NEWTON'S SCHOLIUM GENERALE: THE PLATONIC AND STOIC LEGACY — PHILO, JUSTUS LIPSIUS AND THE...

NEWTON’S SCHOLIUM GENERALE: THE PLATONIC AND STOIC LEGACY — PHILO, JUSTUS LIPSIUS AND THE CAMBRIDGE PLATONISTS

Rudolf De Smet and Karin VerelstFree University of Brussels

Over the last two decades, a number of important new publications have contributed to the clarification of Newton’s intellectual background from a variety of points of view. This is relevant to the historical origins of modern science: its basic concepts are not simply ‘given’, but are constructs peculiar to a specific sociocultural realm. Interest has shifted recently from ancient sources to more contemporary — mainly theological — influences acting upon Newton while he was conceiving his ideas. This in itself is good, since it has filled a gap in our awareness of Newton’s ideological environment. However, a certain tendency to play down the relevance of ancient influences on Newton accompanied these new results. Although we by no means intend to underestimate the importance of contemporary theological controversies, we want to stress, nevertheless, that these too remain marked profoundly by ancient metaphysical dilemmas, and therefore that, if one seeks a proper understanding of Newton’s work, both should be taken into consideration. The emergence of the nova philosophia, the new natural science, was dogged by a fierce conflict between proponents and opponents of widely varying, though profoundly traditional, philosophical schools, whose new methodological underpinnings1 coincided with prevailing religiously-coloured views of a new social climate. The fact that a study of these earlier roots may shed new light on fundamental dilemmas within modern physics is borne out by a renewed interest in the conceptual foundation of Newton’s natural philosophy,2 especially the philosophical background to his mechanics in his Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica. To further the understanding of the precise links between Newton’s two main influences, we shall develop a philosophical-linguistic text analytical study of the Neostoic and Neoplatonic influences on Newton’s concept of ‘gravity’, based on one key text, namely the Scholium Generale.3

THE SCHOLIUM GENERALE

In 1713 Newton published the Scholium Generale at the end of the second edition of his Principia.4 This Scholium was again included in the third edition of the Principia (1726), and Andrew Motte published an English translation of the Latin text as early as 1729.5 A French translation accompanied by a brief commentary was provided by Marie-Françoise Biarnais in 1982.6 A Dutch translation has not yet been undertaken. The topic of our present contribution was prompted by the lack of

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2 · RUDOLF DE SMET AND KARIN VERELST

a systematic detection and analysis of the primary and secondary sources that lay at the basis of the genesis of the Scholium.

It should be made clear from the outset, however, that we in no way wish to detract from the merits of the general setting and avenues explored by scholars such as the late B. J. T. Dobbs and within which special attention was paid to the Scholium Generale.7 Quite the contrary. Our approach, buttressed by a study of the intertextuality, will in several instances complement and corroborate Dobbs’s reasoning, and confirm some of her hypotheses, while shifting the emphasis and thus affording a better insight into the Scholium Generale.

NEWTON’S SCHOLIA

The Scholium Generale to the Principia is certainly not the only place where Newton used this method to arrive at a synthesis, status quaestionis, explication, commentary and source index for his basic text. As early as 1690 he wrote a series of Scholia related to Propositions IV to IX of the third book of the Principia with a view to releasing a second edition of the work (which never appeared). As these scholia reflect Newton’s sources from Antiquity far more explicitly than the Scholium Generale, they are generally referred to as the “classical scholia”.8 Although J. E. McGuire and P. M. Rattansi provided the background to these classical scholia in 1966,9 it was not until 1984 that a complete edition appeared when P. Casini published his article “Newton: The classical scholia”,10 to which the full Latin text was appended together with an apparatus criticus.11 To date this edition has remained the standard edition of Newton’s classical scholia.12

The term σχ|λιον first appeared in Cicero’s correspondence with his bosom friend, the Epicurean Atticus.13 In Antiquity the word denoted commentaries intended to clarify the basic text. Originally, these commentaries were added in both the margins and the body of the text. Later on, scholia constituted autonomous commentary text units and were published separately.14 Their use was similar to that of glossae which were originally commentary notes to any type of text, but very early on came to be used specifically in law.15

Anyone reading the text of the Scholium Generale will observe that Newton did indeed anticipate a commentary and explication for the third book of the Principia, and that the term ‘scholium’ is most apt in this context. The basic ideas expressed in the Scholium Generale must have gestated around 1690 as they are closely akin to some of the items found in the author’s classical scholia. These are linked to the core of Newton’s gravity concept and thus merit closer attention here.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL ROOTS: FROM ‘CHANGE’ TO ‘MOTION’

Our approach to Newton’s concept of ‘gravity’ will be predicated on the fact that he developed it in response to earlier attempts to provide a conclusive solution for the enigma of bodies in motion. This issue, which goes far beyond the movement of heavenly bodies alone, was a direct legacy from Antiquity and was inextricably

NEWTON’S SCHOLIUM GENERALE · 3

linked to the conflict in the Renaissance between the proponents and opponents of Aristotelian physics.16 The gist of the debate revolved around the metaphysics of the concept of ‘change’, which had religious connotations.17 The views regarding this issue centred on the structure of matter and the concomitant status of the concept of ‘space’. It is a commonplace that within Aristotelian metaphysics material properties are considered accidental qualities of substantial forms in an undifferentiated material substratum, i.e. the ”ποκε«µενον.18 Change from the one to the other was ontologically embedded in the qualitative transition from potentiality to actuality. The absolute reference point within this system was the completely actualized ‘First and Unmoved Mover’, in relation to which all other substances irrevocably move.19 Hence, the merging of qualities is to be situated on another level of being than ‘Being’ itself, and allows a way out of the paradox of ‘Being’ and ‘non-Being’, where pre-Socratic thought had ended up in its attempts to get hold of the phenomena of change and motion.20 The representation of reality along two layers — one of ontological stability, i.e. the noumenon, and one of ontological non-paradoxical movement, the phaenomenon — thus constitutes the basic characteristic of every metaphysical world view.21 The ontological distinction between ‘substance’ and ‘accidents’ was epistomologically codified by Aristotle in logic, where the difference between the existential and predicative use of the verb ‘to be’ could then be based on the principle of contradiction.22 Within the same context, ‘space’ could be seen as a measure for motions from place to place, the ‘number of place’, viz as an accidental property of the moving substance, rather than as an entity with an ontological status of its own. However, the impossibility of establishing a comprehensive description of the macroscopic motions of physical bodies within the Peripatetic cosmology, based on this metaphysics, had led to criticism of its underlying ontology during the Renaissance.23 There are three major classically inspired Renaissance schools that are important to our present study: Neoplatonism, Atomism, and Neostoicism.

By literally separating the worlds of change and immutability, Platonism, that other great metaphysics of immutability in change, was able to develop itself through the Middle- and Late-Platonic schools towards an extreme spirituality. The theory of the one, absolute and unknowable immaterial basis of Being that culminated with Plotinus would enter into a long-lasting symbiosis with Christianity from Augustine’s time on. This situation prevailed even when the Peripatetics reigned supreme. The Renaissance witnessed an unparalleled variety of intellectual movements and was the ideal breeding ground for a revival of this school of thought.24 And while at first glance the works produced by adherents of the Platonist school were relevant mainly from a theological and philosophical point of view, both the Italian hermetic humanists and the ‘Cambridge Platonists’ do have a real relevance to our subject.

Atomism represents an alternative to the classical metaphysical schools and has come down to us from Antiquity as another answer to the enigma of change and motion. Nevertheless Atomism, too, is essentially metaphysical in its explanation


of the possibility of non-paradoxical change and motion: Being and non-Being are disentangled ontologically.25 However, this is done ‘directly’, i.e. in the phenomena themselves, not through embedding the changing world of phenomena in an underlying ontologically stable reality. The material constitution of things is endowed with ontological stability: the innumerable, indivisible, complete šτοµοι which move in the κεν|ν, the absolute non-Being, the void. Change is reduced to motion. This ‘physical’ metaphysics seemed to be the perfect doctrine to add a ‘workable’ ontological basis to the epistomological part of the Aristotelian edifice as it had become a seemingly empty reasoning apparatus following the defeat of the Peripatetic natural philosophy.26 The use of the term ‘workable’ is appropriate since the division between Being and non-Being as it appeared in Atomism also formed the basis for the fundamental rule in Aristotelian logic, i.e. the principle of contradiction. This reconciliation was all the more successful because logic — in the guise of mathematics — corresponded perfectly to an emerging new way of looking: experimental observation. It has already been stated that Galileo was a precursor in this respect, even though the fundamental conceptual breakthrough occurred with the definitive reintroduction of classical Atomism by Pierre Gassendi.27

Despite the fact that motion thus became possible without jeopardizing the individual identity of things in macroscopic reality, Atomism was beset by several fundamental flaws. In the acceptance of the ‘existence’ of the void the paradox of Being and non-Being persisted. Furthermore, it proved impossible to formulate anything but random ad hoc hypotheses to explain either the origins of the motions by atoms or the cohesion of the macroscopic bodies they create.28 For all these reasons Atomism never gained a real foothold in Antiquity, whereas it was vehemently attacked by other schools, such as the Stoics.29 According to the latter, Being relied on the continuous interaction between a passive substance and a force active through subtle matter, viz the πνε‡µα,30 with which sets of two elements corresponded: in the first case, water and earth; in the second, air and fire. Ultimately fire is at the origin of everything, and together with air it forms the material shape of the cosmic pneuma which permeates, structures and keeps all things together. By the same token this pneuma is the universal cause — the nexus causarum31 in which all causal cohesion is embedded. Everything is connected, and the force that keeps everything together is entirely its own cause and reason, completely actualized at every moment. Hence, time is simply the development of these identical recurring world moments, until finally the world returns first to its elements, and then to the primeval fire, after which the cycle restarts. There is no trace here of a First Mover as a basis for a causal chain: cause and substance coincide in the pneuma, sc. ³µοουσ«α. The question then remains, of course, how the Stoics dealt with the problem of change and motion. The answer is that they did so precisely through this identity: even though the world moves endlessly, this evolutionless motion is identical to itself in every recurring cycle, and is thus eternal stagnation at the same time.32

From the early Renaissance onwards, these movements re-emerged against the


backdrop of the conflict centring on the conceptualization of change. However, the battleground had changed since Antiquity as two fundamental factors had been added. One of them we have already mentioned, namely Aristotelian logic, which re-appeared in a mathematical cloak and as a seemingly empty reasoning apparatus, imposing strict a priori restrictions on the possibilities of metaphysical reasoning, developed to explain change. The second factor consisted of the theological demands by Christianity.33 We have already indicated why Atomism could best comply with the demands of the first factor after the disappearance of its Aristotelian ontological foundations.34 Yet we have also seen that Atomism failed to address a number of crucial issues. What were the means at Newton’s disposal to answer all these questions while at the same time taking into account the demands of Christian theology?

THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF NEWTON’S GRAVITATION CONCEPT

Atomism did not provide an answer to the question regarding the origin of change and motion in the world, nor to that of the cohesion of bodies composed of atoms. The ‘vortex hypothesis’ mentioned in the Scholium Generale35 refers to an earlier attempt by Newton to give a mechanical, i.e. material, explanation of bodily motion: the material aether. Nevertheless, he himself explains why this explanation is untenable.36 If the origin of motion is material in nature, then it should visibly influence the motion of bodies. However, no trace of such an influence can be found. This led Newton to accept ‘the Boylian vacuum’ in which all bodies, free of resistance, fall at identical speeds. This absolute vacuum had already been developed by Gassendi in strict parallelism with ‘absolute time’ as an ontological alternative to the Peripatetic concepts of ‘place’ and ‘motion’, and provided Newton with the perfect metaphysical framework for the further development of his natural philosophy.37 This immutable foundation, in which the continuous blending of Being and non-Being in the changing phenomena is ontologically stabilized, was a prerequisite to being able again to talk consistently about the world after the disappearance of Peripatetic ontology.38 Furthermore, it also provides the causal justification for the new experimental method.39

The next question Newton needed to address was how to establish a link between this vacuum and a cause for the phenomenon of the ‘motion of bodies’? In order to do so, he harked back to a fundamental Neostoic concept, viz the pneuma.40

We have already mentioned that the ancient Stoics upheld a material conception of the pneuma. However, this subtle material pneuma differed from the coarse ‘ordinary’ matter, for whose properties it served as both the causal and original foundation. Already in Antiquity there were attempts to subsume this Stoic concept into Judeo-Christian theology. It stands to reason that within the latter the pneuma should then correspond to God, the cause and origin of everything. The single most important adaptation would consist of the full dematerialization of the subtle material pneuma, which at the same time retained its omnipresent and all-penetrable character so that it could coincide with the immaterial, exclusive, omnipresent and


all-encompassing nature of God. The most important ancient source for this brand of Stoicism adapted to monotheism is the work of the Alexandria-born Jewish Platonist philosopher Philo (c. 20 B.C. – c. A.D. 50). The exceptionally good text transmission of Philo’s works is undoubtedly due to his major influence on Christian authors such as Clement of Alexandria and Origen.41 Philo’s main objective was to arrive at an allegorical reinterpretation of the Pentateuch through Greek philosophical doctrines.42 His main source of inspiration in this respect was Platonism, added to and sometimes inextricably bound up with Stoic teachings. For instance, he referred to the all-penetrating God who encompasses without being encompassed, the absolute sovereign, who despite being impalpable is always near.43 One of his treatises is aptly entitled Quod Deus immutabilis sit.44 This immortal God-pneuma would play a crucial role in Newton’s thought while determining the concept of force, albeit in the Christianized form in which it had been passed on to him through the Renaissance. Whereas Christianized Middle- and Neoplatonism was revived mainly by the Italian humanists and the Cambridge Platonists,45 the continuator of Philo’s brand of Neostoicism was a thinker from the southern Low Countries, Justus Lipsius.46 Lipsius was well acquainted with the works of the prominent ancient Stoics Zeno, Cleanthes, and especially Seneca. At the same time he was very familiar with Philo’s writings. His objective was to revitalize Stoicism, which can be easily reconciled with Christianity from a moral point of view. During Lipsius’s continual forays in clerical orthodoxy, Philo’s work was extremely helpful to him in his quest for formulations that could be reconciled with Christianity. Here too we can see the emergence of an immaterial omnipresent divine providence and God’s creating hand. Newton visibly benefited from the works of these predecessors when solving his own philosophical problems as reflected in the Scholium Generale.

