RETHINKING POLICE DEADLY FORCE TRAINING

RETHINKING POLICE DEADLY FORCE TRAINING! � 1

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Rethinking Police Deadly Force Training

Eric Maudsley

Cleveland State University

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Abstract

The type of training that police officers typically receive does not reflect the reality of violence

that they face in the field. Younger, less experienced officers are murdered at a higher rate than

more experienced officers. The acquisition of experience can be accelerated with effective

training, but law enforcement agencies primarily use antiquated training methodologies for

reasons of convenience and economics, despite case law requiring agencies to provide more

effective training. Traditional methods of firearms and defensive tactics training in particular

have been shown to be ineffective. Immersive scenarios in which specific responses to

realistically modeled threat cues are rehearsed and trained into a stimulus - response reaction

have been shown to be more effective than traditional training methods.

Keywords: police, training, firearms, scenarios, conditioned response


Rethinking Police Deadly Force Training

Police officers exist in a world that is largely about violence. In the United States, less

than 1% of all citizen contacts with police result in a use of force, yet, on average, a police

officer is killed in the line of duty every 57 hours. As the only members of civil society

empowered to use coercive violence on behalf of the state (Bittner, 1970), the possibility of

violence exists during every citizen encounter. Police officers must be trained to recognize

potentially dangerous offenders and manage violence directed against them while still using only

minimal, “reasonable” force to protect themselves and the public.

The number of law enforcement officers killed in the line of duty has generally declined

since 1974; however, as the number of officer killed has fallen, the circumstances have become

more homogenous (FBI, 2011). Is this because of the type of training police officers receive to

react to a surprise or close-range assault with a firearm is inadequate? Do current training

paradigms really prepare officers for the violence they are most likely to encounter? Do police

officers receive training that accurately models the type of violence that realistically occurs in the

field? Can training be improved to increase the odds of survival when faced with the most

common type of lethal violence?

Case Law

Police use of force is the most direct and visible way the state’s interests collide with a

citizen’s civil rights. There is a specific body of constitutional case law that deals with police use

of force and the training of police officers in the use of force, and understanding what courts

have said on the matter is critical to evaluate the effectiveness of current programs.


The most important of these cases is Tennessee v. Garner (1984), in which the U.S.

Supreme Court found that police use of force is a seizure of a person, and therefore falls under

the 4th amendment with regard to evaluation of the reasonableness of the seizure. The court

specifically addressed the common practice of using deadly force to stop persons suspected of

committing a non-violent felony and determined that it was not generally reasonable unless the

officer has cause to believe that the person fleeing will commit a violent crime if they are not

stopped. Graham v. Connor (1989) further solidified the relationship between police use of force

and the standard of “objective reasonableness”.

Today we make explicit what was implicit in Garner's analysis, and hold that all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force - deadly or not - in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other "seizure" of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its "reasonableness" standard, rather than under a "substantive due process" approach. (Graham v. Connor, 1989)

Three cases in particular point to the responsibility of a police agency to provide quality

use of force training on a continuing basis to police officers. In Popow v. City of Margate,

(1979), courts held that the city of Margate, NJ was liable for the actions of an officer who fired

his weapon and missed, hitting a bystander, because the training provided was inadequate for the

circumstances that the officer operated under in the field. The court noted that the officer’s

training did not include practical application in shooting at moving targets in low light in

residential areas. The court found that use of force training must be given on a continual basis,

including instruction on relevant laws and policies, decision making, and must reflect the actual

conditions under which officers will operate by means of simulation.


In 1989, the Supreme Court rendered a decision in the case of City of Canton v. Harris,

stating in their opinion that “A Municipality’s inadequate training may give rise to (civil rights)

liability when it is deliberately indifferent to the rights of the city’s inhabitants and actually

causes a plaintiff’s injury.” This liability falls under a post-civil war statute, 42 United States

Code, Section 1983, which prohibits deprivation of federally protected rights by any person (or

entity) acting in an official capacity. Conditions that may be a violation of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983

are “Instances in which the need for more or different training is obvious and the inadequacy is

likely to result in violation of constitutional rights” and may include omitting important subjects

from training, teaching dangerous or outdated tactics or policies, failing to raise officers to an

adequate level of proficiency, or responsible officials deliberately or recklessly implementing a

policy of inadequate or improper training.

Another important Federal case, from the U.S. 10th circuit, is Tuttle v. Oklahoma (1996).

In Tuttle, the court issued an opinion that lists the attributes that a law enforcement agency’s

firearms training program must incorporate in order to be considered adequate. Primarily, the

training program must test officer’s knowledge, skill, and ability to make reasonable decisions

under stress, and must include “shoot/don’t shoot” targets and moving targets, low-light

shooting, and the requirement for the officer to move. There must be ongoing in-service training

beyond what is required to pass minimum qualification courses, and all of this training needs to

be replicated for any firearm that an officer is expected to use in the field.

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!Literature Review

In the United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation collects data under the Uniform

Crime Reporting program on police officers killed and assaulted in the line of duty, their

attackers, and the circumstances under which the assault took place. The FBI publishes an annual

report, Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA). The LEOKA database is also

examined extensively for trends and is used to develop training and procedures to increase

officer safety.

Law enforcement agencies reported that out of 698,460 sworn officers employed in the

United States, 54,774 were assaulted while performing their duties in 2011, and 72 law

enforcement officers were feloniously killed. In comparison, 393 offenders were killed in

confrontations with police officers that year. (FBI, 2011)

In addition to the LEOKA report, the FBI has also conducts continuing research into the

circumstances and contributing factors in assaults and murders of police officers. Combined with

the data from LEOKA, three published reports examine relevant factors in violent assaults on

police officers, broken into three categories; victim officer, offender, and situational.

