REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES SANDIGANBAYAN QUEZON CITY SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff, Criminal Cases Nos. SB- 17-CRM-2202 to 2298 For: Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 -versus- Criminal Cases Nos. SB- 17-CRM-2299 to 2395 For: Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents ROLANDO AUREO GUTIERREZ ANDAYA, JR., et al., Present: Accused. CABOTAJE-TANG, P.J., Chairperson, FERNANDEZ, B., J. and PAHIMNA, J.l Promulgated: ~V~~/~ r ~ 1[-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1[ RESOLUTION CABOTAJE-TANG, P.J.: For resolution are the following: 1. "Motion for Reconsideration" dated August 28, 2018, filed by accused Teresita Legaspi panli~anlilio~ ~ -----r;. ~_ ..:.V 1 Associate Justice lorifel l. Pahimna was a signatory to the assailed Resolution. Sitting as a special member of the Third Division as per Administrative Order No. 151-2018 dated March 13,2018. 2 pp. 678-698, Vol. XIX, Record
Transcript
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESSANDIGANBAYAN
QUEZON CITY
SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff,
Criminal Cases Nos. SB-17-CRM-2202 to 2298For: Violation of Section 3 (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019
- versus-
Criminal Cases Nos. SB-17-CRM-2299 to 2395For: Malversation of Public Funds
through Falsification ofPublic Documents
ROLANDO AUREOGUTIERREZ ANDAYA, JR., etal.,
Present:
Accused.
CABOTAJE-TANG, P.J.,Chairperson,FERNANDEZ, B., J. andPAHIMNA, J.l
1. "Motion for Reconsideration" dated August 28, 2018,filed by accused Teresita Legaspi panli~anlilio~ ~
-----r;. ~_..:.V1 Associate Justice lorifel l. Pahimna was a signatory to the assailed Resolution. Sitting as a special memberof the Third Division as per Administrative Order No. 151-2018 dated March 13,2018.2 pp. 678-698, Vol. XIX, Record
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. 8B-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
2. "Omnibus Motion (1) For Reconsideration of theResolution dated 20 August 2018 and (2) Deferment ofArraignment" dated August 28, 2018, filed by accused RolandoAureo G. Andaya, Jr. (Andaya, Jr.);3
3. "Motion for Reconsideration (Re: Resolution dated 20August 2018)" dated August 28, 2018, filed by accused Janet L.Napoles (Janet Napoles};"
4. "Motion. for Reconsideration (Re: Resolution dated 20August 2018)" dated August 28, 2018, filed by accused JamesChristopher Lim Napoles (James Napoles) and Jo Christine LimNapoles (Jo Napoles];>
5. "Motion for Reconsideration (Re: Resolution dated 20August 2018)" dated August 28, 2018, filed by accused RonaldFrancisco Lim (Ronald Lim];>
6. "Motion for Reconsideration (Re: Resolution dated 20August 2018)" dated August 29,2018, filed by accused Nasser C.Pangandaman (Pangandaman];"
7. "Motionfor Reconsideration (of the Denial of the Motion toQuash filed by Accused Nieto}" dated August 29, 2018, filed byaccused Narciso Bustamante Nieto [Nietol.''
8. "Motion for Reconsideration (Re: Resolution dated 20August 2018)" dated August 31,2018, filed by accused Winnie M.Villanueva [Villanueva];"and,
9. "Motionfor Reconsideration" dated September 4, 2018,filed by accused Angelita Villapa Cacananta (Cacanantal.!v
/'7
/113 pp. 699-730, Id4 pp. 731-738, Id5 pp. 739-746, Id6 pp. 474-759, Id7 pp. 784-793, Id8 pp. 794-799, Id9 pp. 12-19, Vol. XX,Record10 pp. 800-805, Id
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17-CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY ACCUSEDPANLILIO
Accused-movant Panlilio insists that her indictment in thepresent cases shows the "arbitrariness" of the Office of theOmbudsman because Dominador V. Sison (Sison) and Nilda Baui(Baui)were exonerated of the same charges despite the fact thatshe was similarly situated and had similar defenses with the saidrespondents; 11 and, the Officeof the Ombudsman did not adduceany explanation why the defenses submitted by the saidrespondents were enough for their exoneration but was notenough for her. 12
She points out that Sison was the officer-in-charge of theAdministrative Division, while Baui was Cashier III of theFinance and Management Division, both of whom were hersubordinates. Accused-movant Panlilio alleges anew that if therewas a finding by the Office of the Ombudsman that Sison andBaui merely performed their official functions, then it would belogical and equitable to apply the same finding as to her. 13 Thus,she submits that she has sufficiently rebutted the presumptionof regularity in the exercise of official functions of the Office ofthe Ombudsman because her submissions dearly demonstratethat her indictment was tainted by abuse, oppression, andarbitrary andj or purposeful discrimination. 14
In support of her arguments, she invokes the case of UnitedStates v. Armstrong,lS which was decided by the United StatesSupreme Court, thus:
A selective prosecution claim is not a defense onthe merits to the criminal charge itself, but anindependent assertion that .the prosecutor hasbrought the charge for reasons forbidden by the
11 pp. 678-679, Id12 p. 685, Id13 p. 682, Id14 pp. 685-686, Id15517 US456 (1996) ~
f7~
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17-CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
Constitution. Our cases delineating the necessaryelements to prove a claim of selective prosecution havetaken great pains to explain that the standard is ademanding one.
Of course, a prosecutor's discretion is "subject toconstitutional restraints." United States v. Batchelder.One of these constraints, imposed by the equalprotection component of the Due Process Clause of theFifth Amendment, is that the decision whether toprosecute may not be based on "an unjustifiablestandard such as race, religion, or other arbitraryclassification." A defendant may demonstrate that theadministration of a criminal law is "directed soexclusively against a particular class of persons . . .with a mind so unequal and oppressive" that the systemof prosecution amounts to "a practical denial" of equalprotection of the law.16
Moreover, accused-movant Panlilio reiterates that theconcept of delito continuado or "continued crime" should beapplied to the cases against her.!? She relies again on thefindings of the Office of the Ombudsman in its Joint Order datedAugust 30,2017, and Joint Resolution dated December 19,2016,viz:
In the present case, however, even iCthe P900million Malampaya Fund was purportedly disbursedto 97 difference [sic] LGUS through 97 checksreleased in Cour batches, the number oCdisbursements was all part and parcel oC oneprocess/transaction only, i.e. alleged supportservices Corbeneficiaries coming Crom97 differentLGUs.
~/hD16 pp. 679-680, Id17 pp. 686-687, Id
Resoll(tionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17-CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al. •
[T]he P900 million Malampaya Fund allocated bythe DMB to the DARin 2009 was malversed through acomplex and well-orchestrated scheme, whichdiverted the funds to the possession and control ofNapoles and her cohorts via bogus NGOs selected toimplement the ghost or inexistent projects. 18
She further argues that she should have been charged withonly forty-five (45) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No.3019 and forty-five (45) counts of malversation of public fundsthrough falsification of public documents due to the fact that theprosecution itself admitted that she countersigned only forty-five(45) checks which' are the subject of these cases.J?
In her further bid to dismiss the present cases against her,accused-movant Panlilio likewise insists that her right to speedydisposition of cases had been violated due to the inordinate delayin the preliminary investigation of these cases.s''
According to the same accused-movant, Section 3 (f), Rule112 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that the investigatingofficer is given ten (10) days within which to determine whetheror not there is sufficient ground to hold a respondent for trial.>'She argues that while the said period may be considered as"directory," such cannot be completely disregarded; the reasonsgiven by the Office of the Ombudsman in its attempt to explainthe delay in these cases had been stricken down by the SupremeCourt in the case of Coscolluela u. Sandiganbayan;22 and, theOffice of the Ombudsman failed to offer any valid reason why ittook two (2) years and two (2) months to resolve Case No. OMB-C-C-13-0357 and one (1) year and nine (9) months to resolveCaseNo. OMB-C-C-14-0331.~
~)t----------------~18 pp. 686-687, Id; Emphasis supplied by the accused-movant19 p. 688, Id20 p. 689, Id21 p. 690, Id22701 SeRA 188 (2013)23 p. 692, Id
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17-CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
To further support her claim of inordinate delay, she invokesthe case of Amanquinton v. People,24 wherein the SupremeCourt ruled that "in a criminal prosecution, the state is arrayedagainst the subject; it enters the contest with a priorinculpatory finding in its hands; with unlimited means ofcommand; with counsel usually of authority and capacity,who are regarded as public officers, as therefore asspeaking semi-judicially, and with an attitude of tranquilmajesty often in striking contrast to that of defendantengaged in a perturbed and distracting struggle for libertyif not for life. ''25
She explains that the differences in standing and resourcesbetween her and the State require that criminal cases bedispensed with promptly; that she has been removed from officeand is currently without gainful employment; and, that the factthat she is being charged with not just one crime but with onehundred ninety-four (194) cases, "she now faces that hangs as a'Damocles' sword over her head" which is a glaring example ofthe "trial and tribulations she had and will endure, day in, dayout. Night in. [Njight out. "26
Accused-movant Panlilio likewise contends that theconstitutional right of the accused to speedy disposition of casesmay be assailed at any time; hence, she could not be faulted forher "seeminqlu belated" assertion of the said right. She submitsthat the Court should have demanded from the Office of theOmbudsman justifiable reasons for the delay in these cases.??
Furthermore, accused-movant Panlilio argues anew that theInformations in these cases fail to inform her of the riature andcause of the accusations against her.28
She bewails that she is constrained to speculate on thesupposed "qlarinq irregularities" which was alleged in the hereinInformations. Relying on the case of Matilde v. Jabson,29 she
24596 SCRA366 (2009)25 p. 692, Id; Emphasis supplied by the accused-movant26 p. 692, Id27 p. 693, Id28 p. 693-694, Id2968 SCRA456 (1975)
//-:~
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. S8-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
argues that the crime charged against her should be described inintelligible terms with such particularity as to inform her, withreasonable certainty, of the offenses charged against her; shemust be fully apprised of the true charges against her; and, sheis presumed to be innocent and has no independent knowledge ofthe facts which constitute the offensewith which she is charged.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY ACCUSEDANDAYA, JR..
In his bid for the reconsideration of the Court's Resolutionpromulgated on August 20, 2018, accused-movant Andaya, Jr.,relies on the followinggrounds, thus:
I
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THIS HONORABLE COURTERRED IN DENYING ACCUSED ANDAYA'S MOTIONFOR BILLS OF PARTICULARS CONSIDERING THATTHE INFORMATIONS CHARGING ACCUSED ANDAYAWITH VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 3(E) OF R.A. NO.3019 AND OF MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDSTHROUGH FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTSARE CLEARLY AMBIGUOUS AND UNDENIABLY LACKTHE DETAILS NEEDED FOR ACCUSED ANDAYA TOBE FULLY APPRISED OF THE PROSECUTION'STHEORY OF THE CASES AS AGAINST HIM.CONSEQUENTLY, ACCUSED ANDAYA IS RENDEREDUNABLE TO PROPERLY PREPARE HIS DEFENSES(WHILE ALLOWING THE PROSECUTION TO UNDULYSURPRISE ACCUSED ANDAYA AT TRIAL).
A
IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION, THISHONORABLE COURT FAILED IN ITS DUTY TOWEIGH ACCUSED ANDAYA'S REQUEST FORDETAILS FROM THE PROSECUTION AND TODETERMINE SPECIFICALLY WHETHER THEDETAILS ACCUSED ANDAYA SEEKS TO/1
~ )i)
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17-CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
SPECIFIED ARE WITHIN THE OFFICE OF A BILL OFPARTICULARS.
B
ACCUSED ANDAYA'S REQUEST FOR BILL OFPARTICULARS CANNOT BE DENIED ON THE SIMPLEAND EXPEDIENT GROUND THAT THEINFORMATIONS, AS WORDED, ADEQUATELYAPPRISE HIM OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THEACCUSATIONS AGAINST HIM. EVEN ASSUMINGTHAT THE INFORMATIONS SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGETHE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATIONSAGAINST ACCUSED ANDAYA, THIS CANNOT DEFEATHIS RIGHT TO REQUEST FOR A BILL OFPARTICULARS IN ORDER TO ADEQUATELY ANDINTELLIGENTLY PREPARE HIS DEFENSES FORTRIAL AND CONCOMITANTLY SET LIMITATIONS TOTHE PROSECUTION'S RIGHT TO OFFER EVIDENCESO AS TO PRECLUDE UNFAIR SURPRISES.
C
THE DETAILS AND ITEMS ACCUSED ANDAYA SEEKSTO BE LAID OUT WITH PARTICULARITY AREFACTUAL ALLEGATIONS WHICH ARE WITHIN THEOFFICE OF A BILL OF PARTICULARS. ACCUSEDANDAYA IS NOT REQUESTING THE DISCLOSURE OFTHE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE. ALL THINGSCONSIDERED, THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO BASIS TODENY ACCUSED ANDAYA'S MOTION FOR THEISSUANCE OF BILLS OF PARTICULARS ESPECIALLYWHERE, AS THIS HONORABLE COURTACKNOWLEDGED, THE INFORMATIONS RELY ONCONSPIRACY AS A MODE OF COMMISSION OF THECRIMES CHARGED.30
According to the said accused-movant, the case of Enrile v.Sandiganbayan,31 teaches that courts should take a "liberalattitude" towards granting an accused's motion for a bill ofparticulars because allegedly, "all doubts should be resolved in
~
)'1J30 pp. 701-702, Id; Emphasis supplied by the accused-movant31766 SeRA 1 (2015) ~~~
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
favor of granting the bill [of particulars] to give full meaning to theaccused's constitutionally guaranteed rights;"32 and, courts aremandated to "diliqenilu [sift] through each detail sought to bespecified, [and] ma[k]e the necessary determination of whethereach detail was an ultimate or evidentiary fact. "33
He alleges that the Court in its assailed Resolution "simplymade a blanket determination that the [herein] Informations arenot 'ambiguous or confusing' and that these 'sufficiently complywith the requirements of Sections 6, 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of theRevised Rules of Criminal Procedure. "34
The same accused-movant also points out that in Enrile,the High Tribunal found that this Court acted with grave abuseof discretion when it denied the motion for bill of particulars of thepetitioner on the ground that the details sought to be itemized orspecified are all evidentiary, without any explanation supportingsuch conclusion.s- to wit:
32 p. 700, Id33 p. 700, Id34 p. 704, Id35 p. 705, ID36 p. 705, Id; Emphasis supplied by the accused-movant
1§]omeof the desired details are material factsthat must be alleged to enable the petitioner toproperly plead and prepare his defense. TheSandiganbayan should have diligently sifted througheach detail sought to be specified, and made thenecessary determination of whether each details wasan ultimate or evidentiary fact, particularly afterEnrile stated in his Reply that the "desired details"could not be found in the bundle of documents markedby the prosecution. Wecannot insist or speculate thathe is feigning ignorance of the presence of thesedesired details; neither can we put on him theburden of unearthing from these voluminousdocuments what the desired details are. The remedyof a bill of particulars is precisely made available bythe Rules to enable an accused to positively respondand make an intelligent derense~
!1J~
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17-CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
According to accused-movant Andaya, Jr., the questionedResolution [1] unduly deprived him of the opportunity to request"crucial factual details" that would aid him in preparing hisdefense and [2] fails to provide justification why each of theparticulars sought need not be provided.37
Moreover, he argues that the finding of the Court that everyelement constituting the offense had been alleged in theInformation does not preclude him from requesting for morespecific details of the various acts or omissions he allegedlycommitted.w He submits anew the list of allegations in the hereinInformations wherein he prays for further details and/orparticularities. 39
The same accused-movant likewise counters that theprosecution's contention that it would be required to prematurelydisclose its evidence is unfounded. 40
He explains that it is not the function of a bill of particularsto provide the accused with the evidence of the prosecution+' andhe is not requiring the prosecution to include in the bill ofparticulars evidentiary matters.e? Thus, the Court should take a"liberal attitude" in granting his present motion in order for himto intelligently prepare his defenses for trial.43
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY ACCUSEDJANET NAPOLES
Accused-movant Janet Napoles reiterates that theInformations in these cases fail to state the ultimate facts whichconstitute the elements of the crimes charged against her and
/'/1037 p. 705, Id38 p. 706, Id39 pp. 707-713, Id40 p. 714, Id41 p. 714, Id42 p. 714, Id43 p. 714, Id
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. 88-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
-11-
x------- -- ------------ -- ---- -------- ------------ ----- ------- x
the allegation of conspiracy was "conveniently" made without asufficient statement of the underlying facts.e+
She explains that her alleged acts of "giving commissionand/ or kickbacks to Pangandaman and Tuason and she used theNGOs as a fund conduit of the amount alleged" should not beconsidered as an ultimate fact because the said allegation fails tospecify what, how, where and when the supposed acts/crimeswere committed.e?
