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The Networked Volcanic Hazard: A Spatiality of
Actors and Information Technology
RGS Geographical Club Award 2014: Final Report
By Daniel Beech
Department of Geography and Earth Science, Aberystwyth University
[email protected], www.aber.ac.uk/en/iges/staff/phd/dib8/
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Acknowledgements
Thank you to the Royal Geographical Society and Aberystwyth University, whose financial support
has been invaluable to the successful completion of the PhD research. The advice and guidance
from my academic supervisors has also been essential to the continuation of the PhD, which the
research conducted in Iceland has complimented. Finally, thank you to each of the interviewees,
as well as the Icelandic Met Office, London Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre, ISAVIA, Civil Aviation
Authority, University of Iceland, and Department of Civil Protection, who have each played a
significant role.
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Abstract
The social, economic and political impacts of the explosive Eyjafjallajökull eruption in 2010
illustrated the need for greater interdisciplinary research within the field of hazard and risk, and
particularly volcanology. The event gave credence to input into the design of hazard management
networks from perspectives that accommodate social science, networked geographies, and aspects
of Science and Technology Studies. Effective and sustainable management of natural hazards
require extensive interaction between human, technical and nonhuman actors, largely clustered in
or between hazard management agencies, community groups, media corporations and
governmental administrations. Funding from the RGS allowed observation and critique of such
interactions, furthering an analysis and interpretation of the Icelandic network that is deeply
engrained in social science.
In March and April 2014, the RGS contributed to the funding of a 5 week period of research at
multiple locations in Iceland, where the translation and flow of hazard data and information,
between actors, could be choreographed, aiding the identification of the actuarial links through
which volcanic hazards in Iceland are monitored and responded to. Bruno Latour’s Actor-
Network Theory, and Sheila Jasanoff’s interpretation of Social Constructivism, are frameworks
that the research uses to provide a grounded analysis of the Icelandic network, and specifically its
mobility and interconnections. In this report, an overview is provided of the research findings, but
also the process through which volcanic hazard monitoring exercises were observed, archival
research was conducted, and semi-structured interviews were carried out with scientific and non-
scientific actors; the research used the RGS funding to effectively highlight the open engagement
and evolving configuration upon which Iceland’s sophisticated multi-hazard network has
developed and become established.
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Project Description
Hazard networks, largely formed of human, technical and nonhuman actors, have often been
researched and analysed from academic perspectives that focus upon social and political inequality,
imbalance and cultural attitudes (Donovan, Paton, etc.). The rationale for conducting this research
is to recognise the role of technical innovation in framing academic interpretations of complex
networks, such as the one designed to mitigate volcanic risk in Iceland. Academic research has
previously tended to neglect the role that technical innovation has played in renegotiating the
subjective social and political layers of dynamic hazard networks. The research also intended to
establish the configuration of the network, and the integration of a disparate spread of actors
emerging from scientific, social, political and industrial backgrounds. Assessing interrelationships
between elements of science, society and technology allows for an evaluation of the extent to
which philosophic frameworks such as Latour’s “Actor-Network Theory” (ANT) can be used to
describe and explain the networked set-up in multi-hazard environment’s such as Iceland. Post-
Eyjafjallajökull the need within hazard management for channels of communication, contact with
the nonhuman, and the process of translating and mediating information, has become increasingly
important to maintaining and reinforcing a network that is sustainable and efficient.
ANT provides a theoretical mechanism that can alter the way complex hazard networks are
perceived, and, despite being contextually specific in the case of Iceland, allows the network to be
performed as a hybrid entity of inseparable human, nonhuman and technical actors. Mediations
give the network the capacity to provide technical solutions to the deficiencies previously identified
by academics, largely through the binding of scientific and non-scientific communities, and the
exercising of effective channels of communication. The field of “Science and Technology Studies”
(STS) has advocated theoretical frameworks such as “Social Constructivism” (Bijker, Jasanoff) and
“Technoscience”; the research argues that these frameworks can be influential in explaining the
position of actors (human, nonhuman and technical) in the Icelandic network. Iceland is a
complex, interoperable and transitional environment in which the relevance and compatibility of
technology can be identified and critiqued; its role as a mediator between human and nonhuman
actors, and its influence upon the transfer of hazard information, is viewed within the research in
the context of the Icelandic public’s acceptance of technology as a method through which to
minimise risk and enhance mitigation.
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The application of ANT and elements of STS provided the academic and philosophical reasoning
for carrying out the research in Iceland, funded by the RGS. Contextually, the constructed manner
in which technology interacts with both science and society sheds light upon the in-built
expectation and trust that synergises, multiplies and strengthens connectivity between actors.
