National Social Watch India, Citizens’ Report on Governance and Development, New Delhi: Pearson, 2006 PARLIAMENT UNDER SOCIAL WATCH REPRESENTATION, ACCOUNTABILITY AND GOVERNANCE by Ajay K. Mehra We must make our political democracy a social democracy as well. Political democracy cannot last unless there lies at the base of it social democracy. What does social democracy mean? It means a way of life which recognises liberty, equality and fraternity as the principle of life. […] On the 26 th of January 1950, we are going to enter into a life of contradictions. In politics we will have equality and in social and economic life we will have inequality. […] We must remove this contradiction at the earliest moment, or else those who suffer from inequality will blow up the structure of political democracy which this Assembly has so laboriously built up. B. R. Ambedkar on 25 November 1949, Constituent Assembly Debates, New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1989, vol. IX, p. 979. INTRODUCTION While putting Parliament of the world’s largest democracy under social watch, it is desirable to briefly underline what role has been envisaged for the institution, which is not only designed to be the body representing the people of India, but also expected to represent the rising aspirations of the billion-plus nation. Dr. Ambedkar’s above statement in his address to the Constituent Assembly on the eve of enactment of the constitution of the world’s largest democracy highlighting the contradictions between social democracy and political democracy, also by implication highlights the representational, and hence role performance, paradox that the Parliament and the State legislatures were likely to face in the nascent democracy. His call for removing this contradiction at the earliest moment underlined the challenges that the country’s system of representation and its representative institutions would face if inequalities persisted. That the Indian society and polity have been unable to meet the challenge of doing away with the inequities in social and economic fields is too obvious to be stated. This puts country’s representative institutions as well as institutions of governance under strain. This also releases political energies that not only affect functioning of political institutions, but also political processes.
Transcript
National Social Watch India, Citizens’ Report on Governance and Development, New Delhi: Pearson, 2006
PARLIAMENT UNDER SOCIAL WATCH
REPRESENTATION, ACCOUNTABILITY AND GOVERNANCE
by
Ajay K. Mehra
We must make our political democracy a social democracy as well. Political
democracy cannot last unless there lies at the base of it social democracy.
What does social democracy mean? It means a way of life which recognises
liberty, equality and fraternity as the principle of life. […] On the 26th of
January 1950, we are going to enter into a life of contradictions. In politics we
will have equality and in social and economic life we will have inequality. […] We must remove this contradiction at the earliest moment, or else those who
suffer from inequality will blow up the structure of political democracy which
this Assembly has so laboriously built up.
B. R. Ambedkar on 25 November 1949, Constituent Assembly Debates, New
Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1989, vol. IX, p. 979.
INTRODUCTION
While putting Parliament of the world’s largest democracy under social watch, it is
desirable to briefly underline what role has been envisaged for the institution, which is
not only designed to be the body representing the people of India, but also expected to
represent the rising aspirations of the billion-plus nation. Dr. Ambedkar’s above
statement in his address to the Constituent Assembly on the eve of enactment of the
constitution of the world’s largest democracy highlighting the contradictions between
social democracy and political democracy, also by implication highlights the
representational, and hence role performance, paradox that the Parliament and the
State legislatures were likely to face in the nascent democracy. His call for removing
this contradiction at the earliest moment underlined the challenges that the country’s
system of representation and its representative institutions would face if inequalities
persisted. That the Indian society and polity have been unable to meet the challenge
of doing away with the inequities in social and economic fields is too obvious to be
stated. This puts country’s representative institutions as well as institutions of
governance under strain. This also releases political energies that not only affect
functioning of political institutions, but also political processes.
2
Any assessment of the functioning of Parliament, or any other representative
institution, in India, whether for a given period or since its inception, therefore, has to
keep the paradox between ‘the design’ and ‘the functional-processual’ compulsions in
mind. The inability to achieving economic democracy at the earliest, as Dr.
Ambedkar exhorted in the Constituent Assembly, is one such compulsion. The other
compulsions arise out of political mobilization of myriad groups in a diverse society
like India and emerging political aspirations and empowerment of disadvantaged
sections of society. They tend to make the democratic institutions cacophonic, if not
chaotic, as also create conditions, if not compulsions, for deviation from institutional
norms. Assessment of an institution like Parliament, therefore, necessitates factoring
in of the conditions imposed by democratisation process and see whether structures of
accountability have been created and sustained to meet the emerging challenges of
socially equitable representation and efficacious governance. Needless to say, one
will strengthen the other.
PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM: AN EVALUATIVE PERSPECTIVE
That independent India would opt for liberal democratic system was a foregone
conclusion and absolutely clear from the way the national movement led by the Indian
National Congress had gone and the various resolutions it had passed over the years
and statements its leaders had made during the course of the struggle for
independence. Naturally, whichever form of government they would have opted for
under a democratic system, a representative legislature was a precondition. However,
after intense debate the Constituent Assembly opted for ‘parliamentary system of
constitution’.1 Dr. Ambedkar gave the following justification for opting for the
parliamentary system:
The Parliamentary system differs from a non-Parliamentary system in as much
as the former is more responsible than the latter but they also differ as to the
time and agency for assessment of their responsibility .... The daily assessment
of responsibility which is not available under the American system is, it is felt,
far more effective than the periodic assessment and far more necessary in a
country like India. The Draft Constitution, in recommending the
1 Both the Union Constitution Committee and the Provincial Constitution Committee recommended
‘parliamentary executive’ for the country. The latter said, ‘it would suit the conditions of this country
better to adopt the parliamentary system of constitution, the British type of Constitution with which we are
familiar’. CAD, vol. IV, New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, p. 578.
3
parliamentary system of executive has preferred more responsibility to more
stability.2
Ambedkar’s statement became the central factor in choosing between the US-type
Presidential system and the British parliamentary system. That main argument which
clinched the issue was the choice between stability on one hand and accountability and
responsibility on the other meant that the parliamentary system in general and the
institution of Parliament in particular were preferred and designed to create a structure of
democratic governance which was not merely representative, but also ensured
accountability.3 No wonder, Ambedkar clearly argued that while the British system
gave more responsibility or accountability and less stability which the American system
gave, what India needed was a daily assessment of responsibility of the executive. That,
indeed, was the key choice India made in shaping its representative system.4
It was not surprising, therefore, that the scheme and system of representation too
came up for an intense debate. Breaking free of communal electorate designed by the
British and providing for universal adult suffrage despite illiteracy and poverty, were
only a few of the measures taken up to ensure optimum representation to the diversity
constituting India. The Constituent Assembly appeared concerned that keeping in view
the complexity of the Indian society the system and processes of representation for both
the houses of Parliament needed to be rational. Thus, the fear of disproportionately
2 CAD, vol. VII, New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, p. 32-33.
3 The parliamentary system of government represents the fusion of executive and legislative powers in
the representative legislature. It naturally means that the theory and practice of representation and
accountability are intrinsically linked to it. The formation of government is linked to majority in the
legislature and responsibility and accountability are determined on the floor of the house in a day-to-
day basis as well as in the long run. For parliamentarism to succeed it is expected that both the
legislature and the government complement each other, i.e., the government should not fret at the
challenges from the Assembly and the Assembly not only should not usurp the functions of the
government, it should also not trivialise the parliamentary functions through uncalled for hostility of
the government.
4 K. M. Munshi supported Dr. Ambedkar’s contention with his own argument about continuity based on tradition and experience:
We must not forget a very important fact that during the last 100 years Indian public life has
largely drawn upon the traditions of British Constitutional law …. For the last thirty or forty years, some kind of responsibility has been introduced in the governance of this country. Our
constitutional traditions have become parliamentary and we now have all our provinces
functioning, more or less, on the British model. As a matter of fact, today, the Dominion
government of India is functioning as a full-fledged parliamentary government. After this
experience why should we go back upon the tradition that has been built for over 100 years, and
try a novel experiment which was, as I said, framed 150 years ago and which has been found
wanting even in America. CAD, vol. VII, New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, p. 984-85 (italics
mine).
4
larger representation to bigger States in the Rajya Sabha was discussed in the Constituent
Assembly and proportional representation as well as equal representation on the lines of
the US Senate came in for consideration. Similarly, the size (area and population) of a
constituency, reservation of seats in general as well as for the minorities came in for
intensive debate and interestingly, the proposal came in for criticism from Muslim
(Maulana Hasrat Mohani) and Sikh (Giani Gurumukh Musafir) members, who thought
that such arrangements would result in compromise with principles of secularism.5
If there were strong opinions on parliamentary supremacy in legislative and
financial matters6, there were equally cogent views on parliamentary accountability. For
example, members argued against extending parliament’s term even during war or
emergency.7 In fact, the question of parliamentary accountability came in for
consideration also during the discussion on Articles 21 and 22 (draft Articles 15 and
15A) relating to ‘personal liberty’ in the chapter on Fundamental Rights. The interesting
part of this debate is that while the Constituent Assembly’s Advisory Council on
Fundamental Rights recommended incorporation of ‘due process of law’ in the Article
meant to secure ‘protection of life and personal liberty’, the Drafting Committee opted
for ‘procedure established by law’. Many members questioned this, arguing that
personal liberty would be in peril if the Parliament and parliamentarians abdicated
accountability, which was considered a possibility given the embryonic stage of
democracy in the country and considered the judiciary to be a perfect and deserving foil
for this situation.8 An apprehension, if not suspicion, of parliamentary accountability
was hallmark of this debate.
