point that is associated with sizable political change in nations with low economic security.3 o

Table 3, then, supports the use of the variables suggested by our earlier discussion to locate nations vulnerable to political change. In the following section a model for predicting the direction of political change is developed and tested.

Predictions of the Development and Decay of Political Representation

A key to formulating predictions for the development and decay of representative politics is found in Lipset's (1960:48) statement that "the more well-to- do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy. T M One implication of this statement for political change is clear: poorer nations with high levels of political representation (deviant cases under the modernization hypothesis) should be sus- ceptible to regression toward lower levels of political representation. If we add that rich nations with un- representative politics should change toward greater representation, and generalize to include forms of development other than wealth, we arrive at the conclusion that imbalance between socioeconomic development and political representation should provoke political change in predictable directions.

Political change in the high literacy low security stratum can be viewed as a response to conditions fostered by the unfulfilled economic needs of the population. Existing governments that have failed to institute economic security are vulnerable to elitist or mass sponsored removal. Actual political change is simultaneously a byproduct of the replacement of ineffective and unpopular governments and a function of the social control needs of political elites as they react to the ebb and flow of sentiment in the population.


The decay of representative institutions can result, for example, through the replacement of a fac- tionalized and inefficient, though representative government with a government processing a mandate to consolidate and centralize power. A popular sentiment for the replacement of an existing government coupled with the appeal of a nationalistic ideology can justify reducing the power of representative assemblies and the suppression of party organi- zations.

Similarly, increases in political representation can be generated by the process of replacement. Ple- biscites and new coalitions incorporating opposition movements raise the level of representation in response to sentiment for replacement and reform of governments, and because powerful people view them as solutions to pressing problems of social control.

If the pressure for congruence between political institutions and social and economic development is powerful, as modernization theory suggests, then the direction of political change should be predictable given knowledge of the imbalance between representation and economic and social modernization. An ineffective government with a relatively high level of representation will tend to be replaced, and the process of replacement will tend to lower the level of political representation; an ineffective government with a relatively low level of political representation will also tend to be replaced, and this will tend to move it toward a higher level of political representation.

The previous section suggests that an alternative to political change is the development of institutions that monitor economic security. In the absence of such intervention, imbalance should provoke change- yielding political institutions more commensurate with the complexity of the economy and the social and organizational characteristics of the population. Hence the direction of political change depends on whether a nation's level of representation is high or low in relation to its level o f socioeconomic development. Consider Figure 3.

Figure 3 shows the relationship between actual political representation and expected representation based on the level of socioeconomic development. Nations A, B, and C all have the same observed level of representation-how is one to predict the direction of political change, should the existing governments fall? Nation A has a higher level of political representation than would be expected on the basis

High

Low

J f o/"y

/ )¢ ,4D

j v ,-/ G

Low High

Expected Level of Political Representation Based on the Relationship Between Representation and Socioeconomic Development in All Nations

Figure 3. Predicted Patterns of Political Change as a Func- tion of Actual and Expected Levels of Political Representation

of economic development and the degree of social modernization of the population. A balance model predicts a decline in political representation if present levels of social and economic modernization are maintained. Nation B should maintain a relatively stable level of representation in the absence of major changes in the economy or in the social characteristics of the population. Naction C, with an "underrepresentative" political structure, should experience an upward trend in representation. Nations D, E, F, and G, although their actual levels of representation differ, should move (or remain stable) in response to the same pressures that bring most nations' political structures into correspondence with socioeconomic development.

We emphasize that the balance model is not being used to predict the likelihood of structural change- the combination of literacy and economic security variables is used for that purpose. The balance model is used only to predict the direction of change when and if it occurs.

The extent to which the political system of a nation at any point in time is "balanced" or "unbalanced" is measured by its error of prediction, based on a multiple-regression equation using its literacy level and energy consumption for that time. For example, in this study the predicted level of political representation for each of the 40 nations is computed from the regression equation (using literacy and energy consumption as independent variables), and the predicted level is then compared to the nation's actual level of political representation. The difference


between the actual and predicted values is our measure of political balance, a2 A nation with a higher level of political representation than predicted from its social and economic characteristics (positive error of prediction) should experience a downward shift, while a nation with lower political scores than predicted (negative error) should increase its level of political representat ion) 3 One would not predict a change in either direction for nations whose predicted values are close to the regression line since they are, by definition, "in balance," and under no pressure (so far as this one variable is concerned) to change.

The analyst may prefer to call the association between the errors of prediction and political change, (if it occurs) a regression effect. Our working hypotheses below, however, specify the conditions under which we expect the regression effect to be operative. If the effect exists, but is not the result of shifts from the extreme high and low political scores over time,3 4 and if the shifts systematically vary according to the socioeconomic characteristics of the nations rather than their time 1 measurement on political representation, then the view that the observed political change related to the balance condition is "simply" a statistical artifact would be hard to maintain.a 5

Hypotheses concerning the effect of political balance on the direction of political change within each stratum follow:

(6) The small amount of political change in the high security/high literacy stratum is a function of its high security level rather than a result of nations in this stratum being in balance and, therefore, under little pressure for change.

(7) The small amount of political change in the low security/low literacy stratum is a function of its low literacy level rather than an artifact of all nations in this stratum being in balance at all times.

