Reworking Democracy: Contemporary Immigration and Community Politics in Vancouver's Chinatown

Pergamon Politid Geography, Vol. 17. No. 6, 729-750, 1998 pp.

0 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd All rights reserved. Printed in Great Britain

PII:SO9624298(97)00070-X 0962-6298/98 $19.00 +O.OO

Reworking democracy: contemporary immigration and community politics in

Vancouver’s Chinatown

KATHARYNE MITCHELL*

Department of GeograpQ, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195, USA

ALISTRACT. This paper examines the political repercussions of large-scale immigra-

tion from Hong Kong on a pre-existing Chinese community in Vancouver, Brit-

ish Columbia. Through an examination of the context of these migration flows,

and through a discussion of two case studies of political challenge and

institutional transformation in Chinatown, the fieldwork reveals how internal

political change and the reworking of the normative democratic values of

Canadian society reflects not a linear movement of assimilation to the dominant

values of the ‘modem’ nation state, but rather the historical context of a non-

linear transmigration network. 0 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved

KEYWORDS. democracy, immigration, community, Chinatown, Hong Kong,

assimilation

Introduction

How do democratic values and practices change in immigrant communities? What is the

effect of rapid and large-scale immigration on the political structures of established socie-

ties? In this paper I attempt to answer these questions by examining the process of politi-

cal transformation in Vancouver’s Chinatown, British Columbia. The paper analyzes the

effects of two major periods of migration between Hong Kong and Vancouver on the

primary political structures within the Chinese community. Although there is a significant

body of research on the impact of large-scale migration on wider ‘host’-society dynamics,

particularly in the economic sphere, there is a dearth of studies focusing on the ramifica-

tions for pre-existing immigrant communities. Those few studies that have foregrounded

the immigrant communities have also tended to emphasize the economic over the politi-

cal, examining, for example, the effects of recent immigration on labor markets, consump

tion patterns and/or the establishment of immigrant enclaves (eg. Portes and Bach, 1985;

Portes, 1990; Sassen-Koob, 1980; Piore, 1979). Here, by contrast, I draw out the complex

political ramifications of large-scale immigration on urban institutions and community

governance.

Analyzing the impact of successive waves of immigration on the political structure of

l Tel: 206543-1494. Email: [email protected]

730 Reworking democracy

immigrant communities is useful in three ways. First, it foregrounds the link between

local institutional change and global transnational processes. Examining the transforma-

tion of political institutions in Vancouver’s Chinatown in the context of global economic

restructuring and geopolitics enables a conceptualization of change that crosses scales.

As Kevin Cox (1996: 668), puts it, ‘scales are linked practically’ and local politics is always

more than the politics of local government (see also Smith, 1990). In examining the

changing discourse of democracy in the local politics of a Chinese community, for example,

it is possible to discern the impact of transnational forces and coalitions that otherwise

might only be theorized at the level of the state or the articulation of capitals. Examining

the ‘interpenetration of scales’ (Cox, 1996: 668) gives greater insight into the manifold

processes that influence political activity, particularly, in this case, the ways in which civil

societies are democratized and/or move away from western-style, normative understand-

ings of democracy.

The emphasis on the interconnections between global and local processes also allows

for a greater understanding of the ways in which the social and political organization of

sending societies, receiving societies, and the smaller networked communities within

them interlink and work to transform each other in an ongoing process. Instead of

sojourners OY settlers, foreigners OY locals, migrants become identified as transnational

players involved in the ongoing transformation of numerous disparate communities

worldwide (Guam&o, 1994; Gilroy, 1996; Glick Schiller et al., 1995; Ong, 1993). As older

center-periphery models become obsolete, new ways of thinking about community and

ethnic&y are opened up that emphasize the scattered movements and allegiances between

locations and identities (Grewal and Kaplan, 1994).

Furthermore, the emphasis on the impact of international relations, of global restructur-

ing and of the non-linear movements of people and capital on local communities aids in

the ongoing critique of assimilation theory. Despite widespread research that has prob-

lematized the fundamental assertions of the assimilation perspective, writings narrating

linear assimilation patterns have proven remarkably tenacious. Although there is some

variety within this iiterature, the main theme has been the projection of a linear, sequential

path for immigrant groups from a starting point of relative difficulty, discrimination and

constraint within the ‘new’ society, to increasing cultural knowledge, acceptance and

eventual assimilation and mobility. Beginning primarily with the Chicago School in the

193Os, this perspective has waxed and waned in popularity, but has never completely

disappeared from immigration studies (see Gordon, 1964; Warner and Srole, 1945; Sow-

ell, 1981; Vecoli, 1977; Handlin, 1941, 1951).

Assimilation theory perspectives are disrupted when global, transnational processes

are incorporated into the analysis because assimilation theory relies heavily on assump-

tions of a ‘core’ culture and of a ‘basic patterned sequence of adaptation’ (Portes and

Manning, 1986: 47). It also relies on a fundamentally closed system, and ascribes an

inherently ‘backward’ worldview to all immigrant groups-a worldview that changes

along proscribed lines as the ethnic groups slowly become acculturated to local, host

society dynamics and cultural values. Theorizing global-local interconnections challenges

assimilation perspectives precisely by opening up both cultural and economic processes

to a broader scale. Rather than reading migration and assimilation as a sequential move-

ment of homogenous individuals to and through a homogenous migrant community, ana-

lyzing these processes in terms of successive dislocations and disruptions related to a

global economy and global political sphere enables us to see the manner in which mstitu-

tions and identities are challenged and transformed in an ad hoc, non-linear, highly

KATHARYNE MITCHELL 731

contingent manner (see also the studies in Lambert and Taylor, 1990; Buenker and Rat-

ner, 1992). As can be seen in the case of institutional change in Chinatown, the effort to ‘democratize’ various political organizations was affected not so much by incremental

acculturation to Canadian norms, but rather by the successive interactions with the latest wave of immigrants from Hong Kong and Taiwan.

Second, analyzing the impact of consecutive periods of immigration on the political structure of immigrant communities is useful because it forces a recognition of internal community dynamics as heterogenous and contested. Generational and class differences between the older members of the community and newer arrivals often lead to bitter struggles over community events, funding, representation and the right to define community boundaries and meanings (see, eg. Erdmans, 1995; Campa, 1990; Saito and Hor- ton, 1994). There is an ongoing power struggle between different groups within these communities that is fundamental to an understanding of political dynamics, yet is often rendered opaque by broad-brush analyses.’ Studies that emphasize these internal challenges and local-local dynamics yet remain attentive to the positioning of the community within a global context, avoid many of the theoretical lacunae associated with both assimilationist and structuralist perspectives-perspectives which tend to posit either a unified community culture or singular structurating force through which individuals are interpellated as fundamentally non-differentiated subjects (see also Ortner, 1995).

The third way in which analyzing the impact of consecutive periods of immigration on the political structure of immigrant communities is useful is in the ongoing deconstruc- tion of the term ‘democracy.’ Democracy is a highly contested term that has varied in meaning through time and place, and that is the source of great philosophical and political deliberation worldwide.* Despite its complex origins and divergent traditions, however, contemporary politics in liberal western societies generally draw from normative understandings of liberal democracy which emphasize the rule of law, the right to vote, and the right to be represented by a government. This understanding is implicitly accepted as the ‘modern’ form of democracy, and the spread of this form throughout the world in the last few decades has enabled conservative thinkers such as Francis Fukuyama, in The

End of History, to proclaim that we have reached ‘the end point of mankind’s ideologi- cal evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government’ (cited in Benhabib, 1996: 3).

