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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THEACADEMIC BUSINESS WORLD

JW PRESS

MARTIN, TENNESSEE

Copyright ©2013 JW Press

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any

means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher.

Published by

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Printed in the United States ofAmerica

PHILANTHROPY AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBIUTY:

Is GIVING, ENOUGH TO TRULY BE ETHICAL?

Mitchell AdrianProfessor of Management

College of BusinessMcNeese State University

Lake Charles, Lousiana

Lonnie PhelpsProfessor of Management

College of BusinessMcNeese State University

Lake Charles, Lousiana

Ashley GatteMBA Student

College of BusinessMcNeese State University

Lake Charles, Lousiana

ABSTRACT

Corporate philanthropy and charitable contributions are often a “visible” example ofresponsibleand ethical behavior by businesses. However, when viewed under the historic concepts morality, theact ofcharitable giving may have little or no connection to ethics. Most cultures recognizephilanthropy as “good”, but ethics is more about choices we make when the normal “rules” no longer servethe situation and the decision makerfaces a choicefor which he or she is unprepared. By reviewing traditionalphilosophies ofethics, this manuscript shows how charitable giving, while “good,”should not be a measure of“ethical behavior”for businesses. Infact, it is recommended thatphilanthropy and much ofwhat we consider “corporate social responsibility”should infact be consideredacomponent ofthe marketing mix.

INTRODUCTION

In our society, perhaps no action is considered asunquestionably moral or ethical as voluntarilyhelping others in need. A famous example forthis type of virtuous act is the story of the GoodSamaritan, who pitied a poor robbery victim,treated his wounds, helped him find a place torest and recover, and paid the innkeeper to lookout for him. In performing this altruistic act, heput aside his own concerns and interests to carefor the needs of another. The Samaritan gave ofhis own means with no expectation of any compensation or benefits in return—not even theexpectation that he would be recognized for hischarity. A self-less act of giving is a traditionalvirtue among many cultures and many religiouscreeds. Charity or giving alms (to the poor) re

quires a renunciation of self to some degree andan elevation of the interests of another. In western cultures, much ofwhat we consider “good” isbased on the ability ofa person to consider othersahead of self and to sacrifice personal desires forthe good ofothers.

As societies around the world increasingly become a part of a global business network, we findthat many large corporations gain assets and revenues even greater than the GDP ofmany smallernations. Some have argued that this implies obligations for organizations to advance social justicewhen governments cannot achieve those aims(Halme and Laurila 2009). The assumption thatcorporations have a social responsibility suggeststhat corporations and businesses, as members ofsociety, are expected to participate as a societalmember and “give back” to the society that en-

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Mitchell Adrian. Lonnie PhelDs. and Ashley Gatte

ables their existence. The purpose ofan organizations existence, under this model, is to not onlylook after the interests of the shareholder, but toalso take into account the interests and impacts it

has on its stakeholders. It is assumed by acting ina socially responsible manner that corporationscan fulfill much of their ethical obligations to society. This expectation mirrors the belief that service to others before service to oneself is a moraland noble action.

Co RPO RATESOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AS A

MORAL OBLIGATION

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a formof self-regulation to monitor and ensure compliance with the spirit of the law, ethical standards,and societal norms. The goal of CSR is to embrace responsibility and encourage a positive impact through its activities on stakeholders. If weassume that corporations must act in a sociallyresponsible manner, then it can be expected thatbusiness leaders would seek an accepted “standard” for responsible behavior. Targeted philanthropy becomes a way for companies and communities to pursue a win—win strategy. Morallyacceptable philanthropy can also be strategic sothat charitable efforts improve the competitivecontext. Philanthropy can align social and economic goals and improve a company’s long-termbusiness prospects (Porter and Kramer 2004).

However, not all companies view philanthropyin self-interested terms. Many believe that giving to the community is simply the morallyright thing to do. When Business Week compiledits 2003 list of the most philanthropic American companies, it polled 218 companies in theStandard and Poor’s 500 index (BusinessWeekOnline 2003). Only four respondents agreedwith Milton Friedman’s claim that “the business of business is business” and that companiesshould give only when doing so increases a company’s efficiency and profitability. The other 214respondents argued that giving is good in itselfand should occur because it is the morally rightthing to do. Employees report feeling betterabout working for companies that seek to bettersociety (Iannou 2003). Portfolio managers whopromote socially responsible investing claim thatinvestors examine philanthropic history becauseinvestors believe there is a correlation between

company generosity and how well the companytreats its employees (Belsie 2005). It is not surprising, then, that Business Ethics magazine usescorporate philanthropy as one indicator of how“moral” a particular company is when compiling its annual 100 Best Corporate Citizens list(Koehn and Ueng 2010).