Hazard networks are messy and uncoordinated, and as a result, collaborative engagements are vital
for appropriate and effective mitigation, decision-making and policymaking. It is therefore
important to track the development of networks, identifying who mediating actors are, where in
the network they are located, and what connections they exhibit. In sum, the research aimed to
explore how Iceland’s volcanic hazard network has evolved in accordance with, and been furthered
by, technical innovation. A main objective was to indicate, through an ANT-centric approach, how
technical inputs can re-present, remediate and renegotiate different communities of practice
(human and nonhuman); if technology is an effective means of furthering or advancing the
mobility of the network, then this aspect is of particular relevance in the context of the research.
Research Questions
1) How can communities of practice within hazardous volcanic regions be described
through networked approaches?
2) How does a monitoring network become sensitised to non-human agencies?
3) To what extent does collaboration renegotiate power dynamics and information flows,
and what is the subsequent impact upon response efficiency within hazard management
networks?
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Study Sites
Despite field sites being spread between Iceland and the UK, and somewhat reflecting the extent
of the network, RGS funding specifically facilitated the Icelandic-based segment. In light of the
events of 2010 and 2011, when two large-scale volcanic eruptions occurred in relatively quick
succession, the research was of significant relevance in the Icelandic context; the region is a
somewhat notorious and high publicised multi-hazard environment. The research therefore had a
much greater likelihood of being impactful, outlining how the uptake and integration of technical
actors has or could influence the actions taken during and since the eruptions of Eyjafjallajökull
and Grímsvötn. By funding the fieldwork in Iceland, the RGS has furthered the construction of a
narrative to Iceland’s responsive efficiency, plethora of laws, policies and initiatives, and already
established sophisticated use of technology, that could then engage with the rhetoric of scholars
from the social sciences, networked geographies and STS. The complexity of the Icelandic network
is one of few globally that lends itself so succinctly to this application of both geographic theory
and practise, ideally fulfilling and contributing to deficiencies in previous academic interpretations.
An illustration of study sites across Iceland. Map from Google Maps, 2015.
Reykjavík, Capital Region. Vík, Southern Region. Höfn, Southern Region.
N
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Outline of research sites in Reykjavik. Maps from Google Maps, 2015.
Within Iceland, fieldwork (both interviews and observations) tended to be based in or around the
capital, Reykjavik, in close proximity to the city centre, at the headquarters of the Icelandic Met
Office (IMO), Civil Protection, Icelandic Aviation Authority (ISAVIA), and the Institute of Earth
Science at the University of Iceland (IES). However, community-based research with local leaders,
farmers, policymakers and members of the public also took place in the southern village of Vík
(Lat 6°.25'N, Long 19°1'W), located in the Katla volcanic zone, and the Eastern settlement of
Höfn (Lat 64°15'N, Long 15°13'W), positioned within the Grimsvötn volcanic zone. Both Vík
and Höfn are directly threatened by volcanic activity, and are located along, or near to, Iceland’s
national ring road, with connections to the Reykjavik Capital Region.
Left: Civil Protection (Almannavarnir). Right: ISAVIA, Reykjavik. Images from Google Earth (2015).
ISAVIA
(Icelandic
Aviation
Authority
Icelandic Civil
Protection
(Almannavarnir)
Icelandic
Meteorological
Office (Veðurstofa
Íslands)
Institute of Earth
Science, University
of Iceland (Háskóli
Íslands)
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Methodology for Iceland-Based Research
The research has been conducted in two key parts, beginning with a five week period in Iceland,
funded by the RGS, in which time interviews and observations were conducted with leading
institutions such as the Icelandic Met Office (IMO) and Institute of Earth Science (IES). The
second part of the research took place over two weeks in the UK, when interviews were carried
with the London Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre (VAAC), the Department for Transport (DfT),
and the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). Between these two distinct periods of research, Skype
interviews and internet-based archival research were conducted. The interdisciplinary nature of
integrating ANT and Social Constructivism into the field of Hazard and Risk, meant that a mixed
methods approach was the most sensible and reflective option for pursuing and exploring this
research. RGS’ funding enabled access to key actors in Iceland, and the subsequent completion of
semi-structured interviews, participant observation, and archival research. The direct contact with
stakeholders, experiential engagement with technical actors, and first-hand observations of the
process through which interaction takes place, allowed for the viewing and accounting of network
elements that could then be interpreted through the guise of ANT and social constructivism.
IES, www.universitypositions.eu, 2015.