This ‘modern’ form of democracy encompasses aspects of both liberal and republican models, and to a certain extent, also the deliberative-proceduralist model of philosophers such as Jurgen Habermas, although it draws most fundamentally from a liberal tradition. These models differ in the conceptualization of the role of the state, either as the guard- ian of a market-society (in the liberal vision), or as the promoter of an ethical community (in the republican model) or as part of a more decentered, procedurally-oriented society in the conceptualization of Habermas (see Benhabib, 1996: 6). Despite these differences, however all of the models rely on a western-based philosophical tradition stemming from Greek philosophers through to Enlightenment thinkers such as Hobbes, Mill, Rousseau and Locke (Arendt, 1958; Held, 1995, 1996; Sandel, 1996). In this tradition, significant emphasis is placed on individual rights, responsibilities, needs and choices guaranteed or protected to some degree by a governing body. In this paper I argue that it is the assumptions implicit in these emphases and this tradition that are called into question through an examination of the differing emphases, traditions and transformations within the community politics of Vancouver’s Chinatown.

In addition to conflicting western conceptualizations, there are also different democratic legacies in Chinese societies. The contemporary Chinese intellectual, He Kin, for example,


has argued that the Greek-inspired model of democracy should not be seen as a standard

with which to judge the ‘real level of democracy’ in other societies. He believes that

democracy (in China) should be aimed at ‘allowing the people to enjoy sovereignty over

the administration of state. Indeed, democracy is just a means, not a purpose-as Mao

Zedong correctly described’ (Quoted in Sorman, 1990: 22). His conceptualization of the

nature of democracy is one that emphasizes process, consensus and broader, societal

good, rather than individual rights, responsibilities and choices guaranteed by the state.

This type of understanding focuses less on the egalitarian individual and more on the

social body and social process; it is, in some ways, closer to both republican and proce-

duralist theoretical models, and to older forms of democracy in western society that

emphasized popular rather than representative democracy (see Williams, 1976). It is also

similar to the understanding of democracy held by members of some of the older politi-

cal institutions in Vancouver’s Chinatown.

An examination of the way that this older, or more ‘traditional’ understanding of the

nature of democracy is challenged by newer immigrants from Hong Kong and Taiwan,

forces a broader conceptualization of the manifold, often hybrid meanings associated

with the term. The analysis points to the cultural construction of democracy and shows

some of the ways that as a hegemonic construct it is always in process and always under

negotiation (see Hall, 1988). It also manifests the manner in which local democratic

values and practices are inexorably influenced by global, transnational processes (see also

Mitchell, 1997).

In this paper I pursue these three themes through an examination of the inter-

community political repercussions stemming from two major periods of migration between

Hong Kong and Vancouver. Examining the context of these major migration periods is

crucial for understanding the ways in which the political economy of both the societies

of departure and arrival have affected the institutional transformation of the Chinese

community. By emphasizing the importance of the geopolitical and gee-economic context

of migration, and of the different kinds of migrants who have arrived in each migration

period, it is possible to see the numerous links between global and local processes and

transformations.

After the establishment of the earliest Chinese settlement in Vancouver in the late 19th

century, prohibitive Canadian immigration policies ensured that Chinese migration was

at first greatly constricted, and then completely banned between 1923 and 1947. The lirst

major movement of people from Hong Kong to Vancouver in the post-war period occurred

after an important reversal in Canadian immigration policy in 1962. Migration between

the regions continued to grow following this policy shift, but changed in tenor after the

expansion of the ‘business’ category of immigration in 1984. In this category, investors

and entrepreneurs wishing to enter Canada, who could inject capital and business expertise

into a Canadian business, would be able to obtain visas without waiting in the immigra-

tion queue (Nash, 1987; Smart, 1994; Mitchell, 1993) Throughout the late 1980s Hong

Kong led as the source region for this category of immigrants, as thousands of wealthy

Chinese migrants moved from Hong Kong to Vancouver during this period (Smart, 1994:

104-105, Lary, 1995).

Although it is difficult to pinpoint precise causal links between the entry of one group

of migrants and changes in the institutional politics of a community, it is clear that there

is a connection between the political demands for a more open and inclusive style of

democratic representation in one of the key Chinese institutions in Vancouver in the late

1970s and the immigration of a substantial number of highly educated professionals from

Hong Kong during the same time period. Similarly, a link can be made between the


immigration of businesspeople in the late 198Os, and the profound struggles over the

future leadership and values of another key political association in 1993. In both these cases the transformation of local politics is greatly influenced by the new migrants’ values,

especially in the understanding of democracy and community representation. Furthermore. the manner in which the understanding and manipulation of the democratic principles of the Canadian state are brought into internal community politics shifts as new immigrants join the community at different time periods. The shifting awareness and usage of the Canadian court system to challenge the authoritarian control of key political associations in Chinatown reflects both the political and economic period in which the migrants left Hong Kong and arrived in Canada, and the constitution of the migrants as subjects zlis-

hi-vis their class orientation and political and cultural allegiances. Through an examination of the context of recent migration flows, and through a

discussion of the two case studies of political challenge and institutional transformation within the Chinese community, I show how internal political change and the reworking of the dominant democratic values of Canadian society reflects the historical context of a non-linear transmigration network. In what follows I describe some of the early Chinese community associations, then outline Canadian immigration policies and the social and political contexts in which they were made. I then examine the post-war Chinese community, with a focus on Chinatown itself. How was the community affected by the arrival of successive waves of immigrants from Hong Kong? In what ways were traditional organizational patterns challenged and/or transformed? And how did this reflect on the political values and practices of democracy?

Traditional community organizations in Chinatown

Immigrants from four counties in the Say-yup region of the Pearl River Delta formed the bulk of the early Chinese settlers in Vancouver. A few of the earliest migrants were merchants. but the majority were peasants and laborers fleeing the Opium Wars, internal political uprisings, and a poor economy in the southern region of the country (Yee, 1988). The major Chinese immigration into the lower mainland of British Columbia occurred during the building of the Canadian Pacific Railroad between 188 1 and 1885. During this time, 17 000 migrants arrived to work on the railroad or to provide services associated with the railroad economy. It was at the end of this building period, as the railroad neared completion, that the first efforts were made to restrict Chinese immigration. In 1885, after several provincial efforts had failed, the federal government passed the first Chinese Immigration Act in an effort to block new arrivals. The obstacles outlined in the law included a $50 head tax and a limited number of immigrants allowed per ship. Following the passage of this law, there was a significant reduction in immigration from southern China for several years, although migration was not completely halted until 1923.

Although there were a few merchant families in the first group of 19th century arrivals. the typical migrant profile was of a male laborer of rural origins and little or no education (Wickberg, 1982: 14). One of the central features of the early migrant community was the mutual aid organizations. The literature on the social and political structure of urban overseas Chinese communities focuses primarily on the organizing principles of these types of associations, generally known as voluntary associations. Voluntary associations (she tuan) provide a mode of social grouping for Chinese immigrants and remain the most prevalent form of social organization in many overseas Chinese societies (Topley, 1960; Yao, 1984). Although other immigrant groups have mutual aid societies. ‘none ot them produces as proportionately large a number of cross-cutting associations as do the


Chinese’ (Willmott, 1968: 30). The importance of these organizations for the community

cannot be overestimated, as they play crucial functions in every area of social, economic,

political and cultural life.

