“Russian Victory: The Resurrection of Deep Battle”

William C. JandrewAmerican Military University

July 20, 2014MILH 654 – World War II and the Eastern Front

Dr. Arthur CoumbeSummer 2014

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Interwar Soviet military doctrine grew from the ashes of

World War I and on the dual prongs of the Russian Revolution’s

social upheaval and the slaughter of the Great War’s positional

battles of attrition. The unique Russian state and its military

bodies were heavily influenced by Marxist-Leninist “class

struggle” ideologies and the disorder in the rest of the post-war

world. Russian doctrinal advances and industrial growth were

partially attributable to a partnership with Germany, its

ideological nemesis, and the chaotic reordering of Soviet

industry under Josef Stalin’s modernization programs gave the

Soviet Union the industry it needed to realize its innovative

theories. The cutting-edge “Deep Battle” doctrines were based on

the careful coordination of mechanized combined-arms forces –

massed offensives featuring armor, air, artillery, and infantry

attacks and supported by strong reserves and a secure rear area –

backed by wide economic support from a fully mobilized society.

These doctrines in many ways surpassed those of the Soviet

Union’s contemporaries, but were brutally repressed in the late

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1930s by Josef Stalin’s military purges, which decapitated the

Red Army just as its forward thinkers turned their attention to

the concepts of security and defense. Mikhail Tukhachevsky and

other “Deep Battle” proponents were executed or imprisoned, and

their work banished; innovation and creativity gave way to

paranoia and caution, and the Red Army suffered a regression to

the territorial and attritional concepts of the Great War. Until

Georgi Zhukov was summoned to Mongolia in the early summer of

1939 to handle a territorial dispute with the Japanese, “Deep

Battle” concepts were forbidden; his application of

Tukhachevsky’s theories contributed to the Soviet Union’s victory

over Japan and the use of massed armor and coordinated combined-

arms offensives became the template for subsequent Soviet

offensive campaigns from the middle through the end of World War

II.

The roots of Russian military thought lie in the Russian

Revolution; Vladimir Lenin, in his Clausewitzean belief in the

inseparability of politics and warfare, also recognized that

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conflict may be inevitable in a society that endeavors to free

itself from the divisiveness of its various social classes.

Revolution, and its possible resultant warfare, may be

unavoidable in such a struggle.1 The stated goal of contemporary

communists was the creation of a utopian society free of class

barriers; they did, however, acknowledge that bourgeois

resistance to their proletarian ideals could create global

conflict and never-ending warfare. The two ideologies would be

forever opposed, locked in a struggle of annihilation inherent in

their doctrines.2 In the chaos that marked Russia’s exit from

the Great War, Bolsheviks and tsarists were eventually forced to

cooperate and coexist in order to maintain the security of the

new state. Without their ideal communist army composed of

motivated workers, they made do with impressments in the style of

the Napoleonic era, and maintained order with the “commissar

system,” a measure of control and motivation that ensured that

1 Vladimir I. Lenin, “War and Revolution,” in The Soviet Art of War: Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics, eds. Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), 25.2 Jacob W. Kipp, “The Origins of Soviet Operational Art: 1917-1936,” in Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art, eds. Michael D. Krause and Cody Phillips (Washington: Center of Military History, 2005), 229.

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the army, whatever its state, could perform its theoretical

function of defending the state.3 Thus was created the unique

dual nature of the Soviet Union’s military system; the socio-

political aspect ruled by politicians, and the military-technical

aspect expected to execute war plans created to serve the aims of

the party. Conflict was inevitable in this system, which forced

the professional military to seek approval for its actions from

the Commissars who often had no military experience and lacked

the qualifications to make such decisions.4

Mikhail Frunze, a hero of the civil war and Red Army Chief

of Staff, sought a unifying doctrine for the fledgling army. He

attempted to establish and procure the best standardized training

and equipment Russian industry could provide, and a system for

the management of the growing army; he also sought a method of

goal-setting within the Communist Party’s agenda, and approved

means with which to meet those goals.5 Frunze and party leaders 3 Condoleezza Rice, “The Making of Soviet Strategy,” in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1986), 650-1.4 Robert Edwards, The Winter War: Russia’s Invasion of Finland, 1939-40 (New York: Pegasus Books, 2008), 189.5 Mikhail V. Frunze, “A Unified Military Doctrine for the Red Army,” in The Soviet Army at War: Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics eds. Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), 29.

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sought a semi-professional army that was a cut above one composed

of the unreliable peasantry, but not quite the professional

class-based armies of the West,6 too reminiscent of Russia’s

recent Tsarist past. The type of army and the goals for which it

would strive were inextricably linked, and the political agenda

of the Communist Party would determine precisely how the Red

Army would grow;7 the strategies it would develop were to reflect

the entirety of the Russian body politic.

Affected by the positional warfare of the Great War, the

armies of the world had turned their thought to concepts of the

offensive. Science and industry had widened and advanced the

fields of aeronautics, chemistry, and mechanical engineering; the

military establishments of the world explored the opportunities

those gains offered, with a determined focus on those of

motorized vehicles.8 Mikhail Tukhachevsky, a civil war veteran

and one of the Soviet union’s leading theorists, realized that

the days of the Clausewitz’ “battle of annihilation” had come to

6 Rice, “The Making of Soviet Strategy,” 655.7 G. S. Issersson, The Evolution of Operational Art. Trans. Bruce Menning (Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 2013), 76.8 William E. Odom, “Soviet Military Doctrine,” Foreign Affairs (Winter 1988/Winter1989), 120.

