'Nation within a nation: Cultural citizenship as a tool

in the struggle for land and against migration in the

Republic of Sakha, the Russian Far East'

Aimar Ventsel

University of Tartu

ABSTRACT: In my talk I challenge the political studies

approach to the Russian Federation as a monolithic entity

with a strict top down subordination structure. My

research shows that after an open struggle for

sovereignty and autonomy in the 1990s Russia’s regions

continue to struggle for more independence, but in a less

confrontational form. In this process, non-Russian

regions of the Russian federation make use of federal

legislation that guarantees cultural and language rights

for non-Russian ethnicities. In the first part of my talk

I give a brief overview on how federal reforms of

centralisation have strengthened ethnocracy in the

Republic of Sakha. In the second part of my talk I

discuss how Sakha culture and language is instrumental,

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in the Republic of Sakha, in legitimising ethnic

domination of the titular ethnic group in politics and

economy. The attempts to dominate social, cultural,

political and economic spheres in the republic are

manifold. On the one hand, Sakha people have strengthened

the position of the Sakha language and presence of ethnic

Sakha in the political life of the republic against the

Russian domination of the past. On the other hand, Sakha

culture is being used to counteract Central Asian and

Caucasian migration. I will discuss several strategies

that the government applies in order to emphasise the

‘Sakhanisation’ of the physical and social space

discretely dominated by migrants.

My presentation is about regional politics and policy in

the biggest territorial sub-national subject of the

Russian Federation, the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia).

The Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)

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The Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) is located in the Russian

Far East, part of the Far Eastern Federal District

(FEFD), covering over three million square kilometres, it

is the biggest territorial unit of Russian Federation.

The population of the republic, according to official

data from 01.01.2012, is 955,859. It's in 55th place among

the subdivisions of the Russian Federation and 3rd place

for the Far Eastern Federal District (FEFD). The average

age of the population at the beginning of 2011 was 33.1

years old. The urban population (64.6 % of the

population) live in 13 towns and 42 big settlements

whereas the rural population live in 586 settlements [4].

The titular ethnic group – Turkic speaking Sakha – are

more than a half of the region’s population, the second

largest group are Russians and the rest a conglomerate

from more than hundred ethnic groups, mainly indigenous

minorities (so called Small Peoples of the North see

Slezkine, Motyl) or from all over the former Soviet

Union. The majority the urban population of the Republic

of Sakha (45.1%) live in the capital Yakutsk.

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The Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) is the main diamond

producer of the Russian Federation but also has

significant oil, gas, gold and coal resources. Yakutsk is

the capital of the region and is the location of the

republican government, the main universities and the

local show business scene. Traditionally, the Sakha

population of Yakutsk has been more prominent than in

other big cities of the region due to the fact that the

Sakha tend to dominate in the regional government. Mirnyi

is the unofficial capital of the diamond industry where

the influx of Sakha is increasing due to the fact that

ethnic Sakha play a growing role in the higher positions

of the main diamond mining company ALROSA. It can be said

that the western and southern part of the republic is

overwhelmingly industrial whereas eastern and northern

Sakha are dominated by different forms of agriculture

(sel’skokhoziastvo), mainly animal husbandry like cattle,

horse and reindeer breeding, as well as hunting and

fishing.

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My interest in the dynamics and volatility in local

politics began when I conducted in the RS(Ya) fieldwork

for my PhD dissertation in 2000-2001. Since then I have

visited the region several times, last time just a week

ago. Apart from studying property regimes I always had a

desire to understand how the region exists within the

political, legal and economic framework of the Russian

Federation and what is going on in the local and regional

politics. When I began to read political studies

literature on Russia I was surprised and annoyed

simultaneously. Both the analytical and geographical

scope seemed to be somehow limited. Geographically, when

political studies scholars look at regions outside of

Moscow and St. Petersburg then these tend to be mainly

Muslim regions or those subjects in the RF where a

significant or dominant part of the population are

devoted to Islam. These are regions from the so-called

Zakavkaz (or southern parts of the RF around the Caucasus)

or Tatarstan. Zakavkaz is seen as the troublesome region

and Tatarstan houses the biggest Muslim ethnicity in

contemporary Russia. The relationship between these

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regions and the federal centre, and processes going on

within these regions, as it is depicted in the political

science literature, seem to me overly simplified, reduced

to power games between a few regional clans/interest

groups and the federal centre. In other cases, the

attention of political studies literature is on Moscow,

in rare cases are embedded also some political figures

from St. Petersburg. Everything else, especially Russia

on the other side of Ural mountains, is a hinterland,

resource frontier without the agency.

