For everything you have missed,you have gained something else,
and for everything you gain,you lose something else
– Ralph Waldo Emerson
COMPROMISE arises in contexts where irreconcilable claims mustnonetheless somehow be resolved. Ordinary people in everyday life,
politicians and artists, doctors engaging in research, humanitarian workersproviding aid in the midst of war—all of them will have faced situations wherecompromise appeared to be the only reasonable option, and yet will have felt thatthere was nevertheless something deeply wrong with it.1 The aim of this article isto help make sense of that sentiment.
The focus of this article will be on some aspects of the morality of compromise.Its lynchpin will be to construe compromise as a joint action, in particular, ajoint wrongdoing—taking part in, and sharing responsibility for, the doing ofthings that are wrong from the point of view of those who are the parties tothe compromise.2 The question of ‘what is wrong with the compromise?’ is thusrecast as a question of ‘what is my part in the wrongs being done as part of thecompromise?’3
*The opinions expressed are the author’s alone and do not represent the views of Médecins SansFrontières. I am grateful for comments from Christine Grady, Joe Millum, Collin O’Neil, and refereesfor this journal. I am especially indebted to Robert E. Goodin for his invaluable encouragement andguidance.
1See, for example, T. V. Smith’s ruminations: ‘Compromise is the process . . . whereby each partyto a conflict gives up something dear, but not invaluable, in order to get something which is trulyinvaluable. In the very nature of the case, therefore, compromise is a sacrifice exacted particularly of“good” men, a sacrifice which their very goodness requires but renders odious.’ T. V. Smith, TheEthics of Compromise (Boston: Starr King Press, 1956), p. 45, quoted in T. M. Bennett,‘Compromising interests and principles’, Nomos XXI: Compromise in Ethics, Law and Politics, ed.J. R. Pennock and J. W. Chapman (New York: New York University Press, 1979), pp. 26–37 at p. 32.For a definition and analysis of compromise also see M. P. Golding, ‘The nature of compromise: apreliminary enquiry’, and A. Kuflik, ‘Morality and compromise’, both in NOMOS XXI, ed. Pennockand Chapman, pp. 3–25 and 38–65 respectively.
2A compromise can be defined as, variously: a) the act of agreeing, b) the content of the agreement,or c) the actions pursuant to the agreement. It is the third meaning that will be used in the rest of thisarticle. Note, however, that the compromise can sometimes concern the ‘beliefs’ which will be takento be true for the purposes of our joint action. See R. Goodin and G. Brennan, ‘Bargaining overbeliefs’, Ethics, 111 (2001), 256–77.
3This question is linked to the companion articles: C. Lepora and J. Millum, ‘The tortured patient:a medical dilemma’, Hastings Center Report, 41 (# 3) (2011), 38–47; C. Lepora and R. E. Goodin,‘Grading complicity in Rwandan refugee camps’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, forthcoming.
The Journal of Political Philosophy: Volume 20, Number 1, 2012, pp. 1–22
It is tempting to suppose that a compromise serves to dilute personalresponsibility, parsing it out among parties to the compromise. Viewing acompromise as a joint action, in contrast, will help us to see how a compromiseactually increases responsibility among parties to it. They are now jointlycollaborating in some action that each of them sees as wrong, at least in part(albeit in differing parts).
Discussions of compromise traditionally prioritize the inter-personal aspect—compromise in the transitive form of ‘compromising with’ someone. But Iargue that the intransitive form—‘compromise of’—deserves pride of place.The reason for prioritizing the intransitive ‘compromise of’ is simple: thatis what is involved in the intra-personal calculation that must, of necessity,go on inside one’s own head in the process of deciding whether or not toagree to a ‘compromise with’ someone else. Intra-personal compromise—the compromise we are involved in when adjudicating among our ownconflicting values, to decide whether or not to agree to a compromise ofthe inter-personal sort—specifically concerns principles, or (more precisely)‘matters of principled concern to the compromising parties’. Not only is thatthe most troubling and morally problematic sort of compromise, it is alsologically the most central case. The first section of the article elucidates howthe intra-personal compromise, a necessary condition of inter-personal ones,also serves as a defining feature of compromise, distinguishing it from otherrelated concepts.
The central part of the article proceeds on these bases to distinguish differenttypes of compromises, and the responsibilities characteristic to each. Eachtype of compromise allows resolving conflicts of principles through mutualconcessions that are accepted and undertaken by all parties. But rather differentresponsibilities are involved, depending upon exactly which of the various typesof compromise I identify is agreed upon.
Compromise may be on-balance desirable, not only from some largerperspective (of social peace or so on) but also from each party’s own perspective.4
Nevertheless, from each party’s perspective, compromise necessarily involvesinteracting with, and sometimes contributing to, wrongdoing. Morally,something is lost, even if more is gained on balance.5
4C. Menkel-Meadow, ‘The ethics of compromise’, The Negotiator’s Fieldbook, A. K. Schneiderand C. Honeyman (Washington, DC: American Bar Association, 2006), ch. 18.
5For expository convenience, I shall couch my discussion in terms of pro tanto andall-things-considered moral judgments. Some moral frameworks (absolutist deontology, actutilitarianism) would proceed directly to overall conclusions without the aid of any interim pro tantomoral evaluations. Insofar as what I shall be talking about as pro tanto evaluations would figure asconsiderations to be taken into account in reaching overall moral conclusions (as clearly they wouldin act utilitarianism, for example), everything I say here applies there as well. Only the terminologywould differ.
2 CHIARA LEPORA
I. THE INTRA-PERSONAL COMPROMISE
When thinking about what might be sought and sacrificed in inter-personalcompromises, all sorts of things come to mind. Speaking in those colloquialterms, we talk about compromising with one another over the price of a used car,over where we will spend our holiday, over what to have for dinner. But thinkingin the other more intra-personal terms—asking ‘which of one’s interests are andare not capable of being “compromised” in that intransitive sense?’—a muchmore restricted list comes to mind.6 Attention there focuses more narrowly onwhat might be generically called ‘matters of principled concern’—fundamentalvalues, moral principles, personal agency, integrity, honour, rights, dignity, and soon.7 Whenever ‘compromising’, strictly speaking, what an agent concedes andwhat the agent hopes to gain through those concessions must be matters ofprincipled concern to the agent involved.8
In the inter-personal case, the compromise in question is with other people. Inthe intra-personal case, the compromise is among principles all of which youharbour but not all of which can be simultaneously pursued. In adjudicating thatinternal conflict, and deciding on a course of action by which you pursue all butnone to the complete exclusion of any other, you strike a compromise amongyour principles. But it counts as a compromise—it feels like a ‘compromise of’something—only because it is indeed something of principled concern that isbeing compromised.