Moreover, accused Janet Napoles points out once again thateven if the Informations against her state the ultimate facts, theallegations therein cannot establish the elements of the crimescharged against her. She insists that the acts imputed to her donot constitute manifest partiality, evident bad faith and grossinexcusable negligence which caused unwarranted benefits orundue injury to the government.v' and, she is a privateindividual and is not in any way an accountable officer who is incharge of public funds.s?
Accused-movant Napoles further stresses that conspiracy asa mode of committing the offenses charged was not sufficientlyestablished in the present Informations; her alleged acts do notindicate that she conspired with her eo-accused; and, the hereinInformations fail to define the alleged chain of conspiracy towhich she is allegedly part of.48
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY ACCUSEDJAMES CHRISTOPHER NAPOLES AND JO CHRISTINE
NAPOLES
Accused-movants James Christopher and Jo ChristineNapoles point out anew that the Informations against them fail [1)to conform to the prescribed form pursuant to Sections 6, 8 and
44 pp. 732-733, Id45 p. 734, Id46 pp. 735, Id47 p. 735, Id48 p. 736, Id
~
/'7
~
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure and [2]to state which signatures and documents were allegedly forgedand fabricated by them.s?
They assert that a mere general averment of their supposedacts / omissions violate the above-mentioned provisions whichrenders them "clueless and unable" to intelligently prepare theirdefenses.w According to them, a broad and sweeping statementthat "they forged signatures and fabricated documents" do notsuffice because these allegations should be made withparticularity-! and the said allegations are deficient for beingmere conclusions of law and unsupported by factual premises. 52
Lastly, accused-movants James Napoles and Jo Napolesallege that the following arguments were purportedly notaddressed by the Court in its assailed Resolution, to wit:
33. The Informationslikewisefailed to state clearlyand distinctively the PLACE of commission of theoffense and the DATEof its commission, pursuant otSection 10 and 11 of the same Rules.Thus:
Accused James Christopher Napoles and JoChristine Napoles cannot possibly answer the seriouscharge of violating Article 217 of the Revised PenalCode,without knowingWHEN,between the enumeratedyears in the Information and WHERE, in thePhllippines were the supposed acts took place.
The allegationin the Informationthat [the]violationwas committed in the span of years enumerated inthe different Informations or thereabout, did notsatisfy the requirement of the Rules, which plainlystates that: /7
?49 pp. 741-742, Id50 p. 742, IdSl p. 743, IdS2 p. 744, Id ~/
ReaolutfonCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
In the case of U.S. V. Dichao[,] the Supreme Courtheld that: the statement as to the time of thecommission of the offense should not be a span ofnumber of years, to wit:
The indictment of both the accused in these casescould be traced to the statements of Benhur Luy andMerlina Sunas. In the Sinumpaang SaZaysay dated 12September 2013, Merlina Sunas stated that:
T: Maalala mo pa ba kung sinu-sino and mgakasama mo sa sinabi mong pagpulong kung saannabanggit ni Madame JENNY na may nakuha siyangpondo mula sa DAR?
S: Opo, andun po iyong mga empleyado ng JLNCorporation na sina BENHUR LUY,EVELYNDE LEON,LAARNIUY, ARTHUR LUY JR., JOHN LIM, MARINASULA at mga anak ni Madame JENNY na sina JOCHRISTINE,a.k.a. "NENENG"at JAMES CHRISTOPHERa.k.a "BUTSOY".Tapos noong bandang October 2009 aypinulong ulit kami ni Madame JENNY at dito niyasinabi na ang pondo ay nagkakahalaga ng Php 900million mula [sa] DAR
T: Sino naman ang mga pumeke sa pirma ngdapat na beneficiaris ng Php 900 million na pondo ngDAR?
S: Si Madame JENNY, and mga anak niyang sinaJO CHRISTINE at JAMES CHRISTOPHER at kamingmga empleyado ng JLN Corporation. Gusto ko langpong linawin na ang lahat ng ito ay utos at pakana niMadame JENNY, sumusunod lamang kami bilangempleyado. Sa katunayan nga po ay iyong mga hindinaming natapos na pirmahan sa opisina ng JLN
ration ay inuuwi ni Madame JENNY NAI
..«:
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
bahay niya at doon nila tinutuloy ang pagpirma kasamaang mga katulong sa bahay at drivers at security nila.
It is clear that based from the above statementthat the accused could not possibly know what specificdocuments were forged, where the forgeries were doneand when these forgeries were allegedly committed. 53
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY ACCUSEDRONALDLIM
Accused-movant Ronald Lim restates that the Informationsin these cases fail to (1) sufficiently apprise him of the chargesagainst him;54(2) state the specific acts or omissions complainedof as constituting the offense.v' and, (3) allege any act thatconstitutes the elements of the crimes charged against him.56
He alleges that he has sufficiently shown that he had noparticipation in the forgery imputed to him.s? that he was notaware that Marina Sula made him the president of Micro AgriBusiness Citizen Initiative Foundation, Inc., (MABFICI);theSinumpaang Salaysay of Marina Sula, Merlina Sunas andBenhur Luy reveals that the alleged forgery of the subjectdocuments pertaining to MABCIFIwas not done by him; in her"Sioorri Statement" dated October 2, 2013, Marina Sula admittedthat she performed all acts necessary to form such foundation;and, in the "Pinaqsamanq Sinumpaang Salaysay of Benhur Luy,Merlina Sunas, Gertrudes Luy, Nova Kay Batal-Macalintal, ElenaS. Abundo and Avenlina C. Lingo" dated September 11, 2011, itwas stated by Benhur Luy that the signatures of the presidentsand incorporators were forged by Marina Sula.v'
/JA-:53 pp. 744-745, Id
54 p. 748, Id55 p. 755, Id56 p. 755, Id57 p. 756, Id58 p. 756, Id
ReaolutfonCriminal Cases Nos. S8-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
According to accused-movant Ronald Lim, it is clear fromthe aforementioned statements of the whistleblowers that hispurported signatures appearing on all documents related toMABCIFIwere not his genuine signatures and he was unwarethat his signature was used by Marina Sula.s?
He submits that the pieces of evidence in these cases willprove that he was neither involved nor did he participate in thealleged forgery; the prosecution "conveniently alleged" that heconspired with his co-accused.sv and, the allegation of conspiracywas misapplied with regard to the cases against him.s-
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY ACCUSED,PANGANDAMAN
Accused-movant Pangandaman insists that the delay of four(4) years in the resolution of the preliminary investigation ofthese cases violated his constitutional right to speedy dispositionof cases.v-
He submits that due to the fact that the filing of the counter-affidavits by several respondents were "spread out over a periodof several months," the Office of the Ombudsman could havestudied the complaint and its annexes prior to the filing of thecounter-affidavits of the respondents= and proceeded with thepreliminary investigation of these cases.s+
Moreover, accused-movant Pangandaman alleges thatalthough the present cases are numerous, they all involve similartransactions; hence, the said cases can be analyzed and disposedof "in a few months at the most;" the factual antecedents of thesecases were already summarized by the Commission on Audit(COA)Special Audit Team in its SAOReport No. 2013-01. Thus,
/7~11
59 p. 757, Id60 p. 757, Id61 p. 758, Id62 p. 785, Id63 p. 786, Id64 p. 786, Id
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17-CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
the facts which were essential to the determination of probablecause are already accessible and synthesized.v''
Accused-movant Pangandaman points out once again thathe was repeatedly denied access to copies of the counter-affidavits of his eo-respondents by the Officeof the Ombudsmanwhich contributed to the delay of the filing of his counter-affidavit. According to him, a favorable ruling on the saidrequests would have "expedited" the submission of his counter-affidavit. He submits that the above requests were tantamount tohis assertion of his right to due process and speedy disposition ofcases.t=
Accused-movant Pangandaman further contends that thelength of time spent in the preliminary investigation of thesecases "sufficiently weakened" any defense that he may have haddue to the fact that he no longer holds any position in thedepartment he previously served; he has no access to thedocuments that may be relevant to the present cases; and, thedelay makes it difficult for him to procure witnesses who couldtestify on his behalf.67
Lastly, accused-movant Pangandaman submits that the"ionq delay" by the Officeof the Ombudsman highlights the factthat the prosecution strained to find evidence in order to indicthim. Thus, the prosecution needed to put him through a "draum-out" preliminary investigation.s"
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY ACCUSEDNIETO
Accused-rnovant Nieto submits that the Court failed torender a clear and definite ruling on his argument that [1] thefacts alleged in the herein Informations do not constitute an
/'7
~
65 pp. 786-787, Id66 p. 787, Id67 p. 788, Id68 p. 788, Id
;/.
ReaolutfonCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
offense and [2] the Informations filed against him charge morethan one (1) offense.69
He points out once again that the present Informations allegethat he requested the amount of Php900,000,OOO.00 from theMalampaya Fund under the instructions of accused-movantPangandaman. However, there is nothing in our existing lawsthat criminalizes or prohibits the act of requesting funds uponthe orders of a superior. Thus, he maintains that the allegationscontained in the present Informations, insofar as he is concerned,do not constitute an offense."?
Moreover, accused-movant Nieto argues that the Court failedto consider that there is only one (1) request for funding that heallegedly made upon the instructions of accused-movantPangandaman; the number of the purported transactions enteredinto is not the gauge in ascertaining criminal intent for severaltransactions; for multiple transactions to be considered separateand distinct crimes, there must be a series of acts with separateindividuals; there is no evidence that he met with separateindividuals or entities for each and every memorandum ofagreement (MOA)signed by him and for every check released byhis office; and, the mere fact that he signed the MOAs cannotlead to the conclusion that he took part in the implementation ofthe questioned transactions and he authorized the improperimplementation thereof.71
Lastly, accused-movant Nieto asserts that his allegedcriminal acts in the Informatioris for violation of Section 3 (e) ofR.A. No. 3019 and the complex crime of malversation of publicfunds through falsification of public documents are one and thesame. Thus, this circumstance purportedly violates his rightagainst double jeopardy. 72
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY ACCUSEDCACANANT~
69 pp. 794-795, Id70 p. 795, Id71 pp. 795-796, Id72 p. 796, Id
~)D
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
Accused-movant Cacananta alleges that the Court erred indenying her motion to quash on the ground that her motionviolated Rule Ill, paragraph 2 (b) (i)of A.M.No. lS-06-10-SC.73
She explains that the said rule prohibits a motion for judicialdetermination of the existence of probable cause and not a motionto quash on the ground that there is no probable cause againstan accused. In support of her argument, she submits thefollowingpurported differences between the two (2), to wit:
1. The motion for judicial determination of the existenceof probable cause is filed to request the court to makeits own determination of a legal ground for theissuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused.On the other hand, a motion to quash on the groundthat there is no probable cause to hold the accusedfor trial is filed to quash the Information;
2. The motion for judicial determination of the existenceof probable cause is filed before the accused posthis/her bail bond while the motion to quash theinformation is filed after the accused posted bail butbefore arraignment;
3. In the motion for judicial determination of existence ofprobable cause, the Court ascertain[s] the sufficiencyof the evidence attached to the information to warrantthe issuance of a warrant of arrest against theaccused. In the motion to quash the information forlack of probable cause, the court examine[s] theallegations of the information and the evidences [sic]submitted if there is a ground to prosecute theaccused and the possibility that he/she can beconvicted of the crime charged in the information. 74
Also, accused-movant Cacananta reiterates that herpurported act of certifying that the subject documents are"complete and proper," when in truth and in fact the same werenot, does not readily show that she conspired with her eo-
/7/D
73 p. 802, Vol. XIX, Record74 p. 802, Id /
/f;'
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. S8-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
accused because the said act does not demonstrate that she hadprior knowledge of the commission of the crime.tf
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY ACCUSEDVILLANUEVA
Accused-movant Villanueva insists that the ultimate facts,with reference to the elements of the crimes charged against her,are not clearly stated in the present Informations. 76
She reiterates that her alleged acts appearing in theInformations of these cases do not constitute any of the elementsof the complex crime of malversation through falsification ofpublicdocuments and violation of Section 3 (e)ofR.A. No. 3019.77
In support of her argument, she invokes the case ofEstradav. Sandiganbayan,78 wherein the Supreme Court ruled, thus:
7S pp. 804-805, Id76 p. 15, Vol. XX, Record77 p. 16, Id78 377 SeRA 538 (2002)
Our rulings have long settled the issue on how theacts or omissions constituting the offense should bemade in order to meet the standard of sufficiency. Thus,the offense must be designated by its name given bystatute or by reference to the section or subsection of thestatute punishing it. The information must also state theacts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify itsqualifying and aggravating circumstances. The acts oromissions complained ofmust be alleged in such form asis sufficient to enable a person of commonunderstanding to know what offense is intended to becharged, and enable the court to pronounce properjudgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient ifit does not accurately and clearly allege the elements ofthe crime charged. Every element of the offense mustbe stated in the information. What facts andcircumstances are necessary to be included therein mustbe determined by reference to the definitions and
/l~
~/'
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement ofalleging the elements of a crime in the information is toinform the accused of the nature of the accusationagainst him so as to enable him to suitably prepare hisdefense. The presumption is that the accused has noindependent knowledge of the facts that constitute theofferise."?
