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Pluralist democracy battling with ethno-nationalism in West Africa: The Case of Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire

Arsène Brice BADO. PhD candidate,

Department of Political Science, Laval University Arsene-brice.bado.1@ulaval.ca

Presented at the International Political Science Association Annual Congress

Montreal, Qc, Canada, July 20, 2014

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Introduction

Having attained independence at the beginning of the 1960s, most African states progressively

oriented themselves towards a single-party system. This was done with the hope of consolidating

national unity in states made up of socio-cultural and political entities that colonization had

required to co-habit. The single-party system, then, was a management strategy of socio-political

diversity across its virtual denial by means of homogenization procedures that resulted in the

installation of several dictatorships. But starting in the 1990s, thanks to internal and external

constraints, African states found themselves obliged to economically liberalize and politically

democratize; pluralist democracy having become, furthermore, a conditionality of international

aid on behalf of bilateral and multilateral partners.

However, one observes with the return of multi-party politics and pluralist democracy, an

affirmation of specific entities, be they ethnic, religious or regional. Since then, the political

space has tended to transform itself into a competition ground between indomitable identities

that oppose the nationalism of a unitary state, using a sort of ethno-nationalism founded on

ethnic identities. Such was the case, for example, in both Congo States, Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra

Leone, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau and Kenya, where civil ethnic conflicts erupted during the

electoral process and thus put into question pluralist democracy’s capacity to adequately manage

ethnic identities. It is the same for the current conflict in Mali where pluralist elections and

majority rule have almost always excluded the Touareg minority who make up less than 10% of

the population and for whom military pressure seems to be the preferred route to ascension to

power or at least to political longevity.

Thus, several post-colonial African societies are challenged by ethno-nationalist forces looking

to assure minority entities survival within the heart of the demographic majority, and in part by

nationalist forces seeking to install a national unity beyond specific identities. In the socio-

historic context characteristic of these societies, pluralist democracy has contributed, in certain

cases, to the reinforcement of national unity and democratic governance by allowing for better

integration of ethnic differences. By contrast, in other cases, it has exacerbated ethnic

nationalism, making the obtaining of political compromises difficult in the view of a civic modus

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vivendi. The question to which this study would like try to reply is the following: To what

conditions can pluralist democracy contribute to the consolidation of democratic governance in

the specific situation of African societies marked by patent ethno-nationalism?

Our working hypothesis is that pluralist democracy has managed to institutionalize itself in the

long-term and to consolidate democratic governance in African societies where it has taken the

form of a type of consociation, founded on the voluntary integration of the different competing

ethnic entities. As to research method, we will propose two case studies: Ghana as a positive

case, and Côte d’Ivoire as a negative case. These case studies will permit highlighting of the

success and practical limits of pluralist democracy practices in Western Africa, and in so doing,

propose fundamental thinking on political pluralism in shattered societies battling the centrifugal

force of ethno-nationalism.

1. Ethnicity in societal processes in West Africa

To demonstrate how pluralist democracy has been trapped by ethnopolitics and

ethnonationalism, it is imperative to understand ethnicity and its relationship to politics, in

general, and to democracy’s functioning, in particular. However, ethnicity is a very complex and

confusing concept that evades any clear definition, making authority among researchers rare

despite the existence of a tremendous literature on ethnic groups and ethnic identity. We dismiss

primordialist approaches that apprehend ethnicity through primordial ties such as language,

custom, kinship, blood, race and religion (Mbatia, Bikuru, and Nderitu 2009). These approaches

make a static concept of ethnicity instead of making it a constructed reality. From the standpoint

of primordialists, ethnic identity is perceived as a prerogative that falls to individuals and groups

regardless of their will. It appears, therefore, as a passive cultural awareness. While ethnic

groups might often identify themselves through biological traits like race and through cultural

attributes such as language, customs, religion, shared history, etc., ethnicity and ethnic identity

are far from being fixed or static concepts. Ethnicity is “constantly changing and developing,

thereby creating its own identity and redefining itself” (Heery and Noon 2001).

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We also dismiss instrumentalist approaches that construe ethnicity as a resource for elites to

achieve social, cultural, political and economic interests (Ake 2003, 93-94, Mbatia, Bikuru, and

Nderitu 2009, 4). While this approach rightly shows that ethnicity is a dynamic concept, it fails

to define what ethnicity is, instead focusing on its function and use. As Claude Ake criticizes, the

instrumentalist definition of ethnicity “is misleading by virtue of the emphasis it places on the

manipulative and exploitable aspect of ethnic construction, for the simple reason that

manipulability or exploitability is not and cannot be a useful definition of ethnicity. Whatever it

is, ethnicity is not always exploited or always exploitable” (Ake 2003, 94).

Besides these two schools of thought, numerous other definitions and approaches to ethnicity

exist. The debate often revolves around whether or not ethnicity is real or constructed. However,

in this study we construe ethnicity as a shared consciousness between individuals that assume (or

are perceived to assume) some combination of cultural, historical, racial, religious, linguistic, or

territorial features (Calhoun 2002). The combination of features may result in different ethnic

configurations that stress different features. For instance, one might call “ethnolinguistic” an

ethnicity that is predominantly based on linguistic factors; “ethnoracial” when the predominant

element is race; “ethno-regional” when the predominant features are geographic or territorial

factors; etc. Thus, ethnic communities are not always built on the same elements.

We consider that ethnicity is both a given phenomenon and a construct reality in the sense that it

combines both ideational aspects such as group consciousness, relationship or sense of solidarity,

and objective aspects such as language, race, customs, territory, etc. The objective aspects alone

do not create ethnicity or ethnic groups, nor do the ideational aspects. By themselves, each of

these aspects or dimensions is necessary but alone are insufficient conditions for the make up of

ethnicity or ethnic groups. Combined, however, they constitute a sufficient and necessary

condition. Admittedly, the most prominent and problematic dimension of ethnicity is the

ideational or constructed aspect. From this emerges a particular ethnic identity based on a shared

consciousness of the self as distinct from others, and on active membership through a sense of

solidarity within the ethnic group.

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One of the major epistemic and ontological problems about ethnicity is that the boundaries of

ethnic identity or ethnic consciousness are porous and fluctuating. For, “ethnic groups are […]

fluid in composition and subject to changes in definition. New ethnic groups are constantly being

formed as populations move between countries. Indians in Britain, for example, constitute an

ethnic group—although as individuals in India they would be seen to be members of markedly

different groups in terms of caste and language” (Scott and Marshall 2009). This dynamic is

consistent with several African countries, where the flow of people, – either by the exodus of

populations within a country or through interstate migration – complicates and accentuates

regional, linguistic, cultural, religious or racial cleavages. These in turn, create conditions for

strengthening ethnic communities.