Material interests might occasionally be matters of principled concern.Satisfying basic needs, for example, is a material precondition for the exercise ofagency, and of principled concern for that reason.9 Or material objects mightcarry symbolic significance or sentimental attachments that make them matters ofprincipled concern. But in the more typical case, when we are sacrificing somematerial interests in order to better secure some other material interests, that feelsfrom the inside much more like a ‘choice’ than a ‘compromise’. In so doing we
6Lacan describes ‘un compromis raisonnable’: the daily personal habit of juggling amongconflicting desires, and being able to synthesise, prioritise, or even exclude values; in short, acceptingthe framework of reality. J. Lacan, ‘D’une question préliminaire a’ tout traitement possible de lapsychose’, La psychanalyse n° 4 (1958), 1–50. Joseph Carens, ‘Compromises in politics’, NomosXXI, ed. Pennock and Chapman, pp. 123–41 at p. 124 notes—in passing, without drawing anyof the further inferences I here do—how intra-personal compromises arise from ‘a givenindividual . . . hav[ing] many goals, some of which conflict with others’.
7A ‘matter of principled concern’ is here used to indicate the truths, rules, or assumptions ofinterest to an individual, as a basis for moral conduct.
8Each party to the compromise must act in pursuit of her principles, but those may or may not bethe same principles that other parties to the contract are pursuing. The former case—which will betermed an ‘intersection compromise’ below—is what is discussed as a ‘principled compromise’ in P.Jones and I. O’Flynn, ‘Internal conflict, the international community and the promotion of principledcompromise’, Government & Opposition, forthcoming.
9‘Basic needs’ are simply defined in that way: as necessary preconditions for anything else that onemight want to do or to be. See, for example: J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1971), pp. 253, 396–7; H. Shue, Basic Rights (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UniversityPress, 1980), pp. 18–20; D. Braybrooke, Meeting Needs (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,1987).
ON COMPROMISE AND BEING COMPROMISED 3
have not ‘compromised’ anything of principled concern to us; we have simplychosen which we prefer to pursue. People typically do not choose unless forcedto choose. If they could have had it all, that is what they would have preferred.But relinquishing one sheer object of desire in order to obtain another is not acompromise, it is simply a choice. Something has been lost, to be sure. Butnothing has been compromised. Something simply has been chosen.
If that is a correct account of the internal phenomenology of ‘compromise’,intra-personally understood—and if intra-personal compromise is logically priorto and forms the basis of any inter-personal compromise—then our loosecolloquial talk about what counts as an inter-personal compromise oughtarguably to be adjusted accordingly. We ought to reserve the term ‘compromise’in the inter-personal context, too, to refer to compromises over matters that areof principled concern to the parties to the compromise.10 A resolution of a disputeover some matter that is of no principled concern to anyone—like the price of aused car—might better be described as merely a ‘deal’ or a ‘bargain’.11
Differentiating between the intra-personal and the inter-personal perspectivehelps also in differentiating real compromise from other types of behaviour.Consider, for instance, abandoning a mistaken belief. Suppose that you areconvinced of some matter of principled importance, and suppose that you findthat it is impossible for you to act upon these convictions. Suppose that, forcedby that realisation to revisit those principles, you come to realise they actuallylack validity. Having established to your own satisfaction the wrongness of yourpreviously held principle, you shift from what you now see as a mistakenconviction to a newly corrected one. That process constitutes a correction, not acompromise. You might strategically pretend to have compromised, because youdo not want to admit a mistake or because you want to extract some advantagefrom another agent by being seen to have ‘given up’ something. From theintra-personal perspective, however, it is clearly a case of ‘correction’, not‘compromise’. An intra-personal compromise would have taken place only if allthe initial convictions were still retained, and the newly formed one was chosenpurely because of the impossibility of acting upon the initial ones.12
Or for another example, consider the difference between compromise and fullsettlement of a moral dispute, where a point of common agreement is reached
10Since intra-personal compromise concerns matters of principled concerns, and intra-personalcompromise is a necessary condition of inter-personal compromise, inter-personal compromisesinvolve matters of principled concern for the compromising parties.
11See similarly R. Bellamy and M. Hollis, ‘Compromise, consensus and neutrality’, Critical Reviewof International Social and Political Philosophy, 11 (1998), 54–78 at pp. 55, 57–8. D. Luban,‘Bargaining and compromise: recent work on negotiation and informal justice’, Philosophy andPublic Affairs, 14 (1985), 397–416 at pp. 414–5 differentiates ‘bargaining’ from ‘compromise’ inprecisely this way, elucidating the ‘the paradox of compromise’ as follows: ‘commitment to a principlemeans commitment to seeing it realized. But in practice this means compromising the principle (sinceall-or-nothing politics is usually doomed to defeat) – and compromise is partial abandonment of theprinciple.’
12See also S. C. May, ‘Principled compromise and the abortion controversy’, Philosophy & PublicAffairs, 33 (2005), 317–48.
4 CHIARA LEPORA
(albeit through adversarial reasoning). ‘Accommodation’ or ‘settlement’ areterms that refer to arrangements in which the initial conflict has been fullyextinguished—through for example arbitration that both parties agree will bebinding on them, or through a decision procedure the outcome of which bothparties agree settles the matter.13 In a compromise, in contrast, parties to it stillmaintain their beliefs in the principles that were, and remain, in conflict. This isclear most especially from an intra-personal perspective: when principles havebeen fully brought into line with one another and no conflict remains, there isnothing to compromise.
Finally, the important difference between ‘capitulation’ and ‘compromise’ isevident intra-personally as well as inter-personally. Imagine someone jugglingconflicting commitments but finally deciding to renounce one altogether topursue the other. That would constitute not a compromise but rather a completecapitulation of one set of the convictions in favour of the other—a completerenunciation of one of the conflicting commitments. Consider the example of adoctor torn between pursuing a career as a researcher or providing overseesservice in a humanitarian organisation. Suppose that whatever decision thedoctor makes, she will have to choose one of her principles (‘seek knowledge’ or‘help humanity’) and renounce the other entirely: suppose for some reason oranother it is impossible to do ‘some of both’. If her choice involves the sacrificeof one entire set of principles in favour of the other, it is unlikely that she oranyone else would describe it as a ‘compromise’. Intra-personally as well asinter-personally, compromise involves concessions that stop short of complete‘capitulation’ or ‘sacrifice’ of one set of principles for another.14
It is perfectly possible that one agent compromises her principles in orderto reach an agreement with another agent, who does not have to compromiseany of his principles for the agreement to be reached. Such a case wouldconstitute a compromise from the first agent’s perspective (a compromise ofher principles), but not the second agent’s. For two agents to be literallycompromising with one another, mutual concessions are required. Inter-personal
13As R. Goodin observes, ‘at law, when a case is settled the case is closed’; On Settling (Princeton,NJ: Princeton University Press, forthcoming), ch. 1, sec. C. And as Golding observes, ‘The aim ofadjudication is to terminate a conflict by rendering a final decision in the given case’ (‘The nature ofcompromise’, p. 20). Note, however, that various of the definitions of ‘compromise’ in the OxfordEnglish Dictionary involve precisely these terms: ‘of contending parties, to settle (differences) bymutual concessions’; ‘the settlement or arrangement made by an arbiter between contending parties;arbitration’.
14T. M. Bennett, ‘Compromising interests and principles’, p. 26. ‘Capitulation’ is ‘completecession’, which ought to be distinguished from partial ones. Partial cessions (‘concessions’) constitutediscrete acts that are part of a compromise. So too are cessions (partial or complete) taking place inan ongoing pattern of interactions: what at any one point in time appear to be complete capitulationsmight, if embedded in an ongoing practice of turn-taking, actually be concessions (I get it all my waythis time, you get it all your way next time). Similarly, in a multi-party compromise what look likecomplete capitulations when analysed separately might, in the context of the compromise as a whole,actually be concessions (e.g. A gives way to B, while B in no way gives way to A but instead gives wayto C, who in no way gives way to B but instead gives way to A).