Archival Research Related to the Fieldwork in Iceland
Archival research was carried out both prior to, and following, the research conducted in Iceland,
largely focussing upon how technology had been used in past volcanic crises, and drawing upon
the evolutionary use of technical actors to develop channels of communication during and since
the 2010 eruption of Eyjafjallajökull. Following extensive reviews of social constructivist and
ANT-centric literature, it became apparent prior to visiting Iceland that there was a need to
carefully account for the methods through which hazard data is discovered, transported and
consumed within the Icelandic community. The knowledge gained from this archival research
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therefore went onto influence the RGS-funded fieldwork, and clarified the elements of the
network that needed to be identified when the fieldwork was being undertaken, and which could
then be analysed using ANT and social constructivist frameworks. Archival research conducted
following the Icelandic fieldwork, focussed to a greater extent upon the specific communication
between actors and institutes during the Bardarbunga eruption in 2014. Using archival methods,
and particularly the storing of social media messages, the findings and conclusions gathered from
the RGS-funded fieldwork in Iceland were unexpectedly applied to an ongoing crisis situation; this
enabled a real-time analysis of the Icelandic network positioned from the theoretical standpoints
of ANT and social constructivism.
Left: Information board at the site of Eyjafjallajökull. Right: Vík church in the Katla volcanic zone. Both images
are field photographs (2014), taken near to where interviews were conducted with non-scientific actors.
Semi-Structured Interviewing Conducted in Iceland
Semi-structured interviews formed a significant part of the Iceland-based fieldwork, and were
originally targeted at academics and specialists in the field, primarily associated with the institutions
(IMO, IES) featuring prominently in the preparatory archival research. The face-to-face contact
with leading actors was largely the outcome of RGS funding, but the identity and positionality of
the interviewee altered as the research continued, with those located in close proximity to volcanic
hazards, and away from institutional headquarters in Reykjavik, emerging as relevant interviewees
in the latter stages of the fieldwork. The broadening of interviewee backgrounds largely reflected
the theoretical undertones of ANT, through the deconstruction of the networks borders and
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expanse beyond institutions. The RGS funded transportation, from the UK to Iceland, and whilst
there, to the following institutions, so that semi-structured interviews could be carried out:
Completing sixty four interviews in the research period was accomplished largely as a result of
Iceland’s close-knit communities, making travelling between actuarial circles feasible, and aided
further by the fieldwork funding provided. The importance of networking in the field became clear
and drastically improved the spread and impact of the research; the semi-structured format allowed
greater flexibility and enabled the Icelandic-based research to target the thoughts, attitudes and
interactions of human and technical actors, better identifying the reasoning for their role,
positionality and purpose in the network.
The output of many interviews, particularly those conducted with coordinators of leading
institutions, identify the Icelandic networks key collaborative relationships, traces of information,
and presence of communication channels (see appendix one); this relates to Latour’s rhetoric of
what composes an Actor-Network. In addition, the role of science, movement of data, and the use
of technology were also major discussion points with scientific and non-scientific actors, and tied
neatly into the narratives of social constructivism, or more broadly to the STS discipline. The
topics and elements referred to were a direct result of the research being undertaken in Iceland,
and led to robust links between theory and practise being established. The transcription of
Icelandic Met Office, (Veðurstofa Íslands) Reykjavík.
Institute of Earth Science, University of Iceland (Háskóli Íslands), Reykjavík.
Institute for Sustainability and Interdisciplinary Studies, University of Iceland,
(Háskóli Íslands), Reykjavík.
Civil Protection, (Almannavarnir), Reykjavík.
Icelandic Aviation Authority, (ISAVIA), Reykjavík Airport, Reykjavík.
Environment Agency of Iceland, (Umhverfisstofnun), Reykjavík.
Reykjavík Metropolitan Police, (Lögreglan), Reykjavík.
Icelandair, Keflavík Airport, Keflavík.
Icelandic Red Cross, (Rauði krossinn), Vík.
Farmers/Community Leaders/General Public, Vík and Höfn.
ICE-SAR (Search and Rescue), Reykjavík, Vík and Höfn.
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interviews, which took place during summer 2014, led to the identification of many of these
outcomes, sourced directly from data gathered during the Iceland-based fieldwork (see appendix
one). Unfortunately, there were instances when a key interview could not be conducted as part of
the RGS-funded fieldwork, in which case the interview was conducted via Skype from the UK.
sa
Left: Snæfellsjökull stratovolcano. Right: Looking towards Grímsvötn from National Ring Road, a key transport
link. Field photographs, 2014.
