Secret War: Spies, Codes and Guerrillas 1939-1945

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DedicationFor

WILLIAMandAMELIEthenextgeneration

ContentsCoverTitlePageCopyrightDedication

Introduction

1BeforetheDeluge1SEEKERSAFTERTRUTH2THEBRITISH:GENTLEMENANDPLAYERS3THERUSSIANS:TEMPLESOFESPIONAGE

2TheStormBreaks1THE‘FICTIONFLOOD’2SHADOWINGCANARIS

3MiraclesTakeaLittleLonger:Bletchley1‘TIPS’AND‘CILLIS’2FLIRTINGWITHAMERICA

4TheDogsthatBarked1‘LUCY’S’PEOPLE2SORGE’SWARNINGS3THEORCHESTRAPLAYS4THEDEAFMANIN THEKREMLIN

5DivineWinds1MRSFERGUSON’STEASET2THEJAPANESE3THEMANWHOWONMIDWAY

6MuddlingandGroping:TheRussiansatWar1CENTREMOBILISES2THEENDOFSORGE3THESECONDSOURCE4GOUREVITCHTAKESATRAIN

7Britain’sSecretWarMachine1THESHARPEND2THEBRAIN

3ATSEA

8‘Mars’:TheBloodiestDeception1GEHLEN2AGENT‘MAX’

9TheOrchestra’sLastConcert

10Guerrilla1RESISTERSANDRAIDERS2SOE

11Hoover ’sG-Men,Donovan’sWildMen1ADVENTURERS2IVORYTOWERS3ALLENDULLES:TALKINGTOGERMANS

12Russia’sPartisans:TerrorisingBothSides

13IslandsintheStorm1THEABWEHR’SIRISHJIG2NOMAN’SLAND

14ALittleHelpfromTheirFriends1‘ ITSTINKS,BUTSOMEBODYHASTODOIT’2AMERICANTRAITORS

15TheKnowledgeFactories1AGENTS2THEJEWELOFSOURCES3PRODUCTIONLINES4INFERNALMACHINES

16‘Blunderhead’:TheEnglishPatient

17EclipseoftheAbwehr1HITLER’SBLETCHLEYS2‘CICERO’3THEFANTASISTS4THE‘GOOD’NAZI

18Battlefields1WIELDINGTHEULTRAWAND2SUICIDESPIES3TARNISHEDTRIUMPH

19BlackWidows,FewWhiteKnights1FIGHTINGJAPAN

2FIGHTINGEACHOTHER3THEENEMY:GROPINGIN THEDARK

20‘Enormoz’

21DecodingVictory

PictureSectionAcknowledgementsNotesandSourcesBibliographyIndexAlsobyMaxHastingsAboutthePublisher

IntroductionThisisabookaboutsomeofthemostfascinatingpeoplewhoparticipatedintheSecondWorldWar.Soldiers,sailors,airmen,civilianshadvastlydiverseexperiences,forgedbyfire,geography,economicsandideology.Thosewhokilledeachotherwerethemostconspicuous,butinmanywaystheleastinteresting:outcomeswerealsoprofoundlyinfluencedbyahostofmenandwomenwhoneverfiredashot.WhileeveninRussiamonthscouldelapsebetweenbigbattles,alltheparticipantswagedanunceasingsecretwar–astruggleforknowledgeoftheenemytoempowertheirarmies,naviesandairforces,throughespionageandcodebreaking.Lt.Gen.AlbertPraun,theWehrmacht’slastsignalschief,wroteafterwardsofthelatter:‘Allaspectsofthismodern“coldwaroftheairwaves”werecarriedonconstantlyevenwhenthegunsweresilent.’TheAlliesalsolaunchedguerrillaandterroristcampaignswhereverinAxis-occupiedterritoriestheyhadmeanstodoso:covertoperationsassumedanunprecedentedimportance.Thisbookdoesnotaspiretobeacomprehensivenarrative,whichwouldfillcountlessvolumes.It

isinsteadastudyofbothsides’secretwarmachinesandsomeofthecharacterswhoinfluencedthem.Itisunlikelythatanymoregame-changingrevelationswillbeforthcoming,savepossiblyfromSovietarchivescurrentlylockedbyVladimirPutin.TheJapanesedestroyedmostoftheirintelligencefilesin1945,andwhatsurvivesremainsinaccessibleinTokyo,butveteransprovidedsignificantpost-wartestimony–adecadeago,Iinterviewedsomeofthemmyself.Mostbooksaboutwartimeintelligencefocusonthedoingsofachosennation.Ihaveinstead

attemptedtoexploreitinaglobalcontext.Someepisodesinmynarrativeareboundtobefamiliartospecialists,butanewperspectiveseemspossiblebyplacingthemonabroadcanvas.Thoughspiesandcodebreakershavegeneratedavastliterature,readersmaybeasastonishedbysomeofthetalesinthisbookasIhavebeenondiscoveringthemformyself.IhavewrittenextensivelyabouttheRussians,becausetheirdoingsaremuchlessfamiliartoWesternreadersthanarethoseofBritain’sBletchleyPark,America’sArlingtonHallandOp-20-G.Ihaveomittedmanylegends,andmadenoattempttoretellthemostfamiliartalesofResistanceinWesternEurope,noroftheAbwehr ’sagentsinBritainandAmerica,whowereswiftlyimprisonedor‘turned’forthefamousDoubleCrosssystem.Bycontrast,thoughthefactsofRichardSorge’sand‘Cicero’s’*doingshavebeenknownformanydecades,theirsignificancedeservesarethink.Theachievementsofsomesecretwarriorswereasbreathtakingastheblundersofothers.AsI

recounthere,theBritishseveraltimesallowedsensitivematerialtobecapturedwhichcouldhavebeenfataltotheUltrasecret.Meanwhile,spywritersdwellobsessivelyonthetreacheryofBritain’sCambridgeFive,butrelativelyfewrecognisewhatwemightcalltheWashingtonandBerkeleyfive

hundred–asmallarmyofAmericanleftistswhoservedasinformantsforSovietintelligence.TheegregiousSenatorJosephMcCarthystigmatisedmanyindividualsunjustly,buthewasnotwronginchargingthatbetweenthe1930sand1950stheUSgovernmentandthenation’sgreatestinstitutionsandcorporationsharbouredanastonishingnumberofemployeeswhosefirstloyaltywasnottotheirownflag.True,between1941and1945theRussiansweresupposedlyalliesofBritainandtheUnitedStates,butStalinviewedthisrelationshipwithunremittingcynicism–asamerelytemporaryassociation,forthenarrowpurposeofdestroyingtheNazis,withnationsthatremainedtheSovietUnion’shistoricfoesandrivals.Manybooksaboutwartimeintelligencefocusonwhatspiesorcodebreakersfoundout.Theonly

questionthatmatters,however,ishowfarsecretknowledgechangedoutcomes.ThescaleofSovietespionagedwarfedthatofeveryotherbelligerent,andyieldedarichtechnologicalharvestfromBritainandtheUnitedStates,butStalin’sparanoiacrippledexploitationofhiscropofotherpeople’spoliticalandmilitarysecrets.ThemostdistinguishedAmericanhistorianofwartimecodebreakingtoldmein2014thatafterhalfalifetimestudyingthesubjecthehasdecidedthatAlliedintelligencecontributedalmostnothingtowinningthewar.Thisseemstooextremeaverdict,butmyfriend’sremarksshowhowscepticism,andindeedcynicism,breedandmultiplyinthecourseofdecadeswadinginthemorassoffantasy,treacheryandincompetencewhereinmostspymastersandtheirservantshavetheirbeing.Therecordsuggeststhatofficialsecrecydoesmoretoprotectintelligenceagenciesfromdomesticaccountabilityfortheirownfolliesthantoshieldthemfromenemypenetration.Ofwhatusewasit–forinstance–toconcealfromtheBritishpubliceventheidentitiesoftheirownspychiefs,whenforyearsMI6’s*mostsecretoperationswerebetrayedtotheRussiansbyKimPhilby,oneofitsmostseniorofficers?TheUSgovernmentrepudiatedabilateralintelligenceexchangeagreedwiththeNKVD*byMaj.Gen.WilliamDonovanofOSS,butofficialcautiondidlittlefornationalsecuritywhensomeofDonovan’stopsubordinateswerepassingsecretstoSovietagents.Intelligence-gatheringisnotascience.Therearenocertainties,evenwhensomeoftheenemy’s

correspondenceisbeingread.Thereisacacophonyof‘noise’,fromwhich‘signals’–truthslargeandsmall–mustbeextracted.InAugust1939,ontheeveoftheNazi–SovietPact,aBritishofficialwrunghishandsovertheconfusedmessagesreachingtheForeignOfficeaboutrelationsbetweenBerlinandMoscow:‘Wefindourselves,’hewrote–usingwordsthatmaybeappliedtomostintelligence–‘whenattemptingtoassessthevalueofthesesecretreports,somewhatinthepositionoftheCaptainoftheFortyThieveswhen,havingputachalkmarkonAliBaba’sdoor,hefoundthatMorganahadputsimilarmarksonallthedoorsinthestreetandhadnoindicationwhichwasthetrueone.’Itisfruitlesstostudyanynation’ssuccesses,itspearlsofrevelation,inisolation.Thesemustbe

viewedinthecontextofhundredsofthousandsofpagesoftriviaoroutrightnonsensethatcrossed

thedesksofanalysts,statesmen,commanders.‘Diplomatsandintelligenceagents,inmyexperience,areevenbiggerliarsthanjournalists,’wrotetheBritishwartimespyMalcolmMuggeridge,whowasfamiliarwithallthree,andsomethingofacharlatanhimself.ThesterilityofmuchespionagewasnicelyillustratedbyFrantišekMoravecofCzechintelligence.Onedayin1936heproudlypresentedhiscommandingofficerwithareportonanewpieceofGermanmilitaryequipment,forwhichhehadpaidaninformanthandsomely.Thegeneralskimmedit,thensaid,‘Iwillshowyousomethingbetter.’HetossedacrosshisdeskacopyofthemagazineDieWehrmacht,pointedoutanarticleonthesameweapon,andsaiddryly,‘Thesubscriptionisonlytwentycrowns.’InthesamecategoryfelltheAbwehrtranscriptofaDecember1944USStateDepartmentmessage

appointinganeweconomicaffairscounsellortothePolishexilegovernmentinLondon.Thisread,inpart:‘Histransportationexpensesandperdiem,TunistoLondon,viaWashington,DC,transportationexpensesandperdiemforhisfamilyandshipmenteffectsdirectauthorised,subjectTravelRegulations.’Apage-longtranslationofthisdecryptwasstamped‘TopSecret’byitsGermanreaders.Theman-hoursexpendedbytheNaziwarmachinetosecurethisgemreflectthefashioninwhichintelligenceservicesoftenmovemountainstogivebirthtomice.Trustisabondandprivilegeoffreesocieties.Yetcredulityandrespectforprivacyarefatalflaws

toanalystsandagent-runners.Theirworkrequiresthemtopersuadecitizensofothercountriestoabandonthetraditionalidealofpatriotism,whetherforcash,outofconviction,oroccasionallybecauseofapersonalbondbetweenhandlerandinformant.Itwillalwaysbedisputedterritory,whetherthosewhobetraytheirsociety’ssecretsarecourageousandprincipledheroeswhoidentifyahigherloyalty,asmodernGermansperceivetheanti-HitlerResistance,orinsteadtraitors,asmostofusclassifyKimPhilby,AlgerHiss–andinourowntimesEdwardSnowden.Thedayjobofmanyintelligenceofficersistopromotetreachery,whichhelpstoexplainwhythetradeattractssomanyweirdpeople.MalcolmMuggeridgeasserteddisdainfullythatit‘necessarilyinvolvessuchcheating,lyingandbetraying,thatithasadeleteriouseffectonthecharacter.InevermetanyoneprofessionallyengagedinitwhomIshouldcaretotrustinanycapacity.’Stalinsaid:‘Aspyshouldbelikethedevil;noonecantrusthim,notevenhimself.’Thegrowthof

newideologies,mostsignificantlycommunism,causedsomepeopletoembraceloyaltiesthatcrossedfrontiersand,intheeyesofzealots,transcendedmerepatriotism.Morethanafewfeltexaltedbydiscoveringvirtueintreason,thoughotherspreferredtobetrayforcash.Manywartimespymasterswereuncertainwhichsidetheiragentswerereallyserving,andinsomecasesbewildermentpersiststothisday.TheBritishpettycrookEddieChapman,‘AgentZigZag’,hadextraordinarywarexperiencesastheplaythingofBritishandGermanintelligence.Atdifferenttimesheputhimselfatthemercyofboth,butitseemsunlikelythathisactivitiesdidmuchgoodtoeither,servingonlytokeepChapmanhimselfingirlsandshoeleather.Hewasanintriguingbutunimportantfigure,oneamongcountlessloosecannononthesecretbattlefield.Moreinteresting,andscarcely

knowntothepublic,isthecaseofRonaldSeth,anSOEagentcapturedbytheGermansandtrainedbythemtoserveasa‘double’inBritain.IshalldescribebelowthepuzzlementofSOE,MI5,MI6,MI9andtheAbwehraboutwhosesideSethendedupon.Intelligence-gatheringisinherentlywasteful.Iamstruckbythenumberofsecretserviceofficers

ofallnationalitieswhoseonlyachievementinforeignpostingswastostayalive,atheftycosttotheiremployers,whilecollectinginformationofwhichnotasmidgeonassistedthewareffort.Perhapsone-thousandthof1percentofmaterialgarneredfromsecretsourcesbyallthebelligerentsinWorldWarIIcontributedtochangingbattlefieldoutcomes.Yetthatfractionwasofsuchvaluethatwarlordsgrudgednotalifenorapound,rouble,dollar,Reichsmarkexpendedinsecuringit.Intelligencehasalwaysinfluencedwars,butuntilthetwentiethcenturycommanderscoulddiscovertheirenemies’motionsonlythroughspiesanddirectobservation–countingmen,ships,guns.Thencamewirelesscommunication,whichcreatedrollingnewintelligencecornprairiesthatgrewexponentiallyafter1930,astechnologyadvanced.‘Therehasneverbeenanythingcomparableinanyotherperiodofhistorytotheimpactofradio,’wrotethegreatBritishscientificintelligenceofficerDrR.V.Jones.‘…Itwastheproductofsomeofthemostimaginativedevelopmentsthathaveeveroccurredinphysics,anditwasasnearmagicasanyonecouldconceive.’Notonlycouldmillionsofcitizensbuildtheirownsetsathome,asdidalsomanyspiesabroad,butinBerlin,London,Washington,Moscow,Tokyoelectroniceavesdropperswereempoweredtoprobethedeploymentsandsometimestheintentionsofanenemywithoutbenefitoftelescopes,frigatesoragents.Oneofthethemesinthisbookisthatthesignalsintelligencewar,certainlyinitsearlystages,was

lesslopsidedintheAllies’favourthanpopularmythologysuggests.TheGermansusedsecretknowledgewelltoplanthe1940invasionofFranceandtheLowCountries.Atleastuntilmid-1942,andeveninsomedegreethereafter,theyreadimportantAlliedcodesbothonlandandatsea,withsignificantconsequencesforboththeBattleoftheAtlanticandtheNorthAfricancampaign.TheywereabletoexploitfeebleRedArmywirelesssecurityduringthefirstyearofOperation‘Barbarossa’.Fromlate1942onwards,however,Hitler ’scodebreakerslaggedeverfurtherbehindtheirAlliedcounterparts.TheAbwehr ’sattemptsatespionageabroadwerepitiful.TheJapanesegovernmentandarmyhighcommandplannedtheirinitial1941–42assaultsonPearl

HarborandtheEuropeanempiresofSouth-EastAsiamostefficiently,butthereaftertreatedintelligencewithdisdain,andwagedwarinafogofignoranceabouttheirenemies’doings.TheItalianintelligenceserviceanditscodebreakershadsomenotablesuccessesintheearlywaryears,butby1942Mussolini’scommanderswerereducedtousingRussianPoWstodotheireavesdroppingonSovietwirelesstraffic.RelativelylittleeffortwasexpendedbyanynationonprobingItaly’ssecrets,becauseitsmilitarycapabilityshranksorapidly.‘OurpictureoftheItalianairforcewasincompleteandourknowledgefarfromsound,’admittedRAFintelligenceofficerGroup-CaptainHarryHumphreysabouttheMediterraneantheatre,beforeaddingsmugly,‘So–fortunately–wasthe

Italianairforce.’Thefirstrequirementforsuccessfuluseofsecretdataisthatcommandersshouldbewillingto

analyseithonestly.HerbertMeyer,aveteranofWashington’sNationalIntelligenceCouncil,definedhisbusinessasthepresentationof‘organizedinformation’;hearguedthatideallyintelligencedepartmentsshouldprovideaserviceforcommandersresemblingthatofshipandaircraftnavigationsystems.DonaldMcLachlan,aBritishnavalpractitioner,observed:‘Intelligencehasmuchincommonwithscholarship,andthestandardswhicharedemandedinscholarshiparethosewhichshouldbeappliedtointelligence.’Afterthewar,thesurvivingGermancommandersblamedalltheirintelligencefailuresonHitler ’srefusaltocountenanceobjectiveassessmentofevidence.SignalssupremoAlbertPraunsaid:‘Unfortunately…throughoutthewarHitler…showedalackofconfidenceincommunicationsintelligence,especiallyifthereportswereunfavourable[tohisownviews].’GoodnewsfortheAxiscause–forinstance,interceptionsrevealingheavyAlliedlosses–were

giventhehighestpriorityfortransmissiontoBerlin,becausetheFührerwelcomedthem.Meanwhilebadtidingsreceivedshortshrift.BeforetheJune1941invasionofRussia,Gen.GeorgThomasoftheWiRuAmt–theWehrmacht’seconomicsdepartment–producedestimatesofSovietweaponsproductionwhichapproachedthereality,thoughstillshortofit,andarguedthatthelossofEuropeanRussiawouldnotnecessarilyprecipitatethecollapseofStalin’sindustrialbase.HitlerdismissedThomas’snumbersoutofhand,becausehecouldnotreconciletheirmagnitudewithhiscontemptforallthingsSlavonic.Field-MarshalWilhelmKeiteleventuallyinstructedtheWiRuAmttostopsubmittingintelligencethatmightupsettheFührer.ThewareffortoftheWesterndemocraciesprofitedimmenselyfromtherelativeopennessoftheir

societiesandgovernance.Churchillsometimesindulgedspasmsofangertowardsthosearoundhimwhovoicedunwelcomeviews,butaremarkablyopendebatewassustainedintheAlliedcorridorsofpower,includingmostmilitaryheadquarters.Gen.SirBernardMontgomerywasaconsiderabletyrant,butthosewhomhetrusted–includinghisintelligencechiefBrigadierBillWilliams,apeacetimeOxforddon–couldspeaktheirminds.AlltheUnitedStates’sbrilliantintelligencesuccessesweregainedthroughcodebreaking,andwereexploitedmostdramaticallyinthePacificnavalwar.Americangroundcommandersseldomshowedmuchinterestinusingtheirknowledgetopromotedeceptions,asdidtheBritish.D-Dayin1944wastheonlyoperationforwhichtheAmericanscooperatedwholeheartedlyonadeceptionplan.EventhentheBritishwereprimemovers,whiletheAmericansmerelyacquiesced–forinstance,byallowingGen.GeorgePattontomasqueradeascommanderofthefictitiousAmericanFirstUSArmyGroupsupposedlydestinedtolandinthePasdeCalais.SomeseniorAmericansweresuspiciousoftheBritishenthusiasmformisleadingtheenemy,whichtheyregardedasreflectingtheirally’senthusiasmforemployingguiletoescapehardfighting,therealbusinessofwar.

GC&CS,theso-calledGovernmentCodeandCipherSchoolatBletchleyPark,wasofcoursenotmerelythemostimportantintelligencehuboftheconflict,butfrom1942Britain’soutstandingcontributiontovictory.FolklegendholdsthatAlanTuring’screationofelectro-mechanicalbombesexposedGermany’sentirecommunicationssystemtoAlliedeyesbybreakingtheEnigma’straffic.Thetruthisfarmorecomplex.TheGermansemployeddozensofdifferentkeys,manyofwhichwerereadonlyintermittently,oftenoutof‘realtime’–meaninginsufficientlyrapidlytomakepossibleanoperationalresponse–andafewnotatall.TheBritishaccessedsomeimmenselyvaluableEnigmamaterial,butcoveragewasneverremotelycomprehensive,andwasespeciallyweakonarmytraffic.Moreover,anever-increasingvolumeoftheGermans’mostsecretsignalswastransmittedthroughateleprinternetworkwhichemployedanentirelydifferentencryptionsystemfromthatusedbyEnigma.TheachievementofBletchley’smathematiciansandlinguistsincrackingtheLorenzSchlüsselzusatzwasquitedistinctfrom,andmoredifficultthan,breakingtheEnigma,eventhoughrecipientsinthefieldknewtheproductsofallsuchactivitiessimplyas‘Ultra’.*BillTutte,theyoungCambridgemathematicianwhomadethecriticalinitialdiscoveries,isscarcelyknowntoposterity,yetdeservestobealmostascelebratedasTuring.UltraenabledtheAlliedleadershiptoplanitscampaignsandoperationsinthesecondhalfofthe

warwithaconfidencevouchsafedtonopreviouswarlordsinhistory.Knowingtheenemy’shanddidnotdiminishitsstrength,however.In1941andinto1942,againandagaintheBritishlearnedwheretheAxisintendedtostrike–asinCrete,NorthAfricaandMalaya–butthisdidnotsavethemfromlosingthesubsequentbattles.Hardpower,whetheronlandoratseaorintheair,wasindispensabletotheexploitationofsecretknowledge.So,too,waswisdomonthepartofBritishandAmericancommandersandtheirstaffs–whichprovedconspicuouslylackingatkeymomentsduringthe1944–45north-westEuropecampaign.Intelligencedid,however,contributeimportantlytomitigatingsomeearlydisasters:youngR.V.Jones’sachievementinshowingthepathtowardsjammingtheLuftwaffe’snavigationalbeamssignificantlydiminishedthepaininflictedbytheBlitzonBritain.Atsea,Ultra’spinpointingofGermanU-boats–withanalarmingnine-monthinterruptionin1942–madeitpossibletorerouteconvoystoevadethem,anevenmoreimportantcontributiontoholdingopentheAtlanticsupplylinethansinkingenemysubmarines.TheAmericanshadsomereasontosuspecttheiralliesofromanticismaboutdeception.Col.