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an end, and that successful military campaigns would not only

require rapid mechanized movement, but also the economic and

industrial backing to sustain it.9 Toward that end, the Soviets

partnered with Germany with the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922,

outwardly a friendly agreement for the mutual advancement of

trade and industry. Officer-exchange programs flourished in both

countries, while German armament factories were built and

operated in Russia, and the two nations developed munitions and

their accompanying doctrines in secret. Though rife with mutual

suspicion, the agreement allowed the Germans to skirt the

conditions of the Treaty of Versailles and the Russians to

develop their heavy industries.10

During the debate over the changing nature of warfare,

Soviet theorists took great interest in the works of foreign

theorists who specialized in offensive doctrines, particularly

J.F.C. Fuller and Guilio Douhet;11 in their search for a method

9 Mikhail N. Tukhachevsky, “Tactics and Strategy,” in The Soviet Army at War: Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics eds. Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott (Boulder:Westview Press, 1982), 44-5.10 James S. Corum, “Devil’s Bargain,” World War II (February/March 2009): 52-4.11 Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Military Doctrine. (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953), 57.

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to restore maneuver to the modern battlefield, Soviet thinkers

bridged the gap between the arts of strategy and tactics, called

the operational art.12 This field encompassed different forms of

military operation, intelligence gathering, logistics, and the

protection of a secure rear area; expanded campaigns, larger

mechanized forces, and cutting–edge weapons and materiel all

played a considerable role in the growing theory. In response to

the static territorial warfare of the Great War, the new

offensive doctrines stressed penetration, maneuver, disruption,

and exploitation of gains in the enemy’s rear area. For the

Soviets in particular and their recent governmental

instabilities, this also meant a strong focus on the concept of a

safe homeland.13 Recognizing the Soviet Union’s relative

backwardness in industrial matters and the importance of the link

between potential theoretical growth and domestic economic

forces, Tukhachevsky called for continued industrial growth in

the Soviet Union14 throughout the mid-1920s.

12 David M. Glantz, “The Nature of Soviet Operational Art,” Parameters (Spring 1985): 4-6.13 Garthoff, Soviet Military Doctrine, 31, 35.14 Tukhachevsky, “Tactics and Strategy,” 44.

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Other Russian theorists recognized the necessity of economic

growth for the realization of military security; Boris

Shaposhnikov advocated total commitment of the civil and

industrial sectors of a given society in the prosecution of

military action. In times of war, he believed, the singular

focus of Soviet society should be the support of whatever war

undertaken at any given time, with all means available.15 In his

work The Brain of the Army, published in 1927, Shaposhnikov called

for military commanders to seek out and obtain greater economic

knowledge, deeming it indispensible to any military planning.16

By the late 1920s, the collaboration between Germany and the

Soviet Union, combined with the implementation of Josef Stalin’s

first five-year plan, widened the breadth and potential of Soviet

thought. Defense spending grew exponentially, and the

availability of modern equipment available via domestic

development and increased purchase from other nations17 helped

15 Rice, “The Making of Soviet Strategy,” 662-3.16 Boris M. Shaposhnikov, “Economics and War,” in The Soviet Art of War; Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics, eds. Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), 46-50.17 Sally Stoecker, Forging Stalin’s Army: Marshal Tukhachevsky and the Politics of Military Innovation (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), 39, 115.

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theorists further embrace mechanization and mobility in their

military pursuits. Modernized traditional weapons could be made

more effective by mechanization and mobilization, and as such

become force multipliers. One weapon in particular combined

firepower and mobility, and had shown its potential toward the

end of the Great War – the tank.

Tukhachevsky’s advanced theories dovetailed with the growing

offensive capabilities of the tank. He believed that armor, in

varying types and capabilities, could achieve the breakthrough

and penetration necessary in a new age of mobility. These

emerging doctrines also recognized other types of mechanized

forces; former Red Army Air Force Chief Aleksandr Lapchinskiy

proposed the concept of air superiority as “the degree to which

air forces permit friendly troops to capitalize…and hinders the

same on the part of enemy troops;”18 not necessarily the ability

to fly at will, but the ability to support the offensive.

Colonel Artur Mednis proposed the specific purpose of ground-

attack aviation for the handling of targets that cannot be

18 Aleksandr N. Lapchinskiy, “The Fundamental of Air Forces Employment,” in TheSoviet Art of War; Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics, eds. Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), 63.

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reached any other way, such as the enemy rear areas; striking

targets that could be destroyed by artillery would be a waste and

a duplication of effort.19 The skeletal framework of “Deep

Battle” had been set.

By 1936, “Deep Battle” had found a home in the Red Army’s

1936 Field Service Regulations; in keeping with traditional Russian

doctrine, offense and mass were the cornerstones of the changes,

but this newest edition reflected the doctrinal and industrial

advancements of the last few years.20 The updated doctrine also

echoed the opportunities offered by the fruits of recent

industry: self-propelled artillery, different types of tanks for

different roles, and purpose-built bomber, attack, and

interceptor aircraft. So-called mechanized “shock armies” would

penetrate enemy defenses, supported by closely-coordinated

airborne, artillery, and infantry attacks; mobile combined-arms

forces would exploit the breach, disrupting the enemy rear in

order to complete an encirclement and eventually annihilate the

19 Artur K. Mednis, “Fundamentals of Operational-Tactical Use of Ground-AttackAviation,” in The Soviet Art of War; Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics, eds. Harriet Fast Scottand William F. Scott (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), 66-7.20 Earl F. Ziemke, “The Soviet Theory of Deep Operations,” Parameters (June 1983), 23.