Thus, while the parliamentary system was the choice of the framers of the Indian
Constitution for the systemic responsibility, as opposed to systemic stability, it offered,
efficacy of both the representative system and responsibility/accountability mechanism
5 CAD, vol. VII, New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, pp. 1195-1258.
6 CAD, vol. VIII, New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, pp. 753-54.
7 CAD, vol. VIII, New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, pp. 86-87. Obviously, the extension of the term of
the Lok Sabha in 1976 during the emergency declared by Mrs. Indira Gandhi was against the spirit of the
Constitution as perceived by the framers.
8 CAD, Vol. VII, New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, pp. 842-55. Also see, Ajay K. Mehra, ‘“Due
Process” or “Procedure Established by Law”’: The Constituent Assembly’s Cogitations’, in Pran Chopra (ed.), The Supreme Court vs. the Constitution: A Challenge to Federalism, New Delhi: Sage,
2006.
5
under the Indian ground reality was continuously under microscope of the Constituent
Assembly. Clearly, the wise persons gathered to create the democratic republic of India
were concerned about the institutional aspects of the new polity in order to create
conditions for deepening of democratic culture in the country. Obviously, a societal
review of the emerging aspects of representation must critically examine the
Parliament’s role in ensuring the ‘daily assessment of responsibility’. This essay,
therefore, will begin by examining the recent trends emerging in the representational
process and character of the Indian Parliament and review how it has carried out its
responsibility of daily assessment during the past one year.
ISSUES IN REPRESENTATION
Two issues of representation, a carry over of the past one decade of politics,
dominated 2004. Before we review those two issues, it needs to be underlined that
the changing nature of representation in both the houses of Indian Parliament has been
mapped. However, that has not been an issue. Gender representation as well as entry
of persons with criminal background into the political arena and particularly their
entry into representative institutions, have dominated the discourse on representation
in India for the past one decade. Both have different, but significant, implications in
the context of Parliament, which deserve analyses.
Gender Representation
The issue of gender representation occupied centre stage of political discourse in the
country since the Panchayati Raj institutions and urban local bodies were given
constitutional protection of one-third representation to women under the 73rd
and 74th
amendments to the Constitution. The demand for similar representation in the
Parliament and in the State Legislatures has been vociferously made by women
politicians cutting across party lines since 1995. Civil society institutions, think tanks
and women’s bodies have articulated this demand in a more scientific manner,
critically examining the proposals put forward by the government. The demand for
33 percent representation, which has been accepted in principle in India since 73rd
and
74th
amendments, is also based on research conducted in the United States in the
1970s, on women's participation in business, which showed that 30 percent
representation by minorities could significantly influence the majority verdict. Drude
6
Dehlerup of the University of Stockholm extended these findings to women's
reservation in politics. She observed that while quotas are necessary to jump-start the
process of equality, the demand for quotas is a manifestation of growing impatience
with unequal political and social citizenship.9
Table 1: Representation of Women in Indian Parliament
Table 1 presents a rather grim state of affairs as far as gender representation in
the Indian Parliament is concerned. True, the number of women MPs in the Lok
Sabha has gone up from 22 (4.41 percent) in the first Lok Sabha in 1952 to 44 (8.10
percent) in the 14th
Lok Sabha, peaking to 49 (9.02 percent) in the 13th
Lok Sabha,
doubling in both numbers and percentages during half a century of Indian democracy,
a look at their number and percentage in the Rajya Sabha does not lead us to any trend
indicating a conscious effort to alter the gender bias in political representation. Of
course, representation of women in the Rajya Sabha has been better, averaging 9
percent as compared to 6.15 percent of the Lok Sabha, it peaked to 38 MPs and 15.51
percent in 1991. This too will have to be attributed to circumstances existing from
time to time rather than to any conscious planning.
Table 2: Success rate of Women Contestants
Lok Sabha Women contestants Elected women MPs Success rate
13th
Lok Sabha 247 49 19.83
percent
14th
Lok Sabha 177 44 24.85
percent
Source: Annual Report, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, GOI
Elections are not only about political representation from people’s point of
view, politically from the point of view of political parties, they are also about
maximizing their presence in legislatures. In a parliamentary system, it is particularly
important to form the government. In short, grabbing and/or maximizing political
power is the ultimate aim of any political game. Therefore, fielding candidates is
about political strategies. A look at the success rate of women candidates in elections
to the 13th
and 14th
Lok Sabha suggests that nearly 20 to 25 percent success rate might
still be considered on the lower side by most political parties. However, these figures
do not take into account a whole range of related issues like whom were these
candidates pitted against, whether they were fielded as losing candidates in strong
constituencies of others, in how many constituencies the women contested against
women and in how many they contested against men and looking at the large number
of candidates contesting elections, what has been the success rate of male candidates.
8
Another related issue which tends to weaken the case for gender representation, but
considered wise as an electoral strategy, is to field a woman kin of a deceased leader.
It is not surprising therefore that within couple of years of granting of 33
percent reservation to women under the 73rd
and 74th
amendments in local
government on a rotation basis, demand for such a reservation in Parliament as well
as in the State legislatures was not only made, but also conceded as a matter of
political principle. However, that was obviously not enough for this principle to find
a place in the Constitution of India. Unfortunately, attempts to establish reservations
for women in the Indian Parliament have evoked stiff resistance – even insecurities –
among MPs, unwilling to share power. The argument for gender-based reservation
has been successfully stopped with argument for quota within quota on caste basis
every time it has been tabled. Samajwadi Party and Rashtriya Janata Dal are among
the prominent protagonists for such an arrangement. Ironically, these parties are in
power in States that are among the very worst in gender indicators – maternal
mortality, women's literacy, etc. Neither is their stance consistent – while demanding
a caste quota within the women's reservation efforts, they show very little interest in
women's reservation within the already existing SC/ST reservation quotas.
The 81st Constitutional Amendment Bill tabled in the Lok Sabha in 1996 for
the purpose by the United Front government was not passed. The 85th constitutional
Amendment Bill, introduced in the Lok Sabha in December 1999 for the same
purpose also fell through. Committed to ‘fully empower women politically,
educationally, economically and legally’ the United Progressive Alliance government led
by the Indian National Congress that came to power after 14th general elections promised
in its common minimum programme that ‘it will take the lead to introduce legislation
for one-third reservations for women in Vidhan Sabhas and in the Lok Sabha’.
However, this legislation was not attempted in 2004. The Bill, as presented twice before
in the Lok Sabha, included the following key provisions:
One-third of all seats in Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabhas shall be reserved for
women.
Such reservation shall also apply in case of seats reserved for Scheduled
Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs).
There shall be rotation of seats so reserved for women.
Such rotation shall be determined by draw of lots, in such a manner that a seat
shall be reserved only once in a block of three general elections.
9
Obviously, the uncertainty introduced by reserving 181 seats of the Lok Sabha
for women has led to stiff resistance from the male dominated political parties against
such an amendment. It arises from the fact that not only would they lose such an
overwhelming number of seats compulsorily to women, but also from the fact that the
rotation clause would bar them from contesting from a constituency for more than two
consecutive terms. Many experts have also been concerned about emergence of
situation similar to Panch Pati at the State and national levels as well, i.e., as male
members of political families in villages became de facto rulers while their female
proxies became de jure Panch in the panchayats, there could be female proxies in the
parliament too. The proposal for restrictions to curb such situations violated
fundamental rights as well as the basic principles of democratic representation.
Further, an all-women contest as well as rotation of constituency might not be
advantageous to women in the long run. The proposal also restricts the reservation of
seats in the Lok Sabha and Legislative Assemblies, leaving out the Rajya Sabha and
Legislative Councils.
As stated, despite the commitment of the UPA government to it in the
Common Minimum programme, the bill was not presented in 2004, neither did the
government make any effort to build consensus on the issue. It continues to remain
one of the major issues relating to representation in Indian Parliament.
Criminalisation of Politics
Since the general elections to constitute the 14th
Lok Sabha took place in 2004, it is
worthwhile examining the records of those elected to represent the people of India to
comprehend the extent of criminalisation of politics. This phenomenon has been
under discussion nearly for a decade now and is critical to representation, the rule of
law and good governance.
There are three dimensions to criminalisation of politics relating to the issue of
representation. First, with the increasing compulsions of retaining political power at
any cost as well as due to increase in corrupt practices for self-perpetuation and self-
aggrandizement amongst the political class, political transgressions into criminality
have become visible and brazen. Second, since the line between criminality and
political goals blurred as a consequence, the use of criminals not only to win elections
with strong arm methods, but also to serve other political goals became prevalent.