In order to facilitate the reading of our analysis and commentary we reproduce the Latin text in extenso in an Appendix.

PLATONISM AND STOICISM: PHILO JUDAEUS

Research by B. J. T. Dobbs has revealed the significance of Philo’s work for an accurate understanding of Newton’s perception of the participation of the divine in nature as formulated in the Scholium Generale. We will show that this concept is closely linked with Lipsius’s Neostoicism, within which the divine is at once immanent and transcendental.47

Dobbs, for one, is quite categorical: “he [sc. Newton] did read Philo.”48 When making this statement, she based herself on two irrefutable facts. Newton quoted Philo’s De allegoriis in the margin of the Scholium Generale.49 Moreover, he also owned the Paris edition (1640) of Philo’s Opera omnia, as shown by John Harrison’s catalogue of Newton’s private library.50

Dobbs also rightly observed that Newton had found a way out of his dilemma in Philo’s dualistic system of matter and spirit, within which the material, but divine, Stoic pneuma was Platonized and immaterialized, yet participates and is


active in each material body.51

After the enlightened analysis by Dobbs, we shall now proceed with a text analysis of the Scholium Generale, and establish the extent to which Philo is present textually and intertextually.

In the course of our research we have used the edition of Philo’s Opera omnia that Newton also consulted. In this respect it is important to add that this is an edition in which the Greek text is accompanied by a Latin translation — a format that was quite common in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It is also likely that Newton would have read the Latin text with more ease than the Greek original, and that his vocabulary may have been influenced by this Latin translation. In the course of the analysis we shall mention the relevant Latin terms from the Scholium and the excerpts from the Latin translation by S. Gelenius of the 1640 edition of Philo’s Opera omnia. In the endnotes, references will be given to the Greek text in a modern edition.

The idea of the unique and indivisible God ruling over his creation is clearly and abundantly present in Philo’s work:

“... to be subjected to the command of only one master (Unius dominio)” (l. 28 S.G.) and “God is one (Deus est unus) and the same God everywhere” (l. 55 S.G.); cf. Philo (Opera omnia, 815): “... repetens: unum esse Deum conditorem, factoremque rerum universarum et hunc dominari creaturis omnibus, quandoquidem vere firma constansque penes ipsum solum est auctoritas”52 (De specialibus legibus, I (= De monarchia), §30–31), and Philo (Opera omnia, 39): “Secundo deum unum esse...”53 (De Opificio Mundi, §171).

As pointed out by L. Stewart,54 Newton’s assertion of the unity of God might be the result of his theological reflections on Arianism and his profound doubts about the Athanasian doctrine, adopted by the Anglican Church. Nevertheless, one must agree that his Arian sympathies concerning the unity of God found a solid basis in Philo’s theological writings on this subject, known to Newton, while fulfilling at the same time his other metaphysical demands:

“Indeed we say my God, your God, God of Israel, God of Gods, and Lord of Lords, but we do not say my Eternal one, your Eternal one, the Eternal one of Israel, the Eternal one of the Gods (Dicimus enim Deus meus ... Dominus Dominorum)” (ll. 37–38 S.G.); cf. Philo (Opera omnia, 345): “[Dicendum igitur illud primum, nihil in rebus aequiparari Deo,] sed hunc esse unum regem, ducem, principem, a quo solo fas est administrari ac dispensari universa” (De confusione linguarum..., §170);55 Philo (Opera omnia, 345): “Quorum cogitationem Moses intellegens, inquit, Domine Domine, rex deorum: ut indicaret eum esse praestantiorem quam subditos” (De confusione linguarum..., §173–4);56 and Philo (Opera omnia, 167): “opifex: ad quem confugerunt supplices facti eius veri famuli, amorem erga suum Dominum declarantes per continuum ministerium” (Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat ..., §62–63).57


Newton’s description of the divine features clearly refers to Philo:

“He is eternal and infinite, omnipotent and omniscient (Aeternus est et Infinitus, omnipotens et Omnisciens)” (l. 44 S.G.); cf. Philo (Opera omnia, 39): “Secundo deum unum esse ... sempiternum ... omnipotentem ... omniscientem” (De Opificio Mundi, §171–2);58 and Philo (Opera omnia, 77): “Deus enim animatorum operum singulus egregie novit quae ipse facit, etiam antequam perficiat, vires quoque quibus utentur in posterum et in universum quicquid actura passurave sunt” (Legum allegoriarum..., III, §88).59

“God is one and the same God, always and everywhere (Deus est unus et idem Deus semper et ubique)” (l. 55 S.G.); cf. Philo (Opera omnia, 23): “Est, inquit, autor et princeps rerum omnium Deus, semper unus, stabilis, immobilis, ipse sui similis, aliorum dissimilis. Ergo in rebus intelligibilibus immobilis et impassibilis...” (De Opificio Mundi..., §100–1).60

Newton describes God’s omnipresence as follows (ll. 47–48 S.G.): “He is everlasting and omnipresent, and by existing always and everywhere he determines the duration and space.” This is also redolent of Philo (Opera omnia, 61): “Nam Deus implet omnia, penetrat omnia, nihil omnino relinquens seipso vacuum. Et quem locum occupabis, in quo non sit Deus?... Deus enim omni creatura est antiquior et ubique est” (Legum allegoriarum..., III, §4–5).61

In the phrasing, “All things are included in him and move in there (In ipso continentur et moventur universa)” (l. 57 S.G.), Newton in the margin refers to Philo’s Legum allegoriae (III, § 4–5), in the Opera omnia, 61: “Nam Deus implet omnia, penetrat omnia, nihil omnino relinquens seipso vacuum. Et quem locum occupabis, in quo non sit Deus? ... Deus enim omni creatura est antiquior et ubique est.” Concerning this topic there are a number of other quotations from Philo in Newton’s work: (Opera omnia, 339): “... Deus autem implet omnia, non contentus sed continens, ...” (De confusione linguarum..., § 136),62 and (ibid.): “... virtus autem illa omnipotens quae condivit et gubernat omnia, vere Deus dicitur, omnia continens in gremio et omnia penetrans vel minima, id invisibile, incomprehensibile numen cum sit ubique, nusquam tamen vere cernitur aut percipitur” (ibid., §137–8).63 The uniqueness of God is expressed as follows by Newton: “This is why he is completely his equal (Totus est sui similis)” (ll. 59–60 S.G.); cf. Philo (Opera omnia, 23): “... ipse sui similis, aliorum dissimilis” (De Opificio Mundi, §100).64

Newton offers a detailed exposé on the Middle-Platonic view of the impenetrability of the divine essence and the non-sensory and immaterial participation of the deity in his (material and sensory) creation: “But least of all in the way of man, least of all corporeally, in a way which is entirely unknown to us ... we have even less of a grasp of the substance of God (sed more minimo humano, more minime corporeo, more nobis prorsus incognito ... et multo minus ideam habemus substantiae Dei)” (ll. 61–69 S.G.). This may be compared with the following quotations from Philo (Opera omnia, 512):


“Ens autem eius terminus Deus, idem rector et gubernator. Itaque sicut Ens ipsum est incomprehensibile, sic quod ab eo terminatur, mensuris nobis ignotis circumscribitur” (Quis rerum divinarum haeres sit..., §228–9);65 (Opera omnia, 57): “Et postea, non sunt habendi stulti qui de essentia Dei disserunt? Qui enim animae suae nesciunt essentiam quomodo huius universitatis animam exacte pernoscere poterunt?” (Legum allegoriarum..., I, §91–92);66 (Opera omnia, 146): “Sed induti rebus mortalibus tanquam cochleae, eisque harum in morem involuti; easdem de illo beato immortalique quas de nobis opiniones habemus verbis quidem negantes Deum humana forma praeditum, re autem ab impietate quorundam, qui affectus ei tribuunt non alieni utcunque tergiversamur: ideo manus, pedes, introitum, exitum, odium, alienationem, aversationem, iram ei affingimus, affectus nihil ad autorem illum summum pertinentes” (De sacrificiis..., §95–97);67 and (Opera omnia, 817): “Persuades, inquit, mihi me non posse manifestam imaginationem tui mente concipere. Oro tamen ut saltem gloriam tuam videre liceat.... Tum Deus: ‘Quae quaeris potestates, utique intellegibiles sunt, non visibiles, sicut ipse sum invisibilis et intelligibilis. Intellegibiles inquam non quod iam intellectae sint, sed quia si comprehendi possent, dumtaxat mente, non sensibus, essent comprehensibiles, cum mentis nativus vigor talium rerum sit capacior. Attamen quamvis earum essentia sit incomprehensibilis, videre licet sigillum quoddam et effigiem earum efficaciae’” (De specialibus legibus, I (= De monarchia)..., I, §45–47).68

The allegorical vocabulary to define the divine properties is described as follows by Newton: “Allegorically it is said however that God sees, hears, talks, loves, hates, desires, gives, receives, is happy, is angry, fights, creates, founds, builds. For when talking about God we use words that are similar to those for human situations. (Dicitur autem Deus per allegoriam videre, audire, loqui, ridere, amare, odio habere, cupere, dare, accipere, gaudere, irasci, pugnare, fabricare, condere, construere. Nam sermo omnis de Deo a rebus humanis per similitudinem aliquam desumitur.)” (ll. 75–77 S.G.). This may be compared with the following by Philo (Opera omnia, 339): “Descendit Dominus ut videret civitatem figurate accipienda sunt. Nam credere quod Deus accedat aut recedat ... impietatis est deportandae in extremas, ut vulgus loquitur, insulas oceani. Sed ista humano more legislator de Deo dicit, quamvis haudquaquam humana forma praedito ad utilitatem discentium.... Deus autem implet omnia...” (De confusione linguarum..., §134–6);69 and (Opera omnia, 47): “Expers enim qualitatis Deus, tantum abest a forma humana”70 (Legum allegoriarum..., I, §37).

It seems clear to us that Newton borrowed several elements from Philo. Occasionally, certain Latin terms and constructions reveal a direct and almost literal borrowing, even though these are not the rule. Rather, one may observe that Newton developed and rendered Philo’s ideas in his own way in order to fit them into his new concept.

However, Philo was not the only influence on Newton’s Scholium.


THE CAMBRIDGE PLATONISTS: HENRY MORE AND RALPH CUDWORTH

J. E. McGuire and P. M. Rattansi drew attention to the influence on Newton of Henry More (1614–87) and Ralph Cudworth (1617–88), two of the Cambridge Platonists.71 This is especially true with regard to Newton’s belief in a prisca theologia, according to which Greek philosophy and science had Hebrew origins, and roots in the Bible.72 Dobbs, too, pointed out their transitional role as regards Newton’s view of the God-filled space, i.e. the immaterial substance of the deity, which makes up and fills the infinite empty space.73 That Newton was familiar with More’s work becomes clear from the fact that the latter had given him at least two of his works, whereas a third bears the inscription Is. Newton donum R[evere]ndi amici D. Moor S.T.D., which in all likelihood also refers to Henry More.74 Again, an autograph manuscript by Newton entitled “Out of Cudworth”, which was purchased by the Los Angeles-based Clark Library in 1940, proved beyond doubt that Newton thoroughly studied Cudworth’s The true intellectual system of the universe (1678).75 There remains, however, the question of whether our research is able to contribute material to this debate and whether the Scholium Generale contains explicit or implicit indications of an influence by the Cambridge Platonists. For Henry More we used the Latin version of his Opera omnia;76 for Cudworth, the Latin translation of the Systema by Joh. Mosshemius.77

In the Scholium Generale (ll. 35–36 S.G.) Newton describes the deity as follows: “The supreme God is a being that is eternal, infinite, utterly perfect (Deus summus est Ens aeternum, infinitum, absolute perfectum).” In his Enchiridium metaphysicum, cap. 8, §8–15 (Opera omnia, ii, 1, 167–9), More lists and provides a commentary on divine tituli.78 In §9 he states: “Sed perpendeamus singulos titulos, illorumque congruentiam notemus. Infinitum igitur hoc extensum a Materia distinctum, primo Unum recte dicitur, non solum quod sit homogeneum quiddam et per omnia ubique sibi simile....” More’s “unum” is reminiscent of Newton’s “Deus est unus et idem Deus semper et ubique”, whereas “ubique sibi simile” is a clear reference to the latter’s “totus est sui similis”.