After defining ethnicity, we now turn our attention to the analysis of how it affects societal

processes and the political game in West African societies. We identify three major factors

through which ethnicity plays an important role in society in general and politics in particular:

ethnic pluralism, influence of ethnic governance institutions, and the importance of ethnic

solidarity networks in weakened states.

Firstly, ethnic pluralism appears to be the primary and most vivid pluralism in West African

postcolonial states (Agbu 2011). These states usually encompass a variable number of ethnic

communities. For instance, depending upon how one defines an ethnic group, there exist around

thirty-five ethnic groups in Côte d’Ivoire, and nearly three-hundred in Nigeria (Liebenow 1986,

56). Ethnic diversity is the most relevant feature of these states, qualifying them as multi-ethnic.

Different substitutes such as multicultural or multinational states are also used to designate the

same reality of multi-ethnic societies. Indeed, pluralism is also religious, regional, linguistic,

cultural, racial, and socioeconomic. Each of these forms of pluralism is likely to lead to violent

conflict that can threaten the national unity of states that are poorly integrated. However, the

specificity of multi-ethnic West African states resides in the characteristic that ethnic pluralism

tends to subsume other forms of pluralism. It has so much importance because the other forms of

plurality feed it. For instance, in Côte d’Ivoire, the Dioula ethnic group is reputed to be largely

merchant, and indeed they do control an important part of trade flow. This combination of ethnic

and socio-economic factors has led to the emergence of a type of social diversity that could be

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called "ethno-economic." In the same vein, ethnicity creates, sustains, or affects social

stratifications that may be ethno-linguistic, ethno-racial, ethno-religious or ethno-regional. Ethnic

membership impacts individuals’ lives in terms of their relationship to politics, the economy,

public administration, and other spheres of public life. Thus, instead of social status or social

classes (Esman 2004, 12-14), in fact ethnic communities represent the most relevant social unit

that structures societal relationships in West African societies.

This predominance of ethnic ties is attributed to the post-colonial state’s failure to integrate the

different ethnic communities as one people within the state territory (Amouzou 2013, Bach 1998,

Esman 2004). For, the territory conquered by each colonial power has not been successfully

transformed into a national territory under the exclusive domination of state power. The problem

is that most territorial boundaries of post-colonial states do not conform to the pre-existing

boundaries of ethnopolitical communities, and have arbitrarily divided formerly unified peoples

across states (Liebenow 1986, 50). The eclectic ethnic composition of these countries accounts

for the difficulty of nation-state building in most African states (William 2004, 45).

The second factor that helps assess the importance of identity communities in sociopolitical

processes is the influence of ethnic governance institutions in several post-colonial African

states. These governance institutions are usually ethnic-based traditional chieftainships that

either existed before colonization or were created by colonial rulers in order to micro-manage

communities in villages. They operate like microstates with a more or less complex organization

according to regions and the socio-political culture of the societies in which they exist. In many

societies, these traditional ethnic-based political organizations have survived both the colonial

and post-colonial states. Their functions and influence have evolved over time. Nevertheless,

they still perform important roles such as conflict resolution especially in rural areas where state

administrations are almost non-existent; the organizing of folkloric activities and cultural

markers that preserve community identity; the development and implementation of customary

laws; and the representation of local populations, etc. (Jonah 2007). Especially in weak states

that have difficulty expanding their administration and services over the boundaries of national

territory (Thies 2009, 632), ethnic-based governance institutions play a significant role in groups

living-together, both socially and politically at the local level. In such weak state settings, chiefs

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that rule over chieftainships are likely to become “competitors to central rulers because of the

loyalties that citizens enmeshed in various ethnic networks have for them. Chiefs are often seen

as more legitimate than the rulers of the state because of their historical legacies, their ethnic

affiliations, and their control over local resources such as land” (Thies 2009, 633). This probable

contentious relationship between central authorities and local leaders is one of the most common

threats to post-colonial state unity (Herbst 2000, 159) as well as to democratization.

The third factor is related to the importance of ethnic solidarity networks. Ethnic solidarity has

always been a major element in the creation of social ties both inside and outside the ethnic

community. After their accession to independence, Ghana in 1958 and Côte d'Ivoire in 1960,

political leaders of the new states have attempted to substitute ethnic solidarity, or at least to

mitigate its influence with civic solidarity through state administrations. With the intent of

consolidating the state-building process, the new states implemented numerous social programs

including health, education, and development projects. These statewide social programs

contributed to strengthening internal cohesion and national unity. As Michael Kpessa, Daniel

Béland, and André Lecours uncovered, there is a strong relationship between nationalism and

social policy and that social programs are key constituents of nation building in developing

countries: “[i]n sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), for example, the ‘social question’ and the ‘national

question’ have long interacted (Mkandawire 2009)” (Kpessa, Béland, and Lecours 2011, 2116).

However, at the end of the 1970s, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and other

financial institutions pressured most African countries to liberalize their economies and to reduce

their public debt. This resulted in the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programs that

highly reduced state commitments in the social sphere. Consequently, this retreat of the state has

marked the revival of ethnic solidarity networks. As Michael Kpessa, Daniel Béland, and André

argue, “there is now a broad consensus among scholars that states in SSA were internally

stronger and more cohesive in the first two decades after independence than in the post-1970s,

following the implementation of structural adjustment programmes (Mkandawire 2001; Madavo

2005; Chabal 2009),” (Kpessa, Béland, and Lecours 2011, 2116). Thus, ethnic solidarity

networks are probably the most important channels, not only in social spheres, but also in

economic and political spheres as well.

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This setting thwarted the consolidation of citizenship as a sense of belonging of individuals to

the state and to a supra-national community across ethnic and other identity communities. Such a

sense of belonging is the foundation of civic nationalism, which is more a territorial concept than

a cultural one. As Milton Esman notes, civic nationalism construes the nation to include any

person who accepts the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, regardless of ethnic origin. For,

from the perspective of civic nationalism, what binds people “together as a political community

is not their ethnic origin, but rather their commitment to a common set of political institutions,

political values, and way of life” (Esman 2004, 42).