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enemy.21 The specific order of battle, in order of execution,

would be: air assault/bombardment, artillery bombardment, assault

and breakthrough by combined-arms forces, exploitation by tank

and infantry forces, and capitalization of gains by massed

reserves,22 with airborne assault, if feasible, inserted

appropriately.

Such mechanization, standardized and spread throughout the

Red Army, would help address a problem unique to the Soviet state

– its ponderous geography. Small mobile forces could be

effective in the lesser Western European nations, but a large,

mobile army was necessary for a behemoth like the Soviet Union;

the proper implementation of mass mechanization could not only

defend the Russian state, but also give the army the means to

achieve the breakthrough, penetration, and annihilation called

for by its doctrines.23 Applied simultaneously over several

different fronts and followed up with successful encirclements,

this “Deep Battle” was theoretically unstoppable, and the Red Army,

21 Robert M. Citino, Quest for Decisive Victory: From Stalemate to Blitzkrieg in Europe, 1899-1940 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 211-2.22 Ziemke, “The Soviet Theory of Deep Operations,” 26.23 Amnon Sella, “Red Army Doctrine and Training on the Eve of the Second WorldWar,” Soviet Studies (April 1975), 247.

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equipped with its newest machines and this cutting-edge doctrine,

was recognized to be among the best in the world.24

With offensive doctrine securely emplaced in the Soviet

system, Tukhachevsky turned his attention to the defensive,

reflecting the traditional military need for secure logistical

support and base of order. The initial defensive doctrines set

forth within “Deep Battle” resembled the “elastic defense” and

“delaying action” concepts of the German and American armies, but

with one important distinction – the Soviet defensive

counterparts to those concepts were only temporary, designed to

protect and marshal resources for immediate counterattack.25

Unfortunately, while Soviet thinkers sought new ways to

capitalize on their recent industrial strengths, the masses

behind those strengths grew restless.

Threatened by widespread unrest, Josef Stalin initiated a

series of brutal “purges,” first begun to silence the vocal

peasantry; by the mid-1930s, it had grown to include military

1eaders. Fearing a fascist influence on his regime, Stalin had

24 Rice, “The Making of Soviet Strategy,” 667.25 Garthoff, Soviet Military Doctrine, 75.

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many of the officers who had trained with the Germans during the

Rapallo period imprisoned and/or executed; the exact number may

never be known, but an estimated 40-80,000 Red Army officers were

“purged”, including three of the five Marshals (Tukhachevsky,

Budyenny, and Blyucher).26 The works of the “Deep Battle”

innovators were banned, and it was forbidden to even speak of

“operations in depth.”27 As a result, the Red Army suffered a

sudden doctrinal backslide. Innovation was suppressed, and many

of the remaining officers embraced past outdated doctrines as a

matter of career (and literal) survival.28 The Red Army was

about to be challenged in the upcoming crises, forced to ignore a

promising doctrine while led by a largely unprofessional officer

class of unmotivated conscripts29 who had embraced the positional

warfare reminiscent of past wars.

In May 1939, a border dispute in Mongolia erupted into a

series of skirmishes with the Japanese Kwantung Army; Georgi

26 Otto Preston Chaney, Zhukov (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971), 39-40.27 Rice, “The Making of Soviet Strategy,” 669.28 Glantz, “The Nature of Soviet Operational Art,” 7.29 Roger R. Reese, “Red Army Professionalism and the Communist Party,” The Journal of Military History (January 2002): 101.

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Zhukov, an adherent of Tukhachevsky’s theories, was sent to

assess the growing situation. He immediately requested, and

received, reinforcements – in the form of mechanized infantry,

tanks, and aircraft; he was also ordered to assume command of the

renamed First Army Group. The upcoming battle would display the

trademarks of what would become the “Zhukov way of war”30 –

numerical superiority, comprehensive logistical preparation and

sophisticated deceptive measures preceding carefully coordinated

combined-arms attacks followed by large tank and infantry

formations. Mistakenly compared to the German Blitzkrieg, Zhukov’s

application of “Deep Battle” was a more complete, effective, and

enduring application of military force, designed for sustained

attack and the annihilation of enemy forces that Blitzkrieg and its

short-term goals could not maintain.31

30 Albert Axell, Zhukov: The Man Who Beat Hitler (London: Pearson, 2003), 46.31 Chaney, Zhukov, 74.

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Figure 1 - The disputed border region, the Khalkin Gol to Nomonhan

Source: Alvin D. Coox, Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939 (Stanford: StanfordUniversity Press, 1985), 144.

In keeping with the Jominian concept of rear area and its

importance to lines of communication and logistics, Zhukov’s

First Army Group established a secure base for the marshaling of

supplies, protected by connecting belts of trenches, machine-gun

positions with overlapping fields of fire, and camouflaged tanks

acting as both artillery and mobile reserves.32

Hundreds of miles from the nearest railhead, an extensive

transport system was established, using every type of conveyance

32 Stuart Goldman, Nomonhan 1939: The Red Army’s Victory that Shaped World War II (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2012), 102.

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that could carry cargo; thousands of vehicles repeatedly made the

five-day round trip route33 heavily laden with materiel (roughly

18,000 tons of shells, 6,500 tons of aircraft ammunition, 22,500

tons of various fuels, and 4,000 tons of food). To help mask

such preparations, loudspeakers blasted construction noise at

unusual hours34 and Russian intelligence personnel broadcast

bogus transmissions when they knew the Japanese were

eavesdropping.