Elsewhere (§10, 168) More discusses at length the question “Quomodo aeternum ... [dicatur Ens]”. In cap. 10, §14, 182 there is a detailed explanation of the “rationis ultimae soliditas; quodque Deus solus aeternus est, et amplitudine absolute infinitus”. In Book I, cap. 4 of Immortalitas animae More explains the attributa Dei as follows: “Deus est spiritus, aeternus, essentia et bonitate infinitus, omniscius, omnipotens et per se necessario existens” (Opera omnia, ii, 2, 298). More also discussed Newton’s absolute perfectum in Antidotus adversus Atheismum, Book I, cap. 7, §3–4 (Opera omnia, ii, 2, 36): the paragraphs are respectively entitled: “huiusmodi esse definitionem Entis absolute perfecti” and “Ens hoc absolute perfectum Deum esse creatorem rerum omnium atque opificem”. In cap. 2 of his Antecedentis antidoti adversus atheismum appendix More examines the explanation of the “Idea Entis absolute perfecti” (Opera omnia, ii, 2, 148). In lines 32ff. of the Scholium Newton discusses the supremacy of God (“dominium Dei, regnum Dei”), to which Henry More devoted no fewer than ten pages in the fourth dialogue of his


Dialogi divini (Opera omnia, ii, 2, 651–61)!So far, one could argue and not without reason, that all these quotations out

of More have one common source: Philo and his legacy, the Church Fathers included. It seems clear that More was inspired by Philo, but it is difficult to say whether Newton borrowed ideas and expressions directly from Philo or in an indirect way via More. It is not impossible that Newton’s acquaintance with More drew his attention to certain paragraphs in Philo’s work. And there is further evidence of a link to More.

When defining the causa gravitatis Newton is extremely cautious and is loath to invent any hypotheses regarding it (ll. 88–92 S.G.). In what may be considered an appendix, but without establishing a clear link with the previous one, he concluded: “I could have said a few things here about this highly subtle spirit (spiritus) which penetrates solid bodies and hides in them, and by whose force and action particles of bodies attract each other at minimal differences and stick together once they get close to one another....” However, in Book III, cap. 13 of his Immortalitas animae (Opera omnia, ii, 2, 433), More concurred with Descartes in making a causa corporea responsible for the phenomenon of gravity; as he explained: “sed vehementer simul suspicor, immaterialem causam aliquam esse oportere, qualem Spiritum Naturae seu inferiorem Animam Mundi dicimus, quae aetherearum particularum motum dirigere debeat, quo in crassiora corpora agant ad ea terram versus depellenda.” In the general introduction to his scripta philosophica (Opera omnia, ii, 2, 8), More described this Spiritus naturae as follows: “Quod si quidem Spiritus Naturae, hoc est, substantia incorporea quae se generalioribus quibusdam mundi phaenomenis producendis intermiscet, credo me tam evidenter demonstrasse....” The concept of substantia incorporea, as has been pointed out adequately by Henry, should be treated with extreme caution.79 We think it possible, however, to shed additional light on the apparently inconsistent use of this concept in More, by taking into account the different philosophical traditions regarding materialism as such. Although their conceptual variety has tended to be underestimated since the nineteenth century,80 they do offer us the same multiplicity of meanings we are confronted with in More’s work. Dobbs suspected this, as can be inferred from her discussion of the “spiritual body” upon which Newton reflected in his post-Principia period.81

In Book II of Antidotus adversus Atheismum (cap. 2, Opera omnia, ii, 2, 58), More states more explicitly: “Tam perspicua demonstratio est hoc Phaenomenon Gravitatis, quod sit Spiritus Naturae, quae vicaria vis Dei sit in motum materiae Universi.” This statement is quite revealing, since in it More describes the spirit of nature “as the vicarious power of God upon the motion of matter of the universe”.82 Despite the fact that Newton eventually dropped the aethereae particulae and the vortex theory, he moved closer to More’s spiritus concept, which he hoped would facilitate the study and possibly the explanation of phenomena that defy a mechanical explanation. J. P. Auffray stresses exactly this point: “Examinant fébrilement tous les documents qu’il possède, dans lesquels le terme serait


susceptible d’apparaître, Newton rencontre vis sous la plume de Kepler, de Huygens, de Wallis et même sous celle de More: dans L’Immortalité de l’âme, ce dernier évoque ‘une force ou qualité innée ... implantée dans les corps terrestres’. Cette phrase introduit l’expression vis insita pour représenter le concept.”83 Accordingly, in the Scholium Generale Newton, albeit in a careful and roundabout way, left the door wide open for an immaterial explanation of the functioning and cause of gravity and gravitation, the essence of which can already be found in More’s work. Though it is clear that their ideas of space are not identical, there is a common pattern of thought that remains, namely the ontological link between God and space. Whatever be the subtle theological differences in their conception of the latter, the wordings used by Newton to describe both God and space testify in the most clear way to the metaphysical parallelism between them. In the Enchiridion metaphysicum, More “expounded upon ‘twenty titles’ or properties traditionally attributed to God but which are equally applicable to space”.84 Astonishingly enough, nobody ever commented upon the strict and literal equivalence in Newton’s theological and scientific formulations regarding them. In the Scholium to the definitions,85 we are confronted with the difference between “spatium absolutum, verum, et mathematicum” and “spatium relativum”, subject to measurement and knowledge. The Scholium Generale on the other hand presents us with his reflections on “God, which is a relative word, and has a respect to servants, as distinct from the absolute terms of eternal, infinite or perfect as ‘titles which have no respect of servants’”.86

All this allows us to take up again the original problem: how to explain the phenomena of change and motion in a world whose fundamental characteristic is to exist? The solution provided for in the framework of Aristotelian ontology collapsed irrevocably under the pressure of early modern natural philosophy. The problem however remained and turned out to be the core around which the whole development of ideas of the Principia revolved. It will be clear by now that for Newton space somehow had to replace the defeated Peripatetic First Mover. Again, More paved the way. “How indeed could He communicate motion to matter, ... if He did not touch the matter of the universe in practically the closest manner, or at least had not touched it at a certain time? Which certainly He would never be able to do if He were not present everywhere and did not occupy all the spaces?” “I believe it to be clear that God is extended in His manner just because He is omnipresent and occupies intimately the whole machine of the world, as well as its singular particles.” “For, to take away all extension, is to reduce a thing only to a mathematical point, which is nothing else but pure negation or non-entity; and there being no medium betwixt entity and non-entity, it is plain that if a thing be at all, it must be extended.”87 It seems reasonable to accept that Newton, in the Scholium Generale, might have been inspired by these words: “Adicere iam liceret nonnulla de Spiritu quodam subtilissimo corpora crassa pervadente, et in iisdem latente; cuius vi et actionibus particulae corporum ad minimas distantias se mutuo attrahunt, et contiguae factae cohaerent....”88


Cudworth’s influence on, or his presence in, the Scholium is less visible. Yet there are a number of elements that merit our attention. In a fragment of the classical scholia (Casini, 38), Newton stated: “et hic spiritus supremum fuit >egresso< numen, iuxta Poetam ab Apostolo citatum: in eo vivimus et movemur et sumus.” This fragment clearly refers to the Acts of the Apostles, XVII, 27–28. The poeta is not mentioned in this excerpt, but in the margin of the Scholium Generale, in line 57: Aratus, more specifically the initial verses of his Phaenomena. Cudworth (Systema, cap. 4 §21, 562–4 in the Latin edition) had closely examined the interpretation of the passage from Acts and mentioned the poet Aratus as being a likely candidate. It is difficult to say whether or not Newton established a link between the passage from Acts and the poet Aratus. At the same time the possibility cannot be excluded. Newton’s quotation of the epithet pantokrator (l. 33 S.G.), which frequently occurs in the Septuagint, is dealt with in great detail in Cudworth’s Systema (p. 391), where the author devotes much attention to the Stoic anima mundi principle which comes in for a fair amount of criticism (pp. 161, 484, 550, 551, 620, 622, 657–60). The unknowability of the divine substance, as phrased by Newton (ll. 65–66 S.G.), was also discussed by Cudworth (Systema, 757ff). The Philonian deus est omnia which so strongly resounds in the Scholium Generale was taken up and annotated by Cudworth through references to the Orphica (e.g. p. 353). In doing so, Cudworth proceeded in line with the humanist tradition, i.e. with extensive references to ancient as well as contemporary sources.

Within the scope of the present article we are unable to discuss this methodology in Newton’s classical scholia. It is clear however that despite the absence of explicit proof, there are sufficient similarities and parallels to suggest that Newton’s debt to Cudworth was greater than one might be led to believe from his manuscript Out of Cudworth.

JUSTUS LIPSIUS AND NEOSTOICISM89

In the year 1997, which marked the 450th anniversary of the birth of the Brabant humanist Justus Lipsius (1547–1606), his life and work received special attention, conferences being organized in both Rome and Leuven.90 Even a cursory glance at research on Lipsius over the past ten years reveals two prominent fields of interest: epistolography91 — Lipsius as a theorist and practitioner of letter writing — and philosophy — Lipsius as the standard-bearer for Neostoicism. Within the framework of our research into Newton’s Scholium Generale we were particularly drawn to the latter area. Following the studies by Zanta,92 Saunders,93 Julien-Aymard d’Angers,94 Abel,95 Forster,96 and Haitsma Mulier,97 Jacqueline Lagrée added an impetus to the study of Justus Lipsius’s Neostoicism by releasing a seminal chrestomathy containing an introduction and translation of Lipsius’s three main Neostoic works, De constantia, Manuductio ad Stoicam philosophiam and Physiologia Stoicorum.98 The book also includes a handy Index Nominum in which the name of Newton is conspicuous by ... its absence. This is a most unfortunate shortcoming in an otherwise excellent work, in which perhaps more attention should have been


paid to the survival of Lipsius’s Stoic theories. As early as 1988 Betty Jo Dobbs drew attention to Philo Judaeus and Lipsius as possible sources of inspiration for Newton, particularly when it came to solving the problem of divine agency in creation:

but another solution to the difficulty was to create a dualistic system of matter and spirit, a Platonizing Stoicism in which the corporeal (but active and divine) Stoic pneuma was made incorporeal but still mingled and blended with every body. That was the solution chosen by Philo, by many of the Church Fathers, and by the prominent sixteenth-century Neostoic Justus Lipsius. It was also the solution Newton needed.99

Lagrée explained Lipsius’s dualism in the following pregnant terms:

Le Dieu de Lipse est en même temps immanent et transcendant, transcendant et donc inconnaissable, immanent et donc présent et proche, mais pas comme une présence aimante et paternelle, comme la loi de l’ordre du monde qui garantit la validité de l’action réfléchie et instruite de l’homme. La résidence de Dieu dans le vide au-delà du monde traduit en termes physiques l’être au-delà de l’Etre et de l’essence qui est propre à Dieu tandis que sa diffusion dans toutes les plus petites parties du monde transcrit physiquement l’omniprésence de sa providence. En ce sens, le néostoïcisme, en supprimant la familiarité symbolique du Dieu-Nature de la Renaissance, a aussi préparé l’avènement de la science moderne.100

Dobbs, for her part, pointed out an additional number of striking similarities between Lipsius and Newton, yet was forced to conclude: “We cannot be certain that Newton read Lipsius’s Physiologiae [sic] stoicorum....”101 Although Dobbs’s caution in this respect is to be commended, it is perhaps excessive. Dobbs lists a number of reasons to corroborate her view: for example, “Newton is not known to have owned Lipsius’ Physiologiae [sic] stoicorum even though two other of Lipsius’s works were in his library.”102 Although this assertion is correct, its importance should be viewed in the appropriate context. John Harrison pointed out that Newton’s personal library was quite extraordinary. In fact, during his period in Cambridge he used it in addition to the works he consulted in other libraries that were available to him, such as that of Isaac Barrow and the Library of the University.103 In addition, it is more than likely that Newton was familiar with Lipsius’s Physiologia Stoicorum, which is quoted several times in Henry More’s Immortalitas animae (Opera omnia, 452–4), a copy of which was in Newton’s possession.104