Participant Observations carried out in Iceland
Overt observations of activities and exercises were carried out at leading institutes in Iceland,
largely as a result of RGS funding. The observations were key to establishing how technology is
used within the network, and by whom; the shadowing of human actors allowed for an
identification of when interaction with technology takes place, and what the resulting impact is
upon the transfer and mobility of hazard information. The interaction between human and
technical actors is one key element of the observations, and forms a direct comparison with
Latour’s ANT narrative, which implies that networks are more coherent when multiple
interactions are present between human and nonhuman (or technical) actors. Furthermore, the
observations carried out in Iceland indirectly led to further observations being conducted in the
UK, at the London VAAC for example, as active inclusion led to the formation of new contacts,
and a subsequent enhancement to the research. Therefore, despite the observations of the
VOLCICE exercise being pre-planned, other observations were more opportunistic and a
response to the connections formed with key actors in the early stages of the fieldwork. Three
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observations took place in Iceland, with the aid of RGS funding, and location and participants are
outlined:
Observations tended to lead to a less formal engagement with actors, with “on-the-spot” questions
leading to key discussions regarding different aspects of the network; each of the observations was
invaluable in gaining a reflective overview of the wider expert and non-expert community, as well
as the interconnections that exist between them. A qualitative field diary was used to record
information and any discrepancies that occurred, with facts and processes documented in the form
of notes and diagrams (see appendix two). Interactions, groupings and communication with
affiliated actors were accounted for, illustrating the interagency dynamics that constitute the
network and represent the relevance of ANT; the field diary became a storage of information that
has since been preserved so that it can advance the analytical and interpretative arguments
conveyed in the PhD.
Both images are of farm buildings near to Eyjafjallajökull, currently (left) and whilst the eruption was ongoing
(right). Field photographs (2014), taken near to where interviews with farmers were conducted.
Observation Participants and Locations
Volcanic Ash Exercise (VOLCICE) IMO, Reykjavík.
ISAVIA, Reykjavík.
London VAAC, Exeter.
Seismic Monitoring Equipment and Forecasting IMO (Forecasting), Reykjavík.
Media Suite and Facilities Civil Protection, Reykjavík
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Research Timeframe
The research took place over a five week period from Tuesday 4th March 2014 until Tuesday 8th
April 2014, in which time the Iceland-based interviews and observations, funded by the RGS, were
conducted in Reykjavík, Vík and Höfn.
Week One (4th-9th March)
- Initial meetings with the four key institutions identified before beginning the fieldwork (IMO, Civil Protection, IES and ISAVIA).
- Arrangements for further interviews within the institutes, discussed.
Week Two (10th-16th March)
- Full tour of the IMO, meeting the Natural Hazards representatives, and conducting first semi-structured interviews.
- VOLCICE exercise observed at the IMO and ISAVIA.
- Follow-up interviews conducted with leading actors at ISAVIA.
Week Three (17th-23rd March)
- Observation of IMO forecasting, a tutorial of protocol outlining the process of what happens once a volcanic eruption has begun.
- Interviews conducted with academic experts and members of the FUTUREVOLC project, at the IES, University of Iceland.
Week Four (24th-30th March)
- Interviews conducted with farmers, community leaders and the general public in and around Höfn, Southern Region.
- Interviews conducted on visit to Skaftafell National Park.
Week Five (31st March – 8th April)
- Interviews conducted with farmers and community leaders, as well as members of the Icelandic Red Cross in Vík and Þórsmörk Nature Reserve.
- Tour of media facilities at the Civil Protection, semi-structured interviews conducted in the institute.
- Preliminary arrangements made for UK-based fieldwork, following contact with the London VAAC at the IMO.
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Following the RGS-funded research conducted in Iceland, interviewing opportunities in the UK
emerged from it, most notably a one week period of research at the London VAAC. Interviews
and observations were carried out in due course, and subsequently followed up on. By the time
the UK-based research was conducted, the Icelandic networks configuration and structure, or lack
thereof, was already being imagined and theorised following the transcription process. Whilst the
Icelandic research provided the foundations for additional research in the UK, it also influenced
the development of a philosophical interpretation of the hazard management network affiliated to
the eruption of Bardarbunga. The event actively generated new scope for carrying out further
archival research, and using office-based methods of data collection via social media, allowed for
the findings gathered in Iceland to be witnessed in practise.
Left: Bardarbunga precautionary measures during the time of the eruption, from www.globalnews.ca, 2015. Right:
London VAAC, where interviews and observations were conducted: From www.thetimes.co.uk, 2015.
August-October 2014:
Eruption of Bardarbunga,
archival research conducted.
Social media posts archived for
further analysis.
September-October 2014:
UK-based fieldwork
(interviews and
observations) carried out at
the CAA, DfT and London
VAAC.
October-January 2014:
Follow-up interviews
conducted via Skype in
relation to Bardarbunga
eruption.