Voluntary associations include those formed on the basis of a common regional place

(huiguan) and those formed on the basis of kinship. They also include overarching,

‘umbrella’ organizations such as the Chinese Benevolent Association (CBA). There is

some overlap in these associations, and many of them interlock in various ways depend-

ing on historical context (Crissman, 1967: 191). In the early 20th century, the huiguan

provided services such as capital loans, lodging, the provision of tickets back to China,

burial fees, and protection from scams and dishonest dealings within the community. The

CBA generally represented several different associations and often made high level policy

decisions with regard to economic and cultural practices within the community, as well

as political relations with the ‘host’ government (Crissman, 1967; Skinner, 1958).

The CBA in Vancouver was founded sometime around 1889, incorporated in 1906, and

remained the dominant force in the community through the 1960s. As the oldest and

largest association in the community it had substantial claims to community leadership,

and acted as the primary intermediary between Chinatown and the wider Canadian

society. Despite a number of changes toward more inclusive representation in the 1940s

and 1950s however, the CBA was heavily dominated by older men associated with

traditional associations such as the huiguan. These associations continued to operate on

the basis of ascribed ties (familial or regional) and particularist values and connections.

Members of voluntary associations based on fraternal or religious or athletic ties such as

the Lions, the Elks, the churches, and the Chinese Veterans Association, which were open

to all members of the community, were not invited to sit on the CBA board. In addition,

following the civil war in China, the position of the CBA board vis-Avis the politics of

China became increasingly autocratic. The executive board was heavily dominated by the

Kuomintang and openly supported Taiwan as the only legitimate government of China.

Through the 1960s there were few, if any, young Chinese professionals in leadership

positions within the CBA (Wickberg, 1982).

The question of how and why these community associations change over time is a

crucial one that has been addressed only sporadically in the China studies literature. Will-

mott’s (1970) traditionalist-modernist typology postulates a spectrum of associations

beginning with those oriented toward what he terms more ‘traditional’ Chinese values

and loyalties and ending with those oriented towards more ‘modern’ or universal ones.

In this framework, the modernist associations appeal more to the younger, better educated

and more culturally assimilated Chinese in an overseas society; older immigrants who

were born in China, the ‘moral sojourners’, would be more apt to belong to the traditional-

ist associations. Through time, the traditional organizations decline and the modern ones

begin to dominate community politics.

If democracy were to be considered in this model of change, more traditional democratic

values and practices would be held up as those which foregrounded the ideology of

authority, consensus and broader community good; modern democratic values would be

seen as those based on more western-style conceptualizations of individual rights and

choices, especially the right to debate openly and freely in a public forum. Scholars fol-

lowing this line of thinking, which draws from assimilationist perspectives, would assume

a simple process of declining traditionalist concepts and rising modernist ones in the

context of a ‘modern’ liberal democracy such as Canada. Contemporary research, however,

has shown this type of progression does not always occur (Wickberg, 1994, 1982;

Armentrout-Ma, 1983; Yao, 1984).


As with assimilation perspectives, one of the main problems with the theory of a general institutional shift from more ‘traditional’ organizations to more ‘modern’ ones is the assumption of a linear sequence of events. Another major lacuna is the western- centric nature of the model, which positions contemporary western organizational norms and practices as modern and progressive, and Chinese values as traditional and backward. A final problem is the undertheorization of the crucial role of post-war immigration in community change. In the case of the transformation of Chinese community associations in Vancouver, I argue that contemporary immigrants from Hong Kong have been able to position themselves as both insiders and outsiders to the preexisting community. As a result of this inbetween positioning, they have been able to galvanize forces of change within the community that might otherwise have succumbed to inertia or political inlight- ing, yet they have not posed a major threat to the existence of the community. Bather than a sequential movement from traditional to modern, however, the new migrants have inaugurated ideas and values that can be considered relatively more or less ‘traditional’ or ‘modern’ depending on their own subject positions and on the historical and geographical context of their emigration.

As with broader assimilation narratives, western-based conceptualizations of democracy, and a projected linear sequence of change from a more ‘traditional’ democracy to a more ‘modern’ democracy fail to capture the contingent nature of immigrants’ experiences or the fluctuations within communities. Institutional changes in the Chinatown community have shifted back and forth, and have resulted primarily from the disjunctures fomented by immigration policy and the heterogeneity of the immigrant arrivals, rather than an assimilation to the cultural and political norms of the modern nation-state. In the examples discussed below, of the Chinese Benevolent Association and the Chinese Cultural Center, the struggles over the appropriate mode of democratic representation and debate in these associations have not followed a singular path of progress from traditionalism to universalism. Instead, they have been challenged and contested by both recent migrants and local born residents in a manner that confounds this type of linear and western- centric theorization.

Immigration and the global economy

The second world war initiated a number of changes in the relationship between the Chinese community and the wider society, but the most important factor in the transformation of community politics after this time was the easing of immigration policy. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1923 was repealed in 1947, the same year in which Chinese were fully enfranchised. Immigration from Asia increased in the 1950s but it was not until 1962, when new regulations removed the country of origin as a major criterion for admission, that direct, legal migration began to flourish. With the curtailment of direct migration from China to Canada in 1949, Hong Kong became the most important source of Chinese migration. By 1967, when immigration policy was overhauled completely and

the last discriminatory elements finally removed, the first group of Chinese migrants who were judged on the basis of skills and education, rather than solely on kinship ties or sponsorship began to arrive in large numbers from Hong Kong (Wickberg, 1982, 1994).

The two most important post-war periods of immigration from Hong Kong included the time following the transition to a ‘points’ system in 1967, and the period after the expansion of the business immigration program in 1984. Statistics show a considerable increase in immigration to Canada from Hong Kong after 1967, burgeoning in the years between 1973 and 1976. Many of these emigrants left Hong Kong during these years as


a result of a series of political disturbances in 1967 and 1968 and a general fear of both

economic and political instability in the colony. The next period of a rapid, large-scale

movement of people between Hong Kong and Canada began in 1987, just one year after

the modification of the business immigration program to include more eligible applicants.

The numbers of people of Chinese origin who settled in the Vancouver metropolitan

area during these years grew markedly. In 1961, census figures show the total population

of those claiming ‘Chinese Single Ethnic Origin’ as approximately 18 000.’ By 1971 this

number had grown to 36 405, and by 1981, it had risen to 83 845. In the census of 1991,

the total population of those of Chinese ethnic origin in the city numbered 167 420. This

increase was far greater than the general population increase for the metropolitan area as

a whole, which rose from 706 165 in 1961 to 1 602 502 in 1991.

In 1962, the shift in Canadian immigration policy away from ethnicity and country of

origin as the main criteria of admission, and toward education and training, was made in

tandem with policy changes in the United States and later in Australia and New Zealand.

In Canada, the reasons for the changes were manifold, but stemmed from two important forces. The first force was primarily political, and related to the growing pressures for the legal institutionalization of a policy of at first biculturalism and then multiculturalism. This policy was an attempt to accede to ‘French Canadians’ demands for equality in the nation-building process [which] spilled into other areas of social and civic life’ (Smith, 1993: 57). The end of a discriminatory immigration policy at this time was thus part of a much broader set of liberal changes in Canada that would culminate in the Charter of Rights and the enshrinement of multiculturalism as official national policy (Mitchell,

1993).

The second major force was largely economic, and was related to the advantages accruing from a system based on achievement and education rather than on national origin, race or color. The points system privileged those with the education. skills, and training that were presumed to be beneficial to the growth and wellbeing of Canada. Applicants were given ‘points’ based on education, age, occupational demand, proficiency in language, vocational training, and destination, among other criteria. In contrast with policies of the past, which encouraged the entry of unskilled rural laborers, and then the sponsorship of their relatives, the new system favored urban, middle class applicants with a particular trade or professional skill.

