Chapter 2 Rethinking the Postcolonial Cypriot Statehood: The Cyprus Problem, Class Struggles, and Ethnic Conflict Umut Bozkurt and Nicos Trimikliniotis Introduction This chapter aims to provide a rudimentary outline for the re-conceptualization of the Cyprus state form as enmeshed in the “Cyprus problem” within its national, regional, and global contexts. It does so by contextualizing the state question within a historical perspective and analyzing the terms of class conflict within the Cypriot formation. A Lilliputian country containing multiple asymmetrical state-related formations within a conflict-ridden context, Cyprus remains a puzzle, which lends itself to alternative interpretations. Is it an example of modern legal-rational authority (Navaro-Yashin, 2003, 2006) or does it constitute an “anomaly” (Dunphy and Bale, 2007)? Is it a system of multiple “states of exception” (Constantinou, 2008; Trimikliniotis, 2007, 2010a) and/or “postcolonial quasi-stateness” (Constantinou, 2010)? These are but some formulations of the state/conflict situation in Cyprus, which we intend to scrutinize. The chapter will analyze some key class and ideological issues that frame the “Cyprus problem.” It continues from the contention with which the introductory chapter in this volume, which critiques the politics derived from the binary “geopolitics versus ethnic conflict,” left matters open for further exploration. It takes matters further from the questions related to imperialism in shaping and reproducing the conflict/division of Cyprus, also discussed in this volume. 1
Transcript
Chapter 2
Rethinking the Postcolonial Cypriot Statehood: The Cyprus
Problem, Class Struggles, and Ethnic Conflict
Umut Bozkurt and Nicos Trimikliniotis
Introduction
This chapter aims to provide a rudimentary outline for the re-conceptualization of the Cyprus
state form as enmeshed in the “Cyprus problem” within its national, regional, and global
contexts. It does so by contextualizing the state question within a historical perspective and
analyzing the terms of class conflict within the Cypriot formation. A Lilliputian country
containing multiple asymmetrical state-related formations within a conflict-ridden context,
Cyprus remains a puzzle, which lends itself to alternative interpretations. Is it an example of
modern legal-rational authority (Navaro-Yashin, 2003, 2006) or does it constitute an “anomaly”
(Dunphy and Bale, 2007)? Is it a system of multiple “states of exception” (Constantinou, 2008;
Trimikliniotis, 2007, 2010a) and/or “postcolonial quasi-stateness” (Constantinou, 2010)? These
are but some formulations of the state/conflict situation in Cyprus, which we intend to scrutinize.
The chapter will analyze some key class and ideological issues that frame the “Cyprus
problem.” It continues from the contention with which the introductory chapter in this volume,
which critiques the politics derived from the binary “geopolitics versus ethnic conflict,” left
matters open for further exploration. It takes matters further from the questions related to
imperialism in shaping and reproducing the conflict/division of Cyprus, also discussed in this
volume.1
The chapter examines the perpetuation of the divide of postcolonial Cyprus, by focusing
on the role of class and social and political conflict within the Cypriot social formation. In this
way it attempts to counterbalance the failures of many mainstream and alternative models, which
not only disempowered social and political forces within Cyprus but also failed to make sense of
the state formation and the dispute itself. In that sense, the weaknesses of the liberal conflict
resolution model and the global/regional geopolitics model in making sense of the Cyprus
dispute are related to both approaches’ sharing the main assumption of the Realist theory in
international relations, which conceptualizes states as rational unitary and autonomous actors,
each moving toward their own national interest.2 Only if the alleged “unitary actors” are
unpacked can we understand the underlying political, economic, and social relations. Our
argument is that in all class societies, conflicting interests continuously struggle to influence the
state to gain the upper hand and state decisions that are taken at any particular moment in history
reflect not the “putative national interest” but a particular solution to conflicting class interests
and the interests of other internal and external actors at that particular conjunction. In that
respect, foreign and internal policy shifts are results of particular solutions to conflicting internal
and external interests, priorities, and strategies. This framework is employed to make sense of
the Cyprus state form as enmeshed in the “Cyprus problem.”
We question the adequacy of the theorization of the Cypriot state form plus conflict as we
are nearing the end of the current conjuncture that initiated global geopolitical transformations
following the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and her allies.
Class Relations, the National Question, and Ethnic Conflict
Class relations and class-based articulated political projects and ideology are closely connected
to the national question in Cyprus. The class structure and the positioning vis-à-vis the political
structures of power provide the basis around which ethnic/national articulations are made.
National aspirations cut across class boundaries; there are nonetheless clear-cut differences
between the various class-based articulations by different political parties. An analysis of class-
related politics within the “national question,” however, requires first a brief concrete analysis of
the class structure in the Cypriot society. The two levels of analysis, although interrelated in the
sense that the structure provides the context, must not be conflated. At one level we examine the
political economy and sociology of class relations and how these structured the national
liberation struggle. The “political” is often autonomous from the immediate socioeconomic, what
Antonio Gramsci referred to as the “corporate interests,” and there is interdependence between
the two, as a mutuality, rather than a one-way relationship.
We are dealing with a postcolonial country that was transformed from a rural into a
tourism and tertiary sector society and economy by the mid-1980s. The emergence of the
capitalistic class structure in the Cypriot society can be traced back to the nineteenth century.