According to her, the Court failed to cite any of the elementsof the crimes charged against her vis-a-vis her questioned acts inits Resolution promulgated on August 20, 2018.80
Lastly, accused-movant Villanueva submits that theallegation that she conspired with her eo-accused is too generaland her alleged acts in these cases are independent from those ofher co-accused.s!
THE PROSECUTIONS OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION FORRECONSIDERATION OF ACCUSED ANDAYA, JR.
The prosecution argues that contrary to accused-movantAndaya, Jr's claim, the Court did not "effectiuelu treat" his motionfor a bills of particulars as a motion to quash; and, that thearguments raised by the said accused-movant in his presentmotion were already passed upon by the Court in its assailedResolution promulgated on August 20,2018.82
It maintains that the subject Informations are clear andcomplete; the required ultimate facts which establish everyelement of the crimes charged against the accused-movant andthe details necessary to apprise accused-movant Andaya, Jr., ofthe nature and cause of the accusations against him have allbeen laid out and alleged in the present Informationsv» and,
_/ /"/., );;
79 Emphasis supplied by the accused-movant80 p. 17, Id81 p. 18, Id82 pp. 57-58, Vol. XX, Record83 p. 59, Id
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
pursuant to the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case ofPeople v. Quitlong,84 there is less necessity in reciting theparticularities of conspiracy in these cases because conspiracy inthese cases is alleged only as a mode of committing the crimescharged. Furthermore, the prosecution contends that accused-movant Andaya, Jr's "over-reliance" on the case of Entile v.Sandiganbayan85 is misplaced.se
It ratiocinates that the same accused-movant failed todemonstrate the applicability of the said ruling to the presentcases; a close reading of the case of Entile reveals that accused-movant Andaya, Jr., cannot properly rely thereon; and, theSupreme Court in the said case partially granted the petitioner'srequest for a bill of particulars based on considerations whichare not present in these cases. It submits the followingcomparison between the factual antecedents in Entile vis-a-visthe present cases, to wit:
16. 1. The Supreme Court in Enrile held that there wasa need to specify "particulars of overt acts" because"the manner of amassing the ill-gotten wealth -through a combination or series of overt acts underSection 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080 - is an importantelement that must be alleged."87 But the accusedAndaya is not charged with Plunder; and a"combination or series of overt acts" is not an elementof the crimes of violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No.3019 and Malversation through Falsification.
84 121562; p. 59-60, Id85 766 seRA 1 (2015)86 p. 60, Id87 Footnote omitted88 Footnote omitted
16. 2. The Supreme Court ruled that there is a need tofurther specify dates of relevant transactions in Enrilebecause the length of time alleged in the Informationstherein was six years88 (i.e., "2004 to 2010"). Inaccused Andaya's case, the material time averred inthe Informations spans [sic] only a short period ofapproximately one year (i.e., "2009 to 2010").
~
h~
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17-CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
16. 3. The Supreme Court held that furtherspecification of relevant details was required becausethe "core of the indictment" against Senator JuanPonce Enrile was the funding of ghost projects usinghis "pork barrel" allocation, his endorsement of JanetNapoles' non-government organizations to implementthese projects, and his receipt of kickbacks inexchange of said endorsement.sv This modus operandiis substantially different from the one employed in theinstant cases.w
According to the prosecution, the doctrine in Enrile, whichwas decided on the facts and circumstances peculiar to it, shouldnot be simply applied to the present cases. Nevertheless, it pointsout that the said case teaches that courts "should exercise itsdiscretion [in resolving a request for a bill of particulars] within thecontext of the facts and the nature of the crime charged in eachcase." Thus, accused-movant Andaya, Jr., cannot insist on aruling identical to Enrile because the said case was decided on adifferent set of facts.v!
The prosecution also insists that the standard against whicha request for a bill of particulars should be measured must beconsistent with the constitutional requirement that the accusedshould be informed of the nature and cause of the accusationsagainst him; hence, once the said standard is satisfied, themotion for a bills of particulars should be denied.v?
It further argues that accused-movant Andaya, Jr'sassertion that "it is one thing for an accused to be apprised of thenature and cause of the accusation against him, but the questionof whether an accused can properly and intelligently prepare hisdefense is an entirely different matter" lacks legal basis. Theprosecution explains that being sufficiently informed of thenature and cause of the accusations against an accused alsocapacitates the said accused to prepare for his/her trial.v'. /79Op. 61, Id )191 p. 62, Id /92 p. 63, Id /93 p. 63, Id
RaolutCOftCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
To further support its contentions, the prosecution insiststhat accused-movant Andaya, Jr.'s prayer for a bill of particularsshould be denied on the ground that his requested details do notconstitute ultimate facts. It contends that the particulars askedby accused-movant Andaya, Jr., refer to the finer details of theultimate facts which are sufficiently and completely averred inthe Informations. Also, the details of conspiracy is not necessaryto be alleged in the Informations when conspiracy is not thegravamen of the offense.v'
Lastly, the prosecution contends that to obtain evidentiarymatters is not the function of a motion for a bills of particulars. 95
Relying on the case of People v. Romualdez,96 it contends thatfiner details of why and how a crime was committed can be leftout because they can be provided during trial. 97
THE PROSECUTION'S OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION FORRBCONSIDERA TION OF ACCUSED PANGANDAMAN
The prosecution stresses that accused-movantPangandaman's present motion merely reiterates the positionsand statements he made in his motion to quash which was deniedby the Court in its assailed Resolution. 98
At any rate, the prosecution argues anew that theCommission of Audit's (COA's) investigation does not foreclosethe Office of the Ombudsman from conducting its owninvestigation due to the fact that the Office of the Ombudsman isduty bound to make an independent determination of probablecause after due and careful consideration of the evidence onrecord.w
94 p. 64, Id95 p. 65, Id96 587 seRA 123 (2009)97 p. 65, Id91 p. 66, Vol. XX, Record99 p. 66, Id
On another point, the prosecution maintains that the saidaccused-movant's right to speedy disposition of cases was not
/7A~~
~ L·f
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
violated100 and the proceedings before the Office of theOmbudsman was not attended by vexatious, capricious andoppressive delays.t?!
According to the prosecution, the Office of the Ombudsmanonly took four (4)years to complete the preliminary investigationof these cases notwithstanding the fact that there were no lessthan thirty-six (36) public officials and private individuals thatwere charged before it102 and the purported delays areattributable to the ordinary processes of justice. It invokes thecase of Dansal v. Fernandez, Sr.,103and argues that althoughit is the Office of the Ombudsman's duty to act promptly on thecomplaints brought before it, this duty should not be mistakenwith a hasty resolution of cases at the expense of thoroughnessand correctness. 104
The prosecution likewise submits that accused-movantPangandaman delayed the proceedings before the Office of theOmbudsman and failed to assert his right to speedy dispositionof cases.t?" It notes that accused-movant Pangandaman'srepeated requests for copies of the counter-affidavits of his eo-respondents delayed the resolution of the cases against him; hisreliance on the case of Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman,106is not correct because the Supreme Court in the said case ruledthat a respondent's right to examine and be furnished copies ofdocuments on record during a preliminary investigation onlypertains to the evidence submitted by the complainant and not ofhis eo-respondents. 107
The prosecution further alleges that the accused-movantfailed to substantiate his claim that he suffered prejudice due tothe purported inordinate delay by the Office of theOmbudsman.rvs and, the accused-movant's reliance on the cases
~
ID100 p. 66, Id101 p. 66, Id102 p. 67, Id103327 SCRA145 (2000)104 p. 68, Id105 p. 68, Id106 748 SCRA1 (2015)107 p. 69, Id108 p. 69, Id
/
.Ruolu~onCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 23916People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
of Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,109 and Remulla v.Sandiganbayan,110 are misplaced due to the differences infactual circumstances of the said cases with the present cases.U!
THE PROSECUTION'S OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION FORRECONSIDERA TION OF ACCUSED NlETO
The prosecution submits that the arguments raised byaccused-movant Nieto in his motion for reconsideration are merereiterations of the same arguments he raised in his motion toquash.us Nevertheless, the prosecution maintains that the factscharged in the subject Informations clearly and sufficientlyconstitute a violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 and thecrime of malversation of public funds through falsification of publicdocuments. 113
It insists that Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules ofCriminal Procedure requires that an Information needs only tostate the ultimate facts, or those which are essential andsubstantial facts, which either form the basis of the primary rightand duty or which directly make up the wrongful acts oromissions of the defendant.U" According to the prosecution, areading of the present Informations reveal that all of the elementsconstitutive of the crimes herein charged are clearly allegedtherein.us
Moreover, the prosecution reiterates that accused-movantNieto is charged to have acted in conspiracy with his eo-accused.Thus, his acts should not be taken in isolation and separatelyfrom his eo-accused in the determination of the sufficiency of theallegations in the Informations against him.!~
In109159 seRA 70 (1988)110G.R. No. 218040, April 17, 2017111 p. 69, Id112 p. 70, Id113 p. 71, Vol. XX, Record114 p. 72, Id115 p. 72, Id116 p. 72, Id
~
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17-CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
In the same vein, the prosecution contends that accused-movant Nieto erroneously invoked the concept of "dupliciiu ofoffenses" as a ground to quash the herein Informations. Itemphasizes that while Section 3 (f), Rule 117, of the RevisedRules of Criminal Procedure prohibits the filing of a singleInformation charging more than one (1) offense, each of theInformations in Criminal Cases Nos. S8-1 7-CRM-2202 to 2298charges only one (1) count of violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No.3019 and each Information in Criminal Cases Nos. S8-17-CRM-2299 to 2395 charges only one (1) count of the crime ofmalversation of public funds through falsification of publicdocuments. 117
It explains once again that the Php900 Million MalampayaFund was not malversed at the same time, but on differentoccasions through a complex and well-orchestrated scheme,which diverted the funds to the possession and control ofaccused-movant Napoles and her cohorts. Thus, eachtransaction constituted a single act with an independentexistence and criminal intent of its own.lIS
On accused-movant Nieto's argument that his right againstdouble jeopardy had been violated due to his indictment for thesubject crimes, the prosecution contends anew that a singlecriminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses where thereis variance or differences between the elements of an offense inone law and another law. It notes that what is proscribed is theprosecution for the same offenseu? and not the prosecution forthe same act;120hence, the mere filing of the two (2) sets ofInformations do not itself give rise to double jeopardy. 121
THE PROSECUTION'S OPPOSITION TO THE MOTIONS FORRECONSIDERA TION OF ACCUSED PANLILIO, JANET
NAPOLES, JAMES NAPOLES, JO NAPOLES, RONALD LIMAND VILLANUE~
117 p. 73, Id118 p. 73, Id119 p. 74, Id120 p. 74, Id121 p. 74, Id
/)1)
ReaolutfonCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
The prosecution submits that the arguments raised by theabove-mentioned accused-movants are mere reiterations of thearguments they raised in their respective motions to quash. Itpoints out that these arguments have already been thoroughlyand judiciously addressed by the .Court in its assailedResolution. 122
It points out once again that the factual allegations of theInformations against the said accused -movants clearly andsufficiently constitute a violation of Section 3 (e)of R.A.No. 3019and the crime of malversation of public funds through falsificationof public documenis.P" an Information only needs to state theultimate facts constituting the offense; the evidentiary and otherdetails can be provided during trial; 124 and, the facts andcircumstances that must be alleged are to be determined basedon the definition and the essential elements of the specific crimescharged. 125
The prosecution also reiterates that a perusal of theInformations in issue clearly show that all the elementsconstitutive of violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 and thecrime of malversation of public funds through falsification of publicdocuments are spelled out therein; 126 the documents allegedlyfalsified are enumerated therein; 127 they explicitly allege thataccused-movant Ronald Lim cooperated and participated in thepurported implementation of a ghost and inexistent project byforging signatures and fabricating documents to conceal thefictitious nature of the transaction; 128 and, the same Informationsadequately allege that [1] the MOAentered into prior to the dateof SARONo. E-09-08417 did not contain the certification fromthe proper accounting official that the fund was dulyappropriated for the purpose and the amount necessary isavailable for expenditure and [2] the project proposal was notapproved. 129~
122 p. 76, Vol. XX,Record - ~123 p. 76, Id / •• -0124 p. 76, Id /125 p. 77, Id •126 p. 78, Id •127 p. 78, Id128 p. 78, Id129 p. 78, Id
ReaoZutfoftCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
Moreover, the prosecution submits that the saidInformations expressly and sufficiently allege conspiracy amongthe accused; 130 conspiracy is only alleged as a mode ofcommitting the crimes herein charged; hence, there is noabsolute necessity of reciting its particularities in the presentInformations.u! and, due to the allegation of conspiracy, privateindividuals may be held liable for the crimes herein chargedpursuant to the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case ofBa.rrl.ga v. Sandiganbayan.132
The prosecution likewise alleges that accused-movantPanlilio's constitutional right to equal protection of the laws wasnot violated.
It submits that the said accused-movant failed todemonstrate that there was a clear and intentionaldiscrimination on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman inindicting her for the above crimes;133 the mere contention thatshe has the same defenses with Sison and Baui are insufficientto support a conclusion that she was denied equal protection ofthe laws;134 jurisprudence dictates that the discretion who toprosecute rests on the sound assessment of the prosecutionj-wand, accused-movant Panlilio's motion to quash is not the properremedy in challenging the fmding of probable cause againsther. 136
Furthermore, the prosecution reiterates that the concept ofdelito continuado or "continued crime" is inapplicable to thepresent cases because each alleged act of disbursement andmisappropriation was represented by each of the ninety-seven(97)checks which was individually considered as one (1)separateact that was impelled by its own accompanying criminal intent. Itcontends that accused-movant Panlilio's participation in thequestioned transactions was not done at a single instancebecause she counter-signed various checks and disbursement
~
ItJ130 p. 78, Id131 pp. 78-79, Id132457 SCRA301 (2005)133 p. 79, Id134 p. 79, Id135 p. SO, Id136 p. SO, Id
/-
RaolutfonCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
vouchers. Thus, the conclusion of the Court that the questionedacts alleged in the present Informations were not the result of asingle criminal intent but by independent acts is proper. 137
On the same accused-movant's assertion that she could onlybe charged with forty-five (45) counts of the afore-mentionedcrimes because she counter-signed only forty-five (45) checks,the prosecution submits that the said contention is evidentiary innature and is a matter of defense which is best ventilated duringtrial. 138
Lastly, the prosecution disputes that there was noinordinate delay in the resolution of the preliminary investigationbefore the Officeof the Ombudsman. 139
It points out that accused-movant Panlilio was given ampleopportunity to present her side and refute the accusationsagainst her through the submission of her counter-affidavit; shesecured a motion for extension of time to file her counter-affidavit;140 the amount of time spent by the Office of theOmbudsman to complete the preliminary investigation of thesecases could hardly be considered inordinate.I+! the sameaccused-movant cannot validly claim that she was prejudiced bythe perceived delay on the bare allegation of anxiety, mentalanguish and sleepless nights;142accused-movant Panlilio shouldhave raised the issue of inordinate delay at the earliestopportunity, or particularly during the preliminary investigationof these cases;143and, the said accused-movant did not mentionthe issue of inordinate delay in her motion for reconsideration ofthe Office of the Ombudsman's adverse Resolution datedDecember 19,2016.144
According to the prosecution, the fact that accused-movantPanlilio has belatedly raised the issue of inordinate delay
/'~
137 p. 80, Id138 p. 80, Id139 p. 81, Id140 p. 81, Id141 p. 81, Id142 p. 81, Id143 p. 81, Id144 p. 81, Id
~
'.