(8) Nations in the high literacy/low security stratum experience political change, and the direction of these changes can be anticipated by knowing the nation's political balance position at time 1. Specifi- cally, nations with large positive errors of prediction at time 1 will tend to experience a decline in political representation; nations with large negative errors will tend to increase, and nations in balance will tend to follow the mean net shift for nations in the stratum during a given decade.

We already know that relatively little absolute change in political representation scores between decades occurred in either the high literacy/high security or the low literacy/low security strata. Table 4 allows us to check on the hypothesis that change in these two strata did not occur because the nations were in balance and, therefore, under little pressure to raise or lower their level of political representation.

The extent to which a nation is in or out of balance at a given time is determined from three separate regression equations. The first equation uses the correlations of 1930 literacy and energy consumption to 1930 political representation shown in Figure 1. The errors of prediction from this equation are used to determine political balance, 1927-36. A nation with an actual political representation level of 6.0 or higher than its predicted "1930" level of political representation is placed in the first row of the top panel in Table 4. A nation whose error o f prediction was plus or minus 5.99 or less is in the center row, and a nation with an actual score 6.0 or more points below its predicted level is in the third row. The second and third panels utilize the errors of prediction based on 1940 and 1950 regression equations.

If the balance effect is to apply to all nations we would expect that, regardless of strata, nations with much higher than predicted levels would experience a net downward shift, nations relatively close to the regression line would move, if they do move at all, in the direction of the mean net shift for all nations in their stratum during the period, and nations far below prediction would tend to increase their level of political representation.

(a) The high security/high literacy stratum

Looking first at the high literacy/high security stratum, it is clear that we do have nations with much higher levels and nations with much lower levels than predicted in all time periods. We do not, however, observe any large or consistent net shift in their political representation scores from one time period to the next.

Aggregating change scores over all time periods also shows that, on the average, nations in this stratum have remained stable or have increased slightly in their level of political representation. Political balance has no systematic effect on these nations.

The lack of change in high security nations that have been out of balance for several decades is of special interest. Three of these nations (Portugal,


TABLE 4

MEAN N E T P O L I T I C A L C H A N G E BETWEEN DECADES BY P O L I T I C A L BALANCE AT I N I T I A L DECADE: WITHIN S T R A T U M

Stratum

Political Balance High Literacy High Literacy Low Literacy at lnitial Decade High Security Low Security Low Security

1927-1936 +6.0 or higher 1,5 -7. i no cases

(2) (7) -+5.99 1.5 -4.3 -0.1

(9) (7) (7) -6.0 or lower -1.0 0,4 no cases

(3) (5)

1937-1946 +6.0 or higher 1.2 -10.0 -1.0

(4) (7) (2) -+5.99 1.0 2.2 -0.2

(6) (4) (5) -6.0 or lower -0.2 7.3 no cases

(4) (8)

1947-1956 +6.0 or higher -0.2 9,7 0.0

(5) (4) (2) -+5.99 -0.2 4.9 2.6

(6) (9) (3) -6.0 or lower 0.0 11.2 2.5

(3) (6) (2)

All Periods +6.0 or higher 1.1 -4.5 49.5

(11) (18) (4) ± 5 , 9 9 0,9 1.1 0.4

(21) (20) 0 5 ) -6.0 or lower -0.4 6.9 2.5

(10) (19) (2)

NOTE: The number of nations on which each mean is based is in parenthesis. The mean net change for each cell is the average of the signed change scores(Yt+ 1 - Y t )

for the nations within that cell. A positive sign indicates increasing political representation. The beginning decade for each political change period is indicated by the date of the corresponding balance scores. For example, the balance scores for the decade 1927-1936 correspond to the political change period from the 1927-1936 decade to the 1937-1946 decade.

Spain, and the Soviet Union) have been consistently far below prediction and have, at the same time, experienced very large gains in literacy. Other nations (Uruguay, Ireland in all time periods, and Chile in the last three periods) have consistently been far above the regression line-and have also experienced large literacy gains.

The size of the errors of prediction among nations with higher levels of political representation than predicted is almost constant. It is remarkable that Uruguay, Chile, Ireland and, as a special case South Africa, 36 have maintained such high levels of representation over this four-decade period. We suggest that the reason they have been able to do this is not because our predictive model has failed, not because the population is utterly committed to multiparty politics, and not because a benevolent military has supported the government. Rather, they have maintained a stable level of representation because the demands of the population for economic security have been effectively met by the respective governments. The demand being fulfilled is not a demand

for representative politics, but for economic security and wellbeing.

The constant low level of political representation in Portugal, the Soviet Union, and Spain, although this level places them further and further out of balance as their level of socioeconomic development increases, can be understood not as a consequence of a coercive military or submissive national character, but in terms of the ability of these governments to meet the demands of their populations for economic security. Whatever the other demands expected of governments by literate populations, it seems clear that these demands can be met without the creation of highly representative political structures. To the extent that populations do press for representative politics, the urgency of such demands can be checked by a government if it is fulfilling basic economic needs. The effectiveness of single-party governments in the high security stratum in meeting demands for economic security has, over the past four decades, allowed these governments to maintain a relatively low level of political representation, secure from the schemes of a minority of prodemocratic forces. By the same token, continued effective rule by governments in nations with high levels of representation is necessary to maintain their stability in the face of potentially antidemocratic elements. There is no reason to think that the level of political representation in any nation in this stratum will change so long as their governments continue to provide solutions to emerging problems of economic security. By the same reasoning, however, we would expect that ineffective government in any of these nations will result in structural political change-nations with high levels will, if the crisis is severe enough, decline and, if the new government is able to effectively meet economic demands, they will remain in power indefinitely. The rise of Nazi Germany may be a case in point.