In our opinion it is possible to give an affirmative answer to the question as to whether the Scholium Generale provides clues, other than those mentioned by Dobbs, to attest to a direct influence by Lipsius on Newton. In the Scholium, Newton opposed the view of the adherents of the Old Stoa’s materialistic anima mundi (ll. 32–35 S.G.: “... not over his own body, as believed by those who consider God the soul of the world...”). In this he had been preceded by Lipsius, who also referred to the dualism of matter and spirit, and to the nature of the participation


of the divine in creation:

...in Augustino: “Varro de naturali theologia praeloquens dicit Deum se arbitrari animam Mundi et hunc ipsum mundum esse Deum”. Sed discrimen deinde addit, quod valde velim notes. “Sicut hominem sapientem quum sit ex animo et corpore, tamen ab animo dicimus sapientem; ita Mundum Deum dici ab animo quum sit ex animo et corpore”. Hoc vult Mundum a se aut per se non esse Deum; tantum a parte meliori id est Mente illa aeterna quae tamen insita Mundo, ut illa aliqua in homine. Non igitur Mundus ο¡σιwδως et sua natura Deus sed κατ~ µετ~δοσιν ut dicunt Graeci, et quia communicat et participat illam mentem.105

The dominatio of God over his own body as it were (l. 34 S.G.) was also criticized by Lipsius by means of a quotation from Lactantius:

Stoici naturam in duas dividunt partes; unam quae efficiat, alteram quae se ad faciendum tractabilem praestet. In illa prima esse vim sentiendi; in hac materiam, nec alterum sine altero esse posse. Ita isti, uno naturae nomine, res diversissimas comprehenderunt, Deum et Mundum, Artificem et Opus, dicuntque alterum sine altero nihil posse, tanquam Natura sit Deus Mundo permixtus. Nam interdum sic confundunt ut sit Deus ipse mens mundi, et Mundus sit Corpus Dei....106

In the Scholium (ll. 59–61 S.G.) Newton says the following: “That is why he is completely his equal, all eye, all ear, all brain, all arm, all strength to feel, to understand and to act....”107 Here too Lipsius’s quotation from Clement shines through: “Non divisus, ait Clemens, aut distractus, non transiens e loco in alium, sed ubique semper existens et nusquam circumscriptus, totus mens, totus lux, totus oculus, omnia videns, omnia audiens, omnia sciens.”108 The “ubique semper existens” corresponds to Newton’s “Deus semper et ubique” (l. 59 S.G.), the “omnia sciens” to the latter’s “Omnisciens” (l. 44 S.G.). Philo’s “He encompasses all things”, which is quoted by Newton in the Scholium (l. 57 S.G.), can also be found in Lipsius in a reference to Lactantius: “at nos scimus cum Lactantio: Divinum Spiritum esse ubique diffusum eoque omnia contineri.”109 This fits in well with a saying by Damascenus which is quoted and put into perspective by Lipsius: “... format eas, non forma; animat etsi non anima. Bene ut pleraque Damascenus: Deus ipse omnia pervadit, sed sine mixtione et omnibus vim et efficaciam suam participat sed pro cujusque aptitudine et captu....”110 The “sine mixtione” is of the utmost importance and was clearly considered transcendental by Newton: “and they move in there, without however there being any mutual influence. For God is not affected by the motion of bodies” (ll. 57–58 S.G.). Newton’s “He is devoid of body and of any corporeal shape” (ll. 63–64 S.G.) had been phrased as follows by Lipsius:

Sed quanquam ipse formam non habeat, non certe ullam adspectabilem, tamen omnes formas format atque in iis se ostendit. Ipsa haec Posidonii ita


Trismegistus: Unam quidem Ideam et formam Deus habet, quae propria est ejus sed quae humanis adspectibus non subjicitur ut quae sit incorporea: et omnes tamen formas per corpora ostendit....111

Here we also touch upon Newton’s conviction that the substance of the deity is incomprehensible to man. In fact, this is something which had been dealt with by Lipsius on several occasions: “addo et tertiam e Damasceno: Cognitio eorum est quae sunt; at Deum super ipsum esse est; ergo et supra et extra notitiam quia supra essentiam.”112 And: “Teneamus tamen illud Arnobii: Quidquid de Deo dixeris, quidquid tacitae mentis cogitatione conceperis, in humanum transilit et corrumpitur sensum: nec habet propriae significationis notam, quod nostris verbis dicitur atque ad negotia humana compositis.”

113 Lipsius’s treatment of Damascenus’s statement

is quite significant, and is followed by a quotation from Seneca: “Solum hoc ejus comprehendi potest quod comprehendi non potest. Et hoc Seneca vidit et fortiter extulit: ‘nemo novit deum. Multi de illo male existimant impune.’”114 Newton’s “As servants we worship him and a God without dominion, providence and final causes is nothing but Fate and Nature” (ll. 71–72 S.G.) echoes a passage in the Corpus Hermeticum, which is quoted and explained by Lipsius:

Est igitur series et connexio atque ea immutabilis quia ab immutabili Deo: ideoque et necessitas cohaeret; quae soror est ut sic dicam, et gemella fati. Trismegistus: “Omnia Natura et Fato fiunt, nec est locus vacuus a Providentia. Est autem Providentia in se perfecta Ratio caelestis Dei cui duae sunt cognatae facultates, Necessitas et Fatum.”

115

It is however the references by Newton in the margin of line 57 that are the most interesting. “Pythagoras in Cicero (De natura deorum, Book I)”, cf. Lipsius: “Animus, Mens, Ratio magis suevit vocari. Ita enim iterum hoc ipsum aliter Cicero sed Pythagorae adscribit: Deum esse animum per naturam rerum omnem intentum et commeantem. E quo totidem verbis Minutius Felix eleganti illo Dialogo transcripsit. Est igitur haec omnia.”116 Newton’s reference to Pythagoras is followed by one to Thales, who is also quoted by Lipsius: “Quid Thales Mentem et Aquam Initia posuit: recta interpretatione, Deum et Materiam.”117 We have been unable to find a trace of Newton’s reference to Anaxagoras in Lipsius’s work. Virgil, on the other hand, is again quoted by both Newton and Lipsius: “et sic Virgilius: Spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus / Mens agitat molem, i.e. Aen. VI, 726–727.” However, Newton’s reference to the Georgica has no parallel in Lipsius. Newton added: “Philo, at the start of the book on the Allegories.” As for Lipsius, “Quod Philo etiam Judaeus prorsus haud abnuit distinguitque: Universi animam Deum esse quodam intellectu”,118 i.e. the start of Philo’s Allegoriae. Newton then continued with Aratus at the beginning of his Phaenomena. The poet Aratus had not been mentioned by name in this context in Lipsius’s Neostoic writings. The quotation from the Acts of the Apostles, which according to Cudworth may have denoted Aratus and which Newton added immediately afterwards, had been included by Lipsius after the quotation from Philo(!): “Quo? quia nos et omnia vivimus et


movemur et sumus in Deo.”119

The question that remains of course is whether we are dealing with accidental parallels due to a common cultural, philosophical and religious gremium, or whether there was a direct influence from Lipsius? The fact that we can observe an almost systematic link with Lipsius’s views and sources both in content and references has convinced us that there was indeed a direct influence.

CONCLUSION

Science completes that which was started by classical philosophy: a reconstruction in reality in order to establish a relationship between man and the world that would be based on certainty, by mastering the frightening chaos of the ever-changing phenomenal world. This is done through an intervention, which involves the separation of the contradictions in our thought, and thus to some extent in our experience of reality itself. This requires a metaphysics which enables again a description of things, as well as a thought methodology adapted to it, i.e. logic. In science things are reversed. Logic is the point of departure, with which reality is brought into agreement through a strict separation of subject and object at the level of human experience: perception becomes experimental observation. A description of the world based on logically structured propositions implies that things are given a fixed identity (Forms, Eleatic atoms, etc.), but also that a dynamics should be added to the description of the world in order to conform it to the changing world of ‘real’ phenomena. Within this metaphysical context, the origin of this dynamics necessarily lies on an ontological level other than that of the phenomena it causes. The quest for a way out of this dilemma is the philosophical thread that takes us from Newton directly to Antiquity. Regarding this, Newton ultimately opted for a radical solution: the dematerialized God-pneuma, in which space and gravity coincide. It has often been demonstrated in the past that for various reasons this suited not only his scientific but also his social and religious intentions.120

The Scholium Generale shows that around 1690 Newton had distanced himself from a material-mechanical explanation of the causes of gravity. The vortex and aether theories were supplanted by a concept with an immaterial basis: the participation of the deity in material creation. This participation had to be partly immanent, partly transcendental: immanent, since it is the omnipresent foundation, the ubiquitously active law of material nature; transcendental, because it is but a part of the intangible and incomprehensible deity. It was particularly in Philo’s works that Newton found various elements to support this concept, particularly the dematerialization of the Stoic pneuma. Lipsius completed the Christianization of this dematerialized pneuma through a targeted exegesis of the available explicit and implicit Stoic sources. Although this issue requires further research, we can already say at this stage that Lipsius was primarily inspired by Philo when reconciling the Stoa with Platonism. Lipsius provided Newton with the best fitting solution to explain the nature of the participation of the deity in material creation while respecting at the same time the constraints imposed upon him by Christian theology.


The Cambridge Platonists, who were very familiar with Lipsius’s theories,121 constituted another important source of inspiration for Newton.

One can therefore say that aside from Atomism, a double circle was closed; the first went from ancient Platonism to Philo, the Italian Hermetics and the Cambridge Platonists, and closed with Newton. The second is that of the Stoa, and again ran from Philo to the Church Fathers who were influenced by him,122 then to Lipsius, and finally Newton.

It is our hope that the present analysis of the Scholium Generale will contribute to a better understanding of Newton’s philosophical and scientific conceptual framework.

APPENDIX: THE LATIN TEXT OF THE SCHOLIUM GENERALE

[Isaaci Newtoni opera quae exstant omnia: Commentariis illustrabat S. H[orsley] (London, 1782), iv, 170–4.]

Hypothesis Vorticum multis premitur difficultatibus. Ut Planeta unusquisque radio ad Solem ducto areas describat tempori proportionales, tempora periodica partium Vorticis deberent esse in duplicata ratione distantiarum a Sole. Ut periodica Planetarum tempora sint in proportione sesquiplicata distantiarum a sole, tempora periodica partium vorticis deberent esse in sesquiplicata distantiarum proportione. Ut Vortices minores circum Saturnum, Iovem et alios Planetas gyrati conserventur, et tranquille natent in Vortice Solis, tempora periodica partium Vorticis solaris deberent esse aequalia. Revolutiones Solis et Planetarum circum axes suos, quae cum motibusVorticum congruere deberent, ab omnibus hisce proportionibus discrepant. Motus Cometarum sunt summe regulares, et easdem leges cum Planetarum motibus observant, et per Vortices explicari nequeunt. Feruntur Cometae motibus valde eccentricis in omnes cœlorum partes, quod fieri non potest, nisi vortices tollantur. Proiectilia, in aere nostro, solam aëris resistentiam sentiunt. Sublato Aere, ut fit in Vacuo Boyliano, resistentia cessat; siquidem pluma tenuis et aurum solidum aequali cum velocitate in hoc vacuo cadunt. Et par est ratio spatiorum caelestium, quae sunt supra Atmosphaeram Terrae. Corpora omnia in istis spatiis liberrime moveri debent; et propterea Planetae et Cometae, in orbibus specie et positione datis, secundum leges supra expositas, perpetuo revolvi. Perseverabunt quidem in orbibus suis per leges gravitatis, sed regularem orbium situm primitus acquirere per leges hasce minime potuerunt. Planetae sex principales revolvuntur circum Solem in circulis Soli concentricis, eadem motus directione, in eodem plano quamproxime. Lunae decem revolvuntur circum terram, Iovem et Saturnum in circulis concentricis, eadem motus directione, in planis orbium Planetarum quamproxime. Et hi omnes motus regulares originem non habent ex causis Mechanicis; siquidem Cometae in orbibus valde eccentricis, et in omnes cœlorum partes libere feruntur: quo motus genere Cometae per orbes Planetarum celerrime et facillime transeunt; et in Apheliis suis ubi tardiores sunt et diutius morantur, quam longissime distant ab invicem, ut se mutuo quam minime trahant. Elegantissima haecce Solis, Planetarum et Cometarum compages non nisi consilio et dominio Entis intelligentis et potentis oriri potuit. Et si stellae fixae sint centra similium systematum, haec omnia, simili consilio constructa, suberunt Unius dominio: praesertim cum lux Fixarum sit eiusdem naturae ac lux Solis, et systemata omnia lucem in omnia invicem immittant. Et ne Fixarum systemata per gravitatem suam in se mutuo cadant, hic eadem immensam ab invicem distantiam posuerit. Hic omnia regit, non ut Anima mundi, sed ut universorum (Id est Imperator universalis) Dominus. Et propter dominium suum dominus Deus Παντοκρaτωρ dici solet. Nam Deus est vox relativa, et ad servos refertur et deitas est dominatio Dei, non in corpus proprium, uti sentiunt quibus Deus est anima mundi, sed in servos. Deus summus est Ens aeternum, infinitum, abso-lute perfectum sed Ens, utcunque perfectum sine dominio, non est Dominus Deus. Dicimus enim