The first of these reports “Killed in the Line of Duty”, was released in 1992. It was

conducted over three years and studied 51 cases in which 54 police officers were killed. 50

offenders were extensively interviewed as part of the research for the study. “Killed in the Line

of Duty” was followed five years later by “In the Line of Fire”. Unlike the first study, the focus

of “In the Line of Fire” is on 40 cases of serious assaults on police officers in which the officer


survived. 42 offenders and 52 victim officers were interviewed in an attempt to determine not

only causal factors in the assaults, but differences between the victim officers in the first and

second study.

In 2006, the same FBI research team released “Violent Encounters”, the third and final

part of the FBI’s research. 40 incidents involving 50 officers and 43 offenders were selected from

over 800 cases submitted to the FBI by local law enforcement.

Comparisons of the three FBI studies, the LEOKA ten-year and twenty-year data, and

LEOKA 2011 data show remarkable similarities in the officers who were the victims of line of

duty murder or serious assault, as well as their attackers and the situations in which these

murders occurred.

The Officer

The average age of officers in the 2011 LEOKA data is 38 (median 35/ mode 31-35). This

is consistent across the 2002-2011 and 1992-2001 data (average of both studies, 37), as well as

the FBI studies (Violent encounters, 35, Killed in the Line of Duty, 34, In the Line of Fire, 33).

Murdered officers averaged 12 years of experience in 2011, which was skewed higher by a small

cohort of older officers who died that year. The 20 year average was 10.5 years years of

experience, and this is slightly higher than the FBI studies (average across 3 studies, 8.33 years).

More than half were age 25-40 with less than ten years of service. At ten years of service, the

number of officers killed dropped by 47%, with another 50% drop at 20 years of service.

Some of the information about the circumstances in which officer were killed probably

accounts for this; most assaults occur between 8PM and 2AM and the most dangerous


assignment is patrol (69% of officers assaulted were assigned to patrol.) Since policing is

predominantly unionized and assignments are generally based on seniority, it is possible that

officers with seniority move to better shifts or specialty assignments like investigations rather

than being assigned to evening or midnight patrol. Younger, less experienced officers will more

likely be on patrol duty at night.

Older officers also have more experience in managing people and violence, and are better

able to “self-select” which calls they respond to based on seniority within the shift. In some

departments, there is an unwritten expectation that junior officers will take assignments for

senior officers if the junior officer is available. It is also possible that officers with greater than10

years are responsible for less self-initiated activity, which is statistically more dangerous. An

officer with 18 years of experience on a large metropolitan agency in Ohio said “I would say I

am more selective, and do more quality work now. I know better what to look for, what is

important and what isn’t.” (Maudsley, 2013).

Only 9% of the patrol officers killed were assigned to two-officer vehicles. The balance

were assigned to single officer zone cars, which is the predominant patrol method in the United

States.

95% of the officers killed were male, 85% were white. On average they were 5’11” tall

and weighed between 197 and 206 pounds. 79% were in uniform at the time of the assault, which

correlates highly with being in a patrol assignment vs. investigations. 70% were wearing body

armor. All had high school diplomas, with a minority having a 2 or 4 year college degree.


Common behavioral descriptors of officers killed and assaulted included “friendly”, “well

liked”, “hard working”, and “service oriented”. A common criticism is that victim officers

tended to not follow established procedures or “take shortcuts” when it came to arrests, traffic

stops, calling for backup, or transporting prisoners. They are also more likely than peers to rely

on their ability to “read” people and inappropriately dropped their guard, which led to the above

shortcuts. (FBI, 1992, 1997, 2006)

A key difference between descriptors of survivors of assaults and murdered officers had

to do with willingness to use force. Survivors were described by themselves and peers as

“willing to use force when necessary”. (FBI, 1992) Victim officers were commonly described as

using less force than peers would have used in similar situations, and being hesitant to use force

at all except as a “last resort”. Victim officers were also described as viewing their job as more

public relations than enforcement. More important, differences in mind-sets of offenders and

officers were significantly noticeable.

Officer’s behaviors were affected by social, legal and ethical considerations learned in their families, schools, and social encounters. They were also exposed to strict legal constraints on their behaviors by their departments, politicians, and their communities. These ethical and legal considerations regarding their behavior were further reinforced by the potential adverse consequences of bad or inappropriate choices on their part, mainly loss of job, civil law suits, and possible jail sentences. Even errors in judgment, although perhaps understandable or even unavoidable, could have lasting and disastrous effects on the future lives of the officers. The offenders’ behaviors were not so constrained. (FBI, 2006)

The Offender

The offenders in both the LEOKA data and the FBI studies were overwhelmingly

younger, less educated, and less socially stable than the victim officers. In keeping with the


more general UCR data on homicide and assault, the offenders were 98% male, and 60% were

under 30 years of age, with the highest number (33%) between 18 and 24 at the time of their

offense. Physically they were as tall as the average victim officer but lighter in weight (average

175-179 lb.).

Social indicators of violence and instability were more pronounced. 95% of the 43

offenders in the Violent Encounters study had a prior arrest for a crime of violence, as did 84%

of the offenders in the LEOKA data. 65% had a prior conviction. 28% were on probation or

parole at the time of their offense. A strong correlation was also seen between prior arrests for

assault on a police officer (24%) and weapons violations (40%).

Offenders who assaulted police officers reported growing up in socially disorganized

households, with over 60% reporting having been physically or psychologically abused by a

caretaker, as well as witnessing domestic violence or disorder in their homes. They also report

being exposed to violence at a young age relative to the officers in the study, and were “more

willing and able to use it” than victim officers. Gang members reported committing their first

crime at an average age of 9 and entering the gang lifestyle around 13 years of age.