Yakutia before the collapse of the Soviet Union

When we look at the history of the RS(Ya) then we

discover a complex and complicated history of centre-

periphery and intra-regional relations. Officially, the

region was united in Tsarist Russia during the first half

of the 17th century. This, however, does not mean that

Russians were controlling the whole territory, economy or

people. The number of Russians in the region was, until

the 1950s, quite limited, the territory enormous.

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Therefore, Tsarist Russia quickly found middlemen among

local Sakha nobles (Toiony) who collected taxes and

regulated trade with different ethnic groups living in

the Far East. Sakha people want to believe that before

the Russians appeared in the region, they governed the

Russian Far East, from Sakhalin Islands to the Yenissei

River. Scarce historical data shows, however, that Sakha

– and especially their nobles – were active traders,

travelling in a huge area from Yenissei to the Pacific

Ocean and making Sakha language to a regional lingua

franca. Some earlier documents indicate that Russians

called the Sakha ‘Siberian Jews’.

Sakha people have a phenomenal ability for adaption and

assimilation. The history of ethnic processes in the

region still remains unstudied but Sakha people managed

to turn local Evenki, Even, Yukaghir and Chukchee into

Sakha speakers. Through intermarriage, local Russian

peasants shifted to the Sakha language maintaining,

however, their Russian culture. The influence of the

Sakha culture and language reached also the higher

echelons of local Russians – one inspecting officer from

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Moscow discovered with great surprise and disgust that

local Russian officials speak Sakha at home. It is not

wrong to argue that Sakha nobles converted to Russian

Orthodoxy and infiltrated regional government structures

reaching the highest possible positions. At the beginning

of the 20th century they sent their children to study in

universities in Moscow and St. Petersburg. At the

beginning of the October Revolution Sakha elite supported

the old regime but when they understood that they were

doomed, Sakha deserted the ship and became loyal

Bolsheviks. Their knowledge of territory, local climate

and people helped them to become a leading force in

establishing Bolshevik power in the region.

Collectivisation and sedentarisation of nomadic people

was to a large extent conducted by Sakha young Communists

in the 1940s. As a result they established Sakha schools

in settlements of sedentarisised Evenki and Eveni people

and finished successfully their shift from the native

language to Sakha. In the Soviet era, Sakha people

maintained a presence in regional political structures,

pursuing their own collective interests but having little

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impact in the emerging diamond, timber or coal industry

which was dominated by ethnic Russians and Ukrainians.

Sakha people, keen for a career in Communist structures,

married Russians, talked Russian at home but maintained

their kinship affiliation. The development can be

compared with similar processes in the Soviet Central

Asian republics, where titular ethnic people became

urbanised Russian-speakers. This is often seen as

Russification but later political processes prove it to

be wrong. Some sources indicate that intermarriage was a

career strategy for both Russians and Sakha. Sakha men

with Russian wives more often were seen as loyal and

therefore promoted within party and administrative

structures. For Russians, it meant using informal clan

solidarity to gain access to high positioned jobs like

directors of hospitals or schools, because respective

ministries where often dominated by ethnic Sakha. As a

result, the Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic

within the RFSSR had under the surface of Soviet

internationalism and loyalty to the ideas of building a

Communist state, a complex setting of ethnic interests

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and rivalries, something not unusual for other Soviet

non-Russian regions and republics.

