Participants in Peace-Keeping Forces

Participants in Peace-Keeping Forces*JOHAN GALTUNGChair in Conflict and Peace Research, University of Oslo HELGE HVEEMInternational Peace Research Institute, Oslo

Galtung, J. & Hveem, H. Participants in Peace-Keeping Forces. Cooperation andConflict, XI, 1976, 25-40.

The article is based on a questionnaire mail study of participants in the UnitedNations peace-keeping forces in Gaza and in the Congo. It is focussed on theproblem of closeness vs. distance to the phenomenon of peace-keeping. By andlarge the studies show that the participants wanted more closeness to the localinhabitants, whereas the way the UNPKF was organized, was based on considerabledistance. There was also a demand for a much higher level of insight in the conflictand the operation than had been given during the briefings. Questions about theattitude to the concrete conflicts reveal relatively standard Western attitudes andprejudices both in the Middle East and the Congo theaters. Finally, the possibility ofsome type of peace-keeping force based on more closeness and involvement is dis-cussed, concluding that under the present political conditions this would hardlybe feasible.

Johan Galtung, Chair in Conflict and Peace Research, University of Oslo.Helge Hveem, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo.

1. PEACE-KEEPING: DISTANCE ORCLOSENESS

This report is based on a questionnaireinvestigation of Norwegian participantsin peace-keeping forces in Gaza (UNEF)and in the Congo (ONUC). The datawere gathered by the International PeaceResearch Institute in Oslo in 1967, basedon the work of a research group thathad prepared the questionnaire. In theresearch group former participants inthese peace-keeping forces also tookpart, and the questionnaire was ad-ministered to a sample of the about13,000 Norwegians who at that time hadserved in the UN forces. They were di-vided into four groups: privates and offi-cers (including NCOs) in the Gaza andthe Congo operations, and the total num-ber of respondents was 1,319.2 The

sample was stratefied, and, being a mailquestionnaire, it should not be claimedthat the answers are entirely represen-tative, but on the other hand the ten-dencies are often very clear and foundin most of the four groups, so we wouldbe inclined to rely on them, particularlywhere they are consistent.

The general theoretical problem to beexplored can be formulated very simply:what was the role of the UN soldier,as seen by some of these soldiers them-selves ? More particularly, where was itlocated on a scale ranging from the mostminimum role definition to a maximumrole conception? Or formulated different-ly, where was it located on an axis fromdistance from the social reality in whichthey were embedded to closeness andinvolvement?

It may immediately be objected thatthis is a pseudo question, for the defini-tion of the UN soldier as it comes out ofinstructions given to them from the UNor from national commands, not to men-tion from local commanders, is relativelyclear: it is a minimum role with a cer-tain amount of distance from the scene.The task is that of keeping peace, not ofmaking it or building it. More concretely,the task is like that of a fire brigade, tobe on duty, on constant call, close enoughto be able to act quickly, yet an observerrather than a participant. As for thefire brigade the task includes observationof any kind of small incident, ’brush-fire’

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that might escalate into the big event.

Unlike the fire brigade, however, therewas the implicit, possibly rather demo-

ralizing assumption that the bigger thefinal event the less likely the participationof UN peace-keeping forces - as was

finally brought out clearly during the

days of June 1967. On the other hand,like the fire brigade, the UN peace-keep-ing forces (UNPKF) do not really act

at the micro level; like the fire brigadeparticipant they are not stationed in-side private homes, peering into local

fireplaces or the hearts and minds ofmen and women everywhere in order tosee whether something might be brewing.

So, as a conclusion, there is no doubtthat the role is defined in a relativelyminimal sense and at a social, if not

geographical, distance from the scene.

The concept is that of a soldier, an ex-pert in violence both in the sense of

deterring it and in the sense of using it

skillfully, minimally, so as to preventmore extensive use of violence. Since

ultimately violence may have to be used,though not on a large scale, social dis-tance may be desirable in order to keeppeace - for the same reason as the policeforces in many countries are never sta-tioned in the cities or the villages fromwhich they come, always somewhere elsewhere they can exercise their sometimesunpleasant duties unimpeded by excessivecloseness.

But there is also the other role con-

ception better expressed in such termsas ’peace-making’ and ‘peace-building’.3 3In this case the task is not merely to keepthe potential belligerents apart, but ratherto weld them together in a functional,equitable, accepted social framework.These are also third party roles, an out-sider is offering his good services, forinstance as a mediator or as social plan-ner with a particular view to solving con-flict through cooperation between parties.In that case very detailed knowledge ofthe local situation is needed, but also

more than that: one practically speakinghas to be a part of the local situationto the point where one is no longer athird party but a new party, for instanceby filling new roles that did not formerlyexist; in close interaction in everyday lifewith all parties to the conflict. This iswhat usually happens when the central

government of a country builds institu-tions in the periphery tom by, for in-stance, ethnic strife, interacting with bothsides, thereby constituting an organiclink between them.

Again it may be objected that this

may be so, but that was not the taskof the UN peace-keeping forces. This istrue, but it may also be that it shouldhave been the task, that in fact one is

dealing with a misconception because ofthe endeavor to separate the peace-keep-ing function from peace-making and

peace-building functions. After all policeofficers everywhere are parts of the localcommunity and although their role be-havior as police may be rather circum-scribed they enter in a multiplicity of

settings that makes it possible also toexercise other roles, for instance in

voluntary associations, in communitywork, etc. Thus, they are able to trans-cend the specificity of their roles nar-

rowly defined and enter into widespread,perhaps-also more diffusely defined re-

lations that may facilitate their work pro-foundly, although it may also lead to,for instance, corruption.4 4

Without arguing what the function ofthe UN in such conflicts could be or

should be in the future, however, there isa more immediate problem that can beexplored by means of such question-naires : how do the participants them-selves see the situation? Where are theylocated on the spectrum mentionedabove? What kind of problems are

there? Where does the role conceptionlook relatively clear? Where is it ratherdiffuse? With that relatively broad pro-blem definition we now turn to the data.