The involvement of ethnic-based identity communities and groups in the political arena led to the

emergence of ethnopolitics or to the formation of ethnonationalism. Both concepts refer to

politicized ethnicity through ethnopolitical consciousness and assertiveness. However,

ethnonationalism is more than merely politicized ethnicity to the extent that it comprises a

demand for self-determination that arises in the tension within multiethnic states. This demand

may come either from ethnic minorities or dominant ethnic groups when they consider

themselves as underprivileged or threatened by other ethnic groups. The rise of ethnopolitics

depends on the action of ethnic entrepreneurs; these individuals are elites able to mobilize ethnic

groups not only into politics but are also able to politicize them. However, ethnonationalism or

ethnopolitics in general are not solely the result of political entrepreneurship; they are also the

product of a shared political and historic experience. There exists a tremendous literature on

ethnopolitics and ethnonationalism (see Breton 1995, Esman 1994, 2004, Finlay 2010, Mbatia,

Bikuru, and Nderitu 2009, Rothschild 1981, Samba 1982, Wolff and Cordell 2011). Instead of

summarizing this literature, which would be an impossible mission to accomplish in few lines,

we limit ourselves to answer these two questions in accordance with the objective of this study:

Why is pluralist democracy tapped by ethnopolitics in several African states? Secondly, how

does ethnopolitics actually affect the functioning of pluralist democracy in these countries?

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2. Pluralist democracy trapped by ethnopolitics and ethnonationalism

The return to pluralist democracy at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s has led to the

liberalization of the political sphere, characterized mainly by the re-introduction of multiparty

politics. This political opening provided an opportunity to identity-based groups to re-assert

themselves in the political arena where for years, they had been forbidden. Indeed, after the

accession to independence in the early 1960s, all West African states had embraced pluralist

democracy. However, in the mid 1970s, most of them eliminated multiparty politics and

endorsed single party politics purportedly, among other reasons, in order to contain ethnic,

regional, and religious rivalries. Indeed, for African leaders, the artificial nature of colonial

boundaries has divided different populations belonging to the same cultural group, language or

formerly unified polity between several countries. As a result, post-colonial states have

understood that their mandate is to achieve national integration. To do so,

[M]any political leaders who have created unity out of the heterogeneous populations they govern, attempt to deal with ethnicity as if it did not exist. In some cases legal steps have been taken to eliminate ethnic-based traditional chieftainship, to ban political parties and other associations based on one ethnic group, to redraft administrative and electoral boundaries to cut across ethnic boundaries, to omit ethnic origin data from national census, and to penalize those who make reference to the separate ethnic identity of citizens (Liebenow 1986, 51).

Despite these measures to contain ethnicity and the rise of centrifugal forces of ethnopolitics, the

single party political system has failed to achieve sustainable national integration and peaceful

socioeconomic development. Grievance at the domestic level and changes at the international

level, particularly at the end of the Cold War, led to the claim of democracy and to the re-

establishment of pluralist democracy.

Nonetheless, the return to pluralist democracy has led to a resurgence of competing ethnic

communities alongside political parties. For, identity affiliations have become resources that

politicians use to form political parties and to conduct election campaigns. Most African political

parties have superficial ideological roots. They are much more defined both in their policy

proposals and voter perception through ethno-regional or ethno-linguistic lines (Amouzou 2013,

166-169). Though ethnic-based political parties have dominated politics, it is important to note

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that in most African multiethnic countries there are several ethnic groups and that, usually, none

of these ethnic groups alone can dominate all the other groups. This situation renders alliances

between several ethnic groups necessary. As a result, political pluralism is forced to coexist with,

and even to be fed by ethnic pluralism. This poses a problem, therefore, for pluralist democracy.

For, when a multiparty system is overlapped with ethnic pluralism, ethnopolitics thrives,

especially in poorly integrated societies. Accordingly, competition between political parties turns

into a more or less patent competition between ethnic groups. Similarly, ethnic identity and other

particular identity markers become the preferred channels of political mobilization, as is the case

in most Sub-Saharan countries.

Like political parties, civil society associations have taken advantage of the political

liberalization to be more visible in the sociopolitical domain. Identity-based associations and

institutions are among prominent civil society organizations (Johnson 2005, 51), since the polity

is built more around identities than around ideologies, and that identity remains the principal

referent structuring politics as we have explained in a previous section (Igwara 2001, 96, Barr

2004, Franck and Rainer 2012, Ihonvbere 1994, Johnson 2005). The inability of state

administrations to adequately respond to the needs of their citizens has also contributed to the

rise of different kinds of societal organizations fed by cultural or regional solidarity networks as

in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, or by religious solidarity networks, as in Senegal and Nigeria

(Arthur 2009, Berman 2004, Johnson 2005, Mbatia, Bikuru, and Nderitu 2009). For instance, in

Côte d’Ivoire’s political and military crisis from 2002 to 2010, civil associations were divided

between the two major political candidates, Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara, the former

supported by civil society organizations dominated by southerners, while the latter was support

by associations dominated by northerners. In such settings, pluralist democracy becomes a

proponent for the promotion of ethnicity through the competition between ethnic communities,

which increases ethnic tension, and raises questions about the ability of pluralist democracy to

manage ethnic diversity.

The debate over the influence of identity-based preferences on voting in Africa has divided

scholars (Bratton, Bhavnani, and Chen 2012, Dunning and Harrison 2010, Ichino and Nathan

2013, Ishiyama 2012, Peele and Morse 1974). In their pioneering article that offers the first

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comprehensive account of popular voting intentions in sixteen African electoral democracies

including Ghana, Senegal, and Nigeria, Michael Bratton, Ravi Bhavnani and Tse-Hsin Chen

(2012), suggested that “that competitive elections in Africa are more than mere ethnic censuses

or simple economic referenda. Instead, Africans engage in both ethnic and economic voting”

(Bratton, Bhavnani, and Chen 2012, 27). They found that the largest ethnic groups are not

always in a position of political dominance, and that “what really matters for the expression of

voting intentions is an individual’s relationship to the ethnic group – regardless of its relative

size – that currently controls executive power” (Bratton, Bhavnani, and Chen 2012, 41).

