This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Environmental Politics on 12/10/2012, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09644016.2012.712793.

Post-environmentalism: An Internal Critique

Christopher D. Buck Assistant Professor of Political Theory

Government Department St. Lawrence University

Canton, NY USA

cbuck@stlawu.edu

Government Department St. Lawrence University

23 Romoda Drive Canton, NY 13617

USA

Abstract: ‘Postenvironmentalism’ is an approach to ecological modernisation in the United States which criticizes mainstream environmentalism’s emphasis on placing limits on economic activity to address the climate crisis. Building upon Ronald Inglehart's analysis of shifting cultural values, postenvironmentalists Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger reject this antipathy towards economic growth because it undermines the material conditions that enable postmaterial, quality of life concerns like environmentalism to flourish in the first place. This essay argues that some of the policies advocated by Nordhaus and Shellenberger to promote economic growth actually serve as obstacles to the realization of postmaterial values and offers an alternative account of the emergence of modern environmentalism by situating it within the transition from a Fordist to a post-Fordist model of economic growth. The post-Fordist analysis reveals more promising possibilities for promoting postmaterial values such as autonomy, self-realization, and environmental concern than the proposals put forward by Shellenberger and Nordhaus.

Keywords: economic growth; postenvironmentalism; post-Fordism; postmaterialism; work

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Introduction

Even before the Great Recession of 2008 activists and academics alike questioned the

effectiveness of mainstream approaches to environmental advocacy in the United States, which

have not been able to seize political opportunities and repeat early legislative successes regarding

the protection of air, water, and endangered species when faced with contemporary ecological

challenges such as global climate change (Dowie 1995, Shellenberger and Nordhaus 2004,

Nordhaus and Shellenberger 2007). Arguably the most influential and controversial articulation

of this frustration with major environmental organizations comes from Michael Shellenberger

and Ted Nordhaus (2004), who received national media attention and fostered vibrant scholarly

discussions over the future of ecological politics (Meyer 2005, 2008, Blühdorn and Welsh 2007,

Brick and Cawley 2008, Chaloupka 2008, Anderson 2010) with their provocatively titled

pamphlet The Death of Environmentalism. The authors fault mainstream environmentalism for a

variety of reasons: its perpetuation of a ‘limits to growth’ narrative which seeks to constrain

human intrusions into the environment, its reliance on scare tactics to draw attention to the

climate crisis, its emphasis on the need for people to make personal sacrifices, and its insistence

on framing climate change first and foremost as an environmental issue at a time when most

people are primarily concerned with economic security. This approach is a recipe for creating an

atmosphere of hopelessness and despair rather than inspiring a broad-based political response to

climate change, and Shellenberger and Nordhaus call for a ‘postenvironmental’ movement which

questions the prevailing assumptions of traditional environmentalism and develops new political

strategies and alliances that they believe will succeed in bringing about the transition towards a

post-carbon future.

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Nordhaus and Shellenberger have elaborated both their critique of environmentalism and

their approach to progressive politics in numerous magazine articles, op-ed pieces, policy

reports, and most notably in their book Break Through (2007). Several of these writings

(Nordhaus and Shellenberger 2007, 2009b, 2009c, Shellenberger and Nordhaus 2010) rely on the

argumentative strategy of upending conventional wisdom by providing alternative explanations

for the successes and failures of environmentalism in the United States. At the centre of their

analysis in Break Though, for example, is a retelling of the American environmental movement’s

emergence as well as its subsequent demise. Drawing on research in cognitive therapy, Nordhaus

and Shellenberger (2007, p. 217) note how the act of re-narration enables patients to ‘imagine

new possibilities and futures for themselves’ and use this insight as ‘a parable for

postenvironmentalism.’ The new narrative highlights the importance of material wealth for the

emergence of postmaterial values such as environmental concern, with the aim of articulating a

‘new social contract for postmaterial America that can provide enough security and prosperity to

support a new progressive era’ (Nordhaus and Shellenberger 2007, p. 40). This narrative is a

welcome departure from the prevailing responses to the challenge of global climate change by

portraying this crisis as an opportunity to promote ecological sustainability while simultaneously

bringing about greater economic security and prosperity, rather than offering a doomsday

scenario in an attempt to motivate people to sacrifice their current standard of living for the sake

of the planet (Nordhaus and Shellenberger 2009a). At the same time, however, the re-narration

they put forward overlooks possibilities for creating even more imaginative and promising

approaches to cultivating postmaterial values.