DudleyClarke–famousnotleasttoSpanishpolice,whooncearrestedhimwearingwoman’sclothesinaMadridstreet–conductedamassivecoveroperationintheNorthAfricandesertbeforetheOctober1942BattleofElAlamein.HistorianshavecelebratedClarke’singenuityincreatingfictionalforceswhichcausedRommeltodeploysignificantstrengthwellsouthofthefocalpointofMontgomery’sassault.However,suchguiledidnotspareEighthArmyfromthefortnightofhardfightingthatprovednecessarytobreakthroughtheAfrikaKorps.TheGermansarguedthatClarke’sactivitieschangednothingintheend,becausetheyhadtimetoredeploynorthwardsbeforethe

decisiveBritishassault.InBurmaCol.PeterFleming,brotherofthecreatorofJamesBond,wenttoelaborateandhazardouslengthstoleaveahaversackfullofdeceptive‘secretpapers’inawreckedjeepwheretheenemywereboundtofindit,buttheJapanesetooknonoticeofthishaulwhentheygotit.From1942onwards,BritishintelligenceachievedanalmostcompleteunderstandingofGermany’sairdefencesandtheelectronictechnologiestheyemployed,butAlliedbomberforcescontinuedtosufferpunitivecasualties,especiallybeforeUSlong-rangefighterswreckedtheLuftwaffeintheairinthespringof1944.WhateverthecontributionofBritishtacticaldeceptionsinNorthAfrica,Allieddeceivershadtwo

importantandalmostindisputablestrategicsuccesses.In1943–44,Operation‘Zeppelin’createdafictitiousBritisharmyinEgyptwhichinducedHitlertomaintainlargeforcesinYugoslaviaandGreecetorepelanAlliedBalkanlanding.Itwasthisimaginarythreat,notTito’sguerrillas,thatcausedtwenty-twoAxisdivisionstokicktheirheelsinthesouth-eastuntilafterD-Day.Thesecondachievementwas,ofcourse,thatofOperation‘Fortitude’beforeandaftertheassaultonNormandy.ItbearsemphasisthatneithercouldhaveexercisedsuchinfluencehadnottheAlliespossessedsufficienthardpower,togetherwithcommandofthesea,tomakeitcrediblethattheymightlandarmiesalmostanywhere.SomeRussiandeceptionsdwarfthoseoftheBritishandAmericans.Thestoryofagent‘Max’,and

thevastoperationlaunchedasadiversionfromtheStalingradoffensive,atacostof70,000Russianlives,isoneofthemostastonishingofthewar,andalmostunknowntoWesternreaders.In1943–44,otherSovietrusespromptedtheGermansrepeatedlytoconcentratetheirforcesinthewrongplacesinadvanceofonslaughtsbytheRedArmy.Airsuperioritywasanessentialprerequisite,intheEastasintheWest:theambitiousdeceptionsofthelaterwaryearswerepossibleonlybecausetheGermanscouldnotcarryoutphotographicreconnaissancetodisprovethe‘legends’theyweresoldacrosstheairwavesandthroughfalsedocuments.TheWesternAlliesweremuchlesssuccessfulingatheringhumintthansigint.*NeithertheBritish

northeAmericansacquiredasinglehighlyplacedsourcearoundtheGerman,JapaneseorItaliangovernmentsorhighcommands,untilin1943OSS’sAllenDullesbegantoreceivesomegoodBerlingossip.TheWesternAlliesachievednothingliketheRussians’penetrationofLondon,Washington,BerlinandTokyo,thelastthroughtheiragentRichardSorge,workingintheGermanembassy.TheUSgotintothebusinessofoverseasespionageonlyafterPearlHarbor,andfocusedmoreeffortonsabotageandcodebreakingthanonplacingspies,asdistinctfromparamilitarygroups,inenemyterritory.OSS’sResearchandAnalysisDepartmentinWashingtonwasmoreimpressivethanitsflamboyantbutunfocusedfieldoperations.Moreover,IbelievethatWesternAlliedsponsorshipofguerrillawardidmoretopromotethepost-warself-respectofoccupiednationsthantohastenthedestructionofNazism.Russia’spartisanoperationswereconductedonafarmoreambitiousscalethantheSOE/OSScampaigns,andpropagandaboostedtheirachievementsboth

atthetimeandinthepost-warera.However,Sovietdocumentsnowavailable,ofwhichmyRussianresearcherDrLyubaVinogradovnahasmadeextensiveuse,indicatethatweshouldviewtheachievementsoftheEasternguerrillacampaign,atleastuntil1943,withconsiderablescepticism.Asinallmybooks,Iseekbelowtoestablishthe‘bigpicture’framework,andtoweaveintothis

humanstoriesofthespies,codebreakersandintelligencechiefswhoservedtheirrespectivemasters–TuringatBletchleyandNimitz’scryptanalystsinthePacific,theSoviet‘RedOrchestra’ofagentsinGermany,ReinhardGehlenofOKH,WilliamDonovanofOSSandmanymoreexoticcharacters.TheforemostreasontheWesternAlliesdidintelligencebestwasthattheybrilliantlyexploitedcivilians,towhomboththeUSandBritishgovernmentsgranteddiscretion,influenceand–wherenecessary–militaryrank,astheiropponentsdidnot.WhenthefirstvolumeoftheBritishofficialhistoryofwartimeintelligencewaspublishedthirtyyearsago,IsuggestedtoitsprincipalauthorProfessorHarryHinsley,aBletchleyveteran,thatitseemedtoshowthattheamateurscontributedmorethandidcareersecretserviceprofessionals.Hinsleyrepliedsomewhatimpatiently,‘Ofcoursetheydid.Youwouldn’twanttosuppose,wouldyou,thatinpeacetimethebestbrainsofoursocietywastedtheirlivesinintelligence?’Ihavealwaysthoughtthisanimportantpoint,echoedinthewritingsofanotheracademic,Hugh

Trevor-Roper,whoservedinbothMI5andMI6,andwhosepersonalachievementmakeshimseemoneofthemoreremarkableBritishintelligenceofficersofthewar.Inpeacetime,mostsecretservicesfulfilledtheirfunctionsadequately,oratleastdidlittleharm,whilestaffedbypeopleofmoderateabilities.Onceastrugglefornationalsurvivalbegan,however,intelligencehadtobecomepartoftheguidingbrainofthewareffort.Clashesonthebattlefieldcouldbefoughtbymenofrelativelylimitedgifts,thevirtuesofthesportsfield–physicalfitness,courage,grit,alittleinitiativeandcommonsense.Butintelligenceservicessuddenlyneededbrilliance.Itsoundsbanaltosaythattheyhadtorecruitintelligentpeople,but–asmorethanafewtwentieth-centurysagesnoted–inmanycountriesthisprinciplewashonouredmostlyinthebreach.Afewwordsaboutthearrangementofthisbook:whilemyapproachisbroadlychronological,to

avoidleapingtooconfusinglybetweentraitorsinWashington,SovietspiesinSwitzerlandandthemathematiciansofBletchleyPark,thenarrativepersistswithsomethemesbeyondtheirtimesequence.Ihavedrawnheavilyonthemostauthoritativepublishedworksinthisfield,thoseofStephenBudiansky,DavidKahnandChristopherAndrewnotableamongthem,butIhavealsoexploitedarchivesinBritain,GermanyandtheUS,togetherwithmuchpreviouslyuntranslatedRussianmaterial.Ihavemadenoattempttodiscussthemathematicsofcodebreaking,whichhasbeendonebywritersmuchmorenumeratethanmyself.ItisoftensaidthatIanFleming’sthrillersbearnorelationshiptotherealworldofespionage.

However,whenreadingcontemporarySovietreportsandrecordedconversations,togetherwiththememoirsofMoscow’swartimeintelligenceofficers,Iamstruckbyhowuncannilytheymirrorthe

mad,monstrous,imagineddialogueofsuchpeopleinFleming’sFromRussiaWithLove.AndsomeoftheplotsplannedandexecutedbytheNKVDandtheGRUwerenolessfantasticthanhis.Allhistoricalnarrativesarenecessarilytentativeandspeculative,buttheybecomefarmoreso

whenspiesareinvolved.Inchroniclingbattles,onecanreliablyrecordhowmanyshipsweresunk,aircraftshotdown,menkilled,howmuchgroundwaswonorlost.Butintelligencegeneratesavast,unreliableliterature,someofitproducedbyprotagonistsfortheirownglorificationorjustification.OneimmenselypopularaccountofAlliedintelligence,BodyguardofLies,publishedin1975,islargelyaworkoffiction.SirWilliamStephenson,theCanadianwhorantheBritishwartimeintelligencecoordinationorganisationinNewYork,performedavaluableliaisonfunction,butwasnevermuchofaspymaster.Thisdidnotpreventhimfromassistinginthecreationofawildlyfanciful1976biographyofhimself,AManCalledIntrepid,thoughthereisnoevidencethatanybodyevercalledhimanythingofthesort.MostaccountsofwartimeSOEagents,particularlywomenandespeciallyinFrance,containlargedosesofromantictwaddle.Moscow’smendacityisundiminishedbytime:theKGB’sofficialintelligencehistory,publishedasrecentlyas1997,assertsthattheBritishForeignOfficeisstillconcealingdocumentationaboutitssecretnegotiationswith‘fascist’Germany,andindeeditscollusionwithHitler.AlliedcodebreakingoperationsagainstGermany,ItalyandJapanexercisedfarmoreinfluencethan

didanyspy.Itisimpossibletoquantifytheirimpact,however,anditisbafflingthatHarryHinsley,theofficialhistorian,assertedthatUltraprobablyshortenedthewarbythreeyears.ThisisastendentiousasProfessorM.R.D.Foot’sclaim,inhisofficialhistoryofSOEinFrance,thatAlliedcommandersconsideredthatResistancecurtailedtheglobalstrugglebysixmonths.UltrawasatooloftheBritishandAmericans,whoplayedonlyasubordinateroleinthedestructionofNazism,whichwasoverwhelminglyaRussianmilitaryendeavour.ItisnomorepossibletomeasurethecontributionofBletchleyParktothetimingofvictorythanthatofWinstonChurchill,Libertyshipsorradar.Likewise,publicistswhomakeclaimsthatsomesensationalmodernbookrecounts‘thespystory

thatchangedWorldWarII’mightaswellciteMaryPoppins.OneofChurchill’smostprofoundobservationswasmadeinOctober1941,inresponsetoademandfromSirCharlesPortal,aschiefofairstaff,foracommitmenttobuild4,000heavybomberswhich,claimedtheairman,wouldbringGermanytoitskneesinsixmonths.Theprimeministerwrotebackthat,whileeverythingpossiblewasbeingdonetocreatealargebomberforce,hedeploredattemptstoplaceunboundedconfidenceinanyonemeansofsecuringvictory.‘Allthingsarealwaysonthemovesimultaneously,’hedeclared.Thisisanimmenselyimportantcommentonhumanaffairs,especiallyinwarandaboveallinintelligence.Itisimpossiblejustlytoattributeallcreditforthesuccessorblameforthefailureofanoperationtoanysinglefactor.Yetwhilescepticismaboutthesecretworldisindispensable,sotooisacapacityforwonder:some

fabuloustalesprovetrue.Iblushtorememberthedayin1974whenIwasinvitedbyanewspaperto

reviewF.W.Winterbotham’sTheUltraSecret.Inthosedays,youngandgreenandamerecasualstudentof1939–45,liketherestoftheworldIhadneverheardofBletchleyPark.Iglancedattheabout-to-be-publishedbook,thendeclinedtowriteaboutit:WinterbothammadesuchextraordinaryclaimsthatIcouldnotcreditthem.Yetofcoursetheauthor,awartimeofficerofMI6,hadbeenauthorisedtoopenawindowupononeofthebiggestandmostfascinatingsecretsoftheSecondWorldWar.Noothernationhaseverproducedanofficialhistoryexplicitlydedicatedtowartimeintelligence,

andapproachinginmagnitudeBritain’sfivevolumesand3,000-pluspages,publishedbetween1978and1990.Thislavishcommitmenttothehistoriographyoftheperiod,fundedbythetaxpayer,reflectsBritishprideinitsachievement,sustainedintothetwenty-firstcenturybysuchabsurd–asdefinedbyitsnegligiblerelationshiptofact–yetalsohugelysuccessfulfeaturefilmsas2014’sTheImitationGame.WhilemosteducatedpeopletodayrecognisehowsubordinatewasthecontributionofBritaintoAlliedvictoryalongsidethoseoftheSovietUnionandtheUnitedStates,theyrealisethatherewassomethingChurchill’speopledidbetterthananybodyelse.Althoughtherearemanystoriesinthisbookaboutbunglesandfailures,inintelligenceasineverythingelserelatedtoconflictvictoryisgainednotbythesidethatmakesnomistakes,butbytheonethatmakesfewerthantheotherside.Bysuchareckoning,theultimatetriumphoftheBritishandAmericanswasasgreatinthesecretwarasitbecameinthecollisionbetweenarmies,naviesandairforces.ThedefiningrealityisthattheAllieswon.Finally,whilesomeepisodesdescribedbelowseemcomicorridiculous,andreflecthuman

frailtiesandfollies,wemustneverforgetthatineveryaspectoftheglobalconflict,thestakeswerelifeanddeath.Hundredsofthousandsofpeopleofmanynationalitiesriskedtheirlives,andmanysacrificedthem,ofteninthelonelinessofdawnbeforeafiringsquad,togatherintelligenceorpursueguerrillaoperations.Notwenty-first-centuryperspectiveonthepersonalitiesandevents,successesandfailuresofthosedaysshoulddiminishourrespect,evenreverence,forthememoryofthosewhopaidthepriceforwagingsecretwar.

MAXHASTINGS

WestBerkshire&Datai,LangkawiJune2015

*Agents’codenamesinthepagesthatfollowaregivenwithinquotationmarks.

*Britain’sMI6isoftenknownbyitsothername,SIS–theSecretIntelligenceService–butforclarityitisgiventheformernamethroughoutthiswork,evenindocumentsquoted,partlytoavoidconfusionwiththeUSSignalsIntelligenceService.

*TheSovietintelligenceserviceanditssubordinatedomesticandforeignbrancheswererepeatedlyreorganisedandrenamedbetween1934and1954,whenitbecametheKGB.Throughoutthistext‘NKVD’isused,whileacknowledgingalsofrom1943thecounter-intelligenceorganisationSMERSh–SmertShpionam–andtheparallelexistencefrom1926oftheRedArmy’smilitaryintelligencebranch,theFourthDepartmentorGRU,fiercerivaloftheNKVDathomeandabroad.

*AmericansreferredtotheirJapanesediplomaticdecryptmaterialas‘Magic’,butthroughoutthistextforsimplicityIhaveused‘Ultra’,whichbecamegenerallyacceptedonbothsidesoftheAtlanticasthegenerictermforproductsofdecryptionofenemyhigh-gradecodesandciphers,althoughoddlyenoughthewordwasscarcelyusedinsideBletchleyPark.

*‘Humint’isthetradetermforintelligencegatheredbyspies,‘sigint’fortheproductofwirelessinterception.

1

BeforetheDeluge

1 SEEKERSAFTERTRUTH

Thesecretwarstartedlongbeforetheshootingonedid.OnedayinMarch1937,aletterdroppedontothedeskofColonelFrantišekMoravec,addressedto‘thechiefoftheCzechoslovakIntelligenceService’–whichwashimself.Itbegan:‘Iofferyoumyservices.FirstofallIshallstatewhatmypossibilitiesare:1.Thebuild-upoftheGermanarmy.(a)theinfantry…’andsoonforthreeclosely-typedpages.TheCzechs,knowingthemselvestobeprospectivepreyofHitler,conductedespionagewithanintensitystillabsentelsewhereamongEurope’sdemocracies.Theyinitiallyrespondedtothisapproachwithscepticism,assumingaNaziruse,ofwhichtherehadbeenplenty.Eventually,however,Moravecdecidedtoriskaresponse.Afterprotractedcorrespondence,theletter-writerwhomPraguedesignatedasagentA-54agreedarendezvousintheSudetentownofKraslice.Thiswasalmostwreckedbyagunshot:oneofMoravec’saideswassonervousthathefiredtherevolverinhispocket,puttingabulletthroughthecolonel’strouserleg.TranquillitywasfortunatelyrestoredbeforetheGermanvisitorarrived,tobehurriedtoanearbysafehouse.Hebroughtwithhimsheavesofsecretdocuments,whichhehadblithelycartedthroughthefrontierpostsinasuitcase.AmongthematerialwasacopyofCzechoslovakia’sdefenceplanwhichrevealedtoMoravecatraitorinhisownranks,subsequentlyhanged.A-54departedfromKraslicestillnameless,butricherby100,000Reichsmarks.Hepromisedtocallagain,andindeedprovidedhigh-gradeinformationfortheensuingthreeyears.OnlymuchlaterwasheidentifiedasPaulThummel,athirty-four-year-oldofficeroftheAbwehrintelligenceservice.SuchanepisodewasalmosteverydayfareforMoravec.Hewasapassionate,fiercelyenergetic

figureofmiddlingheight.Akeengame-player,especiallyofchess,hespokesixlanguagesfluently,andcouldreadsomeLatinandGreek.In1914hewasaneighteen-year-oldstudentatPragueUniversity,withaspirationstobecomeaphilosopher.ConscriptedintotheAustro-Hungarianarmy,likemostCzechshewasunwillingtodiefortheHapsburgs,andonceatthefrontseizedthefirstopportunitytodeserttotheRussians.HewaswoundedundertheirflaginBulgaria,andfinishedthewarwithaCzechvolunteerforceontheItalianfront.WhenCzechoslovakiabecameanindependentstatehegratefullycastoffthesetangledloyalties,tobecomeanofficerinitsnewarmy.Hejoinedthe

intelligencebranchin1934,andtookoverasitschiefthreeyearslater.Moraveclearnedthetrademostlyfromspystoriesboughtoffbookstalls,andsoondiscoveredthatmanyreal-lifeintelligenceofficerstrafficinfiction:hispredecessor ’ssupposedinformantsprovedtohavebeenfigmentsoftheman’simagination,acloakforembezzlement.Thecoloneldevotedmuchofhisservice’sresourcestotalent-spottinginGermanyforinformants,

eachnetworkpainstakinglyring-fenced.HesetupapaydayloancompanyinsidetheReich,targetedatmilitaryandcivilserviceclients.Withinayearninetyofthebank’srepresentativeswereroamingGermany,mostbonafideemployees,butsomeofthemintelligencepersonnelwhoidentifiedborrowerswithaccesstoinformation,vulnerabletobriberyorblackmail.TheCzechsalsopioneerednewtechnology–microdotphotography,ultra-violetrays,secretwritingandstate-of-the-artwirelesses.Moravecwasplentifullyfunded,arecognitionofhisroleinhisnation’sfrontline,andwasthusabletopayaLuftwaffemajornamedSalm5,000Reichsmarks–about£500–asaretainer,andafterwardsthehugesumofamillionCzechcrowns–£7,500–forGöring’sairforceorderofbattle.Salm,however,flauntedhisnew-foundwealth,andfoundhimselfarrested,triedandbeheaded.Meanwhileotherpeople’sspieswerenotidleinCzechoslovakia:Prague’ssecurityofficersarrested2,900suspectsin1936alone,mostofthemallegedlyactingforGermanyorHungary.Everymajornationprobedthesecretsofothersinthesamefashion,usingbothovertandcovert

means.AfterRussia’sMarshalTukhachevksyvisitedBritaininApril1934,heconveyedpersonallytoStalinaGRUagent’sdescriptionoftheRAF’snewHandleyPageHampdenbomber,detailingitsBristolandRolls-Royceenginevariantsandattachingasketchshowingitsarmament:

TheAbwehrsomehowlaidhandsonthe1935fixturelistofanICIplant’sfootballteam,whichinthecourseoftheseasonplayedatmostofthecompany’sotherBritishfactories;BerlinthustriumphantlypinpointedseveralchemicalinstallationstheLuftwaffehadhithertobeenunawareof.TheAustralianaviatorSidneyCottonconductedsomepioneeringaerialphotographyoverGermanyatthebehestofMI6’sWing-CommanderFredWinterbotham.ThesummerroadsofEuropeteemedwithyoungcouplesontouringholidays,someofwhomwerefundedbytheirrespectiveintelligenceservices,anddisplayedanunromanticinterestinairfields.MI6sentanRAFofficer,designatedasAgent479,togetherwithasecretarytoassisthiscover,onathree-weekspinaroundGermany,somewhathamperedbythefactsthatLuftwaffestationperimetersseldomadjoinedautobahns,andneithervisitorspokeGerman.Theairmanhadoriginallyplannedtotakehissister,whowasfluent,butherhusbandrefusedconsent.IntheNazis’interests,inAugust1935DrHermannGörtzspentsomeweekstouringSuffolkand

KentonaZündappmotorbike,pinpointingRAFbaseswithprettyyoungMarianneEmigridinginhissidecar.ButEmigtiredoftheassignment,orlosthernerve,andGörtz,aforty-five-year-oldlawyerfromLübeckwhohadlearnedEnglishfromhisgoverness,feltobligedtoescortherbacktoGermany.Hethenreturnedtocollectacameraandotherpossessions–includingplansofRAF