Eighty-two percent did not finish high school, and 60% reported being chronically

unemployed. Many, particularly gang members, reported their “profession” as involvement in

drug distribution, i.e. low level dealer, enforcer, etc.

Drug and alcohol abuse is another strong predictor of violence in general, and violence

against police officers in particular. Eighty-four percent of the offenders in the Violent

Encounters study used a drug of abuse within two hours prior to their assault. 30% reported daily


use of drugs and alcohol. All were involved in a lifestyle surrounded by alcohol or drug use, with

over 60% reporting drug use and alcohol abuse by a significant other, and 54% were already

know to police as a drug user or dealer prior to their assault.

Ninety-two percent of the time an officer was killed, the offender used a firearm.

Handguns are the predominant choice, with 56% of offenders using a semi-automatic handgun in

9x19mm, .40 caliber, or .45 ACP caliber.

Seventeen percent of offenders used rifles in 2011, mainly semi-automatic rifles in

5.56x45mm and 7.62x39mm caliber. This corresponds almost exactly to the number of officers

who were killed by bullets penetrating their body armor (23 officers were struck through their

vest. 22 with rifles, one with an armor-piercing 9mm pistol round). Interestingly, firearms only

accounted for 4.5% of officer injuries over 10 years. The high number of deaths but low number

of injuries is possibly an indication of the dynamics involved. Most gunfights with police that

end with an officer killed occur at close range where it is relatively easy to hit the intended

target. Across the three FBI studies, offenders stated overwhelmingly that they do not use the

sights on their weapons, but rather just point and shoot. (FBI, 1992, 1997, 2006) Assuming an

angle of fire in which 80% of the rounds hit a human-size, 18 inch wide target at five feet, (24”

spread at 5’/angle of fire @23 degrees) the same bullets are scattered horizontally at 21 feet over

an arc 101 inches/8.4 feet wide, but the target remains the same size.

Only 1.1% of officer deaths and 18.2% of officer injuries over 10 years were the result of

knife or blunt instrument attack; using a vehicle as a weapon was a more common (6%) cause of

death.


Gang involvement was identified as a strong indicator of possible violence. Gang

members are more likely to subscribe to the values explained in Anderson’s “Code of the Street”,

especially regarding competition for respect and reputation in their neighborhood (Anderson,

1994). Gang members studied indicated that they had even ambushed and assaulted officers

when they could have escaped in order to “teach them a lesson”. Non-gang involved offenders

overwhelmingly identified their motivation for assaulting officers as “escape”. (FBI, 2006)

Race does not seem to be a factor, but appears to be dependent upon the predominant

population where the officer patrols. The offenders officers encounter reflect the community and

the level of social disorganization within it. In all, the picture of the offender emerges as a young,

poor, criminally involved male who abuses drugs and alcohol, is impulsive, and has nothing to

lose by killing a police officer, but is desperate to remain out of jail and engaged in crime and

substance abuse. (FBI, 2006)

The Circumstances

When a patrol officer and potentially violent offender meet in ambiguous circumstances,

the stage is set for an encounter that is fatal to one or both of them.

The most dangerous situations for police officers are ones in which little is known prior

to arriving on scene, and officers have to closely approach citizens in order to investigate and

take control. Research by the FBI (1992,1997, 2006) suggests that self-initiated activity is more

dangerous than activity to which an officer is dispatched; this may be because an officer has

some general idea what to expect when dispatched to a call for service.


According to the 2002-2011 LEOKA data, the riskiest types of situation fall into four

broad categories:

Ambush, defined as either an unprovoked attack, or a deliberate effort to lure an officer

into a premeditated, surprise assault. In 126 cases of officers killed by ambush, offenders used

rifles more often (40% of cases) than any other.

Disturbance calls and investigating “suspicious circumstances”, an ambiguous category

that covers everything from fights in progress at bars to domestic violence, are the next most

deadly to police officers. 158 officers were killed between 2002-2011, 36 while investigating

reports of domestic violence, the largest subcategory.

The next deadliest categories of situations are arrests, specifically attempting arrest

robbery and burglary suspects. Robbery suspects are unusually motivated to escape arrest owing

to the serious sanctions imposed by the criminal justice system on those convicted of that crime,

and it is also highly probably that they will already be armed as part of their underlying offense.

In 122 cases, 105 used handguns to kill the victim officers.

A large number of officers are killed on traffic stops, more on “unknown risk” or

“routine” stops than stops where a felony is already suspected. Of 98 officers killed 2002-2011

on traffic stops, 44 of them were killed either without exiting their own car (11) or on their initial

approach to the suspect vehicle (34). 56% of these officers were alone when they were killed,

and 24 never notified dispatch that they were making a stop. Handguns were used in 61 cases.

All of these situations share key similarities. First, the less information an officer has

about what they are dealing with at the start of the situation, the more dangerous it is. This idea


also correlates well with the low number of deaths by officers conducting investigations (2%)

and especially tactical operations (5%), which by definition should be the most dangerous. One

striking fact from the 2011 LEOKA data is that a number of older officers were killed serving

warrants that, in retrospect, probably should have been served by SWAT teams instead of

investigators, but this was an anomaly when compared to the 10 and 20 year data.

The second and most important commonality is distance, or more precisely, the very clear

association between the distance of the encounter and the likelihood of being killed. 79% of all

assaults on police officers that result in death occur within 20 feet or less. The FBI LEOKA

breaks down the range at which officers are killed into five subsets.