This essay engages in an internal critique of Nordhaus and Shellenberger's

postenvironmental politics to highlight the contradictory nature of their project. Kysar (2008)

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follows a similar line of argumentation by identifying several performative contradictions in

Break Through. He notes how Nordhaus and Shellenberger's tendency to portray

environmentalism as a monolith runs counter to their anti-essentialist commitments, how their

critique of the role of science in environmental politics undercuts the urgency of their policy

initiatives, and how their emphasis on the need to market and package these initiatives in ways

that appeal to the American public leaves them with no means 'of evaluating [their] wares, other

than how well they sell' (Kysar 2008, p. 2046). Contra Kysar, I start with the assumption that the

merits of Nordhaus and Shellenberger's postenvironmentalism can and should be judged

according to the criterion set out by the authors themselves: whether or not it establishes the

material conditions which enable postmaterial values to flourish. The central claim of my

critique is that by positing a linear relationship between economic growth and the prioritization

of postmaterial values, Nordhaus and Shellenberger underestimate the ways in which some

forms of economic growth can become obstacles to the fulfilment of postmaterial needs and

desires. While other commentators (Beevers and Petersen 2009, Davidson 2009) make the

general point that the relationship between economic growth and environmental concern is more

complex than Nordhaus and Shellenberger suggest, I demonstrate how specific policies they

propose risk undermining the very postmaterial values they are seeking to promote. By framing

clean energy initiatives not as environmental measures but rather in a manner that resonates with

Americans’ concerns about economic security, Nordhaus and Shellenberger ultimately propose a

new social contract that is more materialist than postmaterialist in its treatment of work.

A second, more constructive aspect of this internal critique of postenvironmentalism

involves appropriating Nordhaus and Shellenberger's preferred argumentative strategy of

offering an alternative account of the history of environmentalism in order to draw attention to

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political possibilities that they overlook. Insofar as it places great emphasis on creating full-time

jobs with high wages through economic growth fuelled by massive public investments in clean

energy research and development, Nordhaus and Shellenberger's social contract resembles the

Fordist-Keynesian compromise between capital, labour, and the state characteristic of the

postwar economic boom driven by mass production and mass consumption that lasted until the

early 1970s. Drawing on the writings of French political ecologists André Gorz and Alain

Lipietz as well as American sociologist Juliet Schor, I put forward an alternative narrative that

situates the emergence of modern environmentalism within the context of the transition from a

Fordist to a post-Fordist model of economic development. From this perspective, the social

upheavals of the late 1960s can be understood in part as a rejection of the Fordist compromise,

on the basis that higher levels of material comfort were no longer considered adequate

compensation for devoting one’s working life to full-time employment. Not only does this

alternative narrative reveal limitations to individual autonomy and flexibility inherent in

Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s new social contract, it also reveals possibilities for enhancing

individuals’ opportunities for self-actualization and minimizing their ecological footprints

through the maximization of free time rather than relying primarily on increases in material

wealth.

Focusing critical attention on Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ vision of

postenvironmentalism is warranted for several reasons. First, their approach constitutes one of

the more prominent and influential examples of ecological modernisation in the United States

(Rootes 2008, Schlosberg and Rinfret 2008, Luke 2009). On the campaign trail in 2008, soon-to-

be President Barack Obama called for a new ‘Apollo project’ that would involve large scale

public investments in clean energy technology to secure energy independence, create jobs, and

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reduce carbon emissions (Klein 2008). This was a reference to a plan outlined by the Apollo

Alliance, a coalition of labour and environmental groups co-founded by Shellenberger and

Nordhaus, and the environmental aspects of the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act

closely resemble the investments proposed by the Apollo Alliance (Schneider 2009), albeit on a

smaller scale which has led Nordhaus and Shellenberger (2010, Shellenberger and Nordhaus

2010) to criticize the Obama administration and Congress for not allocating adequate funding for

research into new clean energy technologies. Second, as both the United States and Europe

appear to be ushering in an era of austerity, the possibility of national governments implementing

green stimulus packages seems less likely than it did at the beginning of the recession. Given this

context it would be prudent to explore other strategies for reducing unemployment, providing

economic security and promoting the development of postmaterial values that do not rely

primarily upon encouraging economic growth through public investments.

Re-narrating the birth of environmentalism

While Nordhaus and Shellenberger offer a scathing critique of modern environmentalism

in the United States, they acknowledge and express gratitude for the impressive achievements

accomplished by the movement soon after its inception. The establishment of the National

Environmental Policy Act, the significant amendments to the Clean Air and Water Acts, and the

creation of the Endangered Species Act in the early 1970s should be celebrated as major

victories that continue to play an important role in preserving and protecting the nonhuman

world for present and future generations. Nordhaus and Shellenberger disagree, however, with

environmentalism’s own version of its origin story and question the movement’s prospects for

adequately confronting the crisis of global climate change.