For these reasons, business leaders, in an attemptto follow the precepts of social responsibility, donate organizational funds and various other resources to a number ofcommunity charities, typically with the assumption they are completing amoral obligation to the community and are exhibiting “good ethical behavior.” However, whenwe examine ethical philosophy, we find that corporate giving may have little to do with moralityand may not be an ethical issue at all. That leavesus with the underlying question, should corporations give, and if so, why?

Charity as an Ethical Act

It is assumed that charity is an act of kindnessand love for others. True “charity,” requires thatwe consider others before ourselves when we give.The Biblical injunction, “Love your neighbor asyourself” is named among the greatest commandments in the Christian belief system andincludes charitable actions toward those in need.According to the Christian tradition, we are todemonstrate agape (the Greek word for Biblicallove that is unconditional and self-sacrificing) inour interactions with others. Christian apologist C. S. Lewis (1944), in The Abolition ofMan,argues that charity is a central component ofthe Natural Law or the Tho and a common element in the moral codes of cultures and creedsover time and location--stated in different terms,but with similar meaning, and all embracing thecommon moral obligation to show charity. Examples include:

• “What good man regards any misfortuneas no concern ofhis?” (Roman)

• “Speak kindness...show good will.” (Babylonian)

• “Men were brought into existence forthe sake of men that they might do oneanother good.” (Roman)

• “He who is asked for alms should alwaysgive.” (Hindu)

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Philanthropy and Coroorate Social Resoonsibility:Is Giving. Enough to Truly Be Ethical?

• “Do to men what you wish men to do toyou.” (Christian)

• “Man is man’s delight.” (Old Norse)

Moral philosopher Immanuel Kant explains howcharitable giving is a moral imperative. Could aperson for whom life is going well legitimately(morally) dismiss the obligation to help anotherwho is struggling with “great hardships”? Kantsays no, because to deny help would be self-contradictory. The uncharitable person would beunwilling to establish his action as a universalrule for guiding the behavior of others. The casemight arise in which the selfish or stingy person is in need of love and sympathy, but by hisactions, he would have established a maxim forbidding his receiving help in the time of his ownstruggles—thus the contradictory nature of theaction. According to Kant, charitable giving is animperfect duty; not being charitable does not attract disapprobation, but engaging in charity is apraiseworthy act.

Utilitarian ethical theory holds that the rightcourse of action is the one that maximizes theoverall “good” consequences of the action. Themost ethical decision is the one wherein the pleasures or benefits created by the action exceed thepains or costs created by the action, when theconsequences to all affected parties are considered. The benefits and costs may not be distributed equally, but an ethical decision requires that,on balance, the overall good is greater than theoverall “bad”. In the case of charitable giving, acharitable act, judged by a utilitarian standard ofethical behavior, brings good consequences to therecipients of the charitable gift. ‘While the benefactor may experience some sacrifice of his ownwealth, the satisfaction of knowing that benefitshave accrued to others helps offset any loss of thedonor’s wealth.

Charity Is a Central Feature of CorporateResponsibility

Corporate responsibility (CR) is a complex phenomenon since it relates business to society. Sincesocieties differ, concepts about responsibility arebound to differ (Halme and Laurila 2009). Different national, cultural and social contexts callfor different sorts of responsibility (Midttun etal., 2006). The complexity of the CR phenomenon has also led to a proliferation of conceptssuch as corporate social responsibility (CSR),

corporate sustainability, ‘business in society’,corporate citizenship, social issues in management and corporate accountability (Garriga andMdc’ 2004; Halme and Laurila 2009; Meehanet al. 2006; Waddock 2004). Halme and Laurila (2009) have distinguished three primary CRtypes: (1) Philanthropy (2) CR Integration (conducting business operations more responsibly)and (3) CR Innovation (developing new business models for solving social and environmentalproblems).

A popular conceptualization of the notion ofcorporate social responsibility that describes corporate charity as integral is that of Archie Carroll

The most popular and enduring critiqueof CSR is the 1970 article by economistMilton Friedman. He argues that corporations do not have “social responsibilities” as defined by most proponents—todo good deeds for society, good deedsabove and beyond the fiduciary obligations responsibilities managers have toowners (shareholders) of the business.Yet Friedman acknowledges the place ofcorporate charity in the sphere ofcorporate social responsibility....

In an effort to showcase corporate responsibility, many organizations have selected the philanthropical approach to CSR, financially supporting charities, impoverished communities,community activities, educational institutions,etc. It is assumed that factors encouraging a philanthropical view of CSR are 1) it is easy for theorganization to show specific CSR activities, 2)it provides good publicity and 3) the public hascome to expect businesses to shoulder much ofthe responsibility of supporting charitable organizations. Both proponents and critics of thephilosophy of corporate social responsibilityrecognize that one key aspect of CSR is making charitable contributions. The degree towhich corporations can, like humans, be said tohave moral obligations, may still be debatable.Whether corporations have “social responsibilities” (beyond merely utilitarian image-buildingactions) may be debatable, but the discussion ofthose social responsibilities leaves no doubt thatthe responsible corporations will make charitablecontributions.