Activity on the Mongolian border intensified with troop

buildups and limited air strikes on rear areas until a Japanese

attack from the north on July 1 captured the Fui Heights and

crossed the Khalkin Gol, attacking toward Bain Tsagan until bled

white and repulsed by Zhukov’s elaborate defenses.35 A Japanese

attack on the lightly-defended (or so deceptive Soviet

intelligence would have it be known) Kawatama Bridge also

faltered, and was mired and destroyed in the overlapping Soviet

trench system. A similar attack at the end of July yielded

33 Ibid., 124.34 John Colvin, Nomonhan (London: Quartet, 1999), 134.35 Edward J. Drea, Nomonhan: Japanese-Soviet Tactical Combat, 1939 (Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1981), 14.

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similar results, and the Kwantung Army dug in under constant

Russian artillery barrages, and prepared to stay in the disputed

territory.

Zhukov and the First Army Group had other plans for the

Kwantung Army, and by this time had amassed between 60,000 and

70,000 troops and had built up materiel superiority in the areas

of 4:1 in armor, 2:1 in aircraft and artillery pieces, 1.5:1 in

infantry, and 1.7:1 in rapid-fire weaponry;36 specifically, 542

field guns, 515 aircraft, and 498 tanks to Japan’s 38,000 men,

318 guns, 225 aircraft, and 130 tanks.37 With such numerical

superiority dispersed on a wide front, Zhukov’s plan was simple –

a modern Cannae. The Northern Force, a mixed tank/infantry/cavalry

formation, would move east across the river toward Fui Heights,

while the Southern Force, a similar formation with a larger tank

component would strike northeast across the river through the

steppes; the Central Force was to attack the Japanese fortifications

on the east bank of the Khalkin and keep it, and its reserves,

36 James J. Krefft, Ten Battles: Decisive Conflicts You May Not Know About, But Should (Centennial, Military Writers Press, 2009), 215.37 Sherwood Cordier, “The Red Star vs. The Rising Sun.” World War II (July 2003):35.

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fixed and unable to reinforce its flanks. It was textbook “Deep

Battle,” double breakthrough followed by a pincer movement38 that

was to close at the small town of Nomonhan to the rear of the

Japanese army. The main assault would be preceded by bomber

sorties quickly followed by artillery barrages, and a mixed force

of armor and infantry would be held as a mobile reserve.39

Figure 2- The Soviet Offensive at Khalkin Gol

Source: Stuart D. Goldman, Nomonhan 1939: The Red Army Victory That Shaped World War II(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2012), 138.

38 Garthoff, Soviet Military Doctrine, 133-5.39 Richard W. Harrison, The Russian Way of War: Operational Art, 1904-1940 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 240.

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Air attacks began at approximately 0600 on August 20 with

bombers and their fighter escorts bombarding Japanese

fortifications with little opposition, having attained

Lapchinskiy’s local air superiority; and using a new weapon, the

aerial rocket.40 Artillery followed closely with the largest

bombardment in the conflict thus far, the first such coordination

in Soviet military history41 and the synergistic effect of the

two arms completely immobilized the Japanese defenders, paving

the way for the infantry assault that began at 0900 hours.

The Central Force fixed Japanese defenders in place and their

reinforcements unable to support the defending flanks, while the

Northern Force stormed past the Fui Heights, bottling up the

defenders there and leaving them for the air forces to clean up.

The Southern Force, meeting great success in the open tank country

of the steppes, bent the weaker Japanese-Manchurian flank back

about eight miles before it collapsed, and by August 24 the

pincers met at Nomonhan, completing the encirclement. When the

40 Amnon Sella, “Khalkin-Gol: The Forgotten War.” The Journal of Contemporary History (October 1983): 675.41 Douglas Varner, To the Banks of the Halha: The Nomonhan Incident and the Northern Limits of the Japanese Empire (Pittsburgh: Rosedog Books, 2008), 146.

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surrounded Japanese forces within the ever-tightening mechanized

circle refused to surrender, they were annihilated by literal

cyclones of artillery. The Soviets won a crushing victory at

Khalkin Gol, inflicting a generally agreed-upon casualty rate of

2 to 3:1,42 and putting an end to Japanese ambition in Siberia.

Georgi Zhukov had also revived and tested in battle, even if not

officially by name, the solid principles of Tukhachevsky’s “Deep

Battle.”

The planning for the Soviet offensive at Khalkin Gol refined

and advanced the relatively new combined-arms formulas for

mechanized warfare. The basic plan was lifted from the 1936 Field

Service Regulations: “simultaneous assault on enemy defenses by

aviation and artillery to the depth of the defense…mutual support

of all types of forces are organized in its interests”43 executed

in waves and backed by a solid logistical rear area. The

mobility of the tank was highlighted, and illustrated the

devastating capabilities of the machine when employed en masse;

it could also penetrate and bypass enemy strong points that would

42 Colvin, Nomonhan, 165-6, 173-5.43 Glantz, “The Nature of Soviet Operational Art,” 6.

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have, in the past, held up a speedy advance. Zhukov further

employed “Deep Battle” as set forth in the Field Regulations,

particularly articles 164 and 181: “the enemy should be

immobilized to the full depth of his position, surrounded and

destroyed,”44 and “groups of long-range tanks have the mission of

breaking through to the rear of the main forces of defense,

crushing reserves and headquarters, destroying the primary

artillery grouping and cutting off the routes of withdrawal for

main enemy forces.”45 The entire Japanese 23rd Division was

annihilated at Khalkin Gol, and their 7th Division reserves were

pulled back when they could not penetrate the Soviet encirclement

to assist, satisfying the “Deep Battle” requirement of the

“annihilation of the army of the enemy.”46

Though the framework for the successful implementation of

“Deep Battle” had been demonstrated at Khalkin Gol with the most

modern equipment available, the tactics and strategies used there

were acknowledged only by a select few and not openly

44 Tukhachevsky, “Tactics and Strategy,” 58.45 Ibid, 58.46 Garthoff, Soviet Military Doctrine, 150.

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discussed.47 Ignored during the disastrous invasion of Finland