This involved the gradual transition of the semi-feudal power relations, with hegemony of the
kojabashi (the noble landowners) and the high-ranked clerics, under the Ottomans’ millet system,
into the hegemony of the “historical bloc” around the bourgeoisie under British colonialism. The
Ottomans ruled using the millet system, which was basically recognizing the religious leaders of
the flock and cooperating with them in the administration (Hill, 1940; Grecos, 1980; Kyrris,
1996, pp. 253–267). Such were the privileges granted to the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus
that the archbishop had direct recognition from the Sultan, as an Ethnarchic leader, the millet
başı (community leader). Contrary to the persecution of the Orthodox Church by the Venetians,
the Ottomans recognized and re-established the Orthodox Church (Kyrris, 1996, pp. 263–264).
The archbishop effectively ruled over the Christian population, together with the “kojabashides,”
who were as a rule “elected” as communal lords (“πρόκριτοι”). The Sultan recognized the
archbishop and the bishops as protectors of the Christians, who also had responsibility for
collecting taxes with police escort. Afterwards, the Beylerbeyi (the Muslim governor), the most
powerful person in Cyprus, was the Archbishop. The third most important person in the power
structure was another Christian, the Dragoman, who acted as an intermediary and
translator<xen>3</xen> between the archbishop and the Beylerbeyi but also had crucial powers
regarding economic affairs, taxation, and population census; he even prepared the budget and
had direct access to the Sultan. The Dragoman would come from the kojabashis class. The vast
majority of Cypriots, from both faiths, were poor peasants whilst their relationship was one of
“peaceful coexistence” (Kyrris, 1985).
With the advent of British colonialism in 1878, the Muslim ruling elites/class of
landowners lost their privileges and gradually lost their influence. The 1881 census puts the
Greek/Christian population to 137,631, whilst the Turkish/Muslim population was 45,458. At the
end of the nineteenth century, one can locate six main groups: High-ranking clerics, who
controlled the large areas of land owned by the Church and the oligarchy of the large land
owners (kojabashis), who formed the ruling class (Katsiaounis, 1996; Hadjikyriakou, 2011).
There was a small section of merchants, mainly Greek-Cypriots, who formed the embryonic
bourgeoisie and became attached to the British establishment. A small layer of petty-bourgeoisie,
namely intellectuals and mainly teachers, were attached to Athens and Hellenic nationalism. The
vast majority of ordinary people were peasants, most of whom owned negligible plots of land.
Finally, there was a numerically small group of artisans/craftsmen, the embryo of the working
class. The vast majority of people lived in conditions of poverty and was largely illiterate
(Lefkis, 1984).
On the other hand, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Turkish-
Cypriots were largely confined to traditional, unskilled occupations. Turkish-Cypriots were fully
dependent on Greek-Cypriots for their vital needs such as law and health. Furthermore, Turkish-
Cypriot town dwellers were dependent on Greek-Cypriot traders for the provision of
consumption goods, while Turkish-Cypriot peasants were dependent on Greek-Cypriot
merchant-usurer capital for both the realization of their produce and the provision of subsistence
goods. Thus, one frequent source of complaint was the extraction of the surplus generated by the
Turkish-Cypriot peasants by the Greek-Cypriot town-based commercial capital (An, 1996, pp. 1–
40). Hence the Turkish-Cypriot ruling elite were relatively underdeveloped in comparison to
their Greek-Cypriot counterparts; this is explained as a result of the late development in the
formation of a Turkish-Cypriot bourgeoisie out of the ruling class. Only after the Kemalist
revolution in Turkey were the processes put in motion for the modernization within the
community that enhanced the conditions for the formation of a Turkish-Cypriot bourgeoisie and
later mass nationalism.
On the arrival of the British colonialists in Cyprus, one could not distinguish a middle
class as such as the merchants were essentially ingrained in a tradition of honor and transactions
of aristocratic nature (Katsiaounis, 1996, p. 16). This code of honor was conserved through
tradition, but was only valid amongst the aristocracy, as the ordinary people, the “reayas”4 were
not considered to be worthy or credible of this treatment, something the British colonialists
found alien (Katsiaounis, 1996, pp. 16-17). The legal developments, from a system of estate,
based on a code of honor to a contract system based on written agreements and commercial
profit illustrate the transformation in the class relations, whereby the newly emergent bourgeoisie
becomes more prominent. It was British colonialism that “modernized” the social structures in an
authoritarian manner from without. However, the old institutions, instead of disappearing, as
would have happened in a revolutionary scenario, were, by and large, transformed and adapted to
the new order (Constantinides, 1995, pp. 33–48; Katsiaounis, 1996).
By the beginning of the twentieth century, conditions changed with the creation of a
small bourgeoisie consisting of merchants, who mustered around them intellectuals and
professionals, such as doctors and lawyers. Although this was the overall schema, the class
boundaries were not very clear as the landowners would many times also be involved in
commerce and merchants would invest in land. Nonetheless, there was no homogeneity in the
group; for example, the merchants/brokers of British products had close ties with the British,
were generally pro-British and conservative, whilst the professionals had a liberal Enosist and
nationalist tendency (Katsiaounis, 1995, pp. 34–35). There were both tendencies in all the
groups, with the most radical, coming from the merchant side, the free masons, who were acting
like a “Jacobin” force as the vanguard of nationalism (Katsiaounis, 1996).5
It was after 1931, with the October uprisings that the class-national question became
more apparent: a popular uprising, largely spontaneous, against the British yoke, with a social
content (Grecos, 1984, 1991). One interpretation is that the 1931 uprising “marks the victory of
the bourgeoisie over the old oligarchy of landowners” (Constantinides, 1995, p. 40). This event
prompted the British to create a “loyal bureaucratic intelligentsia,” rather than relying alone on
the merchant/broker class (Adams, 1968).