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
inevitably negates her claim of a violation of her constitutionalright to speedy disposition of cases.14S
OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OFACCUSED CACANANTA
The prosecution contends that the motion to quash filed bythe said accused-movant essentially sought a re-determination ofprobable cause by the Court. Thus, the said motion circumventedthe prohibition against filing a motion for judicial determination ofprobable cause under Rule Ill, paragraph 2 (b) (i) of the RevisedGuidelines on Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases.tw
Moreover, the prosecution contends that the manner inalleging conspiracy as a mode of committing the offense wassatisfied by the present Informatioris.t"?
Finally, the prosecution restates that her allegation on thelack of evidence of conspiracy between her and her eo-accused isan evidentiary matter which can be best passed upon after a fullblown trial on the merits.v"
THE RULING OF THE COURT
The Court finds the subject motions unmeritorious.
To begin with, in its questioned Resolution promulgated onAugust 20, 2018, the Court squarely passed upon accused-movant Cacananta's argument that there is no probable cause toprosecute her for the crimes charged against her. Therein, theCourt ruled that her motion to quash is a prohibited motion underthe Revised Guidelines on Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases-+?
/'l~
145 p. 81, id146 p. 82, Id147 pp. 82-84, Id148 p. 84, Id149 Took effect of September 1,2017 /!~
RaolutfoftCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
because it essentially calls for a re-determination of probablecause in these cases insofar as she is concerned, thus:
It is noteworthy that the motions filed by accused-movants Cacananta and Panlilio essentially seek a re-determination of probable cause by the Court. Therein,they challenge the finding of probable cause made bythe Office of the Ombudsman and they likewise praythat the present cases against them be dismissed on theground of lack of probable cause.
As aptly pointed out by the prosecution, a motionfor judicial determination of probable cause is now,prohibited under Rule Ill, paragraph 2 (b) (i), of A.M. No.15-06-10-Se or the Revised Guidelines on theContinuous Trial of Criminal Cases which took effect onSeptember 1, 2017. -,
This is precisely what the Court did in thesecases. In its Resolution promulgated on December14, 2017,150 the Court found the existence ofprobable cause after a careful review of the records
. thereof.151 Accordingly, it issued the correspondingwarrants of arrest and hold departure orders against allof the accused in these cases.152 To be sure, the Courtdoes not find a sound reason to depart from itsaforesaid finding. 153
The nomenclature of the motion filed by accused-movantCacananta is not controlling but the allegations therein. A plainreading thereof reveals that the said accused-movant actuallychallenges the finding of probable cause against her by the Officeof the Ombudsman. As above shown, the Court had alreadymade an independent determination of the existence of probablecause against all of the accused in these cases after a careful
/7~
150 pp. 9-12, vol. XVI, Record151Emphasis supplied152p. 11-12, Id153 p. 604, Vol. XIX, Record; p. 33, Resolution; Emphasis supplied
.«:
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. 8B-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
review of the records.F+ Thus, her motion to quash should bedenied for being superfluous and a prohibited motion under theRevised Guidelines on Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases.
Notably, lack of probable cause is not one of the recognizedgrounds for a motion to quash under Section 3, Rule 117 of theRevised Rules of Criminal Procedure.t= Also, Section 2 (b) (iv),Rule III of the Revised Guidelines on Continuous Trial ofCriminal Cases provides:
(b) Prohibited Motions. - Prohibited motions shall bedenied outright before the scheduled arraignmentwithout need of comment andj or opposition.
iv. Motion to quash information when the ground isnot one of those stated in Sec. 3, Rule 117.
On the issue regarding the alleged existence of inordinatedelay in the preliminary investigation of these cases raised byaccused-movants Pangandaman and Panlilio in their respectivemotions to quash, the Court already squarely passed upon thesaid issue in its challenged Resolution promulgated on August20, 2018. It applied the four-fold test prescribed by the SupremeCourt and assiduously examined the facts and circumstancessurrounding the preliminary investigation of these cases and theexplanation given by the prosecution. After doing so, the Court
1~ Resolution promulgated on December 14,2017 /7155 Section 3. Grounds. - The accusedmay move to quash the complaint or information on any of thefollowing grounds: "1
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;(b) That the court trying the casehas no jurisdiction over the offense charged;(c) That the court trying the casehas no jurisdiction over the person of t7heaccused.,(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; • r
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for variousoffenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuseor justification;
and(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the
caseagainst him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
.••• zuetonCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
held that the herein accused's constitutional right to speedydisposition of cases was not violated, to wit:
In the relatively recent case of Remulla v.SGndfganbayan,156 the Supreme Court emphasizedthe need for courts dealing with "speedy dispositioncases," to .approach the said cases on an ad MC basisand weigh the conduct of both the prosecution and theaccused vis-a-vis the [1) length of delay; (2) reason forthe delay; (3) accused's assertion or non-assertion ofhis/her right to speedy trial; and, [4] prejudice causedto the accused resulting from the delay.l57 Notably,none of the above-mentioned elements is either anecessary or sufficient condition to hold the existence ofinordinate delay.l58 Stated differently, the said factorsmust be considered and related together with other
, relevant circumstances and courts must still engage ina difficult and sensitive balancing process.159
Thus, the cases invoked by accused-movantsPangandaman and Panlilio in support of their claim of aviolation of their right to speedy disposition of casescannot be blindly applied to the present cases without aclose scrutiny of the attendant facts and circumstancessurrounding the fact-finding investigation andpreliminary investigation conducted before the Office ofthe Ombudsman, as well as the reason for the delaygiven by the prosecution. To be sure, a meremathematical reckoning of the time involved is notsufficient to hold the existence of inordinate delay.160
In explaining the amount of time spent inresolving these cases before the Office of theOmbudsman, the prosecution chronicles the followingsequence of events that transpired from the time o~
156 G.R. No. 218040, Apri/17, 2017 . ~ J1157 Rem""" v. Sondlgonbayon, G.R. No. 218040, Apri/17, 2017151 Remullo v. Sondlgonboyon, G.R. No. 218040, Apri/17, 2017159 See Remullo v. Sondll1onboyon, G.R. No. 218040, Apri/17, 2017; Spouses Uy v. Adrlono 505 SCRA 625(2006)110 Delo Pella If. Sondlgonbayon, 360 SeRA 478 (2001)
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
filing of the complaint by the NBI and the FIO onOctober 3, 2013, and October 14, 2014, respectively, upto the filing of the Informations in these cases onDecember 2,2017, viz:
March 6,2014 Respondent Sison Jr. filed his Counter-Affidavit
March 7, 2014 Respondent de Asis filed his Motion forExtension of Time to submit CA
March 7, 2014 Respondent Nieto filed his Second Motionfor Extension of Time to submit CA
March 11,2014 Respondent Venancio filed his Motion forExtension of Time to submit CA
March 12,2014 Respondent Panli1io filed a Motion forExtension of Time to file CA
March 12,2014 Respondent Relampagos filed his Counter-Affidavit
March 12,2014 Respondent Andaya filed a Motion forExtension of Time to File CA
March 12, 2014 Respondent Napoles filed a Motion forExtension of Time to File CA
March 17,2014 Respondent Baui filed her Counter-Affidavit
March 178,[sic] 2014 Respondent Andaya filed his Counter-Affidavit
Apri18,2014 Respondent Tuason filed a Motion forExtension of Time to file CA
Apri114,2014 Counsel for respondent Maglanque wrote aLetter of Clarification addressed to PanelChairperson, Karen Funelas Re: NB! V.Arroyo, et al.
April 14,2014 Counsel for respondent Nieto filed a FirstMotion for Extension of Time to Filed [sic]Consolidated Counter-Affidavit Re:Original and Supplemental Complaint-Affidavits
April 15,2014 Respondent Gumafelix filed a Motion forExtension of Time to File CA
April 15,2014 Respondents Jo Christine Napoles andChristopher Napoles filed a Motion forExtension of Time to File CA
Apri115,2014 Respondent Pangandaman filed a Motionfor Extension of Time to File CA
Apri116,2014 Respondent Andaya filed a Motion forAdditional Time to file SupplementalCounter-Affidavit
Apri116,2014 Respondent Sibayan filed a Motion forExtension of Time (To File Counter-Affidavit)
April 21, 2014 Respondent Agcaoili, Jr., filefdl his~J.« )1)
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17-CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
Counter-AffidavitApril 22, 2014 Respondent Reynald Lim filed a Motion for
Extension of Time to File CAApri124,2014 Respondent Manlanque [sic] thru counsel
filed his Final Counter-AffidavitApri130,2014 Respondent Nieto filed a Final Motion for
Extension of Time to File Consolidated CAApri129,2014 Respondent Relampagos filed a Motion for
Extension of Time to File Supplemental CAMay 2,2014 Respondent Sibayan filed his Counter-
AffidavitMay 5,2014 Respondents Jo Christine Napoles and
Christopher Napoles filed their JointCounter-Affidavit
May 6,2014 Respondent Espanol filed her Kontra-Salavsav
May 6,2014 Respondent Relampagos filed hisSupplemental Counter-Affidavit
May 8,2014 Respondent Andaya file[d] hisSupplemental Counter-Affidavit
May 13,2014 Respondent Andaya filed a Motion forAdditional Time to File Supplemental CA
May 20,2014 Respondent Apuang file[d] his Kontra-Salaysay
May 20,2014 Respondent Gumafelix filed his Counter-Affidavit
May 20,2014 Respondent Ronald Francisco Lim filed hisCA
May 20,2014 Respondent Garro filed his CAMav 21,2014 Respondent Ronald John Lim filed his CAMay 21,2014 Respondent Genevieve Uy filed her CAMay 28,2014 Respondent Nieto filed an Urgent Motion
for Extension (ofTime to file CA)May 30,2014 Respondent Ramirez filed her Kontra
SalavsavMay 30,2014 Respondent Rodriguez fileld] his CAJune 2,2014 Respondent Pangandaman filed his second
MOTEXto file CAJune 4, 2014 Respondent Tuason filed her Compliance
re: Order dated May 21, 2014 (submissionof her Sworn Statement)
June 13,2014 Respondent Pangandaman filed his CAOct. 3. 2014163 Respondent Napoles filed her CADecember 19, 2016 Joint-Resolution was issued
recommending the indictment of theaccused for 2 counts of Plunder, 97 countsof Malversation of Public Funds thruFalsification of Public Documents and 97counts of viol. Of Sec. 3 (e)of RA3019
A~
/7~
163 Emphasis supplied
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. 88-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
December 23, 2016 Joint-Resolution was signed by OMBMorales
December 29,2016 Respondent Andaya filed a Manifestation(allowing him to file a Motion forReconsideration from the OMB Joint-Resolution dated December 19,2016)
January 3,2017 Respondent Nieto filed his MR from OMBJoint-Resolution dated December 19,2016
January 3,2017 Respondent Manlanque filed his MR fromOMBJoint-Resolution dated December 19,2016
January 3,2017 Respondent Janet Lim Napoles filed his[her] MR from OMBJoint-Resolution datedDecember 19, 2016
January 3,2017 Respondent Panlilio filed his [her] MR fromOMBJoint-Resolution dated December 19,2016
January 3,2017 Respondent Apuang filed his MR fromOMBJoint-Resolution dated December 19,2016
January 3,2017 Respondents Jo Christine Napoles andJames Christopher Napoles filed theirJoint MR from OMB Joint-Resolutiondated December 19,2016
January 3, 2017 Respondent Ronald John Lim filed his MRfrom OMB Joint-Resolution datedDecember 19, 2016
January 3,2017 Respondent Tuason filed her MR AdCautelam from OMB Joint-Resolutiondated December 19, 2016
January 9,2017 Respondent Pangandaman filed his MR(Re: Joint-Resolution dated December 19,2016)
January 11,2017 Respondent Sibayan filed his MR (of theJoint-Resolution dated December 19,2016)
January 12, 2017 Respondent Andaya filed his MR fromOMBJoint-Resolution dated December 19,2016
January 16, 2017 Respondent Relampagos filed his MR fromOMBJoint-Resolution dated December 19,2016
January 16, 2017 Respondent Ronald Francisco Lim filed aMotion for Reconsideration andReinvestigation (Re:Joint-Resolution datedDecember 19,2016)
January 16, 2017 Respondent Venancio filed his MR fromOMBJoint-Resolution dated December 19,2016 -.