Manston–thatthecouplehadleftbehindinarentedBroadstairsbungalow.Unluckilyfortheaspiringmasterspy,thepolicehadalreadysecuredtheseincriminatingitems,followingatipfromthespy-consciouslandlord.GörtzfoundhimselfarrestedatHarwichandsentencedtofouryears’imprisonment.HewasreleasedanddeportedinFebruary1939;morewillbeheardofHermannGörtz.Forprobingneighbours’secrets,everynation’sskirmisherswereitsserviceofficerspostedto

embassiesabroad.ProminentamongBerlinmilitaryattachéswasBritain’sColonelNoelMason-MacFarlane.‘Mason-Mac’wasshrewdbutbombastic.Onedayin1938,hestartledanEnglishvisitortohisflatbypointingoutofthewindowtothespotwhereHitlerwouldnextdayviewtheWehrmacht’sbirthdayparade.‘Easyrifleshot,’saidthecolonellaconically.‘Icouldpickthebastardofffromhereaseasyaswinking,andwhat’smoreI’mthinkingofdoingit…Withthatlunaticoutofthewaywemightbeabletogetsomesenseintothings.’Mason-MacFarlanedidnothingofthesort,ofcourse.InhistemperatemomentsheforgedclosefriendshipswithGermanofficers,andtransmittedtoLondonastreamofwarningsaboutNaziintentions.Butthevignetteprovidesanillustrationoftheroleplayedbyfantasyinthelivesofintelligenceofficers,totteringonatightropebetweenhighpurposeandlowcomedy.TheUSgovernmentwassaidbyscornfulcriticstopossessnointelligencearm.Inanarrowsense,

thiswasso–itdidnotdeploysecretagentsabroad.Athome,J.EdgarHoover ’sFederalBureauofInvestigationwasresponsibleforAmerica’sinternalsecurity.ForalltheFBI’strumpetedsuccessesagainstgangstersandintensivesurveillanceoftheUSCommunistPartyandtradesunions,itknewlittleofthearmyofSovietspiesroamingAmerica,anddidnothingtodissuadehi-techcorporationsfromboomingtheirachievements.GermanmilitaryattachéGen.FriedrichvonBötticherobservedboisterouslyabouthisyearsofserviceinWashington:‘Itwassoeasy,theAmericansaresobroad-minded,theyprinteverything.Youdon’tneedanyintelligenceservice.Youhaveonlytobeindustrious,toseethenewspapers!’In1936BötticherwasabletoforwardtoBerlindetailedreportsonUSrocketexperiments.AnAmericantraitorsoldtheGermansblueprintsofoneofhiscountry’smostcherishedtechnologicalachievements,theNordenbombsight.ThegeneralurgedtheAbwehrnottobothertodeploysecretagentsintheUS,topreservehishosts’faithinNazigoodwill.Intelligenceagenciesovervalueinformationgainedfromspies.Oneofthemanyacademics

conscriptedintoBritain’swartimesecretserviceobserveddisdainfully:‘[MI6]valuesinformationinproportiontoitssecrecy,notitsaccuracy.Theywouldattachmorevalue…toascrapofthird-rateandtendentiousmisinformationsmuggledoutofSofiainthefly-buttonsofavagabondRumanianpimpthantoanyintelligencededucedfromaprudentreadingoftheforeignpress.’AmericanforeigncorrespondentsanddiplomatsabroadprovidedWashingtonwithavisionoftheworldnolessplausiblethanthatgeneratedbyEurope’sspies.MajorTrumanSmith,thelong-servingUSmilitaryattachéinBerlinandawarmadmirerofHitler,formedamoreaccuratepictureoftheWehrmacht’s

orderofbattlethandidMI6.America’snavalattachésfocusedonJapan,theirmostlikelyfoe,thoughtheywereoftenreducedto

photographingitswarshipsfrompassingpassengerlinersandswappinggossipintheTokyoattachés’club.Assecretaryofstatein1929,HenryStimsonhadcloseddownhisdepartment’s‘BlackChamber ’codebreakingoperation,reasoninglikemanyofhisfellow-countrymenthatanationwhichfacednoexternalthreatcouldforgosuchsordidinstruments.Nonethelessboththearmyandnavy,inisolationandfiercecompetition,sustainedsmallcodebreakingteamswhichexertedthemselvesmightily.TheachievementofWilliamFriedman,borninRussiain1891andeducatedasanagriculturalist,whosearmySignalsIntelligenceServiceteamledbyformermathematicsteacherFrankRowlettreplicatedtheadvancedJapanese‘Purple’diplomaticciphermachineandbrokeitskeyinSeptember1940,wasallthemoreremarkablebecauseAmerica’scryptanalystshadshoestringresources.TheymadelittleattempttocrackGermanciphers,becausetheylackedmeanstodoso.TheJapanesespiedenergeticallyinChina,theUSandtheEuropeanSouth-EastAsianempires,

whichtheyviewedasprospectivebooty.Theiragentswerenothingifnotcommitted:in1935whenpoliceinSingaporearrestedalocalJapaneseexpatriateonsuspicionofespionage,suchwastheman’sanxietytoavoidcausingembarrassmenttoTokyothathefollowedtheE.PhillipsOppenheimtraditionandswallowedprussicacidinhiscell.TheChineseNationalistsheadedbyChiangKai-sheksustainedaneffectivecounter-intelligenceservicetoprotecthisdictatorshipfromdomesticcritics,butacrossAsiaJapanesespieswereabletogatherinformationalmostunhindered.TheBritishweremoreinterestedincounteringinternalcommunistagitationthanincombatingprospectiveforeigninvaders.Theyfounditimpossibletotakeseriously‘theWopsoftheEast’,asChurchillcalledtheJapanese,or‘thelittleyellowdwarfslaves’,inthewordsoftheheadoftheForeignOffice.Britain’sdiplomatswereelaboratelycarelessaboutprotectingtheirsecrets,adheringtothe

conventionsofVictoriangentlemen.RobertCecil,whowasoneofthem,wrote:‘Anembassywasanambassador ’shouseparty;itwasunthinkablethatoneoftheguestscouldbespyingontheothers.’Asearlyas1933theForeignOfficereceivedawake-upcall,albeitunheeded:afteroneofitsstaffputhisheadinagasoven,hewasrevealedtohavebeensellingBritishcipherstoMoscow.Nextaclerk,CaptainJohnKing,wasfoundtohavebeenfundinganAmericanmistressbypeddlingsecrets.In1937alocalemployeeinBritain’sRomeembassy,FrancescoConstantini,wasabletoriflehisemployer ’spapersforthebenefitoftheItaliansecretservice,becausetheambassadorassumedthatonecouldtrustone’sservants.Atthatperiodalso,Mussolini’smenreadsomeBritishcodes:notallItalianswerethebuffoonstheirenemiessupposed.In1939,whenJapaneseintelligencewantedthecodebooksoftheBritishconsulateinTaipei,itsofficerseasilyarrangedforaJapaneseemployeetobecomenight-dutyman.DuringtheensuingsixmonthsTokyo’sagentsrepeatedlyaccessedtheconsulatesafe,itsfilesandcodebooks.Yetnowhereintheworldwasintelligencewiselymanagedandassessed.Thoughtechnological

secretswerealwaysusefultorivalnations,itisunlikelythatmuchofthefeveredsecretpoliticalandmilitarysurveillancetoldgovernmentsmorethantheymighthavegleanedfromacarefulreadingofthepress.Endemicrivalriesinjuredorcrippledcollaborationbetweenintelligenceagencies.InGermanyandRussia,HitlerandStalindiffusedpoweramongtheirsecretpolicemen,thebettertoconcentratemasteryintheirownhands.Germany’smainagencywastheAbwehr,itstitleliterallymeaning‘security’,thoughitwasresponsibleforbothintelligence-gatheringabroadandcounter-espionageathome.Abranchofthearmedforces,itwasdirectedbyAdmiralWilhelmCanaris.WhenGuyLiddell,counter-espionagedirectorofMI5andoneofitsablestofficers,laterstrovetoexplaintheAbwehr ’sincompetence,heexpressedasincerebeliefthatCanariswasinthepayoftheRussians.TheNazisalsohadtheirownsecuritymachine,theReichssicherheitshauptamtorRSHA,directed

byErnstKaltenbrunnerwithintheempireofHimmler.ThisembracedtheGestaposecretpoliceanditssistercounter-intelligencebranchtheSicherheitdienstorSD,whichoverlappedtheAbwehr ’sactivitiesinmanyareas.AkeyfigurewasWalterSchellenberg,ReinhardHeydrich’saide:SchellenberglatertookovertheRSHA’sforeignintelligence-gatheringservice,whichsubsumedtheAbwehrin1944.HighCommandanddiplomaticcodebreakingactivitieswereconductedbytheChiffrierabteilung,colloquiallyknownasOKW/Chi,andthearmyhadalargeradiointelligencebranchthateventuallybecameOKH/GdNA.Göring’sAirMinistryhaditsowncryptographicoperation,asdidtheKriegsmarine.EconomicintelligencewascollectedbytheWiRuAmt,andRibbentrop’sForeignMinistrygatheredreportsfromembassiesabroad.GuyLiddellwrotecrossly:‘UnderoursystemofgovernmenttherewasnothingtostoptheGermansfromgettinganyinformationtheyrequired.’ButtheelaborateNaziintelligenceandcounter-espionagemachineswerefarmoreeffectiveinsuppressingdomesticoppositionthaninexploitingforeignsources,evenwhentheyheardsomethingusefulfromthem.France’sintelligencedepartmentsenjoyedalowlystatusandcorrespondinglymeagrebudgets.

PessimismoverlaiduponignorancecausedthemconsistentlytooverstateGermanmilitarystrengthbyatleast20percent.FrantišekMoravecbelievedthatpoliticscrippledFrenchsecuritypolicyaswarloomed:‘Theirdesireto“know”seemedtodecreaseproportionatelyastheNazidangerincreased.’MoravectheCzechfoundhisFrenchcounterpartshalf-heartedcolleagues,thoughhereturnedfromoneinter-AlliedconferencewithapresentfromafamousFrenchcriminologist,ProfessorLocardeofLyons:achemicaldeveloperwhichprovedusefulforexposingsecretwriting.Sincethebeginningoftime,governmentshadbeenabletointercepteachother ’scommunications

onlywhenspiesoraccidentsofwarphysicallydivertedmessagesintotheirhands.Now,however,everythingwasdifferent.Wirelesscommunicationwasascienceslightlyolderthanthetwentiethcentury,butthirtyyearselapsedbeforeitbecameauniversalphenomenon.Then,duringthe1930s,technologicalbreakthroughspromptedaglobalexplosionoftransmissions.Theetherhummed,whinedandcrackledasmessagesprivate,commercial,military,naval,diplomatictraversednations

andoceans.Itbecameindispensableforgovernmentsandtheirgeneralsandadmiralstocommunicateoperationalordersandinformationbyradio,toeverysubordinate,shipandformationbeyondreachofalandline.Makingsuchexchangessecuredemandednicejudgements.Therewasatrade-offbetweenthespeedatwhichasignalcouldbedispatchedandreceived,andthesubtletyofitsencryption.Itwasimpracticabletoprovidefront-linearmyunitswithcipheringmachines,andthusinsteadtheyemployedso-calledhand-orfield-ciphers,ofvaryingsophistication–theGermanarmyusedaBritish-derivedsystemcalledDoublePlayfair.Forthemostsecretmessages,theonlyalmostunbreakablecodewasthatbasedupona‘one-time

pad’,anamethatreflecteditsdesignation:thesenderemployedauniquecombinationoflettersand/ornumberswhichbecameintelligibleonlytoarecipientpre-suppliedwiththeidenticalformula.TheSovietsespeciallyfavouredthismethod,thoughtheirclerkssometimescompromiseditbyusingaone-timepadmorethanonce,astheGermansfoundtotheiradvantage.Fromthe1920sonwards,someofthemajornationsstartedtoemploycipherswhichweredeemedimpregnableifcorrectlyused,becausemessageswereprocessedthroughelectrically-poweredkeyboardmachineswhichscrambledthemintomulti-millionsofcombinations.Themagnitudeofthetechnologicalchallengeposedbyanenemy’smachine-encryptedsignalsdidnotdeteranynationfromstrivingtoreadthem.ThisbecamethemostimportantintelligenceobjectiveoftheSecondWorldWar.ThebrighteststaroftheDeuxièmeBureau,France’sintelligenceservice,wasCapitaineGustave

Bertrand,headofthecryptanalyticalbranchinthearmy’sSectiondesExamens,whohadrisenfromtherankstooccupyapostthatnoambitiouscareerofficerwanted.OneofhiscontactswasaParisbusinessmannamedRodolpheLemoine,bornRudolfStallman,sonofarichBerlinjeweller.In1918StallmanadoptedFrenchnationality;simplybecausehelovedespionageasagameinitsownright,hebegantoworkfortheDeuxième.InOctober1931heforwardedtoParisanofferfromoneHans-ThiloSchmidt,brotherofaGermangeneral,tosellFranceinformationaboutEnigmainordertodighimselfoutofafinancialhole.Bertrandaccepted,andinreturnforcashSchmidtdeliveredcopiousmaterialaboutthemachine,togetherwithitskeysettingsforOctoberandNovember1932.ThereafterheremainedontheFrenchpayrolluntil1938.SincetheFrenchknewthatthePoleswerealsoseekingtocrackEnigma,thetwonationsagreedacollaboration:Polishcryptanalystsfocusedonthetechnology,whiletheirFrenchcounterpartsaddressedencipheredtexts.BertrandalsoapproachedtheBritish,butattheoutsettheyshowednointerest.Britain’scodebreakershadacquiredanearly-modelcommercialEnigmaasearlyas1927,and

examineditwithrespect.Sincethen,theyknewthatithadbeenrenderedmuchmoresophisticatedbytheinclusionofacomplexwiringpatternknownasaSteckerbrett,orplugboard.Itnowofferedarangeofpossiblepositionsforasingleletterof159millionmillionmillion.Thatwhichhumaningenuityhaddevised,itwasatleasttheoreticallypossiblethathumaningenuitymightpenetrate.In1939,however,nooneforamomentimaginedthatsixyearslaterintelligencesnatchedfromthe

airwaveswouldhaveprovedmoreprecioustothevictors,moredisastrousforthelosers,thaneveryreportmadebyallthespiesofthewarringnations.

2 THEBRITISH: GENTLEMENANDPLAYERS

ThereputationofMI6wasunmatchedbythatofanyothersecretservice.ThoughHitler,Stalin,MussoliniandJapan’sgeneralssharedascepticism,orevenscorn,abouttheoldlion’sfitnesstofight,theyvieweditsspieswithextravagantrespect,indeedcherishedabeliefintheiromniscience.Britishprowessinclandestineactivitydatedbacktothesixteenthcenturyatleast.FrancisBaconwroteinhisHistoryoftheReignofKingHenryVII:‘AsforhissecretSpials,whichhedidemploybothathomeandabroad,bythemtodiscoverwhatPractisesandConspiracieswereagainsthim,surelyhisCaserequiredit.’QueenElizabethI’sSirFrancisWalsinghamwasoneofhistory’slegendaryspymasters.MuchlatercametheromancesofRudyardKipling’sKim,ofJohnBuchan’sRichardHannay,ofdashing‘clublandheroes’whoplayedchessforEnglandwithathousandlivepiecesacrossaboardthatspannedcontinents.AwartimeBritishsecretservantobserved:‘PracticallyeveryofficerImetinthatconcern,athomeandabroad,was,likeme,imagininghimselfasHannay.’ThegreatDanishphysicistNielsBohrtoldthescientificintelligenceofficerR.V.JonesthathewashappytocooperatewiththeBritishsecretservicebecause‘itwasrunbyagentleman’.BritishintelligencehadenjoyedagoodGreatWar.TheRoyalNavy’scodebreakers,suchmenas

DillwynKnoxandAlastairDenniston,labouringintheAdmiralty’sRoom40,providedcommanderswithawealthofinformationaboutthemotionsoftheGermanHighSeasFleet.ThedecryptionandpublicrevelationofBerlin’s1917ZimmermannTelegram,urgingtheMexicanstotakeaggressiveactionagainsttheUnitedStates,playedacriticalroleinbringingtheAmericansintothewar.FortwoyearsaftertheNovember1918Armistice,thesecretservicewasdeeplyinvolvedintheAllies’unsuccessfulattempttoreversetheoutcomeoftheRussianRevolution.Evenafterthiswasabandoned,thethreatfrominternationalcommunismremainedtheforemostpreoccupationofBritishespionageandcounter-espionage.Yetamidtheinter-warslump,fundingwassqueezed.MI6mouldered,toanextentlittleunderstood

byeitherBritain’sfriendsorfoes.HughTrevor-Roper,thehistorianwhobecameoneofitswartimeofficers,wrote:‘ForeignintelligenceservicesenviedtheBritishsecretservice;itwastheiridealisedmodel…Itenjoyedthereputationofaninvisible,implacableforce,likethePlatonicworld-spirit,operatingeverywhere.TotheNazigovernment,itwasatthesametimeabogeyandanideal…Thereality…wasratherdifferent.’MI6’sseniorofficersweremenofmoderateabilities,drawnintotheorganisationbythelureofplayingoutapasticheofKipling’s‘GreatGame’,andoftenafterearliercareersascolonialpolicemen.Theymasqueradedaspassportcontrolofficersinembassiesabroad,orshuffledpaperinthe

service’saustere–indeed,franklysqualid–headquartersbesideStJames’sParkundergroundstation,inBroadwayBuildings,aplaceofthreadbarecarpetsandunshadedlightbulbs.MI6sustainedaquirkytraditionofpayingitsstafftax-freeandincash,butsosmallapittancethataprivateincomewasalmostessentialforofficerswhoaspiredtoanupper-middle-classlifestyle,whichmeantallofthem.Thoughitsbudgetwasprogressivelyincreasedfrom£180,000in1935to£500,000in1939,fewgraduatesenteredtheservice,becauseitsbossesdidnotwantthem.MI6,intheviewofonepractitioner,wasdesignedmerelytoreceiveintelligenceratherthanactivelytoprocureit.Itwasrunbyacoterieofanti-intellectualofficerswhosawtheirprincipal,ifnotsole,taskasthatofcombatingrevolutionarycommunism.TheshiftofemphasistomonitoringNazisandfascistsduringthelatepre-warperiodcausedgreatdifficulties.Somerecruitsofthatperiodprovedill-suitedtotheessentialnastinessofespionage.Lt.Cmdr

JosephNewill,aretiredsailorpostedtoScandinaviain1938onthestrengthofspeakingNorwegian,wailedtoLondon:‘IdoubtwhetherIhavethenaturalguilesoessentialforthiswork!’Newillcomplainedthathisroleinvolvedmuchmorehardlabourthanhehadexpected.Hetoldhisstationchiefpetulantly:‘Iam52andIamnotgoingtoworkmyselftodeathatmytimeoflife.’Buthewaskeptinthejob,andcontrivedtomeetBroadway’sundemandingstandards.MI6’sShanghaistationchief,HarrySteptoe,operatedundercoverasvice-consul.Ajauntylittlecock-sparrowfigurewhoaffectedamoustacheandmonocle,hepuzzledaforeigndiplomatbyhisappearanceatreceptionsinalovat-greensuitadornedwithgoldbraid.Wasthis,demandedthediplomat,thefull-dressuniformoftheBritishsecretservice?WhentheJapaneseinternedSteptoein1942,theydismissedthepossibilitythatsuchacomicfigurecouldbeaspymaster,andinsteadsubjectedtobrutalinterrogationahaplessBritishCouncilrepresentative,whosefieldofknowledgewasexclusivelycultural.BroadwaystruggledtosecureintelligencefromtheContinent.In1936anewMI6departmentwas

formedtomonitorGermanyandItaly.ZSectionwasrunbyClaudeDansey,aformerimperialsoldierwhoboreahaversackgroaningwithblimpishprejudices,amongthemaloathingforAmericans.Itbecameanalmostindependentfiefdom,whichoperatedundercommercialcoverfromofficesinBushHouseinTheStrand.ItssourcesweremostlyelderlyretreadssuchastheLithuanianBaronWilliamdeRopp,whoformorethanadecadeextractedfromtheBritish£1,000ayear–ahandsomecompetence–inreturnforfragmentsofGermanpoliticalgossip.TheNaziswerewellawareofdeRopp’srole,andfedhimwhattheywantedLondontohear.InAugust1938theBarondecidedthathissecretlifehadbecometoofraught,andwiselyretiredtoSwitzerland.NavalengineerDrKarlKruger ’sstoryhadadarkerending.From1914to1939hefedsomegood

informationtotheBritishonacash-and-carrybasis,butvanishedfromsightamonthbeforetheoutbreakofwar.HisfileatBroadwaywaseventuallymarked‘Agentpresumed“dead”.’Thiswasnotsurprising,becauseKruger–likemostofMI6’sGermaninformants–wascontrolledbyitsHaguestation,whereoneofthelocalstaff,FolkertvanKoutrik,wasontheAbwehr ’spayroll.Theservice’s

bestpre-warhumintsourcewasWolfgangGansEdlerzuPutlitz,pressattachéattheGermanembassyinLondon,anaristocratandhomosexual.HewasrunbyKlopUstinov–fatheroftheactorPeter–aRussian-bornjournalistwholosthisnewspaperjobin1935becauseofhisJewishness.WhenPutlitzwastransferredtoTheHaguein1938,UstinovfollowedhimatMI6’sbehest.AfterFolkertvanKoutriklaterbetrayedtheBritishoperationinHolland,PutlitzhastilysoughtasyluminLondon.TheflowofintelligencefromtheContinentwasthin.TheAirMinistrycomplainedaboutthe

paucityofmaterialontheuseofaircraftintheSpanishCivilWar,animportantissueforplanners.Britain’sambassadorinBerlin,SirNevileHenderson,sharedwithhisfellow-diplomatsadisdainforespionagewhichcausedhimtorefusediplomaticstatustoBroadway’s‘PassportControlOfficers’.EvenwhereMI6triedtoprovideGermaninformantswithwirelesssets,mostwerereluctanttotakethem,becausediscoveryofsuchequipmentbytheGestapoensuredadeathsentenceforthepossessor.Veryoccasionally,amongthemountainofrubbishthataccumulatedinBroadway’sfilestherewas

apearl.Inthespringof1939anagentcodenamed‘theBaron’,withgoodsocialconnectionsinEastPrussia,reportedtohishandlerHarryCarrinHelsinkithattheGermansweresecretlynegotiatingwithStalin.HefollowedthisupwithafurthermissiveinJune,assertingthattalksbetweenBerlinandMoscowweremakinggoodprogress.YetthissensationalpointertotheloomingNazi–SovietPact,whichafterwardsprovedtohavecomefromgossipamongaristocratsworkingintheGermanForeignMinistry,wasdismissedinBroadway.ToMI6’sseniorofficers,adevils’pactbetweenStalinandHitlerseemedafantasticnotion.Anauthenticscoopwasmissed;first,becauseMI6,likemostintelligenceorganisations,hadaninstinctiveandusuallyprudentscepticismaboutitsownsources;second,becausewhat‘theBaron’reportedrancontrarytohisemployers’expectations.Atthattime,andindeedthroughoutthewar,MI6hadnointernalmachineryforanalysingincomingintelligence,thoughitschiefscouldpointoutthattheAxisPowerslackedthisalso.CzechoslovakiaandPolandoccupiedthefrontlineintheEuropeanconfrontationwithHitler.MI6

showedlittleinterestincollaborationwiththeirintelligenceservicesuntilMarch1939,whenthestrategicpicturechangeddramatically:theBritishandFrenchgovernmentsgaveasecurityguaranteetoPoland.ThisgalvanisedBroadway.On25July,aBritishdelegationcomposedofanavalintelligenceofficertogetherwithAlastair