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II. MOTIVATION AND LOCALSETTINGOne of the first striking features whenone looks at the responses is that theparticipants did not have much experi-ence abroad in any sense before theycame to such rather exotic soundingplaces as Gaza and the Congo. Of course,the officers had considerable travel ex-

perience, but more than half of the pri-vates had never been outside Scandinavia- 51 % of the privates to Gaza had neverbeen outside Norway. Since Norwegiansgenerally travel rather much, not theleast due to being a seafaring nation, theimplication would be that the participantsin general did not have a reservoir ofexperience to draw upon - a comparativebasis - and also that the travel aspect -the tourist side of the exercise - musthave loomed rather high on the horizon.Any loneliness or anxiety that this mayhave led to was compensated for by thecircumstance that many of them enteredUN service with somebody they knewalready (2/s of the officers, for instance);but 42 % of the privates in Gaza and63 % of those in the Congo did not cometogether with friends. They brought withthem, however, an image of their ownenvironment - people at the place theylived, their own family, most of theirfriends, Norwegians in general as beingvery positive to the mission - the per-centage perceiving the environment backin Norway as hostile was consistentlylow.

But why, then, did they go into theUN service? They were asked to tick offas many as they wanted of 11 reasons;those reasons that were important forthemselves and those that they felt wereimportant for most of the other peoplewho went into the service. And there isno doubt about the result: consistentlythe highest percentage was ’to get to seefaraway places’, and the second in linewas ’because the salary was good’ (onlyamong the officers in the Congo were

there more people, 78 %, who markedthis reason than the first one, which waschosen by 64 % ). Then, the privates -particularly in Gaza - saw this as a ’fineway to do regular military duty’ -simply doing time, whereas the officersin both places saw it as a way in whichthey could ’gain military experience’. Andthen came such reasons as ’to supportNorwegian efforts in the world today’,’to get to a place where something ishappening’, ’to contribute to strength-ening the UN’.

Thus, the conclusion is that the mo-tivation pattern is not related to the con-flict, nor to the task in general. Onegets the impression from the data thatany other job, equally paid and locatedat the same place would have beenequally attractive. The motivation pat-tern is self-oriented and related to one’sown setting back home, not other-ori-ented, related to the place where one isworking. This is certainly a rather gene-ral syndrome and might also apply to,for instance, technical assistance experts.It is not so much what they can contri-bute abroad as what being abroad cancontribute to them at home that matters- perhaps. We mention this because thattype of orientation is highly compatiblewith a minimum role definition and so-cial distance in general - the basic pointis not to get involved, in a sense not toput one’s soul into it but leave it be-hind, letting the body perform its duties.

It should be mentioned, though, thatthey do mark a number of motives:most of them mention two or three. Butwhen pressed to give only one exactlythe same pattern came out: ’to get to seefaraway places’ was preferred, followedby ’because the salary was good’ - thelatter being the more important for theCongo officers. But this, then, showsup in an interesting way in their wishes,retrospectively, for the kind of informa-tion they think participants to UN forcesshould have before they start their ser-



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vice. It is not ’information about geo-graphy and climate’ that ranks highest,nor ’information about the cultural andhistorical background of the place’ -possibly because this was what they hadalready acquired as a background basisfor their tour. What they by far wantedmost were: ’information about the roleof the UN in the conflict’ (around 90%emphasized that this was needed - whichmust serve as an indication that verylittle had in fact been given relative tothe needs), then ’information about thebackground of the conflict’ (about 75%- again strange that it should be so nec-essary to emphasize this point) and fi-

nally, around z/3 mentioned the need for’information about local customs at theplace of service’. In other words, alreadyat this point a certain inconsistency showsup: their motivation pattern was not verydifferent from that of the tourist, yetthe need for much more information thatcould give content to their serviceseems to have been prevalent. Of course,it is a far distance from these three itemsto real closeness, to a more maximallydefined role, but it is also a far distancefrom the very minimum where one per-forms a certain guard ritual and sees theentire experience as precisely that, some-thing enriching - in both senses of thatword - for oneself.

Whatever they got of information theysay they obtained it through ’briefings bysuperiors before service’ and most ofthe information about the conflict itselfwas obtained through ’talks with othersin the UN force’. Many also mention’reading books and newspapers before-hand’, ’Norwegian newspapers or radio’,but consistently low are such sources ofinformation as ’official information fromthe UN’ and ’local information’. Againthe impression is the same: an impres-sion of living in a plastic bubble, an in-dividual bubble where motivation is con-cerned and a Norwegian one where in-formation is concerned - with little con-

tact with the local population and withthe UN as such.