only a few weeks after the Battle of Khalkin Gol, “Deep Battle”

was reburied in favor of Great War-style frontal infantry attacks

and the distribution of tanks in an infantry support role;48

there was also little coordination between the various combat

arms. After a few months of failure in Finland, the Red Army was

reorganized under the supervision of Zhukov’s “Deep Battle”

adherent Simon Timoshenko, who selected Zhukov as his Chief of

Staff. Timoshenko tightened supply lines, streamlined the

command and control system, and reformed armor and infantry

divisions, and creating mobile attack groups. Within a few

months, the Khalkin Gol-styled Red Army had succeeded in Finland

and forced an uneasy peace on the Finns; new defense regulations

reflected the success and permanence of these positive changes.

Zhukov addresses the Red Army High Command Conference in

December 1940 and in his presentation, “The Character of Modern

Offensive Operations,” spoke of swift offensives, massive

47 Glantz, “The Nature of Soviet Operational Art,” 8.48 Robert Edwards, The Winter War: Russia’s Invasion of Finland, 1939-40 (New York: Pegasus Books, 2008), 119.

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flanking attacks, and the ability to switch quickly from the

defense to the offense in order to execute more effective

counterattacks. His speech was well-received, and confirmed as

“an outright recognition of Tukhachevsky’s and Yegorov’s ideas

concerning operations in depth.”49 In February 1941, Zhukov was

appointed Chief of Staff of the Red Army.

The German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 caught

the Red Army in the midst of its transition between doctrines;

one old and ineffective, the other only partially emplaced. In

the confusion and slaughter that ensued, the “Deep Battle”

doctrines used so successfully at Khalkin Gol were used to

increasing effectiveness as the template for subsequent Soviet

operations throughout the rest of World War II.

When Barbarossa threatened Moscow in 1941, Zhukov assumed

control of the Western Front on October 10. His plan was to

bleed the Wehrmacht, waiting for its Operation Typhoon attack to

exhaust itself on hastily-constructed but deep Russian defenses,

49 Chaney, Zhukov, 87-88.24

then to strike back, pushing the Germans away from Moscow.50

Once the Panzer wings (4th Panzer in the north, 2nd Panzer in the

south) threatening Moscow were isolated, they could be destroyed

in the second stage of the counterattack.51

Following the proven method of achieving numerical

superiority, the Red Army amassed over 1 million men, around

8,000 field guns, 1,000 aircraft (almost one-third of all those

available in the entire country), and 800 tanks;52 among the

assembled men were forty Siberian divisions with experience at

Khalkin Gol,53 and three reserve armies in the rear areas.

50 Stephen G. Fritz, Ostkrieg: Hitler’s War of Extermination in the East (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011), 157, 200.51 Chris Bellamy, Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War. (New York: Vintage Books, 2007), 324.52 Nikolai Poroskov, “The Battle for Moscow,” Russian Life (November/December 2001): 54.53 Krefft, Ten Battles: Decisive Conflicts You May Not Know About, But Should, 222.

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Figure 3 - Soviet Counteroffensive at Moscow

Source: Albert Axell, Zhukov: The Man Who Beat Hitler. (London: Pearson, 2003), 86.

Fielding eighty-eight divisions versus the Germans’ sixty-seven,

the Western Front pinned the body of Army Group Center while the

Bryansk and Southwestern Fronts struck west across the Don River,

while the Kalinin Front attacked south across the Volga; it was a

large breakthrough and encirclement operation stretching over 500

miles on a north-south axis,54 it began under the cover of a

blizzard, and was a move reminiscent of that at Khalkin Gol. 54 Martin Gilbert, The Second World War (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1989), 243.

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Planned and executed in similar fashion, a coordinated strike at

the enemy’s weak points after the attainment of numerical

superiority. Though falling short of total encirclement, the

Soviets’ Moscow counteroffensive nearly overwhelmed Army Group

Center and destroyed several of its isolated elements.55

After the lull that characterized both armies’ rest-and-

refit period of early summer 1942, Hitler’s offensive plans for

southern Russia were altered to include the investment of

Stalingrad; by the end of August, German troops had reached the

outskirts of the city, and Georgi Zhukov had been appointed the

Deputy Supreme Commander by Stalin and sent to the city to

oversee its defense. The plan was familiar, a period of “active

defense” to wear down the enemy, followed by a massive

counterattack when the German assault had been expended. Zhukov

restructured his forces, and the plan, Operation Uranus, was

created in the Khalkin Gol model56 – mechanized mobility,

coordination of the various arms, and mass concentrated against

55 Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2000), 137.56 Krefft, Ten Battles: Decisive Conflicts You May Not Know About, But Should, 221-2.

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enemy weak points were the cornerstones of his strategy, the

ultimate goal being the encirclement and destruction of German

forces outside Stalingrad.

While General Vasily Chuikov’s 62nd Army held the center of

the German attack in the rubble of the city, the Red Army amassed

almost one million men, 1,400 aircraft, 1,000 tanks, and 14,000

artillery pieces57 in the rear areas. Using the characteristic

Red Army maskirovka (camouflage, deception) tactics, the shuffling

of troops and materiel was designed to appear defensive in nature

and mask the upcoming onslaught.