Denniston,directoroftheGovernmentCode&CypherSchool,andDillwynKnox,oneofitsforemostcodebreakers,joinedFrance’sGustaveBertrand–himselfnocryptographer,butanotablefacilitatoranddiplomat–atanexploratorymeetingwiththeirPolishcounterpartsledbyCol.GwidoLanger,heldattheircryptographiccentreintheKabackiewoodsnearPyry,southofWarsaw.Thefirstday’stalks,conductedinmixedFrenchandGerman,wentverybadly.Knox,forreasonsunknown,wasinaviletemper,andhighlyscepticalthatthePoleshadanythingtotellworthhearing.HeseemedunabletounderstandthemethodsbywhichtheyclaimedtohaveachievedthebreakthroughwhichhadenabledthemtoreadsomeGermannavaltraffic.Allthepartiespresentwere

fencing,todiscovereachother ’sstateofknowledge.Warsaw’sdecisiontoinvolvetheBritishwaspromptedbynewdifficultiesthathadfrustratedtheirowncodebreakerssincetheGermanson1Januaryadoptedanenhancedsteckerboard,fortheirEnigmas,withtenplugsinsteadofseven.Onthesecondday,26July,theconference’satmospherewastransformedforthebetter.InthebasementofthebuildingthePolesshowedofftheir‘bomby’,primitivecomputingdevicesdesignedtotestmultiplemathematicalpossibilities.Thentheyproducedacoupdethéâtre:theypresentedbothvisitingdelegationswithmimickedcopiesoftheEnigmabuiltbytheirownmen.Knox’sscepticismcrumbled,andthemeetingendedinamoodofgoodwillandmutualrespect.EverybodyatBroadwayrecognisedtheimportanceofthePoles’gesturetotheiralliesasacontributiontothesecretstruggleagainsttheNazis.MarianRejewski,aformermathematicsstudentatWarsawUniversitywhohadjoinedtheKabackiewoodsteambackin1932,istodayacknowledgedasapioneeramongthosewholaidbarethesecretsofEnigma,evenifitfelltoothers,inBritain,toadvanceandexploitRejewski’sachievement.StewartMenzies,thendeputychiefofMI6,wassoimpressedbytheoutcomeofthePolishtripthat

heturnedupinpersonatVictoriastationtogreetGustaveBertrand–andtoinspectthemimickedEnigma.KnoxsentthePolesagiftofscarves,decoratedwithimagesofDerbyrunners,withtheletterthankinghishostsfortheir‘co-operationandpatience’.Atoraroundthistimealso,thePolesprovidedtheBritishwithfiveoftheEnigma’seightalternativerotors.Achasmstillyawned,however,betweenunderstandinghowthemachineworked,andachievingtheabilitytoreaditstraffic.ThoughatrickleofGermanmessageswerebrokenbyhumaningenuityduringthewinterof1939–40,trafficwasbreachedonanindustrialscaleonlyfrom1941onwards,followingthecreationofrevolutionaryelectro-mechanicaltechnology.Nonetheless,theassistanceoftheFrenchandPolesdramaticallyacceleratedprogressattheGC&CS,nowevacuatedfromLondontoasafercountryhome.Physicalpossessionoftheenemy’sencryptioninstrumentenableditscryptanalyststograspthemountainouschallengetheymustovercome.Until1939,andinlargemeasurefortwoyearsthereafter,Britishintelligenceremaineddependent

foritsviewoftheworlduponhumint–reportsfrominformantsabroad.HowwelldidMI6fulfilitsresponsibilitytobriefthegovernmentaboutthemountingthreatfromNaziGermany–‘Twelveland’inBroadwayparlance?ItproducedmanyreportsarguingthatHitler ’slong-termambitionslayintheEast,andthiswasfundamentallycorrect.Unfortunatelyforitscredibility,however,in1940GermanychosefirsttoseektodisposeoftheWesterndemocracies.MI6wasinnodoubtthatHitlerwasrearmingfast,butinsistentlyemphasisedtheweaknessoftheindustrialbasefromwhichheaspiredtomakewar.ResponsibilityforgatheringeconomicdatarestedwiththeIndustrialIntelligenceCentre,anoffshootadministeredsince1934bytheForeignOffice,butrunbytheveteransecretserviceofficerMajorDesmondMorton.Duringthe‘wildernessyears’,MortonpassedtoWinstonChurchill–withthesanctionofprimeministerStanleyBaldwin–detailsofGermanrearmamentwhich

empoweredtheunheededprophettocryforthwarningstotheworld.Ironically,theMajorwildlyoverstatedthegrowthofHitler ’smilitarymachine:Mortonneverhadmuchgraspofeconomicsingeneral,noroftheNazieconomyinparticular.Butmodernhistorianscriticalofpre-warBritishintelligencefailuresmisssomeimportantpoints.

Inthosedaysfewpeopleofanynationalityunderstoodeconomicanalysis.TheIICwascorrectinjudgingthatGermanywasill-preparedtoconductalongstruggle,andwasrenderedvulnerablebyitsdependenceonimportedcommoditiesandespeciallyoil.TheGermaneconomy,asAdamToozehasshown,wasnotstrongenoughtomeetthehugechallengeHitlersoughttofulfil,ofconqueringthemostadvancedsocietiesonearth.Germany’sGDPwasnolargerthanBritain’s,andherpeople’spercapitaincomeswerelower.In1939,Hitler ’sexpendituresonarmamentshadreducedhiscountry’sfinancestoaparlouscondition.ButitwasaskingtoomuchofanyintelligenceservicetogaugethepotentialofGermanindustryunderthestimulusofconflict:totheveryendofWorldWarII,thebestbrainsintheAlliednationsfailedfullytoachievethis.MI6couldnotbeexpectedtopredictHitler ’sconquests,whichdramaticallyenhancedhisaccesstooil,rawmaterialsandslavelabour.Onthemilitaryside,neitherMI6northeservicedepartmentslearnedmuchaboutthenew

technologyandtacticsbeingdevelopedbyBritain’senemies.Norabouttheirlimitations:theywildlyoverratedtheLuftwaffe’sabilitytodevastateBritain’scities.In1938,BroadwayreportedthattheGermanshad927first-linebomberscapableofmounting720sortiesadayanddropping945tonsofordnance(thiswasanexaggerationof50percent),andprojectionsoflikelycasualtieswereevenmoreinflated.WarOfficeappreciationsoftheGermanarmywereequallymistaken,especiallyinestimatingitspotentialmobilisedstrength.Thesesuggestedin1939thatHitlerwasalreadymasterofthelargestwarmachinehisnation’sresourcescouldbear.Rearmament,coupledwithvastpublicexpenditure,‘hadtaxedtheenduranceoftheGermanpeopleandthestabilityoftheeconomicsystemtoapointwhereanyfurthereffortcanonlybeachievedattheriskofabreakdownoftheentirestructure’.AFebruary1939StrategicalAppreciationbythechiefsofstaff,draftedbytheJointPlanning

Committee,assertedthatBritaincouldsurvivealongwarbetterthanGermany.Thiswastrue,butthechiefssaidnothingaboutthedangerthatitcouldmeanwhileloseashortone.Moreover,theyneverpressedthecabinettoacknowledgetheshockingweaknessofBritain’sFarEastempire.Thethreeservices’intelligencebrancheshadnocontactwitheachother,andtherewerenojointstaffs.Asforpolitics,anMI6officerwroteinaNovember1938reportfortheForeignOffice:‘Noteven

Hitler ’sintimates,accordingtooneofthem,knowsifhewouldreallyriskworldwar.’Afewmonthslater,theservice’scredibilitywasseverelyinjuredbyitsissueofwarningsthatGermanyintendedimminentlytostrikeatWesternEurope,startingwithHolland.EmbarrassmentwasincreasedbythefactthattheForeignOfficeforwardedthisalarmcalltotheUSgovernment.OneoftheBritishrecipients,seniorcivilservantSirGeorgeMounsey,deliveredablastagainstMI6whichechoed

aroundWhitehall.TheForeignOffice’sstandingwasdamaged,hesaid,byactingonthebasisof‘ahighlysensationalandhighlydisturbingkindofinformationwhich[MI6]areunabletoguarantee’.Mounseywasdismissiveofallcovertsources,agentswhoserumour-mongeringhadpromptedBroadway’swarning:‘Theyhaveasecretmissionandtheymustjustifyit…Ifnothingcomestohandforthemtoreport,theymustearntheirpaybyfindingsomething…Arewegoingtoremainsoattachedtorelianceonsecretreports,whichtieourhandsinalldirections?’Mounseyhadhisownagenda:tosustainthepolicyofappeasementadoptedbyNevilleChamberlainandLordHalifax,whomheadmiredprodigiously.HisviewsnonethelessreflectedageneralscepticisminhighplacesaboutBroadway’sperformance.GladwynJebboftheForeignOffice,oftenacriticofMI6,onthisoccasionleapttoitsdefence.

Whileacknowledgingthefrustrationsofdealingwithsecretorganisations,hesaidthathecouldnotforgetthatitsofficers‘didwarnusoftheSeptember[1938Munich]crisis,andtheydidnotgiveanycolourtotheridiculousoptimismthatprevaileduptotherapeofCzechoslovakia,ofwhichourofficial[diplomatic]reportsdidnotgiveusmuchwarning’.InDecember1938BroadwayofferedasoundcharactersketchofGermany’sFührer,atatimewhenmanyBritishdiplomatsandpoliticiansstilldeludedthemselvesthathewasamantheycoulddobusinesswith.‘Amonghischaracteristics,’assertedtheMI6report,‘arefanaticism,mysticism,ruthlessness,cunning,vanity,moodsofexaltationanddepression,fitsofbitterandself-righteousresentment,andwhatcanonlybetermedastreakofmadness;butwithitallthereisgreattenacityofpurpose,whichhasoftenbeencombinedwithextraordinaryclarityofvision.Hehasgainedthereputationofbeingalwaysabletochoosetherightmomentandrightmethodfor“gettingawaywithit”.Intheeyesofhisdisciples,andincreasinglyinhisown,“theFührerisalwaysright”.Hehasunboundedself-confidence,whichhasgrowninproportiontothestrengthofthemachinehehascreated;butitisaself-confidencewhichhaslatterlybeentemperedlessthanhithertowithpatienceandrestraint.’ItiseasytocataloguetheshortcomingsofMI6.LikemostofitssisterservicesontheContinent,in

1939itcommandedlittlerespectinhighplaces,andhadsmallinfluenceonpolicy-making.Itseemsnecessarytogobeyondthis,however,andposethequestion:whatmightitsspieshaveusefullydiscovered,grantedmoreresourcesandclevererpeople?Thelikelyansweris:notmuch.MI6’sreportingwasmatchedbyadailybombardmentofnewspaperheadlines,bothshowingbeyondperadventurethatGermanywasrearming.MoreaccurateanddetailedinformationaboutHitler ’sarmedforceswouldhavebeenusefultotheWarOfficeandDowningStreet,butthecriticalissue,thevitaluncertainty,wasnotthatofGermany’scapabilities,butratherthatofitsintentions.Itseemsquitemisplacedtoblamewrongorinadequateintelligenceforthecalamitousfailureof

BritainandFrancetodealeffectivelywiththeNazis.BothnationscorrectlyassessedtheoptionsatHitler ’sdisposalforonslaughtsEastorWest.MI6canscarcelybeheldresponsibleforfailingtoanticipateexactlywhereorwhenhewouldattack,becausehehimselfwasanopportunistwho

reservedhisdecisionsuntilthelastmoment.SirAlexanderCadogan,permanentunder-secretaryattheForeignOffice,wrotemuchlater:‘Weweredailyinundatedbyallsortsofreports.Itjusthappenedthatthesewerecorrect;wehadnomeansofevaluatingtheirreliabilityatthetimeoftheirreceipt.(Norwastheremuchthatwecoulddoaboutit!)’Ratherthanafailureofintelligence,whatmatteredwasthedemocracies’failureofwill–therefusaltoacknowledgethattheNazisconstitutedanirreconcilableforceforevil,whichtheverysurvivalofEuropeancivilisationmadeitessentialtodestroy,ratherthantobargainwith.MostofHitler ’sopponentsinsideGermany,andindeedacrossEurope,werecommunistswho

consideredtheRussianstheonlypeoplebothwillingandabletochallengefascism.EverythingsaidanddonebytheBritishandFrenchgovernmentsbeforetheoutbreakofwarconfirmedanti-Nazisinthatview.Thus,peoplewhowishedtocontributetoundoingHitlerofferedinformationtotheagentsofMoscowmuchmorereadilythantothoseofLondonorParis.Itwasanti-Nazis’pooropinionofNevilleChamberlainthatmadethemreluctanttolooktohiscountryasashieldagainstHitler,nottheirperceptionofMI6.ItisfarmoreplausibletoarguethatBritain’sdiplomatsshouldhaveexposedthedictators’

intentionsthantosuggestthatitsspiesmighthavedoneso.Inpeacetime,goodintelligenceofficerscanassisttheirgovernmentstograsptheeconomic,militaryandtechnologicalcapabilitiesofprospectiveenemies,butitisunusualforasecretservicetoprovideareliablecribabouttheirintentions.Topdiplomatsoughttohavebeenclevererthanintelligenceofficers.Theirtraining,experienceandaccesstosourcesshouldhaveempoweredthemtoassesstheworldwithgreaterwisdomthanBroadway’soldsoldiers.ItseemsfarmorediscreditablethatHenderson,Britain’sambassadorinBerlin,waswillingforsolongtothinkwellofHitler,thanthatMI6withitsmeagreresourceswasunabletotellthegovernmentwhattheFührerwoulddonext.IfaGermananti-NazihadturneduponHenderson’sembassydoorstep,offeringinsideinformation,itislikelythathewouldhavebeensentpacking.AdmiralSirHughSinclair–‘C’,astheheadofthesecretservicewasalwaysknown–died

suddenlyinNovember1939,havingoccupiedhispostforsixteenyears.WinstonChurchill,asFirstLordoftheAdmiralty,pressedtheclaimsofRear-AdmiralJohnGodfrey,directorofnavalintelligence,tosucceedhim.Instead,however,Sinclair ’sdeputy,forty-nine-year-oldGuardsofficerBrigadierStewartMenzies,convincedtheForeignOfficeandtheprimeministerthathehadbeenanointedbythedyingSinclairashisrightfulsuccessor.Hethusinheritedamantlethathewaswidelyconsideredill-fittedtowear.TheninthDukeofBuccleuch,whohadbeenMenzies’fagatEton,toldafriendthat‘C’s’contemporariesweremystified‘howsounbelievablystupidamancouldhaveendedupinsuchaposition’.HughTrevor-RopersneeredatMenziesas‘athoughtlessfeudallord,livingcomfortablyonincomeproducedfromthelabourofpeasantswhomhehadneverseen,workingestateswhichhehadnevervisited’.

Thiswashyperbolic,asweremostofthehistorian’sprivatejudgementsonhiscolleagues,butitwastruethatMenzieshadlearnedhiscraftinabadschool–notsomuchEtonasserviceonthestaffofBrigadierJohnCharteris,Field-MarshalSirDouglasHaig’segregiousintelligencechiefontheWesternFront.Menzies’DSOandMCshowedthathedidnotlackcourage.HissocialskillssufficedtowintheconfidenceofMaj.Gen.Hastings‘Pug’Ismay,soontobecomeChurchill’schiefofstaff,andinsomedegreethatoftheprimeministerhimself.But‘C’knewlittleofthewiderworldheaspiredtospyupon,andtoleratedinBroadwayabevyofevenlessinspiredsubordinates.Decisionswerepowerfullyinfluencedbyhistwojointdeputies,ValentineVivianandClaude

Dansey,whohatedeachother.VivianwasaformerIndianpolicemanwhowascreditedwithamajorroleinfrustratingthemachinationsoftheComintern–theCommunistInternational–inSouthAmericaandtheFarEast;hewasalsoanofficeintriguerofenergyandskill.MeanwhileDanseywentbrieflytoBerninSeptember1939,totrytoorganiseintelligencelinksfromneutralSwitzerlandtoGermany.Aplentifulsupplyoffraudulentinformantsemerged,ofwhombynomeansthemostimaginativewasaGermanrefugeeinSwitzerlandwhousedhisnation’sArmyListtofabricateamobilisationprogrammewhichheattemptedtosell.OneofthefewusefulsourcesDanseyidentifiedwasanAustrianPole,CountHorodyski.He,inturn,introducedtheBritishtoHalinaSzymańska,wifeoftheformerPolishmilitaryattachéinBerlin,nowanexileinSwitzerland.ShebecameoneofMI6’smostusefulconduits,withconnectionsintheAbwehr.DanseythereafterreturnedtoLondon,whereheexercisedapowerfulinfluenceonthewartimefortunesofMI6,mostlytoitsdetriment.Duringtheyearsthatfollowed,Britain’ssecretservicerecruitednumbersofoutstandingofficers

andagents,whodidsomeusefulandafewimportantthingsfortheAlliedcause,butitschieftainsinspiredonlylimitedrespect.Thestimulusofwarwouldgenerateanintelligencerevolution,andgivebirthtooneofBritain’smostdazzlingachievements.However,thisdidnottakeplaceinBroadwayBuildings,butinsteadoutsideadrearysuburbantowninBedfordshire.

3 THERUSSIANS: TEMPLESOFESPIONAGE

Justbeforenoonon23May1938,PavelSudoplatovoftheNKVDstrolledintotheAtlantarestaurantinRotterdamandgreetedaUkrainiannationalistleaderwhomhehadcometoknowwell,intheguiseofbeingasympathiserwiththeman’scause.Sudoplatov,newlyarrivedonamerchantshipfromMurmansk,presentedthemanwithahandsomeboxofchocolatesadornedwiththeUkrainiancrest.Thetwochattedforafewmomentstoarrangeafurtherrendezvous,thenMoscow’sagentbadehiscompanionfarewellandmovedon.Hewasasafedistancedownthestreetbythetimeheheardasharpexplosion.Atimingdevicehaddetonatedabombinsidethebox,killingthenationalist.ThiswasatypicalMoscowCentre*operationoftheperiod,onethrustintherelentlesscampaigntoliquidatestateenemies,realorsupposedtraitors.Sudoplatov’ssuccessearnedhimafour-hour

meetingwithStalin’sforemostsecretpoliceman,LavrentiBeria,whomarkedhimforbiggerthings,suchasmanagingtheassassinationofLeonTrotsky.TheSovietUnionownedthemostactiveandbest-resourcedintelligenceorganisationsintheworld

–theRedArmy’sGRUandtheNKVD,thelattercontrolledbyBeriafromDecember1938.TheforemostpurposesofJosephStalin,masteroftheKremlin,werethepromotionofsocialismabroadthroughtheCominternandthemaintenanceofhisownpoweragainstdomesticandforeignenemies.Bothrequiredspiesinprofusion.Throughoutthe1930s,Russiapursuedastrategymorefar-reachinginitsmeans–theplantationofdeep-penetrationagents–anditsends–theworldwidetriumphofcommunism–thanthoseofanyothernation.HowfarthefundsandenergylavishedonitssecretwarprofitedtheSovietUnionwillbeconsideredbelow.Here,itsufficestosaythattheespionagenetworksitestablishedintheUS,Britain,JapanandEuropewereonascalefarbeyondthoseofanyothernation,andmanifestedinbigthingsandsmall.WhenJapanesepolicearrestedaSovietagentcarryingaLeicacamera,Tokyo’sintelligenceofficerswerepatheticallyenvious:theycouldnotaffordtoequiptheirownspieswithtechnologyremotelysosophisticated.ThiswasatimewhentensofmillionsofRussianswerestarving,yetStalin’sagentsspentwhateverseemednecessarytopurchaseinformationandthedeathsofenemies.FromSwitzerlandtoMexicotheyleftroadsidesstuddedwithcorpses,andcreatedsomeofthemostremarkableagentnetworksinthehistoryofintelligence.TheRussianaddictiontoespionageandconspiracywasasoldastime.In1912,whenaccordingto

officialfiguresGermanyspent£80,387onitssecretservice,France£40,000andBritain£50,000,theRussiansavowedabudgetof£380,000,plusafurther£335,000forthetsar ’ssecretpolice.Tsaristcodebreakersachievedsomenotablecoups,andtheirsuccessorssustainedthetradition.Inthe1930stheNKVD’sFourthDepartment,theworld’smostlavishly-fundedsignalsintelligenceunit,wasbasedintheForeignAffairsbuildingonMoscow’sKuznetskybridge.Itschief,GlebIvanovitchBokii,achievedareputationasakillerandsexualpredatormatchingthatofBeria.ThoughBokii’steamneverbrokewartimeGermanEnigmamessages,itenjoyedusefulearlierandlessersuccesses,suchassecuringthesecretprotocoltothe1936Anti-CominternPactbetweenGermanyandJapan,beforeitschieffacedafiringsquadthefollowingyear.Stalinpersonallyreadmanydecrypts;likeChurchilllater,hetrustedthecodebreakers’productasheneverdidhumint.TheKremlindisplayedasbrutalacarelessnessaboutcasualtiesamongitsspiesasitdidtowardsthefateofitssoldiers.In1936FrantišekMoravecofCzechintelligencereceivedaSovietproposalthathisserviceshouldprovidecrashespionagetrainingforahundredRussians,whowouldthenbedispatchedintoGermany.Moravecexpostulatedthatsuchnoviceswouldfacewholesaleextinction.HisMoscowcontactshrugged:‘Inthatcase,weshallsendanotherhundred.’TheSovietUnionenjoyedacriticaladvantageinbuildingitsempireofespionage.Whilefascism

gainedmillionsofsupportersinGermany,ItalyandSpain,itnevermatchedtheappealofworldwide

communismduringthedecadesbeforethelatter ’sbloodstainedrealitywaslaidbare.Ineverynation,menandwomenofbrainsandeducation,loftyidealsandunboundednaïvetéqueuedtobetraytheirownsocieties’secretsforwhattheydeemedahighercause.FromMoscow,hundredsofmenandwomenweresentforthtodirectnetworksinJapanandtheUnitedStates,Germany,FranceandotherEuropeannations.TheNKVDachievedexcellentpenetrationoftheFrenchForeignOffice,andfrequentlyquoteditsambassadors’dispatches.ManyofitsinformantsdeludedthemselvesthattheywerepassingsecretsnottotheSoviets,butinsteadtotheComintern–whichwasintruthmerelyapostboxfortheKremlin.PavelSudoplatovbecameoneoftheprincipalpuppeteersoftheKremlin’sdansesmacabres.He

wasaUkrainianmiller ’sson,bornin1907,whoservedasacipherclerkwiththeRedArmybeforejoiningtheBolsheviksecurityservice.Asateenager,SudoplatovrananetworkofinformersinhishometownofMelitopol.Secretpoliceworkbecameafamilyaffairwhenhemarriedin1928,sincehisJewishwifeEmmawasamoreseniorofficerthanhimselfintheOGPU,forerunneroftheNKVD.HewastrainedbyitsforeigndepartmentbeforebeingpostedtoGermanyasan‘illegal’,posingasaUkrainiannationalist.Heledarovinglifeintheyearsthatfollowed,travellingacrossEuropeandspendingamonthinaHelsinkijail.Hesawhiswifejustonce,whensheturnedupinParisasacourier.In1938hevisitedSpain,describingitscivilwaras‘akindergartenforourfutureoperations’.AtanearlystageofhisrelationshipwithBeria,Sudoplatovnotedacuriosity:thismostterribleofSovietsecretpolicemendisplayedmeticulouscivilitytolittlepeople–juniorstaff–whiletreatingbigones–hisrivalsintheKremlinhierarchy–withlaceratingrudeness.‘Beriahadthesingularabilitytoinspirebothfearandenthusiasm,’hewrote.Sudoplatovbecameoneofthespychief’smostdevotedservants,graduatingfromfieldworkto

seniordeskroles,assistedbythedemiseofrivals.Between1937and1939,thousandsofintelligenceofficersofallranksdiedbeforefiringsquadsorweredispatchedtothegulag.StalinlashedoutattheintelligenceservicesduringameetingoftheSovietMilitaryCouncilinlanguagethatdefiedparody:‘Wehavedefeatedthebourgeoisieonallfronts.Itisonlyontheintelligencefrontthattheybeatuslikesmallboys.Thisisourchiefweakness…Ourmilitaryintelligenceservice…hasbeenpollutedbyspies.[Itschiefs]wereworkingforGermany,forJapan,Poland,foranyonebutus…Ourtaskistorestoretheintelligenceservice.Itisoureyesandears.’Inhismadness,StalininsisteduponnotmerelytheexecutionofscoresofseniorofficersoftheGRUandNKVD,butalsoontheseveranceofMoscowCentre’srelationswiththeirinformantsinthefield,thousandsofwhomwerebrandedasfasciststool-pigeons.Thechaosthatfollowedimpactedvariouslyupondifferentdepartmentsandregions,butparalysedsomenetworksuntil1941andbeyond.AfterthedestructionofNazism,inViennaaveteranNKVDofficermetanoldGermansource,oneofmanywithwhomhehadbrokencontactinaccordancewithordersbackin1938.Now,thismandemandedoftheRussian:‘Whereonearthwereyouallthroughthewar?IwasGeneralKesselring’spersonalorderly!’