It is convenient to deal next with the low literacy/low security stratum, and discuss the high literacy/low security stratum last.

(b) The low literacy/low security stratum

Only by inspecting all three change periods are we able to test the hypothesis that the lack of political change in the low literacy stratum is primarily due to the low level of literacy, and not to a condition of political balance. The regression equation based on the 1930 data places all seven nations within the balanced range, but in the next two time periods we


have six cases that are outside these limits. The downward movement of the nations with higher political representation levels than predicted is negligible, and in the last time period, the two nations far below prediction move up no more than do the three nations within the balanced range. The pattern of means for all periods shows a small average gain for nations below prediction, and a negligible loss for nations above prediction. We conclude that the balance effect does not operate in this stratum.

c) The high literacy/low security stratum

We observed, in the note to Table 3, that the mean net shift in this stratum was -3.7 in the first change period, -0.1 in the second, and 7.9 in the third. We also noted large absolute political change scores for these nations in each change period. Table 4 allows us to break up the total mean net change, and test for the effects of political balance.

The expectations of the balance model hold fairly well in the first two change periods. Nations with positive errors of prediction decline sharply in political representation, while nations whose politics are less representative than expected, on the basis of literacy and energy consumption, experience increases in political representation. The gains for nations below prediction are relatively small in the first period, but strong for the second change period. Relative to the unbalanced nations, nations with balanced levels of political representation tend not to experience extreme forms of political change. The major exception to this pattern occurs in the third change period, where four nations (Bolivia, Costa Rica, Panama, and Turkey) with positive errors of prediction for the decade 1947-1956 show large increases in political representation scores. The importance of large literacy gains in helping to explain these deviant cases is discussed in the next section.

Aggregating the change scores over all periods within balance categories (bottom panel, Table 4) produces a pattern of change entirely consistent with the predictions of the balance model. Nations above prediction decline an average of 4.5 points on the political representation scale, and nations below prediction show an average increase of 6.9 points on the scale. In the aggregate balanced nations increase only slightly from one decade to the next.

Political changes in the high literacy/low security stratum do not necessarily bring nations into prediction in the next time period. Concomitant changes

in literacy and energy consumption mediate the effects of political balance on political change. Thus we do not expect that the nations in this stratum will all eventually end up in balance. 37 Next we shall examine the effects of average gains in literacy on political change.

Literacy Gains and Political Change

We have noted above that in general, predictions of increases in political representation from increases in literacy are not consistent with our data. Nations with high economic security have maintained stable levels of political representation, even while increasing substantially in literacy and energy consumption. This is not simply an artifact of a measurement ceiling, since several nations with relatively low levels of political representation have remained low in spite of large literacy gains. The stability of low literacy/low security nations appears to result from the low levels of literacy and from the absence of large changes in litetacy over the entire 40-year period.

Among the nations vulnerable to political change (high literacy/low security nations), the impact of large or small literacy gains on political change should be moderated by the nation's balance position at time 1. For nations with higher levels of political representation than expected, large literacy gains should have a maintenance effect because the large literacy gain moves the nation toward balance and will therefore inhibit the expected decline predicted by the balance model. For nations with lower levels of representation than predicted, large literacy gains should have a mobilization effect and help to accelerate the predicted upward shift among nations replacing their governments. 3s Among balanced nations, large literacy gains will tend to keep the nation in balance in both time periods and thus provide a favorable condition for either the maintenance or mobilization effect in contrast to the less favorable conditions for stability or upward movement in balanced nations with low literacy gains.

Table 5 presents comparisons of mean net political change between nations with high literacy gains and nations with low literacy gains within the high literacy/low security stratum. Except for one comparison, we find that within each political balance level, nations with high literacy gains reveal a net advantage in political change for each change period. Among those nations with higher levels of political representation than expected, nations with high literacy gains


TABLE 5

THE E F F E C T OF L I T E R A C Y GAINS ON N E T P O L I T I C A L C H A N G E WITHIN THE H I G H L I T E R A C Y ~ L O W S E C U R I T Y STRATUM, C O N T R O L L I N G FOR P O L I T I C A L BALANCE

Political Change Period

1927-1936 1937-1946 1947-1956 Political to to to Balance a 1937-1946 1947-1956 1957-1966 AtlPeriods

+6~0 or higher -0.2 4,1 2.3 4.7 (3) (4) (4) (3) (3) (1) (10) (8)

-+5.99 3.2 NA 5.7 0.4 (6) (1) (5) (4) (11) (5)

-6.0 or lower 7.0 3.3 15.S ?.7 (4) (1) (5) (3) (5) (1) (14) (5)