What, then, was the relation to thelocal population? They certainly reporthaving had contact ’almost every day’with people from the local population,and ’while on duty’. The two most fre-quently mentioned categories were mer-chants and farmers for the Gaza contin-

gent, ’hunters, tribal people’, combinedwith local police and military for the

Congo participants. In addition to thatthe officers (70% in Gaza and 75% inCongo) mention ’own native servant’.But this does not mean much in termsof contact: the overwhelming majorityof the respondents spent time with peo-ple from the local population off dutyonly ’now and then’ or ’never’ - and inthat case with the categories mentioned,including ’civilian Europeans’ in the caseof the Congo group. And there is nodoubt that the contact was at a distance:

only very few say that they went to thehomes of people from the non-Europeanpart of the population quite often or

often - the typical response being ’rarely’or ’never’ - in spite of the relativelylong tour of duty. The same applies to’talking to the local people to find outtheir opinion of the conflict’ - althougharound 15% of the privates and 20% ofthe officers report that this happened’often’ or ’quite often’. But they did notpresent their own views, in conformitywith a third party type of role, and evenif they made friends among the local

people the friendship could not possiblybe very deep since almost none of themever report that it resulted in sendingpostcards and letters after return home.In other words: there was some openingin the ’plastic bubble’ to let in the mer-chant and the servant - since they per-form roles of key significance in con-

nection with what ’abroad can do forme’ - and not much beyond that. Thenumber of real friendships with the local



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population, and lasting beyond tour ofduty was minimal.How, then, did they think that the

local population reacted to the UNforces when they arrived, and after see-ing them at work? The perception theseparticipants have is overwhelmingly po-sitive : very few locals dislike the UNPKF,most of them accepted it and liked itwell. Of course, this may reflect the con-tact surface in the local population: thatmerchants and servants liked this new

opportunity would go without saying,farmers might also have considerablestake in it. Since there was little or nocontact at all with local political forces,real attitudes of some significance forthe conflict itself might have remainedrelatively unknown, except to the moreprying and observant among the officersand some of the privates. At any rate,the image reported is not one of dyna-mism : attitudes are and were about the

same, which is probably more or less

correct, for if there had been very im-

portant changes the participants wouldin a more or less stereotyped way havereflected this.

There is an ecology to this type ofisolation: the Gaza people lived in bar-racks in a camp and in tents, the Congoparticipants in villas (71% of the offi-

cers) and in barracks (46% of the pri-vates). Thus, inside the forces there wereevidently low class and high class ghet-tos, neither of them conducive to muchcontact with the average man in the local

setting. There might have been a dif-ference, though, between those who livedin villas in white-dominated areas (Leo-poldville, Elisabethville) and those wholived in the smaller and mostly African-populated towns (Goma, Albertville,etc.), the latter interacting more with theAfrican population than the former.The dominant pattern of little con-

tact with the local setting is then rein-forced by the pattern of togethernesswith other UNPKF contingents, from

other nations. The Norwegian partici-pants reported that they had very ’muchin common’ with them, and althoughmost of them only shared quarters withNorwegians, the officers in Gaza (50%of them) in particular lived closely to-

gether with other Scandinavians. It wasalso extended to other UN forces parti-cipants, but in that case particularly toparticipants from English-speaking coun-tries. And this ties in with what weknow about their linguistic ability: onlyabout 1/a of the privates in the Congoand 1/3 of those in Gaza report not to beable to speak and read English ade-

quately. Consequently, they also madefriends among UN people from other

nations, more so in the Congo than inGaza, and here the percentage ’sendingpostcards now and then’ is considerablyhigher than for the local population -as one would expect. Also, between 1/3and 2;3 of the four categories report thatthey ’very much’ would like to meet someof them again. In short: the UN contin-gents provided them with a milieu morethan the local population.

If we now stick to the plastic bubbleimage, how was life inside the plasticbubble? Not bad, according to the an-swers. Only very few felt that they ’veryoften’ or ’quite often’ were missing thepossibility of more leisure time activities(10-15%); except for the privates inthe Congo only very few felt that the

supply of PX-stores at the place wherethey were stationed was ’bad’; more than75% in all categories felt that they ’nev-er’ had any difficulty with the climate andabout the same numbers were ’never’ ill

during their stay. They spent their time,so it seems, doing photography and writ-ing letters, reading papers and books,with sports, and talking to friends (theleast chosen category ’going to parties’ isperhaps the category that outsiders

thought was filling their leisure timemost effectively!).And most importantly, little or no



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difficulty on the job: almost all of themreport that the group they worked withdaily went well together. The only placewhere there is some skepticism is in thereport of the Norwegian UN personnel’sview of the local population: here thereis even some dynamism. Whereas theyfelt that the local population had kepttheir views of the UN contingent con-stant during their stay, that was not whatthey reported about the Norwegians: thepercentage that did not like the local

population much, or right out disliked

them, changed from 28-53 % for the pri-vates in Gaza, from 20-51 % for the offi-cers in Gaza, from 10-20% for the pri-vates in the Congo and from 9-26%for the officers in the Congo.

This leaves open the usual problem:was there friction because there was iso-lation, or was there isolation because ofanticipated friction? And equally as usu-al : the answer probably lies in the dia-lectic between the two. The importantthing for our purpose, however, is thatit is insufficient to describe the totalsituation in terms of lack of contact -there is also a dimension of negative con-tact if we assume that the perceptions arerelatively accurate. And this is of courserelated to what they see as their job:when asked what they considered more

important, that a UN force should ’tryto get well liked by the population in thearea; or that it commands respect evenif this means that it might be necessaryto be a little hardhanded’ the majority inall places except - significantly - the pri-vates in the Congo, chose the latter. Dis-tance and respect; not closeness, famil-iarity, dialogue on equal terms - in short,a setting very close to the idea of a

minimum role, but, with a yearning formore knowledge instrumental to the typeof task they have.