However, the class structure and class conflict became much more important in the
national question with the growing independence of labor. The labor struggles by the militant
labor, organized en masse in the 1940s and 1950s in Παγκύπρια Συνομοσπονδία Εργατών (PSE,
the Pan-Cypriot Confederation of Labor),6 and later Παγκύπρια Εργατική Ομοσμπονδία, (PEO,
the Pan-Cypriot Labor Federation), came in conflict with the “ruling bloc.” The latter consisted
of the Church, merchants, and foreign owners of mines and industry, who had the backing of the
colonial authorities (Anthias and Ayres, 1983; Lefkis, 1984; PEO, 1991).
Interestingly, very few studies exist that attempt to incorporate a class analysis within the
national question in Cyprus. The historical account elaborated above reveals that the interplay
between national/domestic and the international constantly reproduces anew the domestic
political, economic, social, ideological, and legal issues, which form the core of the so-called
Cyprus problem (Attalides, 1979; Kitromilides, 1977, 1979; Anthias and Ayres, 1979, 1983;
Trimikliniotis, 2000, 2010).
Studies connecting class and national question often fail to properly integrate the agency,
mediation, and articulation processes by which class locations-interests are “translated” into
political projects and policies, producing mechanical and reductionist readings (Constantinides,
1995). Such perspectives fail to appreciate the genuine oscillation between the different political
alternatives in the context of what seemed actually realizable and the best political option for the
different political groups at the time. Hence arbitrary interpretations are made about “tactical
retreats,” or automated “class choices.” In this process, class factors are crucial; however, these
are mediated via institutions and are manifested as articulations in the class and wider social
struggles. In any case, empirical proof is required; otherwise conclusions are arbitrary analytical
leaps, with a missing link between the class interests and the particular policies. It does not seem
plausible to argue that pro-independence was the dominant view within the ranks of the Greek-
Cypriot bourgeoisie and Greek-Cypriot politics at large, given the pro-Enosis policy of the entire
Greek-Cypriot political spectrum after independence, albeit by other longer-term means. This
was the policy up to 1967, when the policy of the “feasible” («το εφικτό») was
adopted.<xen>7</xen>
Ethnic-national struggles operate in parallel with class struggles, as class politics has
been articulated within ethnic claims, but not necessarily at the same moment, in competition
with class struggles. Class struggles implanted horizontal alliance between Greek-Cypriots and
Turkish-Cypriots (Attalides, 1979; Kitromilides, 1977; Anthias and Ayres, 1983). Social and
political institutions involved in the conflict perpetuated or reformulated either intentionally or as
a consequence of their practice, the ethnic-racial segregation between the two communities.
These institutions include the Church, the Greek-Cypriot bourgeoisie, the Turkish-Cypriot elites,
schooling, and the class-based Left alternative.
Undoubtedly the Church or the “Ethnarchy” was a traditional political leader, whose
head, the archbishop, led the flock under the millet system, remains to date a mass landowner
and has vital commercial interests. The Greek-Cypriot bourgeoisie or at least its dominant
fraction, which included the landed aristocracy and commercial interests, were closely tied with
the Church and the political parties of the Right. Traditionally, the Church had the allegiance of
the petty-bourgeoisie and mainly teachers/intellectuals, who formed the other elements of the
hegemonic historical bloc. There were two elements in the Greek-Cypriot intelligentsia prior to
the 1940s and 1950s: one was attached to London, the other to Athens. By the 1950s, however,
they largely turned to the rhetoric of nationalism and the Church, as a result of the challenge by
the Left. This attachment continued after independence, though by the late 1960s most turned
their allegiance to the Cypriot Republic out of pragmatism and self-interest (Attalides, 1979;
Constantinides, 1995). However, the influence of the Church waned since the death of the last
“Ethnarch,” Archbishop and President Makarios. The Church no longer “leads” the hegemony
of the historical bloc as it has been relegated to one of having a symbolic and ideological role,
with large commercial interests.
Schooling was segregated and personal and literature used was from mainland Greece
and Turkey (Anthias, 1992, p. 43). On the Greek-Cypriot side the Church in collaboration with
the umbrella of Church-orientated intellectuals organized education. It was via this “ideological
state apparatus,” to use Althusser’s concept that nationalism spread in the country: the Church
led the anticolonial struggle, until the appearance of Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Κύπρου (KKK)
(Communist Party of Cyprus), which challenged the Church authority (Anthias and Ayers,
1983). It was only after the 1930s, more specifically in the 1940s and 1950s, that the Enosis
nationalism became the hegemonic Greek-Cypriots consciousness, whilst the Turkish-Cypriot
nationalism would develop into a mass following in the 1950s (Attalides, 1979; Kızılyürek,
1994).
Ethnicity/nationalism and class are intercrossing; class is potentially an alternative
articulation to nationalism, but this is not necessarily contradictory to nationalism. The particular
construction of Greek-Cypriot ethnicity was such that it suited the Church leadership, allied
closely with the bourgeoisie. The Church/and the nationalist historical bloc on the Greek-Cypriot
side and the Turkish-Cypriot nationalistic elite consolidated their hegemony in their respective
communities by undercutting “the expression of horizontal class alliance between Greek
Christians and Moslem Population” (Anthias, 1989, p. 49).
Class elements and programs were articulated within ethnicity; as such the workers’
claims in the late 1940s were articulations of class interests in the anticolonialist struggle
(Anthias and Ayres, 1983, p. 65; Panayiotou, 1994). In this sense then “ethnicity can be seen to
have the ability to articulate different ideological discourses and to represent different class
political interests” (Anthias and Ayres, 1983, p. 65). The class element, however, can be
undermined as it may “obfuscate them through the submergence of the political representative of
a class--the working class party (AKEL)8 --within the ethnic struggle” (Anthias and Ayres,
1983). Furthermore, elements of rural cooperation between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-
Cypriots, through “traditional coexistence” persisted, though diminished greatly, up until 1974.