NOTE: A high literacy gain is defined as an increase of five percent or more in level of literacy from one decade to the next. The same nation may or may not be in the high gain category from one change period to the next, Numbers not in parentheses represent the difference in mean net political change between nations with high literacy gains and nations with low literacy. A positive difference indicates that the comparison favors nations with high literacy gains. The number of cases on which the differences are computed are given in parentheses; the number of high literacy gain nations is always first.

a The political balance scores refer to the beginning decade of each political change period.

tend to decline less than nations with smaller gains (or no change in literacy). Among those nations with lower levels of political representation than predicted, nations with high literacy gains tend to increase more

than nations with smaller gains in literacy. Balanced nations with high literacy gains tend to gain more (or lose less) than balanced nations with low literacy gains. The last column of the table gives the comparisons between high and low literacy gain nations aggregated over all periods. High gain nations reveal the predicted advantage over low gain nations for nations above and below predictions. Aggregating periods, the effects of literacy gains on balanced nations are positive but small. Our test of literacy gain effects uses adjacent decade scores, and the results should therefore be viewed as demonstrating short run rather than long run or permanent effects on the level of political representation. If literacy gains were producing a permanent effect we would observe a pattern of continual increase in the political representation level among the nations in the high literacy/low security stratum. In the absence of such a pattern, we conclude that the positive effect of a large literacy gain is temporary. Large literacy gains are not sufficient to maintain a newly achieved level of political representation.

SUMMARY

Our initial findings established that theorists view- ing political representation levels as dependent on socioeconomic development are probably correct. We also found that, across four time periods, the regres-

sion coefficients expressing the effects of literacy and energy consumption on political representation were stable.

A typology dividing nations into high and low literacy strata, and further splitting of the high literacy stratum into nations that were high or low on economic security, isolated nations in which change in the level of political representation has occurred during the past 40 years. Nations that were high on both economic security and literacy, and nations that were low on both literacy and security, experienced very little change. Virtually all changes of any magnitude over the 40-year period occurred in the high literacy/low security stratum of 19 nations. These findings suggest that economic security programs, and government bureaucracies that administer them, provide an important basis for political stability, a9 We can expect some differences in political representation among nations to persist, even though nations may converge in social and economic development.

The balance between political representation and social and economic development provides an effective means of predicting future political change among those nations vulnerable to political instability (high literacy/low security nations). As an extension of modernization theory, the balance model predicts declines for nations with levels of political representation higher than expected, and increases in political representation for nations below expectation on the basis of literacy and energy consumption. These predictions are supported by the data for high literacy/ low security nations. The fact that 17 of the 19 nations in this stratum are in Latin America limits our ability to generalize from the past political behavior of this stratum to the future behavior of the underdeveloped new nations in other regions when their level of social and economic development rises to Latin American standards.

The stability of high literacy/high security nations with unbalanced levels of political representation poses a problem for modernization and conflict theorists alike. Literate populations with low levels of representation in high security nations should be demanding and getting higher levels of representation, while nations with higher levels of representation than are typical for populations at their level of development should have abolished democratic institutions and returned to lower levels of representation. These predictions are no t borne out by our data. We have suggested that the economic security of the popu-


lations, and more generally the bureaucratization of central governments, provide a possible explanation for political stability among these nations.

The impact of literacy gains on political change within the high change stratum depends on the initial state of political balance. For nations with higher levels of political representation than expected, large gains in literacy tend to prevent declines in political representation and move nations toward a balanced state. High literacy gains tend to accelerate upward shifts in political representation for nations below expected levels of representation.

Our analysis leads us to make the following predictions.

1) Nations now in the low literacy stratum will exhibit structural political change if their level of socioeconomic development moves beyond the thres- hold level indicated approximately by literacy levels over 20 percent.

2) These nations will then exhibit a pattern of up and down movement in political representation until they manage to achieve an adequate level of economic security.

CONCLUSIONS

Many Western social scientists believe that political representation is a primary aspiration of modernizing populations. We suspect that this opinion has been reinforced by events in the post World War II period. Two key events are, perhaps, the pervasive ideology of the Cold War and the drive for self-determination by populations formerly ruled by European powers. The Cold War reinforced the ethnocentric view of social scientists living in democratic nations that representative politics are desirable for all nations; the revolution of colonial peoples was misinterpreted as a massive empirical demonstration of the drive by populations in underdeveloped nations for representative political institutions. It seems more reasonable now to view these revolutions as an ex- pression of a desire to rid a home territory of foreign domination-following independence the concern of the population is with economic wellbeing, rather than the degree to which their government is or is not structured along representative lines. (It is interesting to note that the acceptability of the view we are expressing may itself be related to the milieu in which we live; the Vietnam was has caused many social scientists to question whether it is desirable or even possible to successfully impose representative political structures on underdeveloped nations.)

Perhaps the degree to which modernized populations actually value representative politics is as much a function of how long they have had them as it is a function of their level of socioeconomic development. Even a modernized population having little experience with effective multiparty government may not automatically value such a government, in spite of the many reasons a modernization theorist might think of which would indicate that they should value such institutions.