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Nordhaus and Shellenberger (2007, p. 6) contend that ‘environmentalists have long

misunderstood, downplayed, or ignored the conditions for their own existence. They have tended

to view economic growth as the cause but not the solution to ecological crisis.’ According to the

narrative frequently told by environmentalists, by the 1960s the levels of pollution generated by

the industrial economy had become unbearable. Cities were shrouded by a haze of smog, and

rivers were literally erupting into flames. Images of Earth photographed from outer space

reminded its inhabitants that they live in a finite world. In the United States widespread concern

gave birth to a movement that put environmentalism on the national agenda and succeeded in

institutionalizing ecological rationality through a series of legislative acts (Nordhaus and

Shellenberger, p. 21-22).

What this narrative fails to take into consideration, however, is the way in which the

postwar era of industrial capitalism itself established the preconditions for ecological concern by

creating unprecedented wealth through economic growth. Drawing on Abraham Maslow’s

hierarchy of needs (1943) and Ronald Inglehart’s analysis of shifting cultural values (1997),

Nordhaus and Shellenberger argue that environmental and other postmaterial quality of life

issues become social priorities only after people feel secure about meeting their physiological

needs for food, water, clothing, and shelter, as well as their safety needs for a steady source of

income and adequate access to health care that are essential for a stable and comfortable standard

of living. When people satisfy these basic needs, new needs such as the desire for fulfilment,

autonomy, and self-realization begin to emerge. According to Shellenberger and Nordhaus

(2011, p. 10), ‘the entire postmaterial project is, confoundingly, built upon a foundation of

affluence and material consumption that would be considerably threatened by any serious effort

to address the ecological crises through substantially downscaling economic activity.’ Given this

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relationship between material wealth and public support for ecological issues, ‘few things have

hampered environmentalism more than its longstanding position that limits to growth are the

remedy for ecological crises,’ leading Nordhaus and Shellenberger (2007, p. 15) to ‘argue for an

explicitly pro-growth agenda that defines the kind of prosperity [they] believe is necessary to

improve the quality of human life and to overcome ecological crises.’ By continuing to embrace

a tragic narrative which portrays humanity as having fallen from grace through its excessive

intrusions upon the natural world, the environmental movement pursues a politics of limits that

seeks to protect the environment by placing constraints on human activities, a strategy that

ultimately risks undermining the movement’s own foundation.

Environmentalism’s ambivalence towards economic growth threatens its relevance at a

time when Americans tend to prioritize their concerns about economic insecurity over ecological

issues such as global climate change. Soon after the environmental movement accomplished its

major legislative victories, social and economic crises put an end to the prosperity enjoyed by

most citizens of United States in the years following World War II and ushered in an era of

economic insecurity that continues to this day. The turbulent transition from an industrial to a

postindustrial economy brought about an accompanying shift in values that runs counter to the

overarching movement away from material values and towards postmaterial values. The outcome

of these transformations is the growing prevalence of a condition Nordhaus and Shellenberger

(2007, p. 14) describe as insecure affluence, in which ‘Americans have seen their wealth and

spending power rise, but they have also become increasingly insecure in terms of their

employment, retirement, health care, and community.’ Nordhaus and Shellenberger stress the

importance of distinguishing the flexibility of postindustrial society from the insecure affluence

that has arisen alongside it. Flexibility itself has the potential enhance individuals’ freedom; what

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is needed is a ‘new social contract’ that provides security without abandoning the benefits of

flexibility (Nordhaus and Shellenberger 2007, p. 15).

Another reason for questioning environmentalism’s ability to confront the crisis of global

climate change stems from the way in which environmentalism has become a victim of its own

success. Often taking the form of a special interest group, as opposed to a movement,

mainstream environmentalism succumbs to the trap of policy literalism. Charged with the

responsibility of protecting nature, mainstream environmental organizations assume that their

campaigns must speak directly to ecological concerns, regardless of whether or not alternative

framings would create broader public support for bringing about the same desired outcome.

Moreover, these organizations fall back on the same tactics and strategies that were effective

within a different values landscape and in response to different environmental issues than the

ones dominating headlines today. Drawing the public’s attention to ecological degradation

through visual imagery and the presentation of scientific facts worked at a time when

postmaterial values thrived and people were primarily worried about pollution, but the looming

threat of abrupt climate change in an era of insecure affluence demands a new approach to

ecological politics. Nordhaus and Shellenberger (2007, p. 6) advocate a political response to

global warming that ‘swim[s] with, not against, the currents of changing social values’ by

framing their initiatives in a way that speaks to Americans’ concerns about insecure affluence

and emphasizing the possibilities for economic growth and job creation associated with

investments in clean energy technology. Surveys conducted in the United States by the Pew

Research Center (2012, p. 6) lend credence to this claim. When asked to identify their top policy

priorities from a list of 22 issue areas, 86% and 82% of respondents mentioned improving the

economy and addressing unemployment respectively, making these issues the two most widely

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shared priorities, whereas responding to climate change appeared at the bottom of the list, with

only 25% of respondents identifying it as a top priority.

Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s willingness to challenge the environmental establishment

has earned them the title of ‘the bad boys of American environmentalism’ (McKibben 2005). But

is their argument really that controversial? After all, the postmaterial narrative of the birth of

environmentalism will sound familiar to most students of environmental policy in the United

States. In the introduction to Environmental Policy, a standard text in the field, Norman Vig and

Michael Kraft (2006, pp. 9-10) acknowledge the

fundamental changes in American values that began after World War II and accelerated as the nation shifted from an industrial to a postindustrial (or postmaterialist) society. Preoccupation with the economy (and national security) has gradually given way to a new set of concerns that includes quality-of-life issues such as the environment.

When coupled with the critique of policy literalism, however, the postmaterial narrative has the

potential to generate controversy insofar as it seems to imply that ecological sustainability will

inevitably result from policies that solely pursue economic growth rather than focusing on

protecting the environment (Davidson 2009). This would not be a fair assessment of Nordhaus

and Shellenberger’s argument (2007, pp. 6-7, emphasis added), since they aim ‘to create a kind

of prosperity that moves everyone up Maslow’s [hierarchy of needs] as quickly as possible while

also achieving our ecological goals.’ Nonetheless, their emphasis on economic growth risks

promoting material values at the expense of cultivating the postmaterial values that can enhance

both human freedom and consideration for the nonhuman world.

The limits of the politics of possibility

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By abandoning the assumption that addressing the crisis of global change must involve a

movement that frames it as an environmental issue, Nordhaus and Shellenberger have formulated

several innovative policy proposals designed to appeal to the values currently held by a majority

of American voters. These values, however, are best understood as materialist rather than

postmaterialist. According to several surveys cited by Nordhaus and Shellenberger (2007 pp. 11,

10) that had results resembling those of the Pew Research Center survey, ‘voters name concerns

like jobs and the economy as their top priorities’ while ‘the environment almost always [comes]

in last.’ In other words, Nordhaus and Shellenberger seem to be rejecting the policy literalism of

mainstream environmentalism on the basis that policies framed around environmental issues

aren’t materialist enough to gain traction among American voters. Nordhaus and Shellenberger

might respond to this criticism by insisting that the establishment of economic security is the first

step toward cultivating postmaterial values, but this response begs the following question: Is

prioritizing economic growth and job creation the best means by which postmaterial values can

be promoted, or are there other ways to pursue economic security while simultaneously

advancing postmaterial values already held by many Americans? While Nordhaus and

Shellenberger call for a new, postmaterial social contract, the policy proposals developed by

their Breakthrough Institute and American Environics company fail to seize the opportunities

generated by the crisis of insecure affluence to create an even more flexible approach to work.

This is due in part to the emphasis they place on full-time employment in their policy proposals.

Through their own research on the values held by Americans and how these values affect

their willingness to support initiatives to increase government assistance to unemployed and

underemployed citizens, Breakthrough Institute, the Center for American Progress, and

American Environics discovered that participants in focus groups encountered a dilemma that

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pits two sets of values against one another: Americans want to be generous and lend a helping

hand to those in need, but also tend to believe people should be able to lift themselves out of

poverty through hard work, dedication, and perseverance (The Breakthrough Institute et al.

2006a, p. 1). Focus group participants realized that a workfare program, in which receiving

assistance was contingent upon maintaining steady, full-time employment, enabled them to

resolve this internal dilemma:

It is fair, it demonstrates that the aid is deserved and earned, and it helps instill confidence in the recipients and cultivate the kinds of traits that all success in life requires. We heard again and again that no matter what the job, if recipients are working or if they can start working, it means that they are motivated to improve their lives, and if they are not so motivated, work will instill the confidence and other traits necessary to better their condition (The Breakthrough Institute et al. 2006a, p. 2, emphasis added).

Based on this finding, these think tanks drafted a policy report calling for the establishment of a

Citizen Corps that would provide full-time work at a living wage for the unemployed by creating

jobs that will improve the housing, education, and infrastructure of low-income communities.

According to the proposal, ‘these transitional jobs will build skills and give needed experience

while bestowing the rights and dignities of workers on the unemployed’ (The Breakthrough

Institute et al. 2006b, p. 2).