Yakutia in the 1990s and early 2000s

As we know, the early 1990s were the period of collapse

of the Soviet Union and of turmoil. After two speeches by

then-president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, where he advised

the regions to ‘take as much sovereignty as they could’

started something that is called the ‘parade of

sovereignties’. Several regions announced their

sovereignty and acclaimed to be republics instead of

their former status of autonomous republics, krais or

oblasts. This process was lead by Yakutia, Tatrstan and

the former mayor of Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov. In the early

1990s Yakutia changed it’s name to the Republic of Sakha

(Yakutia), declared sovereignty, implemented a republican

constitution, passed a law of two state languages – Sakha

and Russian – and fixed a constitutional framework for

citizenship of the republic. The first president of the

RS(Ya) was Mikhail Egorovich Nikolaev, a Russian speaking

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Sakha with a Russian wife. The economic basis for the new

republic was the diamond industry. Former state diamond

company Yakutalmaz was reformed as ALROSA, owned roughly

50-50 by the RS(Ya) and RF. This was also a time of Sakha

national euphoria, many Sakha viewed their republic as

nearly independent. The euphoria was accompanied by

Russian-Sakha conflicts and a slow but continuous Sakha

take over of high position in local industry. The Sakha

government made use of two legal facts. First of all, the

regional parliament was formed of district deputies,

whereas the number of deputies had little relevance to

the population size of the district. The outcome was that

so-called Russian regions, a minority in number but more

heavily populated, were a minority in the parliament

because there is a greater number of ‘agricultural’

districts than ‘industrial districts’ despite the fact

that ‘agricultural districts’ have a smaller population.

The political domination of the Sakha was fully legal.

Another policy was to make use of federal laws on

language and cultural rights for non-Russian minorities.

By cleverly using these laws, the government of RS(Ya)

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not only declared Sakha to be the state language but

began a massive build up of Sakha language elite schools.

While in the Soviet era in Yakutsk there existed only two

Sakha schools and Sakha language was seen as a village

language, from the early 1990s the number was steadily

growing but still unable to satisfy demand. The 1990s

were also a time for a massive Sakha migration to the

cities especially Yakutsk. Using their clan affiliations,

Sakha people became more visible in government

structures, leading positions in the city administration,

reaching high positions in the university and municipal

or republican enterprises.

The situation changed when Vladimir Putin became the

president of the RF. One of the first tasks for him was

to centralise the federation. It is widely known reform

of his, establishing federal districts subordinated to a

special envoy of the president (polpred). Generally

overlooked, however, was the top down order to change

regional constitutions to bring them into accordance with

federal legislation. The process of changing the

constitution in the RS(Ya) was painful. People saw in it

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– and rightly so – the loss of sovereignty. In 2005 came

another blow: regional leaders – presidents – were not

longer elected, but appointed by Moscow. In 2006-2007 the

ownership and distribution of the profit of the diamond

company ALROSA was also reformed. From formerly nearly

50% of profit was retained by the RS(Ya) now only 5% was,

the rest went to Moscow as federal subsidies.

Creating the nation within the nation

Historians have described the structure of Tsarist Russia

as ‘geographies of power’. The Russian empire absorbed

vast territories and throughout its history attempted to

find the optimal strategy to govern these. The politics

and strategies varied regionally: in one region

indigenous people had more freedom and access to

positions in state apparatus than others. This

flexibility is seen as a strength of the state but the

consequence was that the Soviet state was unable to

destroy that order. Although the European Russia was

throughout the Tsarist and Soviet history seen as ‘Russia

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proper’ and non-Russian regions subordinated to Russia

and Russians, the centre was engaged in a dialogue with

the periphery in order to maintain their loyalty. While

even Russian liberals and intellectuals were not free

from the notion of ‘imperial principles of governance’

acclaiming a leading political and cultural role to

Russians, regions counteracted this with ‘regional

mythology’ (regional’naia mifologia). The Sakha myth leans on

the dubious historical claims of an ancient Sakha empire

but also on a perception of cultural superiority that

enables them to survive in a harsh climate.

Sakha politicians and intellectuals cultivate the

mystical bond between the Sakha people and their land.

According to their views, Sakha people have earned the

right to their land after a century long struggle of

mastering and inhabiting these lands. Politically, this

bond is ambiguous. It should not be denied that among the

Sakha have always existed people who dream of full

independence. The majority, nevertheless, have a more

moderate but more complex view.