With the economic and social liberalizations instituted by the government of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau in the early 197Os, the opportunities for people with the types of skills and background held by many of these new, ‘unsponsored’ Hong Kong immigrants, vastly increased. Thus it was during a period of national opening-literally in terms of immigration policy, economically in terms of a more laissez--faire market, and institution- ally, in terms of a major reworking of the nation’s legal and judicial mandates-that the first large influx of urban professionals arrived from Hong Kong. These migrants left a colonial outpost in the midst of major struggles over questions of political authority and legitimacy and joined a nation in a period of widespread liberalization and political change.

The second major migration from Hong Kong to Canada was also related to economic and political factors in both countries. In Hong Kong, the primary consideration for emigration in the 1980s was the pending transition to China’s control in July, 1997. The signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1984

was the first clear indication that the transferral of power would take place as scheduled.

After this, and especially following the massacre in Tienanmen Square in 1989, there was a major increase in Hong Kong emigration worldwide (Skeldon, 1994). Although the type


of migrant leaving Hong Kong during this period varied, and included many in the ‘retired’

and ‘family’ classes, there was a particularly large increase in the migration of the wealthy.

Much of the movement of this upper strata group to Canada in the late 1980s can be

attributed to the refinement and extension of a new business immigration program in

1984. This program, which was first implemented in 1978, was designed to facilitate the immigration of businesspeople who could ‘make a positive contribution to the country’s

economic development by applying their risk capital and know-how to Canadian busi-

ness ventures which create jobs for Canadians’ (Employment and Immigration Canada,

1985: 1). The category allowed investors to skip processing queues if they had, among

other qualifications, a personal networth of at least C$500 000. Entrepreneurs were required to invest a minimum of $350 000 (in B.C.) into a Canadian business over a three

year period (Smart. 1994; Nash, 1987, 1993). The attempt to stimulate business and expand trade was an important impetus for the

officials of the conservative Social Credit government to look toward Asia for new

opportunities. In the context of the rapid economic growth of the NICs in the 197Os, and

the geographical connections between Pacific Rim cities, Hong Kong provided an extremely

attractive lure for federal, provincial and municipal politicians. Political trips, cultural fairs, business seminars, brochures, flyers, pamphlets and the opening of a B.C. office in Hong Kong were among many of the strategies used by Canadian politicans to attract the

capitalists and their capital from Hong Kong (Mitchell, 1993). For Vancouver, this

multifaceted strategy proved particularly successful, as many businesspeople intending to leave Hong Kong were drawn by the relative proximity of the city (in comparison with

Toronto), the quality of life (widely touted by the province and city), and the historical

ties related to the past migrations of family and friends. Statistics show not only vast increases in the emigration of the best educated and highly skilled from Hong Kong during this time, but also flows of capital reckoned in the billions of dollars4

The great majority of the new migrants who came to Vancouver under the investor and entrepreneur categories in the 1980s were urban, most having lived in Hong Kong at least ten years. For many of these ‘business’ immigrants, the attractions of cities such as

Vancouver were primarily political and social rather than economic. Aside from invest- ment in real estate, business opportunities in general were far greater in Hong Kong’s

booming economy than in British Columbia in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As a result, many migrants chose to live part-time in Vancouver, and part-time in Hong Kong. Business- men flying between the two cities were soon labelled, Tai /zong ren or ‘astronauts’ by

virtue of the inordinate amount of time spent in the air (Ong, 1993). In the 1970s the social and economic context of receiving and sending societies was

such that a predominant number of highly educated men and women with professional degrees left Hong Kong to move to Vancouver. In the late 1980s the most influential

group to move between the two cities were businesspeople and their families. Both these groups of migrants differed in many respects from the Chinese immigrants of earlier years. The differing constitutions of the migrants in terms of their class orientation, education, and training, and the different international contexts of their movements has led to different types of struggles and changes in the various communities in which they have interacted. In the next section I examine some of the repercussions of the arrival of these two different migrant groups for the Chinese community in Vancouver. In particular, I focus on the challenges to the CBA and its style of democratic representation and political leadership within the community, and the creation and subsequent challenge to a new voluntary association, the Chinese Cultural Center (CCC).


Reworking democracy in Chinatown

Following the second world war, the huiguan flourished for a brief time by virtue of their

ability to send remittances back to villages in China. By the 196Os, however, these types

of voluntary associations were experiencing a general decline. Cut off from China owing

to the repercussions of the cold war and the Cultural Revolution, the ability of the

associations to carry out their traditional functions related to maintaining connections

with a home village or clan decreased. At the same time, new kinds of community needs

grew with the large numbers of immigrants arriving without sponsorship. A few of the

larger huiguan remained powerful through their affiliation with centers of influence

such as the CBA, but the majority of the ‘traditionalist’ associations became moribund

(Wickberg, 1982: 230).

As the relevance of the huiguan declined, the demand for new kinds of associations

and for the reform of existing institutions grew accordingly. From the Iate 1940s through

the 196Os, the CBA was dominated by directors with a strong allegiance to Taiwan and

the Kuomintang (KMT) party. Lam Fong, for example, served as the senior co-chairman

of the CBA and the president of the KMT during the same period in the 1960s. During

that time, two thirds of the 15-person executive board of the CBA were KMT supporters.

The CBA was also publicly active in its support of Taiwan and condemnation of the

People’s Republic of China (China). In 1967 the organization was one of 285 which took

out a full-page advertisement in The New York Times urging the United Nations not to

admit China into its international body. It was also heavily represented by members of

the more traditional associations-older men who served as directors of both the hui-

gum and the CBA. The CBA remained the most influential organization in the community

through the early 1970s but its right to speak ‘for’ the community became increasingly

contested as a consequence of its increasingly rigid political stance.

The major struggles over the leadership and direction of the CBA began following

Canada’s recognition of China in 1970 and Prime Minister Trudeau’s visit in 1971. The

recognition of China’s sovereignty and the establishment of the consulate in 1973 gave

legitimacy to positive sentiments about China and allowed for competing interpretations

of the sources of authority within the community. As voices for change grew louder and

new organizations were formed which backed China, the KMT extended its grip on the

CBA. According to newspaper sources and pamphlets from the early 1970s two

underground KMT organizations were formed that became directly linked with the CBA.

These two secret organizations were called the ‘enemy-dealing team’ aimed at suppress-

ing suspected Communist sympathizers, and an ‘overseas affairs team’ specializing in the

infiltration of existing Chinese organizations to consolidate KMT power (Bell, 1977;

Grant, 1971; Chow, 1977). The KMIXBA links were disputed for many years by the

chairmen and directors of the CBA. In 1977, however, many of these allegations were

vindicated after an internal KMT memorandum written by the chairman of the CBA

became public.

Up until 1971, the CBA had been dominated by executive board directors who were

sympathetic to the Nationalist Government of Taiwan for a number of different, often

overlapping reasons. Although there was a general consensus to support the government

(manifested in the display of the Taiwanese flag), and although the association emphasized

harmony, authority and respect for tradition, there was also room for internal disagree-

ment and for the possibility of change. Members of the community were elected to the

directorship of the CBA from among the locality associations and from the members at


large, and were expected to represent the community as a whole. (Forty-one of the sixty- one CBA directors were appointed by the associations and twenty were elected by members at the CBA’s annual conventions.)