10
Third, not only some politicians became tainted with criminality, high profile dons
with political connections succeeded in getting acceptance for their political stakes
and entered representative institutions like parliament and state legislatures. No
wonder, the debate on criminalisation of politics in India over the past decade and a
half has shifted from the use of criminals in politics to the entry of criminals into
politics.10
It is a substantive paradigm shift in not only the representative politics
(including in the operation of representative institutions of governance) in India, but
also in the theory and practice of representation. For, the use of criminals for
instigating violence, terrorising the voters to alter their voting options and ‘capturing
polling booths’ were aberrations introduced by desperate as well as unethical
politicians, subsequent assertion and later successful entry of the criminals in the
electoral and political arena is not mere aberration, it is a cancerous growth in the
Indian body politic, which is threatening the rule of law and the very basis of Indian
democracy as it grows unabated. Unfortunately, while pointing an accusing finger at
their rivals for encouraging criminalisation, the parties and leaders have used and
actively pursued winnability formula in giving powerful dons election tickets. In the
process, they have soft-pedaled this issue with the arguments that ‘my criminal is
cleaner than yours’ and that no one should be dubbed a criminal till convicted by a
court of law.
The Lok Sabha in its special session to commemorate the Golden Jubilee of
Indian independence on 31 August 1997 resolved: ‘That more especially, all political
parties shall undertake all such steps as will attain the objectives of ridding our polity
of criminalisation of politics.’11 In fact, this issue has also been raised by the Election
Commission of India (ECI) since 1998. Disqualification for criminal offences is
provided for in Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. As per
Section 8, a person is disqualified from contesting election only on conviction by the
10
Ajay K. Mehra, ‘Criminalisation of Indian Politics’, in K M de Silva, G H Peiris and S W R de A
Samarasinghe (eds.), Corruption in South Asia: India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, International Centre for
Ethnic Studies, Kandy, Sri Lanka, 2002, pp. 99-138.
11 On the same occasion, in his address to the nation on 15 August 1997 at the joint sitting of the two
houses of parliament President of India HE K. R. Narayanan said:
Sheer opportunism and valueless power-politics have taken over the place and principles of
idelaism, relationship between people, groups and parties…. And corruption is corroding the vitals of our politics and society…. It seems the people have to be in the forefront of the fight
against corruption, communalism, casteism and criminalisation of politics and life, in the
country. (Italics mine)
11
Court of Law, which does not take place so easily. The instances of persons charged
with serious and heinous crimes like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. contesting election,
pending their trial, and even getting elected in a large number of cases has been
increasing year after year and election after election both in the Lok Sabha and
Legislative Assemblies of various States.
This has over the years led to a very undesirable and embarrassing situation of
outlaws becoming law makers and moving around under police protection.
Obviously, as we move ahead to review the situation seven years since the Parliament
resolved against criminalisation of politics,12
the state of affairs appears to be far
worse. For example, a survey of 3182 candidates cutting across party lines during
2004 Lok Sabha elections by the Association of Democratic Rights revealed that 518
(16.28 percent) of them had criminal antecedents. A study by ‘Outlook’ magazine
revealed that finally nearly 100 members elected to the fourteenth Lok Sabha have
been chargesheeted in criminal cases, ranging from minor misdemeanours like
‘disturbing the peace’ to the omnibus charge of ‘rioting’ to serious offences like
murder, rape and dacoity.13
This was confirmed further by a detailed and systematic
study on criminalisation and related aspects of the 14th
Lok Sabha by the Public
Affairs Centre, Bangalore, which revealed that over one-fourth of the MPs had
criminal background, of which over fifty percent with the most serious criminal cases
were from UP, Bihar, Jharkhand and MP. The regional parties accounted for a
majority of the MPs with serious criminal cases against them. The study also found
correlation between lower education levels and criminal antecedents of the MPs (see
Table 3).14
12
Mulayam Singh Yadav, the Samajwadi Party chief from Uttar Pradesh, the then Union Defence
Minister and the current Chief Minister of UP, added a qualifier, as it were, to this resolution. He said
in the course of discussion: ‘the N N Vohra Committee Report had talked of a nexus between judges and criminals, and bureaucrats and criminals as well. But only the nexus between politicians and
criminals is mentioned.’(The Pioneer, 29 August 1997). Though the resolution was overwhelmingly
supported by the entire House, Mulayam Singh Yadav’s qualifying remark was not merely a singular jarring note, it echoed wider feelings cutting across party lines and pointed out the Achilles’ heel, as it were, in the Lok Sabha resolution on that solemn occasion.
13 Poornima Joshi, Bhavdeep Kang and Rajesh Sinha, ‘The Law Vs The Legislator’, Outlook India,
Monday 21 June 2004.
14 Samuel Paul and M. Vivekananda, ‘Holding A Mirror to the New Lok Sabha’,
watched keenly and determine the campaign against criminalisation of politics in the
years to come.
In the mean time it would be worthwhile highlighting the dangers of
criminalisation of a representative institution like the Indian parliament in a system of
government that represents the fusion of executive and legislative powers in the
representative legislature. The anomalies arising out of it were visible when Mr.
Shibu Soren, Union Minister for coal in the United Progressive Alliance government
went underground in July 2004 when arrest warrant was issued against him in a 30
year old case of rioting and killing of 11 people in Chirrudih in the undivided state of
Bihar (now in Jharkhand). Of course, he resigned on 24 July 2004, but by then the
damage to both the Parliament and the government was done from two perspectives.
First, there were hints that the BJP-led government in Jharkhand had dug up the case
to embarrass the UPA government and to neutralise Mr. Shibu Soren’s claim to the
State’s Chief Ministership; second, even if three decades back, the political movement
had transgressed democratic norms to the extent that criminal charges could be
framed against a Union Minister who had to abscond forgetting his oath to the
Constitution and the rule of law. Indeed, more bizarre and paradoxical situations are
likely to emerge if we realise that there are more ministers in the government, who
might fall into similar situation, even if partisanship and selectiveness drives
application of the rule of law.
PARLIAMENT, PARLIAMENTARIANS AND ACCOUNTABILITY
The task of Parliament is to ensure good governance in the country. It performs this
task through its representative, legislative and accountability functions, which are
carried out on the floor of the tow houses as well as in parliamentary committees;
sometimes issues spill over on streets. How has the Indian Parliament performed
these two functions during 2004? For, while ensuring governmental responsibility to
the house, the Parliament too is responsible to the people, who have elected it. Its
members have to account for their actions every five years.
The assessments of the performance of the Parliament in 2002 and 200320
the
Social Watch had indicated a mix of achievements and failures. While observing that
20
see Social Watch India, 2003 and 2004.
17
the Parliament has conducted important business, though not sufficient enough even
in terms of the business it lined up for itself, or it is generally expected to perform,
despite a lot of din, noise and chaos, the impression of the Parliament increasingly
becoming a derelict both representationally as well as in role performance has gained
ground.21
Hence, as we commence our assessment of Parliament in 2004, it would be
worthwhile reflecting upon what have been considered as Parliament’s derelictions.
Indeed, progressive qualitative and quantitative decline of parliamentary behaviour
and functioning in recent years has been recorded.22
However, we must recall Lord
Bryce’s caution against the temptation to confer on bygone days the aura of golden
age.23
Balveer Arora has argued that ‘despite outward appearances and commonly
held beliefs, the signs of disorder that India’s parliamentary system frequently
displays are in fact the consequences of its progressive democratisation.’ He
attributes the decline in quantity and quality of work accomplished by the institution
to the increasing competitiveness in the Indian polity leading to contentious issues
being aired and contested on the floor of Parliament and changing composition of the
representative body (‘Oppression, subjugation and humiliation of dalits, minorities
and women seeking their rightful place under the sun …’).24 Clearly, an evaluation of
21
See A. Surya Prakash, What Ails Indian Parliament, New Delhi: Indus, 1995; also see A. Surya
Prakash, ‘Parliamentary Questions as Instruments of Accountability’, in Ajay K. Mehra and Gert W. Kueck, The Indian Parliament: A Comparative Perspective, New Delhi: Konark, 2003, pp. 233-268;
Jayaprakash Narayan, ‘Elections and Representational Legitimacy’, in Ajay K. Mehra and Gert W. Kueck, The Indian Parliament: A Comparative Perspective, New Delhi: Konark, 2003, pp. 86-136;
Madhav Godbole, ‘Parliament and Democratic Governance’, in Ajay K. Mehra and Gert W. Kueck, The Indian Parliament: A Comparative Perspective, New Delhi: Konark, 2003, pp. 137-172 and
Madhav Godbole, Pubic Accountability and Transparency: The Imperatives of Good Governance, New
Delhi: Orient Longman, 2003.
22 Madhav Godbole, Pubic Accountability and Transparency: The Imperatives of Good Governance,
New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2003.
23 He said:
Every traveller who, curious in political affairs, enquires in the countries which he visits how
their legislative bodies are working, receives from the elder men the same discouraging
answer. They tell him, in terms much the same everywhere, that there is less brilliant
speaking than in the days of their own youth, that the tone of manners has declined, that the
best citizens are less disposed to enter the chamber, that its proceedings are less fully reported
and excite less interest, that a seat in it confers less social status, and that, for one reason or
another, the respect felt for it has waned.
Lord Bryce, Modern Democracies, Macmillan, 1921.
24 Baveer Arora, ‘The Indian Parliament and Democracy’, in Ajay K. Mehra and Gert W. Kueck, The
Indian Parliament: A Comparative Perspective, New Delhi: Konark, 2003, pp. 15-26.
18
Parliament in an evolving democracy like India should be undertaken keeping in view
the contemporary stirrings in society and their impact on processes and institutions.