However, their study confirmed that individuals are more likely to vote for the candidate

belonging to their ethnic group because they “expect leaders to treat co-ethnics more favorably

than others when exercising public power” (Bratton, Bhavnani, and Chen 2012, 41). Indeed,

many studies have confirmed that leaders in several African countries tend to use their influence

and state resources to the benefit of their families and their ethnic, regional or religious affiliated

group through clientelistic and neopatromonialist means (Lindberg and Morrison 2008, 116-

120). More than the previous factors, what accounts for ethnic voting most is the feeling that

individuals have regarding discrimination either positive or negative towards their ethnic group

(Bratton, Bhavnani, and Chen 2012, 47). Unfortunately, this feeling of discrimination and

exclusion from power sharing and economic development is present in most African multiethnic

states. This feeling of exclusion has triggered civil conflicts in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal,

Nigeria and other countries. This is one of the reasons the most prevalent types of contemporary

conflict in Africa are intra-state conflicts that oppose different ethnic and ethnonational groups.

As Ilan Peleg notes, “[d]emocratic tradition or an active process of democratization does not

guarantee the absence of internal ethnic conflict. In fact, they often facilitate it” (Peleg 2007, 20).

Pluralist democracy becomes, therefore, a dangerous game in multiethnic societies (Gillies 2011,

Collier 2010). Although there is no doubt that ethnicity is a major factor in politics in general,

and in voting behavior in particular, “structural explanations based on ethnicity are limited” as

Pippa Norris and Robert Mattes pointed out (Norris and Mattes 2013, 42).

The individual as the political unit through which liberal democracy operates constitutes another

stumbling block between pluralist democracy and ethnopolitics in multiethnic African polities.

Liberal democracy is grounded in the assumption of the equality of all individuals, regardless of

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sex, race, religion or ethnicity. The recognition of equal rights for all individuals is therefore the

core demand of liberal democracy, which tends to deal with “individual rights often at the

expense of group rights and identities” (Agbu 2011, 12). With most West African societies

divided along ethnic lines, a group-based approach to politics is predominant. Ethnopolitics and

ethnonationalism value identity groups over individuals. Their claim for equality is less

individualistic than collectivist in the sense that they claim group equality instead of individual

equality. When identity groups structure social relationships and politics, each group strives to

foster its position through a demand for recognition, and even, for self-determination where

ethnonationalism prevails (Peleg 2007, 29). In such settings, pluralist democracy creates

conditions for clashes between competing ethnic groups as we will later demonstrate in our study

cases.

The individualistic approach to democracy also emphasizes the rule of majority, which raises

difficulties in multiethnic societies. Indeed, “it is often noted by democratic theorists that there is

a certain ‘naturalness’ about majority rule, once we have accepted the imperativeness of political

equality (…). If all cannot agree on a choice between option X and Y, then let the majority

preference decide the matter” (Saward 1998, 69). Though, with majority rule one or a coalition

of ethnopolitical groups might control the political process by controlling state institutions and

use this position to foster their interests (Peleg 2007, 1), provoking the frustration of other ethnic

groups who are not exercising power. Thus, the system of majority rule organizes the devolution

of material and symbolic resources of the state to the benefit of a particular coalition of ethnic

groups while excluding others. This behavior encourages the minorities to challenge the

legitimacy of government (Franck and Rainer 2012) and threatens national unity in poorly

integrated multiethnic societies.

To sum it up, it is clear from this analysis that pluralist democracy has some trouble coping with

ethnopolitics and ethnonationalism in societies divided along ethnic lines. There is a need

therefore to explore ways and means for a better functioning of democracy in ethnicly divided

societies. Is the consociational approach to democracy a solution for West African multiethnic

societies?

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3. Rehabilitating ethnicity in the democratic process: a consociational argument

With most West African polities structured more around identities than ideologies, ethnicity

appears to be a major factor structuring their politics. Therefore, failing to take ethnicity or

identity politics seriously into account jeopardizes the functioning of their democracy. In fact,

ethnicity has always been at the center of democratic processes in multi-national societies. What

is problematic then it is the role ascribed to ethnicity in political processes, the ways it is

perceived, or the managing of conflicting ethnic diversity. Ethnicity or ethnic consciousness and

solidarity have often been perceived negatively as a factor contributing to political instability and

social disintegration. Many African leaders have taken measures to suppress the impact of

ethnicity in politics (Johnson 2005, 49). As Liebenow (1986, 52) rightfully noted, “these efforts

to reduce conflict within a heterogeneous state may be laudable, but ethnic diversity and tension

are facts of life in Africa”. The majority of leaders acknowledge this as a matter of fact. They

most often exhibit a common attitude that is less the suppression of ethnicity than its

manipulation and its use as a political resource, both for mobilization and for conquest of power.

Ethnicity, therefore, in itself is not the problem; and it can even “be regarded as a creative

challenge” (Liebenow 1986, 54).

It is important to deconstruct other flaws about ethnicity such as the assertion that ethnicity is

exclusive, irrational and aggressive because its membership is based on either ascription or, at

best, on assimilation (Ngeow 2010, 152). As such, ethnicity is seen as a threat to civic

nationalism. Yet, the reality in ethnically structured polities is that ethnic membership is not

necessarily an impediment to cross-ethnic relationships. As Finlay warns, “[I]n any case, what

should not be underestimated is the value in an ethnically divided society of bringing people

together on the basis of a shared interest or activity where their ethnic identity is not the highest

virtue” (Finlay 2010, xiii). There are many ways in which ethnic identity in multiethnic societies

is transcended in the everyday life of individuals. The fact that ethnic membership remains

strong does not mean that individuals do not have other referential identities such as civic

citizenship grounded in the shared membership to the state and its institutions. The novelty of the

state generally in African countries and in most West African countries lies in the reality that

most West Africans born up to and including the early 1960s, grew up in ethnic communities

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under the colonial state. Their loyalty to their original identity-based community is deeper than

their loyalty to the novel state, which is still an unfinished nation-state project. Efforts to build

the nation-state should first take advantage of the existence of ethnic communities that are small

nationalities and then seek to aggregate them into the project of a multinational-state.

We argue that more than pluralist democracy, consociational democracy, offers a better

management of conflicting ethnic diversity in ways that bring together ethnicity and citizenship

within the framework of an inclusive democratic process. According to Lijphart (1969, 211),

consociational democracy refers to fragmented but stable democracies, and is defined as a

“government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into

a stable democracy” (Lijphart 1969, 216). According to Lijphart,

Successful consociational democracy requires: (I) That the elites have the ability to accommodate the divergent interests and demands of the subcultures. (2) This requires that they have the ability to transcend cleavages and to join in a common effort with the elites of rival subcultures. (3) This in turn depends on their commitment to the maintenance of the system and to the improvement of its cohesion and stability. (4) Finally, all of the above requirements are based on the assumption that the elites understand the perils of political fragmentation (Lijphart 1969, 216).