0 to 5 feet: This is a range at which the officer has almost no reaction time, and almost no

marksmanship ability is needed to hit a critical target. Also the range an officer has to go into to

physically take control of a suspect. Almost half of officers killed in the line of duty (47%) are

killed at this distance. Case studies of serious assaults on officers indicate that officers are often

attacked at this range when they attempt to take a suspect under physical control. The officer’s

perception is that the fight is over and the suspect has surrendered, but the suspect views this

transition as an opportunity to attack when the officer is unprepared. In two cases, officers

attempting arrests alone were attacked when the offender heard the officer holster his weapon

and take out handcuffs, suggesting that it might have been safer to have waited for another

officer to help control the offender before putting away their firearm.

6 to 10 feet: This is the distance that most police business takes place. Officers have to

move into conversation range to speak with citizens, obtain identification and registration on


traffic stops, or most other common tasks associated with patrol. This is the distance which

humans are used to and comfortable speaking to one another without being too close, yet not far

enough away that raised voices have to be used to be understood. 18% of officers are killed at

this range. Many training programs emphasize the importance of maintaining a “reactionary gap”

of 4 to 6 feet from subjects, but in the field this is insufficient by itself in providing enough

reaction time to respond to an assault, or incompatible with other requirements like obtaining

identification. A frequent mode of assault noted from the cases was the use of the “name game”.

Suspects, many of them with warrants for their arrest, gave the officer false or conflicting

identification in order to confuse and distract them, then used the distraction to either attack, or

move into contact range and attack.

10 to 20 feet: Only 14% of officers are killed at this range, which is also where they

typically make their initial contact with citizens, especially during self-initiated contact or when

arriving on the scene of crimes in progress.

20 to 50 feet: Officers have a clear reaction time and marksmanship advantage in these

situations, and will try to control violent situations from a covered position in this range if the

situation permits. Most police marksmanship training is centered on this distance, for reasons

that will be explored in the section on training.

>50 feet: Beyond 50 feet, the advantage goes to the party with better training and more

accurate weapons. Officers have more time to make decisions, but may not be able to perceive

threats. Offenders may have better opportunities to escape if confronted at long range. This is the

distance that tactical teams generally confront suspects if the situation permits.


The fact that 79% of officers are killed at less than 20 feet, and 61% did not return fire

(45% did not even attempt to return fire) seems to indicate that most officers are killed before

they were able to react with their firearm. Once the distance increases to 21 feet, with a

corresponding increase in time to react, the numbers of officers killed go down dramatically. A

1993 study of 180 officer involved shootings in which the officer survived showed that the

majority of those cases occurred at 20 feet or more, with the officer hitting the suspect 61% of

the time (Fairburn, 1993). The rate of officer survival in a deadly assault increases in proportion

to the distance and corresponding reaction time.

One of the most influential articles in the history of police firearms and defensive tactics

training was published by Sgt. Dennis Tueller of the Salt Lake City, Utah Police Department in

1983. Tueller found that, on average, a police officer expecting to have to draw and fire could do

so in 1.5 seconds with acceptable accuracy. In the same timeframe, a charging assailant could

cover an average distance of 21 feet. Tueller used his findings to defend teaching better tactics to

patrol officers, including better awareness and utilization of cover, and lateral movement off the

line of attack of a charging assailant. Although not his intention, Tueller’s study has been used to

justify conducting the majority of police handgun training at a distance of 21 feet for the past 30

years, even though the majority of encounters continue to take place at five feet or less (Tueller,

1983).

Historical Context

Historically, the homicide of police officers is linked to the general homicide rate and the

level of social disorganization present in their environment. Kaminski and Marvell (2002) found


that the most dangerous time period for law enforcement officers in the United States was

between 1918 and 1934, with a peak homicide rate of 11.4 per 10,000 in 1930. This time period

corresponds to the era of Prohibition and the start of the Great Depression, and more than 100

officers were murdered per year for 14 straight years. This corresponds well to their theory that

police homicides are related to hard, uncertain economic times. The second peak in police

homicide in the 20th century occurred between 1969 and 1981, with a high rate of 7.5 officers

per 10,000 killed in 1973. Again, this was a period of relative political, social and economic

uncertainty, and as the economy improved in the 1980s, the rate of police homicide fell. Two

other factors Kaminski and Marvell credit with bringing this rate down was the introduction of

practical body armor in the early 1970s, and the increase in the number of incarcerated offenders.

Their research showed that a 1% increase in the prison population was shown to decrease the

number of officers killed by 2.1%, while only lowering the overall homicide rate 1.1%

(Kaminski and Marvell, 2002).

Overall rates of force used by police officers

In evaluating training of police officers to react to violent, potentially lethal assaults, it is

important to maintain perspective on police use of force as a whole. The use of force by law

enforcement officers is situational, transactional and reactive. In a study of police use of force in

Phoenix, AZ, Garner (1996) found that police officers use force in around 1% of all citizen

interactions, and if handcuffing is excluded, is only used in about 20% of custodial arrests. Most

arrests (80%) do not involve weapons and more than half (50-64%) simply involve control holds

or grappling with the subject. Differences in use of force rates were noted. Not only are younger

officers assigned to busier shifts in higher crime areas, but seniority allows older officers to


move to positions with less street contact with criminals, which is the context in which most uses

of force occur. The biggest predictors of the use of force by officers was dealing with offenders

under the influence of alcohol, drugs or suffering from mental illness. This not only mirrors the

findings of the FBI studies, but points out that police officers spend nearly 99% of their time

interacting with the public by talking to them, and most often have to use force in situations

where the individual is unable to be communicated with in a rational way (Garner, 1996).

Barriers to simple decision making

Aveni (2005) discussed how police training is shaped by external factors including case

law, economics, and political considerations. Societal expectations of ideal police performance

are unrealistic and often formed by perceptions gained from entertainment media. Meanwhile,

the type and depth of police training is largely driven by minimum requirements established by

the state or case law.