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Mitchell Adrian. Lonnie Phelos. and Ashley Gatte

IS GIVING ETHICAL?SHOULD CORPORATIONS GIVE?

One research area regarding philanthropy andCSR is the “bottom line” financial performanceof those who donate. This interest is reflected inmuch of the corporate responsibility researchwhich examine the influence ofCSR on financialperformance. The results of most studies, however, remain mixed (Arago’n-Correa and Sharma2003; Barnett and Salomon 2006; 1-lalme andNiskanen 2001; McWilliams and Siegel 2000;McWilliams et al. 2006; Porter and van derLinde 1995; Orlitzky et al. 2003; Salzmann etal. 2005; Schaltegger and Figge 2000; Simpsonand Kohers 2002), although two meta-analysesprovide some evidence of a positive relationshipbetween corporate responsibility and financialperformance (Margolis and Walsh 2003; Halmeand Laurila 2009; Orlitzky et al. 2003).

Others have tried to show that CSR pays off, ifnot in the short term, at least in the longer runin the form of social legitimacy, employee motivation or other benefits. There is case studyevidence indicating that responsibility generateseconomic benefits through increased employeeloyalty, long-term relationships with customers,better risk management and efficiency improvements (Dunphy et al. 2003; Halme and Laurila2009; Reinhardt, 1999).

Arguments against philanthropy have typicallybeen based on the grounds that the profits of thefirm belong to its shareholders and should be returned to them, not given away to various causesfavored by management (Freidman 1962). In astudy by Koehn and Ueng (2010), it was shownthat some organizations even use charitable donations to help disguise financial restatements,many involving fraud. A number of those firmsrestating suspect earnings appear on lists of topcorporate givers or of most ethical firms, prompting suspicion that companies can use philanthropy as a kind of moral window-dressing (Koehnand Ueng 2010).

Those who argue in favor of philanthropy contend that the role of business in society has beentransformed. Consumers and policy-makers expect businesses to act as good corporate citizensand this behavior is encouraged by tax-breaks,laws guaranteeing limited liability for corporateagents, and support for programs and institutionsthat educate future employees (Koehn and Ueng

2010). In this view, justice demands that corporations use resources to reciprocate the benefitsthey have accepted from the larger social system.Thus, Michael Porter has argued, “‘We are learning that the most effective way to address manyof the world’s most pressing problems is to mobilize the corporate sector in a context of rules, incentives, and partnerships where both companiesand society can benefit” (Porter 2002, p. 4).

Ethics is in the Motive

The question raised by philosophers about theethics ofgiving typically has to do with the motivation behind the gift. Kant states...

To be beneficent where one can is aduty, but I assert that in such a casean action of this kind, however it

may conform with duty and howeveramiable it may be, has neverthelessno true moral worth but is on thesame footing with other inclinations,and the maxim lacks moral content,namely that of doing such actionsnot from inclination but from duty.

Kant may draw his conclusion from Christianand classical origins that include statements suchas...

1”Be careful not to practice your righteousness in front of others to be seen bythem. Ifyou do, you will have no rewardfrom your Father in heaven.” Matthew6:1 New International Version

2”So when you give to the needy, do notannounce it with trumpets, as the hypocrites do in the synagogues and on thestreets, to be honored by others. TrulyI tell you, they have received their reward in full. 3But when you give to theneedy, do not let your left hand knowwhat your right hand is doing, 4so thatyou’re giving may be in secret. Then yourFather, who sees what is done in secret,will reward you.” Matthew 6:2-4 NewInternational Version

Aristotle (2003) suggests that ethics is rootedin different types of goods. Goods of first intentrefer to virtuousness, or “a chief good...which is,in itself, worthy of pursuit... always desirable initself and not for something else” [2003: 61 1]. In

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PhilanthroDy and Coroorate Social ResDonsibilitv:ls Giving. Enough to Truly Be EthEcal?

contrast, goods of second intent describe “thatwhich is good for the sake of obtaining something else” (e.g., profit, prestige, power, etc. [Aristotle, 2003: 611]. The pursuit of goods of secondintent is considered amoral as it tends to definepeople, society, etc. as objects to exploit.

It becomes evident that motive is important indetermining the moral praiseworthiness of acharitable act. Corporate charity is a public practice. Corporate websites seem happy to proclaimall the ways that they have helped the communities in which they operate. Essentially the Christian motive for giving is love, as in love for Godand love for others as one loves oneself. Corporate giving at its best is “strategic”—which is another word for instrumental or utilitarian. Kantdifferentiates between an adherence to duty, oracting in a way to which we feel a social obligation, in contrast to true goodwill. He states...