III. VIEWS ON THE CONFLICTSThese Norwegian soldiers were insertedinto two important conflicts: the MiddleEast conflict between the Arabs and theIsraelis and the conflict in the Congo,which looked like a conflict between thecentral government and a secessionist

group headed by Tshombe in Katangabut which was, in another way, a conflictbetween a new nation-state and interna-tional capitalism, the former backed bythe United Nations, the latter expressedby Union Minière du Haute Katanga.The second conflict was rather remotefor the Norwegians, the former wellknown in a Norwegian political climatethat in_ the 1960’s was definitely on the

Table 1. Who was most. to blame for the conflict? ( % ).



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Table 2. What was your own attitude? (%).

Israeli side. How, then, did they react?Tables 1 and 2 give us some impressions.The conclusions to be drawn are re-

latively unambiguous: as time passed on,as they did their service, three changestook place:

(1) Neutral, balanced views became in-

creasingly impossible; there was a

tendency to take sides.(2) In the two conflicts there was an

increasing sympathy for Israel forthe Gaza participants and for Katan-ga for the Congo participants.

(3) There was, however, also a very pro-nounced tendency to put the blameon third parties, more particularlyon ’politicians in other countries’ inthe case of the Middle East conflict,and on ’businessmen and industri-alists in other countries’ in the caseof the Congo conflict.

These findings are interesting. First ofall they show what is certainly not un-expected : the closer one comes to a con-flict scene, the more difficult it is tomaintain any kind of ’balanced attitude’.Second, positive attitudes develop in fa-vor of Israel and Katanga - and for thismany reasons may be adduced: a tenden-

cy to favor David in any David-Goliathconfrontation; it is easier for Norwegiansto identify with Israelis than with Arabs,and with the Katanga secessionists thanwith the central government - if for noother reason than simply because of thelevel of technical-economic development;these two had the best public relationsimage in the type of mass media to whichNorwegians had access; in general, theywere more ’pro-West’, which Norwegiansat that time would also tend to be; Nor-wegians stationed in an Arab and gene-ral Congo environment had negative ex-periences, frictions of various kinds thatmay also have influenced their view.However that may be, we are more

interested in the first point: it is difficultto maintain a neutral attitude. That is:one may see the third finding, the ten-dency to find a ’third party’ and put theblame on that one, as a way of sharingthe blame equally in the sense that bothparties as commonly defined are acquit-ted. To the extent that this is the casethe underlying conflict perception mayof course be said to be naive: these arenot really ’third parties’ but parties to

a coalition some of which is locatedin the conflict theater, some of which is



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outside. Nevertheless, there is no doubtthat a deeper view of the conflict devel-oped, more aspects became visible, andmore differentiated views emerged.

This is important because it brings usto the basic dilemma we tried to eluci-date : distance or closeness? Even thoughthe setting is an institutionalization of dis-tance, being that close nevertheless forcesthe UNPKF participants to take sides.Since their role behavior is supposed to bestrictly impartial, this means that a con-tradiction is emerging between attitudeand behavior. This may not be so im-

portant as seen from the outside becausethe behavior is rigidly controlled in a

military structure - and for that reasonthe military, hierarchical structure maybe the only one that can be used for thiskind of purpose. But seen from the in-

side, from the point of view of the parti-cipants themselves we would expect a

certain amount of tension and frustrationto crystallize as time passes on. For thereis no doubt that they have taken sides.This comes out even more clearly whenthey are asked where they could imaginesettling if they should stay in the area fora shorter or longer period: the Gaza par-ticipants overwhelmingly choose Israel

(80% - 3% for the privates, 62% -8 % for the officers) and something ofthe same for the Congo participants(58% - 16% for the privates, 56% -15% for the officers).We can get some more insight into

this by studying the perceptions the par-ticipants had of the groups and the peo-ple parties to the conflict. They werepresented with a list of adjectives: friend-ly, active, strong-willed, democratic, hon-est, courageous, wise, quick and wereasked to indicate what they thoughtwould be fitting descriptions of, for in-stance, ’Israelis’, ’Arabs’ and ’Palestinianrefugees’. It should be noted that allthe adjectives were positively formulatedbecause, for obvious reasons, we did notwant direct formulations of negative ste-

reotypes from people who had partici-pated in such important missions, on aworld scale, as UN peace-keeping forces.Nevertheless, the results are interesting.

There was no difficulty distributingthese positive attributes on Israelis, butof the Gaza participants about 50% wereof the opinion that the adjectives did notfit - meaning that they were too positive- for Arabs. Predominant characteristicsattributed to the Israelis are ’strong-wil-led’ and ’courageous’; the Arabs and thePalestinians are seen as ’friendly’ which,combined with the unwillingness to attri-bute the other adjectives to them, readssomething like ’smiling natives’. It is alsointeresting to note that whereas the modeof number of adjectives chosen was 3for the Israelis, it was 0 for Arabs andPalestinians - strong versus weak imagesindeed!What happens when instead of looking

at the nations we look at the top perso-nalities, at Ben Gurion (the former Is-raeli Premier at that time) and Nasser(the then President of Egypt)? Of course,there is more of an image of Nasserthan there is of Arabs, and less of an

image of Ben Gurion than there is ofIsraelis. But Ben Gurion comes out as

strong-willed, courageous, wise and ac-tive ; Nasser comes out as active and

strong-willed - but there is also the clearfeeling that the adjectives on the list

simply do not fit.For the Congo theater the same test

was used concerning the ’Congolese’, the’Katangese’,s and the ’Europeans in Ka-tanga’. The finding is relatively clear:there is not so much difference betweenthe Congolese and the Katangese: themost frequently chosen category is

’friendly’, with the idea that no adjectivefits as a good number 2. The image isbland as for the Arabs and the Palestin-ians, but for the Europeans in Katanga itis more clear and relatively similar to theimage of the Israelis: they are strong-willed, active, courageous - and friendly!