The Garner decision in 1984 led to a proliferation of theoretical decision-making models

to train officers to employ force in a manner that takes into account the actions of the suspect, but

as these have grown more complicated, they have led to hesitation to use force and confusion by

officers as to the type, intensity and duration of force that they are permitted to use, as well as an

unrealistic yet increasing public perception that officers have a duty to use a “stair-step”

approach, trying lower level of force first and moving up the “ladder” if this proves ineffective

(Aveni, 2005). This is both dangerous and impractical. Davis (2013) makes the point that neither

the Garner decision nor subsequent case law require a stair-step approach or “minimum” force,

only that the officer use force that is “reasonable” under the circumstances. While most


progressive law enforcement agencies have returned to the “reasonable force” model, many cling

to continuum models and policies that are more restrictive than what is required by case law, and

thus requiring the officer to make a more complicated decision, often under enormous stress.

This is sometimes imposed externally in response to allegations of civil rights violations.

The U.S. Department of Justice notified the Seattle Police Department in March 2011 that the

DOJ Civil Rights Division was opening an investigation into

(A)n alleged pattern or practice of excessive force and discriminatory policing in SPD, pursuant to the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994…the anti-discrimination provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968…and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Rather than undergo such an investigation, Seattle settled with DOJ and entered into a

“Consent Decree”, under which the city admitted no fault and agreed to a series of “reforms”

dictated by the DOJ Civil Rights Division. These include the establishment of three independent

committees to investigate every use of force by an officer. The Seattle Police Department’s

revised Use of Force policy is 75 pages, and emphasizes, among other things, that officers issue

verbal warnings and attempt de-escalation “whenever possible.” An officer with over 30 years of

experience commented

Now you have officers in a use of force situations trying to remember what a seventy-five page document says and apply it to the situation, knowing their use of force will be reviewed by no less than three different bodies and by the time it is reviewed, all of those external factors like after-the-fact community perception of the incident, local politics, et cetera will definitely be in play. Did I follow the department Bias-Free Policing Policy? Did I do enough to de-escalate and use my Crisis-Intervention Training? The end result is that a split second decision under life and death stress becomes a complicated algebra problem that is in direct contradiction to the guidance (Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendal) Holms’ gave when he said “Detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife.” (Maudsley, 2013)


A retired officer and former Field Training Officer also remarked “In the academy now,

they get hammered with liability, liability, liability. That’s all they’re thinking about. They know

what they can’t do, but they’re not sure what they can do.” (Maudsley, 2013)

Limits of Human Performance

This type of decision making may not even be physically possible in the close range, high

stress situations in which police officers are most often murdered. Cognitive overload, combined

with a lack of applicable training, might be to blame. Morrison and Villa (1996), Grossman

(2004), Siddle (1995) and studies by the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (2011) all

point to the human stress response and reaction time as being incompatible with traditional

firearms training given to police officers.

Morrison and Villa (1996) studied the accuracy of police officers in 19th century New

Orleans, present day offenders, and present day police officers, and found that

No statistical link (could be established) between handgun qual scores and gunfight effectiveness, and modest improvement in field shooting performance since the nineteenth century, despite that era’s generally inferior firearms technology, less reliable ammunition, often nonexistent maintenance practices and, critically, the complete absence of handgun training. There are sufficient similarities between levels of field marksmanship reported for untrained nineteenth century police officers, untrained contemporary opponents and today’s well-equipped, highly trained and handgun “qualified” police officers to tentatively support our contention that police handgun training doctrines and techniques might provide poor preparation for the challenges posed by armed confrontations. (Morrison and Villa, 1996, 514)

The style of training most often given to police officers is based on outdated competition

marksmanship models from the turn of the 20th century, and does not prepare them for a fast,

close-range exchange of fire with a moving target, often in the dark (Morrison and Villa, 1996).


The accepted reaction cycle that officers have to go through in a life or death encounter is

the “OODA Loop”, first proposed by Boyd (Howe, 2005). In summary, the officer has to

Observe or Perceive a threat, (which takes about 1/4 of a second) Orient on that threat (triage that

threat against any other perceived threats or priorities and decide to address it over the others,

about 1/4 second), Decide on a response, choosing from all available responses that he has

learned or seen before, and then Act or physically execute that response.

The main issue comes at the decision phase. Hick’s Law holds that for each available

additional choice, a 58% decrease in reaction time is observed. Grossman (2004) states that all

humans have four basic responses to a threat; fight, flee, freeze, or posture. The introduction of

policies requiring detailed analysis of artificial use of force models prior to responding, while

easy to teach, can cause potentially lethal hesitation; the officer may have to now go through a

mental checklist of “deadly force conditions” as well as considering “minimum” force, with

correspondingly decreased reaction time (Siddle, 1995).

However, stress increases the probability that officers will choose the first option they

consider, and a study by the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) found that the

level of experience of the officer directly affects the ability of the officer to make an optimal

decision. FLETC strongly encourages the use of immersive scenario training to get police

officers into the psychological state of hyper-vigilance, where the threat exceeds their own

perceived capability and the response bypasses conscious thought. FLETC (2011) identified the

experience of being “stuck” at the decision phase of the Boyd loop as being the response of

officers who had not received enough repetitions of a particular response to the presented

stimulus. This research strongly points to the increased use of scenario training so that officers


can build realistic contextual models of threatening behaviors and over train responses to those

threats. The police officer’s response in the field is then automatic and not slowed by a frantic

attempt to remember the correct response.