AmongtheforemostoftheNKVD’soverseasagent-runnerswasTheodoreMaly,aHungarianwhoinhisyouthhadbelongedtoaCatholicmonasticorder.HewastakenprisonerasaHapsburgofficerin1916,joinedtheBolsheviksandforsworeGod.In1936MalywaspostedtoLondon,wheremanyofMoscow’sBritishinformantslatertestifiedtotheirrespectandaffectionforhim.Yetin1938hewasamongthoserecalledtoMoscowandshotasasupposedtraitor,alongwiththeNKVD’sequallytalentedRomeresidentandseveralofitsBerlinmen.Anobviousquestionpersists:whydidanyofficerwithabrainobeytheordertogohome,whentheycouldsurelyhavereadtherunes?Themostplausibleansweristhateveninthosecrazedandbloodydays,adherentstotheworldsocialistideal,suchasMalywas,cherishedalingeringfaithintheSovietsystem,thoughhealsoprofessedfatalismifhisdeathwasdecreed.ManyRussiankneesquakedduringthePurges.Thirty-nineseniorGRUofficers,intelligence

veterans,areknowntohavebeenshot,andtheNKVDsufferedinproportion.PavelSudoplatovsurvivedaninvestigationandthethreatofexpulsionfromtheParty;hebelievedafterwardsthathemighthavebeenpreservedbyStalin’spersonalintervention.Clamberingoveramoundofcorpses,heacquiredhisownofficeintheLubyankabuildingat2LStreet–cosilyreferredtobyitsoccupantsas‘DomDva’,‘NumberTwo’,aplaceofdreadforeverypasser-by,andforanyprisonerwhocrosseditsthreshold.LikeallthosewhoprosperedinStalin’sdreadfuluniverse,Sudoplatovlearnedtoregardthegrotesqueasnormal,theunspeakableasfamiliar.Duringfamilyconversationsintheirapartment,forinstance,heandEmmaneverdeviatedfromarigidlydomesticscript,becausetheytookitforgrantedthateverywordspokenwasrecordedbyBeria’seavesdroppers.Hewrotelongafterwardsinanapparentlyhalf-truthfulmemoir:‘Iacceptedthebrutalityandsternorderthatcharacterisedourcentralisedsociety;itappearedtheonlymethodofpreservingthecountrywhenitwassurroundedbyGerman,PolishandJapaneseenemies.’Meanwhile,elsewhereintheforestanagentoftheGRU,whowouldlaterbecomefamous,or

notorious,forhisassociationwiththeGermanRedOrchestra–theextraordinaryespionagenetworktobedescribedlater–wasputtingdownrootsinforeignparts.AnatoliSukolov-Gourevitch,bornatKharkovinNovember1913,wasthesonofJewishparentswhowerebothpharmacists.Hestartedworkin1929asanapprenticedraughtsmaninafactory,andhatedthelife.Fromanearlystage,andlikemostSovietcitizens,heacquiredthehabitofobsessivesecrecy,writinginhismemoirs:‘Ilearnedtohidemyfeelingsandtroublesfrommynearestanddearest,myfriends,andindeedfromeveryone.’Desperatetoescapefromthecommonruck,whilestillveryyounghebecameacommunistfunctionary,andsomehowsecuredanappointmentasalectureronmilitarystudiesataLeningradschoolforIntouristguides,thereafterservinginintelligence.In1937hewasrecruitedtotraveltoSpainasoneoftheSovietmilitarygroupassistingthe

embattledRepublicangovernment.GourevitchthoroughlyenjoyedhissubsequentSpanishadventures–aswhowouldnot,aftersamplingSovietfactorylife?Hewasabletodresswithanelegance

unimaginableathome,andthereafterfavouredaWarsawtailor.Hetookatripinasubmarine,travelledinFranceandlearnedconversationalFrench,SpanishandGerman.OnreturningtoMoscow,hewasselectedfortrainingasaforeignagentoftheGRU.AskedmuchlaterifithadtroubledhimtojointheSovietUnion’smurderoussecretservices,likeSudoplatovheshruggedthathiscountrywasencircledbyenemies;hethenbelievedthatitsdefendersdidonlywhattheyhadto.Hischief,thegaunt,jug-earedintelligenceveteranMajorSimonGendin,enquiredwhetherhehad

anymarriageplanswhichcouldcomplicatehisfuturecareeroverseas.Gourevitchrepliedthathewasindeedinlove,withagirlnamedLialiawhomhehadmetwhentheywerebothworkinginSpain,andwhowasnowanIntouristinterpreter.GendintoldhisstafftoaddhernametothebrieflistofintimateswithwhomGourevitchmightcorrespond,thoughthatrelationshipperished,likesomuchelse,duringtheyearsthatfollowed.OngraduationfromtheGRU’sspyschool,Gourevitchhimselfexpresseddoubtsabouthisfluencyasacoderandwireless-operator–helackedasensitiveearforMorse.Gendinreassuredhim:hewouldnotneedspecialisedradioskills,forhewasdestinedtobecomeanintelligence-gathererandagent-runner.GourevitchwasbriefedtotraveltoBrusselstoworkwithanotherSovietagent,codenamed‘Otto’,

thentomoveontoSwedenafterestablishinghimselfandimprovinghislanguageskills.HewouldexploithisknowledgeofSpanishbyadoptingacoveridentityas‘VincenteSierra’,aprosperousbusinessmanwithaUruguayanpassport.Forthenextthreeyears,Moscowfurnishedhimwithfundstosustainanappropriatelyflashylifestyle.Yetalthoughhewasinstructedabouttheimportanceofdressingsmartly,affectingthehatandglovesthatwerethenbadgesofbourgeoisrespectability,Gourevitchlatercomplainedthathewasuntutoredinsocialskills.WhenhecheckedintoasmartHelsinkihotelonthefirstlegofhisjourneytoBelgium,hewasbewilderedwhenaporterpickeduphissuitcaseandcarrieditupstairs:neverinhisshortlifehadhereceivedsuchapersonalservice.Hegaspedonseeinganopenbuffetinthehoteldining-room,whichatfirstheassumedwassetforabanquetratherthanforthedailyfareofguests.Later,inBrussels,ashefumbledhiswaytowardsanentréeintorelativelysmartsocialcircles,hewasembarrassedtobetakenasideoneeveningbyanacquaintancewhotoldhimthatonlywaitersworewhitebowtieswithsmokingjackets.‘Iwascompletelyignorantofthesesubtleties,’hewroteruefully.‘Otto’,theSovietagentwhomGourevitchjoinedinBrussels,wasLeopoldTrepper,bornin1904

thesonofaGalicianshopkeeper,oneofthekeyfiguresinRussia’sEuropeanintelligenceoperations,andlateraheroicSovietlegend.Asayoungman,TrepperranaParisnetworkwhichwasrolledupbytheFrenchin1933.HefledfirsttoGermany,thentoRussiawherehefoundemploymentwithStalin’sspymasterswhilemoonlightingaseditorofaJewishjournal.Earlyin1939hewasdispatchedtoBrussels,whichwasdeemedasecurebasefromwhichhecouldforwardinformationfromtheGRU’snetworkinsideGermany.CentreboastedofrunningtwoimportantBerlinagents:IlseStöbe,whoworkedinthepressdepartmentofRibbentrop’sForeignMinistry,andadiplomatnamedRudolf

Shelia.TreppercarriedaCanadianpassportinthenameofAdamMikler,stolenduringtheSpanishCivilWar.Hewasmarriedwithtwosons,butonlyoneaccompaniedhimtoBrussels–theother,seven-year-oldMichael,remainedinMoscow.TrepperbecameknowntohissourcesinWesternEuropeas‘legrandchef’,whileGourevitchwas‘lepetitchef’.SovietnarrativeslavishpraiseontheTreppernetworkforitsservicestothesocialistcause,anditwasplainlyusefulasapostofficeforthemessagesofStöbeandMikler.ButitseemsunlikelythatTrepperrecruitedusefulinformantsofhisown.TheforemostachievementoftheGRUagentsinBelgiumwastostayatliberty,makesomefriendsandcreatelifestylesthatsupportedtheircoverstories.

OfmoreimportancetoMoscow–certainlyfrom1941onwards–weretheGRU’sorganisationsbasedinSwitzerland.ThesewouldlaterchanneltowardstheKremlinmaterialderivedfromBerlinsourcessuchasWesternagent-runnerscouldonlydreamof.Onenetworkhadbeenestablishedin1937byGerman-bornRachelDübendorfer.Alargergroup,whichbecameknownasthe‘Lucy’Ring,wasrunbyDrAlexanderRadó–‘Dora’–a‘sleeper ’permittedbyhischiefstoslumberalmostaslongasSleepingBeauty.AHungarian,Marxistfromhisyouth,RadóservedasacommissarinBudapest’s1919RedTerror.ObligedtofleewhenAdmiralHorthybecameHungary’sdictator,foratimeherananémigréResistancegroupinVienna.HethendecampedtoMoscow,wherehereceivedintelligencetraining,andwasdeemedsufficientlysignificanttobeintroducedtoLenin.PostedtoWesternEurope,heservedasanagentinBerlinandParis,undercoverasacorrespondentfortheSovietnewsagencyTASS.AftermarryingaGermancommunistwithwhomhehadtwochildren,hetriedtosettleinBrussels,butwassentpackingbytheauthorities,whoheldathickdossieronhim.InsteadhewenttoSwitzerland,whereheparleyedalifelongpassionformapsintothecreationofacartographicpublishingbusiness,whichquicklybecameprofitable.TheSwisspolicewatchedRadóforawhile,thenlefthimalonewhentheydecidedhewaswhathe

seemed–aquiet-livingfellow,fortyin1939,whosimplywantedtoturnanhonestpenny.Radówasword-paintedbyoneofhiswireless-operators,anEnglishmannamedAlexanderFoote:‘Withhismildeyesblinkingbehindglasses,helookedexactlylikealmostanyonetobefoundinanysuburbantrainanywhereintheworld.’MoscowinstructeditsmantodonothinguntilEuropeerupted.Radósettleddownquitehappilywithhismaps,whichenabledhimtomakealivingwithoutmuchrecoursetoGRUfunds.WhenhishandlerwasrecalledtoMoscowduringthePurges,Radóforatimelostcontactwithhischiefs.Buthemadeusefullocalfriends,someofthemcommunists,othersnot.OnewasaSwisssocialist,OttoPunter,whoadmiredtheSovietUnionandhadworkedfortheRepublicansinSpain.PunterforgedconnectionsinGermany,andwithsomeGermanémigrésinSwitzerlandsuchasBaronMichelvonGodin.VonGodinrecruitedtheVichyFrenchpressattaché,LouisSuss,codename‘Salter ’.TheChinesepressattachéPaoHsienChu–‘Polo’–wasanothersource,andPunteralsohadconnectionswithinfluentiallocalCatholics.

Radó’scomradeAlexanderFootealwaysclaimedtohavebeenanadventurerratherthanacommunistideologue.Around-faced,bespectacled,mildlyseedyyoungEnglishman,inSeptember1938hereturnedfromserviceinSpainwiththeInternationalBrigade.Afewmonthslater,oneofMoscow’sBritishrecruitersofferedhimunspecifiednewemploymentfortheworkers’causeinSwitzerland.Cheapmelodramawasnotlacking.Inobediencetoinstructions,FootereportedtothemainpostofficeinGenevaatnoononeday,wearingawhitescarfandholdingaleatherbelt.Hewasapproachedbyawomanwhofulfilledhersideoftheidentificationprocedurebyholdingastringshoppingbagandanorange.SheaskedinEnglishwherehehadboughthisbelt,andherepliedimplausibly,atanironmonger ’sshopinParis.Whenhehadthenaskedwherehecouldbuyanorangelikehers,sheintroducedherself.Shewas‘Sonya’,UrsulaHamburger*oftheGRU,whomFootewaspleasedtofindwasnosquatcommissar,butinsteadanattractivewomanofthirty-one,with‘agoodfigureandevenbetterlegs’.ThisremarkablepersonalitywasthedaughterofaBerlineconomist.Attheageofelevenshewasbrieflyachildactressbeforetakingupanalternativecareerinespionage.ShewasalreadyaveteranofexploitsinChinaforwhichshehadbeenawardedtheOrderoftheRedBanner.HamburgerinstructedFootetotraveltoMunich,establishhimselfinthecity,learnGermanand

makefriends.Hewasgiven2,000SwissfrancsandtoldtomeetheragaininthreemonthsinLausanne–onceagain,atthepostoffice.KeepingthisrendezvousafteraGermansojournthatwasuneventfulsaveforachanceglimpseofHitlerlunchinginarestaurant,hewastoldthathewasnowontheGRUpayrollasa‘collaborator ’,atasalaryofUS$150amonthplusreasonableexpenses.Giventhecovername‘Jim’,andvariousmeansofmakingcontactif‘Sonya’disappearedforanyreason,hewasthensentbacktoMunichwithanadvanceofUS$900incash.NothingsignificanthappenedthereafteruntilinApril1939hewasvisitedbyanoldInternationalBrigadecomradefromSpain,LenBrewer,British-bornsonofGermanparents,whomheappearstohaveintroducedtoHamburger,whopromptlyrecruitedhim.InAugusthewassummonedtoyetanothermeeting,thistimeatHamburger ’shome,achaletatCaux-sur-Montreuxwhereshelivedinincongruousbourgeoisdomesticitywithhertwochildren,MaikandJanina,andanoldGermannurse.Footewasdisconcertedbythecasualnesswithwhichhishostessleftcomponentsofherwirelesstransmitterlyingaroundthehouse.TheGRUringinSwitzerlandwasastraumatisedasmanyothercommunistsaroundtheworldby

theAugust1939Nazi–SovietPact.FootefeltthatithitHamburgerevenharderthanhimself;thatherfaithintheomniscienceofthePartywasshattered:‘Ithinkthatfromthattimeonwardsherheartwasnotinthework’–thisseemsimplausible,sinceshelaterbecamecourierfortheatomicspyKlausFuchs,anddiedanavowedStalinist.DesperatetogetoutofSwitzerland,shedivorcedherhusbandandmarriedLenBrewer.Initially,accordingtoFoote,thiswasmerelyanarrangementofconveniencetosecurea‘shoe’–apassport–butthenthecouplefellinlove.Theirplanswere

momentarilythreatenedwhentheirmaid,Lisa,becamedisaffectedandtelephonedtheBritishconsulatetodenouncethemanonymouslyascommunistspies.Butthegirl’sEnglishwassopoorthatnobodyattheotherendunderstood,oratleasttooknotice.Daysbeforetheoutbreakofwar,FooteboardedatrainboundforGermanyoncemore,onlyto

findhishandlersuddenlypushingherwayalongthecarriagetoreachhim,justbeforedeparturetime.Shetoldhimtogetoff,fast.NewordershadcomefromMoscow:warwasimminent;hemuststayinSwitzerland.Duringtheperiodthatfollowed,inwhichthe‘Lucy’Ringwastemporarilydormant,whilelivingatasmallpensioninMontreuxbothFooteandLenBrewerlearnedhowtooperateashortwaveradiotransmitter.TheypractisedonHamburger ’sset,thoughitsperformancewasnotimprovedbybeingburiedinhergardenbetweentransmissions–thenwaitedtobegivenmessagestotransmittoMoscow.

EvenastheGRU’sSwissnetworkswerebeddingdown,Centre’sGermansourceswerealreadyproducinginformationofextraordinaryquality.Thefirstmusicianinwhatbecameknowntohistoryasthe‘RedOrchestra’wasrecruitedfollowinganapproachtotheSovietembassyonedayin1929,byanex-BerlinpolicemannamedErnstKur.Heofferedhisservicesasaninformant,andwaspromptlyrecruitedbythelocalNKVDresidentasagentA/70.Kur,aracketyandoftendrunkenboor,hadbeendismissedfromthepolice,butprovedtohaveacriticalcontactinitscounter-intelligencebranch,whowassoondesignatedbytheRussiansasagentA/201.On7SeptemberMoscowmessageditsBerlinstation:‘Weareveryinterestedinyournewagent,A/201.OuronlyfearisthatyouhavegotyourselvesintooneofthemostdangerouspredicamentswheretheslightestindiscretiononthepartofeitherA/201orA/70couldleadtomultiplemisfortunes.WethinkitnecessarytolookintotheissueofaspecialchannelofcommunicationwithA/201.’InvestigationshowedthatitwasA/201–anofficernamedWillyLehmann,whohadpromptedKur ’sapproachtotheRussians,usinghimasacut-outduringtheirexploratorydealings.Lehmannwasbornin1884,andservedtwelveyearsintheKaiser ’snavybeforebecominga

policeman.HisNKVDfilespokeinthehighesttermsofhischaracter,thoughnotingtheexistenceofalong-termmistress,FlorentinaLiverskaya,athirty-eight-year-oldseamstresswholivedandworkedat21Blumenstrasse.Shewasdescribed,somewhatungenerously,asashortwomanwithreddishhairandaplumpface.WhenKurstartedusinghispaymentsfromtheSovietembassytofundextravagantdrinkingsprees,Lehmannandhishandleragreedthatthisnowredundantintermediarymustbegotoutoftheway.WithunusualsensitivityforCentre,insteadofbeingpushedunderatram,in1933thedissoluteex-copwasrehousedinSweden,wherehepassedtherestofhisdaysasasmalltrader,occasionallymoonlightingasaninformant.Lehmann,codenamed‘Breitenbach’,thereafterbecameoneofMoscow’smostvaluedGerman

agents.ForsometimehishandlerwasVasilyZarubin,anNKVDstar.Bornin1894,highlyintelligent

andpersonablethoughlargelyself-educated,ZarubinservedsuccessivelyinChinaandEuropeasan‘illegal’,latterlyundercoverasaCzechengineer.Acheerfullygregariousfigure,thoughwithamplebloodonhishands,hespokeseverallanguagesandforgedawarmrelationshipwithLehmann.AlthoughZarubinoccasionallygavethepolicemanmodestsumsofmoney,Lehmannneverappearedgreedy,andseemedkeentoassisttheRussianssimplybecausehedislikedhisownnation’sgovernment–ananimositythatbecamemuchmoremarkedaftertheNazisgainedpower.LehmanngaveMoscowdetailsaboutthestructureandactivitiesofGermany’svariousintelligence

organisations,andwarnedofforthcomingoperationsagainstSovietinterests.HeprovidedsamplesofAbwehrcodes,andpassedongossipaboutNazipowerstruggles.HehimselfworkedlatterlyintheGestapo’sDepartmentIVE,ultimatelyunderHimmler ’scontrol,andwasmaderesponsibleforsecurityatespeciallysensitivedefenceplants.Thusin1935heattendedsomeearlyGermanrockettestsatPeenemünde,andproducedareportonthemwhichreachedStalin.Healsoacquiredconsiderableinformationaboutothermilitaryandnavaltechnologicaldevelopments.AstheNazistightenedtheirgripduringthe1930s,LehmannbecameincreasinglynervousaboutmeetingZarubin,orindeedanySovietagent.Hefoundhimselfundersurveillance,asaresultofabizarrecoincidence.Awomanquarrelledwithherlover,anddenouncedhimtotheauthoritiesasaRussianspy:thisprovedtobeanotherGestapoofficer,alsonamedLehmann.Themuddlewaseventuallyclearedup,andtheshadowwasliftedfrom‘Breitenbach’.Butin1935heaskedforafalsepassportincasehehadtoruninahurry,andthiswasdulyprovided.WhenZarubinreportedthatLehmannhadfallenseriouslyill,thenewspromptedapanicinMoscow:CentredeclaredthatitsmostpreciousGermansourcemustbekeptaliveatanycost,andthattheNKVDwouldmeethismedicalbillsifthemoneycouldsomehowbelaundered.‘Breitenbach’recovered.LaterthatyeartheGRUmadeasuddendecisiontowindupitsGermannetworksamidtheNazis’

ruthlesspersecutionofknowncommunists,andtomakeafreshstart,beginningatthetop.BoththeBerlinstationchiefandhisdeputywererecalledtoMoscowandliquidated.Earlyin1937,theNKVD’sZarubinalsofellvictimtothePurges.Hewassummonedhome,andataninterviewwithBeriaaccusedoftreason.Afterinterrogation,unusuallyhewasneitherexecutednorcleared,butinsteaddemoted.HeremainedforatimeinMoscow,servingasassistanttoanoviceintelligenceofficer,VladimirPavlov.BeforeZarubin’sabruptdeparturefromBerlin,hetransferredthehandlingof‘Breitenbach’toa

womannamedClemens,oneofhisstaff.ShescarcelyspokeGerman,buttherewasnobodyelse,andhehimselfexpectedsoontoreturn.Asmattersfellout,Clemenswasobligedtoassumeongoingresponsibilityfortherelationship,exchangingenvelopescontainingordersandinformation,whichwerethenpassedtoanotherNKVDillegal,Ruben,whosoonfoundhimselfthesolesurvivingmemberoftheBerlinstationasthePurgesclaimedevermorevictims–theGRU’sMajorSimonGendin,whohadsentGourevitchtoBrussels,wasshotinFebruary1939.