ON COMPROMISE AND BEING COMPROMISED 5
compromise is necessarily transitive, requiring mutual concessions. If theconcessions were unilateral, it would be a matter of ‘conceding to’ rather than‘compromising with’.
Approaching the analysis of compromise by focusing first on intra-personalcompromises—which are a necessary pre-requisite of any inter-personal one—isthus highly illuminating. It helps us see clearly what compromise is and how itnecessarily involves conflicting principled concerns, and the commitment bothto concessions and to maintaining and acting upon at least some (or somesemblance) of the principles one initially held.
II. COMPROMISE ORIGINATES IN CONFLICT
Intra-personal compromise is always a matter of ‘compromise of’. It involvesjeopardising something of principled concern (not pursuing it or prioritisingsome other principles over it), by force of necessity. The ‘necessity’ in view canhave many sources in cases of intra-personal compromise. Often, if perhapsnot invariably, it arises from the impossibility of simultaneously pursuing tothe utmost two or more of one’s principles that lead to partially conflictingaction-implications in the case at hand.15
In cases of inter-personal compromise, the necessity of compromising alwaysarises from the impossibility of pursuing one’s own principled concerns throughone’s actions alone, and having to act together with some other agentswith (partially or wholly) differing principled concerns, in order to produce anoutcome that can only be the product of their joint action. It arises from theconflict of principles between agents.16
In saying that compromise originates in conflict, I mean to refer not to conflictas a physical activity (armed combat or such like) but rather to the structure ofthe situation, defined in terms of the principled concerns at stake for eachparty and the relations among them.17 Conflict of the sort I shall be discussingrefers to the fact that certain claims, feelings, thoughts, principles, rights, and soon are mutually exclusive, in the sense of being incapable of being simultaneouslysatisfied.
Principled concerns may conflict either by being in ‘opposition’ to one anotheror by being ‘incompatible’ with one another. Put simply, opposition betweenprinciples occurs when the principles cannot both be right.18 Incompatibility
15Intra-personal compromises can also be necessitated by limited resources, such that not all of anagent’s principles can be pursued simultaneously to the utmost.
16For expository convenience, I shall focus on the limiting case—absolute impossibility, known forcertain to be the case—whereas in the real world agents typically have to act on the basis ofless-than-certain knowledge. This will become important in the discussion of the wrongfulness of‘omitting’ to act on one’s principles as part of a compromise, below.
17See also A. Margalit, On Compromise and Rotten Compromises (Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 2010).
18Opposition is here used loosely to include contrariety, contradiction, and exclusion.
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occurs when two principles may both be right (or wrong) and merely cannot inpractice be simultaneously applied19—that is, for purely contingent reasons it ispragmatically impossible for both to be simultaneously satisfied. In the lattercase, I have no principled objection to your acting upon what you believe in, noryou to my acting upon what I believe in; it just so happens that, for pragmaticreasons, my acting upon my beliefs would preclude you from acting upon yourbeliefs, and vice versa.20
The necessity for intra-personal compromises (‘compromises of’ your ownprinciples, giving up something of principled concern to you) arises in such casesof ‘compromising with’ others, either because the other person’s principledconcerns are in opposition to yours or else because they are pragmaticallyincompatible with yours (that is, yours and his cannot be simultaneouslyrealised). In describing that inter-personal compromise as ‘a necessity’, I amassuming that all other options for dealing with mutually exclusive principleshave been taken into account and discarded, either because they entail somethingworse than the mutual concessions or because they are plainly infeasible.21
Compromising with somebody with opposed principled concerns, even if doneunder force of necessity, nonetheless entails an intra-personal ‘compromise of’something that each party to the inter-personal compromise regards as beingof principled concern. For that reason, it inevitably involves some level ofwrongdoing from the point of view of those who are party to the compromise.That is what I next go on to analyse through distinguishing three main sorts ofcompromises and linking those with the specific responsibilities involved.
III. TAXONOMY OF COMPROMISES
Every compromise implies a quid pro quo. Each agent promises concessions onmatters of principled concern to her, in order to resolve the conflict existing withthe other(s). Through scrutiny of the ‘quid pro quo’ involved in a compromise,distinctions can be drawn concerning the nature and amount of principledconcessions made and the nature of the agreement reached by the parties.22 These
19I shall in what follows phrase ‘incompatibility’ as an all-or-nothing matter, of either applyingprinciple P completely and Q not at all or vice versa. Incompatibility can of course be instead amatter of degrees, a more-or-less matter, with the more of P that is achieved the less of Q thancan be achieved. Everything I say below can be said of that case, too, with minor adjustments ofphrasing.
20Mixed cases exist, in which one agent sees principles as being opposed to one another, whereasthe other sees them merely as pragmatically incompatible. But no distinct analysis of the moralresponsibilities of each party emerges from that case.
21Maybe because agents won’t be able to accomplish all, or any, of their principled concerns in thecontext of the conflict, or maybe because interaction effects are such that accomplishing them in thecontext of the conflict would be worse than accomplishing them through the compromise.
22Specifically, it is not necessarily true of all compromises that they necessarily involve ‘mutualconcessions that would be separately unacceptable’ (Luban, ‘Bargaining and compromise’, p. 415).As will be seen, that is true only of what I analyse below as ‘conjunction’ compromises.
ON COMPROMISE AND BEING COMPROMISED 7
distinctions, in addition to those concerning the nature of the conflict (oppositionor incompatibility of principles), determine the extent of responsibility held bythe compromising parties in ways I will next describe.
A. SUBSTITUTION COMPROMISE
Imagine two doctors caring for a terminal patient who is unaware of herdiagnosis. One doctor, worried about the patient’s frail psychological state,resolves to avoid broaching the subject of end-of-life decisions with her. The otherdoctor, convinced of the patient’s right to know, wants to start discussingend-of-life decisions with her as soon as possible. These are matters of principlefrom each doctor’s perspective: the first takes it as a matter of principle thatphysicians should not needlessly jeopardise the well-being of their patients; thesecond takes it as a matter of principle that physicians should be completely openand honest with their patients. Suppose finally that the two physicians shareresponsibility for the patient’s care, and must come to a joint decision whether totell the patient or not. It is clearly impossible for both doctors to stand by theirrespective principles in this case, but conflict forces them to search for acompromise. So, for example, each might backpedal on his position in deferenceto the other, and they finally agree to talk to the patient’s family only. That is notwhat either doctor’s principle requires—the one doctor is not being fully honestwith his patient in that way, while the other doctor might still be worried that thepatient will be stressed if family members raise awkward questions with her. Thetwo doctors have simply agreed to do something different than what either oftheir principles requires.23
We can call this type of compromise a substitution compromise. In it, someother principle is agreed among the parties as a viable substitute for their previousprinciples. Schematically, imagine that Agent 1 holds principles {A, B, C, D},Agent 2 holds principles {E, F, G, H}, and those sets of principles are in conflictwith (either in opposition to or incompatible with) one another.24 A substitutioncompromise requires both agents to abandon pursuit of their entire set of initialprinciples, and to promise to pursue another principle {X} that both Agent 1 andAgent 2 will agree to act upon instead. They do so, given the impossibility of
23Maybe as a mere ‘rule of regulation’, in the terms of G. A. Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), pp. 263–8. But more likely it is actually afull-blooded principle that each comes to see of value in its own right in the given conflictual context(albeit of less value than the original principles they relinquished in coming to it) that ‘at least and atmost the family of fragile patients should be told the full facts’. I hasten to add that none of theseexamples should not be read as ‘good practice’: they are just typical cases of compromise; no ethicalevaluation is here implied.