The most important links, however, between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots were mainly
through trade unions and class-based action (Attalides, 1979; Anthias and Ayres, 1983). This
potential alternative could surpass and penetrate the ethnic boundaries, but was never realized
due to the overwhelming power of the segregationist forces, importing also the “Cold War
syndrome.”
The symbolic and ideological significance, apart from the crudely “material” role of
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Britain, Turkey, and Greece, cannot be ignored or
underestimated. It seemed inconceivable for a small island to oppose great powers, especially
when those who did resist were assassinated by paramilitaries funded and armed by these same
forces.<xen>9</xen>
The Cyprus problem cannot be reduced to a conflict of nationalisms, although the
question of nationalism is a significant aspect of the conflict. As such “nationalism” is
conceptualized and related to the Cyprus problem using a contextual perspective.10
The role of
constitutional/administrative processes can be crucial in the construction of ethnicity in different
ways. They may generate or be actively utilized to build upon them politically, and thus
“politicize” in a nationalist-exclusivist direction of ethnic and religious-cultural divisions. This
process begun prior to independence; in fact the division along ethnic lines was in many ways
strikingly similar to the representational level with the millet system, which the Ottomans had
exercised when they ruled the island (Kitromilides, 1977). With the advent of British colonialism
these became formal-legal with deadly effects (Kitromilides, 1977; Pollis, 1979, 1998; Anthias,
1992). The role of British colonial policy in structuring the particular development of nationalism
in Cyprus is well documented (Attalides, 1979; Kitromilides, 1979; Anthias, 1992, p. 41). The
British constitutional system “was founded upon the assumption of persistent ethnic conflict,
formalized ethnic divisions and was conducive to laying the seeds for bi-national consciousness”
(Anthias, 1992). Furthermore, this meant the bonds between ordinary Greek-Cypriots and
Turkish-Cypriots under the Ottoman Empire, the “traditional coexistence” (Kyrris, 1992), broke
down (Pollis, 1992). It is apparent from the constitutional structure in the representation of the
two main “ethnic groups” in the legislative council the colonialists played one community
against another to ensure that their policies prevailed.<xen>11
</xen>
The post-independence regime in Cyprus was comprised of two opposing nationalist
élites, which had to rule together. In practice, Εθνική Οργάνωση Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών (EOKA)
(National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) supporters and fighters who became ministers of the
new Republic, without restraint spoke in public about the continuing struggle for Enosis until the
end.12
Even the Left (AKEL), the only party that had bridges with the Turkish-Cypriots, was
advocating self-determination-Enosis, but stressing the need for Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-
Cypriot cooperation. AKEL was isolated, effectively excluded from political influence, and a
Cold War type anti-communist suspicion “restrained [AKEL] to a defensive strategy”
(Kitromilides, 1981, p. 46; see also chapter by Panayiotou, Kızılyürek, and Charalambous in this
volume). The “dialectic of intolerance” (Kitromilides, 1979), within and between the two
communities was the major characteristic of the political life in Cyprus. It did not allow Cypriots
to debate and see the potential alternatives of confrontation, to the “predetermined route to
disaster,” such as the creation of a Cypriot consciousness, over and above their narrow racial or
ethno-religious and linguistic-cultural identities/consciousness.
Post-independence Cyprus was a newly established state under a “guarantor system” of
three NATO “allies” which oddly belonged to the non-aligned movement. At the international
scene, the president of the country played one superpower against the other to outmaneuver
successive efforts to shed this strip of land between two expansionist mother-countries, which
threatened the stability of the eastern flank of NATO. Internally, the fine balance contained in
the power-sharing consociation collapsed by 1963 and the ethnic conflict war threatened to
wreck the country apart: the Greek-Cypriot power elite conquered the bicommunal state, as the
Turkish-Cypriot chauvinist elite imposed its siege mentality on the enclaves it controlled. Those
who defied the ethnic division and insisted on intercommunal cooperation in a common state
were silenced, were murdered, marginalized, or ignored. By 1974, the Greek coup and Turkish
invasion completed the de facto partition of a fragmented country, which remained in a state of
limbo until our days.
Soon after the 1974 disaster, Nairm (1979) wondered whether two factors would shift the
sand: first, the realization by the Turkish-Cypriots that their interests diverged from Turkey’s as
the Greek-Cypriots came to realize in the 1960s with respect to Greece. Secondly, the role of the
European Community presented itself as a possible outside force that could alter the relations in
the triangle of Turkey–Greece–Cyprus and create conditions for a settlement. These two factors
did indeed materialize and produce powerful results, but have not yet led to a solution. Together
with Turkey’s internal transformation and the regional/global context, these factors are operative
today and are pushing history forwards. We cannot predict the outcome of this historical process
but we do know that the forthcoming reality will not resemble the current one.