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And this, of course, gives us one clueas to why there was increased sympathyfor Katanga: maybe not so much be-cause of the Africans in Katanga as be-cause of the Europeans with which theremust have been a high level of identifica-tion. There is actually an indirect confir-mation of this idea: the images of Lu-mumba and of Tshombe are relatively si-milar, they are both active and strong-willed and courageous - although thereis the difference that Tshombe is seen as’wise’ in addition. But the difference in

profile is not nearly as pronounced asthe difference between the images ofBen Gurion and Nasser.

It is tempting to suggest that thereis an element of ’racist’ identificationhere: firstly, the Europeans in the Congorepresented a pole of attraction that didnot exist in Gaza; there the Israelis gotthe identification of the troops which

might be referred to ’racism’. Secondly,there was no difference of opinion onLumumba and Tshombe, both Blacks,whereas ’Katanga’ got much more posi-tive identification than ’Congo’ (the Cen-tral Government).6

It is quite interesting to compare allthis with the images of Hammarskj6ldand U Thant - the former and presentSecretary General at the time the surveywas made. All these positive adjectivesare generously distributed by all four

groups on both of them, with very smalldifferences except for the tendency tosee Hammarskj6ld as more courageousthan U Thant. Incidentally, neither ofthem is seen as being ’quick’ - probablya reaction and a reflection on UN bureau-

cracy rather than on the two personsthemselves. We mention this becauseit illustrates, in a certain sense, the UN’plastic bubble’: well developed, positiveand differentiated and rich images insidethe bubble, much more bland and stereo-typed images outside.

But then, on the other hand, these

Norwegians experienced the conflict at

a distance. The UN was probably a closerreality to most of them, being the sourceof livelihood and the framework withinwhich they were working. Thus, onlyabout 20% of them were ever involvedin an exchange of fire, only few of themreported that they were often or quiteoften in a situation where there was a

great danger of an exchange of fire, veryfew of them (from 2 % to 6 % ) weretaken prisoner for any length of time,and very few of them were afraid of

being hurt. In short, the distance builtinto the setting was also built into theactual service as a soldier: it was the

potential rather than the actual use ofviolence that dominated the situationfor the Norwegian contingent. It mighthave been interesting to see what wouldhave happened to the attitudes if theyhad been more exposed to ’shot fired inanger’. Needless to say, it would dependrather much on who fired those shots,and how well they aimed - but again,a strengthening or weakening of the ten-dency to favor one rather than the otherparty might not affect their behavior asUN soldiers.

This shows up directly when they wereasked a question designed to tap exactlythis: ’Did you ever think it would have

been, more satisfactory to you yourself fif you had been able to support one ofthe parties more actively?’ Of course,the majority say no, around 60% saynever. But the remainder say ’now andthen’, ’quite often’, and ’often’. And al-though this does not apply quite as oftento the officers as to the privates, thatdifference is a minor one in this parti-cular case.

About the same profile appears whenthey are asked whether they think theUN should have taken a different standon the conflict: although the majority feelthat ’the UN stand was the only onepractical’ there are those who think theUN should have been more neutral and- a smaller group - those who feel that



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the UN should have given more supportto one of the sides.But these critical voices are scant and

dispersed. By and large they feel thatthe UN force ’was of great use in thearea’, they are in doubt when it comesto whether there is a continued need forUN forces there, but they are ’quitesatisfied’ with their own effort in theUN service and with the group they be-long to - and only very few feel that

they would not consider enlisting againif Norway were asked to take part inother UN operations. In short, they comeout as favorable to the UN, not over-whelmingly so, but with sufficient marginto make it clear that by and large theywould constitute a source of positive pro-paganda for this type of UN activity.

IV. THE ROLE OF A UN SOLDIER

Having presented the general dilemmabetween distance and closeness let us

then have a look at how these partici-pants defined the role. What do theythink a UN soldier should do and whatshould he not do? They were given 20descriptions of actions, and asked to indi-cate whether these were things that they’absolutely must do’, ’preferably shoulddo’, ’may or may not do’, ’preferablyshould not do’, ’absolutely must not do’.

Only four of the 20 items came outwith a very clear profile, meaning thatmore than 90% in all four categoriesfelt that these were things one should ormust (not) do. The items were: ’studythoroughly what the conflict is about’,’emphasize that he is in UN service, notnational’, ’study the general conditionsof the country where he is serving’ and’be able to speak and understand at leastone world language’. These are ratherobvious things; one would be rather sur-prised if anybody had been against thisor even felt that one ’may or may not’. Itgoes without saying that the officers areeven more determined in this regardthan the privates.

But when it comes to many other is-sues there is not much consensus in therole image; there even seems to be someconfusion. This is particularly clear inthe relationship to the local population- and this is also precisely where thedilemma distance versus closeness is lo-cated.