At the Second National Conference of the CBA, held in Vancouver, in 1971, however, public elections to the CBA directorships were ended and a new (secret) constitution was written for the association. Furthermore, many local Chinese organizations and the Chinese public were not informed of the convention’s time or meeting place. According to one Vancouver delegate who had served as chairman of the CBA in 1958 and from 1960-1965, delegates who were not sympathetic to the KMT or who were neutral to the politics in China and Taiwan were verbally harassed at the meeting (Sing, 1972: 8). Furthermore, it was made clear through the dispatch of a supportive telegram to President Chiang Kai Shek, that the politics of Taiwan preempted both Canadian national and local politics. The telegram read: ‘Lead the counter-attack to recover the mainland, save the people from misery. We, the delegates from the ten provinces of Canada attending the Second National Conference of CBA, on behalf of the 120 000 Chinese in Canada pledge faithful devotion to the Republic of China and utmost dedication to the government as rear guards.15 This convention matked the beginning of a major shift in the democratic procedures of the CBA.

Following this convention, the community associations were only able to send non- voting observers to CBA conventions, and voting privileges were restricted to delegates from CBA branches. Elections were held every three years rather than annually. Accord- ing to interviews and to many newspaper sources in both the Chinese and English language press, the organization became a direct arm of the KMT and a vocal and powerful lobbi- est for the government of Taiwan (Vancouver Sun, Aug. 13,1977; Oberlyn, 1977: Chinese Cultural Centre Reports, 2. No. 6, 1977, Vol. 2, No. 5, 1977; Ming, 1973; Mah, 1977. Despite the lack of democratic representation, however, the association continued to act as the primary voice of the community, and obtained federal and provincial support from the Canadian government through the 1970s (Vancouver Sun, Aug. 15, 1977). As several new organizations were established during these years to meet the needs of the new immigrants, competition over these government funds became increasingly intense. A major power struggle between the leadership of the CBA and the newly founded Chinese Cultural Centre erupted in the mid-1970s and embroiled the Chinese community for several years. Much of the debate revolved around the meaning and practice of democracy.

The CCC, which was established in 1973 for the purpose of building a cultural center for the community, was the target of a series of bitter attacks from directors of the CBA. After it had garnered the support of many of the most prominent professionals and 53 of the organizations in Chinatown, the early fund-raising efforts by the CCC were extremely successful. This early success, the ambitious plans for a large and central community space, and the democratic leadership style espoused by the founders of the new organization threatened the dominance and traditional authority of the CBA in the political and social affairs of the community. In response to this threat, several directors from the CBA formed a rival association in 1977, which called itself the Chinese-Canadian Activity Center (CCAC). This organization applied

to the federal government requesting funds for a community centre nearly identical to the one planned by the CCC founders. At the same time, a smear campaign against the CCC was launched in the Chinese press, in which the the CCC was labelled as an organization ‘belong- ing to the Communist Party (Sing Tao Zhi Bao, May 26, 1977).

The rancorous debate between the CBA and the CCC spread through the community and began to hinge on the question of democratic representation. Several articles in the Chinese Times, the main Chinatown newspaper through the 1970s questioned the process through which representatives were elected to the CBA. In these articles democracy


was narrated as an open, public process. In one editorial from 1973, the writer equated the Canadian system with a democratic society and argued for greater openness in the procedures of the CBA. He wrote:

In a democratic society, public opinion is considered to be most important.

Bodies which are elected democratically by the people are the governing bod-

ies, such as the parliament, legislature and city council. These are governing

bodies under the Canadian democratic system. In our Chinese community,

there is also a so-called ‘highest governing body of the Chinese’-the CBA. But

this is in name only, because it is controlled and abused by a small group of

people. For every public organization or the highest governing body of the

Chinese, the least it can do is to hold public election, and to have a complete

constitution and organization. On the contrary, failure to announce the election

publicly and proceeding secretly with internal agreement can only alienate the

community; it cannot lead nor have the confidence of the people (Editor, Chinese

Times, May 24, 1973).

In a later article, the right of the CBA to speak for the community was contested. The editorial staff demanded public answers to questions related to the constitutional procedures of the organization. The emphasis on the dissemination of knowledge to a general public for purposes of decision-making and debate is a key component of the liberal model of democracy, in which the public sphere is understood to be an arena where participants are equally informed and rationally debate matters related to the community welfare. This type of liberalism stems from a western-based tradition and is part of the founding principles of the British legal system (see Rawls, 197 1; Habermas, 1989; Kymlicka, 1991). It has also been an important force in the establishment of the British

colonial empire (see Asad, 1990). What is interesting in this case is the way in which a community organization relying

more on a ‘traditional’ conceptualization of democracy (based on hierarchy, consensus and communal good)-is contested from within the community by the language ofwestern- style liberal democracy (based on a conceptualization of equal process, representation and individual rights). The CBA’s move away from rather than towards an open, public and egalitarian system of debate and election in the years after 1971 is challenged by a new force within Chinatown. This force was composed largely of highly educated immigrants from the post-war period. The Chinese Cultural Centre, which became one of the leading voices in the demand to ‘democratize’ the CBA, was composed largely of employed or self-employed Chinese professionals, many of whom had immigrated to Vancouver in the 1960s and 1970s. The leading founder of the association, Dr. S. Wah Leung, for example, was a professor of oral biology and dean of the UBC faculty of dentistry who had immigrated to Canada in the late 1950s.” This educated and activist political force brought in new terms and understandings to the political debates over the future of community institutions. The editor of the Chinese Times wrote:

In order for the readers and the Chinese public to understand whether the CBA

National Headquarters truly represents all the Chinese in Canada or not, we

request that the highest official of CBA publicly answer the following questions:

1 What is the complete content of the registered constitution?

2) What are the detailed procedures for election of offtcers?

3) How are delegates from various cities (especially Vancouver) elected?

4) What cities do the present executive members represent? (Editor, Chinese

Times, June 22, 1973).

,bT”ARYNE I~‘~ITCHELL 741

In addition to the Chinese Times, several other organizations within the community

began to call for greater public disclosure and greater public representation in the CBA. This general demand culminated in 1977 with the formation of two groups with the express intent of changing the association’s democratic procedures. The first was called the Committee of Concerned Chinese Canadians (CCCC), and the second, a spin-off group formed at the end of the year, was known as the Committee to Democratize the Chinese Benevolent Association (CDCBA). Both of these organizations began a concerted, highly vocal campaign against the CBA that was reported in both the English and Chinese language media. The most vociferous battle occurred in August, when the B.C. provincial secretary, Grace McCarthy, hosted a luncheon for CBA delegates during their fourth national conference. The CCCC, which opposed the conference and the provincial support of the lunch, said in a statement to the press, ‘The conference is being convened by the illegally constituted Vancouver branch of the CBA, which has not held free and democratic elections for many years.’ (Quoted in the Vancouver Sun, Aug. 13, 1977,

p. 13). During the conference the CCCC protested outside the convention headquarters, and

circulated a pamphlet entitled, ‘Return the CBA to the Chinese Community.’ The pamphlet, which began, ‘A hoax of the democratic process is about to be replayed again,’ went on to describe the CBA as a ‘tragic organization, composed of worn out, decrepit souls’ which ‘pretend(s) it represents all Chinese Canadians.’ The pamphlet devoted one section to the ‘Undemocratic Election Process of CBA and another to ‘The Total Disregard for Local Community Issues.’ Another section of the pamphlet disclosed the connections between the Chinese Canadian Activities Center (CCAC) and the CBA, accusing the Vancouver CBA of using the national conference ‘to lend legitimacy to a puppet organization.”