24For expository convenience, I phrase these as if they were wholly separable, independentprinciples. There may be complex relations or interactions between them, in which case the notationwould have to change. But the same basic principles I elucidate by reference to that simple case wouldhold, mutatis mutandis, with respect to any more complex variation.
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securing agreement on joint action to pursue the initial principles that each stillregards as superior to the new one, {X}. But they each agree that jointly acting on{X} is better than no joint action at all.
B. INTERSECTION COMPROMISE
Another case of compromise might take place between Agent 3, holdingprinciples {I, J, K, L}, and Agent 4, holding principles {K, L, M, N}. In this case,there is some conflict between the agents’ principles, but there is also someoverlap. That partial correspondence of principles can be ground for anagreement.25 Agents 3 and 4 might agree to compromise by maintainingprinciples {K, L}, each of them agreeing not to pursue the subset of principlesopposed or incompatible with those of the other (principles {I, J} for Agent 3;principles {M, N} for Agent 4).
Imagine two doctors working in a remote area with overwhelming healthneeds, one of whom adopts the principle of treating as many patients as possiblein one working day, the other of whom adopts the principle of giving as muchindividualised attention as possible to each patient. Both doctors came to work inthat remote area following their common conviction about the medicalresponsibility to bring relief to a suffering population; nonetheless their principlesconflict on how to allocate their capacities when confronted with overwhelmingneeds. But suppose that the two doctors have to work together, and at the samepace—one is a surgeon, the other an anaesthetist, and surgery cannot beperformed without each of them examining patients prior to any surgery. Indeference to their perceived responsibility for carrying out medical interventionsin this context, both will have to partially renounce their principles in order towork together. Agent 3 will decrease slightly the number of patients consulted perday, and Agent 4 will slightly decrease the time spent with each patient. Theintersection between their principles will be maintained (enhanced, possibly), atthe cost of what each of them perceives as a compromise of their principles aboutwhat ‘quality work’ demands.
Intersection compromise is different from substitution compromise in twonotable respects. First, in the case of the intersection compromise, the principlesmaintained through the compromise were shared from the onset among the agents,whereas substitution compromise required them to search for some new principleand to agree on it. Second, the degree of concessions required by intersectioncompromise is partial (only a subset of the principles that each held from the onset
25‘Trimming’, in the old-fashioned terminology resurrected by C. R. Sunstein, ‘Trimming’,Harvard Law Review, 122 (2009), 1049–94. See also Bellamy and Hollis, ‘Compromise, consensusand neutrality’, pp. 55, 60–2. This is the sort of compromise Golding has in mind when saying thatby nature a ‘compromisable conflict situation’ necessarily involves ‘a partial coincidence of interests’(‘The nature of compromise’, p. 13).
ON COMPROMISE AND BEING COMPROMISED 9
is sacrificed), but is much more extensive in substitution compromise (where eachsacrifices the full set of relevant principles held from the onset).
Intersection and substitution compromise, however, are similar in one respect.In intersection compromise, Agent 3 renounces a subset of his principles, notbecause he prefers {K, L} to {I, J, K, L}, but because he deems {K, L} superior to‘nothing’ (‘nothing’ being the likely or inevitable result of his conflict with Agent4, if he does not compromise). Similarly in substitution compromise, Agent 1renounces his full set of principles, not because he deems {X} to be superior to {A,B, C, D}, but simply because he deems {X} to be superior to ‘nothing’ (‘nothing’again being the likely or inevitable outcome if he does not compromise withAgent 2).
C. CONJUNCTION COMPROMISE
Consider now a third kind of conflict. This is among two agents who do not shareany principle in common, either at the onset or after negotiation. This appears tobe the sort of case that is most often envisaged when we talk about compromise.The two parties have conflicting principled positions, but—let us suppose—they nonetheless have a reason to resolve these differences, at least for certainnarrow purposes. Were the sets of principles wholly incompatible, even justpragmatically and much less logically, it is difficult to imagine how such acompromise could be possible among them. A compromise including both O andnot-O, for instance, is simply not logically possible.
Maybe agents might come to realise that what initially seemed completelyincompatible principles were in reality not altogether mutually exclusive—that some subset from each agent’s list was compatible with some subset fromeach other’s. But this would then constitute an intersection compromise.Another possibility might be that initially incompatible principles could beslightly modified so as to overcome the incompatibility. But then that wouldbe a case of substitution compromise. Conjunction compromise is differentfrom both.
Genuine conjunction compromise takes place when agents’ full sets ofprinciples are literally and wholly opposing, rather than merely pragmaticallyincompatible.26 A conjunction compromise then involves both agents agreeing topursue some subset of each set, with each agent agreeing in the process not topursue the opposing element(s) in her own set. Suppose Agent 5 holds principles{O, P, Q, R}, and Agent 6 holds principles {not-O, not-P, not-Q, not-R}. Theintersection between them is null, and (let us further suppose) no mutuallyagreeable substitute principle can be found. Parties might still have reasons towant to reach a compromise, but the only compromise possible would then have
26By ‘literally and wholly opposing’ I mean that for every principle in one set there is someprinciple in the other set such that both principles cannot simultaneously be right.
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to include principles drawn from opposing sets, pursued either by one of theparties with the forbearance of the other or by both of them together. For instancea compromise may maintain {O, P, not-Q, not-R} as principles for both Agent 5and Agent 6 to pursue (or anyway allow to be pursued by the other).27
The fact that conjunction compromise necessarily involves agentscompromising on literally and wholly opposing principles impacts heavily on thetypes of responsibility involved in the compromise. When two agents hold literallyand wholly opposing principles, each of them considers the other’s principles to beliterally and wholly wrong. A compromise agreement leading to the formation ofa joint agency to act (or permit action28) in pursuit of principles opposed to one’sown will hence constitute acting together with a wrongdoer, from the point ofview of each agent. From Agent 5’s perspective, following (some of) Agent 6’sprinciples would amount to wrongdoing, and vice versa. Forming a joint agencywith one another, and acting together on the new set of principles that conjoins asubset of both their sets of literally and wholly opposing principles, would betantamount to contributing to wrongdoing from each agent’s perspective.