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Research Budget
Equipment and insurance are excluded from the research budget as they were provided by
Aberystwyth University free of charge. The following budget is only applicable for the Iceland-
based research, which the RGS significantly contributed to. Funding emerged from multiple
sources and allocations were fully spent over the course of the research:
Source of Funding Nominal Amount
Royal Geographical Society: Geographical Club Award 2014 £1000.00
Doctoral Careers Development Scholarship, Aberystwyth University £500.00
Postgraduate Discretionary Research Fund £500.00
Total £2000.00
Nominal Amount and Details Total Funding Source
Accommodation
Keflavík Airport: (2 nights) £174
Reykjavík: (27 nights) £957
Vík: (3 nights) £294
Höfn: (5 nights) £362
£1787 RGS (£1000) DCDS (£500) PDRF (£287)
Transport
Flights (Gatwick-Keflavík return):
£218
Rail Fare (Aberystwyth-Gatwick
return): £71
Airport Transfer: (Keflavík-
Reykjavík return) £20
Car Hire: (8 days) £190
Fuel: (Reykjavík-Höfn, Höfn-Vík,
Vík-Reykjavík) £145
£644 PDRF (£213) Self-Funded (£431)
Subsistence
Food and Drink: £320
Clothing: £70
£390 Self-funded (£390)
Total Cost: £2821.00
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Research Findings (Iceland-based fieldwork)
The research essentially identified key elements of Iceland’s hazard network that were compatible
with, to varying extents, ANT and social constructivism; the network, and its distribution of
interconnected human and technical actors bore resemblance with key elements of Latour and
Jasanoff’s respective frameworks. Firstly, within the Icelandic network, communities of practice
exist in the form of different groupings of actors; whilst some are domestic and confined within
Iceland’s national borders, others protrude disparately overseas to institutions and individuals in
both the UK and mainland Europe. No actuarial community is, however, closed off, particularly
in an age of social media, and each are interacting through channels of communication that merge
society, science and technology, therefore adapting Latour’s narrative. Secondly, the monitoring
network has integrated technology, or more generally, less-than-human elements, as a result of
social attitudes in Iceland and increasingly the role played by social media. Through theories
associated with the STS, notably social constructivism and technoscience, it becomes clear how
contact has been enhanced and the perceived distance, both physically and psychology, between
the human and the nonhuman has been reduced. Finally, the formation and exercising of
newfound collaborative relationships has renegotiated existing power dynamics and flows of
information, leading to the investment of trust in new areas of the network, prominently
technology. Through social constructivism, it becomes clear how, and for what reasoning, this
process has occurred in Iceland; in addition, using ANT to explain these evolving network
characteristics has, through evidence of greater interconnectivity, reflected upon the wider
influences and responsive efficiencies (individual and collective) to volcanic crises.
1) Renegotiating and Positioning Power and Authority in Iceland
The Icelandic community has strived to reduce distances between circles of expertise, particularly
actors from scientific and non-scientific backgrounds. The implementation and use of technology
has perhaps given greater precedence and authority to the roles, responsibilities and positions of
leading monitoring institutes, such as the IMO, within which many mediating human and technical
actors are clustered. The VOLCICE exercise demonstrates a binding of institutes, and a
collaborative relationship between actors within ISAVIA, the London VAAC and the IMO; the
design of the exercise holds together and energises these complex and multi-faceted institutions,
with actors based in both Iceland and the UK.
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Through the rituals and data transfers that are enveloped in the design of VOLCICE, collaborative
relationships have formed not only between institutional coordinators, but also between
contributing actors, such as forecasters. Actors have become more exposed to those outside of
institutional boundaries, with digital and virtual modes of communication purporting a more
engaging and democratic network between institutes and the stakeholders they are obliged to serve.
This analysis has particular contemporary relevance in the field of hazard and risk as it clarifies
roles and responsibilities, and reinforces the need for actors to work in close proximity in order to
improve efficiency and responses to volcanic activity. The wider implications of identifying and
locating where power is in a complex network, are ideally a reduction or minimisation of potential
conflicts and discrepancies between institutes, both monitoring and response-focussed, in times
of crises. Whilst many of these interpretations of VOLCICE, and the wider institutionalised
landscape of the Icelandic network, are framed from the perspective of Latour’s ANT, it is
representative of how power relations and actuarial agencies have been renegotiated through
technology and the performance of collaboration. Such findings are relevant in the context of the
scrutiny attributed to monitoring exercises since the eruption of Eyjafjallajökull, so any
identification of how power dynamics can be renegotiated for the benefit of all are welcomed.