In order to make sense of Cyprus within the world, particularly as regards the theorizing
the state form in Cyprus, we need to map the parameters of what is acknowledged by many
scholars as the peculiarity of Cyprus’ historically speaking “the peculiarity of Cyprus, 1878–
1931” (Holland and Markides, 2008). They start their account with a colonial office minute of
November 28, 1901: “we are hampered on all sides by the peculiar position of Cyprus” (Holland
and Markides, 2008, p. 162). These authors refer to “the unusual limitations in the age of
decolonization” imposed on the Republic and they trace the roots of the different historical path
when compared to Greek islands which united with Greece. The story for Holland and Markides
stops in 1960 as the travails of the resulting Republic are not their concern; they refer to the fact
that “the island was always surrounded by externalities, uncertainties and ambiguities.” We
venture to propose that the big political question to research for the current conjuncture lies
precisely in bringing the story since independence to the present; the idea is to re-evaluate such
contentions today. The so-called “peculiarity” entails one of the theoretical and ideological traps:
“exceptionalism,” which blurs our conception of the political reality as a part of the world at
large. The argument that we dispute is one that takes this “peculiarity” as a given without
questioning it: the notion that our case is so sui generis that makes it incomparable to anything
else is bur smokescreen that aims to results in hindering the potential for learning by comparison.
State Theory: Conceptualizing the State in Its Global Context
The state question in Cyprus is an instance of a specificity that is simultaneously reflective of a
broader regional and global reality. States in capitalist societies necessarily differ from one
another and there can be no general theory of the State<xen>13
</xen> (Jessop, 1990, p. 44). We
resist the analysis that perceives the Cyprus case exclusively as an exception to the norm, whilst
we simultaneously refuse to succumb to the exact opposite trap, which is the typical assumption
that Cyprus is but an instance of geopolitical interests where all is played at a global/regional
map, where Cypriots have no role or significance.
We note the long-standing difficulty in theorizing the state formation[s] in Cyprus. This
is hardly surprising; there is an inherent difficulty of moving from a descriptive theory to a
genuine theory of the state as the descriptive theory is but “a phase in the constitution of theory”
(Althusser, 2001, p. 93).14
A theory as such requires that we deepen our insights into the
apparatus of the state to go further “in order to understand the mechanism of the State in its’
functioning.” In the context of Cyprus, whilst there has been a serious advancement of empirical
studying of the Cypriot state formation(s), the theory of the Cypriot state formation(s), with some
notable exceptions, remains at the descriptive phase. What we provide here is a rudimental basis
for a theorization, in what could be called a prolegomena to a theorization of the state
formation[s] in Cyprus.
The classical readings of the state can guide our attempt to conceptualize the state. Two
broad theoretical approaches can be cited: first, the Weberian or organization-analytic
approaches and secondly, the Marxist or class-analytic approaches.15
Weberian or organization-
analytic approaches emphasize the ways in which states constitute autonomous sources of power
and operate on the basis of institutional logics and dynamics with variable forms of interaction
with other sources of power in society. Marxist or class-analytic approaches anchor the analysis
of the state in terms of its structural relationship to capitalism as a system of class relations
(Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987).
The Weberian conception of a state as an autonomous apparatus that should not be
imprisoned by social forces strongly informs the literature on Cyprus. The argument that the
state in Cyprus is hardly a rational state that acts as a neutral arbiter but embodied and
exacerbated the contestation between the two communities is widely shared by others.16
On the other hand, regarding the state formation in the north, it is noticeable that overall,
the literature produced in Turkish and English is dominated by empirical findings with little
theorization of the state. As Arslan’s chapter in this volume elaborates, most often Cyprus is
described as a problem that belongs to the realm of international relations, and studies that focus
on the domestic dynamics of the Turkish-Cypriot society is rather sparse.
Certainly, TRNC’s relationship with Turkey further complicates the scholarly endeavors
to theorize the state formation. The key question is, can the TRNC lay claim to sovereignty on its
territory--which is the defining characteristic of a modern state--when the administration in north
Cyprus is dependent on Turkey in political and financial terms? Whilst it is correct to state that
the relationship between the TRNC and Ankara is one dependency with and that the TRNC
regime is not a legal entity according to international law, it is rather unconvincing to present the
TRNC as a mere “puppet” of Ankara as has been done in some Greek-Cypriot accounts
(Ioannides, 1991; Yennaris, 2003). Furthermore, TRNC is not a system solely based on military
might. But this does not amount to saying that the TRNC is a normal functioning state. Rather, as
Navaro-Yashin argues,
The “TRNC” can be studied as a two-tiered system, whereby there is a state
administration with procedures, laws and regulations much on a par with legally
recognized states, but the functions of this administration are limited by dependence on
Turkey’s military sovereignty in Northern Cyprus … The “TRNC”, if unrecognized
under international law, is a state which has been formed through the practices and
procedures of modern legal states… In other words, this illegal state is not without
legality in its practices, in its modes of governmentality. (2006, p. 290)
Note that Yashin, despite her criticism of contemporary accounts’ associating bureaucracy with
lack of effect (Yashin, 2006, p. 282; 2012), employs a Weberian conception of bureaucracy as a
“rationalizing apparatus that instigates discipline” (2006, p. 282). It is noticeable that there are a
number of scholars analyzing the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) or Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus (TRNC) that are employing Weber’s conceptualization that distinguishes the state
formations in Cyprus from a modern state based on legal-rational authority. For example,
Faustmann argues that the deep-seated political patronage in RoC undermines the principle of
meritocracy (2010, p. 269), whereas Sonan (2007) depicts the system in the north as
“constituency clientelism and patronage.” Kızılyürek (2010) shares Sonan’s assessment in
categorizing the system as a patronage system.