As a rough approximation to a conjunction compromise, consider the exampleof a humanitarian convoy of medical supplies that needs to cross a militarisedzone in order to reach a hospital. Geneva Conventions require medical aid to beunarmed, white flagged, neutral with respect to any fighting force, so as to berespected by all of them. Disgracefully, though, there are wars where medicalworkers are nevertheless attacked by the fighting forces.29 In these cases,humanitarians might (contrary to the Geneva Conventions, and their owndeeper principles) accept an armed escort for a medical convoy in a parti-cularly dangerous context or moment of the war.30 Such compromise allowshumanitarians to provide essential aid in the midst of an armed conflict,and allows armed forces to have a functioning hospital accessible nearby.Humanitarians will have to give up their principles of unarmed interventions, andarmed forces will have to deploy some of their members as escort, contrary to theirpreferred rules of engagement. Practical considerations and each agent’s interests
27Agreement to pursue some principles, while the other stands back and allows that to happen, isitself a form of joint agency.
28I here assume that even merely ‘permitting’ or ‘allowing’—when you could have done otherwise,and when your doing otherwise would have prevented outcomes you regard as bad (as is exhypothesis the case here)—involves a form of wrongdoing.
29Think at the notable example of a plane shot down in South Sudan in 1989 <http://www.msf.fr/2009/12/21/1605/sud-soudan-msf-se-souvient-des-premiers-volontaires-assassines-en-mission/9>.
30Although the agreement clearly requires concessions on matters of principle from thehumanitarian groups, often fighting forces will not really sacrifice anything of principled importanceto them, and simply follow their self-interest of having a functioning hospital without truly having toconcede anything for it. These cases do not amount to mutual compromise as I have here defined it.The ones analysed here require concessions on both sides, for instance if the fighting group acceptsto cross an enemy zone without taking advantage of it from a military point of view, or if they acceptto fire only in response and only under certain (e.g. minimal-harm) conditions imposed by thehumanitarians.
ON COMPROMISE AND BEING COMPROMISED 11
motivate the compromise, although some moral uneasiness is inevitably andrightly attached to this type of compromise, from the perspectives of both partiesinvolved.
IV. RESPONSIBILITY FOR WHAT?
A. DIRECT WRONGS: COMMITTING, OMITTING
Two distinct kinds of responsibility are already distinguishable in the processof an intra-personal compromise: what I shall call ‘committing responsibility’,that is, responsibility for what actions one undertakes in pursuit of prin-cipled concerns as a result of the compromise; and what I shall call ‘omittingresponsibility’, that is, responsibility for actions one fails to undertake inpursuit of principled concerns, as a result of the concessions involved in thecompromise.31
Committing responsibility refers to the direct responsibility that we have forour own actions and their consequences. When as a result of a conjunctioncompromise I end up committing an act that is contrary to my principles, forexample, I will have committed an act that is wrong, at least ‘pro tanto’, from myown point of view.
It may of course be the right thing to do on balance, if there is some conflictbetween principled concerns that simply must be overcome. The necessity toovercome the initial conflict may provide an excuse—or, indeed, a justification.But before accepting an individual’s committing responsibility as justified orexcused in that way, we must be certain of the necessity of overcoming theconflict, rather than living with it or pursuing the conflict to its conclusion (be ita victory or a failure of one’s own principles, but at least not a compromise ofthem). To put it in bluntly consequentialist terms, one might say that an actioncommitted as a result of a compromise is blameworthy if the result of thecompromise attained is overall worse than the likely result of not compromising.But as I shall argue below, we are not any less responsible for what we commitas a result of a compromise—responsibility for committing a pro tanto wrong isnot ‘diluted’—even if the conflict of principled concerns and the necessity ofovercoming it excuses or justifies our actions on balance.
The second component of direct individual responsibility in compromiseconcerns what one omits doing, as a result of the compromise. In an intersectioncompromise, for example, one is responsible for omitting to act on that subsetof one’s principles that does not fall in the intersection with the other party’s. Ina substitution compromise, one is responsible for omitting to act on all the
31Henceforth throughout the text, the actions I shall be discussing are in pursuit of principledconcerns involved in the compromise. Sacrificing a principled concern thus corresponds to failing toact when one could and should have acted on such a principle. I will not elaborate that on eachoccasion, but it should be taken as read.
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principles one initially wanted to see jointly acted upon. From an intra-personalpoint of view, omitting always constitutes a pro tanto wrong—a failure to dosomething the agent ought to do, in the agent’s own view—even if, once again,it might on balance be the right thing to do in light of the necessity of overcominga conflict of principled concerns.
Omitting responsibility attaches though only to the failure to act when onecould and should have acted. We have postulated that one enters into acompromise precisely because one could not have successfully acted on one’s ownto achieve one’s principles (so, for example, in an intersection compromise thechoice was in effect to pursue a subset of principles or ‘nothing’). If the conflictof principled concerns truly blocks one’s doing what one ought to do, failing toact will inevitably follow—whether within or outside any possible compromise.In such a case, omitting is inevitable and no moral responsibility attaches toinevitable events. Real-world cases typically lie somewhere in between: owing touncertainties over what exactly was and was not possible in the circumstances,some measure of moral responsibility may attach to omitting to do things onemaybe could (and if could, should) have done.
B. ANOTHER DIRECT WRONG: FORMING A JOINT AGENCY
Actions (and omissions) in a state of compromise are necessarily undertakenjointly, in conjunction with the other compromising agent(s).32 More specifically,the very essence of a compromise is the joint action comprising of contributoryconcessions of something of principled importance agreed jointly by the parties.33
It might also be wrong (from one’s own point of view) to join together with aperson with conflicting principled concerns to constitute a joint agent in the firstplace.34 A joint agency is formed beforehand, in reaching an agreement withsomebody holding wrong principles, and in promising to pursue principles thatare wrong from one’s own perspective. Agreeing to that may be a wrong (fromone’s own point of view), over and above whatever wrong (from one’s own pointof view) is then actually done through the joint agency thus constituted.35
32Here and elsewhere in the text it is assumed that even mere allowing of action is itself a form ofcontribution to that action. It is a contribution by inaction, rather than an active contribution, to besure—but it is a contribution nonetheless, if the agent could and should have done something toprevent the wrongdoing from occurring.
33‘Compromise of any kind involves a kind of responsiveness to the other’, as H. Richardson notesin his chapter on ‘Deep compromise’, Democratic Autonomy (New York: Oxford University Press,2002), pp. 143–61.
34Repugnance for forming a joint agency might be grounded in purely emotional factors (disgustor revulsion at someone with those principles); in moral ones (it is wrong to benefit someone with badvalues by interacting with them); or simply in strategic thinking (it is bad to be ‘associated with’wrongdoers).
35One of the reasons it may be wrong is that, in creating a joint agency—and especially where youcommission other agents then to act on its behalf—you run the risk of that joint agency going beyondwhat was originally agreed in the compromise that created it, in ways of which you woulddisapprove.