2004 was the year of general election when the 13th
Lok Sabha was dissolved
on February 6 and the 14th
Lok Sabha was constituted. Obviously, the parliamentary
system as well as the government were in ‘exiting’ mode in the first half of the year
and in ‘settling’ mode in the next half of the year.25 The National Democratic
Alliance government was voted out of power and United Progressive Alliance
government took its time to crystallize and settle down. So, parliamentary business
was bound to be low in a year of governmental transition because the 13th
Lok Sabha
met only to pass the vote on account for the general budget as well as the railways.
Performance Appraisal
Both the houses of Parliament, meet thrice a year – the budget session, the monsoon
session and the winter session – during which they conduct all the business. Social
Watch reports of the previous years have pointed out the following negative trends in
the work of Parliament:
Decline in the number of sittings per year, decline in the average number of
questions that come up for oral answers in the two houses.
Decline in the time devoted by Parliament to budget-related discussions.
Rise in the number of unfulfilled promises by government.
Perfunctory or disinterested attitude of member of parliament (MPs) to serious
issues like drought, plight of farmers, insufficient food and drinking water for
a large mass of people.
Wastage of parliamentary time on political controversies.
There is nothing to suggest that the trend would have changed substantially in
2004. However, the emerging trends could be examined keeping in view the limited
parliamentary time available and the perspective of democratisation of the society and
polity we have outlined above.
Cacophonic Tide Drowns Parliamentary Time
25
The Union Cabinet in its meeting on 27 January 2004 took the decision to disolve the 13th
Lok
Sabha. The winter session of Parliament commenced on 29 January 2004 for a week and transacted
essential business of passing the vote on account for the general budget as well as the railways till the
next Lok Sabha was constituted and convened. On February 6, 2004 the President of India issued the
communique to dissolve the Lok Sabha. The 14th
Lok Sabha was constituted on 17 May 2004 and its
first session was held on 2 June 2004.
19
Parliaments the world over have emerged as arenas of political contestations. Aside
from performing their conventional tasks of representing their constituencies –
territorial, political and socio-economic – legislating, ensuring and seeking
accountability and responsibility, they utilise the parliamentary time for political
consolidation (the treasury benches) and regeneration (the opposition). Indeed, in
situations of intense countrywide political competition as in India for the past decade
and a half, during which the party system has been fragmented under the pressure of
social plurality and diversity,26
the floor of Parliament has lately been used not only to
settle past and present political scores, but also to prepare for the future political and
electoral battles – for the Lok Sabha, Vidhan Sabhas and even for the Panchayati Raj
Institutions (PRI).
Table 5: Number of Sittings
Fourteenth Lok Sabha
Session Duration Sittings Days
1st
June 2, 2004 to June 10, 204 7 9
2nd
July 5, 2004 to August 26, 2004 24 53
3rd
December 1, 2004 to December 23, 2004 17 23
Rajya Sabha
201st
June 4, 2004 to June 10, 2004 5 7
202nd
July 5, 2004 to August 26, 2004 24 53
203rd
December 1, 2004 to December 23, 2004 17 23
This has been visible statistically in the 5.28 percent of the time lost in
pandemonium in the 11th
Lok Sabha (1996-98) increased to 10.66 in the 12th
Lok
Sabha (1998-99) and more than doubled to 22.4 percent in the 13th
Lok Sabha (1999-
2004). The 14th
Lok Sabha, which commenced only in June 2004 during which it
witnessed the delayed budget session (due to the parliamentary elections) and the
Monsoon and Winter sessions, lost 26 percent of its time in interruptions arising out
of various political controversies. During the same period the Rajya Sabha lost a total
26
See, Ajay K. Mehra, D. D. Khanna and Gert W. Kueck, Politcal Parties and Party Systems, New
Delhi: Sage, 2003.
20
of 29 percent of its time during its 201st, 202
nd and 203
rd sessions, obviously on
corresponding issues (see Table 5 and 6). This is a considerable rise over the time
lost in the 12th
Lok Sabha (10.66 percent) and 13th
Lok Sabha (22.4 percent). In fact,
if we go sessionwise the first two sessions of the Lok Sabha suffered 38 percent loss
of time, while the corresponding sessions of the Rajya Sabha suffered a whopping 46
percent loss of time.
Table 6: Time Lost on Adjournments due to Interruptions
Fourteenth Lok Sabha
Session Total Time Time Lost on Adjournments due
to Interruptions
percentage of time Lost
on adjournment
Hours Minutes Hours Minutes
1st
42 0 15 57 38
2nd
144 0 54 43 38
3rd
102 0 4 53 5
Total 288 0 75 33 26
Rajya Sabha
Session Hours Minutes Hours Minutes
201st
25 0 11 23 46
202nd
120 0 54 47 46
203rd
85 0 1 16 1.5
Total 230 0 67 26 29
Even though it is not easy to list each of the issues that led to frayed tempers
of the Indian parliamentarians, it is possible and desirable to look at and analyse some
of the issues and outline the emerging trends regarding disruptions and boycott of the
parliament’s session as a political strategy. The Lok Sabha witnessed uproarious
scene on June 4, 2004 as soon as the Speaker asked the Prime Minister to introduce
his Council of Ministers. The opposition made an issue about the ‘tainted’
parliamentarians being made ministers in the UPA government. The Lok Sabha had
to be adjourned for a couple of days. This was repeated again on July 19, on the third
21
day of the budget session, when the NDA protested against the disappearance of
union coal minister Shibu Soren after an arrest warrant was issued against him by a
Jharkhand court.27
On August 24 the railway budget was passed amid pandemonium
on the move to arrest of Ms. Uma Bharti, then BJP Chief Minister of Madhya
Pradesh.28
Again in December there were protests leading to pandemonium in the
Lok Sabha on a letter written by the estranged daughter-in-law of the leader of the
opposition L. K. Advani to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh Chief with allegations
of ‘physical and mental’ exploitation.29
These three incidents, which led to the loss of significant parliamentary time
and public money deserve analysis. Aside from displaying political hypocrisy that all
the parties in the country are afflicted with, these three incidents reflect trivialisation
of the rule of law by the Indian lawmakers. Indeed, criminalisation of politics and
public life has emerged as a hydraheaded monster for India, but despite their golden
jubilee hypocritical resolution in Parliament, most political parties and the political
leaders at the highest level have treated the issue with their characteristic hypocrisy.
No wonder, while the BJP-led NDA government in Jharkhand digs up three decade
old case against Shibu Soren, the Congress-led coalition digs up a similarly old case
against the BJP’s firebrand Sadhvi and the then Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh.
To reduce this ridiculous to bizarre, the Union Minister absconds and the Chief
Minister resigns and attempts to script another drama to embarrass the State
government, the Central government and the UPA (Congress party in particular).
Both are eventually released, leaving the issue of ‘tainted minister (or Chief
Minister)’, and in the process of the criminally tainted parliamentarians, unattended.
Predictably, none of the parties rising to create pandemonium in Parliament attempted
either a debate, or declaration, let alone a legislation, on the vital issue of
27
The NDA protested when Union Coal Minister Shibu Soren, President of Jharkhand Mukti Morcha,
a constituent of the United Progressive Alliance, went underground without resigning his post when a
Jharkhand court issued warrant against him in connection with the Chirrudih massacre in 1975.
28 Ms. Uma Bharti was found guilty of inciting violence and riot by a court in Hubli, Karnataka, in
1995 by trying to hoist national flag in the Idgah ground. She later resigned the post and was arrested
in Karnataka on August 25, 2004. Later, within a week, all the cases against her were withdrawn and
she was released.
29 Ms Advani wrote in Hindi, ‘I am writing this letter today [Nov. 19, 2004] with a heavy heart. When I
heard that Mr Advani had been elected party president, some old images came to my mind. I cannot
explain these incidents in words. These are matters that are not hidden from you and will cause every
Indian and Hindu society to hang its head in shame.’ http://www.milligazette.com/dailyupdate/2004/20041128.htm
National Social Watch India, Citizens’ Report on Governance and Development, New Delhi: Pearson, 2006
Working Through Committees
Parliamentary committees have evolved over centuries to be important instruments of
accountability of the representative system that parliaments embody the world over.
Parliament and its committees are designed to ensure, that ‘power is exercised within the
limits set by (it) … and to acceptable standards of economy, propriety and justice.’36
Parliamentary control in democratic systems has come to imply, in the words of Crick,
‘influence not direct power; advice not command; criticism not obstruction; security not
initiation; and publicity not secrecy’. He further elaborates:
Parliamentary control is not the stop switch, it is the tuning, the tone and the amplifire
of a system of communication which tells the government what the electorate want
(rightly or wrongly) and what they will stand for (rightly or wrongly) and tells the
electorate what is possible … within the resources available.37
Even though the committee system in the Indian parliament has reached the present
stage through gradual process of evolution and is still in the process of evolving, its
functioning is an important indicator not only of the parliamentary efficiency of making the
executive accountable, but also of the Parliament’s own accountability. Tables 12 and 13
present the record of the functioning of the Standing and other committees in the 14th
Lok
Sabha during the second and third sessions in 2004. The parliamentary committees in India
have not been comprehensively studied, therefore, the parameters of their efficacy have not
been clearly delineated. Thus, despite the general feeling that the committee system in Indian
Parliament requires reforms, there is no efficiency index on which to judge the role of
parliamentary committees in India. It is nonetheless expected that the problems and issues of
representation and accountability discussed above would generally reflect in the committee
system too, for the same members would be running the committees.