Thus, the participants are very muchsplit on the issue of whether they shouldtry to get in contact with the local peoplewhen off duty: close to 50% are of theopinion that one may or may not, andthe rest are equally divided in the must/should people and the must not/shouldnot people. They agree, however, that

they should not make their opinion ofthe conflict clear to the local population.Again, it is particularly the officers whofeel strongly that one should not makeone’s opinion clear to the local popu-lation - in general we find that wheneverthere is a tendency in the data about roleimages the officers express this tendencyeven more strongly, as is to be expected.’ 7What about the classical question en-

countered by all kinds of ’internationalmen’, such as technical assistance ex-

perts ? Should one ’maintain a high stan-dard of living to make one’s self re-

spected’, or, ’live as frugally as possiblein order not to offend the local people’?There is a clear tendency in favor of

frugality: relatively few (between 10-

20%) say explicitly that one should notlive frugally, this figure increases some-what when it is formulated positively interms of having a standard of living thatinspires respect. The conclusion is ’mayor may not’ - since this must have beena hotly debated issue most of the timeit is quite clear that there is considerableconfusion at this point. Incidentally, itis particularly the officers who feel thatone should not maintain a high standardof living, but the differences are not

very pronounced.Nor is there a clear situation when it

comes to the old problem of whether one



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should give money to begging childrenor not: between 50-60% say ’may ormay not’; but the overwhelming majorityof the remainder are of the opinion thatone should/must not. This may not dif-fer significantly from the local popula-tion’s attitude or a tourist attitude - butit still indicates a field where no clear

prescription has emerged for the UN sol-dier. Where there is a high level of con-sensus, however, is that in such situa-tions one has to be more militarily cor-rect than at home: it is quite clear thatthe majority, about 80%, were of the

opinion that the norms at home werenot sufficient for the level of correctnessneeded in such places. This attitude wasparticularly pronounced among the offi-cers.

What about role relations relative to

the UN - was there any sign that thesehad crystallized further?We have mentioned already that they

overwhelmingly agreed that they shouldemphasize that they were in UN service,whether this is because they thought anypositive behavior should be credited to

the UN or that any negative behavioron their part should not be blamed onNorway. And they also feel that one

should study the most important aspectsof whatever else the UN is doing, but’preferably’ rather than ’absolutely’, just

as one ’preferably’ and not ’absolutely’should try to get well acquainted withpeople from other countries’ contingents.One indicator here of how uncrystal-

lized the status is, lies in how they feelthey should react when the UN commitsmistakes - should they admit this franklyto the local people, to other UN person-nel ? The answers are well distributed onthe five possible categories, only that

relatively few say that one ’absolutelymust’ admit it to the local people, andrelatively few say that one ’absolutelymust not’ admit it to other UN parti-cipants. And the same applies to the

easy way out: although relatively fewanswer ’absolutely must’ there is a re-

latively equal split on the remainingpossibilities when it comes to whetherone should emphasize one’s own nation-ality and that one is not responsiblefor everything the UN does. How shouldone interpret this?On the one hand it is a sign of lack

of crystallization of the role, on the otherhand it is also a sign of a certain detach-ment. If they had felt thoroughly inte-

grated relative to the UN rather than tothe local population the differences re-

ported in Table 3 between how they viewthe role relative to UN personnel andrelative to the local people would havebeen much higher.

Table 3. Should one admit UN mistakes? (% difference).



36

As it stands there is no doubt that

they would rather admit (and discuss)mistakes inside the system, but the dif-ferences are not that overwhelming whenone considers that it could have been aconsistent row of plus 100 for ’absolutelymust’ and an equally consistent row

of minus 100 for ’absolutely must

not’. Hence, there are two conclusionsto be drawn: there is not much of an

integration into the UN peacekeepingsystem, and, on the other hand, theyare not that detached from the local

population either - they are probablysomehow suspended in between the two,not having really good contact witheither.When one then asks more in detail

how they are related to the contingentsfrom the other nations the general predi-lections for work with other Scandinavi-ans and people from English speakingcountries comes out quite clearly. Onlyvery few would like to see the Norwe-

gian contingent mixed with people fromother nations, and they are particularlyloathe to see them close together withsouthern Europeans, Latin Americans,Africans and Asians. This is clearly ex-pressed when the question is asked inthe form ’If there should be fighting,with the soldiers from which countrieswould you rather fight together?’ wherethe only non-north European/Anglo Sax-on element would be a Congo-participantpredilection for Asians, probably mean-ing gurkha (Indian) soldiers. Significantly,this category scores highest when the

question reads, ’From a military pointof view, which countries have the bestsoldiers?’ But when the formulation is interms of who are best suited for theirwork in the UN forces, or who were mostliked by the civilian population in the

area, who had the best understandingof the causes of the conflict, or fromwhich countries would you prefer the

commanding officers to be: always Nor-wegians, Scandinavians and English-

speaking people. The others would onlydominate the ranking list when the ques-tions were negative: who ’were least neu-tral to the conflict’, ’who had least con-tact with the local population’, etc.The relation to the other UN contin-

gents is thus problematic: there is a cer-tain distance to everything outside one’sown, and then there is positive discrimi-nation in favor of geographical and cul-tural neighbors, negative discriminationin disfavor of the rest. How is this solvedfrom an organizational point of view?The respondents were asked how one

should constitute a UN force; should itconsist entirely of soldiers from one

country, or should it be ’pure’ at the

brigade level, consisting of brigades fromdifferent nations; at the battalion levelconsisting of battalions from differentnations and so on for companies andtroops? Very few wanted a UN forcethat consisted entirely of soldiers fromone country (from 6-9%); but even

fewer wanted to mix soldiers from diffe-rent nations together within one platoon(from 2-6%). The most frequentlypicked views seemed to be a UN brigadeconsisting of battalions from differentnations, thus making for a compromisebetween distance and closeness. Need-less to say, military hierarchization lendsitself to this kind of compromise whetherit is to the good or to the bad.