This groundbreaking accepted definition of consociation by Lijphart has been improved

incrementally by further studies. There also exist numerous contending definitions (Andeweg

2000, Doli and Korenica 2013, Finlay 2010, Lehmbruch 1993, McGraw 2014, Esman 2004).

However, as Finlay notes, “it might be just as accurate to describe consociation as the

disaggregation of power (Bell 2008) for it also involves the proportional distribution of posts not

just in the executive, but in the legislature and bureaucracy such that these cannot be dominated

by any one group” (Finlay 2010, 1-2).

How can consociational democracy be an alternative for highly identity-based African societies,

especially in West African countries? At the outset, it is important to note that consociation, as a

method of managing conflicting diversities is flexible in its form and content, which vary

according to the particularities of each multi-ethnic society and the issues at stake. Nevertheless,

with regard to the cases of Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, we highlight these benefits of

consociational democracy.

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Firstly, consociational democracy can provide a better recognition of identity-based groups as

well as promote unity in diversity. Through the intentional integration of identity-based

communities, consociation creates opportunities for inclusive dialogue between sub-state

entities. This rehabilitation of identity-groups allows the recognition of ethnic nationalism not as

a hindrance to civic citizenship, but rather as a component of it. From this standpoint, nationality

is construed as the consciousness of membership to an identity-based sub-state entity, and

citizenship is understood as the consciousness of membership to the state. The distinction

between nationality and citizenship is essential in the emergence of the multinational or multi-

ethnic state. For instance, an individual from the Senoufo ethnic group that mostly occupies the

north regions of Côte d’Ivoire may say that he is both Senoufo and Ivorian. Indeed, it is very

common that in Côte d’Ivoire or Ghana, individuals introduce themselves first through their

ethnic membership. This does not mean that they are opposed to the citizenship of the state;

rather it suggests that their belonging to the state is via their “nation” membership to their

ethnic community. In other words, these individuals are not just Ivoirians, Ghanaians, etc., but

they are also Senoufo, Baoule, or Asante, to name a few groups. Consociation, therefore, helps to

seriously consider ethnonational entities in the democratic process. This is not automatic. As

Lijphart notes “[t]he leaders of the rival subcultures may engage in competitive behavior and

thus further aggravate mutual tensions and political instability, but they may also make deliberate

efforts to counteract the immobilizing and unstabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation”

(Lijphart 1969, 211-212). The achievement of consociational democracy depends on the

commitment and willingness of leaders of conflicting identity-based communities.

Secondly, consociation offers a better representation of identity groups and individuals. For,

consociation is based on proportional representation and non-majoritarian attributes of power

sharing. Instead of the majority rule that divides constituencies into winners and losers,

consociation establishes a kind of win-win rule where the majority governs, but the minority is

not excluded and has a proportional share in power (Lijphart 1969, 214). This consensual

approach to political power devolution helps protect minority rights in fragmented societies,

including the right to existence, the right to legal equality of all groups and the right to

proportional participation in political decision-making, etc., (Stanovčić 1992, 364). Thus, group-

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based rights can coexist with individual rights. Hence, consociation can provide opportunity to

each ethnic group for ensuring the best representation at the top of the state (Rossatanga-Rignault

2012, 61).

Thirdly, consociation can foster political participation and accountability. In polities structured

around regional or cultural membership such as those concerned by this study, usually the

demand for political reforms and accountability comes from identity-based communities and

organizations that feel excluded from political affairs and socio-economic development. In

Nigeria for instance, the main ethnic groups, Hausa, Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba, dominate political

game and set the tune for political claims through either political parties or regional and cultural

organizations. This raises the level of political participation, and can open pathways for political

accountability when elites strive to represent the needs of their communities.

In addition to these three above-mentioned benefits, consociational democracy offers an array of

other advantages in the management of assertive identity-based communities through inclusive

democratic process. We now present the empirical analysis of two case studies, Côte d’Ivoire

and Ghana.

4. Two tales of success and failure of democracy in multi-ethnic societies

Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana are both former colonies. Côte d’Ivoire became independent from

France on August 7th, 1960, and Ghana from United Kingdom on March 6th, 1957. These post-

colonial states have been in existence for only half a century and are made up of heterogeneous

ethno-linguistic and religious communities. These identity-based communities shape

sociopolitical life. To assess their impact on democratic processes, for each case study, we

analyze the state of ethnicity and then strive to find out how ethnicity impacts the functioning of

democracy.

16

4.1. Côte d’Ivoire, a bitter story of democracy in a multiethnic society

Côte d’Ivoire has a population estimated at twenty-three million people in 2014 (see CIA, The

World Factbook 2014). It counts about sixty ethno-linguistic groups that are usually classified

into the following six groups: the Akan, located mostly in the East South; the Gur, (also called

Voltaic) located mostly in the North; the Northern Mande located mostly in the North; the

Southern Mande and the Krou located mostly in the West; and the remaining minority ethnic

groups, scattered in different parts of the country. According to the 1998 Census, the Akan group

represents 42.1%, Gur 17.6%, Northern Mande 16.5%, Krou 11%, Southern Mande 10%, and

others 2.8%. The same census also revealed that foreigners represent 26,1% of the entire

population, which is one of the world’s highest proportions of foreigners within a single country.

The population is also divided between Islam and Christianity, the two major religious

communities. Muslims, mostly in the North, represent 38.6% North; and Christians, mostly in

the South, 32.8%. Identity politics in Côte d’Ivoire revolves around the triple combination of

language, region, and religion, which are three major factors that feed ethnicity and provide it

with a solid anchor in sociopolitical life. How does ethnicity shape the democratic process in

Côte d’Ivoire?