Figure 4 - Operation Uranus

57 Dennis Showalter, “Stalingrad.” World War II (January 2003), 36.28

Source: Hans W. Henzel. “The Stalingrad Offensive: Part II”, Marine Corps Gazette(September 1951), 55.

On November 19, following an artillery barrage, General

Nikolai Vatutin’s Kletskaya Front attacked south across the Don River

against the weaker 8th Italian and 3rd Romanian armies on the

northern flank of Army Group Center; General Andrei Yeremenko’s

Stalingrad Front pushed northwest into the Romanian 4th Army and the

4th Panzer Corps in an attempt to meet up with the Kletskaya Front

near the town of Kalach. General Rokossovsky’s Don Front was to

cross the Volga from the south of the city and hold the German

6th Army in place and keep it from moving to reinforce either of

its besieged flanks. The successful encirclement, complete only

four days later, trapped over 200,000 Axis troops and their

equipment; Soviet troops performed double duty, keeping those

trapped within the pocket from getting out, and reinforcements

from getting in. German generals refused initial Soviet offers

of surrender, and were pounded by the largest artillery

bombardment (to date) in history; the German 6th Army’s 90,000

survivors surrendered on February 1, marking the greatest defeat

29

in German history. The successful results at Stalingrad

reaffirmed the validity and effectiveness of Tukhachevsky’s

doctrine, but without his “Deep Battle” label and no official

recognition of that fact.58

At the battle of Kursk in 1943, the Red Army combined the

aggressive offensive tactics of Khalkin Gol and the defensive

tactics used in the retention of Leningrad and Stalingrad. Aware

of the German intention to squeeze closed the Soviet salient and

destroy the forces within, the Red Army constructed what was, in

essence, the largest tank trap the world had ever seen.

Deceptive measures reached their most sophisticated levels yet,

as the Soviets built their layered defenses under the watchful

eyes of the Wehrmacht while simultaneously disguising the amounts

of men and materiel brought in from the rear.59 Every part of

the vast defensive scheme was designed to trap German tanks, deny

them the mobility that made them effective, and kill them in

place.

58 Glantz, “The Nature of Soviet Operational Art,” 8.59 Mark Healy, Zitadelle:The German Offensive Against the Kursk Salient, 4-17 July 1943 (Gloustershire: The History Press, 2010), 64-5.

30

Workers (mostly civilians) built almost 3,700 miles of

trenches60 featuring belts of connected foxholes and bunkers with

overlapping fields of fire, and placed hundreds of thousands of

land mines along the channels where German tanks would be

directed; six, and in some places eight belts of reinforced

positions reached a depth of 110 miles in many places. Anti-tank

guns were placed at key choke points, and the entire area was

backstopped by 31,000-plus artillery pieces of varying caliber.61

The Steppe Front stood in ready reserve, to plug gaps in the lines

as they occurred or react to German penetrations.62 Over three-

quarters of the Red Army’s available armor, 3,000 aircraft, and

almost half of its available manpower were devoted to the Soviet

counterattack phase,63 the “overwhelming force” required by “Deep

Battle.” The counterattack was designed to encircle the German

pincers trying to squeeze off the salient, and either drive off

or completely destroy them.

60Albert Axell, Marshal Zhukov: The Man Who Beat Hitler (London: Pearson, 2003), 113-5.61 Healy, Zitadelle: The German Offensive Against the Kursk Salient, 4-17 July 1943, 69.62 Thomas J. Weiss II, “Fire Support at the Battle of Kursk.” Field Artillery (July/August 2000), 10.63 Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), 90.

31

Figure 5- The Battle of Kursk

Source: Richard Overy. Why The Allies Won (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995),

93.

This was the first time the Red Army willingly undertook a

defensive posture, and it had taken form reflective of the 1936

Field Regulations; it was designed to slow down, delay, and bleed the

enemy advance.

Both sides attacked on July 5, with a Soviet preparatory

barrage preceding the German advance. After days of pitched

battle, the German offensive, despite the presence of new and

upgraded tanks and AFVs, was blunted and worn down by the massive32

Russian defenses. The planned Soviet counteroffensives opened up

in the north of the salient, with the Bryansk Front pushing behind

the 9th Panzer Army and toward Army Group Center while the Central

Front bludgeoned its way due west. The Soviet Southwest Front struck

west behind the 4th Panzer Army and toward Army Group South. To

avoid encirclement, German forces pulled back and the Red Army

advanced hundreds of miles, retaking territory and vital cities

lost two years earlier.64 The Wehrmacht suffered irreplaceable

losses in men and materiel, and was forced thereafter to

transition to a fighting retreat toward Berlin for the rest of

the war.

The massive Russian counterstrike resembled the

encirclements at Moscow and Stalingrad in planning, preparation,

and execution, and “Deep Battle”-styled operations had now become

the norm in Soviet planning, rather than the exception. With the

German army on the defensive and the Red Army ascendant, the

Soviets hatched an ambitious plan for their summer 1944 offensive

– Operation Bagration - the centerpiece of a series of attacks with

64 Lous L. Snyder, The War: A Concise History: 1939-1945 (New York: Julian Messner, Inc., 1960), 311.

33

the Clausewitzean goal of the destruction of Germany’s main force

on the Eastern Front, Army Group Center.65

Planned in utmost secrecy, the gargantuan offensive would

feature four fronts (1st Baltic, and 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Belorussian)

advancing simultaneously along a 450-mile north-south axis.