3) The level of political representation present in a nation at the time it moves from a condition of low to high economic security will, given effective government use and allocation of resources, be continued indefinitely. If this level of representation is low, such structural changes as do occur will be minor ac- comodations to the increasing complexity of ruling an ever larger and more interdependent socioeconomic system, rather than a response to a buildup of pressure by the modernized population for a more representative form of government.

4) The direction of structural political change in a modernized high security nation following a period of ineffective rule (or other events that threaten economic security) will, barring outside intervention, follow the pattern of growth and decay observed in high literacy/low security nations. The process of replacement will tend to move nations with relatively low representation to a higher level, and this process will tend to move nations with relatively high levels to a lower level.*

APPENDIX A

A nation's political representation level for a given year is the sum of points from its parliament, executive, and effective franchise scores.

(1) Parliament scoring

If the nation has, in a given year, a functioning parliament elected by popular vote for two or more competing parties, then: 2½ points are given if the party with the most seats in the lower (or only) chamber did not have more than 70% of all seats and the second largest party had at least 20% of the seats.

Two points if either the 70% or the 20% "rule" above was violated or,


One-and-one-half points if both the 70% and the 20% rule were violated.

One point if the nation had a functioning parliament elected by popular vote for only one party.

One-half point if the nation had a parliament whose members were appointed (or selected by popular vote, but there was no party identification of candi- dates).

No points if there was no functioning parliament (parliament dissolved, constituent assembly, or none in the first place).

(2) Chief Executive Scoring

One-and-one-half points if the Chief Executive is selected by a parliament in multi-party competitive election system in which the majority (selecting) party did not have more than 70% of the seats. Same points if directly elected under the same conditions of competitive and relatively balanced party strength.

One point if selected by parliament violating 70% rule but in competitive party system. Same points if directly elected under these conditions.

One-half point if executive role is played by non- hereditary ruler (junta, clique, or other) not eligible for 1 or more points. No points if executive is hereditary ruler.

(3) Effective Franchise Scoring

Each year the nation had a parliament with 1 or more points, the percent of the population eligible to vote for one or more parties was computed. I f 50% of the population was eligible (e.g., only males could vote and there were no literacy or racial restrictions on voting), a party-based election was held, and the par- liarnent thus elected was still functioning, the nation received Y~ point. The range of possible scores for each year on effective franchise is from 0 to 1.

*Our thanks to S. Cobb, B. Cummings, and W. Key for research assistance, and Vanderbilt University for computer time. M. Zald, A. Stinchcombe and Irving Louis Horowitz provided helpful criticisms of an early draft.

APPENDIX B .

1927-1936 1937-1946 1947-1956 1957-1966

Stratum PRIF Error PRIF Error PRIF Error PRIF Error

High Literacy High Security

Australia 49 2.0 50 3.9 49 4.2 50 4.7 Canada 47 43.9 38 -10.9 42 -5.3 44 -2.2 Chile 35 -0.8 44 9.5 46 11.7 46 9.1 Ireland 50 8.8 50 8.4 50 9.4 50 7.6 New Zealand 49 1.9 50 4.5 50 6.5 50 7.2 Portugal 7 -15.7 10 -14.8 10 -13,5 10 -18.1 South Africa 36 12.1 39 10.3 42 14.3 41 11.1 Spain 21 -14.1 15 -16.7 10 -23,9 10 -26.9 Sweden 50 3.0 45 -1,4 50 5.2 46 1.4 Switzerland 45 -2.0 45 -0,2 45 1.9 45 2.3 United Kingdom 44 -2.1 50 2.1 50 3.8 50 4.3 U.S.S.R. 25 -10.6 25 -15.6 25 -17.2 25 -19.0 United States 46 -2.1 48 -1,7 50 1.8 50 2.4 Uruguay 42 5.4 50 15.3 50 15,0 50 12.7

High Literacy Low Security

Argentina 37 -1.1 33 -4.1 32 -4,1 31 -7.8 Bolivia 24 9.3 16 3.8 22 8.6 30 11.7 Brazil 15 -7.0 5 -15.3 27 5,6 22 -5.2 China (mainland) 5 -15.0 5 -12.6 11 -5.4 25 0.0 Colombia 41 14.4 41 16.8 16 -9,8 14 -15.4 Costa Rica 44 11.1 38 8.8 39 9.1 50 18.2 Cuba 34 -2.4 49 15.4 32 43.3 7 - 28.0 Dora. Repubhc 20 1.0 10 -5.3 10 -6.2 10 -14.7 Ecuador 5 -18.4 5 -13.9 14 -6.4 18 -8.2 E1 Salvador 11 -5.1 5 -9.1 9 -6.0 17 -3.8 Guatemala 12 -2.0 5 -7.7 16 2.8 28 10.2 Honduras 34 14.1 8 -11,1 9 -5.8 31 10.4 Mexico 25 2.9 25 -1.2 29 4.1 35 6.9 Nicaragua 45 26.4 32 15.7 14 -1.9 26 3.6 Panama 40 10.4 37 10.0 35 8.1 49 16,3 Paraguay 29 3.1 11 -6.8 16 -3.0 25 - 1,2 Peru 14 -6,7 27 6.6 14 -6.8 39 10,9 Turkey 25 11.1 31 16.5 35 18.3 41 20.3 Venezuela 10 -11.9 9 -14.4 10 -18.3 42 6.3

Low Literacy Low Security

Afganistan 0 -4.3 0 1.5 1 3,2 5 0.6 Haiti 10 3.5 12 8.8 10 7.1 10 2.3 Iran 5 -2,4 5 -4.4 5 -3.6 9 -6.0 Iraq 5 -1.8 2 -4.7 0 -10.1 5 -11.7 Liberia 10 4.5 10 10.3 10 8.5 10 -0.1 Nepal 0 -4.7 3 0.9 0 4.4 3 -.07 Saudi Arabia 0 -4.3 0 -1.2 0 -6.0 0 -11.7

NOTE: "PRIF" is Political Representation Index with Franchise. "Error" is the error of prediction using each time period's regression equation.