We have used four parameters in looking at the committees – number of sittings each
committee has had during different sessions of the Lok Sabha, duration for which they met,
average attendance in each session and the reports presented by these committees. However,
as stated earlier, in the absence of an in-depth and comprehensive study of the working of the
36
As quoted by Sandeep Shastri, Dynamics of Legislative Control over Administration, New Delhi: Uppal,
1994, p. 4.
37 Bernard Crick, The Reform of Parliament, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966, pp. 77-78.
33
parliamentary committees in India, it would be unfair to pronounce a definitive judgment on
them.
The indicators used by us suggest that all the Standing Committees had a number of
sittings during the second session of the Lok Sabha, while all but two (Agriculture and Food,
Consumer Affairs and Public Distribution) had one or more sittings in the third session.
Since after the constitution of the 14th
Lok Sabha and after its inaugural and budget session in
June 2004 the committees were constituted by August, the sittings of the committees during
the second session was expected. The average time devoted in the sitting of each of the
committees during the second session was two hours, while it varied between 30 minutes to
two and a half hours in the third session. The attendance of members varied between 68.5
percent to 41.4 percent in the second session and from 52 percent to 29 percent in the third
session. Obviously, the first phase of the meeting in the second session generated more
interest than in the third session. All the Standing Committees produced one or more reports
in the second session, while five committees did not produce original or action taken report in
the third session. Eight committees presented action taken report in the third session of the
Lok Sabha (Table 12).
We used similar indicators to look at the functioning of the fourteen Parliamentary
Committees (other than Financial and Standing Committees). These committees had fewer
meetings and spent lesser time than the Standing Committees. All but four of these
committees in the second session and eight committees in the third session had their sittings
during the year. Joint Committee on Offices of Profit and Joint Committee on Salaries and
Allowances of MPs did not have any sitting during either of the sessions. The Business
Advisory Committee was the most active committee, having met during both the sessions for
over an hour with close to 80 percent attendance and it produced three reports in each of the
sessions. Only two committees (Committee on Petitions and Committee on Welfare of SC
and ST) presented action taken reports.
The meetings of the committees are held in camera and the demand for making the
meetings open to public, at least on a selective basis, has not been accepted yet. It is,
therefore, not possible to comment on how participative these meetings are and what kind of
problems these committees face in dealing with issues, many of which are highly technical in
nature. It has been observed that research and technical support available to the
parliamentary committees are deficient and deserve to be strengthened. Critical readings of
34
the Department Related Standing Committees (DRSC) reveal that the Committees have done
serious and thorough work. The reports of the DRSCs have often been critical of the
concerned departments for deficient performance, or spending their grants at the fag end of
the financial year. They have also commented on the decreasing financial allocation to some
of the ministries. Some of the DRSCs have come down very heavily on the Ministries and
Departments, particularly on the bureaucracy, for ignoring their advice, for it has been
pointed out that most of the suggestions of the committees contained in their various reports
is not implemented.38
From this perspective, at least some of the parliamentary committees
have been performing their role. Indeed, the efficacy of the committee system has been
questioned and it is necessary to develop a holistic view on how the parliamentary
committees could be made efficacious for exercising effective control over the executive.
Parliament in Development
Ever since the Members of Parliament Local Area Development Scheme (MPLADS), which
was launched in December 1993 to enable MPs to recommend development schemes in their
constituencies of upto Rs. 1 crore (10 million) and later doubled in 1998-99, came into
existence, it has received flak for low utilisation and high corruption. The CAG report 2001,
pointed to poor utilisation of the fund, poor monitoring by the Ministry, poor quality and at
times inadmissible work, and suspected fraud and corruption by tinkering with labour
material ratios, appropriation of money meant for labour expenses by obtaining fake muster
rolls and large scale evidence of incomplete works.39
Planning Commission’s evaluation of
the MPLADS did not yield a better result. It found that most of the MPs while allocating
funds to individual works seem to be thrifty, despite the fact that there is a large unspent
balance of MPLADS. The Commission’s evaluation team found financial mismanagement of
the scheme and consequent inflated reporting of the amount spent. It pointed out that
allocation of insufficient fund by MPs leaves many of the works incomplete, though often
officially reported as complete, or completed by compromising the quality of the asset. In
38
Sandeep Shashtri, ‘Parliamentary Committees in India and Legislative Control over Administration’, in Ajay K. Mehra and Gert W. Kueck, The Indian Parliament: A Comparative Perspective, New Delhi: Konark, 2003,
pp. 220-22.
39 Purnima S. Tripathi, ‘The case against MPLADS’, Frontline, 21 (22), Oct. 23 - Nov. 05, 2004; Siba Sankar
Mohanty, ‘Rhetoric and Reality of MPLADS’, New Delhi: Centre for Budget and Governance Accountability, 2004, p.i.
35
quite a few cases allocation by the MP had to be supplemented by funds from a number of
sources to complete the work. Monitoring was found to be weak and insufficient as most
Collectors could not find time to visit the work sites and pleaded lack of staff to do so.40
Table 14: Utilisation of MPLADS (Rs. in crore)
As On Funds Released by
Government of India
Expenditure Incurred by
the District Administration
percent
Utilisation
Over Release
31.03.2002 8897.80 6610.18 74.29
31.03.2003 10497.80 8272.70 78.80
31.03.2004 12179.80 10009.38 82.18
30.06.2005 14058.80 12283.26 87.37
Source: complied from Lok Sabha Unstarred Question.
Table 14 shows that while still the MPLADS funds are not fully utilised, the percent
of utilisation of released funds is increasing over the years. Obviously, increasingly the MPs
are utilising the funds, which should be considered a positive feature on a progression basis.
A Statewise look at the data on percentage of utilisation of the funds on the other hand shows
variations ranging between 70s and 90s, while MP-wise data available for earlier years shows
that many of the MPs did not use the fund at all. Indeed, the current state of utilisation of the
MPLADS and its indictment by independent evaluations as well as the one by the Planning
Commission, does not present a very bright picture of the scheme. The ground level realities
present a mixed a picture, where some MPs have made a good use of the funds by not only
funding development but also creating assets, as shown in the Planning Commission
evaluation, in many cases it has created another network for corruption and siphoning off
public money. From this perspective the contrary demands for scrapping this fund and
doubling its amount, as some young MPs have been demanding with the logic that those who
have been utilising it for the benefit of their constituency should not be made to suffer due to
those who have been derelict, is not easy to balance.
An overall assessment of the functioning of the MPLADS, however, presents a mixed
picture both of the Parliament and the MPs, whether we look at it from the representational
point of view, or from the accountability point of view. Parliament as an institution would
perform both its desired functions as good as the people’s representatives sitting their would
perform theirs. The functioning of the MPLADS shows that the representational crisis
arising out of criminalisation of politics (which subsumes, rather begins from, a high degree
of corruption) and accountability deficit reflected in pandemonium and loss of parliamentary
time, despite the competitive political perspective discussed above, is a serious reality, which
deserves to be discussed and discoursed in public forums.
Conclusion
This appraisal of the Indian Parliament has been attempted with the issues of representation
and accountability as the main criteria. This also takes into account the impact of the
processes and dynamics of democratisation on the functioning of parliament, which have
often been reflected in pandemonium on the floor of both the houses. While future analyses
of and appraisal of the Indian Parliament from the social watch perspective is being suggested
on this line a continuous monitoring of the events with more data is required.
Parliamentary system of government was adopted in India because it ensured ‘a daily
assessment of responsibility’. The framers of the Indian constitution had visualized a system
wherein the MPs representing the multitude of India would be governing the country by no
only becoming a mirror of society at the national seat of power, but also by effectively
linking the society to polity. Simultaneously, the parliament in India was expected to become
and it did become an instrument and the part of the process of democratization of the Indian
society and polity.
However, two issues of representation have haunted Indian Parliament for the past
two decades and they continued to remain unresolved in 2004, the year that witnessed the
Lok Sabha being constituted 14th
time since 1952. First issue is the sanctity of the central
pillar of the Indian democracy being violated by nearly one-fourth of the Members of
Parliament with criminal records. Since these members represent both major national parties
and smaller regional parties, it obviously reflects a deep political nexus, which is disturbing.
The social watch analysis needs to take this into account with comprehensive data base and
continuous monitoring. The second issue relates to gender representation and that too
deserves a sustained campaign by the social watch.
The accountability role of the Indian Parliament too can not be simplistically analysed
in terms of time lost due to contestations leading to pandemonium. Issues of contestations
from power, socio-economic and party politics perspective deserve more nuanced analyses.
37
While ‘what’ and ‘how much’ parliamentarians did in a year is a valid criteria, ‘what they did
not do’, ‘why not’, ‘what kind of contestations held up parliamentary proceedings’ too
deserve to be understood to fully comprehend the process of democratisation in India. It
would be an important question to ponder over in near future as to what impact the process of
democratisation is having on democratic institutions, particularly whether it is strengthening
the institutions of democracy or weakening it.
38
Appendix 1
Affidavit In Form 26(Rule 4A)
Affirming That There is no Criminal Case41
ELECTION COMMISION OF INDIA
Nirvachan Sadan, Ashoka Road, New Delhi – 110 001.