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Deus meus, Deus vester, Deus Israelis, Deus deorum, et Dominus dominorum: sed non dicimus Aeternus meus, Aeternus vester, Aeternus Israelis, Aeternus deorum; non dicimus Infinitus meus; vel perfectus. Hae appellationes relationem non habent ad servos. Vox Deus passim sinificat Dominum: sed omnis Dominus non est Deus. Dominatio Entis spiritualis Deum constituit, vera verum, summa summum, ficta fictum. Et ex dominatione vera sequitur Deum verum esse vivum, intelligentem et potentem; ex reliquis perfectionibus summum esse vel summe perfectum. Aeternus est et Infinitus, omnipotens et Omnisciens; id est durat ab aeterno in aeternum, et adest ab infinito in infinitum: omnia regit; et omnia cognoscit, quae fiunt aut fieri possunt. Non est aeternitas et infinitas, fed aeternus et infinitus; non est duratio et spatium, sed durat et adest. Durat semper et adest ubique et existendo semper et ubique, durationem et spatium constituit. Cum unaquaeque spatii particula sit semper et unumquodque durationis indivisibile momentum ubique certe rerum omnium Fabricator ac Dominus non erit nunquam, nusquam. Omnis anima sentiens diversis temporibus, in diversis sensuum, et motuum organis eadem est persona indivisibilis. Partes dantur successive in duratione, co-existentes in spatio, neutrae in Persona hominis, seu principio eius cogitante; et multo minus in substantia cogitante Dei. Omnis homo, quatenus res sentiens, est unus et idem homo durante vita sua in omnibus et singulis sensuum organis. Deus est unus et idem Deus semper et ubique. Omnipraesens est non per virtutem solam, sed etiam per substantiam: nam virtus sine substantia subsistere non potest. In ipso continentur et moventur universa, sed sine mutua passione. Deus nihil patitur ex corporum motibus: illa nullam sentiunt resistentiam ex omnipraesentia Dei. Deum summum necessario existere in confesso est: et eadem necessitate semper est et ubique. Unde etiam totus est sui similis, totus oculus, totus auris, totus cerebrum, totus brachium, totus vis sentiendi, intelligendi, et agendi, sed more minime humano, more minime corporeo, more nobis prorsus incognito. Ut caecus non habet ideam colorum, sic nos ideam non habemus modorum quibus Deus sapientissimus sentit et intelligit omnia. Corpore omni et figura corporea prorsus destituitur; ideoque videri non potest, nec audiri, nec tangi, nec sub specie rei alicuius corporei coli debet. Ideas habemus attributorum eius, sed quid sit rei alicuius substantia minime cognoscimus. Videmus tantum corporum figuras et colores; audimus tantum sonos; tangimus tantum superficies externas; olfacimus odores solos; et gustamus sapores: intimas substantias nullo sensu nulla actione reflexa cognoscimus; et multo minus ideam habemus substantiae Dei. Hunc cognoscimus solummodo per proprietates eius et attributa, et per sapientissimas et optimas rerum structuras et causas finales, et admiramur ob perfectiones; veneramur autem et colimus ob dominium. Colimus enim ut servi; et Deus sine dominio, providentia, causis finalibus nihil aliud est quam Fatum et Natura. A caeca necessitate metaphysica quae utique eadem est semper et ubique, nulla oritur rerum variatio. Tota rerum conditarum pro locis ac temporibus diversitas, ab ideis et voluntate Entis, necessario existentis, solummodo oriri potuit. Dicitur autem Deus per allegoriam videre, audire, loqui, ridere, amare, odio habere, cupere, dare, accipere, gaudere, irasci, pugnare, fabricare, condere, construere. Nam sermo omnis de Deo a rebus humanis per similitudinem aliquam desumitur, non perfectam quidem, sed aliqualem tamen. Et haec de Deo de quo utique ex Phaenomenis disserere, ad Philosophiam Naturalem pertinet. Hactenus Phaenomena caelorum et maris nostri per vim gravitatis exposui; sed causam gravita-tis nondum assignavi. Oritur utique haec vis a causa aliqua, quae penetrat ad usque centra Solis et Planetarum, sine virtutis diminutione; quaeque agit non pro quantitate superficierum particularum, in quas agit (ut solent causae mechanicae) sed pro quantitate materiae solidae et cuius actio in immensas distantias undique extenditur, decrescendo semper in duplicata ratione distantiarum. Gravitas in Solem componitur ex gravitatibus in singulas Solis particulas et recedendo a Sole decrescit accurate in duplicata ratione distantiarum ad usque orbem Saturni ut ex quiete Aph-eliorum Planetarum manifestum est et ad usque ultima Cometarum Aphelia, si modo Aphelia illa quiescant. Rationem vero harum Gravitatis proprietatum ex Phaenomenis nondum potui deducere, et hypotheses non fingo. Quicquid enim ex phaenomenis non deducitur, Hypothesis vocanda est; et hypotheses seu Metaphysicae, seu Physicae, seu Qualitatum occultarum, seu Mechanicae in

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Philosophia experimentali locum non habent. In hac Philosophia Propositiones deducuntur ex phaenomenis et redduntur generales per inductionem. Sic impenetrabilitas, mobilitas, impetus corporum, et leges motuum et gravitatis innotuerunt. Et satis est quod Gravitas revera existat, et agat secundum leges a nobis expositas, et ad corporum caelestium et maris nostri motus omnes sufficiat. Adicere iam liceret nonnulla de Spiritu quodam subtilissimo corpora crassa pervadente, et in iisdem latente; cuius vi et actionibus particulae corporum ad minimas distantias se mutuo attrahunt, et contiguae factae cohaerent; et corpora Electrica agunt ad distantias maiores, tam repellendo quam attrahendo corpuscula vicina; et Lux emittitur, reflectitur, refringitur, inflectitur, et corpora calefacit; et Sensatio omnis excitatur; et membra Animalium ad voluntatem moventur, vibrationibus scilicet huius Spiritus, per solida nervorum capillamenta, ab externis sensuum organis ad cerebrum, et a cerebro in musculos, propagatis. Sed haec paucis exponi non possunt; neque adest sufficiens copia Experimentorum, quibus leges actionum huius Spiritus accurate determinari et monstrari debent. Finis Principiorum.

[In margine: ll. 40 ff.] Pocockus noster vocem dei deducit a voce Arabica du (& in casu obliquo di,) quae dominum significat. Et hoc censu principes vocantur dii, Psalm. LXXXIV.6 et Ioan. X.45. Et Moses dicitur deus fratris Aaron et deus regis Pharaob (Exod. IV.16 et VII.1) Et eodem sensu animae principum mortuorum olim a gentibus vocabantur dii, sed falso propter defectum dominii.

[In margine: ll. 57 ff.] Ita sentiebant veteres, ut: Pythagoras apud Ciceronem, de Natura Deorum, lib. 1, Thales, Anaxagoras, Virgilius, Georgic. lib. 4 v. 220 et Aeneid. lib. 6 v. 721, Philo Allegor. lib. 1 sub initio. Aratus in Phaenom. sub initio ita etiam scriptores sacri ut Paulus in Act. XVII, 27, 28, Iohannes in Euang. XIV, 2, Moses in Deut. IV. 39 & X, 14, David Psal. CXXXIX, 7, 8, 9, Solomon I Reg. VIII, 27, Iob XXII, 12, 13, 14, Ieremias XXIII, 23, 24. Fingebant autem idololatrae Solem, Lunam et Astra animas hominum et alias Mundi partes esse partes Dei summi, et ideo colendas sed falso.

REFERENCES

An abridged version of this article appeared in E. Walravens and J. Stuy (eds), Denken als openheid: Liber amicorum Hubert Dethier (Brussels, 1999), 171–87, under the title “Justus Lipsius en Isaac Newton: Neostoïcijnse invloeden op Newtons gravitatieconcept”.

1. E. J. Dijksterhuis, De mechanisering van het wereldbeeld (Amsterdam, 19501, 19962), especially chapters 3 and 4. In P. Feyerabend, Against method (London, 1975), the crucial early-modern controversy surrounding the reliability of telescopic observation is discussed in detail.

2. See P. B. Scheurer and G. Debrock, Newton’s scientific and philosophical legacy (Dordrecht, 1988).

3. R. Commers pointed out the importance of the Scholium Generale in Het vrije denken: Het ongelijk van een humanisme (Brussels, 1992), 239ff.

4. Our reference is to the Latin text of the Scholium Generale, published with a brief commentary by S. Horsley (ed.), Isaaci Newtoni opera quae exstant omnia: Commentariis illustrabat S. H. (London, 1782), iv, 170–4.

5. Motte’s English translation was revised, completed and annotated by F. Cajori, Sir Isaac Newton’s Mathematical principles of natural philosophy and his system of the world (Berkeley, 1962, repr. of the 1934 edition), ii, 543–7.

6. M.-F. Biarnais, Les principia de Newton: Genèse et structure des chapitres fondamentaux avec traduction nouvelle (Paris, 1982), 215–20.

7. B. J. T. Dobbs, The foundations of Newton’s alchemy; or The hunting of the Greene Lyon (Cambridge, 1975); eadem, “Newton’s alchemy and his ‘Active Principle’ of gravitation”,

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in P. B. Scheurer and G. Debrock (eds), Newton’s scientific and philosophical legacy (Archives internationales d’histoire des idées, 123; Dordrecht, 1988), 55–80; eadem, The Janus faces of genius: The role of alchemy in Newton’s thought (Cambridge, 1991), especially pp. 185–209.

8. Gregory MS 247, Library of the Royal Society, London. Drafts of various items can be found in the Portsmouth Collection in Cambridge University Library.

9. J. E. McGuire and P. M. Rattansi, “Newton and the Pipes of Pan”, Notes and records of the Royal Society of London, xxi (1966), 108–43.

10. P. Casini, “Newton: The classical scholia”, History of Science, xxii (1984), 1–58.

11. Ibid., 24–46.

12. As far as the transcription is concerned, Casini’s edition is generally reliable. We should however like to correct some disturbing errors.

In the transcription of the scholium to Prop. IX, Casini read the following (p. 33; the symbols <...> denote a deletion, [...] an addition or an abbreviation in full). Planetas id est vi gravitatis ab actione animarum oriunda. Unde nata videtur <opinio> autem vi animarum suarum moveri dicebant in orbibus suis <moveri> dicebant, Peripateticorum de Intelligentiis orbes solidos <rotantibus> moventibus opinio.

This transcription is incomprehensible in Latin and can never have been written by Newton. Casini must have failed to recognise an interlinear addition by Newton and instead inserted it in the wrong place. The passage should in fact read: Planetas autem vi animarum suarum moveri dicebant in orbibus suis <moveri dicebant>, id est vi gravitatis ab actione animarum oriunda. Unde nata videtur <opinio> Peripateticorum de Intelligentiis orbes solidos <rotantibus> moventibus opinio.

At the end of the scholium to Prop. IX Casini read (p. 34): Eadem Philosophorum sententiam <expressit> Vergilius <qui> expressit: nam et [materia] animam dedit et ut gravitati attestaretur mentem vocavit. In spite of Newton’s clear handwriting Casini probably overlooked the apostrophe above the a in Eadem, for the text is Eandem ... sententiam. If anything the addition [materia] would seem to be rather sloppy from a linguistic point of view. Materiae would have been possible if it had not been for the fact that on fol. 7r. of the scholia (Casini, p. 35) Newton quoted Macrobius: hunc rerum ordinem et Vergilius expressit. nam et mundo animam dedit. It is obvious that Casini should have added [mundo]. Casini twice (p. 38) correctly transcribed observarat, but seemed very surprised at the form itself since he twice adds (sic). Observarat is a common syncopated form of observaverat, an indicative plusquamperfect 3rd person singular active of the verb observare, which fits in well with the context. Cf. Suetonius, De Vita Caes., Tiberius, c. 70, §1: In oratione Latina secutus est Coruinum Messalam, quem senem adulescens obseruarat.

13. Cicero, Att. XVI, 7, 3: “Graviora quae restant: ‘velim σχ|λιον aliquod elimes ad me, oportuisse te istuc facere.’ itane, mi Attice? Defensione eget meum factum, praesertim apud te qui id mirabiliter adprobasti?”

14. Der Kleine Pauly, v, col. 23–25 (H. Gärtner).

15. Der Kleine Pauly, ii, col. 815–21 (H. Gärtner and M. Fuhrmann).

16. “... it is possible to see Newton’s ideas as the ‘fruition of a long tradition’ extending from Aristotle through Newton, a tradition in which Aristotle’s finite plenum was slowly and by painful steps converted into the void, infinite, three-dimensional framework of the physical world required by classical physics. Newton’s God-filled space was the penultimate development in the process by which concepts of space were developed by attributing to space properties derived from the Deity; after Newton’s time, the properties remained with the space while the Deity disappeared from consideration.” Dobbs, Newton’s alchemy (ref. 7), 60 (our bold).