2) Accepting Technical Actors and the need to Invest Trust in the Nonhuman
As the IMO, ISAVIA and the London VAAC have inevitably encompassed advanced technology,
both software and hardware, a significant reliance upon technical actors has developed. There has
needed to be an investment of trust passed down from human stakeholders to the information
artefacts that technical devices, mediums and systems constitute. Whilst some human stakeholders
have been unconscious to this transfer of power to a largely nonhuman device, social
constructivists would argue that this has resulted from the will of Icelandic society to accept
technology. As technology becomes increasingly significant within hazard and risk, the agency it
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develops and the investment of trust within it is likely to become more influential in determining
its effectiveness and positionality, but the use of technology must also be appropriate. An ANT
argument is relevant as it does not privilege either the technical or social credentials of network,
but instead assessing the interactive mediations between them, as a means of explaining and
comprehending the construction and evolution of complex networks. Theorising these
associations can advance the field of hazard and risk by aiding the process through which the use
of technology is deemed appropriate, and integrating both social and technical narratives. The use
of technical instruments is determined by more than innovation, wireless signals and portable
monitoring stations; from a social constructivist perspective, social and political stakeholders,
through their usage and policymaking, provide the parameters within which technology can be
integrated.
Those entrained in constructivist elements of STS would argue that the physical construction of
devices, deployed in Iceland’s network, are an outcome of environmental conditions; as early
adapters of new technology, Icelandic’s are somewhat pre-prepared and expectant for hazard
networks to become increasingly autonomous, particularly with the expansion of social media and
Smartphone applications. The observations and tendencies of a network such as Iceland can
therefore be used to influence and guide policy on the use of technology in more challenging
hazard regions. Through the guise of ANT, technology can be viewed as a mediating force, not
only providing the solvent to hold together human stakeholders, but also determining how
information is represented, and to what extent it can be translated by the stakeholders affected.
Technology actively creates channels of communication, through which actors can interact,
translate and re-present hazard information to wider publics; for this purpose, the use of
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technology and the need to accept and invest trust within it, is of particular relevance to more
contemporary assessments of hazard management networks.
3) Complexity and the Flattening of Scale
New technologies have furthered the ability to openly engage along information pathways, but this
has also brought into question the scale at which the network operates; the application of scale to
hazard and risk research is relevant as it aids the design of networks and helps to clarify the
positionality of local, national and international actors. However, in a network as complex and
institutionalised as Iceland, the research has established that it is very different to group or
aggregate actors at a particular scale, blurring the space and time over which actions and mediations
take place. Whilst this is not to the detriment of the network, in terms of efficiency or success, it
does draw attention to how interconnected the network has become. Connectivity is therefore
essential, and the implications of this are that is makes it easier to identify where communication
links are most critical, and where contingencies and additional resilience is required; for example,
the IMO have an obligation to pass on information to the Civil Protection so that on-the-ground
risks can be addressed, whilst also continuing dialogue and monitoring exercises in the aviation
industry. Identifying this link is of significant relevance as it helps to stress the need for flexibility,
and further a doctrine that does not place a burden of responsibility upon one particular actor;
connectivity maintains a sustainable balance, and the same time enables actors, such as those within
the IMO, can act across a range of scales, forming a rhetoric comparative to that of ANT.
The emergence of innovative technology has inevitably lead to a reducing of disparities between
science and non-science, effectively manipulating the concept of scale so that work packages, such
as those outlined in the EU-based FUTUREVOLC project, can modulate and aid communication.
The crossing of the scale concept is of vital importance as relations have been eased between actors
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of varying expertise, manifesting a progressive community that adequately reflects the wider
network. At the same time, the distance between hazard information and the end-user has been
reduced significantly, through the furthering of open-source data; the implication of this has been
a democratic system of data dissemination, weakening the boundaries that exist between experts
and non-experts. The feedback of information is of relevance as it empowers non-experts, and
largely prevents any feeling of resentment or disenfranchisement to the scientific community. By
flattening the scale of the network, and maintaining a non-hierarchical structure, any actor can
actively participate in the monitoring and response process, regardless of their background.
Institutes do not operate as purified entities but collaborate extensively at an inter-organisational
level, through partnerships or monitoring exercises; this blurs boundaries and envisions the
network as a hybrid.
4) Developing and Influencing the Evolving use of Social Media
As an almost endless channel of communication, sporadically distributed across space and time,
social media further questions the presence of scale in the Icelandic network, perhaps representing
the technical transformations through which network appears to have seamlessly passed. Hazard
information is fluid, and in being disseminated via social media, it is positioned in a manner that
allows it to react to society’s acceptance or adaptability; this gives rise to the narratives preached
through social constructivism. The current and future significance of social media, to hazard and
risk, cannot be underestimated, and Iceland is perhaps exhibiting a model situation that enables
the future merits of social media to be performed. The medium has been relevant in the context
of the research as it has strengthened and improved the resilience and connectivity of the network;
observations of how the IMO and Civil Protection used social media during the 2014 eruption of
Bardarbunga illustrated not only their proximity to each other, but also their efforts, through
retweets and notifications, to expand the outreach of their work.