No. ECI/PN/24/2002
Dated : 28th
June, 2002
PRESS NOTE
Subject: Supreme Court’s order dated 2nd May, 2002 relating to right to information of
electors regarding criminal antecedents, assets and liabilities and educational
qualifications of candidates – implementation of the order.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, by its order dated 2nd May, 2002 in Civil Appeal
No.7178 of 2001 (Union of India v Association for Democratic reforms and another), has
directed as follows: - “The Election Commission is directed to call for information on
affidavit by issuing necessary order in exercise of its power under art 324 of the Constitution
of India from each candidate seeking election to Parliament or a state legislature as a
necessary part of his nomination paper, furnishing therein, information on the following
aspects in relation to his/her candidature: -
(1) Whether the candidate is convicted/acquitted/ discharged of any criminal offence in the
past-if any, whether he is punished with imprisonment or fine?
(2) Prior to six months of filing of nomination, whether the candidate is accused in any
pending case, of any offence punishable with imprisonment for two years or more, and in
which charge is framed or cognizance is taken by the court of law. If so, the details thereof.
(3) The assets (immovable, movable, bank balances etc) of a candidate and of his/her spouse
and that of dependants.
(4) Liabilities, if any, particularly whether there are any over dues of any public financial
institution or government dues.
(5) The educational qualifications of the candidate.” 2. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also observed in its aforesaid order dated 2nd
May, 2002
that ‘the Election Commission has from time to time issued instructions in order to meet with
the situation where the field is unoccupied by the legislation’ and has further directed that ‘the norms and modalities to carry out and give effect to the aforesaid directions should be drawn up properly by the Election Commission as early as possible and in any case within
two months’. 3. The Election Commission, on detailed consideration of the matter, was of the view that the
most efficacious manner of implementing the above judgment and order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court would be by amending Forms 2A to 2E appended to the Conduct of Elections
Rules 1961 (forms of nomination papers to be filed at elections to Parliament and State
Legislatures), and accordingly approached the Government of India in the Ministry of Law,
Justice and Company Affairs by the Commission’s letter dated 14th May, 2002 for suitably
4. The Government of India in the Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs has
informed the Commission by its letter dated 19th
June, 2002 that the matter of amending the
forms ofnomination papers is receiving consideration of the Government and that the
Government hasconvened a meeting of political parties for consideration of the matter on 8th
July, 2002.
5. The Commission feels duty bound to implement the above referred order dated 2nd
May
2002 of the Hon’ble Supreme Court within two months from the date of pronouncement of that order, that is to say, by 1
st July 2002, as the said order has the force of law within the
meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution and is enforceable throughout the territory of India
under Article 142 of the Constitution
6. Therefore, in pursuance of the said order dated 2nd
May, 2002 of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court, the Commission has made a detailed Order on 28th
June, 2002 under Article 324 of
the Constitution, containing the norms and modalities to carry out and give effect to the
directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reproduced in para 1 above. A copy of the said
Order bearing No.3/ER/2002/ JS-II/Vol.III dated 28th
June, 2002 is annexed hereto.
7. A perusal of the Commission’s Order will show that the Commission has prescribed, in para 14(1) of the Order, an affidavit (Annexure-1 to the said Order) which will have to be
filed by each candidate at the time of filing his nomination paper for any election to the
Council of States, House of the People, Legislative Assembly of a State or Legislative
Council of a State. The consequences of failure on the part of the candidate to furnish the said
affidavit or to furnish wrong or incomplete information or suppression of any material
information have also been spelt out clearly in paras 14(3) and 14(4) of the Order. The
manner of dissemination of the information furnished by the candidate in the said affidavit
has also been specified in paras14(5) and 14(6) of the Order.
(C.R. BRAHMAM)
SECRETARY
ELECTION COMMISION OF INDIA
Nirvachan Sadan, Ashoka Road, New Delhi – 110 001.
No. 3/ER/2002/JS-II/Vol-III
Dated : 28th
June, 2002
O R D E R 1. Whereas, the superintendence, direction and control, inter alia, of all elections to
Parliament and to the Legislature of every State are vested in the Election Commission by
Article 324 (1) of the Constitution of India;
2. And whereas, the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi, by its order dated 2nd November, 2000 in
Writ Petition No. 7257 of 1999 (Association for Democratic Reforms v Union of India and
Others) held that for making a right choice by electors in regard to the candidate at the
election, it was essential that the past of the candidate should not be kept in the dark as it was
not in the interest of the democracy and well-being of the country, and directed the Election
Commission to secure to voters the following information pertaining to each of the
candidates contesting elections to Parliament and to the State Legislatures and the parties
they represent: -
(1) Whether the candidate is accused of any offence(s) punishable with imprisonment? if so,
the details thereof;
(2) Assets possessed by a candidate, his or her spouse and dependent relations;
40
(3) Facts giving insight to candidate’s competence, capacity and suitability for acting as parliamentarian or legislator including details of his/her educational qualifications;
(4) Information which the Election Commission considers necessary for judging the capacity
and capability of the political party fielding the candidate for election to Parliament or the
State Legislature.;
3. And whereas, the Union of India filed an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India [Civil Appeal No.7178 of 2001 – Union of India v Association for Democratic Reforms
and Another] contending that the High Court ought to have directed the writ petitioners to
approach the Parliament for appropriate amendments to the law instead of directing the
Election Commission of India to implement the same; 4. And whereas, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has, by its order dated 2
nd May, 2002, heldas follows: -
“(1) The jurisdiction of the Election Commission is wide enough to include all powers necessary for smooth conduct of elections and the word ‘elections’ is used in a wide sense to include the entire process of election which consists of several stages and embraces many
steps.
(2) The limitation on plenary character of power is when the Parliament or state legislature
has made a valid law relating to or in connection with elections, the Commission is required
to act in conformity with the said provisions. In case where law is silent, art 324 is a reservoir
of power to act for the avowed purpose of having free and fair election. Constitution has
taken care of leaving scope for exercise of residuary power by the Commission in its own
right as a creature of the Constitution in the infinite variety of situations that may emerge
from time to time in a large democracy, as every contingency could not be foreseen or
anticipated by the enacted laws or the rules. By issuing necessary directions Commission can
fill the vacuum till there is legislation on the subject. In Kanhiya Lal Omar’s case (AIR 1986 SC 111), the court construed the expressions ‘superintendence, direction and control’ in art 324(1) and held that a direction may mean an order issued to a particular individual or a
precept which may have to follow and it may be a specific or a general order and such phrase
should be construed liberally empowering the Election Commission to issue such orders.
(3) The word ‘elections’ includes the entire process of election which consists of several stages and it embraces many steps, some of which have an important bearing on the process
of choosing a candidate. Fair election contemplates disclosure by the candidate of his past
including the assets held by him so as to give a proper choice to the candidate (sic) (elector)
according to his thinking and opinion. As stated earlier, in Common Cause case [(1996) 2
SCC 752], the court dealt with a contention that elections in the country are fought with the
help of money power which is gathered from black sources and once elected to power, it
becomes easy to collect tons of black money, which is used for retaining power and for re-
election. If on affidavit a candidate is required to disclose the assets held by him at the time
of election, voter can decide whether he could be re-elected even in case where he has
collected tons of money.
(4) To maintain the purity of elections and in particular to bring transparency in the process
of election, the Commission can ask the candidates about the expenditure incurred by the
political parties and this transparency in the process of election would include transparency of
a candidate who seeks election or re-election. In a democracy, the electoral process has a
strategic role. The little man of this country would have basic elementary right to know full
particulars of a candidate who is to represent him in Parliament where laws to bind his liberty
and property may be enacted.
41
(5) The right to get information in democracy is recognised all throughout and it is natural
right flowing from the concept of democracy. At this stage, we would refer to art 19(1) and
(2) of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights which is as under:-
(1) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
(2) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
(6) Cumulative reading of plethora of decisions of this court as referred to, it is clear that if
the field meant for legislature and executive is left unoccupied detrimental to the public
interest, this court would have ample jurisdiction under art 32 read with arts 141 and 142 of
the Constitution to issue necessary directions to the executive to subserve public interest.
(7) Under our Constitution, art 19(1)(a) provides for freedom of speech and expression.
Voters’ speech or expression in case of election would include casting of votes that is to say, voter speaks out or expresses by casting vote. For this purpose, information about the
candidate to be selected is must. Voter’s (little man-citizen’s) right to know antecedents including criminal past of his candidate contesting election for MP or MLA is much more
fundamental and basic for survival of democracy. The little man may think over before
making his choice of electing law breakers as law makers.”; 5. And whereas, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, by its aforesaid order dated 2nd
May, 2002, has
directed as follows: -
“The Election Commission is directed to call for information on affidavit by issuing
necessary order in exercise of its power under art 324 of the Constitution of India from each
candidate seeking election to Parliament or a state legislature as a necessary part of his
nomination paper, furnishing therein, information on the following aspects in relation to
his/her candidature:-
(1) Whether the candidate is convicted/acquitted/ discharged of any criminal offence in the
past-if any, whether he is punished with imprisonment or fine?
(2) Prior to six months of filing of nomination, whether the candidate is accused in any
pending case, of any offence punishable with imprisonment for two years or more, and in
which charge is framed or cognizance is taken by the court of law. If so, the details thereof.