Breakthroughs and encirclements were planned throughout the

front, and partisan activity was to simultaneously disrupt German

rear-area and logistical support.66 Logistical planning reached

a new level of organization and preparedness; a fleet of over

10,000 trucks transported and stockpiled tons of ammunition,

food, fuel, and medical supplies in the secure rear areas behind

the various fronts.67 Maskirovka reached its pinnacle; movements of

large amounts of armor and aircraft in the southern areas of the

front led the Germans to believe that the main assault would be

carried out south of the supposedly impassable Pripyat Marshes,

while concealed troops and material were marshaled in the north,

the area of the main Soviet thrust.68 The German high command 65 Bellamy, Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War, 610.66 Jonathan W. Jordan, “The Wehmacht’s Worst Defeat,” World War II (July/August 2006), 38.67 Alexander Werth, Russia at War: 1941-1945 (New York: Avon Books, 1945), 781.68 Bellamy, Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War, 612.

34

moved its reinforcements according to these Soviet deceptive

measures, unwittingly playing into the Bagration plan by moving

troops away from its main thrust in the center. Finally,

showcasing the Soviet propensity for gigantism, the Red Army had

amassed 166 divisions numbering almost 3.5 million men (including

reserves), over 2,700 tanks, over 1,300 assault guns, around

5,000 aircraft of various types, and almost 13,000 artillery

pieces;69 overall superiority ratios were 2:1 in manpower, 4.3:1

in armor, 2.9:1 in field guns and artillery, and 4.5:1 in

aircraft.70

69 Jonathan W. Jordan, “Turnabout!” World War II (March 2007), 43.70 Werth, Russia at War: 1941-1945, 781.

35

Figure 6 - Operation Bagration

Source: Albert Axell. Marshal Zhukov: The Man Who Beat Hitler (London: Pearson,

2003), 123.

Launched with an artillery barrage on the third anniversary

of Barbarossa, the staggered series of offensives surpassed even

their planners’ expectations. This mechanized attack was even

more sophisticated and well-coordinated than those previous;

engineer groups led mixed formations of tanks and infantry under

cover of artillery and air support,71 casting aside the wasteful

“human wave” tactics of the war’s initial phases and

71 David M. Glantz and Jonathan House, When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 205.

36

concentrating their fire on tactically important strongpoints

before calling up tanks to exploit and widen their successes.72

Within a few days, the various fronts had achieved no less than

six major penetrations of the German lines, and successfully

executed large encirclements of German forces at Bobruisk and

Vitebsk.73 The 3rd and 2nd Belorussian Fronts met up near Minsk,

completing their pincer movements while protected by the 1st

Belorussian and 1st Baltic Fronts on their respective flanks. By

August 1944, German troops had been cleared from most of

Belorussia and Lithuania, and the Red Army had neared the German

border. It had also inflicted 350,000 casualties and the loss of

approximately 30 divisions on the Wehrmacht, in what the Official

Journal of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht called “a greater catastrophe

than Stalingrad.”74 The remarkably agile Red Army had been able

to exceed even its most optimistic expectations from Bagration,

finally realizing the mobility, penetration, and depth of

operations that the creators of “Deep Battle” sought a decade

72 Jordan, “The Wehrmacht’s Greatest Defeat,” 40.73 Werth, Russia at War: 1941-1945, 782.74 Ibid, 784.

37

earlier.75 The success of the tank and shock armies within their

respective fronts resembled a more powerful and enduring example

of the Blitzkrieg concept, on more reflective of the unique needs

and qualities of the Soviet Union during the Second World War.

“Deep Battle,” whether or not called by its proper name, had

become entrenched in the Soviet military mind.

With the surrender of Germany in May 1945, the allies turned

their full attention to Japan. The Soviets denounced the Soviet-

Japanese Neutrality Pact shortly after the German surrender, and

began moving troops east. Using the concepts of “Deep Battle”

not far from their first true test at Khalkin Gol, the Soviet war

machine amassed eight divisions (over one-and-a-half million

men), just under 4,000 tanks, 30,000 field guns, and about 6,000

aircraft versus a small fraction of those numbers put forth by

the Kwantung Army, by this time in the war a pale shadow of its

former self. Late on August 8, the Russians declared war on the

Japanese and prepared to unleash their living, breathing

75 Murray and Millett, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War, 450.38

definition of “overwhelming firepower” in Manchuria, in the form

of three massive fronts.76

Figure 7 - Invasion of Manchuria

Source: Douglas C. MacCaskill. “The Soviet Union’s Second Front:Manchuria” Marine Corps Gazette (January 1975), 21.

The main thrust of the assault was to be carried by the Trans-

Baikal Front, which was to push southeast through Mongolia while the

Far Eastern Front was to move west from the coast, pinning Imperial

Japanese forces in place for their destruction by the 2nd Far Eastern

Front, which was to strike southeast toward Harbin. Conceived

from the beginning as a “deep” operation, it was a test bed for

76 Douglas C. MacCaskill, “The Soviet Union’s Second Front: Manchuria,” Marine Corps Gazette (January 1975), 20.

39

new combinations and ratios of various combat arms used in

various strike roles.77

Fast-moving reconnaissance units led off the invasions,

bypassing strongpoints and leaving them to be finished off by the

mobile tank and artillery formations that followed. Soviet air

superiority allowed deep paratroop drops and resupply of the

ground forces still on the move, and the operation took half as

much time as it was allotted. Some elements of the Kwantung Army

were pushed as far south as Korea, and the Red Army took almost

600,000 prisoners. This operation was lauded as a model of

combined-arms operations, with the four cornerstones of combat

arms (armor, artillery, infantry, and aviation) linked by careful

coordination, sound logistics, and effective communications to

achieve the “devastating synergistic effect”78 demanded by “Deep

Battle” doctrine. The Soviet Manchurian Campaign, served by the

full resources of the Red Army, was perhaps the pinnacle of the

77 Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler, 280.78 R.J. Biggs, “The Origin of Current Soviet Military Doctrine,” Marine Corps Gazette (August 1985), 65.