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The research has established that social media has become one of the clearest indicators of ANT
being applied to the Icelandic network; its integration into response-based institutions, such as the
Civil Protection, has altered the manner in which hazard information is translated, reflecting the
evolutions in attitudes and close relationship Icelandic’s share with technology. Social media is of
significance due to the extraordinarily high usage and uptake of it amongst Icelandic society,
allowing it to become an extremely powerful tool through which to communicate. Despite the
need to caution against information overload, contradictions and factually ambiguous data; social
media has begun to present itself in hazard and risk as a useful tool from which to not only share
information, but also to determine, imply or influence the actions that are taken in response to a
crisis. A constructivist narrative would argue that environmental factors such as broadband
provision, wealth and social attitudes are the key factors, but until the high profile eruption of
Bardarbunga in 2014, social media had continued to be a largely unknown quantity in designing
and managing hazard networks. The efforts made by the Civil Protection and the IMO to enhance
their social media presence, for the first time, became apparent, and the observation of this is
significant as it shed light upon the flat ontology of the network through the utilisation of
seemingly endless information pathways. Emerging technologies, and particularly social media,
possess trace elements that can be referred to in order to identify the construction and transfer of
knowledge and information; whilst there is no default method of representing hazardous
environments, Iceland’s use of social media has extended communication pathways to actuarial
circles that were previously considered distanced.
Research Conclusions
Iceland’s hazard network is representative of both ANT and social constructivism; the socially
constructed knowledge’s within it have led to the development of the current actor-network. The
application of theory to practise is neat if imperfect, and through qualitative analysis, attributes the
mitigation of risk to collaborative relationships, connectivity and increasingly technical devices.
Iceland displays Latour’s ANT concepts of “mediation” between actors, and the
“translation” of hazard data, aided by a co-operative society and participatory approach
to new technology that improves connectivity between human and technical actors.
The human is not privileged, and relies upon technical actors; as a test bed for emerging
technology, Iceland possesses the socially constructivist narratives that enable technical
devices to infiltrate the network, and post-structurally empower or rescale stakeholders.
22
Research Outreach
Conferences
Since the fieldwork was conducted in Iceland in March and April 2014, a number of conferences
have been attended, during which the findings from the research have been outlined and feedback
has been gathered. Conferences attended include:
Dialogues in Human Geography. Paper: Communicating Volcanic Hazards: Actor
Networks and Information Technology. Location: Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyth.
Date: 29th May 2014.
Royal Geographical Society with IBG Annual Conference. Paper: Redesigning Hazard
Communication through Technology: Collaboration, Co-Production and Coherence.
Location: RGS, London. Date: 26th-29th August 2014
GEORISK International Conference. Paper: Collaborative Monitoring in Southern
Iceland: A Technical Volcanic Environment. Location: Instituto Geografico Nacional,
Madrid. Date: 18th-22nd November 2014
Volcanic and Magmatic Studies Group Annual Conference 2015 and STREVA Workshop.
Paper: A Networked Approach to Seismic Activity: The Need for Communication and
Cohesion. Location: OPEN Norwich and University of East Anglia, Norwich. Date: 5th-
8th January 2015.
Gregynog Human Geography Conference. Paper. Envisioning a Hazard Management
Network without Boundaries: Volcanic Activity in Iceland. Location: Gregynog Hall,
Newtown. Date: 11th-12th March 2015.
The findings gathered have also featured in two three hour lectures, given at Aberystwyth
University to third year undergraduate students, as part of the “Volcanic Activity” module. In
addition, research conclusions have been included in feedback reports, given to Icelandic
institutions. There are future plans to publish aspects of the research in the form of journal articles
and book chapters.
23
Research Contribution
The interdisciplinary nature of the research was intended to advance geographical knowledge by
applying aspects of social science to volcanology, with wider implications to the field of hazard
and risk. Iceland is a complex region, in a geological, economic and political sense, but the ways in
which its complexity is perceived, managed and consequently acted upon can be altered through
the lens and scope of philosophical frameworks. Whilst the research has identified the post-
structural design, actuarial freedoms, renegotiations of power, and hybridity between human and
nonhuman elements, the findings are contextually specific, but will ideally influence approaches
taken in other volcanic environments where political, demographic and economic pressures are
more severe. Whilst theoretically rich, and with an academic focus, the research could also
contribute to the evolving perceptions of science, and its broader interactions with society, and
the aviation industry. Continued interdisciplinary research could influence future approaches and
collaborative efforts in policy-making discussions, decision-making strategies, and assessments of
mitigation techniques. The research framework will ideally motivate other academics to study
complex environments, particularly hazardous regions, from the perspectives of networked
geographies and STS. Further qualitative approaches to hazard and risk could allow for a greater
appreciation of evolutions in hazard networks, and the need for flexibility in monitoring and
response-based institutions. Hazard management is inextricably linked to the development of big
data, crowdsourcing, and satellites, so the role and contestation of technology will become
increasingly relevant as it continues to influence the actions of human stakeholders, and reinforce
the adaptability and resilience of hazard networks, in doing so, developing communication
pathways and enhancing the scope of actors to mediate and translate hazard information.