However, there are actually different

things they think of when it comes to

the important question of how UN forcesshould be better able to carry out their

job. They ask for ’better arms and equip-ment’ and not for ’better military train-ing’ but for ’better police training’ - thisis particularly pronounced for the Gazaparticipants. In short, the problems areseen in terms of a certain type of ex-

pertise police are supposed to have moreof than the military, and in terms ofhardware. There is also the view ’that

participants should be better informedabout the conflict’, ’better trained in



37

dealing with people from other coun-

tries’ - whereas (with the exception of theofficers in the Congo!) not much im-

portance is attributed to ’better organi-zation at UN headquarters’, or ’betterlocal organization of the UN force’.

In a sense there is an interesting con-tradiction here: the police role has lessdistance built into it, less of a minimumrole conception - but increased relianceon hardware would point in the oppositedirection. But there is also a logic tothis: the military role in which the soldierswere put must have been perceived as

inadequate in low temperature situationswhere closeness would be called for,e.g. ability to really understand what isgoing on at the human and social levels- and the rather modest arms withwhich they were equipped were totallyinadequate in a high temperature situa-tion. Rather than being disarmed militaryforces they seem to opt for being armedpolice f orces - both of them quite under-standable in view of the situation inwhich they were located.

V. CONCLUSION

The dilemma of the participants is alsoour analytical dilemma - and more sig-nificantly, it is a political dilemma of theUnited Nations. On the one hand thereis a relatively clear minimum role defini-tion in terms of guard and observationduty, keeping the parties apart with a

very modest display of arms, showingbehavior rather than attitude. On theother hand, there is another type of role:being involved, being part and party tothe entire conflict system, showing atti-tude as well as behavior, but trying tomediate and trying to help build a newsocial structure encompassing the anta-

gonists. The former role is possible butnot very effective, the second is veryeffective, but not very possible.The minimal role has the advantage

from a certain point of view that itdoes not ask for attitudes - all it asks for

is a certain type of behavior in cer-

tain situations, and in other situationsthere may very well be some role con-fusion. The other role also asks forattitudes, and if attitudes are called forwe know from the data something aboutwhich direction they would have beenin. The development that has taken

place since the survey was made has

by and large been in favor of the Arabcause in general and Palestinians in parti-cular, rather than the Israelis, and infavor of the central government ratherthan the Katanga secessionists - in otherwords, the inclination found in the Nor-wegian UNPKF participants has so farnot proven to be on the ’side of history’.8 8

So there we stand, more or less: a

choice between distance, neutral behaviorand a certain shallowness on the one

hand, and closeness, partial behavior andpolitical implausibility on the other. Onthe one hand there are three mutuallyreinforcing aspects of the situation inwhich the UNPKF participant finds him-self : the motivation pattern in terms ofcuriosity and good salaries, the generalsocial distance to the Arab and African

worlds, and the rather minimum defi-nition of the role with its rights andduties as it emerged in practice. On theother hand there seems to be a yearningfor something more than this - a latentmotivation, a desire for more contact

and understanding, a need for a broaderconceptualization and enactment of therole.There is a contradiction here, and it

cannot be resolved within the frameworkdefined by the present pattern of peace-keeping operations. There is no way,it seems, of combining control and evenexercise direct violence, with a closerand broader role relationship. It is onlyby changing the whole conception ofthird party roles in conflicts that basi-

cally different roles can emerge.The way to proceed would, obviously,

be to build into the role peace-making



38

and peace-building components - as in-dicated several times above. Thus, insome of the UN operations, and towardsthe top level, elements of peace-making,particularly in the form of mediation,have been built into the concept, makingfor much closer patterns of participationand much broader role relationships.9These have been elite roles, however -hardly for the common participant -but then it may also be argued that itis only at the top level that such ope-rations can be effective anyhow. Onlyat that level will the necessary education-al base be sufficient for such delicate

operations to work. And - a much

stronger argument: if there is a broad

role-participation on a large scale, withthousands participating like in the UNEFand the ONUC operations, it mayamount to some type of internal in-tervention. Nevertheless, it might be

possible under some conditions to com-bine the peace-keeping function of theUN soldier, the peace-making functionof the mediator, e.g. of the Quaker type,and the peace-building function of the

peace corps volunteer.i° That wouldmake for a very rich role combination,somewhat similar to what Gandhi experi-mented with, on a non-violent basis inhis satyagraha brigades - and might evenbe highly effective. Precisely for thatreason it cannot be left entirely to theoutside: the broader the role defined fora third party, the more it turns the localpopulation into clients, taking away fromthem the experience that might haveserved them in building conflict resolu-tion capacity, leaving them with solu-tions rather than challenges.

Thus, beyond the contradiction of thepresent role, between its limited scopeand a natural desire to do somethingmore, is the more ’advanced’ contradic-tion, which may well turn into a con-

flict, between all those who say ’whatan interesting conflict you have, let mesolve it for you’, and those who are

parties to that conflict. If solving thefirst contradiction leads on to the se-

cond, then what is the way out of thesecond contradiction? Possibly some

kind of formula whereby local conflict

participants and outside third partieswould merge into one flexible organiza-tion for conflict resolution with social

justice, possibly some formula wherebythe parties do without third parties at all.In either case it seems to be true that ifthe conflict can be resolved with suchmeans, then it cannot be very deeplyrooted in the social structure. A realstructural conflict, built around deep-rooted patterns of exploitation can hard-ly be resolved by means of third parties- true liberation of the underdog has alsoto be by the underdog, and usually notthrough ’cooperation’ but through sometype of withdrawal from the structure

(strike, civil disobedience, sabotage), evendestruction of the structure in order tocreate a new structure.