(3) The assets (immovable, movable, bank balances etc) of a candidate and of his/her spouse
and that of dependants.
(4) Liabilities, if any, particularly whether there are any over dues of any public financial
institution or government dues.
(5) The educational qualifications of the candidate.”; 6. And whereas, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in its aforesaid order dated 2nd
May, 2002,
further observed that ‘the Election Commission has from time to time issued instructions in order to meet with the situation where the field is unoccupied by the legislation’ and has further directed that ‘the norms and modalities to carry out and give effect to the aforesaid directions should be drawn up properly by the Election Commission as early as possible and
in any case within two months’; 7. And whereas, the Election Commission, on detailed consideration of the matter, was of the
view that the most efficacious manner of implementing the above judgment and order of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court would be by amending Forms 2A to 2E appended to the Conduct of
Elections Rules 1961 (forms of nomination papers to be filed at elections to Parliament and
State Legislatures), and accordingly approached the Government of India in the Ministry of
42
Law, Justice and Company Affairs by the Commission’s letter dated 14th May, 2002 for
suitably amending the said forms;
8. And whereas, the Commission also furnished to the Ministry of Law, Justice and Company
Affairs the drafts of the forms of nomination papers (Forms 2A to 2E) as sought to be
revised;
9. And whereas, the Government of India in the Ministry of Law, Justice and Company
Affairs has, by their letter dated 19th
June, 2002, informed the Commission that the matter of
amending the forms of nomination papers is receiving consideration of the Government and
that the Government has convened a meeting of the political parties for consideration of the
matter on 8th
July, 2002;
10. And whereas, the Government of India has, by its aforesaid letter dated 19th
June,
2002,requested the Commission to approach the Hon’ble Supreme Court to give further two months time beyond 1
st July, 2002 for the implementation of the Hon’ble Court’s order dated
2nd
May, 2002;
11. And whereas, the Commission has, by its letter dated 21st June, 2002, informed the
Government of India that it is for the Union of India to request the Hon’ble Supreme Court for time, if it considers this necessary;
12. And whereas, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has not so far granted any extension of time for the implementation of its aforesaid order dated 2
nd May, 2002;
13. And whereas, in the absence any direction to the contrary by the Hon’ble Supreme Court or extension of time by it, the Commission feels duty bound to implement the above referred
order dated 2nd
May 2002 of the Hon’ble Supreme Court within two months from the date of pronouncement of that order, that is to say, by 1
st July 2002, as the said order has the force of
law within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution and is enforceable throughout the
territory of India under Article 142 of the Constitution;
14. Now, therefore, the Election Commission, in pursuance of the above referred order dated
2nd
May, 2002 of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and in exercise of the powers, conferred on it by Article 324 of the Constitution, of superintendence, direction and control, inter alia, of
conduct of elections to Parliament and State Legislatures, hereby direct as follows: -
(1) Every candidate at the time of filing his nomination paper for any election to the Council
of States, House of the People, Legislative Assembly of a State or the Legislative Council of
a State having such a council, shall furnish full and complete information in regard to all the
five matters, specified by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and quoted in para 5 above, in an
affidavit, the format whereof is annexed hereto as Annexure-1 to this order.
(2) The said affidavit by each candidate shall be duly sworn before a Magistrate of the First
Class or a Notary Public or a Commissioner of Oaths appointed by the High Court of the
State concerned.
(3) Non-furnishing of the affidavit by any candidate shall be considered to be violation of the
order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the nomination of the candidate concerned shall be liable to rejection by the returning officer at the time of scrutiny of nominations for such non-
furnishing of the affidavit.
(4) Furnishing of any wrong or incomplete information or suppression of any material
information by any candidate in or from the said affidavit may also result in the rejection of
his nomination paper where such wrong or incomplete information or suppression of material
information is considered by the returning officer to be a defect of substantial character, apart
from inviting penal consequences under the Indian Penal Code for furnishing wrong
information to a public servant or suppression of material facts before him: Provided that
43
only such information shall be considered to be wrong or incomplete or amounting to
suppression of material information as is capable of easy verification by the returning officer
by reference to documentary proof adduced before him in the summary inquiry conducted by
him at the time of scrutiny of nominations under section 36 (2) of the Representation of the
People Act 1951, and only the information so verified shall be taken into account by him for
further consideration of the question whether the same is a defect of substantial character.
(5) The information so furnished by each candidate in the aforesaid affidavit shall be
disseminated by the respective returning officers by displaying a copy of the affidavit on the
notice board of his office and also by making the copies thereof available freely and liberally
to all other candidates and the representatives of the print and electronic media.
(6) If any rival candidate furnishes information to the contrary, by means of a duly sworn
affidavit, then such affidavit of the rival candidate shall also be disseminated along with the
affidavit of the candidate concerned in the manner directed above. 15. For the removal of
doubt, it is hereby clarified that, apart from the affidavit in Annexure-1 hereto referred to in
para 14 (1) above, the candidate shall not be required to file any additional affidavit which
was earlier required to be filed in pursuance of the Commission’s order No.509/disqln./97-JS-
I dated 28th
August, 1997, as the information furnished in the earlier affidavit will now form
part of the information required to be furnished in the present affidavit (Annexure-1). 16. In
so far as elections to the Legislative Assembly and Legislative Council of the State of Jammu
and Kashmir are concerned, the directions of the Election Commission contained in the
preceding para 14 shall be deemed to have been issued under the provisions of section 138 of
the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir which are akin to Article 324 (1) of the Constitution
of India and vest the superintendence, direction and control of the conduct of all elections to
either House of the Legislature of that State in the Election Commission.
By order,
A.K.MAJUMDAR
Secretary,
Election Commission of India
Annexure-I
Affidavit to be furnished by candidate alongwith nomination paper
Before the Returning Officer
for election to _________________________ (name of the House)
from ___________________________ constituency
( name of the constituency ) I, ___________________________, son/daughter/wife of ________________________ aged
_____ years, resident of ____________________________________________, candidate at
the above election, do hereby solemnly affirm and state on oath as under:- (Strike out
whichever not applicable)
(1) I have, in the past, been convicted of a criminal offence in the following case(s) and the
details are as under:-
(i)Case No.
(ii) Section of the Act and description of the offence for which convicted :
(iii) Date(s) of conviction:
(iv) Court(s) by which Convicted :
(v) Punishment imposed (indicate period of imprisonment
44
awarded and / or quantum of fine imposed) :
(vi) Details of appeals / revision, etc. filed against above conviction(s) :
(2) That I have in the past been discharged / acquitted in the following cases :-
(i) Section of the Act and description of the offence with which charged :
(ii) Case No. :
(iii) Name of the Court by which acquitted / discharged :
(iv) Date of acquittal / discharge :
(v) Details of appeal(s) / application(s) for revision / review, if any,
filed against above acquittal / discharge :
(3) That I have, in the period ending six months prior to the date of filing the present
nomination, been accused of the following offences, punishable with imprisonment with two
years or more, and in which a charge has been framed or cognizance taken by the Court as
indicated hereunder:-
[Note: This excludes the cases mentioned in (1) and (2) above.]
(i) Section of the Act and description of the offence with which charged / cognizance taken :
(ii) The Court which has framed the charge / taken cognizance :
(iii) Case No.
(iv) Date of the order of the Court framing charge / taking cognizance :
(v) Details of appeal(s) / application(s) for revision, etc., if any, filed against above order
framing charge / taking cognizance :
(4) That I give hereinbelow the details of the assets (immovable, movable, bank balance, etc.)
of myself, my spouse and dependents*:
A.
Details of movable assets. (Assets in joint name indicating the extent of joint ownership will also have to be given)
S. No.
Description
Self
Spouse(s)
Name(s):
Dependent-1
Name:
Dependent-2
Name:
Dependent-3, etc.
Name:
(i) Cash
(ii) Depositsin Banks, Financial Institutions and Non-Banking Financial Companies
(iii) Bonds,
Debentures and Shares in companies
*Dependent here means a person substantially dependents on the income of the candidate.
(iv) Other Financial
instruments NSS, Postal Savings, LIC, Policies, etc.
(v) Motor Vehicles (details ofmake, etc.)
(vi) Jewellery (give details of weight and value)
(vii) Other assets, such as values of claims / interests
45
Note : Value of Bonds / Shares / Debentures as per the latest market value in Stock Exchange
in respect of listed companies and as per books in the case of non listed companies should be
given.
B. Details of Immovable assets
[Note : Properties in joint ownership indicating the extent of joint ownership will also have
to be indicated] S. No.
Description
Self
Spouse(s)
Name(s):
Dependent-1
Name:
Dependent-2
Name:
Dependent-3, etc.
Name:
(i) Agricultural Land
- Location(s)
- Survey number(s) -
Extent (Total measurement) - current market value
(ii) Non-Agricultural Land
- Location(s)
- Survey number(s) -
Extent (Total measurement) - current market value (iii)
Buildings
(commercial and residential) - Location(s) -
Survey / door number(s) -
Extent
(Total measurement)
- current market value
(iv)
Houses / Apartments,
etc. - Location(s) -
Survey/ door number(s) -
Extent (Total measurement) - current market value
(v) Others (such as interest in property)
(5) I give hereinbelow the details of my liabilities / overdues to public financial institutions
and government dues :-
[Note : Please give separate details for each item]
S.No.