In its August and September bulletins in 1977, the Chinese Cultural Centre joined in the public denunciation of the efforts by the CBA to support a rival association (the CCAC) for the building of a community center. They also demanded and won a retraction from the newspaper, Sing Tao, for the article of May 26, which claimed a connection between the CCC and the Communist Party. In the September report. the Chairman of the CCC, Dr. S. Wah Leung, made it clear that further libel would result in legal action within the framework of the Canadian court system (Chinese Cultural Centre Reports, 2, No. 6, 1977, September. Following an interview published with Liberal MP Simma Holt in the Toronto Sun, the cultural centre and its 31 directors tiled a libel suit in B.C. Supreme Court against Holt and six other defendants for statements that were allegedly false, malicious and defamatory (Chow, 1977, p. Al).

In many CCC reports in 1977, the association repeated its position as ‘an open democratic organization (where) membership is open to everyone regardless of race, creed or belief (eg. Chinese Cultural Centre Reports, 2, No. 5, 1977, August. In the chairman’s letter of September, Dr. Chung declared that the centre ‘is now the truly representative organization of the entire Vancouver Chinese community and is the one organization providing positive and constructive leadership for and on behalf of all Chinese-Canadians’ (Chinese Cultural Centre Reports, 2, No. 6, 1977, September. The iteration of a style of leadership and representation based on public debate and open elections was made repeatedly and was deliberately contrasted with the undemocratic, secretive procedures of the CBA.

The lack of constitutional democratic procedure in the CBA was foregrounded in two front-page articles in the leading English-language papers in Vancouver, the KZncouzJer Sun and the Province, in December, 1977. In these articles it was disclosed publicly that the CBA had two different constitutions-an English language version from 1925, which


was on file in Victoria, and a Chinese language version that had been adopted in 1971,

but had never been filed with provincial authorities. In a TV debate between Andrew Joe

of the CDCBA and the CBA spokesman Y.C. Mah, it became clear that in the context of

the later, unregistered constitution, organizations and individuals who supported China

were prohibited from voting in CBA elections (Chinese Cultural Centre Reports, 2, No. 6, 1977, September, p. 4. This stipulation, and others, were not part of the earlier constitu-

tion and were challenged in court by members of the CDCBA.

As a result of the internal contradictions between the 1925 constitution and the 1971

constitution, the leaders of CDCBA were able to argue in the B.C. Supreme Court, for a

return to the rules of the public, registered document as opposed to the later, ‘secret’

document. In 1978 the Canadian courts decided that the CBA was required by law to fol-

low their own constitutional procedures as outlined in the earlier constitution of 1925.

In this constitution, an annual general meeting was required in which the board of direc-

tors were elected by the huiguan as well as by individual members of the CBA. A general

meeting was immediately called in 1978, and following major campaigning, leafletting

and enlistment of supporters, the entire slate put forward by the CDCBA was elected to

become a new executive and board of directors (Chinese Cultural Centre Reports, 3, No.

5, 1978, p. 1. The CCC interpreted this overwhelming victory as a sign that ‘the Chinese

community wants the Chinese Benevolent Association to return to its former role of serv-

ing the needs of Chinese-Canadians of this area and to cease supporting policies report-

edly dictated by a foreign political party and a foreign government’ (Chinese Cultural

Centre Reports, 3, No. 6, 1978, p. 1.

According to Bill Yee, the lawyer who took the case to the B.C. Supreme Court and

was subsequently elected to be a member of the board of directors of the CBA, the ‘pres-

sure for leadership in the community to facilitate change’ was greatly influenced by the

late 1960s influx from Hong Kong. He said that prior to the 197Os, Chinatown functioned

largely as a ‘traditional Chinese community’ with ‘traditional business involvements.’

With the rise of younger, second generation immigrants in professional schools (such as

himself), and the post-war Hong Kong immigrants, however, there was greater pressure

on the leadership of the community to ‘accommodate the changes brought by this group,’

to ‘be more Canadian’ and to ‘get more into politics’ (Author’s interview, July, 1996). The

initial idea for the Chinese Cultural Centre was brought up in the context of this demand

for greater political involvement and for a transformation of ‘old-style’ democratic under-

standings within the community. After the Premiere of the province agreed to support

the new center financially, it began to receive recognition and widespread interest.

According to Yee, the CBA leadership was invited from the earliest moment to participate

in establishing the cultural center, but rather than joining the effort, they established the

CCAC and applied for the same government funds in order to block the new center. He

said:

The CBA expected the CCC board to be handed over to them. When the founders said no, the CBA said no to participation. The CBA was resistant to the more open political system advocated for the CCC. They wanted control of the board and no elections (Author’s interview, July, 1996).

The victory of the CDCBA in the 1978 B.C. Supreme Court ruling and in the subsequent

election manifested a new current in the politics of the community. Young, urban-based

professionals who had largely immigrated to Canada after 1967 allied with second genera-

tion, local born Chinese residents to demand a new type of community association and

a new type of leadership in Chinatown. This generation of highly educated immigrants


and residents challenged the political orientation of the older associations, as well as the political process itself. In mounting this challenge the new guard attacked what they perceived as a democratic system relying on hierarchy, internal consensus and respect

for authority, and promulgated instead a more ‘modern’, open and equal system of debate and elections.

In the following section, however, I show how the terms of this challenge shifted once again with the entry of an even more recent influx of immigrants from Hong Kong in the late 1980s. By contrasting this second case study with the first, I hope to demonstrate both the impact of a shifting global political and economic environment, which produced a different kind of immigrant group, and also the highly contingent nature of democratic evolution.

The Chinese cultural centre 1993 elections

In 1993 another major challenge was posed to the established leadership in Chinatown, but this time it was the directors of the Chinese Cultural Centre whose leadership was contested. Once again, the issue of democracy was emphasized, and once again, an influential influx of immigrants from Hong Kong galvanized the debate. Despite the Centre’s early support of the goals of the CDCBA in promoting a more open and democratic process in association elections, its own board had come under attack by the late 1980s for a perceived insularity and traditionalism. Jane Chan, a lawyer who had served on the board during this time period, claimed that the CCC board was ‘badly run’ and ‘not accomplishing anything’. She also characterized it as ‘not democratic’, with ‘power held by a few’ (Author’s interview, July, 1996).’ In addition to the problems she felt were endemic to the political process itself, she was also angered by the position that the board took in continued support of China after the Tiananmen massacre in 1989. Because of her desire to change these things, Chan, along with twenty-four other young professionals, campaigned for election to the board of directors in 1993. The group ran under the banner of the ‘Chinese Cultural Centre Renewal Committee.’

The Renewal Committee, which claimed to be more open and more responsive to the recent changes in Chinatown, was composed entirely of professionals, eight of whom had been in Canada less than ten years.g The Committee challenged the sitting directors of the CCC on two main points: the lack of an open, democratic and professional organizational process (manifested most obviously in the attempt to amend the Centre’s constitution in 1992), and the Centre’s ongoing political allegiance with the PRC. On the first score, Patrick Chen, a lawyer and former CCC director wrote in an article in the Chi-

natown Neuls,

Our commitment to offer ourselves to the membership as candidates for the board originated in the campaign to oppose the amendments to the Centre’s

constitution at last year’s Annual General Meeting. The small group in charge of

the Cultural Centre’s Constitution Committee tried to push through resolutions

amending the constitution which would have: I) restricted membership by

requiring that all applicants first be approved by the board; 2) restricted the

right of members to vote and to run for election by requiring them to have been

members for 60 days instead of 30 days; 3) destroyed the democratic concept

of voting at large by reserving 11 of the 31 seats on the board for ‘organization

members’ (Chen, 1993: 7).“’

Chen went on to note that these changes may have jeopardized the Centre’s tax-exempt status with the city, but even more importantly, were ‘antidemocratic and not in the best interests of the membership.’