Zarubin,inMoscow,contrivedtosendanoteto‘Breitenbach’,assuringhimthathewasnotforgottenbyhisfriends;thatheshouldcontinuehisintelligenceactivities,whileexercisingextremecaution.TheGestapoofficerreplied:‘Ihavenoreasonstoworry.Iamsurethatthey[inMoscowCentre]alsoknowovertherethateverythingisbeingdoneresponsiblyhere,everythingthatcanbedone.Sofarthereisnogreatneedforanyonetovisitfromthere.Iwillinformyouifthiswillbecomenecessary.’AstheNKVD’ssilencebecameprotracted,however,Lehmanngrewfrustratedandimpatient.HesentanothermessagetoZarubinviaClemens:‘JustwhenIwasabletomakegooddeals,thecompanytherestoppedbeinginterestedindoingbusinesswithme,forcompletelyunknownreasons.’Zarubinrespondedsoothinglythat‘thecompany’tremendouslyvaluedhiswork,andbesoughthimtokeepgoing–whichhedid,untilNovember1938.Butthen,astheSovietintelligencemachinebecameparalysedbyitsdomesticcontortions,allcontactbetween‘Breitenbach’andMoscowwaslost:therelationshipwasnotrestoreduntiltheautumnof1940.WillyLehmannwasbynomeansMoscow’sonlyGermansource,norevenanylongeritsmost

important.Onedayin1935aLuftwaffeofficernamedHarroSchulze-Boysen,whoheldaseniorpostinHermannGöring’sAirMinistry,contactedtheSovietembassyinBerlinwithanofferofinformation,whichwasimmediatelyaccepted.Hewasgiventhecodename‘Corporal’,andNKVDfile34122.Schulze-BoysenwasachampagnesocialistfromasmartBerlinfamilyofintellectualinclinations–AdmiralTirpitzwasamonghisforebears.FromhisdeskintheAirMinistryheforgedcontactsinarmystaffcommunications,amongAbwehrofficers,andalsowithHansHenniger,agovernmentinspectorofLuftwaffeequipment.Göringgaveawaythebrideathis1936wedding,tothebeautifulandexuberantLibertasHaas-Heye,whohadworkedforatimeasaBerlinpressofficerforMGMFilms.ShenowlearnedtoshareSchulze-Boysen’spoliticalconvictionsandtheburdenofhislaboursfortheSovietUnion,andherbedwithalegionoflovers.Ataboutthesametime,butindependently,aseniorcivilservantintheeconomicsministry,Arvid

Harnack,contactedtheSovietembassy,andwaslikewiserecruitedasagent‘Corsican’,NKVDfile34118.Harnackwasbornin1901intoascholarlyfamilyinDarmstadt.Hequalifiedasalawyerandpractisedasaneconomist,spendingsometimeintheUnitedStates.AttheUniversityofWisconsin’sMadisoncampushemetMildredFish,astrikinglyhandsomeandserious-mindedstudentofEnglish.Theyweremarriedin1929,andelectedtoliveinGermany.BothwerekeenlyinterestedinMarxism–theymadeatouroftheSovietUnion,andin1932launchedapoliticalstudygroup.WhenArvidbegantopassinformationtotheRussians,andtorecruitfellow-foesofHitlertohisring,hejoinedtheNaziPartytoimprovehisprotectivecolouring.MeanwhilebothheandSchulze-Boysensteadilyextendedtheirgroupsoflike-mindedintellectualfoesofHitler.Betweenthem,by1939theyhadopenedwindowsintosomeofthemostinfluentialinstitutionsinNaziGermany.Moscownowmadeaserioussecuritymistake:itorderedthatthetwonetworksshouldcollaborate.

Theirguidingspiritshadverydifferenttemperaments.Schulze-Boysenwasanexuberant,impulsive

extrovert;Harnackwasaquiet,intenseintellectual,whoseimpeccablemiddle-classbackgroundenabledhimselfandhisfriendsforyearstoescapetheattentionoftheGestapoandtheAbwehr.Thetwomennonethelessforgedacloserelationship,drivenbysharedhatredoftheNazisandromanticenthusiasmfortheSovietUnion.UntilJune1941theyhadnoneedofwirelesses,merelytransmittinginformationthroughtheRussians’Berlinmilitaryattaché.

Oneofthemoststrikingaspectsofespionageisthatitsprocesses,themerebusinessoflivingacovertexistence,acquirealifeoftheirown,heedlessofspies’achievementsascollectorsofinformation.AnatoliGourevitch,inhismemoirs,touchesonaweaknessinhisowntrainingwhichmightbeappliedtotheexperienceofmanyotheragents.Hewasexhaustivelyinstructedintechniques–secretinks,passwordsforrendezvousandsuchlike.Nomatchingeffort,however,wasexpendeduponexplainingthepurposeofhismission:‘WhywassolittleheedpaidtothemeansbywhichImightobtaininformation,tothewholeorganisationalaspectofthebusinessofintelligence-gathering?’Inotherwords,andasGourevitch’ssubsequentcareerillustrated,formanysecretagentsthemanagementandperilsofdailyexistenceconsumedalion’sshareoftheirenergies,oftenoverwhelmingthefunctionthatmattered–theacquisitionofinformationofvaluetotheirserviceanditsgovernment.ArrivedinBrusselsearlyin1939,freshfromtheGRUtrainingschool,Gourevitchtookroomsin

alodginghouse,enrolledhimselfinalanguageschoolinhisguiseasaUruguayanvisitor,andreflectedthathisownabsoluteignoranceofcommerceseemedlikelytoproveanimpedimenttohisintendedcoverlife,helpingtorunalocallybasedbusiness.Thisconcernreceded,however,inthefaceofamoreseriousone:disillusionmentonfirstmeetinghisboss,LeopoldTrepper.GourevitchhadforgedaheroicmentalimageofthissecretagentsomuchesteemedbyMoscowCentre,yetnowhewasconfrontedbywhatheafterwardsclaimedwasadrab,unimposingreality.Hehadbeenbriefedtosupposethatasolidbusinesscoverhadbeenestablishedfor‘Otto’s’networkinBelgium,whereasonthespothefoundonlyalittlesuburbanexportbusinessemployingjustthreepeopleandpeddling‘theForeignExcellentTrench-Coat’.ItssecretarywasayoungRussianémigré,marriedtoaformertsaristarmyofficer,whowasapparentlycompletelyignorantoftherealnatureofthefirm’soperations.AllthemanagerswereJews,whichmustmaketheminstantlyvulnerableintheeventofaGermantakeoverofBelgium.Gourevitchfeltmoreconfidenceinhisfellow-agent‘Andre’,athirty-five-year-oldAlsatiannamed

LeonGrossvogel,whohaddesertedfromtheFrencharmyin1925,thendriftedaroundGermanybeforetravellingtoPalestine,wherehebecameacommunist,andforgedafriendshipwithTrepper.AfterthreeyearstherehereturnedtoBelgium,wherehisparentslivedandranasmalltradinghousenamed‘AuRoi’.ItwasthepresenceoftheGrossvogelsthatpersuadedTreppertocometoBelgium,andtoexploittheircommercialcontactsasacover,whenin1938Moscowchargedhimwiththe

formationofaWestEuropeanespionageorganisation.HisnewdeputynonethelessdecidedthatTrepper ’ssupposednetworkofimportantintelligencecontactswasnothingofthesort.WhilelargeallowancemustbemadeforthefactthatGourevitchpublishedhisversionlongafterhehimselfwasdenouncedasatraitor,thethrustofhisremarksmakessense.WhateverTrepper ’stradecraftskills,togetherwithhisplausibilityincomposingreportswhichfoundfavourinMoscow,itishardtoimaginewhatusefulintelligencehecouldhaveacquiredinlow-gradeBelgianandFrenchbusinesscircles,theonlysocietythathehadaccessto.CentreseemedcontenttoacceptTrepper ’sclaimtohavecreatedasystemthroughwhichmaterialcouldbegatheredandpassedtoMoscowfromitsBerlinsourcesintheeventofwarwithGermany.ButGourevitchdismissedas‘completelyfalse’theclaimsofpost-warSoviethistoriansthatTrepperranalargenetworkofimportantagentsextendingintoScandinavia.Ontheeveofwar,MoscowCentrecouldboastthattheSchulze-Boysen/Harnackgroupsin

GermanyprovidedexcellentinformationfromtheNazis’innercircle.The‘Lucy’RinginSwitzerlandhadestablisheditselfsoundly,butonlybegantoprovideimportantintelligencefrom1941onwards.TheTrepper–Gourevitchnetworkstrodwateruntil1940.TheextensiveSovietsecretmachineintheUS,whichwillbedescribedelsewhere,producedasteadystreamoftechnologicalintelligence,whichwouldhavebeenmoreusefultotheRussiansinadvancingtheirowndefencebaseiftheirindustrieshadbeencapableofexploitingit.

WehavelefttolastthebestofallMoscow’smen–orrather,themostspectacular.RichardSorgegripstheimaginationofposterity,morebecauseofwhathewasthanthroughhisinfluenceonhistory,whichwasmarginal.HedispatchedtoMoscowaflowofprivilegedpoliticalandstrategicinformation,acquiredthroughanaccesstohighplacesachievedthroughsheerforceofpersonality.Muchofhismaterialwasignored,however,ormerelyduplicatedsimilarreportsfrommoreauthoritativeBerlinsources.SomehistorianswhoselectivelyquoteSorge’soccasionalbrilliantinsightshaveignoredhismisjudgementsandfalseprophecies–‘noise’.Hischaracterandcareerasanagentwerenonethelessextraordinary.‘Ika’,asSorgewasnicknamed,wasborninBakuin1895,oneofninechildrenofaGerman

petroleumengineerandaRussianmother.AftercompletingschoolinGermanyhefoundhimselfthrustintotheKaiser ’swarasayoungsoldier.WhileconvalescinginKönigsbergaftersufferingabadwound,hewasindoctrinatedintocommunistideology,allegedlybythefatherofoneofhisnurses,thoughtherewasalreadyafamilyprecedent:Sorge’sgrandfatherhadbeenanassociateofMarxandEngels.WhenthewarendedhebecameaMarxistinstructor,andacquiredaPhDinpoliticalscience.In1921hemarriedChristianeGerlach,havingpersuadedhertoabandonaprevioushusband.Hiscommunistandrevolutionarylinksattractedtheunfavourableattentionofthepolice,andhefoundGermanybecomingtoohottoholdhim.In1924thecouplemovedtoMoscow,whereSorge

wasrecruitedandtrainedasaSovietagent.Uncertaintypersistsabouthismovementsinthenextfiveyears,thoughitisknownthathevisitedBritain.Christianelefthim,withouttheformalityofadivorce–hisimmenseappealtowomenmadehimcarelessaboutwhethertheystayedorwent.Thecombinationofrough-hewngoodlooksandahypnotic,drivenpersonalityenabledhimtoattract,andoftentomaintainintandem,animpressiverangeofloversofallshapesandsizes.ThoughscepticslatercondemnedSorgeasacharlatanaswellasabetrayer–afundamentallyshallowfiguredespitehisintellectualpretensions–hewasastrikinglysuccessfulone.In1929theRedArmy’sFourthDepartment–latertheGRU–offeredhimanoverseasassignment.

HerequestedChina,andarrivedinShanghaithatNovemberundercoverasafreelancejournalist,withawireless-operatorintow.HeachievedrapidsocialsuccessintheEuropeanconcessions,andmadewell-informedfriends.Alsoagents.HehimselfwasmasqueradingasanAmerican,butdroppedtheposewithAgnesSmedley,theAmericanChinatraveller,whomheenlistedinMoscow’sservice.In1930hemettwenty-nine-year-oldHotsumiOzaki,astrugglingmagazinewriterwithcommunistsympathies,whomhealsorecruitedandwhoplayedanotablepartinhissubsequentcareer.Likealmostallthosewhoworkedwithhim,Ozakifellundertheforeigner ’sspell.Longafterwards,anotherofhisJapanesenetworksaidwonderinglyofthesuperspythatSorgebecame,‘Youmeetamanlikehimonlyonceinalifetime.’TheGRUagentthrewhimselfintoresearchingeveryaspectofChineselife,andhisreportsearnedwarmapprovalfromhischiefs.InJanuary1933hereturnedtoMoscow,wherehe‘married’again:ayoungRussiangirlnamed

YekaterinaMaximova–‘Katcha’–towhomhewroteemotionallettersthroughtheyearsthatfollowed.HehimselfwantedtostayinRussia,butwhatusewasaforeignspyinhisemployers’owncountry?TheGRUdecidedtoposthimtoTokyo.Inpreparationforthisassignment,SorgetravelledtoGermany,nowNazi-ruled,tosecureappropriatecredentials,andachievedanotherbrilliantsocialandprofessionalsuccess,whilesomehowevadingexposureofhiscommunistpast.HemetthepublisherofZeitschriftfurGeopolitik,anardentNationalSocialist,andsecuredfromhimbothacontractasa‘stringer ’andaletterofintroductiontotheGermanembassyinTokyo.Healsogainedthegoodwillofthemagazine’sfounder,KarlHaushofer,asecond‘stringing’

arrangementwithTäglischeRundschau,andaletteraddressedtoLt.Col.EugenOtt,aGermanofficerservinganexchangetermwithaJapaneseartilleryregiment.Theeditor-in-chiefurgedOttto‘trustSorgeineverything;thatis,politically,personallyandotherwise’.Throughthesesponsorsthespypulledoffafurthercoup:hebecameamemberoftheNationalSocialistParty.Thusarmoured,thisavowedNazisetoffforTokyoviatheUnitedStateswithawireless-operator,BrunoWendtoftheRedArmy,carryinginhisluggageacopyofthe1933GermanStatisticalYearbooktoprovidethekeyforhiscoding.Sorgewasthirty-eight,andonthethresholdofoneofthegreatestespionagecareersinhistory.ArrivedinJapan,withremarkablespeedheestablishedarelationshipwiththeGermanambassador

HerbertvonDirksen,aPrussianaristocrat;andamuchcloseronewithColonelOtt,whoembracedanotherformerFrontsoldatenaskin.Sorge,withcharacteristicrecklessness,promptlybegananaffairwithOtt’swifeHelma,anAmazoniansix-footerwhowasherselfaformercommunist.Thisappearstohavedonenoharmtothespy’srelationshipwithherhusband,whoseemed,asheremained,mesmerisedbyhisnewfriend.ThecolonelwasanaustereandunbendingfigurewhoperhapssawqualitiesinSorgewhichheenvied,notleastexuberance.ThenewcomeralsoingratiatedhimselfwiththeconvivialandcharmingCaptainPaulWenneker,whojoinedtheGermanmissionin1934asnavalattaché.Sorge’sintimacywiththeembassywonhimsomerespectandattentionfromtheJapanese,though

atthisstagetheTokyogovernmenthadbynomeanscommitteditselftoanalliancewithHitler–Germanresidentsweresubjecttopolicesurveillanceasintrusiveasthatimposedonotherforeigners.Sorgethrewhimselfintoacquiringinformationofallkindsaboutthecountry,itspeople,historyandculture,formingalibraryofoverathousandbooks,thoughheneverlearnedtoreadJapanese,noreventospeakitwell.Hissexualindiscretionswouldhaveearnedcensureinanyspyschool,buthismanagementoftherelationshipwiththeGermandiplomaticcommunityatthecolonnadedandhandsomelygardenedembassyofferedamasterclassinpenetration.DespitehisavowedNationalSocialistallegiance,hewasgailycriticalofGermangovernmentpolicies.AtmeetingswithDirksenandOtt–whowasnowtransferredtobecomemilitaryattaché–Sorge

appearedtoprovideasmuchinformationashereceived.Indeed,theyrecognisedthatthejournalistknewmoreaboutJapanthantheydid.HestartedtoassistinthecompilationofdiplomaticreportsforBerlin,andforgedalong-distancerelationshipwiththeeditoroftheNaziPartynewspaper,contributingtoitscolumnsandattendinglocalTokyobranchmeetings.Meanwhile,patientlyandskilfully,SorgebuiltuphisnetworkofinformantsforMoscow.HotsumiOzaki,hisoldfriendandsourcefromShanghai,wasnowarespectedjournalistinOsaka,whencehewasabletotransfertoTokyo.Inthatpre-social-mediauniverse,forthenexttwoyearsSorgewasabletopreventOzakifromdiscoveringhisrealname:theGermanwasknowntohimonlyas‘MrJohnson’,theAmericancoveridentityhehadworninhisChinadays.Anotherrecruit,YotokuMiyaki,wasapainterbornin1903,whosefamilyhadmovedtoCalifornia

whenhewasachild.TheAmericanCommunistPartytalent-spottedMiyakifortheComintern,andtheslightly-builtyoungmanwaspersuadedtomovebacktoJapan,whereheprovedasuperbagent.InkeepingwithMoscow’sstringentfinancepolicies,thoughMiyakireceivedasalaryfromSorge,hesupplementedthisthroughgivinglanguagelessonsandsellinghispictures,whichcommandedrespectableprices.AnotherkeySorgesubordinatewasaYugoslav-bornjournalist,BrankodeVoukelitch.TheFourthDepartmentperemptorilyinstructedVoukelitchtostrengthenhiscoverbydivorcinghiswifeEdithandmarryingaJapanesewoman.Thisthecompliantagentdulydid,confusinghimselfaswellashisassociatesbyfallingsincerelyinlovewithawell-bornlocalgirl,

YoshikoYamasaki,whoeventuallymarriedhim.ItwasareflectionofColonelOtt’sintimacywithSorgethatwhenhetouredManchuriain1934,he

tookalongtheRussianspyashiscourierintheNaziinterest.SorgesubsequentlyghostedOtt’sreporttothearmyeconomicdepartment,whichwonplauditsinBerlin.Thefollowingyear,theJapanesepolicebrokeupanotherSovietspyringinTokyorunbyanAmerican,JohnSherman,adevelopmentwhichincreasedMoscow’sdependencyonSorge.Heoncesaid,‘Spyingworkmustbedonebravely,’andindeedhebecameafamousfigureinTokyo’ssocial,journalisticanddiplomaticcircles,careeringaboutthecityonamotorbike,drinkingheroicquantitiesofalcohol,beddingeverywomanwithinhisreach.Herentedatwo-storeyJapanese-stylehouseat30NagasakiMachi,andMoscowkepthimsuppliedwithsufficientfundstosustaintheracketylifeheloved.Hehadahousekeeperwhobecamedevotedtohim,togetherwithamaidandalaundrymanwhowereroutinelyquizzedbythepolice.ButeventhepathologicallysuspiciousJapanesehadnocluethatSorgemightbeaspy;theyregardedhimmerelyasaninfluentialacolyteoftheNazis.