Description Name and address of Bank
/ Financial Institution(s) / Department(s) Amount outstanding as on ………………. (a)
46
(i) Loans from Banks
(ii) Loans from financial institutions
(iii) Government dues (other than income tax and wealth tax) (No Due Certificate to be
enclosed in case holding or having held any public office)
S.No.
Description
Details of Assessment Amount outstanding as on ……………... (b)
(i)
Income Tax including surcharge [Also indicate the assessment year upto which Income Tax
Return filed. Give also Permanent Account Number (PAN)]
(ii) Wealth Tax [Also indicate the assessment year upto which Wealth Tax return filed.]
(iii) Sales Tax [Only in case of proprietary business]
(iv) Property Tax
(6)
My educational qualifications are as under :-
(GIVE DETAILS OF SCHOOL AND UNIVERSITY EDUCATION)
(Name of School / University and the year in which the course was completed should also be
given.)
DEPONENT
VERIFICATION I, the deponent abovenamed, do hereby verify and declare that the contents of this affidavit
are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief; no part of it is false and nothing
material has been concealed therefrom.
Verified at ____________ this the _________ day of _______, 200__.
DEPONENT
47
Appendix 2
ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA
Election Commission of India No. 509/Disqln./97 - J.S.I Dated : 28th August, 1997
ORDER
Subject: Criminalisation of Politics - participation of criminals in the electoral process as
candidates - disqualification on conviction for offences - effect of appeal and bail- regarding.
Whereas, the country is facing the serious problem of criminalisation of politics in which
criminals, i.e., persons convicted by courts of law for certain offences, are entering into
election fray and contesting as candidates; and Whereas, section 8 of the Representation of
the People Act, 1951, lays down the conditions under which a person would be disqualified
on grounds of conviction for contesting elections to Parliament and Legislature of a State;
and Whereas, any person convicted of any offence listed under sub-section (1) of section 8 of
the Representation of the People Act, 1951, shall be disqualified for a period of six years
from the date of such conviction; and
Whereas a person convicted for the contravention of any of the laws listed under sub-section
(2) of section 8 of the Representation of People Act, 1951, and sentenced to imprisonment for
not less than 6 months shall be disqualified from the date of such conviction and shall
continue to be disqualified for a further period of 6 years after his release; and
Whereas, under sub-section (3) of section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, a
person convicted of any other offence and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 2
years shall be disqualified from the date of such conviction and shall continue to be
disqualified for a further period of 6 years since his release; and
Whereas, sub-section(4) of section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, states
that none of the above mentioned disqualifications will take effect in case of a person who on
the date of the conviction is a Member of Parliament or the Legislature of a State, till 3
months have elapsed from that date or, if within that period an appeal or application for
revision is brought in respect of the conviction or the sentence, until that appeal or application
is disposed of by the court; and
Whereas, it has been often observed that even those persons who are not the sitting members
of Parliament or State Legislatures on the date of conviction, contest election if they have
filed an appeal or application for revision and have bee granted bail during pendency of such
appeals/ revision; and
Whereas, the Commission has carefully examined and considered the question whether such
persons who have been convicted of offences mentioned in the said section 8 of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951, can contest elections during the period when they are
released on bail, pending disposal of their appeals or applications for revision; and Whereas,
the Commission has observed that this very question has come to be considered byseveral
Hon'ble High Courts and they have taken the view that the release on bail does not wipe off
the disqualification under the said section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951;
and
Whereas, it has been observed that the Hon'ble Madhya Pradesh High Court, while dealing
with the case of Purshottamlal Kaushik Vs. Vidya Charan Skukla (66 Election Law
Reports-110) held in that case as follows:-
48
"It is obvious that the decision of the returning officer must depend on facts as they existed
on the date of scrutiny since it is beyond human comprehension to visualise subsequent
events and to base the decision of validity of nominations on the unknown future events. 'The
improper rejection' of a nomination within the meaning of expression used in section 100(1)
(c) and 'improper acceptance' in section 100(1) (d) (i) of the R.P.Act, 1951, must, therefore,
mean whether the rejection of acceptance of the nomination by the returning officer was
improper with reference to section 36(2) (a) on the basis of facts existing on the date of
scrutiny which alone were available to him and were relevant for deciding the validity of the
nomination.
The question now is of the effect of suspension of the sentence by the appellate Court.
Section 389 Cr. P.C. which gives this power to the first court till filing of appeal and then to
the appellate court enables suspension of execution of the sentence or order appealed from. It
is only the execution which is suspended and nothing more with the result that the sentence
awarded is not to be suffered during the pendency of the appeal even though it subsists and
the appellant is released on bail. There is no indication in section 8(2) of the R.P.Act that the
disqualification thereunder remains in abeyance during the pendency of appeal against
conviction. On the other hand, section 8(3) gives the contrary indication by laying down an
exception only in case of sitting members. Suspension of execution of the sentence or order
and grant of bail under section 389 Cr. P.C. has the only effect of avoiding sufferance of
sentence pending appeal, but then in order to attract the disqualification under section 8(2) it
is not necessary to suffer any part of the sentence awarded. This has also been held by the
Supreme Court in Sarat Chandra's case (Supra): This decision also indicates that suspension
of sentence does not wipe out the conviction and sentence. It was held that a reprieve is a
temporary suspension of the sentence which does not wipe it out; all that it does is to have an
effect on the execution of the sentence. If suspension of sentence during pendency of an
appeal does not have the effect of wiping it out, it is difficult to accept the contention that the
disqualification under section 8(2) remains arrested or in abeyance during operation of the
suspension order pending appeal against the conviction and sentence. This is more so, when
in section 8(2) there is nothing to support this view and section 8(3) gives contrary
indication."; and
Whereas, the Hon'ble High Court of Judicature at Allahabad also took a similar view in the
case of Shri Sachindra Nath Tripathi Vs. Doodnath (84 Election Law Reports 46). And
while declaring the election as void of Shri Doodnath, who stood convicted by the trial court
for offences under sections 302 and 307 IPC, and who stood released on bail during the
election period, held that:-
"The disqualification, which is an automatic effect of convection, springs up right at the time
of pronouncement of conviction, which finding is yet to be reversed or set aside. It is to be
seen as to what is the effect of bail, granted to the respondent before the date of filling the
nomination paper. If no bail is granted and the execution of the sentence is not suspended by
the stay orders, then the accused will remain in jail and the only effect of granting bail is that
he is released from the confinement. Grant of bail does not interfere with the finding of
conviction and that cannot render the disqualification, automatically emerging from
conviction, inoperative": and
Whereas, the same question again came to be considered in a more recent case before the
Hon'ble Himachal Pradesh Court in Vikram Anand Vs. Rakesh Singha etc. etc. (Election
Petition Nos. 1, 4 and 5 of 1994), and the Hon'ble High Court, while declaring the election as
void of the returned candidate (Shri Singha), who stood convicted in a criminal case under
49
section 148, etc., of the IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for 5 years and who had been
released on bail during the pendency of appeal to the Hon'ble Supreme Court, held in its
judgment dated 13.09.1994 as follows:-
".......Despite suspension of sentence and release on bail, the order of conviction remains in
operation holding the person guilty of such offence or offences for which he has been
awarded sentence of imprisonment for not less than two years, as such the disqualification as
provided under sub-section (3) of section 8 of the Act continues. In order to attract
disqualification under subsection (3) of section 8 of the Act, the execution of the order of
conviction and sentence of imprisonment or any part thereof is not required. What is
necessary is the actual conviction and sentence imposed by the Court for not less than two
year, which order remains in operation despite stop put to execution of the order of sentence
during the pendency of appeal by releasing the convicted person on bail and suspending the
sentence awarded to him.
After examining the legal position, this court has come to the conclusion that when the
appellate Court passes an order of suspension of sentence and/or release on bail on a
convicted person, the order of his conviction still remains in existence and the
disqualification, suffered by him as a result of conviction and sentence, for a period of not
less than two years as envisaged under sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the Act, is not
automatically suspended and it continues to be in operation.;'' and
Whereas, it has also been observed that when the Hon'ble Supreme Court dismissed the
criminal appeal filed by Shri Rakesh Singha, it also dismissed his election appeal holding that
Shri Singha was disqualified ab initio for contesting election under section 8(3) of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951;
Now, therefore, the Election Commission has, after taking due note and paying due regard to
the above judicial pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Hon'ble High
Courts, come to the considered view that the disqualification under section 8 of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951, for contesting elections to Parliament and State
Legislatures, on conviction for offences mentioned therein, takes effect from the date of
conviction by the trial court, irrespective of whether the convicted person is released on bail
or not during the tendency of appeal [subject, of course, to the exception in the case of sitting
members of Parliament and State Legislatures under sub-section (4) of the said section 8 of
the Representation of the People Act, 1951].
Accordingly, the Election Commission, in exercise of its powers of superintendence,
direction and control of election to Parliament and State Legislatures vested by Article 324 of
the Constitution, hereby directs that all the Returning Officers, at the time of scrutiny of
nominations, must take note of the above legal position and decide accordingly about the
validity or otherwise of the candidature of contestants disqualified under the said section 8 of