»«: )0
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
January 19,2017 Respondent Reynaldo Lim filed his MRfrom OMB Joint-Resolution datedDecember 19,2016
January 20, 2017 Respondent Cacananta filed his MR withMotion for Reinvestigation from OMBJoint-Resolution dated December 19,2016
January 20,2017 Respondent Pangandaman field [sic] anUrgent Manifestation and Motion (tosupplement his Motion forReconsideration)
January 23,2017 Respondent Dinso, Jr., filed his MR fromOMBJoint-Resolution dated December 19,2016
January 25,2017 Respondent Rodriguez filed his MR (Re:Joint-Resolution dated December 19,2016)
January 25, 2017 Respondent John Raymond De Asis filedhis MR (Re: Joint-Resolution datedDecember 19,2016)
January 25, 2017 Respondent Venancio filed his Motion toAdmit with his Amended MR (Re: Joint-Resolution dated December 19,2016
February 1, 2017 Respondent Venancio filed a Supplementto the MR dated January 16, 2017 (Re:Joint-Resolution dated December 19,2016)
February 2, 2017 Respondent Gumafelix filed his MR (Re:Joint-Resolution dated December 19,2016)
February 6, 2017 Respondent Relampagos filed aSupplemental MR (Re: Joint-Resolutiondated December 19,2016)
February 17, 2017 Respondent Tuason filed a Manifestationand Motion (for full immunity from casesinvolving Janet Lim Napoles, to wit: 1)Sula; 2) Luy; 3) Suiias; 4) Baltazar; 5)Briones; 6) Tuason
February 23,2017 Respondent Pangandaman filed aReiteratory Motion (RE: UrgentManifestation and Motion dated 20January 2017) (requesting for copies of CAof his eo-respondents)
March 2, 2017 Respondent Tuason filed a SupplementalMR
March 17,2017 Respondent Tuason filed a SecondSupplement to the MRAd Cautelam dated03 January 2017
Apri125,2017 Respondent Relampagos filed aConsolidated Very Urgent Motions: 1) ToVisit Due Process in Earnest; and 2) For a
, Bill of Particulars
~/-i,
ResolutionCriminalCases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202to 2395Peoplevs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
May 22,2017 Respondent Relampagos filed a Motion toResolve Pending Incident (Re: Very UrgentMotions to Set Case for ClarificatoryHearing and/or to Confront/ Cross-Examine the Complainants and/or TORequire Complainants to AnswerInterrogatories
June 15, 2017 Respondent Andaya filed a Manifestationand Supplement to MR
June 23,2017 Complainant FIO filed a ConsolidatedComment/ Opposition (for the NominalComplainant)
July 3,2017 Respondent Relampagos filed aManifestation and Further Supplement toMR
July 4,2017 Respondent Agcaoili, Jr., filed hisComment (re: OMB-C-C13-0357)
August 30, 2017 Joint-Order was issued resolving the MRsof the respondents and therebyrecommending the indictment for 97counts of Malversation of Public Fundsthru Falsification of Public Documents and97 counts of viol. Of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019whilst dismissing the charges of Plunder
September 5, 2017 Joint-Order was signed by OMS MoralesDecember 2, 2017 Informations for 97 counts of Malversation
of Public Funds thru Falsification of PublicDocuments and 97 counts of viol. Of Sec.3 (e) of RA3019 were filed
DATE INCIDENT REMARKSOctober 14,2014 Complaint was filed by [the] FI0165November 27, 20141• Order to file CA167were issued against the
respondentsDecember 16,2014 Respondent Tuason filed a MOTEX168to file
CADecember 16,2014 Respondent Anday[a) filed a MOTEX to file
CA
164 Annex "A" to the Prosecution's Opposition; pp. 681-686, Id165 Field Investigation Office, Office of the Ombudsman166 Emphasis supplied167 Counter-Affidavit168 Motion for Extension
~
/"l~
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
February 3,2015 Respondent filed his Compliance ofsubmitted his CA169
February 3,2015 Respondent Nieto filed his CAFebruary 3,2015 Respondent Pangandaman filed a MOTEX
to file CAFebruary 6,2015 Respondent Pangandaman filed a Motion
for Reconsideration (re: Order dated 10February 2015)
February 10,2015 Respondent Palmones, Jr., file[d] hisMOTEXto file CA
February 10,2015 Respondent Dequiria files her CAFebruary 10,2015 FIO Order was issued granting Respondent
Pangandaman forty-five (45) days to filehis CA
February 16,2015 Respondent Pangandaman filed aManifestation (Re: Entry of Appearance)requesting copies of all pleadings, records,orders and other papers to be furnished tothe defense counsel
February 17,2015 Respondents Jo Christine and JamesChristopher Napoles filed their Joint CA
February 23, 2015 Respondent Palmones filed a Compliancewith the Order of dtd. Nov. 27, 2014170submitting his Counter-Affidavit and/orAnswer of Palmones with Annexesattached; Affidavit of respondent UY andAffidavit of Dra. Perlita Urbano
February 24,2015 Respondent Dequifia filed a Motion toAdmit Supplemental Affidavit of Witness
March 3,2015 FIO Order was issued resolvingRespondent Pangandaman's MR Re: Orderdtd. 10 February 2015171 by giving himadditional time to file his CA or untilMarch 6,2015
March 6,2015 Respondent Pangadaman filed a Motion toAdmit Attached Counter-Affidavit
March 16,2015 Counsels for accused Pangandaman wrotea letter-request dated 13 March 2015addressed to AO Cabras and GIPO IVOquendo requesting for copies of CA ofother respondents to the case
April 1, 2015 GIPO IV Oquendo issued a letter-replyaddressed to the counsels ofPanzandaman denying their request
May 25,2015 Respondent Pangandaman filed a Motionfor Inhibition of the Honorable SpecialPanel of Investigators
169 As quoted from the Annex "A" submitted by the Prosecution170 Dated November 27, 2014171 Dated February 10, 2015 ~
/')i
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
August 15,2015 Respondent Pangandaman filed a Motionto Resolve (Re: Motion for Inhibition dtd.25 May 2015)172
September 2,2015 Counsel for respondent Sufias wrote [a]letter addressed to Ombudsman Moralesdated 01 September 2015 requestingextension of Immunity of their client to theMalampaya cases
November 27,2015 Respondent Valdez filed hisSupplementary CA (In view of newlydiscovered evidence)
December 19, 2016 Joint-Resolution was issuedrecommending the indictment of theaccused for 2 counts of Plunder, 97 countsof Malversation of Public Funds thruFalsification of Public Documents and 97counts of viol. Of Sec. 3 (e)of RA3019
December 23,2016 Joint-Resolution was signed by OMBMorales
January 3,2017 Respondent Nieto filed his MR from OMBJoint-Resolution dated December 19,2016
January 3, 2017 Respondent Maglanque filed his MR fromOMBJoint-Resolution dated December 19,2016
January 3,2017 Respondent Janet Lim Napoles filed hisMR from OMB Joint-Resolution datedDecember 19,2016
January 3,2017 Respondent Panlilio filed his [her] MR fromOMBJoint-Resolution dated December 19,2016
January 3,2017 Respondent Apuang filed his MR fromOMBJoint-Resolution dated December 19,2016
January 3,2017 Respondents Jo Christine Napoles andJames Christopher Napoles filed their MRfrom OMB Joint-Resolution datedDecember 19,2016
January 3,2017 Respondent Ronald John Lim filed his[her] MR from OMBJoint-Resolution datedDecember 19,2016
January 3, 2017 Respondent Tuason filed her MR AdCautelam from OMB Joint-Resolutiondated December 19,2016
January 9,2017 Respondent Pangandaman filed his MR(Re: Joint-Resolution dated December 19,2016)
January 11,2017 Respondent Sibayan filed his MR (of theOMBJoint-Resolution dated December 19,2016)
January 12, 2017 Respondent Andaya filed his MR from
/./7)0
172 Dated May 25, 2015
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
January 16,2017 Respondent Relampagos filed his MR fromOMB Joint-Resolution dated December 19,2016
January 16,2017 Respondent Ronald Francisco Lim filed aMotion for Reconsideration andReinvestigation (Re: Joint-Resolution datedDecember 19,2016)
January 16, 2017 Respondent Venancio filed his MR fromOMB Joint-Resolution dated December 19,2016
January 19,2017 Respondent Reynaldo Lim filed his MRfrom OMB Joint-Resolution datedDecember 19,2016
January 20,2017 Respondent Cacananta filed his MR withMotion for Reinvestigation from OMBJoint-Resolution dated December 19,2016
January 20,2017 Respondent Pangandaman filed an UrgentManifestation and Motion (to Supplementhis Motion for Reconsideration)
January 23, 2017 Respondent Dinso, Jr., filed his MR fromOMB Joint-Resolution dated December 19,2016
January 25,2017 Respondent Rodriguez filed his MR (Re:Joint-Resolution dated December 19,2016)
January 25, 2017 Respondent John Raymond De Asis filedhis MR (Re: Joint-Resolution datedDecember 19,2016)
January 25,2017 Respondent Venancio filed his Motion toAdmit with his Amended MR (Re: Joint-Resolution dated December 19,2016)
February 1, 2017 Respondent Venancio filed a Supplementto the MR date[d] January 16, 2017 (Re:Joint-Resolution dated December 19,2016)
February 2, 2017 Respondent Gumafelix filed his MR (Re:Joint-Resolution dated December 19,2016)
February 6,2017 Respondent Relampagos filed aSupplemental MR (Re: Joint-Resolutiondated December 19,2016)
February 17,2017 Respondent Tuason filed a Manifestationand Motion (for full immunity from casesinvolving Janet Lim Napoles, to wit: 1)Sula; 2) Luy; 3) Sunas; 4) Baltazar; 5)Briones; 6) Tuason
February 23, 2017 Respondent Pangandaman filed aReiteratory Motion (RE: UrgentManifestation and Motion dated 202January 2017) (requesting for copies of CA
~/'A
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
and his eo-respondents)March 2, 2017 Respondent Tuason filed a Supplemental
MRMarch 17, 2017 Respondent Tuason filed a Second
Supplement to the MR Ad Cautelam dated03 January 2017
March 20, 2017 Respondent Relampagos filed aConsolidated Very Urgent Motions: 1) ToVisit Due Process in Earnest; and 2) For aBill of Particulars
April 25, 2017 Respondent Relampagos filed a VeryUrgent Motions to Set Case forClarificatory Hearing and/or toConfront/ Cross-Examine theComplainants and/or to RequireComplainants to Answer Interrogatories
May 22,2017 Respondent Re1ampagos filed a Motion toResolve Pending Incident (Re: Very UrgentMotions to Set Case for ClarificatoryHearing and/or to Confront/ Cross-Examine the Complainants and/or toRequire Complainants to AnswerInterrogatories)
June 23,2017 Complainant FIO filed a ConsolidatedComment/ Opposition (For the NominalComplainant)
July 3,2017 Respondent Relampagos filed aManifestation and Further Supplement toMR
August 30, 2017 Joint-Order was issued resolving the MRsof the respondents and therebyrecommending the indictment for 97counts of Malversation of Public Fundsthru Falsification of Public Documents and97 counts of viol. Of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019whilst dismissing the charges of Plunder
September 5,2017 Joint-Order was signed by OMBMoralesDecember 2,2017 Informations for 97 counts of Malversation
of Public Funds thru Falsification of PublicDocuments and 97 counts of viol. Of Sec.3 (el of RA3019 were filed
As can be readily seen from the above chart, afterthe complaints were filed by the NBI and the FIO, theOffice of the Ombudsman took continued actions toresolve the preliminary investigation in these cases.Each of the respondents (nowaccused) was given ampleopportunity to present his/her side and answer theaccusations against him/her through the submission of
/ /'JO
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
their respective counter-affidavits. In fact, these samerespondents (which included accused-movants Panlilioand Pangandaman), moved for several extensions oftime to file their counter-affidavits which were grantedby the Officeof the Ombudsman
The Court notes that the Office of theOmbudsman only took two (2)years and two (2)months[counted from the date of the last pleading filed up tothe Joint Resolution dated December 19, 2016] in CaseNo. OMB-C-C-13-03S7, and one (1)year and twenty-one(21) days in Case No. OMB-C-C-13-0331 to resolve thecomplaints filed by the NBI and FIO which resulted inthe finding of the existence of probable cause againstthe respondents.
Also, the motions for reconsideration, thesupplemental motions for reconsideration and the othermotions filed by the respondents in their bid to have the"Joint Order" dated December 19, 2016, reconsidered,were immediately resolved.
To be sure, the number of the respondentsinvolved, the complexity of the charges againstthem, the motions for extension filed by them, thenumber of days given to the respondents to filetheir counter-affidavits, the various pleadingssubmitted by the respondents which included,among others, supplemental motions forreconsideration, motions requesting copies of co-respondents' counter-affidavits, motions for bill ofparticulars, the period during which the variousdocuments submitted by the respondents wereexamined and reviewed, the time poured into theresearch of pertinent laws and applicablejurisprudence, the levels of review that the caseshad to go through and the exercise of legaljudgment and discretion should all be taken intoconsideration in determining the existence ofinordinate delay. And, after it had done so, theCourt finds that the accused's imputation ofinordinate delay to the Office of the Ombudsmanhas not beenpositively estabZished.173/J
'" Emphasis supplied ~ / A
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17-CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
To repeat, the concept of speedy disposition ofcases is relative and flexible such that a meremathematical reckoning of the time involved is notsufficient to determine the existence of inordinatedelay.t?+ It is consistent with reasonable delays that isattributable to the ordinary processes of justice.P"Thus, particular regard must be taken of the facts andcircumstances peculiar to each case.t?>
As above-shown, the present cases involved numerousrespondents who were given ample opportunity to respond to thecharges against them. Moreover, the records of these cases werevoluminous and the issues involvedwere complex which requireda significant amount of time to resolve soundly. Thus, accused-movant Panlilio cannot seriously claim that the investigatingofficer in these cases should have determined the existence ofprobable cause within ten (10) days from the submission of thecase for resolution. At any rate, the Supreme Court has ruledthat the period provided for in Rule 112 of the Rules of Court ismerely directory. 177
In support of his claim of inordinate delay, accused-movantPangandaman further insists that the preliminary investigationof these cases could have been analyzed and disposed of by theOfficeof the Ombudsman "in. a few months at the most" becausethe factual antecedents of these cases were already summarizedby the Commission on Audit. This same argument was likewisepassed upon by the Court in its assailed Resolution, thus:
Accused-movant Pangandaman further bewailsthat the cases against him could have been easilyresolved by the Office of the Ombudsman because thefacts needed in the determination of probable causewere readily accessible and synthesized by the COA~
174 See Ombudsman v. Jurado, 561 SeRA 135 (200B), Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan 442 see» 294 (2004), Oela k.Pena v. Sandiganbayan, 360 see» 47B (2001), Oonsal v. Fernondez, Sr., 327 SeRA 145 (2000), Magsaysay, et - Val., v. Sandiganbayon, 316 SeRA 65 (1999) and Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan, 220 SeRA 55 (1993)175 See Corpuz v. Sondiganbayan 442 SeRA 294 (2004), Mendoza-Ong v. Sondiganbayan 414 seRA 1B1(2003) - • ~
176 Footnote omitted; pp. 619-632; Vol. XIX, Record; pp. 49-61, Resolution ~ ••m See Raro v. Sandiganbayan, 335 SeRA 581 (2000)
RaolutionCriminal Cases Nos. S8-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
its Special Audit Team Report which was submitted tothe Office of the Ombudsman.
The Court is not persuaded.
It must be remembered that the interest of theCOAis merely administrative and its investigationdoes not foreclose the Ombudsman's authority toinvestigate; neither does a determination ofprobable cause depend upon the findings of theCOA.178In the case of Cabrera v. Marcelo,179theSupreme Court held:
It should be borne in mind that the interestof the COA is solely administrative, and that itsinvestigation does not foreclose theOmbudsman's authority to investigate anddetermine whether there is a crime to beprosecuted for which a public official isanswerable. In Ramos v. Aquino, the Court ruledthat the fact that petitioners' accounts andvouchers had passed in audit is not a ground forenjoining the provincial fiscal from conducting apreliminary investigation for the purpose ofdetermining the criminal liability of petitionersfor malversation. Clearly then, a finding ofprobable cause does not derive its veracityfrom the findings of the COA,but from theindependent determination of theOmbudsman.lBO
Furthermore, the Court finds accused-movantPangandaman's insistence that his repeated requests for his eo-respondents' counter-affidavits would have "expedited" hissubmission of his counter affidavit bereft of merit.