The Fresh Start proposal represents an innovative attempt to cultivate postmaterial values

by expanding welfare benefits in a manner that has the potential to garner widespread public

support insofar as it speaks to citizens’ commitment to a strong work ethic and the American

Dream. Its authors acknowledge that ‘“work” must therefore be put at the center of the initiative,

but not in a way that cedes important ground to the conservative worldview’ (The Breakthrough

Institute et al. 2006a, p. 3). Through the creation of a Citizen Corps, the proposal seeks to

‘reclaim the inherently communitarian role of work in this country—work as a means, not to

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amass extraordinary amounts of personal wealth, but to help build and rebuild our communities

and better the lives of others’ (The Breakthrough Institute et al. 2006a, p. 1). In other words, the

initiative fosters postmaterial values not only by securing the material conditions for these

values, but by generating employment opportunities that will potentially provide workers with a

sense of belonging and fulfilment as well.

Despite the intention of its authors, the Fresh Start initiative’s very insistence upon

placing a work component at the centre of its proposal for welfare reform ultimately affirms a

conservative worldview that risks undermining the overall aim of cultivating postmaterial values.

Rather than embracing the decline of the Protestant work ethic caused by the shift to a

postindustrial society, the Fresh Start proposal exhibits nostalgia for the postwar era of economic

expansion when it notes that ‘the modern economy continues to change at a rapid pace, and

America must return to a culture that puts work at its core’ (The Breakthrough Institute et al.

2006b, p. 2, emphasis added). This is surprising, considering that in Break Through Nordhaus

and Shellenberger (2007, p. 247) celebrate how ‘the traditional Protestant work ethic has been

replaced by a more flexible and more creative relationship to work, employment, and one’s

identity as a laborer’ in postindustrial societies. The message of the Fresh Start proposal,

however, seems to be that individuals must learn to gain satisfaction from full-time work,

whatever the job may be, in order to be entitled to economic security. While a work requirement

might make expanding welfare programs more appealing to American voters, it does so at the

cost of promoting a less flexible relationship to work.

The Fresh Start initiative also departs from another aspect of the new social contract

advocated by Nordhaus and Shellenberger in Break Through. They emphasize that health

insurance and retirement plans ‘are preconditions to autonomy, control, and meaningful self-

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creation,’ but also note how these benefits can become ‘an obstacle to imagining and starting a

new career and life’ when people must hold down full-time jobs to secure them (Nordhaus and

Shellenberger, pp. 178-179). Moreover, some approaches to expanding health care coverage,

such as those that focus solely on coverage for children, risk ‘reinforcing the widespread

perception among the insured that those without health care are personally responsible for their

plight and thus undeserving of assistance’ (Nordhaus and Shellenberger, p. 183). The centrality

of work in the Fresh Start proposal, by contrast, functions precisely to reinforce the perception

among the employed that those unable to find work are personally responsible for not having a

job and thus undeserving of assistance until they find full-time employment, since the work

requirement makes welfare reform more palatable to American taxpayers.

In sum, the Fresh Start proposal, as well as other initiatives spearheaded by American

Environics and the Breakthrough Institute (such as the New Apollo Project), assumes that

spurring economic growth with the aim of creating more jobs is the best means by which

economic security can achieved, thus establishing the conditions necessary for postmaterial

values to thrive. There are also moments when Nordhaus and Shellenberger (2007, p. 115) go

further by implying that economic development should be understood not only as a means to

promote postmaterial values, but also as a paradigmatic example of human achievement that

ought to be valued as an end in itself:

overcoming global warming demands something qualitatively different from limiting our contamination of nature. It demands unleashing human power, creating a new economy, and remaking nature as we prepare for the future. And to accomplish all of that, the right models come … from the very thing environmentalists have long imagined to be the driver of pollution in the first place: economic development.

This leads them to overlook the ways in which economic development, especially for the sake of

creating jobs, can serve as both an obstacle to and a precondition for the realization of

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postmaterial values, and results in a missed opportunity to formulate more imaginative

approaches to establishing a new social contract capable of ensuring both economic security and

ecological sustainability.

Ronald Inglehart’s analysis of the relationship between economic and cultural

transformations provides grounds for calling into question a direct correlation between economic

growth and the shift in emphasis from material to postmaterial values. Inglehart argues that

economic growth brings diminishing returns in subjective well-being once a certain threshold

level of GDP per capita is met. In wealthy, postmaterial societies ‘further economic gains no

longer produce an increase in subjective well-being. Indeed, if further economic growth brings

deterioration in the nonmaterial quality of life, it may actually lead to lower levels of subjective

well-being’ (Inglehart 1997, p. 64). To meet the new needs of its postmaterial citizens, these

societies ought to ‘place increasing emphasis on quality of life concerns, rather than to continue

the inflexible pursuit of economic growth as if it were a good in itself’ (Inglehart 1997, p. 65).

Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s approach to addressing global climate change risks prioritizing

economic growth over quality of life concerns, even though the United States, when viewed from

a comparative perspective, currently appears to be pursuing economic growth at the expense of

leisure and subjective well-being.

In 2009, Luxembourg and Norway were the only OECD countries that enjoyed higher

levels of per capita income than the United States, when adjusted to reflect purchasing power

parity (OECD 2011). With regard to labour productivity, measured as ‘the value of goods and

services that the economy can produce, on average, in an hour of work’ (Mishel et al. 2009, p.

360), Norway had the highest level, while Belgium, France and the Netherlands had roughly the

same level of productivity as the United States (Economic Policy Institute 2011b). This suggests

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that the high level of per capita income in the United States cannot be explained solely by its

level of labour productivity. According to the authors of The State of Working America

2008/2009 report (Mishel et al. 2009, p. 366), a significant part of this income ‘comes not from

working more efficiently than its peer countries, nor from being more successful in providing

jobs to potential workers, but rather from each worker simply working longer hours on average.’

With the exceptions of Greece and Italy, workers in every other Western European country

worked fewer hours on average in 2009 than workers in the United States (Economic Policy

Institute 2011a). Interestingly, workers in the Netherlands, a country with a similar productivity

level as the United States, worked the fewest hours on average out of all OECD countries in

2009 (Economic Policy Institute 2011a) and the Netherlands had one of the lowest levels of

unemployment at 3.4%, compared to 9.3% in the United States (Economic Policy Institute

2011c).

These statistics demonstrate how wealthy countries such as the United States can direct

the fruits of economic development toward either material or postmaterial ends: ‘In essence,

some countries have chosen to translate their high levels of productivity into more leisure, while

the United States has tended to use such efficiency gains to boost consumption of goods’ (Mishel

et al. 2007, pp. 357-358). At the level of prosperity already achieved by the United States, the

pursuit of economic growth as a means to increase in employment opportunities is neither

necessary nor sufficient for enabling postmaterial values to flourish. On the contrary, the

comparison between the Netherlands and the United States suggests an alternative strategy,

overlooked by Nordhaus and Shellenberger, for overcoming insecure affluence: redistributing

work to attain the goal of each individual ‘working less so everyone can work’ (Gorz 1989, p.

233).1 To explore this opportunity, I will offer an alternative narrative inspired by the work of

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Gorz, Lipietz, and Schor. This narrative, which characterizes the social and economic

transformations of the late 1960s and early 1970s as a shift from a Fordist to a post-Fordist

model of development, reveals how the relationship between economic growth and postmaterial

values is more complex than it is portrayed in Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s narrative. In

addition, this narrative discloses possibilities for establishing a new social contract that is more

flexible and postmaterial than the one proposed by Nordhaus and Shellenberger.

An alternative narrative: the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism

Just as Nordhaus and Shellenberger investigate the preconditions for the emergence of

postmaterial values in general and ecological concern in particular, they also take a further step

back to consider the factors that made the impressive economic growth of the postwar era

possible. The Fresh Start proposal simply asserts that ‘it is [Americans’] work ethic that led to

the greatest expansion of economic progress the world has ever witnessed, in the immediate

aftermath of the two World Wars’ (The Breakthrough Institute et al. 2006b, p. 1) Nordhaus and

Shellenberger (2007, pp. 29-30) provide a somewhat more sophisticated account in Break

Through when they attribute postwar prosperity to the political leadership of the Roosevelt,

Kennedy, and Johnson administrations, as well as the ‘brand of benign corporate capitalism

made possible by the postwar compact between big business and organized labor.’ This

compromise between capital and labour is one aspect of what Lipietz refers to as the Fordist

model of development, a phase of capitalism that was not as benign as Nordhaus and

Shellenberger suggest.

Henry Ford invented neither the assembly line nor the hierarchical organizational

structures that enabled him to mass-produce the Model-T. For David Harvey (1990, pp. 125-6),

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what was special about Ford…was his vision, his explicit recognition that mass production meant mass consumption, a new system of the reproduction of labor power, a new politics of labour control and management, a new aesthetics and psychology, in short, a new kind of rationalized, modernist, and populist democratic society.

In 1914 Ford instituted the five dollar, eight hour day for assembly line workers to ensure their

acceptance of the discipline demanded on the shop floor, to encourage them to adopt a sanitary

and morally upright lifestyle in the private sphere, and to give them the opportunity to purchase

the very cars they manufactured. In conjunction with Keynesian reforms designed to maintain

near full employment of the workforce, the Fordist regime of accumulation created conditions

for impressive economic growth from 1945 until 1973, when the first major postwar recession

hit.