17. In this context it is important to refer to research by Redondi, who showed that the real reason


behind Galilei’s conviction by the Church was not “Copernicanism” but his defence of Atomism. See P. Redondi, Galilei, ketter (Amsterdam, 1989), 179ff, 216ff.

18. Aristotle, Metaphysica, VII, 1028b(34)–1029a(3).

19. Ibid., II, 994(1–20).

20. G. Vlastos, “Zeno’s race course”, in D. W. Graham (ed.),The Presocratics (Princeton, 1993), 189–204, p. 193.

21. H. Arendt, The life of the mind (London, 1978), 23.

22. Aristotle, Metaphysica, Book IV, 1005b(8–34), in H. Tredennick (ed), Aristotle: Metaphysics Books I–IX (Cambridge, Mass., 1933, 1996).

23. On Newton’s Neoplatonic predecessor Henry More, see A. Koyré: “Henri More succeeded in grasping the fundamental principle of the new ontology, the infinitization of space, which he asserted with an unflinching and fearless energy.” A. Koyré, From the closed world to the infinite universe (Baltimore and London, 1976), 126. Also see Dijksterhuis, op. cit. (ref. 1), 276, §36; Redondi, op. cit. (ref. 17), chap. 1, 15ff.

24. H. Dethier, De beet van de adder. Part 3: De Tafel van Smaragd. Filosofieën van de Eros en het Goudland. Prolegomena door Rudolf De Smet en Willem Elias (Brussels, 1997), chap. 2, 153–208.

25. In his Letter to Herodotus, Epicurus wrote that it was the Void which caused atoms to be separated from each other and to remain in motion ad infinitum. M. Conché, Epicure. Lettres et maximes, texte établi par Marcel Conché (Paris, 1987), 102–3. Also see Tredennick, op. cit. (ref. 22), Introduction, pp. xviii–xix.

26. Starting from an entirely different, contemporary angle, G. Günther reached the same conclusion: “A system of logic is a formalisation of an ontology!” G. Günther, “Cybernetic ontology and transjunctional operations”, in M. C. Yovits et alii (eds), BCL publication 68: photomechanically reproduced from Self-organizing systems, 1962 (Washington, D.C., 1962), 313–92.

27. “C’est l’idée qui nous paraît ressortir de la présentation de la première partie de la Physique dans le Syntagma, le De Rebus Naturae Universae Cette ‘Physique’ fait immédiatement suite à la ‘Logique’ par quoi commence l’ouvrage, et elle en constitue la presque totalité. Il ne s’y trouve pas en effet de ‘Métaphysique’, et Gassendi s’en explique dès le début: ce n’est pas que la métaphysique soit sans objet, ou inaccesible, c’est qu’il n’y a pas de distinction entre physique et métaphysique; c’est à la même science qu’il appartient de traiter ... de l’Etre et de la Nature entière.... Ce sont donc bien des catégories physiques qui prennent ici la place de l’ontologie aristotélicienne, en même temps qu’elles recoivent un contenu opposé à celles de la physique d’Aristote. L’atomisme sera la réalisation adéquate d’un tel projet, mais l’on a vu que celui-ci apparaît ... à partir de la critique des ‘formes substantielles’, apporter une nouvelle conception du ‘mouvement naturel’, ressusciter ‘l’espace des Anciens’ contre le ‘lieu Aristotélicien’, rétablir le ‘vide’ dans la Nature, proposer une nouvelle notion du ‘Temps’ etc.”, O. R. Bloch, La philosophie de Gassendi: Nominalisme, matérialisme et métaphysique (’s-Gravenhage, 1971), 172–3 (our bold). On Gassendi see also H. Jones, Pierre Gassendi 1592–1655: An intellectual biography (Bibliotheca Humanistica et Reformatorica, xxxiv; Nieuwkoop, 1981).

28. Koyré, op. cit. (ref. 23), 210.

29. “Quamquam utriusque cum multa non probo, tum illud in primis, quod, cum in rerum natura duo quaerenda sint, unum, quae materia sit, ex qua quaeque res efficiatur, alterum, quae vis sit, quae quidque efficiat, de materia disseruerunt, vim et causa efficiendi reliquerunt.” So far Cicero on the atomists, see J. Martha (ed.), Cicéron: De finibus bonorum et malorum (Paris, 1967), i, §17ff. The bold is ours.

30. This distinction between “subtle matter” and the ordinary “coarse matter” in the “material” world is of paramount importance to our topic. It is related to the doctrine of the “fluidum”,


and to the “sympathy” which according to Stoics links all beings. “Subtle matter” was a familiar concept within the theological tradition as the material aspect of angels and demons, and as the substance of the Resurrected body, one of whose traditional gifts was subtilitas, permeatibility. Newton’s views on the dilemma of the omnipresence of God as a force and on the impermeability of the atomistic (sc. Eleatic) matter were influenced by this. For the meaning of the concept of ‘pneuma’ and the various forms of materialism, see J. J. Poortman, Ochêma: Geschiedenis en zin van het hylisch pluralisme (Assen, 1954), i, §5–6, 31ff, especially note 5, p. 31, and note 5, p. 45.

31. M. Spanneut, Permanence du Stoicisme de Zénon à Malraux (Gembloux, 1973), 24.

32. Ibid., 24–25.

33. By explaining the sacramental transubstantiation of bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ, Tridentine Catholic dogma became inextricably linked to the Peripatetic natural philosophy. Redondi, op. cit. (ref. 17), chap. 7.

34. Newton’s Atomism manifested itself most clearly in Queries 28 to 31 to the Latin edition of his Opticks. Koyré, op. cit. (ref. 23), 210–14.

35. Cajori, op. cit. (ref. 5) translates vortex.

36. Scholium Generale, ll. 1–18. The same reasoning can be found in the Queries, where it is expanded with the question related to the atomist cohesion in macroscopic bodies and the faculty of observation in living creatures. Newton unambiguously stated that mechanical explanations are ineffectual both logically and physically, and that those who cling to them are forced to “invent hypotheses”. Conversely, he seems to have considered the “First Cause” a clearly immaterial “type of gravitation force”. It is the task of experimental philosophy to attempt to establish the laws and principles that govern the functioning of this force. Koyré, op. cit. (ref. 23), 208–10, 213.

37. For a more detailed discussion see K. Verelst and B. Coecke, “Early Greek thought and perspectives for the interpretation of quantum mechanics: Preliminaries to an ontological approach”, in G. Cornelis, S. Smets and J.-P. Van Bendegem (eds), Metadebates: The Blue Book of Einstein meets Magritte (Dordrecht and New York, 1999), par. 5, 175–81.

38. Hence he not only formulates an a priori completeness, but also the pure mathematical nature of space and time: “Tempus Absolutum, verum, et mathematicum, in se et natura sua, sine relatione ad externum quodvis, aequabiliter fluit, alioque nomine dicitur Duratio.... II. Spatium Absolutum, natura sua sine relatione ad externum quodvis, semper manet similare et immobile ...”, Principia, Book I, in the “Scholia to the definitions”, Horsley (ed.), op. cit. (ref. 4), 6 (the bold is ours).

39. “The general validity of the principle that the universe presents the same aspect from every point ... is accepted in modern science as a necessary condition for the repeatability of experiments, since space and time are the only parameters which, at least in principle, are beyond the control of the experimenter and cannot be reproduced at his will.” M. Jammer, Concepts of space: The history of theories of space in physics (3rd edn, New York, 1993), 84.

40. The Latin concept spiritus used by Newton was, together with anima, the traditional translation of the Greek pneuma, as he undoubtedly knew. See Poortman, op. cit. (ref. 30), 31.

41. See E. R. Goodenough, An introduction to Philo Judaeus, 2nd edn (Oxford, 1962); S. Sandmel, Philo of Alexandria: An introduction (New York and Oxford, 1979); D. Winston, Logos and mystical theology in Philo of Alexandria (Cincinnati, 1985).

42. H. Lewy (ed.), Philo Alexandrinus: Philosophical writings (Oxford, 1946), Introduction, 13.

43. F. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker (eds), Philo in ten volumes (Harvard, 1962), iv, 83, §XXVII, [136–8].

44. Yet the editors of Philo’s work in the Loeb Classical Library considered this to be irrelevant: “The title is not very appropriate and applies only to §§ 20–22”! Colson and Whitaker (eds), Philo in


ten volumes (ref. 43), iii, 3. The same applies to both Philo and Newton: when the texts are read outside their metaphysical context, they become virtually incomprehensible.

45. Koyré, op. cit. (ref. 23), chap. 6: “God and space, spirit and matter: Henry More”, 125ff.

46. Dobbs, Newton’s alchemy (ref. 7), 68–69.

47. Dobbs, Newton’s alchemy (ref. 7), 68–71; eadem, The Janus faces (ref. 7), 200–5.

48. Dobbs, Newton’s alchemy (ref. 7), 70–71.

49. Cf. footnote 50.

50. J. Harrison, The library of Isaac Newton (Cambridge, 1978), 216, no. 1300: Philo Judaeus, Omnia quae exstant opera (Paris, 1640).

51. Dobbs, Newton’s alchemy (ref. 7), 68.

52. L. Cohn (ed.), Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt, v: De specialibus legibus (Berlin, 1906, repr. 1962) (= De monarchia), I, §30. ποτf µfν λeγων ™τι θε{ς ε¿ς †στι κα{ κτ�στης κα{ ποιητhς τ�ν ™λων, ποτf δf ™τι κŸριος τ�ν γεγον|των, †πειδh τ{ βeβαιον κα{ πaγιον κα{ τ{ κ‡ρος £ς “ληθ�ς περ{ α¡τ{ν µ|νον πeφυκε. (“(This lesson he continually repeats,) sometimes saying that God is one and the Framer and Maker of all things, sometimes that He is Lord of created beings, because stability and fixity and lordship are by nature vested in Him alone” (Loeb edn, vii, 116–17).)

53. Ibid., i, De Opificio Mundi (Berlin, 1896, repr. 1962), §171: δεŸτερον δ’ ™τι θε{ς ε¿ς †στι. (“Secondly, that God is one” (Loeb edn, i, 134–5).)

54. L. Stewart, “Seeing through the Scholium: Religion and reading Newton in the eighteenth century”, History of science, xxxiv (1996), 123–65.

55. P. Wendland (ed.), Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt, ii: De confusione linguarum... (Berlin, 1897, repr. 1962), §170. “λλ’ Œστιν ε¿ς šρχων κα{ �gεµ‰ν κα{ βασιλεŸς, À πρυτανεŸειν κα{ διοικε¤ν µ|ν¶ θeµις τ� σŸµπαντα. (“(Now we must first lay down that no existing thing is of equal honour to God) and that there is only one sovereign and ruler and king, who alone may direct and dispose of all things” (Loeb edn, iv, 102–3).)

56. Ibid. § 173. ¾ν τhν “π|νοιαν κατιδ‰ν Μωυσhς φησι. “κŸριε, κŸριε, βασιλε‡ τ�ν θε�ν” (Deut. 10, 17) <ε{ς> Œνδειξιν τÁς παρ’ ”πηκ|ους šρχοντος διαφορaς. (“It was the delusion of such persons that Moses saw, when he says ‘Lord, Lord, King of the Gods’ (Deut. x. 17), to show the difference between the ruler and the subjects” (Loeb edn, iv, 104–5).)

57. Cohn (ed.), op. cit. (ref. 52), i, “Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat ...”, §62. µ|νος δ’ “ξι|χρεως ³ δηµιουργ|ς, À προσπεφεŸγασιν œκeται γν¬σιοι κα{ θερaποντες α¡το‡ γιν|µενοι, τ{ φιλοδeσποτον δι� τÁς συνεχο‡ς ”πηρεσ�ας κα{ τÁς τ�ν †πιτραπeντων “οκνοτaτης †πιδεικνŸµενοι φυλακÁς. (“The Creator alone was deemed meet for them, with Whom they have taken refuge as genuine suppliants and become His attendants, discovering their love for their Master by constant service and untiring guardianship of the sacred things committed to their care” (Loeb edn, ii, 244–5).)

For the Deus-Dominus principle, see Philo: – τ�ς Âν οuν το‡θ’ ”πολaβοι ψυχ¬, ™τι ³ δεσπ|της κα{ �γεµ‰ν τ�ν ™λων ο¡δfν τÁς

Ãαυτο‡ φŸσεως µεταβaλλων, µeνων δf †ν ³µο�¶, “γαθ|ς †στι συνεχ�ς κα{ φιλ|δωρος “νελλιπ�ς; (De plantatione, §91). (“What soul, in fact, would imagine that the Master and Sovereign of the Universe, without undergoing any change in His own nature, but remaining as He is, is kind continuously and bountiful incessantly...?” (Loeb edn, iii, 258–9).)

– ³ τ�ν ™λων κυβερν¬της (De migratione Abrahami..., §6). (“the Helmsman of the Universe” (Loeb edn, iv, 134–5).)