40 STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE I N T E R N A T I O N A L DEVELOPMENT

NOTES

1. Political representation refers to the extent to which the nonelite population's interests are likely to be taken into account by the ruling elite. The concept and its measurement are in the text below. Appendix A details the measurement procedures.

2. There are no actual studies that have observed this effect-analysts have inferred that such an effect must occur, given their observation of the world in recent years.

3. A somewhat different view seeking to explain the relationship between indicators of modernization and the level of representation holds that as a society is modernized, the increasing division of labor and greater structural complexity of the society requires new forms of government adequate to cope with the problems of governing a heterogeneous social order. A representative government is the answer to modern social structure. This viewpoint we term the "systemic" theory. Cutright (1963) elaborates this view.

The independent variables utilized by the systemic and the modernization theorist are the same, and either theory allows the analyst to introduce a concept (and a measure of it to be discussed below) of the "expected" level of political representation, and thereby predict the direction of political change from one time to the next in nations that can be objectively defined as balanced or unbalanced.

To test whether the modernization or systemic theorist is on the firmer ground would be very difficult, since the use of our measure of political representation would probably not be the ideal choice of a measure of political development from the systemic theorist's point of view, while the modernization theorist might accept it. Without a common dependent variable a test seems impossible.

4. Dahrendorf states that totalitarian regimes in industrial societies should be subject to intense conflict and sudden structural change. However, he upholds the view that "skillfully ruled" totalitarian societies may successfully limit conflict and change.

5. The question of what the different "dimensions" of political development may be has yet to be determined. Indeed, a recent empirical study (Olsen, 1967: Table 1 )o f the interrelations among "executive functioning," "legislative functioning," "party development," power diversification," and "citizen influence"-all derived from Banks and Textor (1963)-does not resolve this issue. For example, Olsen reports significant correlations among all five theoretically distinct "dimensions." Further, all these measures of political development have significant correlations(Kendall's Tau C) ranging from .39 to .54 with an early version of the political representation measure used in this paper. Knowledge of a nation's political representation score is a fairly good predictor of its score on other measures of political development.

Some additional information about the validity of measures of political representation is given by the results of other studies. Using the earlier form of the index, Cutright (1967a) found negative correlations between political representation and inequality in the distribution of income within nations. A negative correlation between the Political Representation Index and domestic violence has also been reported (Wiley, 1967). Since representative government should in theory be related to greater equality in the distribution of wealth and more effective control of social conflict, these results support our use of this measure in the present study.

6. Again, the same political score in two time periods does not prove that the nation experienced no change-what it does indicate is that the mean decade level of political representation for the population did not change.

7. Literacy data are from United Nations (various years-a); United Nations (1963); UNESCO (1965). Missing data for early years were estimated from known data relating newsprint consumption, newspaper circulation, or urbanization to literacy. The unknown literacy score for the time period is its "expected" literacy value as estimated from its newsprint consumption, newspaper circulation or urban level. In most cases, missing data were in nations with low literacy levels. For estimates of error in 1950's literacy data see Russett (1964: 221). Although the accuracy and comparability of literacy estimates is questionable, the correlation between 1930 literacy scores and 1939 energy consumption was .88 and the correlation of 1930 literacy scores and 1930 political representation was .84. Although neither correlation can be construed strictly as a validity coefficient, their high values do indicate that errors in literacy data are probably not too serious. The question is not whether the independent variables are perfect measures, but whether they are adequate to test our hypotheses. The lower their accuracy, the more difficult it should be to demonstrate the expected relationships.

8. Energy consumption data from United Nations (various years-b); United Nations Statistical Office (1952-1965). The more sensitive measure used in later years of kilograms per capita was applied to earlier estimates that were in terms of metric tons per capita.

9. A maximum of five programs is possible. For analysis of these programs and the relationship of political representation, literacy, and energy consumption to the number of years of program experience see Cutright (1965).

M O D E R N I Z A T I O N A N D P O L I T I C A L R E P R E S E N T A T I O N : 1927 -1966 41

10. Twelve of the 14 high security nations were also among the top 14 energy consumption nations in 1930. This fact conceals the enormous variability in wealth within this stratum. Per capita GNP in 1957 (Russett et al., 1964: 152-153) ranged from about $300 to $2,500.

11. The date of measurement of the independent variables is, therefore, partially lagged behind the midpoint of the ten-year period covered by the political representation scores. Comparison of correlations lagged ten years behind the dependent variable with these partially lagged correlations did not reveal a difference in the strength of correlations that would justify using the ten-year lagged data.