Such conceptualizations entail a number of problems. First of all, most of the theorizing
on the state in Cyprus is made in terms of contrasts with ideal-typical forms. Mostly the Cypriot
state formation(s) is (are) criticized for not conforming to these ideal types. This position glosses
over the fact that the Weberian ideal type is a mental construct, and treats the ideal type of
Western capitalist state (that is legal-rational state) as if it corresponded to the empirical reality
of developed capitalist societies (Yalman, 1997, p. 91). The state is seen as a neutral arbiter, a
neutral agent of social transformation, independent of social classes and Weber’s conception of
idealized bureaucracy--which is the key vehicle of the state as a neutral arbiter--constructs
bureaucrats as totally depoliticized, socially disembodied, and in rational pursuit of a self-evident
national interest (Pempel, 1999, p. 144). Yet there is a need to underline that even if bureaucrats
make their own rules, these rules are developed and enforced with the interests of certain groups
within the society in mind. Every decision implemented by bureaucrats has socioeconomic
foundations. It is absurd to claim that policies devised by bureaucrats in modern nation states
operate in pursuit of self-evident and unproblematic national goals, whereas policies
implemented by bureaucracy in settings like Cyprus are merely about pleasing different sections
in the society.
The “institutional materiality” of the Cypriot State Formation(s)
A key issue is how to examine the “institutional materiality” of the Cypriot state formation as
the different forms and phases it passed reflect various struggles/conflicts. When examining the
particular way the Cypriot state formation took place and the role its colonial predecessor has
played in the ethnicity–class conflict and in anticolonialism, this constitutive role of the state is
particularly relevant.17
This basic notion of postcoloniality was taken up explicitly as well as implicitly in
describing and theorizing the “moments” or aspects of Cypriot administrations and power
structures. The literature of the immediate post-1974 period up to the early 1980s, mainly from
Greek-Cypriot scholars, viewed the Cyprus problem in a critical manner and particularly critical
of the role of NATO, British policies, and the role of British colonialism. Some Turkish-
Cypriots, however, reached similar conclusions (see Salih, 1978); however, most Turkish-
Cypriot scholars originally treated the advent of the Turkish army and partition with relief. Their
approach is assertive of Cypriot independence from Western dependency, promoting
reconciliation between the two communities and linking Cyprus to the Non-Aligned Movement,
in line with the postcolonial and “Third Worldist” tradition. In the post-1974 period, insightful
and creative works provided the basis for the rethinking of policy on Cyprus.18
Some of the texts
placed emphasis on the internal dynamics of Cypriot society, without ignoring the international
factors. Other works look at the role of nationalism and ethnic conflict in Cyprus (Loizos, 1974;
Stavrinides, 1978). The “dialectic of intolerance” was perceived as a postcolonial remnant, and
the legacy of colonialism was the ideological framework of political life, which was
characterized by an absence of serious dissent that would challenge the dominant social and
political life of Cyprus, which resulted in the weakening of social critique (Kitromilides, 1981,
pp. 451–453).
The later versions of theorizing of “state and society” refer essentially to the Greek-
Cypriot controlled state and society. In the literature on RoC, undemocratic elements, and
deficiencies in observing the constitution (Ierodiakonou, 2003; Attalides, 2006), a so-called
“atrophy of civil society” and “clientelist neocorporatism” as a characteristic of Greek-Cypriot
society have been underscored (Mavratsas, 2003, pp. 119–157). There are strong elements from
“modernization” theory, many with a Weberian-derived logic: this is circular argument that
assumes that the state has not [yet] acquired the bureaucratic logic of the “rational-legal”
paradigm due to the inherently insufficient and institutionally deficient modernization of the
state/country. Accession to the EU will eventually achieve this, the argument goes.
Gramsci’s contribution to the study of civil society provides an approach different from
the dominant Western approaches (Gramsci, 1972), which was proved quite influential and
innovative in the development and renewal of Cypriot sociological thought. A number of studies
that open up thinking against the dominant Weberian-pluralist model have drawn on Gramscian
thinking. The essential features of this difference contained in Gramscian and other radical
perspectives is that such perspectives are critiques to the dominant perspectives, in their liberal
and conservative variants, from the vantage point of drawing out the potential for, or the
structural constraints to, radical social transformation. Gramscian reading have been instrumental
in opening routes for rethinking and activating social and political transformation via
empowering the subaltern, renewing radical thought and praxis, as well as liberating it from
reductionist and dogmatic (mis)readings of Marxism which was dominant in the Stalinist era.
Such readings are particularly fruitful when trying to rethink the state and the global: there is a
vast literature and different disciplines from social history, to cultural, subaltern, and
postcolonial studies to international political economy.19
In the context of Cyprus, Gramscian-inspired critiques led to a variety of ideological and
political orientations and approaches from Marxist, to anarcho-syndicalist to post-structuralist
and postcolonial readings (Trimikliniotis, 2000, 2010). Moreover, Panayiotou (1999, 2005;
2006) adopts a Gramscian reading of the Cypriot context in what is the most comprehensive
study on the role of the Left within civil society, and sketches out an alternative view of civil
society, modernization, and development of Cypriot/Greek-Cypriot political culture: the Left has
historically played a crucial role in Cyprus’ own route to modernity in the twentieth century, but
the contest for hegemony between the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot elite resulted in a
distorted public sphere and shaped the civil society accordingly. There are others who have been
influenced by Gramsci.<xen>20
</xen> Another type of theorization can be considered to be
deriving its inspiration primarily from the critical, postcolonial theory:21
these are Greek-Cypriot
readings of the RoC--the “stronger” state of a “weak” postcolonial regime.
The Cypriot States of Exception: New Insight into Theorizing the State
in Cyprus?