As aptly pointed out by the prosecution, accused-movantPangandaman's reliance on the case of Estrada v. Office of theOmbudsman181 is misplaced due to the fact that the Supreme
~/J)'1)
178 Emphasis supplied179446 SeRA 207 (2004)180 Emphasis supplied; pp. 634-635, Vol. XIX, Record; pp. 63-64, Resolution181748SCRA 1 (2015)
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
Court held in Estrada that a respondent's "right to examine"refers only to the "evidence submitted by the complainant," viz:
Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request forthe counter affidavits of his eo-respondents violates hisconstitutional right to due process. Sen. Estrada,however, fails to specify a law or rule which statesthat it is a compulsory requirement of due process ina preliminary investigation that the Ombudsmanfurnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of hisco-respondents.182 Neither Section 3(b), Rule 112 of theRevised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor Section 4(c), RuleII of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of theOmbudsman supports Sen. Estrada's claim. What theRules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsmanrequire is for the Ombudsman to furnish therespondent with a copy of the complaint and thesupporting affidavits and documents at the time theorder to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to therespondent.ws This is clear from Section 4(b), Rule II ofthe Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsmanwhen it states, "[a]fter such affidavits [of the complainantand his witnesses] have been secured, the investigatingofficer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of theaffidavits and other supporting documents, directing therespondent to submit, within ten (10) days from receiptthereof, his counter-affidavits x x x." At this point, there isstill no counter-affidavit submitted by any respondent.Clearly, what Section 4(b) refers to are affidavits of thecomplainant and his witnesses, not the affidavits of the eo-respondents. Obviously, the counter-affidavits of the eo-respondents are not part of the supporting affidavits of thecomplainant. No grave abuse of discretion can thus beattributed to the Ombudsman for the issuance of the 27March 2014 Order which denied Sen. Estrada's Req~
h1J/-/182 Emphasis supplied183 Emphasis supplied
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. S5-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
Although Section 4(c), Rule 11 of the Rules ofProcedure of the Office of the Ombudsman provides that arespondent "shall have access to the evidence on record,"this provision should be construed in relation to Section4(a) and (b) of the same Rule, as well as to the Rules ofCriminal Procedure. First, Section 4(a) states' that "theinvestigating officer shall require the complainant orsupporting witnesses to execute affidavits to substantiatethe complaint." The "supporting witnesses" are the
.witnesses of the complainant, and do not refer to the eo-respondents.
Second, Section 4(b) states that "the investigatingofficer shall issue an order attaching thereto a copy of the
.affidavits and all other supporting documents, directingthe respondent" to submit his counter-affidavit. Theaffidavits referred to in Section 4(b) are the affidavitsmentioned in Section 4(a). Clearly, the affidavits to befurnished to the respondent are the affidavits of thecomplainant and his supporting witnesses. The provisionin the immediately succeeding Section 4(c) of the sameRule 11that a respondent shall have "access to the evidenceon record" does not stand alone, but should be read inrelation to the provisions of Section 4(a and b) of the sameRule 11requiring the investigating officer to furnish therespondent with the "affidavits and other supportingdocuments" submitted by "the complainant or supportingwitnesses." Thus, a respondent's "access to evidence onrecord" in Section 4(c), Rule 11of the Ombudsman's Rulesof Procedure refers to the affidavits and supportingdocuments of "the complainant or supporting witnesses" inSection 4(a) of the same Rule 11.
Third, Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules ofCriminal Procedure provides that "[t]he respondent shallhave the right to examine the evidence submitted by thecomplainant which he may not have been furnished and tocopy them at his expense." A respondent's right toexamine refers only to "the evidence submitted by thecomplainant. "184/'7/. )!)
184 Emphasis supplied
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
Plainly, accused-movant Pangandaman's insistence for thecopies of the counter-affidavits of his eo-respondent was madewithout legal basis and his repeated refusal to comply with theorder of the Office of the Ombudsman to submit his counter-affidavit naturally contributed to the delay in the proceedingsduring the preliminary investigation of these cases.
On another point, accused-movant Panlilio argues that thereasons given by the Officeof the Ombudsman in its attempt toexplain the purported delay in these cases had been strickendown by the Supreme Court in the case of Coscolluela v.Sandiganbayan.185
To be clear, jurisprudence teaches that courts dealing withspeedy disposition cases must approach the said cases on an adhoc basis. In other words, the facts and circumstances peculiarto the present cases as well as the explanation given by theprosecution must be carefully weighed together in determiningthe existence of inordinate delay. Thus, the explanation adducedby the prosecution in these cases should be scrutinized, studiedand related with the peculiar set of facts in the preliminaryinvestigation of these cases before it can be given merit or bestricken down just like in Cosco llue la. This is what the Courtprecisely did in these cases. It weighed the explanation given bythe prosecution vis-a-vis the factual backdrop of these cases and,after doing so, it found that the purported delay was no morethan what may be reasonably attributable to the normalprocesses ofjustice.
Accused-movants Pangandaman and Panlilio reiterate thatthey were prejudiced by the purported delay in the preliminaryinvestigation of these cases. For accused-movant Panlilio, sheinsists that the one hundred ninety-four (194) cases imputed toher "hangs as a 'Damocles' sword over her head" which showsthe "trial and tribulations she had, and will endure. "186 Foraccused-movant Pangandaman, he asserts that the time spent inthe preliminary investigation of these cases "sufficientlyweakened" any defense he might have had; he has no access tothe documents that may be relevant for his defense; and, it mayr:
t1J185701 seRA 188 (2013)186 p. 692, Vol. XIX, Record
/.
.a.oruetonCriminal Cases Nos. 8B-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et aL
be difficult for him to procure witness who could testify on hisbehalf. 187
The Court remains unpersuaded.
In its assailed Resolution promulgated on August 20, 2018,the Court held that [1] any anxiety or unrest that the accusedmay have experienced during the pendency of the cases againstthem are natural inconveniences that confront any accused in acriminal case and [2] the accused-movants failed to adduce anyproof of the prejudice which they purportedly suffered during thepreliminary investigation of these cases, thus:
On the anxiety and unrest allegedly suffered byaccused-movants Pangandaman and Panli1io, suffice itto state that any anxiety, suffering, mental andemotional stress due to the uncertainties brought aboutby the pending charges against an accused areunwelcome but attendant inconveniences that confrontany respondent or any accused in a criminal case.
Also, the said accused-movants miserably failed todemonstrate the kind of anxiety that they purportedlysuffered during the preliminary investigation of thiscase. It has been opined that the nature and degree ofthe anxiety and unrest due to the delay in thedisposition of a case against an accused must beoppressive, unnecessary and notoriouslydisproportionate to the nature of the criminal charge forit to constitute a violation of the accused's right tospeedy trial. 188
In Corpuz v. Sandfganbayan,189 the Supreme Court heldthat prejudice should be assessed in the light of the followinginterests of the accused: r 11 to prevent oppressive pre-trialincarceration; r21 to minimize anxiety and concerns of theaccused to trial; and, [3] to limit the possibility that his/her
.;: See separate concurring oplnlon of Justice Josue N. BelosUlo in ••• ",. v. ' ••••••• 400 SeRA 26/1(2003); pp. 633-634, Vol. XIX, Record; pp. 62-63, Resolution ~ ~1It442SCRA 294 (2004) ~ •., /" U
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
defense will be impaired.I''? Thus, the mere fact that accused-movant Panlilio is indicted for ninety-seven (97) counts forviolation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 and ninety-seven (97)counts of malversation of public funds through falsification ofpublic documents is not sufficient to hold that she was prejudicedby the supposed delay in the preliminary investigation of thesecases.
Also, accused-movant Pangandaman's assertion that he isunable to gather evidence in support of his defense and will bedifficult for him to procure witnesses remains unsubstantiated.In fact, he has not even identified who these potential witnesseswould be.
In the same vein, the Court held in its assailed Resolutionthat the above-mentioned accused-movants belatedly raised theissue of inordinate delay.191 In the relatively recent case ofCagang v. Sandiganbayan,192 the Supreme Court teaches thatthe right to speedy disposition of cases is usually invoked by anaccused [or respondent) to any type of proceeding once the delayhad become prejudicial to him/her; hence, assuming arguendothat the said accused-movants were indeed prejudiced by thealleged delay in the preliminary investigation of these cases, theyshould have raised the same issue at the earliest instance. 193
Moreover, accused-movant Panlilio's insistence that theconcept of delito continuado should be applied to the casesagainst her fails to persuade. Again, the Court has ruled on thesame issue in its questioned Resolution in this wise:
The concept of "continued crime" or deliiocontinuado is defined as a continued or continuingsingle crime, consisting of a series of acts arising fromone criminal resolution. 194 It may refer to (1)a PIU/?
190 See Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, 442 SCRA294 (2004) /.~ A1191 p. 633, Vol. XIX, Record; p. 62, Resolution192 G.R. No. 206438; July 31, 2018 •. ~.193 See cagang v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 206458, July 31,2018; Perez v. People, 544 SCRA532 (2008),citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 US 514 (1972)194 Amurao, Commentaries on Criminal Law, First Edition, 2013; People v. Sandiganbayan, 447 SeRA 291(2004); Paera v. People, 649 SeRA 384 (2011)
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
of acts performed during a period of time;195 or [2]several crimes but in reality there is only one crime inthe mind of the perpetrator .196
A reading of the Joint Order dated December19, 2016,197of the Office of the Ombudsman revealsthat the alZeged siphoning of thePhp900,000,000.00 Malampaya Fund was notmade in a single instance but on differentoccasions which included, among others, accused-movant Nieto's alZeged participation when he"hastily acted on the 97 letter-requests and theNGOs questionable project proposals without evenvalidating them; entered into the highly irregularMOAsprior to the issuance of the SARO;certified inthe obligation slips that the incurred obligationswere necessary, lawful and under his directsupervision; and approved the disbursementsrelative thereto. "198
Similarly, accused-rnovant Panlilio's participationin the questioned transactions was not made at a singleinstance. In the said joint order, the Office of theOmbudsman found that accused-movant Panliliocountersigned various checks and disbursementvouchers, in her capacity as Undersecretary of theFMAO of the DAR, in order to facilitate the purportedtransfer of the Php900,OOO,OOO.OOMalampaya fund tothe NGOs allegedly operated by accused Napoles.
As aptly pointed out by the prosecution, thesepurported criminal acts of the accused-movantscannot be said to have been "continuous" and/orarose from a single criminal intent because theseacts were committed on different occasions.199Infact, each count of a violation of Section 3 (e) ofR.A. No. 3019 and malversation of public fundsthrough falsification of public documents issupported by its own set of checks, disbursemen~
195 Santiago v. Garchitorena, 228 SCRA214 (1993), citing p. 520, Aquino, Revised Penal Code, £S7 ed. '196 Santiago v. Garchitorena, 228 SCRA214 (1993), citing p. 102, Guevarra, commen.taries on the ~Revised Penal Code, 1957 ed. ,/197 pp. 16-140, Vol. I, Record -r:198 p. 68-69, Id; Emphasis supplied / ' •.199 Emphasis supplied
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
vouchers and purported falsified documents.200Thus, the Court is of the view that the delictual actsalleged in the Informations in the one hundred ninety-four (194) cases against the accused-movants were notthe result of a single criminal intent but constituteindependent acts which may be consummated on itsown.201
On the alleged "arbitrariness" of the Office of theOmbudsman in indicting accused-movant Panlilio of the crimesherein charged, it must be noted that the said issue was alsosquarely passed upon by the Court in its questioned Resolutionpromulgated on August 20,2018, to wit:
Accused-movant Panlilio argues that her right toequal protection of the laws was violated when her eo-respondents, Nilda P. Baui and Dominador V. Sison,Jr., were exonerated by the Office of the Ombudsmandue to insufficiency of evidence. However, she wasindicted for the crimes herein charged despite the factthe there is no substantial distinction between thedefenses invoked by them.
The Court finds the said argument puerile.
In People v. Dumlao,202 respondent Dumlaolikewise claimed that his prosecution, to the exclusionof his eo-respondents, constituted unfair discriminationand violated his constitutional right to equal protectionof the law.203In rejecting his argument, the SupremeCourt ratiocinated that the manner in which theprosecution of a case is handled rests within thesound discretion of the prosecutor, and the non-inclusion of other guilty persons is irrelevant to thecase against the accused.204 Citing the case~
200 Emphasis supplied dl201 See People v. Ledesma, 73 SeRA 77 (1976); People v, Dichupa, 3 SeRA 327 (1961); People v.Sendaydlego, 81 see» 120 (1978); People v. Madgrlgal-Gonzales, 7 SeRA 942 (1963); pp. 641-642, Vol. XIX,Record; pp. 70-71, Resolution . .. ~202580 SeRA 409 (2009) ~ .'203 p. 433, People v. Dumlao, 580 SeRA 409 (2009)204 p. 433, People v. Dumlao, 580 SeRA 409 (2009); Emphasis supplied
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. 8B-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
Santos v. People205 and People v. Dela Piedra,206 theHigh Tribunal explained in Dumlao, to wit:
The prosecution of one guilty person whileothers equally guilty are not prosecuted,however, is not, by itself, a denial of the equalprotection of the laws. Where the official actionpurports to be in conformity to the statutoryclassification, an erroneous or mistakenperformance of the statutory duty, although aviolation of the statute, is not without more adenial of the equal protection of the laws. Theunlawful administration by officers of a statutefair on its face, resulting in its unequalapplication to those who are entitled to betreated alike, is not a denial of equal protectionunless there is shown to be present in it anelement of intentional or purposefuldiscrimination. This may appear on the face ofthe action taken with respect to a particularclass or person, or it may only be shown byextrinsic evidence showing a discriminatorydesign over another not to be inferred from theaction itself. But a discriminatory purpose isnot presumed, there must be a showing of"clear and intentional discrimination. "207Appellant has failed to show that, in chargingappellant in court, that there was a "clear andintentional discrimination" on the part of theprosecuting officials.
The discretion of who to prosecutedepends on the prosecution's sound assessmentwhether the evidence before it can justify areasonable belief that a person has committedan offense. The presumption is that theprosecuting officers regularly performed theirduties, and this presumption can beovercome only by proof to the contrary, notby mere speculation.208 Indeed, appellant hasnot presented any evidence to overcome thispresumption. The mere allegation that appellant,a Cebuana, was charged with the commissi~
206 350 scs» 163 (2001) ~;t[)207 Emphasis supplied in the original text /- '208 Emphasis supplied in the original text
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
a crime, while a Zamboanguefia, the guilty partyin appellant's eyes, was not, is insufficient tosupport a conclusion that the prosecutionofficers denied appellant equal protection of thelaws.
There is also common sense practicality insustaining appellant's prosecution.
While all persons accused of crime areto be treated on a basis of equality before thelaw, it does not follow that they are to beprotected in the commission of crime.209 Itwould be unconscionable, for instance, toexcuse a defendant guilty of murder becauseothers have murdered with impunity. Theremedy for unequal enforcement of the law insuch instances does not lie in theexoneration of the guilty at the expense ofsociety x x x.210 Protection of the law will beextended to all persons equally in the pursuit oftheir lawful occupations, but no person has theright to demand protection of the law in thecommission of a crime.