Since the return of liberal democracy with the re-establishment of multi-party politics in April

1990, ethnicity has dominated the political game in Côte d’Ivoire through ethnopolitics and the

rising of ethnonationalism (Toungara 2001, 64, Babo and Droz 2008, 751). The major political

parties are structured along ethnic lines. The PDCI (Parti Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire –

Rassemblement Démocratique Africain), the former state-party, is dominated by the Baoulé, a

sub-group of the Akan ethno-linguistic group. The PDCI had been the ruling party for almost

four decades, from independence in 1960 to the December 1999’ coup d’État that unseated

President Henri Konan Bédié. The latter and his predecessor, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, were

both from the Baoulé ethnic group, therefore, making the Akan people the basis of support of the

PDCI. Though, from 1960 to 1990, President Houphouët-Boigny strived to eliminate ethnic

associations and to contain the influence of ethnicity (Woods 1994, 467), he paradoxically relied

upon ethnic clientelism to establish and consolidate his power as President. For, he used it to

redistribute state economic resources to ethnic elites across the country. He also appointed elites

17

from diverse ethnic groups to higher public offices. Through this economic and political

clientelism, he built a nationwide network of elites that served as relays in their own ethnic

group. For thirty years, this ethnic-based clientelism had been the main strategy for the PDCI as

the ruling state-party. However, the return of multi-party politics tore apart this fragile

equilibrium between elites that were not satisfied by the clientelism that was usually selectively

advantageous of Baoulé elite. Particularly after the death of Houphouët-Boigny, ethnicity

became increasingly politicized and contentious with the implementation of pluralist democracy.

As Jeanne Toungara wrote,

In preparation for the round of elections in 2000, Bédié forged ahead, taking more repressive measures. Having made promises to reward Baule1 party activists for mobilizing informal support groups called the Cercle National Bédié, he initiated a purge within the civil service. Bédié replaced many devoted and highly respected technocrats of Northern origins with persons belonging to the president’s own Baule group who were perceived as less competent or unqualified. His security forces terrorized Northerners and took part in the forced removal of numerous Burkinabe laborers from the Southwest (Toungara 2001, 67).

With the PDCI failing to be a pan-ethnic party, and with its increasing focus on Baoulé at the

expense of other ethnic groups, the political party RDR (Rassemblement Des Républicains)

would be created from a scission of the PDCI. If at its beginnings in 1995, “the RDR was not

formed as an ethnic party” and “was composed by disenchanted PDCI stalwarts and civil

servants seeking effective and transparent governance” (Toungara 2001, 67), it slowly

transformed itself into an ethno-regional party. For,

due to the mounting evidence of human rights violations against Northerners, the incentives for the emergence of a united Northern opposition grew stronger. Fearing for their safety, notherners flocked to a leader with whom they could identify based on ethnicity, national origin, religion, and a proven record of service to the nation. When the RDR elected Ouattara to head their party upon his return to Côte d’Ivoire in July 1999, and selected him as their presidential candidate, Northerners pledged their support in solidarity (Toungara 2001, 68).

The FPI (Front Populaire Ivoirien), another major political party, has a strong ethnic basis. The

Krou ethnic group dominates the FPI that also draws other Akan ethnic subgroups dissatisfied by

1 Baule is another spelling of Baoulé. In the literature, we may also find the following spellings: “Bawoulé”, or “Bawulé”.

18

the PDCI dominated regime. Laurent Gbagbo, the leader of FPI is indeed a Beté, a subgroup of

the Krou ethnic group.

With the three main political parties organized along ethnic membership, the electoral

competition between parties that is a core element of liberal democracy becomes a competition

between ethnic communities. This ethnopolitics unfortunately raises the prospects of

intercommunity clashes during the democratic process. For, ethnic communities and other

identity-based communities compete for power and economic resources through political parties

that appear to be more like disguised ethnic associations or ethnic-based interest groups. The

results of the last presidential elections confirmed the salience of ethnicity in the democratic

process in Côte d’Ivoire. After the first round on November 28th, 2010, each candidate of the

three major parties obtained his best score within their own ethnic community and region. The

incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo and the FPI gained in the West and in the Southeast Krou

dominated people; Henri Konan Bédié scored high in the Akan (and especially Baoulé)

dominated Centre regions; and Alassane Dramane Ouattara gained in the Northern region

dominated by the Mande group, especially among the Senoufo and Malinke people. This ethno-

regional polarization is not necessarily a problem; it becomes a danger when the polarization

triggers violent intercommunity conflicts that threaten the peace and the unity of the country

through the rise of an ethno-nationalism.

Ethnonationalism has emerged as a major political discourse during the electoral process in the

1990s amid the elite power struggles. The concept of “Ivoirité” that has been put forward in this

period summarizes the ethnonationalist ideology. Ivoirité means “Ivorianness”, that is, the

essence of being Ivoirian. It aims at re-interpreting national identity to both distinguish true

Ivoirians from strangers, and to prevent the latter from depriving the former of their privileges

(Ekanza 2007, 45). Ahead of the 1995 presidential elections, on the basis of Ivoirité, President

Bédié succeeded in invalidating the candidacy of former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara,

accused of having a dubious nationality. As Patrick Meehan explains,

The political motivations behind his support for Ivoirité became most explicit in the country’s New Electoral Code (1994) which restricted the right to vote to Ivorian nationals, stated that all presidential candidates must have complete Ivorian parenthood, must not have lived outside of the country within the past five

19

years and should never have renounced their citizenship to take the nationality of another country. It was clearly designed to prevent Ouattara from running against him for President since Ouattara’s father was purportedly Burkinabe and Ouattara had worked abroad for the IMF since 1993 and had once travelled on a Burkinabe passport (Meehan 2011, 3).

Thus, the eruption of ethnonationalism in the electoral process had increased the cleavage and

opposition between Ivorians and foreigners. In the context of economic crisis and a high level of

employment, thousands of foreigners were expelled from the country or were deprived of their

properties (Babo and Droz 2008, 752). But the worst was the fact that some Ivorians were

considered to be foreigners or as being not true Ivorian. Northern ethnic groups like the Dioula

that share the same language (Malinke), customs, and even religion (Islam) with neighboring

countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea-Conakry were considered to be less than true

Ivoirians. This aggravated the split between Northerners and Southerners by adding an identity

cleavage to the existing economic separation that divided the underdeveloped Northern region

and the more developed South.

Moreover, the implementation of the new Land Code of 1998 which denies non-nationals the

right to be landowners, greatly contributed to the fragmentation of ethnonationalism in the sense

that the latter will be construed as autochthony, which emphasizes the fact of being native to a

particular area. Therefore, not only Northerners, but also ethnic groups in the South suffered

from expropriation (Babo and Droz 2008, 753, Bah 2010, Dozon and Chauveau 1988, Ekanza

2007, Werthmann 2005, Woods 1994).

Overall, the return to liberal democracy in Côte d’Ivoire since the early 1990s has resulted in a

competition of ethnic communities for the control of both power and economic resources.