Constantinou aptly refers to “the Cypriot states of exception” (Constantinou, 2008, pp. 145–164)
to exemplify the multiple exceptionalism that defines the political-legal order of Cyprus, where
one exception generates another. This brings us to the heart of “the Cyprus problem,” which cuts
across the country and naturally intersects with the operation of the acquis in a de facto divided
country. The invocation of exception is blurring the distinctions between legality and illegality,
normality and abnormality. It opens up “opportunities” for those in power to extend their
discretion in what Poulantzas referred to as authoritarian statism or as Carl Schmitt (2005)
underlined, long-established regimes of exception allow the sovereign to decide when and how to
invoke the emergency situation. In emergency situations, the normal democratic order and rights
are suspended; power is exercised by the forces that actually control and determine on the
ground that it is an emergency situation. This may last indefinitely.
In this sense, Cyprus is a bizarre case in which the distinction between the “exception”
and the “norm” is not easy to decipher. When “norm” and “exception” are so intertwined and
interdependent, the “grey zones” of edges, or what is assumed to be the edge, become the core.
Agamben (2005, p. 1) argues that current global reality is characterized by a generalized state of
exception, then we ought to examine the intersection between norm and exception in the specific
EU context: “the question of borders becomes all the more urgent,” indeed. The reference here is
that at the “edges” of law and politics, there is “ambiguous, uncertain, borderline fringe, at the
intersection between the legal and the political.”22
The analytical insight into the ambiguity and
uncertainty of “the no-man’s land between the public law and political fact” and between the
judicial order and life must move beyond the philosophical and the abstract to the specific legal
and political context, if it is to have a bearing on the socio-legal and political reality that is
currently reshaping the EU.
There is an abundance of literature which is essentially apologetic of each of the ethnic
states of exceptions, following the collapse of the bicommunal regime in 1963–1964. It was this
collapse that generated the RoC state of exception, known as “the doctrine of necessity.” This
doctrine was legitimized via the Supreme Court in the famous case of Mustafa Ibrahim--the court
considered this extraordinary excerpt to be so significant that it was put as part of the summary
judgment (p. 97):<xen>23
</xen>
This court now, in its all-important and responsible function of transforming legal theory
into living law, applied to the facts of daily life for the preservation of social order, is
faced with the question whether the legal doctrine of necessity discussed earlier in this
judgment, should or should not, be read in the provisions of the written Constitution of
the (RoC). Our unanimous view, and unhesitating answer to this question, is in the
affirmative.
Apologist-type studies often are, as Constantinou (2008) aptly points out,
legalistic in character, safely assuming the jurisprudential basis of the doctrine, and
simply looking at its interpretations and applications. Such works take the Roman maxim
salus populi suprema lex (people’s safety is the supreme law) for granted, without being
concerned with “whose safety” is secured and at what price.
Greek-Cypriot apologist accounts, which argue that the “doctrine of necessity” is a valid system
of law,24
as there are equivalent Turkish-Cypriot accounts that argue the complete opposite for
the doctrine of necessity but are apologist accounts for the TRNC.25
However, a number of
critical studies are making their appearance (Constantinou, 2008; Trimikliniotis, 2007, 2010a,
2010b). The fact that a number of critiques to the state of exception in Cyprus have been
published and are beginning to have some influence on public debates opens up ways of viewing
the state in Cyprus in a more critical manner (Constantinou, 2008; Trimikliniotis, 2009, 2010a,
2010b; Trimikliniotis and Demetriou, 2008, 2011). Constantinou’s (2008, p. 145) starting point
is
Certain states of exception are more comfortable than others. Even while they appear
problematic or absurd to those experiencing them they can still be judged preferable—
less bad, less risky—than available alternatives.
The basic argument elaborated elsewhere is that the Cypriot states of exception, in the forms of
the Greek-Cypriot “doctrine of necessity,” the “TRNC,” the British “sovereign bases,” the
“Green line” are undergoing a process of long-term erosion and de-legitimization, in spite of the
efforts to re-legitimize them, an aspect Constantinou perhaps overstates. We may begin to talk
about an “organic crisis of the Cypriot state of exception,”26
but as Gramsci would have it, “the
old is dying but the new is yet to be born”. Moreover, the logic of exceptionalism is to justify
authoritarian “solutions” and it thrives even when the doctrines invented as apologetics are under
crisis.
Conclusions
Many perspectives on the Cyprus problem, despite their very different ideological and
methodological outlook, can complement each other and set out various aspects, albeit in a
fragmental manner, and thus provide the basis for theorizing the particularity/globality dialectic
of the Cypriot postcolonial condition. However, what is missing is a holistic reading that would
try to critically string such perspectives together in a manner that would properly grasp the
vitality and actual agency of the local dynamics and potential for social-political action. Most
readings are not concerned with such issues, as they are either interested in recording the
specificity within the “global” or the “regional,” or cannot go beyond the fact that the situation in
northern Cyprus is fundamentally different in terms of the unrecognized state formation highly
dependent on Turkey, as a result of which they fail to grasp the wider processes within which to
locate this state formation.
This chapter aimed to locate gaps in knowledge and critiqued the approaches to the
theorization of state formations in Cyprus. It offered a rudimentary frame of understanding of
State formations in Cyprus, arguing for the need to further elaborate a theorization of the state in
Cyprus beyond the descriptive and empiricist accounts. It then placed the theorizations of the
state formations within the conflict in the country. In addition, via such a rethinking the chapter
aimed to illustrate that the interest in the case of Cyprus is not confined to its contextual
specificities of area studies, because it lends itself as an interesting instance in comparative
politics, state formation, and international political economy of a localized condensation of local,
regional, and global conflicts. The case of Cyprus is a subject of study that extends beyond local
interest, not so much due to the divisions of the past, but due to the processes unleashed at the
moment, which create the potential for a new Cyprus drawing from the lessons of the past
fragmentations. Only via a multilayered and complex theory that assesses the role of
“imperialism” today, nationalism, class, and other social conflicts, inter- and intra-regional state
projects and rivalries, can we gain the insight to appreciate it and devise the necessary strategies
and tactics.