40

“Deep Battle” doctrinal framework79 and served as the operational

template for the future Red Army.

Beginning with the stunning Soviet victory at Khalkin Gol,

the forbidden “Deep Battle” doctrines were resurrected and

utilized effectively; widely dispersed and aggressive offensive

maneuvers by mechanized forces were supported by artillery and

aviation forces,80 spanning the gap between strategy and tactics with

the operational art of Tukhachevsky’s doctrines. With an

inclination toward encirclements and flanking maneuvers81 after

attaining numerical superiority and supplied by extensive and

dependable logistical systems, large operations could be

sustained over great geographic distances. This formula, once

demonstrated, remained consistent within Soviet operational

planning for the remainder of the war.

Each offensive began with artillery bombardments and air

assaults, both ground attack and rear-area bombing, followed by

infantry and mechanized attacks on enemy lines and/or

79 David M. Glantz, “Soviet Operational Art Since 1936,” in Historical Perspectives ofthe Operational Art, eds. Michael D. Krause and Cody Phillips (Washington: Center of Military History, 2005), 267.80 Colvin, Nomonhan, 131.81 Ziemke, “The Soviet Theory of Deep Operations,” 28.

41

fortifications. Breakthroughs, when successful, were secured by

ready reserves that also engaged in pursuit of enemy forces when

possible.

Figure 8 - The Breakthrough

Source: Raymond L. Garthoff. Soviet Military Doctrine (Glencoe: The FreePress, 1953), 71.

The wings of the double-envelopment or encirclement

operations in the battles of Khalkin Gol, Moscow, Stalingrad,

Kursk, Bagration, and Manchuria, seen as their own fronts,

performed as shown above in Figure 8. The main blow achieves the

42

breakthrough, and subsequent waves capitalize; reserves secure

the penetration and initiate pursuit and disruption in the enemy

rear area while holding actions prevent the enemy from shifting

forces to close the gaps. At Khalkin Gol the fronts were as

small as 40 miles, but could be as extensive as those in Operation

Bagration, stretching hundreds of miles.

Figure 9 - Breakthrough and Encirclement

Source: Raymond L. Garthoff. Soviet Military Doctrine (Glencoe: The Free

Press, 1953), 135.

When individual breakthroughs were linked together in

simultaneous operations with a common objective, the coordination

of fronts achieved encirclement (Figure 9), such as at the battles43

of Khalkin Gol, Stalingrad, and Bagration. Enemy forces were

trapped in various pockets and destroyed, one of the “Deep

Battle” system’s major goals. Though the attempt at encirclement

failed at Moscow, Army Group Center was forced to retreat to

avoid being trapped; retreat of the enemy was a secondary goal of

“Deep Battle,” when the opportunity for annihilation was not

present. Holding actions, as shown above, deprive enemy forces

of mobility and make flanking efforts easier for the attacking

force. The Soviet flanking maneuvers and encirclements at

Khalkin Gol and Stalingrad are perhaps the best examples of

Tukhachevsky’s offensive doctrines, as the flanking pincers

successfully performed the dual role of entrapping enemy troops

inside the cauldron as well as keeping enemy reinforcements out.

The Soviet defensive preparations for the Battle of Kursk

highlight the growth and maturity of the defensive doctrines that

were incomplete at the start of the war. The theoretical

precepts of positional warfare, augmented by the experience of

the siege at Leningrad and the defense of Moscow and Stalingrad,

44

resulted in the successful “defense in depth” fortifications that

so successfully stopped the Germans at Kursk.

Figure 10 - Soviet Active Defense

Source: Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Military Doctrine (Glencoe: The FreePress, 1953), 71.

Once the German assault had been ground down and repulsed by

the dense defense network, the Red Army, with its reserves and

rear area protected by those same defenses, was ready to

transition immediately to the offensive and undertake multi-front

operations like those shown in Figures 8 and 9. The repulsion of

enemy attacks by extensive defense networks in order to quickly

45

counterattack was also one of the “Deep Battle” requirements that

was repeatedly exhibited in later Soviet operations. The Soviet

pincer counterattacks at Kursk were the results of the successful

marriage of both the offensive and defensive doctrines, and

showcased the adaptability of the “Deep Battle” format. By 1944,

the Red Army’s ability to carry out large operations had grown

and was showcased with the success of Bagration, and one year

later with the invasion of Manchuria; the Manchurian campaign

would be the model for conventional Soviet operations for decades

to come.

The military doctrines that grew with the Soviet state

reflected its unique needs and capabilities; Tukhachevsky’s “Deep

Battle” doctrines combined the four cornerstones of military

action (infantry, artillery, airpower, and armor) with modern

mechanization, effective communications, and deep, layered

logistics. Mobility and mechanization applied to offensive

action had assumed supremacy, and Soviet doctrine had taken its

place among the most advanced in the world. The resurrection of

“Deep Battle” and its use at the Battle of Khalkin Gol provided

46

the Red Army with an effective operational template for the war

to come; successive battles highlighted the Red Army’s growing

facility in the formation, control, and execution of large

operations. Throughout the war the Soviets developed and refined

the “Deep Battle” doctrines into a workable system that was

eventually able to resist, repel, and overpower the German

onslaught, and shoulder the burden of the Allied effort; in its

final evolution, it was to serve as the template for conventional

Red Army operations throughout the Cold War.

47

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