12. An argument for the criterion of political independence for cross-national comparisons is given in Marsh (1967: 12).

One consequence of this selection criterion is that many African and Asian nations that now exist are excluded. However, the correlations between measures of social and economic development with political representation in the 1940-1960 period using 77 nations (Cutright, 1963) and the 1950-60 period using over 90 nations (Olsen, 1967: Table 3) are very similar to the correlations reported for comparable time periods using only the 40 nations in our universe. The exclusion of many African and Asian nations does restrict our ability to generalize if regional and cultural factors (rather than the structural factors we are using) have important effects on the frequency and magnitude of changes in political representation.

13. The United States occupied Nicaragua until 1934, leaving it with a structurally competitive party system. Its first political score is taken from an average of its 1934-1936 condition multiplied by ten to obtain a decade score.

14. Exogeneous influences determining the net shift in the level of political representation over time still exist, and to the extent that they vary, the net shift between time periods will also vary (see Table 1 and note to Table 3). Such factors might be world-wide economic conditions, or the germination of new political ideologies. Our independent variables do not take such factors into account.

15. The reader may partially check for himself by examining the distribution of nations in the three strata by their errors of prediction in Table 4. Perfect normality, linearity, and homoscedastic conditions are not necessary for product moment analysis, but they should be approximated by the data. See Blau and Duncan (1967: 143-145) for discussion.

16. The relation between energy in kilograms per capita and the Political Representation Index is slightly curvilinear; the slope is always positive but declines somewhat at the higher values of energy. A logarithmic transformation on energy scores removes this curvilinearity from the relationship. See Ezekiel and Fox (1959: 72). The fact that equivalent "increases" in energy consumption produce smaller "increases" in political representation scores at the upper end of the energy distribution does not necessarily mean that the true relation is curvilinear. The same result can occur if there is an arbitrary measurement ceiling; that is, if the Political Representation Index does not adequately discriminate between nations with high levels of representation.

17. Energy consumption adds significantly (.05 level) to the explained variance after literacy is entered in the last three time periods.

18. Campbell and Stanley (1963) apply the cross lag method to tabular data.

19. For example, if either lagged self-correlation approaches unity, all cross correlations approach the same value, resulting in no difference between cross-lagged zero-order correlations. One alternative suggested by Pelz and Andrews is a comparison between cross lagged partial correlations. The susceptibility of these partials to sampling and measurement error is very high when the correlation of a measure with itself is high.

20. The sign is taken from the sign of the regression coefficient for Yt r on X t where Yt is held constant. A positive sign

indicates that literacy (Xt) is positively related to the component of variation in late political representation scores which cannot be predicted by earlier political representation. This component is necessarily a function of political change between decades. A rationale for expecting a positive relation between literacy levels at time 1 and political change between time 1 and time 2 is given by Pelz and Andrews. High levels of literacy (brought about by increases in literacy) should be related to positive political change and low levels of literacy (assumed to be a result of decreases in literacy) should be related to negative political change. Hence the correlation between literacy level and political change should be positive, if literacy causes political representation. See Pelz and Andrews (1964: 846-847).

• . 2 21. The test used here is defined by the statistic where R a is a multiple coefficient of determination with m a predictors,

F ---

R2a - R2b / / ma - m b

1 - R2a/~N _ ma

R2b is a multiple coefficient of determination with m b predictors, and N is the size of the sample. See Bottenberg and Ward (1963: Appendix I).

42 STUDIES 1N C O M P A R A T I V E I N T E R N A T I O N A L D E V E L O P M E N T

22. The correlation between literacy and energy consumption (logloscale) for each time period begins with .88 in 1930,

and shows successive declines to .86, .82, and .77. The decline results, in part, from sharp increases in energy consumption in a few nations with low literacy levels, and the failure of literacy gains in these nations to match the gain in energy consumption.

We reproduced the statistics in Figure 2 using only the 26 nations with low security levels. The correlations axe somewhat lower, but the level and stability of the regression coefficients are quite similar to those for all 40 nations in Figure 2.

23. If one "wishes to compare populations to determine whether or not the underlying causal processes are basically similar, he should make use of the unstandardized coefficients" (Blalock, 1967a: 675). For a more detailed discussion see Blatock (1967b).

24. The source for this test is Rao (1965: 237-240). A test of the null hypothesis is given where SS c is the sum of the

SS c - SSd/u.v F =

S S d / N - u

squared errors of prediction for the common regression which ignores time periods, SS d is the sum of the squared errors of prediction for all decade regressions, u is the number of parameters estimated in the decade regressions, and v is the number of parameters estimated in the common regression.

25. The net regression coefficients for literacy and energy consumption (in that order) are .41 and 1.9 for 1930, .28 and 8.9 for 1940, .28 and 9.3 for 1950, and .25 and 8.2 for 1960. The deviation between the net regression coefficients for the first decade and those for the remaining decades can be partially explained by the high correlation (.88) between literacy and energy consumption in the first decade.

26. A typology formulated by Huntington (1956) also predicts the greatest political change where governments are not institutionalized and where the population is highly mobilized. Huntington's high mobilization/low institutionalization category corresponds to the high literacy/low security stratum as defined in this study.