From a training standpoint, an officer who has received only minimal firearms training

may not have the level of skill required to draw and operate his firearm or defend himself

without conscious thought, distracting him from thinking through the situation. This

“unconscious-competent” level of proficiency is not achievable or sustainable without a

significant investment in training. Schmidt and Wrisberg (2008) found that 300 to 500

repetitions of individual motor skills must be correctly performed in order to “program” a motor

skill to the unconscious-competent level. A significant investment of time and effort must go into

training an individual to this level of performance. The current system of training and

qualification exists at the tipping point between conscious-incompetent (Knowledge of the

correct way to execute a technique but inability to perform that technique correctly) and

conscious-competent (able to perform a technique correctly as long as focus is maintained on the

task) (Schmidt and Wrisberg, 2008).

Angel et al (2012) noted that a conceptual mode called “recognition-primed decision

making” shows promise for training officers to react more quickly under stress. Recognition-

primed decision making is a model of intuitive, pattern-recognition based thinking composed of

three components; matching, diagnosis, and course of action. The difference between top level,

“expert” performers and novices, according to their research, was during the “Observe” phase of

the OODA loop. “Experts” used more efficient scanning patterns than novices, which supports

the conclusion that experienced officers have a better intuitive understanding of what danger


signs to look for. Once a source of danger is observed, the pattern of behavior is diagnosed as

matching a previously trained response, which the officer carries out without slowing at the

“Decide” phase of the OODA loop (Angel et.al., 2012). This matches Siddle’s (1995) research

into the role of trained response to stimulus under stress, and the need to “overtrain” pre-

programmed responses to specific threats for an effective response.

The Current Training Paradigm

Traditional police firearms training was derived from target shooting and archaic military

marksmanship training and does not model the type of violence encountered by police officers in

field very well (Morrison and Villa, 1996). The traditional model is that a shooter with the ability

to hit a small target at a long distance should be able to hit the same size or larger target at a

shorter distance. To this end, officers are typically placed on a distraction-free firing range and

taught the “fundamentals of marksmanship”; fully extending their weapon to arms length toward

the target, perfectly aligning the front sight blade in the rear sight notch so that it is vertically and

horizontally centered, then superimposing this perfect alignment on the intended target. Officers

are taught to concentrate on the front sight (not the target) and use their index finger to press the

trigger straight to the rear without disturbing this perfect sight alignment. This focus should be so

intense that the discharge of the weapon should be a surprise, and the trigger should be held to

the rear until the sights settle back into perfect alignment in what is called “follow through.”

Shifting focus from the sights to the target the shooter makes the determination whether another

shot is necessary. Stress is antithetical to accurate shooting, as are outside distractions and the

need to fire shots rapidly. (U.S. Navy, 2006)


Most police agencies rely on the State to set minimum standards for training and

performance. In Ohio, for example, the Ohio Peace Officer Training Commission, or OPOTC

sets all minimum professional standards for police officers to remain certified. Last updated in

January 2013, the Semi-Auto Pistol Qualification Course requires a total of 25 rounds fired. It

must be successfully completed by each officer once per calendar year, which can result in up to

24 months between qualifications. (An officer could conceivably fire for qualification in January

of one year, and December of the following year, for example, and still be qualified.) (OPOTC,

2013).

Officers fire at ranges of four, nine, 12, 20, 30 and 50 feet. The officer must score 20 hits

in the “preferred area” of a human-size silhouette target out of 25 shots in order to pass. (See

Appendix 1). Hits outside the “preferred area” but still on the silhouette do not subtract from the

overall score, but firing additional shots deducts -1 point per shot.

The course of fire calls for the shooter to take one step either back (at 4 feet) or to the

side to “create distance and move off of the line of attack”, but officers are not penalized if they

fail to do so. Only six rounds out of 25 are fired at the distance where 65% of officer deaths

occur. At four feet, officers are given five seconds to draw and fire three shots, and at nine feet,

officers are given six seconds to draw and fire two shots at the “preferred area” and one shot at

the smaller head or hip targets. (OPOTC, 2013)

This course of fire is also interesting for what it lacks. There are no multiple targets or

moving targets. The decision to shoot using shoot/don’t shoot targets is not tested, and the course

is specifically conducted is daylight. While “agencies are encouraged to provide training” per the


course of fire in the topics specifically listed in the Margate and Tuttle cases as indicators of an

“adequate” program, these are not included in the skill testing that must be demonstrated by an

officer before going into public to enforce the law.

This course of fire was immediately criticized by some police firearms instructors,

especially for the generous time limits. Morrison and Villa make the same observation on police

handgun qualification in general:

Handgun qualification for the police…still consists of shooting at fixed numbers of clearly defined targets at well-known distances, standard firing elements and sequences, liberal time limits, and arbitrary threshold scores. The rote firing of time-honored courses and their derivatives produces well-practiced range marksmen, but it does not assess their ability to perform in gunfights. Being “handgun qualified” should mean being able to perform competently during unpredictable armed confrontations arising out of routine activities involving close-range exchanges of gunfire, and to do this it must reflect the totality of the training. (Morrison and Villa, 1996, 529)

A comparison with a course of fire developed by retired Montgomery County Deputy

Sheriff Dave Spaulding, a noted firearms instructor in Ohio, is revealing. Spaulding’s “Close

Quarters Skill Drills” has officers firing on three, eight inch circular targets, and can be fired at

any range from contact distance to 20 feet. The biggest difference is time. Spaulding only gives

an officer 1.5 seconds to draw and fire one shot, and 2.8 seconds to draw and fire three shots on

three targets. His standard to draw and fire two shots, regardless of distance, is two seconds. In

his book Handgun Combatives, Spaulding reasons “It doesn’t take a great deal of skill or

accuracy to shoot someone who is only a double arms’s length away. All you have to do is be

first on the trigger.” In Spaulding’s opinion, police firearms instruction continues to concentrate

on distances over 20 feet because “It’s easier to do.” With slower times and shooters evenly

spaced in rows and not moving, traditional training makes it easier for instructors to monitor


larger numbers of students shooting at once safely. Spaulding suggests that instructors using his

course of fire make the target smaller as officers achieve the suggested par times, making the

course as challenging as possible (Spaulding, 2003).