Notes
<fn-group type=“endnotes”>
<en><label>1</label>See the relevant chapters by Trimikliniotis, Panayiotou, Rooksby, and
Arslan in this volume.</en>
<en><label>2</label>Realism relies on the problematic argument whereby the state is perceived
as a single actor capable of identifying goals and preferences and determining their relative
importance (Pease, 2010). In that sense, it conceptualizes rational state as a potent actor that can
override the many conflicting interests in society and act as an autonomous power, in the name
of a “putative national interest.”</en>
<en><label>3</label>The term δραγομάνος also means “translator” today.</en>
<en><label>4</label>“Ραγιάς,” which was a derogatory term referring to Greeks as well as all
non-Muslim subjects as slaves during the Ottoman Empire. It derives from the Turkish raiyye,
taken from the Arabic ra`iyah herd, flock </en>
<en><label>5</label>In the 1926 Legislative Council, out of the nine Greek members, four were
usurers, three were lawyers, one was a landowner and the other was a bishop, which goes to
show the kind of people who were in the administration (Storrs, 1938, p. 473). “Money lending”
was a thriving business in an environment of mass poverty of ordinary people, who were forced
to put as security their little personal property, to borrow on extortionate interests. The result of
this was the accumulation of mass property in the hands of moneylenders (Lefkis, 1984). The
Church as well as the Ekvaf was also involved in moneylending (Constantinides, 1995, pp. 45–
46).</en>
<en><label>6</label>This is the first trade union organized in Cyprus, not to be confused with
SEK, the right-wing trade union organized in reaction to Left-wing PEO.</en>
<en><label>7</label> For instance Constantinides argues that class processes are not properly
empirically backed in the situation in 1974, prior to the coup and the invasion. He argues that the
support of the bourgeoisie for Makarios was waning in favor of Grivas, which led to an
increasing need of Makarios to rely on AKEL and EDEK. He is conflating here the crisis in the
military elites and regime in Greece and the EOKA-B ramp in Cyprus with the (Greek-Cypriot)
bourgeoisie. In fact the junta regime in Greece was undergoing a severe internal crisis at the time
and in early 1974 EOKA-B, was according to most analysts, destitute. The coup was a desperate
move of the junta to “complete” its “plan” to get rid of Makarios, and his Communist supporters,
and “unite” Cyprus, or at least part of it with Greece, even if it meant granting part of it to
Turkey. The Pentagon was fully aware of these moves and did nothing to prevent them
(Hitchens, 1984; Attalides, 1979).</en>
<en><label>8</label>AKEL, Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζομένου Λαού (Progressive Party of
Working People).</en>
<en><label>9</label>Constantinides (1995) for instance consistently underestimates this. He
seems to overstate the importance of domestic over international affairs and when he does
discuss the international he deals primarily with Greece and Turkey, and little with the United
States and Britain. He also overstates the conflict of interests between the United States and
Britain, which may be different at times. However, it is misleading to see them as having
fundamentally opposing interests; there may be a difference in emphasis rather than conflict of
interest as such. After all NATO is an umbrella, which may be dominated by the United States,
but Britain and other western European countries are part of it. When discussing the forces
supporting independence for example, he fails to specify what kind of “independence”. He states
for example that “the British favored independence,” as did the dominant faction of the Cypriot
bourgeoisie (commercial-broker section) and that later AKEL became a consistent supporter of
independence. However, all political goals cannot be painted with the same thick brush simply
because one’s failure to distinguish between the different independence scenarios. There is a
qualitative difference between a Zurich–London type of independence, which is NATO-
supervised or fettered independence with foreign troops and bases, and a genuine political
independence, without foreign bases, troops, and guarantees.</en>
<en><label>10</label>The study of the phenomenon referred to as “nationalism” has undergone
a process of drastic expansion over the last 20 years, but this note only refers to those studies
relevant to this thesis.</en>
<en><label>11</label>Representation of nine Greek-Cypriots, three Turkish-Cypriots, and six
British officials with the Governor having the casting vote. Only once a Turkish-Cypriot
Member of the Council, a Kemalist who was friendly toward the Greek-Cypriots, was when he
voted against the taxation proposal. Soon after that the British dissolved the Legislative
Council.</en>
<en><label>12</label>On the radio, for example (Attalides, 1979, p. 55).</en>
<en><label>13</label>We use capital letter for “State” whenever we want to emphasize it or
when it is a subject of enquiry, unless it is quoted otherwise.</en>
<en><label>14</label>In his famous article “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus (Notes
Toward an Investigation),” pp. 92–94; see Althusser (2001).</en>
<en><label>15</label>The variety of conceptualizations of the state mostly draws on one of
these two main approaches.</en>
<en><label>16</label>This is the typical reading of legal scholars such as Tornatides (1982),
Chrysostomides (2000), and Soulioti (2006), as well as political and sociology scholars such as
Kyriakides (1967), Markides (1977), and Attalides (1979).</en>
<en><label>17</label>This dynamic perception provided by Poulantzas (1985, 1980, 1975) is
used to consider the construction of the Cypriot State form.</en>
<en><label>18</label>We are referring to the works of Attalides (1977, 1979), Kitromilides