– ™τι ³ τ�ν ™λων κŸριος κα{ θε{ς “µφ|τερα τα‡τα το‡ γeνους †στ{ν α¡τ‹ (De somniis..., I, §159). (“(it clearly taught him) that He who is Lord and God of the Universe is both Lord and God of his family” (Loeb edn, v, 380–1).)

– ™τι ο¨τος Äλπισεν †π{ τ{ν τ�ν ™λων πατeρα κα{ ποιητ¬ν (De Abrahamo, § 9). (“(And


therefore, in his wish to give the highest praise to the hoper, after stating) that he set his hope on the Father and Maker of all...” (Loeb edn, vi, 8–9).)

– ¹στε τ� †ν γενeσει πaντα τα‡θ’ ”περβaντες †π{ τ{ν ποιητhν κα{ πατeρα τ�ν ™λων “νατρeχειν τ‹ λ|γ¶ τολµ�σι (De specialibus legibus..., II, §6). (“(But so great is the lightness and heedlessness shown by some) that they pass by all these works of creation and allow their words to dash on to the Maker and Father of all” (Loeb edn, vii, 308–9).)

– šρρην µfν � µ|ν¶ θε‹ προσκληρο‡σα Ãαυτhν £ς πατρ{ κα{ ποιητÎ τ�ν ™λων κα{ πaντων α–τ�¶ (De specialibus legibus..., III, §178). (“The male soul assigns itself to God alone as the Father and Maker of the Universe and the Cause of all things” (Loeb edn, vii, 586–7).)

58. L. Cohn (ed.), op. cit. (ref. 52), i, De Opificio Mundi, §171–2. δεŸτερον δ’ ™τι θεoς ε¿ς †στι, δι~ το½ς ε–σηγητ�ς τÁς πολυθeου δ|ξης, οŠ ο¡κ †ρυθρι�σι τhν φαυλοτaτην τ�ν κακοπολιτει�ν Åχλοκρατ�αν “π{ γÁς ε–ς ο¡ραν{ν µετοικ�ζοντες⋅ τρ�τον δ’ £ς Äδη λeλεκται ™τι γενητ{ς — κ|σµος, δι� το½ς ο–οµeνους α¡τ{ν “γeνητον κα{ “�διον εÆναι, οŠ πλeον ο¡δfν “πονeµουσι θε‹⋅ τeταρτον δ’ ™τι κα{ ε¿ς †στιν — κ|σµος, †πειδh κα{ ε¿ς — δηµιουργ{ς <—> †ξοµοιwσας α”τ‹ κατ� τhν µ|νωσιν τ{ Œργον, ™ς ÇπaσÏ κατεχρ¬σατο τÎ ªλÏ ε–ς τhν το‡ ™λου γeνεσιν⋅ ™λον γ�ρ ο¡κ Âν Èν, ε– µh †ξ ™λων †πaγη κα{ συνeστη τ�ν µερ�ν⋅ ε–σ{ γ�ρ οœ πλε�ους ”πολαµβaνοντες εÆναι κ|σµους, οœ δf κα{ “πε�ρους, šπειροι κα{ “νεπιστ¬µονες α¡το{ πρ{ς “λ¬θειαν …ντες ¾ν καλ{ν †πιστ¬µην Œχειν⋅ πeµπτον δ’ ™τι κα{ προνοε¤ το‡ κ|σµου ³ θε|ς⋅ †πιµελε¤σθαι γ�ρ “ε{ τ{ πεποιηκ{ς το‡ γενοµeνου φŸσεως ν|µοις κα{ θεσµο¤ς “ναγκα¤ον, καθ’ οÉς κα{ γονε¤ς τeκνων προµηθο‡νται. ³ δh τα‡τα µh “κοÎ µaλλον » διανο�Ê προµαθ‰ν κα{ †ν τÎ α”το‡ ψυχÎ σφραγισaµενος θαυµaσια κα{ περιµaχητα ε›δη, κα{ ™τι Œστι κα{ ”πaρχει θε{ς κα{ ™τι ε¿ς — Ëν …ντως †στ{ κα{ ™τι πεπο�ηκε τ{ν κ|σµον κα{ πεπο�ηκεν ∙να, £ς †λeχθη, κατ¥ τhν µ|νωσιν †ξοµοιwσας Ãαυτ‹ κα{ ™τι “ε{ προνοε¤ το‡ γεγον|τος, µακαρ�αν κα{ ε¡δα�µονα ζωhν βιwσεται δ|γµασιν ε¡σεβε�ας κα{ ³σι|τητος χαραχθε�ς. (“Secondly, that God is one. This with a view to the propounders of polytheism, who do not blush to transfer from earth to heaven mob-rule, that worst of evil polities. Thirdly, as I have said already, that the world came into being. This because of those who think that it is without beginning and eternal, who thus assign to God no superiority at all. Fourthly, that the world too is one as well as its Maker, who made His work like Himself in its uniqueness, who used up for the creation of the whole all the material that exists; for it would not have been a whole had it not been formed and consisted of parts that were wholes. For there are those who suppose that there are more worlds than one, while some think that they are infinite in number. Such men are themselves in very deed infinitely lacking in knowledge of things which it is right good to know. Fifthly, that God also exercises forethought on the world’s behalf. For that the Maker should care for the thing made is required by the laws and ordinances of Nature, and it is in accordance with these that parents take thought beforehand for children. He that has begun by learning these things with his understanding rather than with his hearing, and has stamped on his soul impressions of truths so marvellous and priceless, both that God is and is from eternity, and that He that really IS is One, and that He has made the world and has made it one world, unique as Himself is unique, and that He ever exercises forethought for His creation, will lead a life of bliss and blessedness, because he has a character moulded by the truths that piety and holiness enforce” (Loeb edn, i, 136–7).)

59. Ibid., i, Legum allegoriae..., III, §88. ³ γ�ρ ζ¶οπλaστης θε{ς †π�σταται τ� Ãαυτο‡ καλ�ς δηµιουργ¬µατα κα{ πρ{ν α¡τ� ε–ς šκρον διατορε‡σαι, τaς τε δυνaµεις, α¿ς αuθις χρ¬σονται, κα{ συν|λως τ� Œργα τοŸτων κα{ πaθη. (“For God the Maker of living beings knoweth well the different pieces of his own handiwork, even before He has thoroughly chiselled and consummated them, and the faculties which they are to display at a later time, in a word their deeds and experiences” (Loeb edn, i, 360–1).)


60. Ibid., i, De Opificio Mundi..., §100–1. “ÌΕστι γaρ, φησ�ν, �γεµ‰ν κα{ šρχων Çπaντων θε{ς ε¿ς “ε{ Ðν, µ|νιµος, “κ�νητος, α¡τoς α”τ‹ ™µοιος, ∙τερος τ�ν šλλων.” †ν µfν οuν το¤ς νοητο¤ς τ{ “κ�νητον κα{ “παθfς... (“(Evidence of what I say is supplied by Philolaus in these words:) ‘There is, he says, a supreme Ruler of all things, God, ever One, abiding, without motion, Himself (alone) like unto Himself, different from all others.’ In the region, then, of things discerned by the intellect only [7 exhibits] that which is exempt from movement and from passion...” (Loeb edn, i, 80–81).)

61. Ibid., i, Legum allegoriae..., III, §4. πaντα γ¥ρ πεπλ¬ρωκεν — θε{ς κα{ δι¥ πaντων διελ¬λυθεν κα{ κεν{ν ο¡δfν ο¡δf Œρηµον “πολeλοιπεν Ãαυτο‡. πο¤ον δ¬ τις τ|πον †φeξει, †ν À ο¡χ{ θε|ς †στι; µαρτυρε¤ δf κα{ †ν Ãτeροις λeγων⋅ “— θεoς †ν τ‹ ο¡ραν‹ šνω κα{ †π{ τÁς γÁς κaτω, κα{ ο¡κ Œστιν Œτι πλhν α¡το‡” (Deut. 4, 39). κα{ πaλιν⋅ “¾δε ∙στηκα πρo το‡ σe” (Exod. 17, 6): πρ{ γ¥ρ παντoς γενητο‡ — θε|ς †στι, κα{ ε”ρ�σκεται πανταχο‡ (“... for God fills and penetrates all things, and has left no spot void or empty of His presence. What manner of place then shall a man occupy, in which God is not? The prophet elsewhere bears witness of this saying, ‘God in heaven above and upon the earth beneath and there is none else but He’ (Deut. iv. 39). And again, ‘Here stand I before thou (wert made)’ (Exod. xvii. 6); for before every created thing God is, and is found everywhere” (Loeb edn, i, 302–3).)

62. Wendland (ed.), op. cit. (ref. 55), ii: De confusione linguarum..., §136. ”π{ δf το‡ θεο‡ πεπλ¬ρωται τ¥ πaντα, περιeχοντος, ο¡ περιεχοµeνου. (“But God fills all things; He contains, but is not contained” (Loeb edn, iv, 82–83).)

63. Ibid., ii, §137–8. τοŸτου δŸναµις δe, καθ’ Ñν Œθηκε κα{ διετaξατο τ� πaντα, κeκληται µfν †τŸµως θε|ς, †γκεκ|λπισται δf τ� ™λα κα{ δι� τ�ν το‡ παντoς µερ�ν διελ¬λυθε. τ{ δf θε¤ον κα{ “|ρατον κα{ “κατaληπτον κα{ πανταχο‡ ¸ν —ρατ|ν τε κα{ καταληπτ{ν ο¡δαµο‡ πρ{ς “λ¬θειaν †στιν. (“... but that Potency of His by which he made and ordered things, while it is called God in the accordance with the derivation of that name, holds the whole in its embrace and has interfused itself through the parts of the universe. But this divine nature which presents itself to us, as visible and comprehensible and everywhere, is in reality invisible, incomprehensible and nowhere...” (Loeb edn, iv, 84–85).)

64. Cohn (ed.), op. cit. (ref. 52), i, De Opificio Mundi, §100. α¡τoς α”τ‹ ™µοιος, Œτερος τ�ν šλλων. (“Himself (alone) like unto Himself, different from all others” (Loeb edn, i, 80).)

65. Wendland (ed.), op. cit. (ref. 55), iii, “Quis rerum divinarum haeres sit...”, §228–9. Œστι δf ™ρος α¡το‡ — θε|ς, �ν�οχος κα{ κυβερν¬της α¡το‡. ¹σπερ οuν “περ�ληπτον τ{ ™ν, οªτως κα{ τo —ριζ|µενον ”π’ α¡το‡ µeτροις το¤ς ε–ς τhν �µετeραν †π�νοιαν Ñκουσιν ο¡ µεµeτρηται. (“God is its boundary, God who guides and steers it. And so just as the Existent is incomprehendable, so also that which is bounded by him is not measured by any standards which come within our powers of conception” (Loeb edn, iv, 396–7).)

66. Cohn (ed.), op. cit. (ref. 52), i: Legum allegoriae..., I, §91. οŠ γ¥ρ τÁς –δ�ας ψυχÁς τhν ο¡σ�αν ο¡κ ›σασι, π�ς Âν περ{ τÁς τ�ν ™λων ψυχÁς “κριβwσαιεν; � γ�ρ τ�ν ™λων ψυχh — θε|ς †στι κατ¥ Œννοιαν. (“For how should those, who know not the substance of their own soul, have accurate ideas about the soul of the universe? For we may conceive of god as the soul of the universe” (Loeb edn, i, 206–7).)

67. Ibid., i: De sacrificiis..., §95–96. “λλ’ ε–ς τo θνητ{ν ε–σδυ|µενοι καθaπερ οœ κοχλ�αι κα{ περ{ Ãαυτο½ς ¹σπερ οœ †χ¤νοι σφαιρηδoν εœλοŸµενοι, κα{ περ{ το‡ µακαρ�ου κα{ “φθaρτου τ� α¡τ� Ó κα{ περ{ Ãαυτ�ν δοξaζοµεν τhν µfν “τοπ�αν το‡ λ|γου, ™τι “νθρωπ|µορφον τ{ θε¤ον, “ποδιδρaσκοντες, τhν δf †ν το¤ς Œργος “σeβειαν, ™τι “νθρωποπαθeς, †παναιροŸµενοι. δι� το‡το χε¤ρας π|δας ε–σ|δους †ξ|δους Œχθρας “ποστροφ�ς “λλοτριwσεις Åργ�ς προσαναπλaττοµεν, “νο�κεια κα{ µeρη κα{ πaθη το‡ α–τ�ου⋅ [¾ν †στι κα{ ³ ™ρκος τÁς �µετeρας †π�κουρος “σθενε�ας]. (“We creep within our covering of mortality, like snails into their shells, or like the hedgehog we roll ourselves


into a ball, and we think of the blessed and the immortal in terms of our own natures. We shun indeed in words the monstrosity of saying that God is of human form, but in actual fact we accept the impious thought that He is of human passions. And therefore we invent for Him hands and feet, incomings and outgoings, enmities, aversions, estrangements, anger, in fact such parts and passions as can never belong to the Cause. And of such is the oath — a mere crutch for our weakness” (Loeb edn, ii, 164–7).)