Instead of providing an opportunity for national integration, liberal democracy has actually led to

national disintegration and mutual exclusion of ethnic communities. All this resulted in socio-

political instability with a coup in December 1999, the outbreak of a civil war between 2002 and

2005, then violent post-election conflicts in 2010 and 2011. In the setting of ethnonationalism

and ethnopolitics, liberal democracy as a political system has proved to be unsuitable for the

multinational state of Côte d’Ivoire. It has failed to manage peacefully the conflicting

ethnonationalist communities across the country. Instead of competitive electoral democracy,

20

consociational democracy might have helped by integrating and peacefully managing the

conflicting ethnonationalist entities.

4.2. Ghana, a success story of democracy in a multiethnic society

Ghana has an estimated population of twenty-five million according to the recent 2012 census. It

encompasses seventy-five ethnic groups that are usually grouped into a further nine groups with

the following proportions according to the 2010 Census: Akan 47.5%, Mole-Dagbon 16.6%,

Ewe 13.9%, Ga-Dangme 7.4%, Gurma 5.7%, Guan 3.7%, Grusi 2.5%, Mande-Busanga 1.1%,

and other 1.6% (see Ghana Statistical Service 2014). Geographically, these ethnic groups are

scattered throughout the country thanks to social mobility for different reasons. Still, the Akan

are located mostly in the South and West, the Mole-Dagbon in the West, the Ewe in the East, the

Ga-Dangme in the Southeast, the Gurma in the Northeast, and the Guan, the Grusi and also the

Mande-Busanga in the North. As for religion, the population is divided between the two main

religions, Christianity and Islam, with the former representing 71.2% and the latter 17.6%

according to the 2010 census.

Ghanian political life revolves around two significant divisions, ethno-regional and ethno-

linguistic. The first regional split represents the North/South divide and is grounded in

socioeconomic inequalities. The Northern parts of Ghana are poorly developed with limited

economic infrastructures in comparison to the Southern regions. Northern populations also have

weak access to social services, and often confront inclement weather conditions in agriculture

and other economic activities. As Asante and Gyimah-Boadi summarize, “[t]here are wide

disparities with respect to the distribution of medical and health facilities, access to telephones,

consumption of electricity, small-scale industries, schools and other key social services,

particularly between the North and the South” (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi 2004, 17). The

Northern regions were neglected during colonial rule, and their situation has not improved much

in the post-independence era (Linde and Naylor 1999, 13).

21

By contrast, the southern regions have better weather conditions for the development of export

crops since colonial rule. Most infrastructural development as well as social and financial

investments and political institutions are concentrated in the South. According to the 2010

census, about 70% of the population live in the Southern regions. The disparities between the

North and South have divided the country and created a vivid contrast between underprivileged

Northerners and more privileged Southerners. This setting has provided the basis for the rising of

ethno-regional nationalism since the colonial period, with Northern elites demanding greater

socioeconomic equality. This regional polarization still is a major parameter in politics and

public life in Ghana. Before explaining how it impacts democratic functioning, we present ethnic

rivalries.

Ethnic rivalries constitute the second major division of ethnonationalism that influences the

political reality in Ghana. Ethnonationalism in Ghana dates back at least to the beginning of the

20th century and has become prominent since independence in 1957. Violent ethno-political

clashes have occurred in several parts of the country, and particularly in the North regions. As

Ada van der Linde and Rachel Naylor wrote,

Between 1981 and 1994, a series of conflicts engulfed much of the eastern half of Ghana's Northern Region. In each conflict, Konkombas, a historically noncentralized and politically marginal group, engaged in protracted fighting with one or several of their historically centralized and politically dominant neighbours: Dagombas, Nanumbas, Gonjas, and Mamprusis. The 1981 conflict resulted in over 2,000 deaths and many more people were displaced. The central claim made against Konkombas was that they continually disregarded their centralized neighbours' traditional authority and status. For their part, Konkombas argued that they had suffered long-term exploitation and subjugation by Nanumba, Dagomba, and Gonja chiefs. The last major conflict, the so-called "Guinea Fowl War" of 1994, was much larger and precipitated violence that quickly engulfed seven Northern districts, six ethnic groups and resulted in an estimated 15,000 deaths (Linde and Naylor 1999, 27, see also UNDP 2007, 67).

In addition to these major ethnonational conflicts, there are numerous small clashes with limited

violence and destruction. Factors that fuel ethnonational clashes and demands are usually

landownership and other resources, sovereignty issues related to chieftainships, and

discrimination issues. Thus, like Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana is also a multi-ethnic and multinational

society divided along two main lines, ethno-regional and ethnonational. How do these divisions

22

shape the democratic functioning of Ghana since the return of liberal democracy in 1992?

Identity-based communities have become important players in Ghanaian politics since its

independence. As Asante and Gyimah-Boadi noted, “the united front adopted by the nationalist

elites against colonialism in the pre-colonial period later turned antagonistic, especially with the

emergence of ethno-regionally based political parties during the decolonization era. This

development has impacted on the politics of the subsequent years” (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi

2004, 19). During the early years of independence, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah,

introduced the Avoidance of Discrimination Act that banned the use of ethnonational-based

parties and associations for political purpose (UNDP 2007, 67). The repression against ethnicity

in order to preserve national unity has proved ineffective as shown above with the existence of

numerous clashes between ethnic groups.

Yet, under the Fourth Republic that has re-established liberal democracy since 1992, Ghana

multi-party politics has been dominated by two ethnic-based parties, the National Democratic

Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP). The NDC is largely perceived as Ewe

dominated party, while the NPP is perceived as Asante/Akan dominated party. This polarization

has created a longstanding ethnopolitical rivalry between Ewe and Asante people (Asante and

Gyimah-Boadi 2004, 30), and explains bloc voting based on the ethnicity of the candidate and

the ethnicity of the party (Arthur 2009, 47). Presidential elections since 1992 provide strong

evidence of ethno-regional voting in Ghanaian democracy. For, the NDC has always obtained its

best scores in the Volta Region located in Southern Ghana considered to be its stronghold. The

NDC won 93.2 percent of the valid votes cast in the presidential election of 1992, 94.5 percent in

the 1996 elections, 88.47 percent in the 2000 elections, 83.3 percent in the 2004 elections, 82.88

percent in the 2008 elections, and 85.47 percent in the last presidential elections of 2012.