Likewise, [i]f the failure of prosecutors toenforce the criminal laws as to some personsshould be converted into a defense for otherscharged with crime, the result would be that thetrial of the district attorney for nonfeasancewould become an issue in the trial of manypersons charged with heinous crimes and theenforcement of law would suffer a completebreakdown.
It is jurisprudentially settled that the discretion who toprosecute lies on the prosecution's sound assessment whetherthe evidence before it can justify a reasonable belief that a personhas committed an offense.s!' In this case, except for her bareallegation, accused-movant Panlilio failed to present any evidence
~
/.;1209 Emphasis supplied in the original text210 Emphasis supplied in the original text211 See Alvarez v. People, 677 SeRA 673 (2012)
RaolutfonCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
that there was a "clear and intentional discrimination" on the partof the Office of the Ombudsman in filing the present casesagainst her.
Contrary to the claim of the herein accused-movants, in itsquestioned Resolution, the Court assessed the allegationsappearing in the Informations of these cases, excluding mattersaliunde, and ruled that the facts charged in the subjectInformations constitute offenses; conform to the prescribed form;and, sufficiently apprise the accused of the nature and cause ofthe accusations against them, thus:
To begin with, a motion to quash an Information isa mode by which an accused assails the validity of acriminal complaint or Information filed against him/herfor insufficiency on its face in point of law, or fordefects which are apparent in the face of theInformation. 212 Jurisprudence teaches that thedeterminative test in appreciating a motion to quash onthe ground of insufficiency of the allegations in theInformation is that whether the facts alleged therein, ifhypothetically admitted, would establish the essentialelements of the offense as defined by law withoutconsidering matters aliunde.o»
Thus, the Court shall now proceed to assess thesufficiency of the allegations in the Informations of thesecases vis-a-vis the elements of the crimes chargedagainst the accused excluding matters aliunde.
The Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. SB-17-CRM-2202 to 2298, which charge the accused withviolation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, on ninety-seven (97) counts, are similarly worded except for theNGOs allegedly benefitted, amounts involved, the localgovernment units (LGUs) which purportedly wrote aletter-request, and, the names of the mayors of the saidLGUS./?
.Io.- .~ ~
213 See People v. Odtuhon, 701 seRA 506 (2013); Go v. 8ongko Sentrol ng Plllplnos, 604 seRA 322 (2009);.Lozorte v. SGndlgonboyon, 581 seRA 431 (2009); and, People v. Romuoldez ond Sondlgonboyon, 559 SeRA492 (2008), Cobrero v. Sondlgonboyon, 441 sce« 377 (2004)
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
The elements of a violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A.No. 3019 as follows:
1. The accused is a public officer or a privateperson charged in conspiracy with him;
2. Said public officer commits the prohibitedacts during the performance of his officialduties or in relation to his public position;
3. He causes undue injury to any party,whether the government or private party;
4. Such undue injury is caused by givingunwarranted benefits, advantage orpreference to such parties; and,
5. The public officer has acted with manifestpartiality, evident bad faith or grossinexcusable negligence.214
The hereinbefore quoted Information, and the otherInformations in its kindred cases, specifically allegesthat [1] accused Andaya, Jr., Relampagos,Pangandaman, Nieto, Panlilio, Cacananta and Venanciowere public officers at the time material to this case; [2]they were discharging administrative and/ or officialfunctions at the time of the questioned transactions; [3]they conspired with private individuals Janet Napoles,Jo Napoles, James Napoles, Reynald Lim, Tuason, DeLeon, Ronald Lim, John Lim, Rodriguez, Gumafelix, DeAsis, Galay, Garro, Dinso, Jr., Apuang, Sibayan,Maglanque and Villanueva; [4]while in the performanceof their official functions, they acted with manifestpartiality, evident bad faith and/or gross inexcusablenegligence; and, [5] the collective participation of all theaccused in the transactions in issue caused undueinjury to the government or gave unwarranted benefits,advantage or preference to a private party.
_____ s_i_m_l_·l_ar_l_y_,_theInformations in Criminal Cases NO~
214 Mendoza-Arce v. Office 0/ the Ombudsman, 380 SeRA 325 (2002) / /
.-/f:: ~
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
8B-17 -CRM-2299 to 2395, which charge the accusedwith malversation of public funds through falsification ofpublic documents on ninety-seven (97) counts, aresimilarly worded except for the NGOs involved,amounts purportedly disbursed, alleged LGU whichissued a letter-request; and, the purported falsifieddocuments.
The following are the elements of the complexcrime of malversation of public funds throughfalsification of public documents under Article 217 inrelation to paragraph 2, Article 171 of the RevisedPenal Code, to wit:
1. The offender be a public officer, employee ornotary public;
2. That he had custody or control of funds orproperty by reason of the duties of hisoffice;215
3. That those funds or property were publicfunds or property for which he wasaccountable;216
4. That he took, misappropriated or consentedor, through abandonment or negligence,permitted another person to take them;217
5. That the offender takes advantage of hisofficial position;218and,
6. That the offender falsifies a document bycausing it to appear that the persons haveparticipated in any act or proceeding whenthey in fact did not so participate.v-?
A reading of the Informations in Criminal Cases
215 Zoleta v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), 764 SeRA 110 (2015)216 Id217 Id
218 Gull/ergan v. People, 641 SeRA 511 (2011)219 Gull/ergan v. People, 641 SeRA 511 (2011)
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. 8B-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
Nos. SB-17-CRM-2299 to 2395 likewise shows thatthey specifically allege that [1] accused Andaya, Jr.,Relampagos, Pangandaman, Nieto, Panlilio, Cacananta,Venancio were public officers at the time material tothese cases; [2] they were accountable public officersand/or had custody and control of the public funds inissue; [3] they allegedly conspired with privateindividuals Janet Napoles, Jo Napoles, James Napoles,Reynald Lim, Tuason, De Leon, Ronald Lim, John Lim,Rodriguez, Gumafelix, De Asis, Galay, Garro, Dinso,Jr., Apuang, Sibayan, Maglanque, and Villanueva; [4]through the concerted efforts of all the accused, thesaid public officers appropriated, took and/ ormisappropriated or consented, or throughabandonment or negligence, permitted another personto take the said public funds; [5] the said public officerstook advantage of their official positions; and, [6] thesaid public funds were misappropriated bymanufacturing and/or falsifying certain publicdocuments.
Applying settled jurisprudence as well as theprovisions of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of CriminalProcedure, the Court finds that the elements ofviolation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 and thecomplex crime of malversation of public funds throughfalsification of public documents are properly alleged inthe Informations of the present cases.
In their further attempt to have the cases againstthem dismissed, accused-movants James Napoles, JoNapoles, Janet Napoles, Ronald Lim and Villanuevacontend that the Informations against them do notconform substantially to the prescribed form allegedlybecause they fail to state in ordinary and conciselanguage the acts or omissions complained of asconstituting an offense.
On the other hand, accused-movant Andaya, Jr.,claims that the allegations set forth in the Informationsagainst him are "ambiguous" and "vague" which renderhim unable to intelligently enter his plea duringarraignment.~
~/
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
The Court does not find merit in the above-mentioned contentions.
Generally, the fact that the allegations in theInformation do not constitute an offense, or that theInformation does not conform substantially to theprescribed form, are defects curable by amendment. Insuch cases, jurisprudence instructs that the outrightdismissal of a case without giving first opportunity tothe prosecution to amend the apparent defect in theInformation is proscribed.v-?
At any rate, the Court holds that the subjectInformations need not be amended because theyconform substantially to the form prescribed by theRevised Rules of Criminal Procedure and theysufficiently apprise the accused of the cause andnature of the accusations against them.
The sufficiency of the allegations in anInformation is determined pursuant to the followingprovisions of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of CriminalProcedure, viz:
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint orinformation. - A complaint or information issufficient if it states the name of the accused;the designation of the offense given by thestatute; the acts or omissions complained ofas constituting the offense; the name of theoffended party; the approximate date of thecommission of the offense; and the placewhere the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more thanone person, all of them shall be included in thecomplaint or information.
Section 8. Designation of the offense. - Thecomplaint or information shall state thedesignation of the offense given by thestatute, aver the acts or omission constituting
0(2014) citing People v. P1Q77 (1963) ~
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. 8B-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
the offense, and specify its qualifying andaggravating circumstances. If there is nodesignation of the offense, reference shall be madeto the section or subsection of the statutepunishing it.
Section 9. Cause of the Accusation. - Theacts or omission complained of asconstituting the offense and the qualifying andaggravating circumstances must be stated inordinary and concise language and notnecessarily in the language used in thestatute but in terms sufficient to enable aperson of common understanding to knowwhat offense is being charged as well as itsqualifying and aggravating circumstances and forthe court to pronounce judgment.221
Applying the aforesaid provisions, the SupremeCourt has consistently held that the allegations in theInformation must be in such form as is sufficient toenable a person of common understanding to knowwhat offense is intended to be charged and enable thecourt to know the proper judgment.222 In other words,the Information must allege clearly and accurately statethe ultimate facts and circumstances which aredetermined by reference to the definition and elementsof the specific crimes charged.223
The main purpose of requiring the elements of acrime to be set out in the Information is simply to enablethe accused to suitably prepare his/her defensebecause he / she is presumed to have no independentknowledge of the facts that constitute the offenseagainst him/her.224
As above discussed, the elements of the cnmescharged against the accused are aptly alleged in the
zzz See Quimvel v, People, G.R. No. 214497, April 18, 2017; Andoyo v. People, 493 SCRAS3~"'f.bv. Sandiganbayan, 396 SeRA 443 (2003); Lazarte, Jr., v. Sandiganbayan, 581 SeRA 4!JA2009); Miranda v.Sandiganbayan,464 scs« 165 (2005) ~.223 Quimvel v. People, G.R. No. 214497, Apri/18, 2017 .,/" •224 Quimvel v. People, G.R. No. 214497, Apri/18, 2017
.•...""Criminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
factual allegations in the Informations in these cases.
Going now to the issue of sufficiency of form, aplain reading of the present Informations will show thatthe acts and/or omissions complained of are alleged inplain, ordinary and concise language. In fact, thespecific participation of all the accused in the allegedMalampaya Fund Scam are outlined in detail in each ofthe Informations in these cases. The acts or omissionsimputed to accused-movants Andaya, Jr., JamesNapoles, Jo Napoles, Janet Napoles, Ronald Lim andVillanueva are as follows:
(a) Andaya approved. the request of DAR, throughNieto for NINE HUNDRED MILLION [PESOS](P900,OOO,OOO.00)from the Malampaya Funddespite the lack of any clear basis for thespecified amount; and approved and signedSpecial Allotment Release Order (SARO)No. E-09-08417 and Pangandaman's request for theissuance of the Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA-BMB-E-09-0024816) even prior to the reviewthereof by DBM Budget and ManagementBureau-E Director Nora C. Oliveros anddespite the latter's observations on the lack of·supporting documents;
(i) Napoles used AHPI as a fund conduit for theTEN MILLIONPESOS (P10,000,OOO.00)for thepurported implementation of a ghost andinexistent project through the indispensableparticipation and cooperation of Jo ChristiDe,James, Ronald, Reynald, John, De Leon,Rodriguez, Gumafellx, De Asis, Galay, Garro,Dinso, Apuang and Sibayan, who forgedsignatures and fabricated documents toconceal the fictitious nature of the transaction,which documents were used to request saidamount from the DAR, receive thecorresponding check for the amount, andliquidated the same; paid commissions and/ orkickbacks to Pangandaman (throughMaglanque), Nieto, Panlilio and Tuason inreturn for the [sic] their acts in facilitating therelease of the TEN MILLION PESOSr:/. AJ
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. 8B-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
-64-
x -- -------- --------------------------------- ----------------x
(PIO,OOO,OOO.OO);and appropriated a portionthereof for herself and caused the transfer invarious amounts to different bank accounts ofvarious entities and individuals; and
m Villanueva facilitated the illegal diversion ofthe TEN MILLIONPESOS (PIO,OOO,OOO.OO)byallowing AFPHI to open a bank account inMetrobank despite questionable submitteddocuments for the opening thereof andallowing irregular withdrawals and transfersfrom the said account upon clearing of thedeposited check.225
Contrary to accused-movant Andaya, Jr.'sallegation, an objective and careful reading of the onehundred ninety-four (194) Informations in these casesreveals that there is nothing ambiguous or confusing inthe allegations therein against him. To be clear, thesubject Informations plainly allege that [1] accused-movant Andaya, Jr., committed the offenses charged inrelation to his office, being then the Secretary of theDBM; [2] he conspired with certain public officers andprivate individuals to willfully, unlawfully and criminallycause undue injury to the government and/ or giveunwarranted benefits, advantage and preference tocertain non-government organizations operated and/orcontrolled by accused Janet Lim Napoles; [3] he actedwith manifest partiality, evident bad faith and/or grossinexcusable negligence; [4] he approved the request ofDAR, through accused-movant Nieto, for NINEHUNDRED MILLION (P900,000,000.00) from theMalampaya Fund despite the lack of any clear basis forthe specified amount; and approved and signed SpecialAllotment Release Order (SARO) No. E-09-08417 andaccused-movant Pangandaman's request for theissuance of the Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA-BMB-E-09-0024816) even prior to the review thereof by DBMBudget and Management Bureau-E Director Nora C.Oliveros and despite the latter's observations on the lackof supporting documents; [5] he willfully, unlawfully andfeloniously took or misappropriated and/or allowed thetaking or misappropriation of certain amounts /'7
225 The specific portion in the allegations in the Informations of these cases are similarly worded except for the HNGO purportedly used as a fund conduit and the amount involved. / ," U
••
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17-CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
disregarding applicable laws, rules, regulations andstandard operating procedures and making it appearthat the public fund was used to fund a rehabilitationproject for specified beneficiaries in a certain LGU; and,[6] the alleged scheme was further perpetrated by themanufacture and falsification of various publicdocuments.
Indeed, the factual allegations appearing in thepresent Informations sufficiently comply with therequirements of Sections 6, 8 and 9, Rule 110 of theRevised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Thus, the Courtholds that these allegations adequately apprise theaccused of the nature and cause of the accusationagainst them.