ON COMPROMISE AND BEING COMPROMISED 13
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), for instance, agreed toprovide health care in concentration camps during the last year of War World II.The first necessary step in doing so was to form some sort of connection with theNazi camp managers, talking to them and shaking their hands regardless of anycrime they were and were known by the ICRC to be responsible for. It is preciselythis ‘joint agency’, rather than anything (and despite everything) that they didthrough it, that still haunts the ICRC today.36 Parties who compromise with oneanother on matters of conflicting principled concerns may be responsible fordoing something pro tanto wrong (from their own point of view) even merely inconstituting a joint agent with others with conflicting principled concerns.37
C. CONTRIBUTORY WRONGS: CAUSING, ENABLING, PERMITTING
In addition to doing direct wrongs, a compromising agent is also implicated inindirect contributory wrongs.38 An individual has direct responsibility for whatact she commits and omits as a result of the compromise. She also has indirectresponsibility for what she does indirectly, by way of her contribution to actions(in which term I here include omissions) jointly undertaken with others as a resultof an inter-personal compromise.
The interaction among compromising agents will (or anyway is designed to)cause or enable or permit one to act on principles one would not have actedupon, were it not for the compromise. Let us now analyse these various forms ofcontributory action, and identify their relationship with the various forms ofcompromise.
A compromise will cause compromising parties to act upon a prin-ciple wherever the principle is new to the compromising party. This type ofresponsibility is found in substitution compromise, where each compromisingparty finds a new principle to act upon, causing the other to act likewise. Sincesubstitution compromise concerns the formation of a new principle that eachparty considers acceptable, upon reflection, each party is actually causing theother to commit an act that is not wrong (even pro tanto, much less all thingsconsidered) from the perspective of each.
36Birgitt Morgenbrod and Stephanie Merkenich, Das Deutsche Rote Kreuz unter der NS-Diktatur1933–1945 (Paderborn, Germany: Ferdinand Schöningh Gmbh, 2008).
37At least when the ‘agency’ of that joint agent—defined in terms of the tasks it is assigned orpermitted—lies within the scope of the conflicting principled concerns of the agents constituting it.Maybe there is nothing wrong with pro-life and pro-choice advocates constituting a bowling leaguetogether, since bowling does not lie within the scope of the conflict of principled concerns that existsbetween them.
38As J. Gardner says, ‘I am responsible for what I do, and you are responsible for what you do.But on any credible view I need to give attention, in what I do, to what you will do in consequence.And you need to give attention, in what you do, to what I will do in consequence. In that sense, thereare two parts of morality. There is what I should do simpliciter, and then there is what I should doby way of contribution to what you do’ (‘Complicity and causality’, Criminal Law and Philosophy,1 (2007), 127–41). See further the companion articles referred to in note 3.
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Conjunction compromise might also see each party causing the other to actupon a principle they did not hold before. Furthermore, such a principle will be(by the way a conjunction compromise has been defined) wholly opposed tothose held by the agent. This means that one agent is responsible for causing theother to commit an act that is wrong from the perspective of the agent caused tocommit the act. More commonly, however, conjunction compromise will occuramong two parties who agree to allow each to pursue his own principles withoutthe interference of the other, despite the other’s opposition to those principles. Insuch a case each party would rather hold the contributory responsibility ofpermitting the other to act on principles opposed to their own.39
We can also construe an intersection compromise as a case of permitting theothers to act upon their principles. But remember, not compromising would haveprevented each party from acting upon their principles at all. Hence, whatan intersection compromise actually does, above all else, is ‘make possible thatø’ (where otherwise it would have not been possible that ø). Intersectioncompromise thus enables, rather than merely permits, each party’s efficaciouspursuit of some subset of her principles.40 As for substitution compromise, anintersection compromise will enable each party to act on a subset of principlesthat is right (even pro tanto, not merely all things considered) from theperspective of each.
A rough correspondence may thus be drawn between: causing responsi-bility and substitution compromise; enabling responsibility and intersectioncompromise; and permitting responsibility and conjunction compromise. Howtight this correspondence is, however, will depend on how the compromise isdone, what types of actions it requires of each, and so on. However muchcausing, enabling, and permitting responsibilities differ in respect of the specificactions undertaken pursuant to the compromise, they all have one aspect incommon. They all involve joint agency among compromising agents, and they allpoint to ways in which one might be responsible for the contributions they maketo, through, and because of that joint agency.
V. COMPROMISES INCREASE INDIVIDUALS’ RESPONSIBILITIES
Agents typically engage in a compromise reluctantly and regretfully. Afterall, any compromise requires concessions of principled concerns. Agentstypically depict themselves as choosing to compromise because doing so is theonly possible option for overcoming a conflict of principled concerns that
39As the humanitarian agency might end up unwillingly ‘permitting’ the armed escort to killsomeone while escorting the convoy.
40I tell the story in terms of limiting cases, for clarity and expository convenience. But of coursecompromises can occur when the principled objectives in view are merely ‘very unlikely’ (but not‘literally impossible’) to be achieved in the absence of compromise; and enabling might take the formof ‘making it easier, or less costly, or more likely that ø’ (rather than, literally, ‘making ø possible whenotherwise ø would not have been possible at all’).
ON COMPROMISE AND BEING COMPROMISED 15
desperately needs to be resolved. They often describe themselves as having ‘noother option’ than engaging in a compromise. They say that they were ‘forced’into the compromise. The implication is supposed to be that they are notmorally responsible (or anyway are less morally responsible, depending on thedegree and the kind of force implicated) for the actions committed in pursuitof it.
Such representations are misrepresentations, however. An agent alwayschooses to engage in a compromise. When facing a conflict of principledconcerns, the agent could have simply avoided any interaction with the other, oropposed more aggressively the other’s principles through his own actions. Anagent can be forced into an agreement (at gunpoint, for example). But an agententers into a compromise through a voluntary act of will. To be sure, he does sofor good reason: because doing what is required by the compromise is better onbalance than anything else he can do in the circumstances. But the fact that therewere good reasons should not obscure the fact that it was a matter of choice.
Since a compromise is reached only among voluntary and knowing parties, acompromise necessarily expands rather than dilutes the responsibilities of thosewho are party to it.41 An inter-personal compromise involves the formation of ajoint agency (at the very least in identifying and agreeing on what principles willform the basis of the compromise, and in most cases of inter-personal compromisein the pursuit of those principles as well). It requires concessions (entailing at thevery least omitting responsibility) and often direct actions by each party (entailingcommitting responsibility as well). Finally, inter-personal compromise entailsindirect as well as direct contributions to the doing of things that are wrong fromthe agent’s own point of view, in the case of a conjunction compromise overwholly opposed principles. Each of those involves causing, permitting or enablingmore things—not fewer—that are pro tanto wrong from the agent’s ownperspective. Far from diluting responsibility, compromise thus expands it.
In cases of compromises that are justified from each agent’s perspective, eachof these pro tanto wrongs is counter-balanced, because the compromise allowseach party to reach a state of affairs she regards as comparatively better than thatwhich would exist without the compromise. Furthermore, compromise isprobably overall the best option to preserve one’s own principles whenconfronted with opposition that would overwhelm one’s own capacity to pursuethose principles unhindered. Compromise would then be the best moral option,all things considered. But that is merely to say that there are both more goods onthe scale as well as more bads, in consequence of the compromise. It is not todeny that, in absolute terms, one who compromises would be involved in morepro tanto bads than one would have been without compromise.
41Of course, each party, if failing to compromise, would be responsible for what happens. Theirresponsibility is expanded though because of the joint agency acquired in compromising. Each partywill not only be responsible for what happens, and for what they do, but also partially for theircontribution to the other party’s actions.