According to Jennifer Lim, a member of the board in 1996, the attempt to render the constitution less democratic was part of a general organizational mode in the CCC in the late 1980s and early 1990s which was ‘very inward looking.’ She believed that ‘despite the increase in immigrants and new needs’ of the community, most of the board was still controlled by elderly individuals who were ‘locked in’ to older cultural values. Lim claimed that the new immigrants were more liberal and open-minded, and wanted to hire professional people and run the association more systematically, and less on the basis of favorit- ism and ascribed relationships (Author’s interview, July, 1996). Nelson Tsui, a lawyer and member of the Renewal committee said in an interview, ‘We want the board to be directly accountable; we want the process to be open.’ He claimed that the politics in older Chinese-Canadian institutions had been based on the traditional Chinese model of respect for authority. But younger immigrants, living in democratic Canada, want ‘to see that

context applied, rather than 5000 years of Chinese history, which is not democracy’

(Quoted in Appelbe, 1993: 10). The other major criticism that was launched at the CCC board was its political ties with

China. Following the Tiananmen massacre on June 4th, 1989, the board made the decision to attend the October 1st National Day banquet held by the Chinese consular general. They also voted against the erection of a statue of the Goddess of Freedom in the Sun Yat-sen gardens, commemorating the massacre. These two decisions infuriated many of the younger members of the board, and engendered widespread community criticism. According to both Chan and Lim, the continued endorsement of China during this time raised the issue of the strong economic ties with China held by several members of the board. Bill Yee, in particular, was noted as having important ‘business contacts with China. ’ ’ ’

The Renewal Committee’s public allegations of undemocratic procedures and shady financial dealings in turn angered the CCC board, who labelled the new group, ‘elitist social activists’ and portrayed them as young, urban professionals who were new to Canada, yet wanted to take over from the old pioneers who had built Chinatown. The board and its supporters formed a group called the ‘Committee to Maintain the Com- munity’s Participation in the Cultural Centre.’ This group began a strong counter-attack in which they depicted themselves as more traditional and respectful of history and authority; they claimed to be composed primarily of the older family and regional associations, the Chinatown merchants, and a working class core. In an article defending the CCC board, the Executive Director, Fred Mah, upheld the leadership of the association, and spoke against its increased politicization. He represented the CCC board as ‘moder- ate’ and the Centre’s positions as ‘apolitical’ (Mah, 1993: 2).‘*

The debate between the Renewal Committee and the Maintain group became increasingly rancorous as the elections approached in April. By the time of the Chinese Cultural Centre election on April 25, there were 74 candidates running for 31 seats (an all-time high), and 7800 eligible voters. Before the election campaign started, there were only 1849 Centre members, but 5000 new members signed up in the last week of eligibility in late March. This late membership drive prompted many Renewal candidates to charge that elder Chinese from around the Lower Mainland had been brought into the election for the express purpose of boosting the Maintain vote (Bula, 1993, p. B1).t3 The internal dispute within the community became widely known following a number of articles in the Vancouver Sun, and one in the Toronto newspaper, the Globe and Mail. In these articles, the battle was largely portrayed as the Hong Kong yuppies versus the Chinese old guard.14

As with the earlier debates in the 1970s the challenge to an older, established, and

IC\THAHYNE IMITCHELL 745

traditional organizational system was made by a coalition of recent Hong Kong (and Taiwanese) immigrants and second and third generation Chinese professionals. In the two situations both the political process and the political orientation of the established group was challenged. Despite the CCC’s early origins as a new, invigorating force in China- town, by the late 1980s it had become entrenched in an old-style, traditional politics of authority and consensus. This emphasis culminated in 1992 in the attempt to limit the types of members who could be elected to positions of power on the Board of Directors. It was also evident in the strong desire to seem neutral and apolitical in the context of overseas politics. As many Renewal candidates pointed out, however, the decision to attend the People’s Republic of China banquet in 1989 and not to erect a pro-democracy statue or plaque in the garden were themselves political statements. As with the earlier interrogation of the CBA leadership and its relations with the KMT, the board’s economic connections with China were raised and its financial dealings questioned. In both these cases, the money links between regions and individuals were brought to the fore by a group claiming some degree of ‘outsider’ status.

The outsider status allowed members of the Renewal group to challenge the CCC’s democratic practices and connections with China, but it eventually led to their defeat at the polls. (The Renewal group’s entire slate of 25 candidates was defeated. The Maintain group’s slate of 12 candidates were all elected, as were the 19 independent candidates whom they endorsed). Despite fairly diverse representation, Renewal candidates were squarely positioned as brash, young arrivals from Hong Kong. And although immigrants from Hong Kong represented a wide spectrum themselves, including refugees. family class migrants and the working class, the general sentiment about Hong Kong immigrants as arrogant and wealthy was fueled by the influx of business migrants in the late 1980s. It was this undercurrent of negative feeling about new, ‘rootless’ immigrants who only lived part-time in Vancouver and didn’t respect the history of Chinatown or its working class core, that was effectively manipulated by the Maintain group. (One Renewal candidate claimed that older people yelled ‘you should be ashamed of yourself’ as they walked by her to the polls.) (Author’s Interview, July, 1996). In the context of a yuppy ‘takeover’, the old guard of Chinatown closed ranks, upheld a more ‘traditional‘ vision of organizational authority, and moved away from the open, ‘unselfish and democratic procedures’ advocated by members of the Renewal committee (Quoted in Mah, 1993: 2).

Conclusion

In this paper I posed the question of political change in immigrant communities, asking what impact immigration has on a preexisting community’s democratic values and practices. I argued that this type of analysis can be useful in three ways: first, as a way of foregrounding the link between local institutional change and global processes; second. as a reminder of the heterogeneity of both migrants and community residents; third, as a way to examine some of the assumptions implicit in ‘key words’ such as democracy.

In foregrounding the link between local politics and global processes I introduced the themes of scale, transnationalism and assimilation. I argued that much of assimilation theory has relied on western assumptions of trdditionalism and modernity, as well as on a trajectory of progress that follows a sequential path. In the case studies discussed above, I attempted to show how assumptions such as these are unhelpful for analysing political change in immigrant communities. Assimilation to the democratic norms of a ‘modern’ liberal state, for example, does not necessarily follow a linear or sequential path. In the case of Vancouver’s Chinatown, the political movement towards and away from a more


‘modern’, western-style conceptualization of democracy and the democratic process was

influenced by a wide variety of factors, including shifting global economic rationales and

agendas, as well as an ever-changing national context of migration. It was these transna-

tional forces moving unevenly across scales that had the greatest influence on community

politics and identities, not a local and contained, pre-ordained march toward the acme of

‘modern’ liberal democracy.

In this paper I also addressed the question of conceptualizations of democracy that

diverge from western-based traditions. Philosophical deliberations over what best

constitutes a democratic process vary widely in the west, yet liberal democracy, the most

prevalent form of democracy in western societies (including Canada), is often presumed

to be the ‘true’ democracy against which all other forms are measured. In the struggles

over political formation in Vancouver’s Chinatown, however, it is possible to see differ-

ent traditions and understandings about the nature of democracy converging and coming

into conflict. Understandings within the older political institutions, such as the CBA, for

example, foregrounded consensus and institutional and community good over individual

rights and choices guaranteed by a constitution or the state. This understanding was

sharply challenged by new immigrants from Hong Kong, along with second and third

generation-born Chinese, who argued that this way of thinking did not constitute a true

democracy. Significantly, this group (the Committee to Democratize the CBA), took their

grievances outside of the community, and used the Canadian court system to overturn

the perceived ‘undemocratic’ operations of the CBA. Furthermore, in subsequent elec-

tions to the association, they outlined their position in terms of individual rights, procedural

rights and constitutional rights-all major components of a western liberal tradition.