68. Ibid., v: De specialibus legibus, I (= De monarchia), I, §45–47. “πeπεισµαι µfν τα¤ς σα¤ς ”φηγ¬σεσιν, ™τι ο¡κ Âν ›σχυσα δeξασθαι τo τÁς σÁς φαντασ�ας †ναργfς εÆδος. œκετεŸω δf τhν γο‡ν περ{ σf δ|ξαν θεaσασθαι (Exod. 33, 18)⋅ δ|ξαν δf σhν εÆναι νοµ�ζω τ�ς περ{ σf δορυφοροŸσας δυνaµεις, ¾ν διαφεŸγουσα � κατaληψις šχρι το‡ παρ|ντος ο¡ µικρ{ν †νεργaζετα� µοι π|θον τÁς διαγνwσεως”. ³ δf “µε�βεται κα� φησιν⋅ “Òς †πιζητε¤ς δυνaµεις ε–σ{ν “|ρατοι κα{ νοητα{ πaντως †µο‡ το‡ “ορaτου κα{ νοητο‡⋅ λeγω δf νοητ�ς ο¡χ{ τ�ς `δη ”πo νο‡ καταλαµβανοµeνας, “λλ’ ™τι ε– καταλαµβaνεσθαι ο¿α� τε εÆεν, ο¡κ Âν α›σθησις α¡τ�ς “λλ’ “κραιφνeστατος νο‡ς καταλαµβaνοι. πεφυκυ¤αι δ’ “κατaληπτοι κατ� τhν ο¡σ�αν ™µως παραφα�νουσιν †κµαγε¤|ν τι κα{ “πεικ|νισµα τÁς Ãαυτ�ν †νεργε�ας⋅” (“‘I bow before Thy admonitions, that I never could have received the vision of Thee clearly manifested, but I beseech Thee that I may at least see the glory that surrounds Thee (Exod. 33, 18), and by Thy glory I understand the powers that keep guard around Thee, of whom I would fain gain apprehension, for though hitherto that has escaped me, the thought of it creates in me a mighty longing to have knowledge of them.’ To this He answers, ‘The powers which thou seekest to know are discerned not by sight but by mind even as I, Whose they are, am discerned by mind and not by sight’, and when I say ‘they are discerned by mind’ I speak not of those which are now actually apprehended by mind but mean that if these other powers could be apprehended it would not be by sense but by mind at its purest. But while in their essence they are beyond your apprehension, they nevertheless present to your sight a sort of impress and copy of their active working” (Loeb edn, vii, 124–5).)

69. Wendland (ed.), op. cit. (ref. 55), ii: De confusione linguarum..., §134–6. Τ{ δe, “κατeβη κŸριος –δε¤ν τhν π|λιν κα{ τ{ν πŸργον” (Gen. 11, 5) τροπικwτερον πaντως “κουστeον⋅ προσιeναι γ�ρ » “πιeναι » κατιeναι » το¡ναντ�ον <“ν>eρχεσθαι » συν|λως τ�ς α¡τ�ς το¤ς κατ� µeρος ζÍοις σχeσεις κα{ κιν¬σεις ›σχεσθαι κα{ κινε¤σθαι τ{ θε¤ον ”πολαµβaνειν ”περωκεaνιος κα{ µετακ|σµιος, £ς Œπος ε–πε¤ν, †στ{ν “σeβεια.τα‡τα δf “νθρωπολογε¤ται παρ� τ‹ νοµοθeτÏ περ{ το‡ µh “νθρωποµ|ρφου θεο‡ δι� τ�ς τ�ν παιδευοµeνων �µ�ν, £ς πολλaκις †ν Ãτeροις εiπον, •φελε�ας. †πε{ τ�ς ο¡κ οÆδεν ™τι τ‹ κατι|ντι τoν µfν “πολε�πειν, τ{ν δf †πιλαµβaνειν τ|πον “ναγκα¤ον; ”π{ δf το‡ θεο‡ πεπλˆρωται τ� πaντα περιeχοντος, ο¡ περιεχοµeνου. (“The words, ‘the Lord came down to see the city and the tower’ (Gen. xi. 5), must certainly be understood in a figurative sense. For to suppose that the Deity approaches or departs, goes down or goes up, or in general remains stationary or puts Himself in motion, as particular living creatures do, is an impiety which may be said to transcend the bounds of ocean or of the universe itself. No, as I have often said elsewhere, the lawgiver is applying human terms to the superhuman God, to help us, his pupils, to learn our lesson. For we all know that when a person comes down he must leave one place and occupy another. But God fills all things; He contains but is not contained” (Loeb edn, iv, 82–83).)

70. Cohn (ed.), op. cit. (ref. 52), i: Legum allegoriae..., 1, §36. šποιος γ�ρ ³ θε|ς, ο¡ µ|νον ο¡κ “νθρωπ|µορφος. (“for God is not only not in the form of man, but belongs to no class or kind” (Loeb edn, i, 170–1).)

71. See F. J. Powicke, The Cambridge Platonists (London, 1926: repr. Hildesheim, 1970); G. A. J. Rogers, The Cambridge Platonists in philosophical context (Dordrecht, 1997).

72. McGuire and Rattansi, op. cit. (ref. 9), 109, 124, 131, 132, 134–8. P. Casini minimized this


influence and expressed doubts regarding the More connection, at least for the classical scholia, op. cit. (ref. 10), 4–5.

73. Dobbs, Newton’s alchemy (ref. 7), 60: “Henry More and other contemporaries were already treating the Deity as an incorporeal yet three-dimensional Being whose immensity constituted infinite three-dimensional space, and it is possible to see Newton’s ideas as the ‘fruition of a long tradition’ extending from Aristotle through Newton....” See also Jammer, op. cit. (ref. 39), 42ff.; A. Koyré, Newtonian studies (Cambridge, 1965), 89ff.

74. Harrison, op. cit. (ref. 50), 12.

75. See D. B. Sailor, “Newton’s debt to Cudworth”, Journal of the history of ideas, xlix (1988), 511–18.

76. H. More, Opera omnia (Hildesheim, 1966), a reprint in 3 vols of various Latin translations of More’s works. These Opera are composed of (a) the Opera theologica (1674), and (b) the Opera philosophica (1679). Although there is no direct evidence of Newton’s familiarity with this monumental edition, it is certain that Newton was aware of it through his contacts with More.

77. R. Cudworth, Systema intellectuale huius universi seu de veris naturae rerum originibus commentarii. Iohannes L. Moshemius omnia ex Anglico Latine vertit (Jena, 1733).

78. In this respect More followed the example of his predecessor Marsilio Ficino who translated and wrote a commentary on the work by Dionysius the Areopagite (PG, iii) under the title of De divinis nominibus. (Our references are to the Basel edition of the Opera omnia of 1576; repr. in the series: Monumenta politica et philosophica rariora, nos. 9–10 (Turin, 1962).) Opera omnia, ii, 1113, “Deus est idem”; 1114, “similis”; 1116, “omnipotens”; 1124, “perfectus”; 1127, “unus”. In his commentary on Plotinus he stated “quomodo Deus sit infinitus” (Opera omnia, ii, 1643); in his Theologia Platonica, lib. II (Opera omnia, i, 100) he noted: “Esse Deum et esse unum, primumque et infinitum virtute, duratione, spatio....” For Ficino cf. Dethier, De beet van de adder... (ref. 24), iii, passim. Pico della Mirandola also discussed some of these tituli in his De ente et uno, ed. by E. Garin (Florence, 1942), 402–22.

79. J. Henry, “A Cambridge Platonist’s materialism: Henry More and the concept of soul”, Journal of the Warburg and Courtald Institutes, xlix (1986), 172–95, esp. pp. 173, 176.

80. See the revealing comment of J. J. Poortman in the introduction of his work on hylisch pluralisme (hylic pluralism) when discussing the origin of this tendency in the work of the nineteenth-century German philosopher F. A. Lange, Geschichte des Materialismus und Kritik seiner Bedeutung in der Gegenwart. J. J. Poortman, Ochêma: Geschiedenis en zin van het hylisch pluralisme (Het z.g. Dualistisch Materialisme) (Assen, 1954), 17ff.

81. Dobbs, The Janus faces (ref. 7), 214–15. This “spiritual body” is nothing else than the Ochêma, the “subtle vehicle”, the focus of Poortman’s study.

82. The original English version (1652) reads as follows: “So plain a Demonstration is this Phaenomenon of Gravity, that there is a Spirit of nature which is the Vicarious power of God upon the Motion of the Matter of the Universe.”

83. J.-P. Auffray, Newton, ou le Triomphe de l’alchimie (Paris, 2000), 147.

84. J. Henry, “Henry More and Newton’s gravity”, History of science, xxxi (1993), 83–97.

85. Horsley (ed.), Principia (ref. 4), i, 71.

86. Stewart, op. cit. (ref. 54), 131.

87. Henry, “A Cambridge Platonist’s materialism” (ref. 79), 176. For the alchemical connotations of this theme, see also M. Eliade, Histoire des croyances et des idées religieuses, iii (Paris, 1983), 266ff.

88. S.G. ll. 96 ff.

89. For an overview of the current state in research on Lipsius, see R. De Smet, “Les études lipsiennes


1987–1997: État de la question” in M. Laureys (ed.), The world of Justus Lipsius: A contribution towards his intellectual biography. Proceedings of a colloquium held under the auspices of the Belgian Historical Institute in Rome (Rome, 22–24 May 1997) (Bulletin van het Belgisch-Historisch Instituut te Rome, no. 68; Brussels and Rome, 1998), 15–42.

90. For the proceedings of the conference in Rome, see ref. 89. The proceedings of the colloquium in Louvain have recently been edited by G. Tournoy, J. De Landtsheer and J. Papy, Justus Lipsius Europae lumen et columen: Proceedings of the International Colloquium Leuven 17–19 September 1997 (Louvain, 1999).

91. Particular attention should be drawn to the commissioning of the publication of the Iusti Lipsi epistulae by the Belgian Royal Academy.

92. L. Zanta, La renaissance du stoicisme au XVIe siècle (Paris, 1914; repr. Geneva, 1975).

93. J. L. Saunders, Justus Lipsius: The philosophy of Renaissance Stoicism (New York, 1955).

94. J. Eymard d’Angers, Recherches sur le stoicisme aux 16e et 17e siècles, ed. by L. Antoine (Hildesheim, 1976).

95. G. Abel, Stoizismus und frühe Neuzeit: Zur Entstehungsgeschichte modernen Denkens im Felde von Ethik und Politik (Berlin and New York, 1978).

96. L. Forster, “Lipsius and Renaissance Neostoicism”, in A. Stephens (ed.), Festschrift für Ralph Farrel (Bern and Frankfurt, 1977), 201–20.

97. E. O. G. Haitsma Mulier, “Het neostoïcisme in de zeventiende eeuw: Enige opmerkingen naar aanleiding van een studie over de invloed van Lipsius in Frankrijk”, Theoretische geschiedenis, v (1978), 130–3; “Neostoicisme en het vroeg-moderne Europa”, Theoretische geschiedenis, ix (1982), 69–82.

98. J. Lagrée, Juste Lipse et la restauration du stoïcisme: Étude et traduction des traités stoiciens De la constance, Manuel de philosophie stoicienne, Physique des Stoiciens (extraits) (Paris, 1994).

99. Dobbs, Newton’s alchemy (ref. 7), 68. This hypothesis can also be found in The Janus faces (ref. 7), 203.

100. Lagrée, Juste Lipse (ref. 98), 56.

101. Dobbs, Newton’s alchemy (ref. 7), 70.

102. Ibid., 79, n. 53.

103. Harrison, The library (ref. 50), 6–7.

104. English version of 1659, cf. Harrison, The library (ref. 50), 196, no. 1113.

105. Lagrée, Juste Lipse (ref. 98), 228. Ph. S., I, 8.

106. Lagrée, Juste Lipse (ref. 98), 214. Ph. S., I, 8.

107. “Unde etiam totus est sui similis, totus oculus, totus auris, totus cerebrum, totus brachium, totus vis sentiendi, intelligendi, et agendi....”

108. Lagrée, Juste Lipse (ref. 98), 242. Ph. S. I, 11.

109. Lagrée, Juste Lipse, 230. Ph. S. I, 8.









118. Lagrée, Juste Lipse, 232. Ph. S. I, 9



120. See Commers, op. cit. (ref. 3), 229ff.

121. H. More repeatedly quoted Lipsius, cf. supra. In the commentary to Johannes Moshemius’s Latin translation of R. Cudworth’s Systema there are frequent references to Lipsius’s Physiologia Stoicorum. As far as we know, Cudworth himself did not quote Lipsius’s name in the Systema.

122. See M. Spanneut, Le stoïcisme des Pères de l’Eglise: De Clément de Rome à Clément d’Alexandrie (Patristica Sorbonensia 1; Paris, 1957).

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NEWTON'S SCHOLIUM GENERALE: THE PLATONIC AND STOIC LEGACY — PHILO, JUSTUS LIPSIUS AND THE...

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