Political and economic considerations were cited as the reason for the revision of the

qualification course, and associated increase in the amount of time an officer has to fire at close

range. It has been alleged by several instructors that professional associations representing police

executives pressured OPOTC to make the qualification course easier, allowing more officers to

be qualified with correspondingly lower costs for ammunition and training. OPOTC defended

their revision by stating that the intent of a shorter qualification course was to allow agencies to

better use their limited supply of expensive ammunition for additional training rather than for

qualification, but one instructor estimated that 75% of police agencies in Ohio conduct no other

firearms training outside of annually firing the state minimum course (Active Response Training,

2013).

Another instructor recently conducted pre-employment firearms training of new officers

for his agency. All of these new hires had recently passed a state certified police academy. “It

was like day one on the range, like they had never been trained at all.” said the instructor, who

has over 30 years of law enforcement experience and has used deadly force himself. “All they

learned to do was stand in one spot and shoot.” Students at OPOTC certified police academies

receive 60 hours of instruction in firearms, and need only complete the state mandated

qualification course with a score of 20/80% to pass the firearms unit.


The veteran instructor went on to talk about the practice of only shooting the qualification

once per calendar year, and not providing additional training.

We (his agency) do a three-day in-service once per year, and fire the state qual three times per year. At the in-service I have them fire the state qual as a warm-up, and I still get one or two per class of 30 who don’t pass the first time. We give them some remedial training and have them shoot it again, and another 50% don’t pass. So if this is what I am seeing from a group that shoots three times a year and gets 24 hours of additional in-service training, what are the results going to be from someone who might shoot once a year? (Maudsley, 2013)

Currently, there is no specific training in the OPOTC basic academy curriculum dealing

with the mechanics of integrating defensive tactics into deadly force situations, even though the

most effective initial response is more likely to be a strike to deflect the opponent’s gun or

disarming technique (OPOTC, 2013). 60 hours of “Subject Control Techniques” are required,

generally using the Use of Force continuum’s “stair-stepped” approach (OPOTC, 2013). The

level of force is explained, followed by demonstration of the approved techniques for that level

of force. For example, an offender who is pulling away from the officer is (absent several other

factors) at a level three on the continuum, active resistance. According to the UOFC, an officer

can then use control holds, empty hand strikes to specific target areas, taking the subject to the

ground, or deploy OC “pepper spray”, but not use a baton, a CED (“Taser”) or firearm. The

instructor demonstrates the techniques one by one, then coaches the trainees while they practice

the technique on each other, usually in a gym while wearing athletic clothing. Angel et al.(2012),

doing research in Canada, found that

Trainees typically practice unarmed defensive tactics on compliant and “notionally” uncooperative assailants because of the chance of injury. Thus many cadets do not experience the true effects of a more violent altercation because full force strikes, head strikes, etc. are not permitted during training.


This leaves trainees with a lack of confidence in their own skills as well as the skills of

their peers. (Angel et al, 2012, 105) One Ohio officer with eight years of experience, remarked;

The problem is, at the academy, the training isn’t realistic at all. It’s designed for the maximum number of people to pass. So they never pair you up with someone (for defensive tactics) who is bigger than you, or really resists, or is unpredictable. You always know what they are going to do, and what technique the instructor wants to see you use. Your buddy never really fights because he has to fight you next, so everyone tries to help each other out. Most of the techniques they taught us didn’t work, and the few that did, you have to do them exactly right because if you don’t you’ll end up getting hurt. (Maudsley, 2013)

An 18 year veteran officer, who is a defensive tactics instructor as well as a martial arts

instructor in his spare time, said

I wrestled in high school. That was two hours a day, five days a week, five months a year. When we wrestled we were carefully matched up with someone the same size and weight, wore protective equipment and wrestled on a gym mat. Only certain techniques were allowed to avoid really hurting each other. As a cop you want me to do essentially the same thing, wrestle a guy to the ground and handcuff him, but I don’t get to pick who it is. He might be bigger and stronger than me, and is usually drunk or high. We might be fighting in a parking lot with broken bottles on the ground. The bad guy is free to use any technique he wants, or he might just pull out a gun and shoot at me. Other than training I do on my own, I got one week of training 18 years ago. Although I work for a department that gives us about 8 hours a year of in-service, it’s not required by the state. So that’s 8 hours per year versus 200 hours a year wrestling in high school, and that’s more than most cops get. Yeah, that adds up. (Maudsley, 2013)

The only specific training officers receive in armed close-quarters confrontations in Ohio

is a lesson titled “shot avoidance”. According to Sam Faulkner, the instructor who wrote the

lesson while at OPOTC, the topic is usually taught in between 20 minutes to an hour. There is no

state requirement for in-service training, but Faulkner recommended ten minutes of training once

a month, rather than once a year during an in-service training day, so that officers are familiar

with the technique. Other officers criticized the technique as unrealistic. “We spent about 10


minutes on it, with the instructors throwing tennis balls at us. I guess if you can dodge a tennis

ball, you can dodge a bullet.” said one eight year veteran (Maudsley, 2013).

Another longtime instructor questioned the validity of the technique in a variety of

circumstances.

It was developed for the (Ohio State) Highway Patrol, and for what they do, primarily traffic stops, it is ok. Basically what you do is go from standing to touching the ground with your hands as fast as you can, then run like hell. So if the guy shooting at you is in a car, dropping down like that might be useful since the door is in the way. But I’d like to see it work in some crappy little public housing apartment full of junk where you can reach out and touch both of the walls. (Maudsley, 2013)

Conclusion and Recommendations

It is clear that the type of training police officers receive to manage violence is falling

short of what officers, especially younger officers, actually need to prepare for the reality of

close range armed assault, which is the statistical model of the most likely violent threat to their

lives. Police use of force training needs to be restructured to reflect reality.