In contrast with the CBA elections of the 197Os, the attempt by Hong Kong immigrants

and others to promulgate a more ‘modern’ democratic approach in the Chinese Cultural

Centre failed in 1993. As the latest influx of transnational business migrants attempted to

join the political institutions of Chinatown, their allegiance to the local knowledge base,

traditions and historical memory of the community were questioned. While their posi-

tion as wealthy high-fliers gave them the ability to express criticism of the status quo, it

also resulted in community resistance to the changes advocated by this new cosmopolitan

and ‘sojourning’ immigrant class. Despite the earlier movement toward an expansion of

liberal democratic values and practices, community members rejected the same ideologi-

cal arguments in the 1990s.

What is interesting in these cases is the manner in which different democratic concepts

and practices are contested through time, and always reflect the socioeconomic context in

which they occur. In the struggles over the leadership of the CBA and the CCC it is possible

to see some of the many forces that impact community identity and political transformation.

In the last three decades a key process affecting the Chinese irmnigrant communities in

Vancouver has clearly been the arrival of two post-war generations of Hong Kong Chinese

professionals and businesspeople. These two groups, however, have influenced the com-

munity in completely different ways. It is only by examining these migrations in their histori-

cal context that the particular configuration of economic, political and cultural events and

ideologies can be understood as they apply to institutional and community change.

Acknowledgements

Research funding for this project was provided by a subsidy from the Pacific Cultural Foundation of

Taiwan, and by the Royalty Research Fund at the University of Washington. I would also like to thank

Edgar Wickberg for his generous assistance and the sharing of his research files.


NOTES

1. One of the few flaws of Anderson’s (1991) otherwise brilliant book, Vancouver’s Chinatown, is

exactly this type of broad-brush analysis. Although alert to the minute details of racial formation

as defined and imposed by the wider Canadian society, her study is less attentive to the internal

dynamics within the Chinese communities she studies. In this research I take the opposite tack,

emphasizing instead the heterogeneity of the community and the many struggles over political

formation in the context of increased Chinese immigration from Hong Kong. In a sense, Ander-

son’s (1991) earlier work has enabled this project, as it has opened the space for an emphasis on

internal community dynamics, while serving as a constant reminder of the impact of racism and

European hegemonic constructs on the community’s overall development.

2. For just a few contemporary studies, see Benhabib, 1996; Trend, 1996; Jelin and Hershberg,

1996; Held, 1996, Lefort, 1988. In this paper I am less concerned with the nuanced philosophi-

cal debates on democracy than with how normative understandings of democracy in liberal

Canadian society have infused contemporary politics, and how these understandings affect the

internal debates within the community politics of Chinatown.

3. The actual figure is 17 263 but does not include data for a number of sub areas, including Fraser

Mills, Port Coquitlam, Port Moody, the University Endowment Area, and White Rock. These areas

are included in the later census figures, The statistics are taken from the Census of Canada 1961,

Population: Ethnic Groups (1962); Census of Canada 1971, Population: Ethnic Groups (October,

1973); Census of Canada 1981, British Columbia Population, (April, 1984); and Census of Canada

1991, Profile of CMAs and CAs-Part B (October, 1993).

4. In 1992, for example, the total emigration from Hong Kong was in excess of 100 000 people. In

1990, ‘fully 66% of emigrants of working age and 34% of total emigrants could be considered

“managers and administrators, professionals and associate professional” workers’ (Skeldon, 1994:

30-31). For estimates on the amounts of capital moving between Hong Kong and Vancouver,

see Mitchell, 1993.

5, Quoted in pamphlet, ‘Return the CBA to the Chinese Community,’ by the Committee ofConcerned

Chinese Curtudiuns (nd). Research on the history and contemporary conflicts in Chinatown

was conducted by the author in July and August, 1996, and follows several years of fieldwork in

Vancouver and Hong Kong. Twenty-three in-depth interviews were conducted during the month

of July. Much of the archival material cited here is anonymous and undated and can be found in

27 boxes in the Special Collections Division of the University of British Columbia library under

the title, ‘Chinese Canadian Research Collection.’ This extraordinary material was collected over

several years primarily by three scholars: Edgar Wickberg, Graham Johnson, and William Will-

mott.

6. Lists of the early directors of the CCC show a preponderance of professionals. See Chinese

Cultural Centre 10th Anniversary, 1983, p. 9. Of the 43 nominees for director in 1983, 29 were

in the professions or real estate. See the ‘Chinese Cultural Centre of Vancouver Notice of the

1983 Annual General Meeting of Members’, March 28, 1983. In a breakdown of donations to the

CCC in 1977, Chinese professionals accounted for 21.4% of the total donation figure. See Chinese

Cultural Centre Reports, 2, No. 2, May, 1977, p. 7.

7. This pamphlet can be found in the Chinese Canadian Research Collection, Box 17.

8. Owing to the ongoing sensitivity of this case I have used pseudonyms to protect informants’

identities. In the case of published material names have not been changed.

9. This status is indicated in the 1993 Board of Directors Nominees List of the Chinese CUkUrdl

Centre of Vancouver, Notice of the 1993 Annual General Meeting of Members, April 8, 1993.

Private files of Edgar Wickberg. 10. Organization members were members of older Chinese societies such as huiguun associations.

Reserving one third of the CCC seats for members of these associations would change the tenor

of the board toward a more ‘traditional’ political bias.

11, In addition to the business contacts of some of the directors, many Renewal candidates felt that

funds related to the election had been supplied by Beijing. Jane Chan remarked of the election,


‘there were writers, security guards, buses, a parking lot, etc. Where was the money coming

from?’ (Author’s interview, July, 1996).

12.The debate raged in the Chinese newspapers betweenJanuary and April of 1993. See in particular

the articles in the Sing Tao Zbi Baa, April, 3-4, 14-15, April, 24-25, 26; the Zbong Hua Min Guo, April 16, the Chinatown News, February 7, April, 18, and the Chinese Cultural Centre

Bulletin, March 30.

13.m an article entitled ‘Beijing “Spies” Defeat Vancouver Coup Bid,’ the South China Morning Post in Hong Kong reported that Beijing was said to have ‘paid to bus in the hundreds of elders

who came in from outlying areas to boost the Maintain vote. The Chinese consulate in Vancouver

allegedly acted as a conduit for the cash.’ South China Morning Post, May 9, 1993, p. 5.

14,See Frances Buta, ‘Chinatown Pioneers Take Lead in Vote,’ Vancouver Sun, April 27, 1993, Bl;

‘Yuppies Challenging the Old Guard in Chinese Community,’ Vancouver Sun, March 24, 1993,

Al; ‘Battle of the Ballots,’ Vancouver Sun, April 24, 1993, B3; Robert Sheppard, ‘A Vote Divided

Between Generations,’ Globe and Mail, April 5, 1993, A13.

References

Anderson, K. (1991) Vancouver’s Chinatcnun:RaciulDiscourss in Cunndu, 1875-l%%). McGiII-Queen’s University

Press, ~Montreal.

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Reworking Democracy: Contemporary Immigration and Community Politics in Vancouver's Chinatown

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