It bears appropriate to stress that anInformation is required to state only the ultimatefacts, or those facts which the expected evidencewill support. 226 Matters of evidence and otherdetails, i.e., the facts supporting the ultimate factsas well as the finer details of why and how thecrime was committed, do not need to be alleged inan Information.227 In People v. Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision),228the Supreme Court ruled, viz:
For as long as the ultimate facts constituting theoffense have been alleged, an Information charging aviolation of Section 3(e) of RANo. 3019 need not state,to the point of specificity, the exact amount ofunwarranted benefit granted nor specify, quantify orprove, to the point of moral certainty, the undue injurycaused. We have consistently and repeatedly held ina number of cases that an Information need onlystate the ultimate facts constituting the offenseand not the finer details of why and how the crimewas committed.229
As alleged in the Information, theunwarranted benefit was the privilege granted byCastillo to the Arciagas to operate the dumpsite
5) /J227 Enr/le v. People, 766 seRA 1 (2015); Emphasis supplied228770 SeRA 162 (2015)229 Footnote omitted; Emphasis supplied
/. A
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17-CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
without the need to comply with the applicablelaws, rules, and regulations; the undue injurybeing residents and students were made to endurethe ill-effects of the illegal operation. The detailsrequired by the Sandiganbayan (such as thespecific peso amount actually received by theArciagas as a consequence of the illegal operationof the subject dumpsite or the specific extent ofdamage caused to the residents and students) arematters of evidence best raised during the trial;they need not be stated in the Information. Forpurposes of informing the accused of the crimecharged, the allegation on the existence ofunwarranted benefits and undue injury under theInformation suffices.230
The afore-quoted portions of the Court's assailed Resolution,manifestly show that the Court enumerated the allegationsagainst each of the accused in these cases uis-a-uis the elementsof the crimes charged against them, excluding matters aliunde,and held that the allegations in the present Informationssufficiently charge the offenses levelledagainst them.
Similarly, the Court has ruled in its impugned Resolutionthat there is nothing ambiguous or confusing in the allegationsappearing in the Informations against accused-movant Andaya,Jr., thereby foreclosing the need for a bill of particulars.
Notably, the details required by accused-movant Andaya,Jr., such as how the conspiracy was committed; when the allegedconspiracy took place; his particular acts in furtherance of thealleged conspiracy; the manner by which he allegedly approvedthe request of the DAR; the facts that will justify the conclusionthat the action of accused Nieto on the request of the DAR wasdone for, and on behalf of, accused Andaya, Jr; the standardoperating procedures, rules and regulations that were allegedlyviolated by accused Andaya; his specific involvement infalsification of documents; and, the list of persons who allegedlyfalsified certain documents and the documents allegedly falsifiedrefer to how and in what manner he allegedly participated in thequestioned transactions./?
EO pp. 605-606, Vol. XIX, Record; pp.34-47, Resolution M/
RaolutfonCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
To the mind of the Court, the above matters need not bespecifically alleged in the present Informations because anInformation. need only state the ultimate facts, or those factswhich the expected evidence will support.v-! It does not refer tothe details of probative matter or particulars of evidence bywhich these material elements are to be established.232 It onlyrefers to the facts that the evidence will prove during trial. 233
Moreover, contrary to the claim of accused-movants JamesNapoles and Jo Napoles, Section 10, Rule 110 of the RevisedRules of Criminal Procedure provides that an Information. issufficient if it can be understood from the allegations therein thatthe offense was committed or some of its essential ingredientsoccurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the Court,unless the particular place constitutes an essential element ofthe offense charged. Likewise, Section 11 of the same ruleprovides that it is not necessary to state in the Information. theprecise date the offense was committed except when it is amaterial ingredient of the offense.s='
In these cases, accused-movants James Napoles and JoNapoles are charged with having committed a violation of Section3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 and malversation of public funds throughfalsification. of public documents sometime in 2009 to 2010,within the Philippines, which is within the jurisdiction of thisCourt. Applying Section 10 and 11, Rule 110 of the RevisedRules of Criminal Procedure, the Court holds that the precisedate, time and place of their purported participation in thequestioned transactions need not be stated with specificity sincethese details are not material ingredients of the offenses chargedagainst them.
On accused-movant Janet Napoles' assertion that shecannot be held liable for the crimes charged against her becauseshe is a private individual who is not an accountable publicofficer, the Court already held in its questioned Resolutionpromulgated on August 20, 2018, to wi~
231 Enrllev. People, 766 SCRA 1 (2015) . It232/d »>:mid ~ ••234 People v. Delfln, 729 SCRA617 (2014)
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
In People v. Go,235 the Supreme Courtemphasized that private persons, when acting inconspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, iffound guilty, held liable for the offenses under Section3 of R.A. No. 3019. The High Tribunal ratiocinated thatthis is consistent with the avowed policy of the Anti-Graft Law to repress certain acts of public officers andprivate persons alike which constitute graft and corruptpractices or those which may lead thereto.236
Moreover, the case of Zoleta v.Sandiganbayan,237 teaches that a public officer whois not in charge of public funds or property or evena private individual may be held liable formalversation or iZZegal use of public funds orproperty if such private individual conspires withan accountable public officer to commit the saidcrime.238
Thus, accused-movants Jo Napoles, JamesNapoles, Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald Lim andVillanueva cannot validly contend that they cannot beindicted for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019and the complex crime of malversation of public fundsthrough falsification of public documents on the groundthat the aforementioned crimes require that theoffender be a public officer. To be sure, theInformations in these cases specificaZZy aZZegethatthey conspired with certain public officers inpurportedly committing the afore-mentionedcrimes. 239
In its challenged Resolution, the Court refused to make adeterminative finding on accused-rnovants' allegation of the lackof proof of conspiracy between them upon the followingratiocination=;-;
~'~See People v. Go, 719 SeRA 704 (2014) /237764 see» 110 (2015)238 See ZoletQ V. Sandiganbayan, 764 SeRA 110 (2015); Barriga v. Sandiganbayan, 457 seRA 301 (2005);Emphasis supplied239 pp. 636, Vol. XIX, Record; p. 65, Resolution; Emphasis supplied
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17-CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
In People v. CastiZZo,240 the High Tribunal, citingthe case of Go v. Sandiganbayan,241 reiterated that itis premature at this early stage of the proceedings forthe Court to rule on the presence or absence of theelements of the crime charged, thus:
Moreover, it was clearly premature onthe part of the Sandiganbayan to make adeterminative finding prior to the parties'presentation of their respective evidence thatthere was no bad faith and manifestpartiality on the respondents' part and undueinjury on the part of the complainant. In Go v.Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan,242we heldthat "it is well established that the presenceor absence of the elements of the crime isevidentiary in nature and is a matter ofdefense that may be best passed upon after afull-blown trial on the merits. 'r.l43 Also, it wouldbe unfair to expect the prosecution to present allthe evidence needed to secure the conviction ofthe accused upon the filing of the informationagainst the latter. The reason is found in thenature and objective of a preliminaryinvestigation. Here, the public prosecutors do notdecide whether there is evidence beyondreasonable doubt of the guilt of the personcharged; they merely determine whether there issufficient ground to engender a well-foundedbelief that a crime has been committed and thatrespondent is probably guilty thereof, and shouldbe held for trial.
240 590 scn« 95 (2009)241521 scs« 270 (2007)242521 scs« 270 (2007)243 Emphasis supplied244 See Singian, Jr., v. Sandiganbayan, 706 SeRA 451 (2013); People v. Go, 719 SeRA 704 (2014); People v.Dumlao, 580 SeRA 409 (2009); Go v. Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division), 521 SeRA 270 (2007); Heirs of the LateNestor Trla v. Ob/as, 636 SeRA 91 (2010)
Likewise, accused-movants Cacananta, JamesNapoles, Jo Napoles, Ronald Lim, Janet Napoles andVillanueva's assertion of lack of proof of conspiracybetween them and their eo-accused is also a matter ofdefense and is evidentiary in nature. The truth thereof isbest passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.s+'Jurisprudence teaches that courts need not make a
~»:
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. 8B-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
determinative finding regarding the existence or non-existence of conspiracy among the accused at this stageof the proceedings. Thus, in Go v. Sandiganbayan(Fifth Division),245 the Supreme Court ruled:
Following these truisms, the specific actsof petitioner Go in the alleged conspiracywith Rivera in violating Section 3(g) of RA3019 as well as the details on how petitionerGo had taken part in the planning andpreparation of the alleged conspiracy neednot be set forth in the Information as theseare evidentiary matters and, as such, are tobe shown and proved during the trial on themerits.246 Indeed, it bears stressing that "[t]oestablish conspiracy, direct proof of anagreement concerning the commission of a felonyand the decision to commit it is not necessary. Itmay be inferred from the acts of the accusedbefore, during or after the commission of thecrime which, when taken together, would beenough to reveal a community of criminal design,as the proof of conspiracy is frequently made byevidence of a chain of circumstances. Onceestablished, all the conspirators are criminallyliable as eo-principals regardless of the degree ofparticipation of each of them, for incontemplation of the law the act of one is the actof all.247
Moreover, the Court rules that the following argumentspresented by the herein accused-movants are all matters ofdefense and are evidentiary in nature which should be threshedout during trial on the merits:
1. Accused-movant Ronald Lim's submission on his lackof participation in the questioned transactions due to theadmissions of the whistleblowers that the alleged forgeries in thedocuments pertaining to MABCIFIwere not done by him;
2. Accused-movant Nieto's claim that there is no evidence
/7~
/~
245521 see» 270 (2007)246 Emphasis supplied247 pp. 637-639, Vol. XIX, Record; pp. 65-68, Resolution
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
that he met with separate individuals or entities for eachmemorandum of agreement signed by him and every checkreleased by his office;
3. Accused-movant Nieto's assertion that there IS noproof that he took part in the improper implementation of thequestioned transactions;
4. Accused-movant Panlilio's claim that she only signedforty-five(45) checks which are the subject of these cases;
5. Accused-movant Panlilio's assertion that she regularlyperformed her officialfunctions; and,
6. Accused-movant James Christopher Napoles and JoChristine Napoles' submission that they could not have possiblyknown the specific documents forged and where and when thesaid forgeries were committed.
To repeat, the validity or merits of a party's defense and/ oraccusation, and the admissibility of testimonies and evidence ofthe parties are all evidentiary in nature.s'"
Finally, the Court holds that accused-movant Nieto'sinsistence on a violation of his right against double jeopardy ispuerile.
In its questioned Resolution promulgated on August 20,2018, the Court ruled that what is prohibited is the prosecutionfor the same offense and not the prosecution for the same act,thus:
(l) Right against double jeopardy
The rule on double jeopardy prohibits the identityof the elements of the crimes in two (2)offenses. What isprohibited is the prosecution for the s~~ o!{ense noy;
an, 478 SCRA348 (2005); 500;>1<0 "nllever v. Tan, 7155CRA 36 (2014), J.4.United Coconut Planters Bank v. Looyuko, 534 SCRA322 (2007), People v. Yecyec 739 SCRA 719 (2014), Clay '0and Feather International, Inc. v. Llchaytoo, 649 SCRA 516 (2011) and Lee v. KBC Bank N.V., 610 SCRA 117(2010)
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
In these cases, the accused-movant's invocation ofdouble jeopardy is baseless because none of them hasbeen found guilty or acquitted of the offenses charged.Neither has there been a prior case involving the samecharges as those of the present cases which wasterminated without their consent.
Furthermore, the Court finds that there 1S noduplicity of charges in these cases.
In Nierras v. Dacucuy,250the Supreme Court,citing the case of People v. Milflores,251held that thefiling of several charges against an accused which arosefrom one criminal act may validly occur.252 Statedotherwise, a single criminal act may give rise to amultiplicity of offenses when there are differencesbetween the elements of an offense in one law andin another and it is not unusual that a single act orincident might offend two {2} or more entirelydistinct and/or unrelated provisions of the law.253In such cases, there will be no double jeopardy becausewhat the rule on double jeopardy prohibits is theidentity of the elements of the crime in two (2)offenses,254to wit:
While the filing of the two sets ofInformation under the provisions of BatasPambansa Bilang 22 and under the provisions ofthe Revised Penal Code, as amended, on estafa,may refer to identical acts committed bypetitioner, the prosecution thereof cannot belimited to one offense, because a single criminalact may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses andwhere there is variance or differences betweenthe elements of an offense in one law and anotherlaw as in the case at bar there will be no doublejeopardy because what the rule on dOU~
249 See Nlerras v. Dacuycuy, 181 SeRA 1 (1990); People v. Milllores, 115 SeRA 570 (1982) ftb250 181 see» 1 (1990) ~251115 scs« 570 (1982) •252 Sorlano v. People, 591 SeRA 244 (2009) •253Sorlano v. People, 591 SeRA 244 (2009); Emphasis supplied254 See Rlmando v. Aldaba, 732 SeRA 232 (2014); People v. Cresencla Reyes, 228 SCRA 13 (1993); People v.Miraflores, 115 SCRA570 (1982); Nierras v. Dacuycuy, 181 SeRA 1 (1990)
.. ~.. ••• i1df.n
Criminal Cases Nos. S8-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elementsin the two (2) offenses. Otherwise statedprosecution for the same act is not prohibited.What is forbidden is prosecution for thesame offense. Hence, the mere filing of the two (2)sets of information does not itself give rise todouble jeopardy (People v. Miraflores, 115 SeRA570).255
In sum, the Court finds no new and substantial matter thatcould warrant a reconsideration of the Court's assailed Resolutionpromulgated on August 20,2018.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the following motions forlack of merit and for being pro-forma:
1. "Motion for Reconsideration" dated August 28, 2018,filed by accused Teresita Legaspi Panlilio;256
2. "Omnibus Motion (1) For Reconsideration of theResolution dated 20 August 2018 and (2) Deferment ofArraignment" dated August 28, 2018, filed by accused RolandoAureo G..Andaya, Jr;257
3. "Motion for Reconsideration (Re: Resolution dated 20August 2018)" dated August 28, 2018, filed by accused Janet L.Napoles;258
4. "Motion for Reconsideration (Re: Resolution dated 20August 2018)" dated August 28, 2018, filed by accused JamesChristopher Lim Napoles and Jo Christine Lim Napoles;259
5. "Motion for Reconsideration (Re: Resolution dated 20August 2018)" dated August 28, 2018, filed by accused RonaldFrancisco Lim;/'7
-----.68~ution
256 pp. 678-698, Vol. XIX,Record /-257 pp. 699-730, Id •• •2SI pp. 731-738, Id2SI pp. 739-746, Id2fCI pp. 474-759, Id
ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-17 -CRM-2202 to 2395People vs. Andaya, Jr., et al.
6. "Motion for Reconsideration (Re: Resolution dated 20August 2018)" dated August 29,2018, filed by accused Nasser C.Pangandaman.w'
7. "Motion for Reconsideration (of the Denial of the Motion toQuash filed by Accused Nieto}" dated August 29, 2018, filed byaccused Narciso Bustamante Nieto;262
8. "Motion. for Reconsideration (Re: Resolution dated 20August 2018)" dated August 31,2018, filed by accused Winnie M.Villanueva ·263and, ,
9. "Motion for Reconsideration" dated September 4, 2018,filed by accused Angelita Villapa Cacananta.w+
Set the arraignment of the accused-movants on January 18,2019, at 8:30 in the morning.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Metro Manila
~~O~AJE-TA&'~PreSl sticeChairperson
WE CONCUR:
o R. FERNANDEZssociate Justice
~AHIMNAustice ---::;;;;:..... '
261 pp. 784-793, Id262 pp. 794-799, Id263 pp. 12-19, vol. XX, Record264 pp. 800-805, Id