Ideally, police officers should be trained to the unconscious-competent level of skill with

both their subject control/defensive tactics and firearms skills, and be required to maintain these

skills throughout their careers. An increased emphasis should be placed on confrontations at

close quarters (<10 feet) and the integration of armed and unarmed defensive skills. Beyond

basic marksmanship, however, police firearms training should be conducted primarily through

immersive scenario training, so that the officer has pre-programmed experience to fall back on

when experiencing cognitive overload and his or her brain must go directly to a response without

conscious thought.


The data clearly indicate that police officer’s level of experience is a key indicator of

survivability. Future training should focus on providing that experience to new officers sooner in

their careers through the use of immersive scenario training. The use of scenarios during in-

service training not only accelerates the acquisition of experience, but serves to re-enforce the

experience of older officers while increasing their awareness of current and emerging threats,

and discouraging complacency.

A clear comparison can be made between how individuals are taught to drive an

automobile and police use of force training. Both initial driving and academy use of force

training include a classroom component on relevant laws and procedures, and a written test on

that material. Basic operation is then taught in a safe environment under strict supervision of

instructors. For driving students, this is usually an empty parking lot with some orange cones

taking the place of other cars. For prospective police officers, this is a gym with padded floors or

a shooting range.

The difference is that a driver’s license requires practical application and practice in

actual traffic under real world conditions, while most police officers never progress past the

firing range or gym before their skills are tested in real, life or death confrontations. Drivers

amass thousands of hours of experience and quickly become unconscious-competent at operating

an automobile in variety of conditions. A police officer will probably go his or her whole career

without being involved in a close-range, life or death gunfight, but it might happen the first week

after academy graduation. The only way to safely provide the repetitions and experience police

officers need to acquire the skill and ability to save their own lives is with immersive scenario

training.


The firearms and defensive tactics training most police officers currently receive is

inadequate to meet the most prevalent threat. Police officers are not being prepared for the type

of violence that they will most likely encounter, and current training paradigms are antiquated

and driven by external considerations of economics, politics and student throughput rather than

utilizing available research on line of duty deaths and assaults.

Training exists that accurately models the violence most often associated with the line of

duty murder of police officers. Unfortunately, most change to police training programs in the

past has been driven by the requirements of case law or the realization of financial liability on

the part of an agency. It is likely that most police officers will to continue to receive minimal,

substandard, antiquated training, and inevitably some will die as a result.

!


References

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New York, NY : W.W. Norton & Company

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Review of the Skills Perishability of Police “Use of Force” Skills (Work Order Number

29 - PSC/CSP 29 dated January 2010). Guelph, Canada: Police Sector Council.

Aveni, T. (2005). Critical Analysis of Contemporary Police Training. San Antonio, TX: The

Police Policy Studies Council.

Bittner, E. (1979). The functions of the police in modern society: A review of background factors,

current practices, and possible role models. Cambridge, Mass: Oelgeschlager, Gunn &

Hain.

Center for Security Forces (2006). Small Arms Marksmanship Instructor. United States Navy.

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IN: Responder Media.

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (2011). Stress and Decision Making. Department of

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Garner, Joel (1996). Understanding the use of Force by and Against the Police. Washington,

D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice.

Grossman, D., & Christensen, L. W. (2004). On Combat: The Psychology and Physiology of

Deadly Conflict in war and in Peace. Illinois: PPCT Research Publications.


Howe, P. R. (2005). Leadership and Training for the Fight: A few Thoughts on Leadership and

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Maudsley, E. (2013). Views on Deadly Force Training. Cleveland, OH: unpublished.

Morrison, G. B., & Vila, B. J. (1998). Police Handgun Qualification: Practical Measure or

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New OPOTC Rifle Qualification Course | Active Response Training. (n.d.). Retrieved from

http://www.activeresponsetraining.net/new-opotc-rifle-qualification-course

OPOTC (2013). Semi-Auto Pistol Qualification. Retrieved from http://www.chlohio.com/

uploads/2011-11-7_Semi-AutoPistolQualification_OPC.pdf

OPOTA (2013). Ohio Peace Officer Training Commission Peace Officer Basic Training Audit

Sheet. Retrieved from http://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/OhioAttorneyGeneral/files/

00/00969c52-68e6-4175-ae6f-12dc72196a6c.pdf

Schmidt, R. A., & Wrisberg, C. A. (2008). Motor Learning and Performance: A Situation-Based

Learning Approach. Champaign, Ill. [u.a.: Human Kinetics.

Siddle, B. K. (1995). Sharpening the Warrior's Edge. Millstadt, Ill: PPCT Management Systems.

Spaulding, D. (2003). Handgun Combatives. Flushing, NY: Looseleaf Law Publications.

Tueller, D. (1983, March 1). How Close is too Close? S.W.A.T, 3(3), 20-23.


United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Uniform Crime Reports Section (1992). Killed in

the line of duty: A Study of Selected Felonious Killings of Law Enforcement Officers.

Washington, D.C: The Bureau.

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Assaulted, 2011. Clarksburg, WV: The Bureau.

United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation (1996). In the Line of Fire, August 1997. S.l: s.n.

United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation (2007). Violent Encounters, August 2006. S.l: s.n.

!


Appendix 1

Ohio Peace Officer Training Council Target. Light shaded region is the “preferred

area” for scoring. !

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

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RETHINKING POLICE DEADLY FORCE TRAINING

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