HeperformedadailytourofnewspaperofficesandtheGermanClubbeforemakinghiswaytotheembassy,wherehenowspentsomuchtimethathewasprovidedwithhisownofficeinwhichtoconductresearchandpreparematerialfortransmissiontoBerlin;privacywasalsousefulforphotographingdocumentsforMoscow.AGermandiplomatspokelaterofSorgeas‘agay,dissoluteadventurerwithabrilliantmindandanunassailableconceit’.ThespywroteamemorablyironiclettertohisMoscow‘wife’Katchain1937:‘itisveryhard,aboveallthissolitude’.ItwasindeedaceaselesschallengefortheSovietagenttosustainamasqueradeasaNazistooge

whilehepartiedandwomanised.Intheeveningshefrequentedastringofbarsandclubs–Lohmeyer ’srestaurantintheGinza,whichhadaloyalGermanclientèle;theseedylittleFledermaus;andtheRheingold,whoseproprietorHelmutKetelwasanardentadmirerofHitler.ItwastherethatSorgemet‘Agnes’,oneofmanybargirlswhofellforhim.Agnesprovedtohavestayingpower.Shewastwenty-three,andherrealnamewasHanakoIshii.Shebecameincreasinglyafixtureinhishouse,andhepaidforhertotakelessonstofulfilacherishedambitiontobecomeasinger.ButSorgewasnomorefaithfultoHanakothantoanyotherwoman:heconductedalongparallelrelationshipwithAnitaMohr,wifeofalocallybasedGermanbusinessman,whowasdescribedasa‘blondebombshell’.Hanakoappearstohaveprovidedaconvenienceratherthananobjectofrealaffection.Sorge’sprioritywasalwaysservicetoMoscow.AstheweightofGRUmaterialincreased,sodid

thedifficultiesoftransmittingit.Wendt,hisradioman,wasincompetent,andSorgeinsistedthatabettermanmustbefound.In1935thespyleftTokyo,supposedlyonholiday,boundfortheUnitedStates.FromtherehetravelledcovertlytotheSovietUnion,toconferwithhischiefsandsortoutthecommunicationsissues.InMoscowhewasrebriefedaboutpriorities,foremostamongwhichwastoexploreJapan’sintentionstowardstheSovietUnion.Thereafter,indescendingorderhewasorderedtostudytheJapanesearmyandindustry;policiesinChina;positioningtowardsBritainandtheUS.SoonafterSorge’sreturntoTokyo,anewwireless-operatorandcourierjoinedhimfrom

Moscow.MaxClausenheldofficer ’srankintheRedArmy.Toprovidecoverheestablishedablueprint-copyingbusinessinTokyo,whichbecameanotablyprofitablepetproject.Clausen’sfirstintelligencetaskwastobuildhisownwirelessset,commonpracticeamongagentsincountriestowhichitwasdeemedtoodifficultordangeroustodispatchaprofessionallyconstructedone.Heusedadomesticradioreceiver,attachedthetransmittertoaBakelitepanelmountedonawoodenbox,andwoundtuningcoilsfromcoppertubingintendedformotormanufacture.Intheabsenceofinstrumentstomeasurewavelengths,Clausentransmittedona37–39metreband,andreceivedon45–48.Sorgepersuadedafriendandfellow-journalist,GuntherStein,toallowtheSovietoperatorto

messageMoscowfromhisflat.Steininitiallyrecoiledfromacceptingthisappallingrisk,buteventuallyassented.SinceClausendarednotsetupanexternalaerial,hestretchedtwocopper-strandedwires,sevenmetresinlength,aroundtheroomfromwhichhetransmitted.Steinalso

becameausefulinformantfortheSorgering,exploitingfriendshipshehadformedattheBritishembassy.SotoodidToraoShinotsuka,ownerofasmallmilitary-equipmentfactoryinKansai,whoprovidedextensivematerialonmilitaryaircraftandnavalarmaments.AnnaClausen,Max’sadoredwife,arrivedinTokyofromMoscowtosharethewireless-operator ’shazardousexistence.TheSovietnetwork’smembershipthusexpandedataperiodwhenJapanwasenteringaperiodof

paranoiaaboutforeignespionage,andreinforcingitsdomesticsecurityagencies.In1936therewasabadmomentwhenTokyopolicearrestedTaikichiKawaiattherequestoftheirManchuriancounterparts.Kawaihadbeenaninformantof‘MrJohnson’inShanghai.Incaptivityhewasbrutallyinterrogated.Unlikemostagentsundertorture,however,hegaveawaynothingsignificant.Sorge’sluckheld.Hisworkwasgivingthehighestsatisfactiontobothofitsbeneficiaries,MoscowCentreandtheForeignMinistryinBerlin.Thelatterwasespeciallydelightedbyareportwhichhecompiledonthe1936Japanesearmyrevolt,butwhichheinsistedshouldcirculateamongtheNazihierarchyonlyunderthecoyinitials‘RS’,becauseheremainedfearfulofaGestapoinvestigationofhispoliticalpast.HehelpedOttandDirksendraftacabletoBerlin,askingforinformationaboutarumoured

German–Japanesenegotiation.SorgesoughttopromoteMoscow’sagendabyurgingontheGermanembassyteamtheviewthatsuchanalliancewouldbemistaken,androotedinabsurdrumoursthatStalin’sfallwasimminent.HepublishedanarticleontheJapanesearmyinDieWehrmachtmagazine.HisreputationwiththeTokyoembassyandwithBerlinsoaredafterthefulfilmentofhispredictionthatJapan’swarinChinawouldproveprotracted.Moreimportant,however,wasthemassofinformationaboutJapanesedeploymentsontheSovietborderwhichOttprovidedtoSorge,whoswiftlyforwardedittotheGRU.MoscowalsoprofessedappreciationofindustrialdatadeliveredbyHotsumiOzakiatmonthlyrestaurantmeetings.Thejournalisthadbecomeinfluentialingovernmentcircles,andcorrespondinglywell-informed:foratimeheevenservedintheJapaneseprimeminister ’sofficeasanexpertonChina.Eventhoughhelostthatrolewhenthegovernmentchangedin1939,hesecuredanewjobasaTokyo-basedresearcherforJapan’sKwantungarmyinManchuria.In1938HerbertvonDirksenwasinvalidedhome.Hissuccessorasambassadorwasnoneother

thanColonelOtt.SorgethenceforwardfoundhimselfdraftingtheGermanembassy’sdispatchesforBerlin,whiletransmittinghisowntoMoscow.Onhisforty-thirdbirthdayhewaspresentedwithasignedphotographofNaziforeignministerJoachimvonRibbentropasatokenofBerlin’sappreciationforhisservices.NoforeignpenetrationofaBritishdiplomaticmissioncouldbecomparedinsignificancewiththatachievedbySorgeofHitler ’sTokyoembassy.WhenaRussiangeneraldefectedtoTokyoin1938,thespywasimmediatelyabletowarnMoscowthatitscodeswerecompromised.InMay1939,whentensionsontheRusso–Japanesebordereruptedintolocalclashes,thankstoOzakiSorgecouldtellMoscowauthoritativelythattheJapanesehadnointentionofescalatingthe‘NomohanIncident’intoawiderwar.Onthisissueasonmanyothers,however,doubts

persistabouttheusemadeofhismaterial.SorgesupposedlygavetheSovietsdetailedJapaneseorder-of-battleinformation,butGeorgiZhukovastheRedArmy’slocalcommandercomplainedbitterlyabouttheabsenceofsuchdata.ItseemslikelyeitherthatSorgelaterexaggeratedhisowncontribution,orthattheGRUfailedtopassonhismaterial.HesoughttostrengthenhiscoverbypubliclytauntingSovietdiplomatswhenhemetthemat

internationalreceptions,butthestressofhisfantastichigh-wireactincreasinglytoldonhim,andwasreflectedinmassiveinfusionsofalcohol.InthecompanyofHanako,hesuccumbedtomorose,drink-fuelledmonologues,especiallywhenshebeggedhimtogiveherachild:‘Iamanoldman.Iamgoingtodiesoon.Icandowithoutababy!Oh,poorSorge.YoushouldstudysothatyoucangetalongwithoutSorge…’Onenighthecrashedhismotorbike,withagonisingconsequences–manydaysinhospitalandthelossofhisteeth.Fortherestofhislifehecouldswallowmeatonlyifitwasminced.Hehadsenseenoughtoabandonbiking,andinsteadacquiredasmallcar.Heembarkedona

whimsicalculturalimprovementprogrammeforHanako,persuadinghertoreadGoneWiththeWind,whichhehimselfconsidered‘magnificent’.Severalhundredpageslatershesaid,‘IlikeCaptainButler.’Perhapsprovidingaglimpseofhisself-image,Sorgedemanded,‘DoyouthinkIamlikeRhettButler?’ButClausenwrotelaterabouthim:‘Heisatruecommunist…HeisamanwhocandestroyevenhisbestfriendforthesakeofCommunism.’Hecouldalsodestroyacomrade.Thespy’streatmentofhiswireless-operatorwascavalier,evenbrutal.AndhislifestylewasevermoreatoddswiththeidealofadedicatedservantoftheParty.Sorgehadmadehimselfprobablythebest-informedsecretagentintheworld.Nonetheless,hisrashnessmadeanultimatetrainwreckinevitable,evenifin1939thisstilllayasurprisingdistanceinthefuture.Bythecomingofwar,theSovietUnion’shugeexpenditureonespionage,anditsaccesstohighly

placedcommunistsympathisersinmanylands,shouldhavemadetheKremlinthebest-informedcentreofgovernmentontheplanet.YetthoseinMoscowwhoreceivedandprocessedthereportsfromthefieldwerefartoofearfulofoffendingtheonlyaudiencethatmattered–JosephStalin,masteroftheKremlin–toforwardanyintelligencethatwaslikelytoproveunwelcome.EvenwhenimportantinformationreachedMoscow,itwasseldomproperlyreviewed,farlessexploitedbypolicy-makers.ChristopherAndrewhaswritten:‘TheSovietcapacitytounderstandthepoliticalanddiplomaticintelligenceitcollected…neverapproacheditsabilitytocollecttheintelligenceinthefirstplace.’Stalinactedashisownanalyst,preferringtodrillendlesswellsofespionageinsearchofimaginedconspiraciesratherthantouseintelligencetoinformpolicy-making.Sovietintelligenceofficersfearedfortheirlives,withgoodreason,iftheytoldStalinwhathedidnotwanttohear.Heseemedtocreditonlyreportsthatidentifiedplotsagainsthimselforthestate,athomeandabroad.Wherethesedidnotexist,Russia’smostseniorintelligenceofficersinventedthem.Stalinusedtheproductofhiscodebreakerstosomeeffectwhereandwhenthiswasavailable,butenteredthegreatest

conflictinhistoryalmostblindthroughhisownactsofwill.

AfterMunich,withthedoomofCzechoslovakiasealed,theCzechintelligencechiefFrantišekMoravecwasapproachedbythreerivalbiddersforhisservices:AdmiralWilhelmCanarisfortheGermans,ColonelLouisRivetfortheFrench,andMI6’slocalman,MajorHaroldGibson,fortheBritish.MistrustingtheFrench,MoravecdeterminedtothrowinhislotwithBritain.InanticipationoftheNazioccupationhedidhisutmosttoreinforcelinkswithlocalinformantsbeforehimselfleavinghiscountry.HewasabletotransfertoLondonlargesumsofforeigncurrency,andhopedthustoensurethathecouldsustainaCzechintelligenceserviceinexile,thoughfewofhisagentswereeverheardfromagain.On3March1939theAbwehr ’sPaulThummel,Moravec’sbestGermansource,methiminPragueandreportedthatthecitywouldbeoccupiedonthe15th.‘AgentA-54’alsowarnedthathisentirestaffwouldbeseizedbytheGestapo,andcouldexpectnomercy.MoravecwasamazedthatThummeldeclaredhimselfwillingtocontinuehisowncollaboration.Theonlyproviso,saidtheAbwehrman,wasthattheCzechsmustensurethateverythingabouthimselfintheirfileswasdestroyed.Withthatassurance,thetwomenparted.Thummelsaid,‘Goodluck,Colonel.ThisisnotgoodbyebutAufwiedersehen.’TheGermanofficertookawaywithhimtwoaddressesforfuturecorrespondence,oneinHolland,theotherinSwitzerland.InPragueonthenightof13March,HaroldGibsonofMI6–‘Gibby’,asMoravecalwayscalled

him,asmall,slightfigurewithamoustacheinproportion–droveacarintotheCzechIntelligenceDepartment’sgarage.Thiswasloadedwithhundredsoffilespackedincanvasbags,whichwereborneawaytotheBritishembassy.Thefollowingafternoon,aDutchcivilianplanecharteredbyBroadwaylandedatRuzynairfieldoutsidePraguetocollectpassengersforEngland–Moravecandtenofficersofhisstaff.Hechosethemunsentimentally,hewrotelater,takingthosewhowouldbemostvaluableinLondon,andthosewhoknewtoomuchtobelefttotheGestapo.Hefeltobligedtoleavebehindhisownwifeandtwodaughters,andindeedtoconcealfromthemhisintendeddestination:hesaidhewasmerelymakinganovernighttriptoMoravia.Theplanetookoffwithdifficultyamidstasnowstorm,whichforatimethreatenedtoforcethem

downintothepathoftheapproachingGermans.Moraveccarriedabriefcasecontaining200,000Reichsmarksand100,000Dutchguildersincash–about£32,000–toprovidehislittleteamwithfurtherseedmoneyforfutureoperations.AstheplanepassedoverthemountainswherelayCzechoslovakia’sfrontier,thecolonelburiedhisheadinhishandsandsobbedunashamedlyattheprospectofexile.AfterabriefstopinAmsterdam,thepartylandedsafelyatCroydon.WhenformerCzechprimeministerEdvardBenešlaterarrivedinLondon,MoravecreportedtohisPutneyresidencetoofferhisservicesandthoseofhisofficers,whichwerereadilyaccepted–hisrolewasformalisedthefollowingyear,whenBenešformedagovernmentinexile.Thecolonel’swifeandchildrenescapedfromPragueandwalkedtosafetyinPoland,fromwhencetheyjoinedhimin

Britain.InJune1939Moravecwasdelightedtoreceivealetter,forwardedfromaZürichcoveraddress,

whichbegan,‘DearUncle,IthinkIaminlove.Ihavemetagirl.’Onthesamepagewasasecretinkmessage,appointingarendezvousinTheHague.ItwasfromagentA-54,theAbwehrcolonelPaulThummel.TheCzechofficerwhodulymethimearlyinAugustwarnedThummelthatMoravec’sshrunkenorganisationnolongerhadcashtolavishuponhimasgenerouslyasinthepast,buttheGermanrespondeddismissivelythat‘moreimportantmattersthanmoneyareatstake’.HetoldtheCzechthataninvasionofPolandwasplannedfor1September,andprovideddetailsofthelatestWehrmachtorderofbattle.HealsohandedoveralistofPolishtraitorsworkingfortheGermans.ThummelsubsequentlyprovidedtheNazis’amendedtimetable,includingon27AugustafinaldateforthePolishinvasionof3September1939.ForthepeopleofCzechoslovakia,Poland,andnowofallWesternEurope,thesparringwasover:thedeathstrugglehadbegun.

*BoththeGRU’sandNKVD’sofficersandagentsreferredtotheirrespectiveheadquartersas‘Centre’.

*Hamburger,likemanyothersinthisbook,usedavarietyofnamesinthecourseofhercareer,startingoutasKuczynskiandendingupasWerner.Toavoidconfusion,onlyonenameisusedthroughoutforallthosedescribed.

2

TheStormBreaks

1 THE‘FICTIONFLOOD’

ThefirstsignificantexcitementoftheBritishsecretservice’swarcameinNovember1939.Adocumentlaterknownasthe‘OsloReport’wassentanonymouslytotheBritishlegationinNorway,thenforwardedtoLondonbyitsnavalattaché.TheparcelthatreachedBroadwaycontainedseveralpagesofGermantypescriptandasmallcardboardbox.Itrepresentedtheoutcomeofanearlier‘feeler ’messagetothelegation,sayingthatiftheBritishwantedtoreceivedetailsofnewscientificdevelopmentsinGermany,theyshouldmakeaminorchangeinthewordingofaBBCbroadcasttoGermany:insteadofstarting,‘Hello,thisisLondoncalling’,itwastosay,‘Hello,hello,thisis…’Thiswasdulydone,andafterashortdelaythe‘OsloReport’wassubmitted.Itsnarrativecoveredaremarkablerangeofenemyactivities.Theanonymousauthorassertedthat

theGermansweredevelopingacousticandradio-controlledtorpedoes;detailedthewavelengthsonwhichGermanradarstationswereoperating;suggestedbombingtheLuftwafferesearchstationatRechlin;andmuchelse.Theboxcontainedatriggertube,tobeemployedfornewanti-aircraftshellproximityfuses.Butthecredibilityofthewholedocumentwasunderminedbytheinclusionoftwononsenses:aclaimthattheLuftwaffe’sJu-88bomberswerebeingproducedattheimpossiblerateof5,000amonth;andthataGermanaircraft-carrier,theFranken,wasapproachingcompletionatKiel.ThesemistakescontributedtoaverdictbyWhitehallthatthedocumentshouldbedismissedasaGermanplant.ButthereportwasalsoreadbyDrReginaldJones,theoutspoken,combative,twenty-eight-year-

oldassistantdirectorofAirMinistryscientificintelligence.Jonesshinesforthasanauthenticstarinthewartimesecretfirmament.Hewasasocialhybrid,sonofasergeantintheGrenadierGuardswhodisplayedprecociousbrillianceathissouthLondonschool,andlaterprovedasmuchateaseholdingforthatgrandcountry-housepartiesasfightinghiscornerinmeetingschairedbytheprimeminister.HavinghadanotableearlycareerinphysicsandastronomyatOxford,whereforatimeheworkedunderFrederickLindemann–laterLordCherwell–hebecamefascinatedbythepossibilitiesofexploitinginfra-redtechnologyforthedetectionofaircraft,andin1936wenttoworkfortheAirMinistry.Hewasintolerantofslow-mindednessorbureaucracywhereverheencounteredit,andthere

wasplentyofbothatBroadwayBuildings,whereafterabriefstintatBletchleyParkhewasinvitedtoshareanofficewithFredWinterbotham.InthecourseofthewarRegJonesbecameoneoftheforemostBritishinvestigatorsofGermanair

technology.InNovember1939,however,hisachievementsstilllayinthefuture,andhewasseeninWhitehallsimplyasapushyyoung‘boffin’whoseemedtoofreewithhisopinionsinthepresenceofseniorofficers.Jones,almostalone,electedtobelievethattheOslodocumentwasauthentic.Hisinstinctbecameanear-certaintyinthesummerof1940,whentheLuftwaffebegantousetheWotannavigationalbeamtoguideitsbombersoverBritain,exploitingprinciplesmentionedbyOslo’sauthor.R.V.Jones,asheisknowntoposterity,foundtheinformationinvaluableindevisingcounter-measuresduringthe‘BattleoftheBeams’thatinfluencedtheBlitz–whichgainedhimtheearandtheadmirationofWinstonChurchill.Againandagainthroughtheyearsthatfollowed,whentheBritishgainedhintsaboutnewGermanweapons–theacoustictorpedo,forexample–JoneswasabletopointouttoservicechiefsthatOslohadwarnedofthem.Afterthewar,inaretrospectiveonhisownintelligencecareer,thescientistusedtheexampleofthe1939documenttourgethat‘casualsourcesshouldnotbetreatedflippantly.Itwasprobablythebestsingle[scientificintelligence]reportreceivedfromanysourceduringthewar.’OnlyafteranintervalofalmostfortyyearsdidJonesestablishthedocument’sauthorship.Itwas

theworkofaforty-five-year-oldGermanphysicistnamedHansFerdinandMayer,whoadoptedascientificcareerafterbeingbadlywoundedonhisfirstdayinactionasaconscriptin1914.HehadbeenemployedbySiemenssince1922,doingworkthatresultedintheawardofeighty-twopatentsandthepublicationofforty-sevenpapers,andalsospentfouryearsasprofessorofsignalstechniqueatAmerica’sCornellUniversity.Duringtheinter-waryearsheformedawarmfriendshipwithanEnglishmanworkingforGECnamedCobdenTurner,whobecamegodfathertoMayer ’ssecondson.TheGermanwasespeciallyimpressedbyagooddeed:whenhetoldTurneraboutthetragiccaseofaJewishschoolchilddisownedbyherNazifather,theEnglishmanarrangedforthelittlegirltocometoEngland,whereforeightyearsshelivedasamemberofhisownfamily.Whentheinternationalhorizondarkened,onwhatprovedTurner ’sfinalvisittoGermanyMayer

toldhimthatifwarcame,hewouldtrytosupplyBritainwithinformationaboutGermanscientificandtechnologicalprogress.Inlate1939thescientistexploitedachancebusinesstriptoNorwaytomakegoodonhispromise.HeborrowedanoldtypewriterfromtheporterattheHotelBristolandcomposedthe‘OsloReport’,whichwasdispatchedintwopartstotheBritishembassyon1and2November.MayeralsowrotedirectlytoCobdenTurner,suggestingfurthercontactthroughanintermediaryinneutralDenmark.ButalthoughthislettercausedtwoBritishsecurityofficerstovisitandquestiontheGECman,forreasonsunknownnothingwasdonetoopencommunicationwithMayer–MI6’sofficialhistorymakesnomentionofthiscourageousGerman.InAugust1943MayerwasarrestedbytheGestapoinhisofficeatSiemens,andchargedwithlisteningtotheBBC.Hewas

confinedinDachau,butwasfortunateenoughtobeemployedinatechnicalplant,wherehesurvivedthewar.HisbravegesturewaspromptedbyadmirationforCobdenTurner,whomhelikedtoregardasarepresentativeEnglishman.RecognitionofMayer ’scontribution,however,cameonlyfromRegJones.Amongthereasonsthe‘OsloReport’receivedsuchachillyreceptionisthatitwasdebatedin

WhitehalljustastheBritishsecretcommunityreeledinthewakeofasuccessfulGermanruse.On9November1939,duringthefirst,passivephaseofthewarthatbecamederisivelyknownasthe‘sitzkrieg’,thetwoseniorMI6officersintheneutralNetherlands,CaptainSigismundPayneBestandMajorRichardStevens,drovewithaDutchofficerinBest’sLincolnZephyrcartoarendezvousattheCaféBackus,situatedbetweentheDutchandGermanbordercustomsbarriersatVenlo.Withinminutesoftheirarrival,theywereseizedbyarmedmen.WhentheDutchmandrewapistolandfiredatoneassailant,hewashimselfshotdead.Best,Stevensandtheirlocaldriverwerethenhustled150yardstothefrontier:theirkidnapperswereNazicounter-intelligenceofficersoftheSD,ledbythebranch’slaterboss,WalterSchellenberg,whowasnarrowlymissedbytheDutchofficer ’sbullet.TheBritishspieswerefortunateenoughtokeeptheirlives,butspentmostoftherestofthewarinSachsenhausenconcentrationcamp.Incontradictionofmythsaboutheroicsilenceunderinterrogation,StevensandBesttoldtheirabductorswhattheyknewaboutMI6,whichwasplenty:itsContinentaloperationswerechieflyconductedfromtheirownHaguestation.‘TheVenloincident’,asitbecameknowninWhitehall,derivedfromanapproachsomeweeks

earlierbysupposedlyanti-NaziGermangeneralseagertonegotiatewithBritain.MI6becamemuchexcitedbytheprospectofbrokeringadeal,thoughtheForeignOfficewasprudentlysceptical.SirAlexanderCadoganwroteinhisdiaryon23October:‘Ithinkthey[theGerman“plotters”]areHitleragents.’Thewarcabinetwasinformedaweeklater,andWinstonChurchill,thenstillFirstLordoftheAdmiralty,expressedviolentobjectionstoanyparley.ButthegovernmentauthorisedMI6tocontinuediscussions,provided–asCadoganstrictlyinstructed–nothingwasputinwritingtothesupposeddissidents.TheBritishignoredthedangerthattheirinterlocutorswouldplaynotmerelyadiplomaticgamewiththem,butarougherone.Theyshouldhavebeenalerttosuchanoutcome,becausetheNazishadpreviousformascross-borderkidnappers:inApril1934theyhadluredtotheGermanfrontieraCzechintelligenceofficer,twenty-nine-year-oldCaptainJanKirinovic,thenrushedhimacross.AGestapowitnessgaveevidenceatKirinovic’ssubsequenttrialthathehadbeenarrestedonGermansoil,andKirinovicwassentencedtotwenty-fiveyears’hardlabour.AlthoughinthefollowingMarchtheCzechofficerwasexchangedfortwoGermanspies,hediedinsaneafewyearslaterasaresultofthedrugsadministeredtohimbytheGestapo,notablyscopolamine.InNovember1939,itwassymptomaticofMI6’sinstitutionalweaknessthatitsHaguestation

employedFolkertvanKoutrik,anAbwehrinformant.ThesupposedrepresentativeofthedisaffectedGermangenerals,‘MajorSchaemmel’,wasintruththeRSHA’sSchellenberg,whomtheBritish