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VI. MORAL DISCOMFORT IN COMPROMISE
Following the framework for moral evaluation just outlined, we can now clearlysee how the feeling of ‘being compromised’ hinges upon a combination of directand indirect responsibilities acquired as a consequence of the joint agency formedwith the other compromising party. Moral discomfort might first and foremostdepend on whether the compromising parties hold opposing or merelyincompatible principles.
As already foreshadowed, intersection and substitution compromise mainlyinvolve direct committing and omitting and indirect causing and enablingresponsibilities. The result of the compromise will be, in each party’s perspective,less preferable than the simple pursuit of the initial full set of principles each partyheld; it will however be clearly preferable to ‘nothing’, which would be the resultof the conflict in the absence of compromise. Whether in a context of opposed orincompatible principles, what is ‘done’ in pursuit of an intersection or substitutioncompromise does not appear to be wrong from the point of view of thecompromising party. It is what is ‘not done’ as a result of either of those sorts ofa compromise, rather than what is done, that grounds one’s feeling of beingcompromised. Omitting to pursue one’s own principles is the inevitable source ofmoral discomfort attached to intersection and particularly to substitutioncompromises.42 Another source of moral discomfort in these compromises may belinked with forming a joint agency, in cases of agents holding opposing principles.
Moral discomfort comes from the awareness of the wrongs involved incompromise. But those are merely pro tanto wrongs from each party’s point ofview.43 On balance, the ‘all things considered’ moral evaluation from each party’spoint of view would presumably be positive, or else agents would not have agreedto the compromise.44 But that is merely to say that the state of affairs associatedwith the compromise is better, from the point of view of each, than the inevitable(or likely) consequences associated with the pre-existing conflict of principledinterests and the necessity to overcome it. The badness of the latter state of affairs(and the way in which, among other things, it may preclude one from successfullypursuing one’s own principles) is what balances these pro tanto wrongs.
The same might be said about conjunction compromise, although it is clearthat moral discomfort would be more significant in this case. Just as in theprevious cases, pro tanto wrongs are attached to omitting and forming ajoint agency. But in addition to those, the party who accepts a conjunction
42As already foreshadowed, no moral guilt should be attached to omitting to act if the preexistingconflict would have rendered it impossible to act anyway. Moral discomfort may there be relative touncertainty about whether or not that is the case.
43This only applies to cases resulting in some sort of wrong from one agent’s perspective. It is ofcourse possible that, from the first agent’s perspective, a compromise might cause the other agent torefrain from committing worse, for instance, or to actually commit something better than they wouldotherwise. I shall say more about this below.
44Setting aside cases of coercion, which are excluded by definition from genuine cases ofcompromise : that, as I have said, is necessarily voluntary.
ON COMPROMISE AND BEING COMPROMISED 17
compromise also holds a more clear responsibility in actually contributing towrongdoing, or even committing it. Remember that the context in which aconjunction compromise takes place is that of literally and wholly opposedprinciples among the parties. Hence, from one party’s perspective, the other partyto the compromise is a wrongdoer, and whatever actions the wrongdoer willcarry out in pursuit of the compromise is grounded on wrong principles. One’sinvolvement in a conjunction compromise necessarily involves some level ofpermitting, enabling, or causing wrong.
A conjunction compromise may take two different forms, each involvingdifferent types of responsibilities. In one case, each agent pursues the subset ofprinciples that she harboured before the compromise, with the other agentmerely allowing her to do so without interference (so the responsibility in playthere is of the permitting or omitting sort). In the other case, the full set of newprinciples forms the basis of joint action undertaken by both agents, who nowconstitute themselves as a joint agent for the purpose (so the responsibility inplay there is of the committing or causing sort). In the former case, each agentis responsible for forming a joint agency (identifying a common principle ofaction and promising to pursue it); each agent is also responsible for permittingsome wrong that she could and (pro tanto) should have avoided. In the lattercase, that of coordinated or joint action in pursuit of the newly agreed set ofjoint principles some of which each agent thought and still thinks to be wrong,each agent is responsible both for herself causing or committing what sheregards as wrongs and also for permitting the other to pursue a principle sheregards as wrong.
An additional aspect of causing/omitting responsibility may also play a role inthe moral calculation of engaging in a compromise with somebody holdingopposed principles. Agent 5 is convinced that all principles held by Agent 6 arewrong. When engaging in a conjunction compromise with Agent 6, Agent 5becomes responsible for excluding some principled concerns from the range ofprinciples that Agent 6 acts upon—and hence for causing Agent 6 to makeprincipled concessions that lead Agent 6 to omit to perform actions that wouldhave been right from Agent 6’s point of view, but wrong from Agent 5’s point ofview. That, from Agent 5’s perspective, is good: Agent 5 has caused Agent 6 toact less wrongly (from Agent 5’s perspective) than he would otherwise have donehad the compromise not taken place. Agent 6, on the contrary, will see himself aswrongfully omitting to act upon some principles that Agent 6 regards as good,because of the terms Agent 5 has imposed for the compromise. Causing/omittingresponsibility will impact positively on each agent’s overall moral discomfortinsofar as the agent causes (or facilitates or abets) the other agent’s reducedwrongdoing.45 Through the compromise, one agent leads the other to act upon
45Of course, the way I have set up the story, Agent 6 would have been unable to realise principles{S, T, U, V} unilaterally anyway. So strictly speaking Agent 1 did not need to do anything more than
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only a subset rather than all of the second agent’s principles, all of which arewrong from the first agent’s point of view.46
It is thus clear that the sources of moral discomfort from engaging incompromise are multiple, and particularly intense when the compromise isreached with a party holding principles wholly opposed to one’s own. Such layersof direct and indirect responsibilities evoke feelings of ‘being compromised’from an intra-personal perspective. Two interlinked aspects may contribute tosuch feeling. Firstly, as previously outlined, ‘compromise of’ one’s principlesnecessarily occurs when ‘compromise with’ takes place. Secondly, ‘compromisewith’ entails some levels of contribution to wrongdoing, when the other partyholds opposing principles.
Of course, in a way these aspects are just consequences of the initial conflictcontext, and the impossibility of successfully pursuing all (or maybe any) one’sown original principles in that context. It is the choice to accept, with regret,the conflict as being otherwise unsolvable (unsolvable through resistance orpersistence or tolerance, for instance) that grounds one’s choice to compromise.And it is indeed true that such irresolvable conflict and powerlessness engenderfeelings of discomfort, sadness, and even anger. But while the sheer existence ofa conflict engenders discomfort with the state of the world, that does not in itselfimpinge on one’s evaluation of the state of oneself as a moral agent. It is choosingto compromise in such situations that engenders distinctively moral discomfort,the feeling of ‘being compromised’.
VII. ABOVE THE BOTTOM LINE
One might query just what moral standing those feelings of discomfort shouldhave. Isn’t it just a kind of moral preciousness to regret being compromised inthose ways? After all, the bottom line is that you have, on balance, done the rightthing by compromising in those ways.47
himself omit to cooperate in {E, F, G H} to prevent them from being implemented. But there might besome bad, from Agent 1’s point of view, that comes from Agent 2’s even-unsuccessful pursuit of {E,F, G H} that Agent 1 is glad to have averted, by causing Agent 2 to omit pursuing (even if inevitablyunsuccessfully) {E, F, G H}. Cases exist, of course, where permitting Agent 6 to achieve principles{S, T}, while less wrong than permitting her to achieve principles {S, T, U, V}, is nonetheless morewrong than blocking Agent 6’s actions altogether.