27. One peculiarity of the political index is that a nation with an evenly balanced legislature at time 1 that violates the "70% rule" at time 2 will lose points-even though the election process that yields an unbalanced legislature may reflect the will of the people. Variation in democratic nations caused by temporary violations of the 70% rule should not be overinterpreted (or misinterpreted) as evidence that much actual change in what we want the index to measure has actually occurred.

28. It is interesting that the stability of political representation scores within this stratum occurs in the face of a ten percent increase in the mean literacy level between 1930 and 1960, and in spite of large gains in energy consumption during the same time period. The gain in political representation from 1930 to 1960 is less than 2 points. The regression coefficients within this stratum are stable, and at about the same level as those reported in Figure 1 for all 40 nations. We will explore the implications of these fmdings in a later section dealing with the impact of political balance on change in the stratum.

29. The same nations are in the stratum throughout the time period. Although several of these nations added programs after 1936, they have neither the years of experience nor the wealth necessary to produce a high level of effective coverage for the population with their new programs.

The mean level of literacy in this stratum increased from 42% in 1930 to 47, 53, and 60% in the following decades, but these gains were not immediately followed by corresponding mean net gains in political representation (the mean political level in these 19 nations from 1930 through 1960 was about 24, 21, 21, and 28). Whether one wants to "explain" the lack of immediate association between mean stratum changes in literacy and mean net shifts in political representation by pointing to the 1930-1940 depression (to account for the drop in representation during this period) and the effect of World War II (to "explain" the lack of net political change between 1940 and 1950, while holding that the cumulated "backlog" of pressure from increased literacy levels by 1950 and the relative prosperity during the 1950s allowed a n e t political gain from 1950 to 1960 is, perhaps, a matter of taste. We expect, however, that the introduction of additional variables will be helpful for a more systematic analysis of the direction of political change in this stratum.

30. No nation in this stratum received a representation score greater than 12 at any time, and the mean scores from 1930 through 1960 were about 4, 4, 4, and 6. Literacy gains are also very small, averaging about three percent per decade. A few nations that have experienced large gains in energy consumption since 1940 (notably Saudi Arabia) have yet to translate them into literacy gains, and literacy gains of over ten percent from 1930 to 1960 (Iran, Iraq) have not been followed by noticeable structural changes in their political systems.

31. Lipset is less explicit on the consequences of low political representation in economically developed societies.

32. This measure of political balance was first proposed by Cutright (1963), but was phrased in terms of an expected movement over time towards an equilibrium position for those nations with large errors of prediction.

M O D E R N I Z A T I O N A N D P O L I T I C A L R E P R E S E N T A T I O N : 1927 -1966 43

An important check before using the method is that the relationships between the variables is linear, and the errors are homoscedastic-otherwise the errors will be related to the nations' literacy or energy consumption levels. The earlier notion of equilibrium has been replaced by one of "balance," since it is hard to imagine that all nations will eventually end up "in equilibrium" (correlations would be 1.0). For an application of time 1 errors of prediction to predict change in social and demographic data see Feldt and Weller (1965).

33. See Appendix B for errors of prediction for each nation in 1930, 1940, 1950, and 1960. Only the first three periods are used as measures of time 1 political balance.

34. If extreme values on the dependent variables move toward the mean from one time to the next and if these extreme values are related to the errors of prediction, then one might simply call the observed change a "regression effect" (due, perhaps, to measurement error). Nations with scores on political representation of 45 or more, or 5 or less, were grouped together and compared to nations with less extreme scores. Chi-square tests for each change period (and all periods combined) were run to see whether the nations with extreme scores were more likely to move toward the mean than the nations with less extreme scores. No significant differences in movement for any time period appeared.

35. Feldt and Weller (1965) have further discussion of the meaning of the "regression effects" they observed in their data. In the absence of measurement error a regression effect should be taken as something to be explained.

36. The positive balance condition of South Africa warrants a brief note. We would not insist that South Africa "really" has a higher level of political representation than expected. We have a structurally competitive SYstem for whites only, and if we took the characteristics of the white population, the nation would be within prediction. It is interesting that the.80% of the population that is excluded from the system does reduce the representation score by 8 points per decade (because of the inclusion of the effective franchise component in the representation index), but this adjustment is not enough. What gives South Africa its low expected value is the lowliteracy levels of the nonwhite population. Nonwhite literacy is near the 20% level that appears to be necessary for effective mobilization of a population for change, and it is worth noting that present government policies are not geared to changing the nonwhite population into a literate (and less manageable) group. If the government can maintain high economic security for the white population and prevent literacy levels among nonwhites from rising, the situation should remain as it has been for the past 40 years (barring outside intervention).

37. Feldman (1964: 124-125) has recently argued that balance and simultaneity of change in major social institutions is impossible to maintain but that failure to maintain balance creates profound strains and tensions in societies.

38. To some extent this argument follows from the statement of the balance model. Further analysis of the effects of literacy gains on national political representation would require information on the educational system, so that the effects of mass literacy programs could be differentiated from the effects of educational inputs to younger age groups.

39. We have not dealt explicity with the relationship between government bureaucracy and political representation, although the existence of economic security programs is one measure of the bureaucratization of central governments.

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Modernization and political representation: 1927–1966

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