Similarly, the NPP has always won the votes in the Ashanti Region as the following results of

presidential elections demonstrated: 60.5 percent in 1992, 65.8 percent in 1996, 79.89 percent in

2000, 74.6 percent in 2004, 72.4 percent in 2008, and 70.86 percent in 2012. While there is no

doubt that ethno-regionalism is a major factor in Ghanaian democratic functioning, voter

alignment can still not be explained by ethnicity alone. Or, at least, as Richard Asante and

Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi state:

23

the [ethno-regional] impact on electoral outcomes in Ghana is very difficult to gauge mainly because some regions are largely Côterminous with ethnic groups or sub- groups of ethnic groups while others are not. For example different sections of the Akan sub-group tend to vote differently. Consequently, Akan voters often support and vote for individuals and candidates who are not Akans. Similarly, non-Akan voters also support and vote for parties and individuals who are Akans (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi 2004, 35).

The cross-ethno-regional voting is better explained by the fact that Ghana seems to implement a

kind of consociational democracy though officially it is a liberal competitive electoral

democracy. The electoral system is majoritarian of the type of the First-Past-the Post System.

But Ghanaian political leaders have strived to take ethnicity seriously into account in the entire

democratic process through an intentional integration of members from different ethnic groups.

For instance, though the NDC and the NPP have an ethnic basis, their national executive

members are usually representative of the major ethnic communities across the country (Asante

and Gyimah-Boadi 2004, 47). Moreover, presidential tickets of both parties often include a

running mate from different ethnic groups in order to make their ticket more attractive to voters

from diverse ethnic communities. For instance, for the 2000 presidential elections, the NPP

candidate John Kofi Agyekum Kufuor had as his running mate Alhaji Aliu Mahama. Kufuor was

from the Asante ethnic group from the South and was a Roman Catholic while Mahama was

from the Dagomba ethnic group from the North and was a Moslem. The NPP presidential ticket

turned out to be more attractive for both Southerners and Northerners as well for Christians and

Moslems. Hence, Kuffor and his running mate won the elections, which allowed the first

peaceful democratic transition of power in Ghana since the country's independence in 1957.

This strategy of ethnically mixed electoral tickets is also implemented in parliamentary elections,

in major appointive positions in government and public administrations as well as in the army

and other major national institutions. As the UNDP acknowledges in the Ghana Human

Development Report 2007,

even though there is no fixed formula for making appointments into the public sector in general as way of encouraging ethnic inclusiveness, there is a norm requiring that cabinet, bureaucratic and technocratic positions in government and the public sector, as well as membership of ruling military regimes are informally balanced to reflect the cultural and ethnic diversity of the country (UNDP 2007, 67-68; see also Gyimah Boadi and Daddieh 1999).

24

Likewise, the ethno-regional cleavage that divides Northerners and Southerners has also been

addressed through social and economic policies aiming at fostering development in the Northern

regions. Even though there still are inequalities between the resource-deprived North and the

more resource-endowed South, the rivalry between Southerners and Northerners has been

softened, and tensions between the two communities are under control and are well managed, a

situation that strengthens Ghanaian nation-building and unity.

Thus, the analysis of ethnonationalism in Ghana under the Fourth Republic that marks the return

of liberal democracy since 1992 shows a surprising picture. For, in such a divided multi-ethnic

setting, one would have expected competitive democracy to raise the prospects of civil conflict

or to weaken national unity. Fortunately, Ghana has moved increasingly towards consolidating

and strengthening national unity as well as liberal democratic principles, structures and

processes. The fact that political leaders have strived to take into account ethnic

representativeness may not be the only reason, but it is certainly one of the major reasons why

liberal democracy has succeeded both in managing conflicting ethnonational diversity and in

fostering national unity.

Conclusion

The restoration of competitive electoral democracy in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire in the early 1990s

led to a resurgence of rivalries between identity based communities, be they ethnic, regional,

religious, etc. The nature of poorly integrated societies that characterizes many African states

constitutes one of the central reasons for the woeful implementation of democracy in these states.

Indeed, most African countries were born under a colonial rule that constrained multiple

nationalities to live under the same flag within a new territory that delimits the borders of the

new state. While the existence of such identity-based communities is not specific to Africa, since

they exist also in developed democracies, the problem is that these identity-based communities

structure the political game and outcome in several African societies. Identity is therefore not

only a political issue, but also the main referent structuring politics and involvement.

25

This study has uncovered that, for democracy to be functional, it must take into account the

fragmented structure of multi-national societies in which loyalties to ethnic communities are

more deeply rooted than the newly planted loyalty to the state. Of course, we do not mean to

endorse the existing societal divisions, but rather to incorporate them into the democratic system

and to better manage the conflicting societal pluralism. This helps create, for each ethno-national

group, a sense of participation in the political process through their representatives that assume

higher political and administrative positions in political parties, as well as in the government. As

the case of Ghana demonstrates, the proactive integration of representatives of various ethnic

groups in the executive committees of political parties and in the government, turns the parties

and the government into a framework of debate and pressure where the various ethno-national

entities may present their grievances and demand for more equality. This promotes the

aggregation of divergent interests through the search for a compromise between the elites of

ethno-national groups.

Thus, while the case of Côte d'Ivoire shows that ethno-nationalism can ensnare the proper

functioning of a democratic state, the Ghanaian experience, on the contrary, shows that a

democratic state can integrate ethno-nationalisms through a kind of consociational approach that

values ethnic participation and ethnically mixed structures of governance. Consociational model

of management of sociopolitical pluralism in Ghana has shown to be more effective in both the

consolidation of democracy and of national unity. The consociational model implies a form of

consensus that is not necessarily unanimity, but refers more to the participation and integration

of different community identities in the democratic governance. This model also implies a type

of power distribution that takes into account the divisions of society in terms of ethnicity,

regions, etc. But the danger of such a model is that it can easily encourage patronage, clientelism

and even nepotism. This was unfortunately the case for Côte d'Ivoire. Indeed, when the ethnic or

regional balance in the distribution of positions of responsibility supersedes electoral

mechanisms, it leads to a kind of “pseudo-democracy”, which, over time, may prove to be a

threat to sociopolitical stability.

Finally, this study suggests that individuals who rely on ethnic solidarity and other referential

identities are not anti-democrats. They are “dissatisfied democrats” who demand for more

26

participation in the management of the state. They demand a better national representation:

politically through power sharing, and economically through access to resources and better

socioeconomic development. Their claims, therefore, can lead to more accountability from

power holders. From this standpoint, instead of disqualifying ethnicity in democratic processes,

because it tends to be exclusive, one should strive to find ways and means to understand and

channel the influence of identity membership while upholding democratic principles. This

appeals to a redefinition of democracy for multi-ethnic or multi-national societies.

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