I also set aside actions that are really inconformity with duty but to which human beings have no inclination immediately and which they still perform because they are impelled to do so throughanother inclination. For in this case it

is easy to distinguish whether an actionin conformity with duty is done fromduty or from a self-serving purpose. It ismuch more difficult to note this distinction when an action conforms with dutyand the subject has, besides, an immediate inclination to it.

For example, a shopkeeper does notovercharge an inexperienced customer,and where there is a good deal of tradea prudent merchant does nor overchargebut keeps a fixed general price for everyone, so that a child can buy from himas well as everyone else. People are thusserved honestly; but this is not nearlyenough for us to believe that the merchant acted in this way from duty andbasic principles of honesty, his advantage required it.

A gift given purely for the benefit of deservingrecipients is clearly praiseworthy. If the gift helpsthe illiterate learn to read, or the ill to be healed,the benefits are obvious. However, it is suspectedthat gifts and donations are seldom given without thought of self-interest. If self-interest is in-

volved, then according to Kant the act of givingwas not a moral act. While giving is certainly not“wrong” or immoral and is socially encouraged,it is not a measure of corporate ethical behavior.The key for assessing “virtue” seems to rest onwhether an organization’s philanthropy is givenfor reasons of first intent (a virtuous pursuit) orof second intent (an instrumental pursuit).

DISCUSSION

The context in which this is written assumes corporations as organizations owned by shareholders. While sole proprietors, partnerships, etc.,can choose, as individual owners to spend theirassets as they wish, managers and board members have a fudiciary obligation to the shareholders (owners) of the corporation. Classic liberaleconomists, such as Milton Friedman and former OECD chief economist David Henderson,insist that corporations have no moral obligation whatsoever to address social ills. On thecontrary, when corporations give away profits tocharities or NGOs, they effectively steal moneythat should be returned to shareholders.

The only social responsibility of business is to increase proflts...f\Few trends would so thoroughly undermine the very foundations ofour free society as the acceptance by corporate officials of asocial responsibility other than to make as muchmoney for their stockholders as they possiblycan. This is a fundamentally subversive doctrine(Friedman 1962, p. 133).

Kant says that good will is good, without limitations. Good will is not good because of what it

accomplishes but rather because of its volition,that is, it is good in itself. He continues this

I also set aside actions that are really inconformity with duty but to which human beings have no inclination immediately and which they still perform because they are impelled to do so throughanother inclination. For in this case it

is easy to distinguish whether an actionin conformity with duty is done fromduty or from a self-serving purpose. It ismuch more difficult to note this distinction when an action conforms with dutyand the subject has, besides, an immediate inclination to it.

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Mitchell Adrian. Lonnie PhelDs. and Ashley Gatte

In the example given earlier, Kant discusses theshopkeeper acting honestly because if his dishonesty or trickery were made public, he couldpotentially lose business. Therefore, he acts as hedoes from duty and basic principles of honestybecause his advantage requires it. Kant furtherstates that...

To be beneficent where onecan is a duty, but I assert thatin such a case an action of thiskind, however it may conformwith duty and however amiableit may be, has nevertheless notrue moral worth but is on thesame footing with other inclinations, and the maxim lacksmoral content, namely that ofdoing such actions not from inclination but from duty.

Based on these precepts, it is difficult for us toascertain the motive behind corporate giving.It is also likely that some intention ofgain is desired by the organization when making a choiceabout charitable donations. Whatever one maysay about the broader issue of the corporation’s social responsibilities, corporate charitydoes not measure up to the altruistic standardof selflessness or self-sacrifice that individualcharity demonstrates. Paul Godfrey’s (2005)suggests that consistent philanthropic activityraises moral capital by enhancing an organization’s reputation. Raising moral capital serves asa form of insurance against future misbehavior.With moral capital comes greater social license.This of course begs the question, are you trulymoral ifyou are banking credits in preparationfor possible future immoral behavior?

Managers may see philanthropy as a way to meetminimum, intangible obligations to society. Riskmanagement and insurance theory emphasizesgoods of second intent, thereby encouraging aninstrumental mode of reasoning. Associatingresponsiveness with purely instrumental motives can change the intrinsic nature of philanthropic activity into “another technique of manipulation” (Gergen, 1990: 154), thus dilutingthe genuineness of philanthropic action. Whileorganizations may certainly choose to supportphilantropical causes and donate to charity, they

should choose to do so for strategic reasons andnot try to assume such behavior supports organizational ethics. Ethical behavior is about thechoices we make (not the donations we give).

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