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Typically to most Siberian indigenous peoples, Sakha

people might have had their problems with the colonialist

attitudes of local Russians and their companies (which

did not hire Sakha for a long time) but in large they

felt solidarity with the Soviet Union/Russia, which is

seen as the Motherland (Rodina). For example, during the

Chechen wars the majority of Sakha people supported not

the Chechens but the federal government, and young Sakha

are very proud that they were appreciated in the Russian

army as excellent snipers. This controversial attitude –

a quest for a larger autonomy and ethnic dominance inside

the republic and unconditional support for Moscow in

other issues – has always existed and still exists in the

RS(Ya). One key element that bridges this controversy is

the legend of the Great Victory in WWII, where Sakha

together with Russians and other Soviet people liberated

the world of fascism1.

There is barely any theoretical academic literature

discussing such a twilight situation. The long tradition 1 The meeting with a Sakha girl in RAIPON 2000.

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of postcolonial theoretical literature is generally not

suitable to analyse the situation. Postcolonial theory

also tends to discuss either former colonial, now

independent nations, or stateless people. The Sakha are

neither.. Also, to my mind, the cultural setting is

different. Sakha people adopted Russian/European culture

but the approach was very interesting: many intellectuals

claim that this was a conscious strategy with the aim to

modernise Sakha culture and maintain a dominant political

position in the region. In general, the Sakha have

cultivated a superior attitude to local indigenous

minorities and other Asian people (like Mongolians) who

have never been ‘civilised’ enough. There are very few

academic attempts to bring together postcolonial and

post-socialist theories and they have only a limited

overlapping with the realities in the RS(Ya). When Moore

argues that in certain cases the Soviet Union can be seen

as a colonial empire, then we do not find in the Sakha

the stark political juxtaposition similar to the Baltic

states. It is a fact that resource extraction in the

region also helped to establish infrastructure, made

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education more accessible and enabled people to travel

within the SU, independent of their ethnic origin. Sakha

people also did not draw a sharp ethnic line between

themselves and incomers as Central Asian people did.

Chari/Verdery note for example similar strategies in

supporting indigenous culture and education in the

British Empire and Soviet Union but they fail to address

the differences – Soviet campaigns in educating and

rising living standards in rural areas. Colonial and

postcolonial theories are also not of great help when

studying regional ethnocracies within the RF.

Alexei Yurchak writes about the ‘paradox of Soviet life’

when it comes to private and public spheres. According to

Yurchak, private and public did not exist separately but

together as a symbiosis, initiating –from a first glance

– illogic combinations. This paradox and illogical

symbiosis is could also be noticed in the realities of

the RS(Ya). Moreover, I argue that the central government

has fostered and deepened that paradox.

I mentioned the centralisation and newly established

federal districts. As it quickly appeared,

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representatives of the president turned out to be useless

functionaries. Their ability to control and influence

local presidents and governors became very soon minimal.

The reason is that regional presidents, including the

president of the RS(Ya) became sole controllers of

federal subsidies. When at the time the RS(Ya) received a

significant share from the diamond profits directly,

money was distributed among different governmental

structures and state programmes, then now the president

of Sakha has to bless any allocation of the federal

money. It means that even entrepreneurs who are

interested in having contracts with the state (for

example the construction sector) depend on the first row

on their good personal relations with the president and

his people.

The second president of the RS(Ya) was local Russian

Viacheslav Shtyrov. As a third president, Moscow

appointed in 2008 former minor Communist Party

functionary Egor Borisov, an ethnic Sakha. When I arrived

to Yakutsk after a break of a few years 2011, I

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encountered a very interesting picture – most of the

government were ethnic Sakha, ethnic Sakha also dominated

the high offices in the local (federal) university. One

saw more and more Sakha in leading positions in ALROSA

whereas new private and republican diamond companies are

completely run by ethnic Sakha.

The Sakha language, once a language for the rural

population and a small circle of urban intellectuals had

become more prominent: I noticed a Sakha speaker

encounters little difficulties in service when speaking

Sakha. The Sakha language has become compulsory for Sakha

who wish to make career in government structures and non-

Sakha are expected to possess at least some rudimentary

skills in the language.