Several factors contributed to the decline of Fordism. By the late 1960s productivity in

the United States had fallen while real wages and fixed capital costs continued to rise, leading to

lower profit margins. At the same time, the Western European and Japanese economies finished

their post-war recoveries and began competing with manufacturers in the United States by

exporting lower-cost goods. The oil crisis of 1973 was the final nail in the coffin, bringing an

end to the postwar boom and the Fordist model of development that sustained it (Harvey 1990,

Lipietz 1992). What has emerged in its place is a post-Fordist model of development that relies

on casual forms of labour with fewer fringe benefits and tolerates higher levels of unemployment

and underemployment. According to Schor (1992, p. 40), ‘rather than hire new people, and pay

the extra benefits that would entail, many firms have just demanded more from their existing

workforces. They have sped up the pace of work and lengthened the time on the job.’ Those

lucky enough to hold full-time jobs have little choice but to resign themselves to more

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demanding hours or risk joining the ranks of the unemployed, leading to an unequal distribution

of worktime.

Given the precarious nature of employment in the current neo-liberal phase of capitalism,

it is tempting to look back at the postwar Fordist period with nostalgia. Historian William Sewell

(2005, p. 30) remarks that ‘from the perspective of the hypercompetitive, predatory, and

extraordinarily inegalitarian American capitalism of the early twenty-first century, the Fordist

mode of regulation may seem remarkably humane, a kind of quasi social-democratic “world we

have lost.”’ It is important to keep in mind, however, that many of the countercultural and

progressive movements of the late 1960s can be understood both as an expression of postmaterial

values and a rejection of the Fordist compromise, according to which increasing levels of

consumption were supposed to serve as compensation for engaging in forms of work that in

many cases were not intrinsically fulfilling. Lipietz (1992, p. 349) notes how most inhabitants of

the global North enjoy

a standard of living in which the right to well-being is restricted more by a ‘lack of quality of life’ than a ‘lack of possessions’. Even before the economic crisis, around 1968, the post-war model of mass consumption began to reveal its existential deficiencies. People need time to live with what they have; they need to experiment with new social relations and independent creative activities.

The collapse of Fordism resulted in more free time for some, but more often than not it came in

the form of unemployment and underemployment at a moment when the social safety net was

unravelling, thus ushering in an era of economic insecurity that has only been exacerbated by the

most recent recession.

Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s new social contract attempts to bring together the best of

both worlds by re-establishing some, but not all, aspects of the Fordist regime of accumulation

(economic security through relatively high wages and full employment) while preserving the

19

flexibility of the post-Fordist workplace. Yet for Gorz and Lipietz, full-time employment is itself

a form of inflexibility that can place constraints on individual freedom. It may seem as though

this account of the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism that focuses on new methods of

labour control has nothing more to offer than another narrative of tragedy and resentment, but

Gorz and Lipietz aim to provide a clear articulation of the crisis in order to highlight both the

dangers and opportunities associated with the decline of the Fordist mode of development.

Gorz’s proposal for a new social contract (1999, p. 53), for example, resembles that of Nordhaus

and Shellenberger insofar as he seeks to liberate post-Fordist flexibility from insecurity:

It is [the] insecure worker that is potentially the central figure of our own world; it is this figure which must be civilized and recognized so that, rather than being a condition one reluctantly bears, this pattern of working can become a mode of life one chooses, a mode that is desirable, one that is regulated and valued by society, a source of new culture, freedoms, and sociality, establishing the right of all to choose the discontinuities in their working lives without experiencing a discontinuity in their income.

While they share a similar vision with Nordhaus and Shellenberger, Gorz and Lipietz’s narrative

points towards an alternative political agenda for bringing this vision to fruition. Nordhaus and

Shellenberger diagnose the crisis of economic insecurity as a lack of employment opportunities

that can be remedied by creating jobs through ecologically sustainable development. Gorz,

Lipietz, and Schor, on the other hand, interpret the crisis as a problem of unequal distribution of

working time, and call for a reduction of working hours and work-sharing program as a means

for providing economic security and leisure time for all. This proposal not only addresses

economic insecurity associated with unemployment, but also promotes the fulfilment of

postmaterial values and would result in a smaller ecological footprint (Schor 2005, p. 47).

Why do Nordhaus and Shellenberger neglect this alternative approach? Three reasons

come to mind. First, Nordhaus and Shellenberger (2007, p. 222) characterize reductions in

20

consumption as a sacrifice, and an environmental agenda cantered upon convincing people to

consume less is unlikely to succeed since a pragmatic approach to politics must, among other

things, provide ‘a solution that is not perceived to require tremendous sacrifice.’ This is why

Nordhaus and Shellenberger (2007, p. 126) support public investments in clean energy: it

enables people to minimize their ecological footprint without a major shift in their consumption

habits.