But given the conditions under whichan enlarged third party role would be

meaningful, do the data indicate thatthese Norwegians would be adequate forthat kind of a job? Superficially seen thedata seem to be indicative of the con-

trary. There are clear signs of very limitedcontact surface with the local population,of stereotyped attitudes to non-Western

groups, of a Western bias in the politicalevaluation of the situation, of a tendencyonly to prefer that which is close andsimilar. But, to our mind, this should notbe a source of worry, for at least three

good reasons.First, all these are highly predictable

patterns, growing out of the Norwegiansetting from which they come, with its

particular culture, political perspectiveand image of the world. Second, there isno reason to believe that any other na-tional group would have been much bet-ter or worse: as we live in a world ofnation states, at present, polarized bysome conflicts, this is what we get. And



39

third and most importantly: when suchattitudes develop, it is also a sign ofhow little was done locally to counteractthis, how ineffective the organization ingeneral and briefing in particular musthave been, and above all: the role didnot call for anything above relativelyprimitive, stereotyped analysis, reflectingpre-judgements already acquired at home.The easy, actor-oriented reaction to

such findings would be to say that theremust be something wrong with these

Norwegians, and, we would bet, one

would be in for some disappointmentsas other nations’ contingents are likelyto exhibit the same or similar patterns.llA less easy, more structure-oriented, viewwould ask for a change of those elementsin the structure of a UN peace-keepingoperation that would fail to counteract,perhaps even reinforce such attitudes.But beyond the indication given abovewe are not prepared to develop a clearerimage of an alternative structure - per-haps because we feel that the world, byand large, is not yet ready for this

approach.

NOTES* The present paper is the outcome of a

project on international peace-keeping at theInternational Peace Research Institute, Oslo,and is published as PRIO publication No.17-10. We would like to express special grati-tude to Otto Grieg-Tidemand and the lateArne G. Lunde, who, as secretary and under-secretary of defense, facilitated the collectionof data, and to Colonel Bjørn Egge and Lt.col.Fredrik Bull-Hansen who contributed muchvaluable advice in connection with the con-

struction of the questionnaire and the inter-pretation of the results. Kjell Skjelsbæk alsocontributed with critique and interpretation.The responsibility for the conclusions drawn,however, is entirely our own.The project has been supported financially

by the Norwegian Research Council for Sci-ence and the Humanities (NAVF) and the

Norwegian Council for Arms Control andDisarmament (Nedrustningsutvalget).

1 The intention was actually to supplementthe questionnaire study with other research

techniques such as in-depth interviewing, butdue to the sensitive nature of this subject thatidea was given up. A small pilot project inGaza, however, was completed - see ’SomeFactors Affecting Local Acceptance of a UNForce: A Pilot Project Report from Gaza’(Essay, II, 9).

2 The response rate was 45.3%.3 See ’Three Approaches to Peace: Peace-

keeping, Peace-making and Peace-building’(Essays, II, 11), also in Impact of Science onSociety, Vol. 26, No. 1.For an early evaluation of the peace-keeping

approval in the context of Nordic UN forces,see Per Frydenberg (ed.), Peace-keeping Ex-perience and Evaluation. The Oslo Papers,from the Norwegian Institute of InternationalAffairs, Oslo 1964.

4 One of the simplest relations is the rela-tion of marriage and parenthood in the com-munity, giving rise to countless ties with thelocal population. Needless to say the UNpeace-keeping forces had no such ties so theirrelations remained more abstract, devoid ofmuch human content.

5 The Katangese are, of course, also Congo-lese, but that distinction made very much sensein the early 1960s. The concept ’Katangese’was sponsored by the small African elite

supporting Tshombe and the European inter-ests promoting secessionism; it very probablyhad little meaning to the average Africanliving in the Katanga region, busy with day-to-day life problems, and, in some areas, withinter-tribal strife that cut across the Congo-Katanga distinction.

6 One author, Jens Erik Normann, Hvit slaveblant svarte (White Slave among Blacks): Enhelikopterflygers erfaringer fra Kongo, Gyl-dendal, Oslo 1972, argues on the basis of hisown experiences in the Congo that all Nor-wegians in ONUC were racist and manifestedit whenever they had a chance. While one ofthe present authors has first-hand informationfrom his own experience as an ONUC mem-ber in 1963, which gives some support to theNorwegian thesis, we find it much too generaland not founded on reliable sources to beacceptable.

7 Their commitment is deeper, consequentlywhatever normative element there is, it shouldbe more pronounced among the officers. Ifit were the other way round, the stage wouldbe set for a conflict between idealistic privatesand more or less corrupt officers - the datashow convincingly that this was not the case.

8 But in so being they were not the only



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ones, and hardly different from participantsin other contingents from Western countries.

9 This is very clearly seen from such im-portant contributions to understanding howthe UNPKF functions at this level as is foundin the books by two commanders, Odd Bulland Michael Harbottle. See in particular OddBull, På post i Midt-Østen, Gyldendal, Oslo1973 (forthcoming in English).

10 This theme is developed to some extentby Arthur Waskow, and by Egge, Harbottleand Rikbye. See also the article referred toin Note 3 above.

11 We are well aware that this may soundlike a chauvinist plea, but it is probably a

fair judgement. At least the senior author hasno record of expression of positive sentimentfor the Norwegian military establishment.



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Participants in Peace-Keeping Forces

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