Using their legal rights for culture and language, Sakha

people have ritualised their bond to the land through the

‘ancient tradition’ which in some cases looks pretty

invented. One instrument is using the national epos of

Olonkho as a symbol that marks the right of Sakha people

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to the land, because Olonkho is a creation myth for the

Sakha nation, i.e. a story how different Sakha clans

inhabited different Sakha core areas. Conferences about

Olonkho and Ysyeakhs have become more and more bombastic.

These events have also become political statements

symbolically demonstrating the unity of ‘Sakha lands’.

More interesting than this, is the – from the first sight

apolitical – appropriation of urban space. When some 5-7

years ago the urban space was very Russian, then now it

is covered with Sakha symbols and Sakha language. One

such symbol is Sakha food. Tamara Dragadze speaks about

the domestication of the religion in the Soviet era where

religion was more practiced at home and rituals were more

often carried out by women. Maybe because of that, but

the presence of Sakha food is growing in Yakutsk and

other urban centres with every year. Once a delicacy and

a food to celebrate holidays, Sakha food has become a

pretty staple diet now in urban Sakha homes. Sakha food,

however, is closely related to identity and religion: a

‘proper’ Sakha has difficulties moving around without

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doing food sacrifices. Especially high ritualistic status

is given to Sakha pancakes and kumys – fermented mare

milk. Once a hard to get delicacy in Yakutsk, kumys can

now be bought easily on the market, in shops and is

available in numerous ‘national cuisine’ (natsional’naia

kukhnia) restaurants. These restaurants can now be found

in every district and with different standards and price

levels. Even more so than Sakha statues, Sakha

restaurants symbolise a certain turn in the public

manifestation of Sakha identity – Sakha food has

transformed from exotic and hidden low quality food to

high cuisine demonstrating simultaneously the modernity

of the Sakha culture. The rise of ‘national cuisine’

restaurants in Russian ‘ethnic’ regions.

The politicisation of food, religion and the tradition of

‘claiming back’ the Sakha land from ‘gastarbeitery’ is

very interesting. Gastarbeiter is the word for Central

Asian migrants whose number is growing even in the Far

East. There exist several ‘migrantnye’ settlements around

Yakutsk, in places of transport hubs or heavy industry. I

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was privileged to witness the opening of a House of

Olonkho one year ago. The opening was bombastic, with the

presence of high-up political leaders. The building was

opened through the purification ceremony with kumys and

pancakes. As I understood there exists a republican

programme to open similar houses in other ‘migrantnye’

settlements in the near future.

What is interesting here is that the former enmity

between Russians and Sakha seems to be decreasing, and

collective negative attitudes are focused on migrants.

The ambivalent identity game becomes especially exciting

in the light of recent political processes. In August,

Russian president Putin put a ban on the import of

Western food. I was there and witnessed the euphoric joy

of people when they greeted the decision to get rid of

‘evrotomaty’ other fruits or vegetables, expecting them to

be replaced by better quality Russian equivalents. This

however, has not happened. Now in the market dominate

Chinese and Central Asian imports. When reading Sakha

newspapers, Internet forums and talking to people,

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negative attitudes to Chinese agricultural products and

imported Brazilian meat is noticeable. People consciously

prefer Central Asian fruits-vegetables and local or

Russian meat. Interestingly, when Central Asian grapes or

apples are considered ‘Our Soviet’ (nashi sovetskie) then

people who sell these are dangerous and not ‘ours’. ‘Our

Soviet’ food is juxtaposed to the dangers of Western led

globalisation symbolised with ‘non-our’ imports. In

certain sense, the ‘war of food’ symbolises – using the

language of Russian TV - the ‘geopolitical’ conflict

between Russia and the West. Politicising imported food,

people also give it a ‘geopolitical’ meaning. ‘Our’

allies vs. ‘enemies’. By looking at different politics of

space, language, food and tradition, we end up in the

paradox illogical situation again. When symbolically

conquering back land from migrants then import networks

of Central Asian fruits symbolise the extension of ‘our’,

it seems that the Russian sphere is a big political game.

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