46For an imperfect example of that, recall the case of compromise involved in a humanitarianorganisation getting an escort from a militia group. One effect of the compromise is that some militiamembers stop fighting for the period of time it takes to escort the humanitarian convoy; a secondeffect is that the one militia uses its resources to bring medicine to the hospital, which will be used totreat both its fighters and the opposing side’s. The humanitarians think both effects are good, whereasthe militia think both are to some extent bad (the latter, at least insofar as the medicines are used totreat their opponents).
47Brian Barry, Democracy, Power & Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 340, objectsto this sort of thing as the ‘moral narcissism’ of a ‘moral dandy’. Bernard Williams feels the need todefend against the charge of ‘moral self-indulgence’ in Moral Luck (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1981), ch. 3.
ON COMPROMISE AND BEING COMPROMISED 19
The bottom line, ‘on balance’ judgment is almost certainly the best guide inthe end for deciding what it is right for one to do. But if the bottom line iswhat ought to guide one’s actions, it does not suffice for the full assessmentof moral responsibility linked to the decision. It would be wrong torestrict moral assessment of a compromise to the moral responsibility forthe actions pursuant to the agreement. Those moral assessments must beallowed to range more widely, and to extend to the moral reasoning leadingup to it.
There is a clear moral difference between two moral bottom lines both worth+2, where one arises from a combination of +4 good actions and -2 bad actions,and the other arises from a combination of good actions worth +1002 and badactions worth -1000. Anyone who does not see the difference—who thinks ‘samebottom line, no difference’—is morally missing something.
Acknowledging such difference allows us to understand why one canreasonably feel compromised, and why those feelings morally matter, evenaccepting that the bottom line ought to be the morally determinative feature indeciding whether to compromise.48 If bottom lines are the same, it is what liesabove that identifies individuals’ responsibilities. People are morally responsiblefor all the good and all the bad that they do—not just over the course of theirlives as a whole, but also in the course of a single compromise.
Compromises of one’s own principled concerns and contributions towrongdoing are thus rightly regarded as pro tanto wrongs. That fact should notbe eclipsed by the bottom line, ‘on balance’ judgment. The latter is indeed whatshould guide one’s decision of what to do, of whether or not to compromise. Forthose purposes, one requires a univocal verdict: ‘do this, don’t do that’. An ‘onbalance’ judgment weighing all the pro tanto considerations against one anotherprovides that. But in assessing one’s moral responsibilities, not all the pro tantoconsiderations wash out in that way. In adjudging one’s moral responsibilities,one must remember how much bad one did in order to achieve the good. All thepro tanto wrongs remain on the moral ledger, each separate and distinct, abovethe action-guiding bottom line.
Thus, it is wholly appropriate that all the pro tanto wrongs one had to do, inorder to do the best thing on balance, should remain on one’s mind afterwards.One is responsible not only for doing the right thing on balance, but also for howone has done it. Someone who has done much harm to do even more good mayhave done the right thing on balance, if there was no other way in which that
48That is to say, it shows us a way through the conundrum of the classic dirty hands debate. Somesay ‘these are situations in which, ex hypothesi, there is no virtuous choice to be made’;R. Hursthouse, ‘Applying virtue ethics’, Virtues & Reasons, ed. R. Hursthouse, G. Lawrence andW. Quinn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 57–77 at p. 66. Others say ‘it seems confusedto suppose that their hands can remain dirty even if such actions are justified’; G. Gaus, ‘Dirty hands’,A Companion to Applied Ethics, ed. R. G. Frey and C. H. Wellman (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), pp.167–78 at p. 178. The analysis just given explains why it is both right to act on the bottom line andto register that doing so came at considerable moral cost.
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good could have been accomplished. She is nonetheless responsible for all theharms she has done, even if for the best outcome.49
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This article is not intended to condemn compromises, necessarily, nor to presenta complete moral analysis of when one should or should not compromise. Its aimhas simply been to emphasise that compromise should be pursued with fullawareness of the expanded and complex moral responsibility that each partyassumes by way of compromising.
To do so, I first of all restricted my analysis to compromises over matters ofprincipled concern, and showed that a conflict rather than an interest in mutualgain is what grounds principled compromises. Analysing compromise from anintra-personal perspective, and thereby giving pride of place to the sense of‘compromise of’, affords us better insight into both its nature and its limitations.Understanding intra-personal compromises as joint actions further assists usin isolating the various layers of responsibility that each party might incur whenengaging in compromise. In addition to the responsibility that each partyobviously holds for committing some action pursuant to the compromise,responsibilities for omitting, causing, enabling and permitting are also intrinsic tothe process of inter-personal compromise. Distinguishing causing, enabling andpermitting responsibilities allows us to better analyse individual responsibilitiesrelevant to the various sort of compromises. It further helps us identify the roleof contribution to wrongdoing as source of moral discomfort.
All this talk about responsibility for committing, omitting, causing, enabling,and permitting what you see as wrong, as part of a compromise, should not beconstrued as implying a moral prohibition on engaging in compromises. Theseresponsibilities are indeed associated with doing something that is wrong,from the agent’s point of view. But those wrongs are merely pro tanto wrongs.They are negatives, to weigh in the balance: but other positive aspects ofthe compromise might (from the same agent’s own point of view) makecompromising the best thing to do on balance. Indeed, the agent presumablywould not have agreed to the compromises unless that on-balance assessmentwas positive from his point of view.50
Still, compromises over matters of principled concern necessarily involve directand indirect responsibilities, as part of a compromise, for something that is atleast pro tanto wrong, from the agent’s own point of view. Far from being
49Those that way inclined could consider this a reflection on the agent’s moral character, as distinctfrom her acts. But it could equally well be read as an evaluation of the act for which she is responsible,which produced great good at the cost of great bad. Seen that way, it is not at all a matter of ‘changingthe subject’.
50The preservation of one’s own principles when confronted with irreconcilable claims is only oneof the positive aspects ensured by a compromise.
ON COMPROMISE AND BEING COMPROMISED 21
diluted, individual responsibility for pro tanto wrongs is thus increased (evenif the wrongs are outweighed, on balance). That increase of individual respon-sibility for pro tanto wrongs is what rightly grounds the agent’s feeling of ‘beingcompromised’ when engaging in compromise. Inter-personal ‘compromiseswith’ other people—with people whose principled concerns are opposed to orincompatible with your own—necessarily involve ‘compromise of’ your ownprinciples, in that way.
Compromise may well be necessary in order to resolve a conflict over mattersof principled concern. Compromising may be a good choice, all thingsconsidered, even taking into account all the additional pro tanto wrongs forwhich you become responsible in the course of compromising. Those additionalpro tanto wrongs might be counterbalanced by the good you can do onlyby compromising. But the pro tanto wrongs are only counterbalanced, notcancelled. They remain on the scale, as a justified source of moral discomfort.