Academic References
Bijker, W. E., Hughes, T. P., Pinch, T., & Douglas, D. G. (2012). The social construction of technological systems:
New directions in the sociology and history of technology. MIT press.
Donovan, A., Oppenheimer, C., & Bravo, M. (2012). Science at the policy interface: volcano-monitoring technologies
and volcanic hazard management. Bulletin of Volcanology, 74(5), 1005-1022.
Jasanoff, S., Markle, G. E., Peterson, J. C., & Pinch, T. (Eds.). (2001). Handbook of science and technology studies.
Sage Publications.
Latour, B. (2005). Reassembling the social-an introduction to actor-network-theory. Reassembling the Social-An
Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory, by Bruno Latour, pp. 316. Foreword by Bruno Latour. Oxford University
Press, Sep 2005. ISBN-10: 0199256047. ISBN-13: 9780199256044, 1.
Paton, D., Millar, M., & Johnston, D. (2001). Community resilience to volcanic hazard consequences. Natural Hazards,
24(2), 157-169.
24
Appendix One – Examples of Interview Transcripts (Icelandic Fieldwork)
IMO
Interviewer: Has the way the IMO communicates with its partners, in Iceland and overseas, been
influenced or altered in any way as a result of the 2010 and 2011 volcanic eruptions, and if so,
how?
Interviewee: Well, the impetus is there for expanding the network, and we (IMO) are very much
focussed on improved monitoring and the ability to assume the earliest warning possible, to not
only help the aviation industry in Iceland but also in the UK, we have regular contact with not
only the VAAC but also the BGS, they are very keen to see the strain network expanded; a series
of meetings took place during and after the eruptions, with discussions relating to the UK’s
assistance, but in recent years we have also become more involved with research interests from
scientific groups in UK, US and European universities, as well as the Cabinet Office.
Civil Protection
Interviewer: What relationship does the Civil Protection (CP) have with the FUTUREVOLC
project, particularly in Iceland?
Interviewee: We (CP) are in the business of taking the scientific information and newfound
information and connecting the Civil Protection and the public, we are making a route for the
information to flow freely and to have like a lexicon of our volcanoes, FUTUREVOLC seems to
have this database with historical data and raw data and all types of real time data from the
volcanoes and not just for the course of science but for the civil protection as well.
IES
Interviewer: To what extent do you feel the Icelandic context, as a country, and as a community,
lends itself to the network that has been set up, and which we have discussed today?
Interviewee: Iceland is a miniscule country, but the benefits of a very small country is that it is very
easy to just pick up the phone, the networking is very, very, good. But of course you always have
to nourish it, maintain it, and establish what we (IES) can do better and so on but the absolutely
the strength in Iceland is that we are few so it makes the communication very easy.
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Appendix Two – Field Diary Example (VOLCICE Observation)
Volcanic Ash Observation (VOLCICE): 11/03/2014 – IMO, ISAVIA, London VAAC
8AM: IMO send notice to London VAAC. Activity imminent on Reykjanes Peninsula.
8.30AM: IMO send confirmed activity notice to London VAAC and ISAVIA.
SIGMET’s issued to the London VAAC from the IMO. Irregularities are present, so a correction
message is sent to explain the error.
8.45AM: Radar scanning begins, monitoring of activity is expanded by the IMO.
9.05AM: Volcanic ash chart sent from the London VAAC to the IMO, ash cloud projections are
developed by the IMO in due course.
SIGMET 5 issued: IMO amend ash cloud forecast and receive updates from the London VAAC,
the ash distribution model is shared.
10.15: IMO warn the London VAAC and ISAVIA of misrepresentation in polygons on
information reports. The London VAAC and ISAVIA amend reports individually.
The London VAAC reruns the exercise whilst the IMO awaits communication. The Volcanic Ash
report is compiled by the IMO and sent to the London VAAC. London VAAC compile the data
and report back to both ISAVIA and the IMO, necessary actions are then taken.
14.00: Institutional debriefs: Debriefs are held within the IMO, ISAVIA and London VAAC. The
institute’s contribution to the report, is discussed, and feedback is shared.
15.00: Exercise debrief: A debrief takes place between representatives of IMO, ISAVIA and
London VAAC, to discuss the success or failure of the exercise, to arrange a suitable time for the
next exercise, and to give advice on how improvements can be made.
Exercise report: Conclusions and findings are shared through an exercise report, accessible online.