This treatment of consumerism, however, does not mention how reaching higher levels of

consumption often involves sacrificing opportunities for greater free time brought about through

increases in productivity. As mentioned earlier during comparison between the Netherlands and

the United States, the increased productivity of a given country can be translated into either

higher income levels or fewer working hours, but it would be misleading to describe the United

States’ privileging of increases in material wealth over greater leisure as an outcome freely

chosen or democratically decided, since employers rarely allow their employees to forego pay

raises in exchange for a reduction in hours and ‘the growth of worktime did not occur as a result

of public debate’ (Schor 1992, p. 3). Survey data cited by Schor suggests that a majority of

American workers would exchange future income for greater free time if given the choice (Schor

1992, 2005), and an increasing number of Americans are making ‘voluntary lifestyle

change[s]…that [entail] earning less money’ (Schor 2011, p. 107). In addition, many workers

who are forced to accept involuntary reductions in working hours eventually come to appreciate

the greater amount of free time and are reluctant to return to full-time employment when given

the opportunity (Schor 2011, pp. 108-109).

Second, Nordhaus and Shellenberger (2007, p. 174) associate consumerism with ‘the

virtuous cycle of economic growth’ in which consumption ‘…increases production, which

21

increases employment, which increases consumption.’ This cycle of growth, central to the

Fordist model of development, made the economic successes of the postwar era possible, but it

was no longer considered virtuous by the late 1960s when postmaterial values began to emerge.

At that point, the ongoing cycle of working and spending became an obstacle to the realization of

freedom, belonging, and self-actualization for many young people, resulting in social opposition

to the Fordist compromise.

Third, while Nordhaus and Shellenberger (2009c) do not engage directly with the

approach to environmental politics advocated by both Gorz and Schor, it would not be surprising

if they dismissed it as a call for voluntary simplicity which serves primarily to alleviate middle-

class guilt rather than make a significant reduction in overall carbon emissions or associated it

with an anti-modern 'ecotheology' which 'values creativity, imagination, and leisure over the

work ethic, productivity, and efficiency...' (Shellenberger and Nordhaus 2011, p. 12). These

characterisations of Gorz and Schor’s privileging of free time over consumerism, however,

would overlook how they value free time not only an end in-itself but also a means to reduce

unemployment through a more equitable distribution of working hours.

Finally, the social values research conducted by American Environics (2006) does not

appear to devote much attention to Americans’ attitudes towards free time and leisure. In a

‘Glossary of Environics Social Values Trends,’ 11 of the 117 entries relate to consumption and

consumerism, while no entries exist for free time or leisure.2 By neglecting to investigate

whether people might prefer to translate productivity gains into more free time instead of higher

levels of consumption, Nordhaus and Shellenberger might underestimate Americans’ willingness

to participate in the ecological movement advocated by Gorz, Lipietz, and Schor that ‘aims

fundamentally to restore politically the correlation between less work and less consumption on

22

the one hand, and more existential autonomy and security for all, on the other’ (Gorz 2010, p.

70).

Conclusion

In the final pages of Break Through, Nordhaus and Shellenberger (2007, p. 270)

rearticulate their vision for the future:

the new vision of prosperity will not be the vision of economic growth proposed by those who worship at the altar of the market. It will define wealth not in gross economic terms but as overall well-being. Wealth will be defined as that which provides us with the freedom to become individuals. It will embrace our power to create new markets.

If Nordhaus and Shellenberger are serious about redefining wealth in terms of individual

freedom, then they should consider devoting their energies towards creating what Schor (2005, p.

45) calls the ‘missing market’ for shorter working hours. By placing full-time work at the centre

of their proposals for economic development, Nordhaus and Shellenberger advocate a politics

whose means risk undermining its ultimate ends: economic security comes at the cost of

flexibility and autonomy, leaving people with fewer opportunities to fulfil their postmaterial

needs and desires. In an age of insecure affluence, it may be the case that a politics of limits—a

postenvironmental politics which seeks to empower individuals with the freedom to set limits on

the amount of time they must spend at work—holds the greatest promise for minimizing

ecological degradation while simultaneously expanding the sphere of human possibility.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Bill Chaloupka, Andrew Jones, Michael Nordquist, Mark Somma, Rosa

Williams, and several anonymous reviewers for commenting on earlier versions of this essay.

23

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1 Alain Lipietz (1992, p. 84) prefers the reverse formulation: ‘everybody working so that people can work less.’ 2 An entry for ‘time stress’ exists, but this variable measures one’s ‘desire to obtain better control of one’s life stress, particularly as it applies to better time management,’ and not one’s desire for more free time (American Environics 2006, p. 72).