officersobliginglysuppliedwithawirelesstransmitter.EitherHitlerorHimmlerpersonallyauthorisedthekidnapping,whichtheBritishatfirstsoughttokeepsecret.WhenanofficialaskedCadoganwhatwastobesaidabout‘thebrawlinHolland’,thesubjectoffeveredrumourandspeculation,thepermanentunder-secretaryorderedtheissueofa‘D’Notice,forbiddingmentionofitintheBritishpress.Amazingly,forafortnightafterVenlotheGerman‘conspirators’sustainedadialoguewithMI6,untilon22NovemberHimmlerlostinterestandtheGermansshutdowntheexchangeaftersendingalastderisivemessagetoBroadway.TheNazisthenpubliclyannouncedthatBestandStevenshadbeenengagedinanassassinationplotagainstHitler.MeanwhilevanKoutrik’sbetrayalwentsofarundetectedthathesecuredemploymentwithMI5inLondon,anditwasveryfortunatethathebrokeoffcontactwiththeAbwehr–perhapsforlackofmeansofcommunication–becauseitwaswithinhislaterknowledgetohavebetrayedelementsoftheDoubleCrosssystemtothem.InsideWhitehall,MI6soughttotalkdownVenlo,arguingthattheGermanshadbehavedcrasslyby

grabbingthetwoofficersinsteadofsustainingadouble-crossgamewiththem.Itishardtooverstatetheepisode’ssignificance,however,forthefuturecourseofthesecretwar.BritishespionageactivitiesontheContinent,suchastheywere,sufferedadevastatingblow:theGermanswereabletorelieveBestofalistofhisstation’scontacts,whichhehadtakeninhispockettotherendezvous.ThereputationofthesecretservicewithintheBritishgovernment,nothighbeforethedébâcle,afterwardssaggedlowindeed.GuyLiddellofMI5speculatedinhisdiarythatBest,apreposterousfigurewhoaffectedamonocle,mighthavebeenadoubleagent–‘therealniggerinthewoodpile.[He]hadapparentlybeeninfairlylowwateranditwasnoticeablethatafterhebecameassociatedwith[DrFranz]Fischer[aNazidoubleagentinHolland]heseemedtobeverywellinfunds.’ThereisnoreasontothinkLiddell’ssuspicionsjustified.Merebunglingwasresponsibleforthefiasco,thoughWalterSchellenbergassertedlaterthatBestwaswillingtobe‘turned’.Meanwhile,theDutchwereembarrassedbytherevelationthatoneoftheirownintelligenceofficershadbeencomplicitinaBritishplot,whichstrengthenedtheNazis’propagandahandbycompromisingHolland’sproclaimedneutrality.AfurtherconsequenceofVenlowasthattheBritishbecamemorbidlysuspiciousofanyapproach–

andtherewereseveral,laterinthewar–byGermansprofessingtorepresentan‘anti-HitlerResistance’.Inonesensetheircautionwasprudent,becausemostofthearistocratsandarmyofficerswhobecameengagedinplotsagainsttheNazischerishedabsurdfantasiesabouttheGermanytheymightpreservethroughanegotiationwiththeWesternAllies.FormerLeipzigmayorKarlGördeler,forinstance,wasanationalistwithviewsonGermanterritorialrightsinEuropethatwerenotfarshortofHitler ’s.EvenhadtheFührerperished,therewouldhavebeennothingplausibleforGermany’senemiestodiscusswithhisdomesticfoes.Attheveryleast,however,BritishparanoiaaboutsufferingarepeatoftheVenlohumiliationpermanentlyexcludedMI6fromsomeuseful

sources,whichtheRussiansandlatertheAmericanswerelefttoexploit.Moreover,fortherestofthewarBroadway’schiefsmaintainedanexaggeratedrespectfortheirGermanadversaries,derivedfromthememoryofhavingbeenfooledbytheminNovember1939.Throughtheicywintermonthsofthe‘PhoneyWar ’,theGC&CSatBletchleystruggledwiththe

intractableEnigmaproblem,whileBroadway’sspiesproducedlittleornousefulinformationabouttheenemyandhisintentions.KennethStrongofWarOfficeIntelligencewrote:‘WehadacontinuousstreamofcallersfromtheServiceswithanextraordinaryvarietyofqueriesandrequests.Whatwerethemostprofitabletargetsforairattacksinthisorthatarea,andwhateffectwouldtheseattackshaveontheGermanArmy?Wasourinformationaboutthesetargetsadequateandaccurate?HowwastheGermanArmyreactingtoourpropagandacampaigns?Ifoundsomequitefantasticoptimismregardingtheeffectsfrompropaganda.Thedroppingofleafletswasconsideredalmostamajormilitaryvictory.’SomeMI6officerswenttoelaboratelengthstoconcealtheirlackofagentnetworks.RegJones

citedtheexampleofWilfred‘Biffy’Dunderdale,whowasresponsibleforFrance,andfedtoJones’sbranchasuccessionoftastytitbitsontheGermanJu-88bomber,allegedlycollectedbyspies.Firsttherewasinformationaboutitsengines;thenitselectrics;andsomewhatlateritsarmament.JonesteasedDunderdalethathemusthavesecuredacopyoftheaircraft’soperatinghandbook,thenfedextractstoBroadway,tocreateanimpressionofmultiplesources.ThehaplessofficeradmittedthatJoneswasright,butbeggedhimtokeephismouthshut.Hecouldkeephisbossesmuchmoreinterested,hesaid,bydrip-feedingthedata.ThiswasnottheonlyoccasionwhenDunderdale–likeofficersofallintelligenceservices–soughtto‘sexup’themeansbywhichhismaterialhadbeenacquired.HealsoproduceddetailsofGermantroopmovementssupposedlysecuredbyagentnetworks,whichinrealityderivedfromFrenchintercepts.Muchcouldbelearnedfromanenemy’swirelesstransmissions,evenwithoutbreakinghiscodes,

through‘trafficanalysis’–thestudyofsignalorigins,volumeandcallsignstopinpointunits,ships,squadrons.Usefulinformationwasalsogleanedbythe‘YService’,eavesdroppingonvoicetransmissions,andbybreakingsimpleenemycodesusedforpassinglow-grademessages.TheFrenchforwardcryptographicalunitwasbasedat‘StationBruno’,intheChâteaudeVignobleslocatedatGretz-Armainvilliers,fifteenmileseastofParis.BrunoreceivedanimportantreinforcementfollowingthefallofPoland.GuyLiddellofMI5recordedon10October1939thatseventeenPolishcryptanalystswereseekingasyluminBritain.BletchleyParkshruggeddismissivelythatithadnouseforthem,eventhoughitschiefAlastairDennistonhadmetsomeofthesamemeninWarsawafewmonthsearlier,andknewthattheirclaimstohavepenetratedRussianandGermanciphers‘cantosomeextentbemaintained’.DennistonsuggestedthattheywouldbemoreusefulattheChâteaudeVignobles,workingwith

GustaveBertrand,whichwaswheretheyweresent–thoughBletchleylaterchangeditsmindandtried

invaintogetthemback.ItwasatBruno,on17January1940,thattheex-WarsawgroupbrokeitsfirstwartimeEnigmasignal.By11MarchCol.LouisRivet,headoftheFrenchsecretservice,waswritinginhisdiary:‘ThedecryptsoftheEnigmamachinearebecominginterestingandnumerous.’Duringthemonthsthatfollowed,however,materialwasreadfartooslowly–outof‘realtime’–toinfluenceeventsonthebattlefield.Instead,Alliedintelligenceofficersstrovetomakesenseofajumbleofhumintwarnings,ofvaryingdegreesofplausibility,aboutwhenHitlerintendedtostrikeintheWest.ThefirstofthesehadcomeinthepreviousNovemberwhenMajorGijsbertSas,Dutchmilitary

attachéinBerlin,receivedadramatictip-offfromhisfriendColonelHansOsteroftheAbwehr:theWehrmacht,saidOster,wouldlaunchafull-scaleoffensiveagainsttheBritishandFrencharmiesonthe12thofthatmonth.Thiscoincidedwithseveralotheridenticalorsimilarwarnings–includinganimportantonefromCol.Moravec’sCzechsinLondon,relayedbytheirmaninSwitzerlandfromAgentA-54,theAbwehr ’sPaulThummel.Whennothinghappenedon12November,theBritishandFrenchchiefsofstaffassumedthattheywerethevictimsofNazidisinformation.TheDutchalreadysuspectedSasofbeingadoubleagent,andthecredibilityoftheothersources,includingA-54,sufferedaccordingly.Yetthewarningswerecorrect.HitlerhadindeedintendedtostrikeinNovember.Hewasenragedthathisgeneralsinsisteduponalast-minutepostponementuntilspring,becausethearmywasunreadytomove.HerewasavividillustrationofapreceptlateradvancedbyaBritishArmyintelligenceofficer:‘Perfectintelligenceinwarmustofnecessitybeout-of-dateandthereforeceasestobeperfect…Wedealnotwiththetrue,butwiththelikely.’ThenextexcitementtookplaceonedayinJanuary1940:thickfogcausedaGermancourier

aircraftflownbyMajorErichHönmannstoforced-landinneutralBelgium.Localpolicearrestedthepilotandhispassenger,anofficernamedReinberger,interruptingthemastheyattemptedtoburnpaperstheycarried,andretrievedthecharredsheetsfromastove.Withinforty-eighthourstheFrenchandBritishhighcommandswerereadingtheWehrmacht’splanforitsintendedinvasionofFranceandtheLowCountries,focusedonathrustthroughHollandandBelgium.Herewasatextbookexampleofagenuineintelligencecoup,withwhollyunhelpfulconsequences.TheFrenchwereconfirmedintheirconvictionthattheGermanswouldattackthroughBelgiumastheyhaddonein1914,andasallFrance’sdeploymentsanticipated.TheBritishsuspectedanenemydeception:thematerialseemedtoogoodtobetrue.GuyLiddellofMI5wrotewearilyon14January:‘AGermanaeroplanecamedowninBelgium…withcertainpapersfoundonthepilotindicatingprojectedattackbytheGermansonBelgiumandHolland.Itlooksratherasifthismayhavebeenpartoftheschemeforthewarofnerves.’CadoganattheForeignOfficedescribedreceiving‘completeplanofGermaninvasionoftheLowCountries.Veryodd.Butonecan’tignorethesethings,andallprecautionstaken.’KennethStrongwroteruefullyafterwards:‘SooftenIhavehearditsaidthatifweonlyhadthe

plansoftheothersidethingswouldbesimple:whentheyactuallycameourwaywefoundgreatdifficultyinpersuadingourselvesthattheyweregenuine.’Mostimportant,however,thecapture

immediatelyforfeitedallvirtue,becausetheGermanproprietorsoftheplanknewthattheAllieshadit.Thus,Hitlerinsistedonchangingtheinvasionconcept,tothrustinsteadthroughtheArdennes,whichprovedtheoneauthenticstrategicinspirationofhislife.Herewasanothercriticallessonaboutintelligence,especiallyimportantforcodebreakers:capturedmaterialbecameworthlessifitsoriginatorsdiscoveredthatitwasinenemyhands.AlexanderCadogannotedinhisdiaryfor19January1940thatStewartMenziesnowseemedto

expecttheGermanstoattacksoonafter25January,andaddeddismissively,‘buthe’srathermercurial,andratherhastyandsuperficial(likemyself!)’.Ifthisremarksomewhatshort-changedthediarist,itwasscarcelyaringingendorsementof‘C’.Therewasonefurtherstrand:low-gradeAbwehrmessagesdecryptedbyMI5’sRadioIntelligenceServiceofferedindicationsabouttheloomingonslaught.Atthattime,however,machinerywaslackingtoanalysesuchmaterial,tofeeditintothemilitarycommandsystemandensurethatnoticewastakenbycommanders.Inthatpre-Ultrauniverse,politicians,diplomatsandgeneralswerechronicallyscepticalaboutintelligenceofallkinds.WhenanewwarningreachedMI6viaMoravec’s‘LondonCzechs’–thatAbwehrofficerPaulThummelexpectedagreatWehrmachtthruston10May,itvanishedinthewelterof‘noise’thatspring.The9AprilGermaninvasionofNorwaycaughttheWesternAlliestotallybysurprise.Thoughno

decryptswereavailable,theAdmiraltyignoredormisreadplentifulcluesaboutHitler ’sintentions.WhentheWehrmacht’samphibiousforcesbegantolandontheNorwegiancoast,theRoyalNavy’smajorunitswerefaraway,awaitingananticipatedbreakoutintotheAtlanticbyGermanbattleships.Throughtheweeksthatfollowed,WehrmachteavesdropperseasilytrackedtheBritishbrigadesstrugglingtoaidthelittleNorwegianarmy,whileintelligencelearnedlittleornothingabouttheinvaders’lightningmovements.On10May1940,HitlerlaunchedhisBlitzkriegintheWest.Thepanzerssweptthroughthe

Ardennes,acrosstheMeuse,andthencetotheChannelcoastandintotheheartofFrance.MuchoftheinformationsentbackfromthefrontbyFrenchunitswassofancifulthataheadquartersintelligenceofficer,AndréBeaufre,dismisseditcontemptuouslyasa‘fictionflood’.Gen.MauriceGamelin,theAlliedcommander-in-chief,rejectedeveryreportthatcontradictedhisobsessivebeliefthattheGermansstillplannedtomaketheirmainattackthroughBelgium.ThecampaignprovedatriumphfortheGermanarmy’sintelligencedepartment,aswellasforits

generals.Ananglophileandbonviveur,Lt.Col.UlrichLiss,headedForeignArmiesWest–FHW,theWehrmacht’sprincipalintelligenceevaluationdepartment.Liss,whowasexceptionallyableandenergetic,calledsigint‘thedarlingofallintelligencechiefs’,becauseitcouldbetrustedasspiescouldnot–andinMay1940thebestofitwasinthehandsofhisownstaff.Duringthelong,staticwinter,GermaninterceptorshadidentifiedthelocationsofmostoftheAllies’formations,muchassistedbytheinsecurityoftheFrencharmy’swireless-operatorsandheadquartersstaffs,whooften

discussedplansanddeploymentsinplainlanguage.Col.Handeeming,radiointelligence’sinterceptionchiefwithArmyGroupA,wasexplicitlycommissionedtomonitortheFrenchSeventhArmy’sadvanceintoBelgium,whichhedidwithnotableefficiency.Liss’smenalsobenefitedfromsecuringvastnumbersofAlliedprisoners.Allarmiesgleaned

muchfromPoWinterrogation.Throughoutthewar,eveniffewprisonersknowinglybetrayedsecrets,amidtheshockofcapturemostgavetheircaptorsmorethantheregulation‘name,rankandnumber ’.Rommel’sintelligencestafffoundthatBritishprisonerstalkedfreelyuntilalatestageoftheNorthAfricancampaign.OneofMontgomery’sofficersenthusedtotheGermans,withalmostinsaneindiscretion,thatEighthArmy’sradiomonitoringservicewas‘brilliantineveryrespect’.AGermanwrotethatBritishofficerswererepeatedlycaptured‘carryingimportantlists,codesandmaps’.ItwasastandardtechniqueforintelligenceofficerstoengagePoWsinapparentlyinnocentconversationaboutnon-militarysubjects.TheWehrmacht’s‘GuidelinesfortheinterrogationofEnglishprisonersofwar ’,datedBerlin,16April1940,urgedcommanderswheneverpossibletouseinterrogatorsfamiliarwithBritainandtheBritish.‘Ifcordiallyaddressed,’saidthebriefingnote,‘everyEnglishmanwillatonceanswerallquestionsentirelyfrankly.’Beyondimmediatetacticalissues,theIntelligenceDepartmentadvised:

SpecialvalueissetonprobingprevailingeconomicandsocialcircumstancesinEngland.Answerstothefollowingquestionsareuseful:

a)WhatareyoutoldaboutHitler?b)WhatareyoutoldabouttheNazis?c)WhatareyoutoldabouttheGestapo?d)WhatareyoutoldabouttheJews?e)WhatareyoutoldaboutfoodconditionsinGermany?f)Whatareyoutoldaboutmilitarysuccesses?g)Howdoyoumakepropaganda?h)Howarewomenandchildrencaredfor?i)Doyoutakecareofelderlyparentsnolongerabletowork,whosesonsaresoldiers?…k)Whatisthefoodsituation–especiallymeat,vegetables,eggs,butter,andbread?l)Whatdoyouthinkoftheblack-out?m)WhoiscurrentlythemostpopularmaninEngland?n)WhodoyouconsiderthemostforcefulpersonalityintheBritishcabinet?o)DoyoulistentoGermanradio?p)Doyoulike[Lord]Haw-Haw[theNazipropagandabroadcasterWilliamJoyce]?q)HowareyourrelationswiththeFrench?r)DoyoubelievethatGermanyisbentonworldconquest?s)Wouldyoumakepeacetomorrow?

ThebehaviourofmostPoWswasstronglyinfluencedbytheirownnation’simmediatecircumstances.Atthistime,whenAlliedfortuneswereplumbingthedepths,areportonthehandfulofGermanPoWsinBritishhandsrecordedgloomily:‘Theofficers(andmostofthemen)werequite

immunetopropaganda,thinkHitlerisagodandrefusetobelieveasinglewordoftheBritishnews.’Bycontrast,aSouthAfricanRAFpilotnamedSgtEdwardWunschprovidedhisGermancaptorswithahighlysympatheticviewoftheNazicause,asrecordedbyhisinterrogator:‘LikeallSouthAfricanswhohaveenteredDulagLuft,Wunschisanunashamedanti-Semite…[Hesays]ThereisnohatredtowardsGermanyinSouthAfrica,noenthusiasmforthewaratall.MostpeoplebelievethenonsensepressandpropagandatellthemaboutGermanatrocitiesbut…W.thinksitpossiblethatonedaySouthAfricacouldagreetoaseparatepeace,ifGermanycontinuestobemilitarilysuccessful[author ’sitalics].’

TheAllieslostthe1940battleforFranceformanyreasons.Ithasbeenasourceoffiercecontroversyeversince,whethertheFrencharmy’sdefeatresultedfromafailureofjudgementbyMauriceGamelin,Alliedcommander-in-chief,orinsteadfromanationalmoralcollapse.Itisunlikelythatanyamountofintelligenceoradvancewarningcouldhavechanged1940outcomes.TheGermanarmyshoweditselfanincomparablymoreeffectivefightingforcethantheAllies’,andtherewouldbenovictoriesuntilthatchanged.IfBritishandFrenchintelligencewaspoorin1940,sowaseverythingelse.AstheContinentwasevacuated,therewasalateflurryofbuccaneeringbysecretserviceofficers

andfreelances:MI6’sMajorMontyChidson,aformerheadoftheHaguestation,rescuedapricelesshaulofindustrialdiamondsfromAmsterdam.PeterWilkinsongotmostofthePolishgeneralstaffoutofFrance.TommyDavies,apeacetimedirectoroftheCourtauldstextilebusiness,escapedfromitsCalaisplantwithaloadofplatinumhoursbeforetheGermansarrived.Buttheselittlecoupswerefleabitesinthegreatschemeofaffairs.MI6hadmadenocontingencyplansforstay-behindagents,toreportfromFranceintheeventofitsoccupationbytheNazis,andBroadwaywouldprobablyhavebeenaccusedofdefeatismhaditdoneso.Throughmanymonthsthatfollowed,Britain’sintelligenceserviceswerethusalmostblindtoeventsontheContinent,tothefrustrationoftheprimeminister.Beleagueredontheirisland,theybecamedependentforknowledgeofHitler ’sdoingsonthevagariesofairreconnaissance,andreportsfromneutraldiplomatsandcorrespondents.Thesecurityserviceexploredthelimitsofthepossibleandtheacceptableinhandlingastreamof

AbwehragentswhodescendedonBritain,andwerepromptlycaptured.MI5spurnedtortureasameansofinterrogation,butinSeptember1940atCamp020,theservice’sinterrogationcentreatLatchmereHousenearHamCommon,oneofitsofficersassaultedandbatteredthecapturedAbwehragent‘Tate’–HarryWilliamson–untilhewasdraggedoffhim.GuyLiddelldeploredthisepisode,sayingthatheobjectedto‘Gestapomethods’onbothmoralandprofessionalgrounds.Col.AlexanderScotlandwaslikewisepreventedfrominjectingWilliamsonwithdrugs.NavalIntelligenceDivisioninterrogatorstesteddrugsoneachotherasameansofextractinginformation,andconcludedthatitwasawasteoftime.Skilledquestioning,theydecided,wasnotmerelymoreethical,butmore

effective.Asthenextactofthegreatglobaldramaunfolded–Hitler ’sairassaultonBritain–neither

BroadwaynorBletchleyParkhadmuchtocontribute.ThemostsignificantaidtoFighterCommandinitsepicstruggletorepelGöring’sairfleetswaswirelesstrafficanalysisofthefloodofMorsefromtheGermans’newFrench,Belgian,DutchandNorwegianbases,togetherwithmonitoringofLuftwaffecockpitchatterbytheGermanlinguistsoftheRAF’sinfantYService,mostofthemwomen.Theprimeministerandthechiefsofstaffwereformanymonthspreoccupied,evenobsessed,by

twoquestions:wouldtheGermansinvade;andifso,when?InthemadmoodprevailinginLondonintheautumnof1940,ablendofheroicdefianceandabsurdity,theWarOffice’sdirectorofmilitaryintelligencesuggestedexploitingcapturedAbwehragentstotrytoprovoketheGermansintohasteninganinvasion,whichhefeltsurecouldbedefeatedbytheRoyalNavyandtheBritishArmy.ThisproposalfoundnofavourinWhitehall.MeanwhilethedisasterinFrancehadendowedtheWehrmachtwithalmostmagicalpowersinthemindsofthegenerals,manyofwhomconvincedthemselvesthatHitlermightlaunchanamphibiousassaultonBritainwithonlyafewweeks’preparation,offeringnonoticetothedefenders.TheRoyalNavy’sCommanderGeoffreyColpoyswasresponsiblefordeliveringtoDowning

Streeteachdayat1p.m.areportfromtheSpecialInvasionWarningCommittee,whichformostoftheautumntookitforgrantedthataGermanassaultwasimminent,andconcerneditselfchieflywiththetiming.TheJointIntelligenceCommittee,chairedbytheForeignOffice’sVictor‘Bill’Cavendish-Bentinck,onlyoncesoundedthealarmtosuggestthatinvasionwasimminent,on7September,when,asBentinckhimselfnotedsardonicallylater,hehimselfwasbrieflyabsentandthearmy’ssomewhatunstabledirectorofintelligence–thesamemanwhoadvocatedincitingtheWehrmachttoland–temporarilyheldthechair.Churchillhimselfwasalwaysscepticalaboutaninvasion,buthedeemeditpoliticallyimperativetosustaintheBritishpeople’sbeliefinthethreatnotonlyin1940,butthroughoutthefollowingyearalso,topromotetheirvigilanceandsenseofpurpose.On31JulySirAlexanderCadoganexpressedhisownconvictionthattheGermanswouldnotcome,butwouldinsteadthrustatGibraltarandEgypt,thenadded,‘our“intelligence”givesnothingtocorroboratethistheory.Butthenthey’reawfullybad.’NowhereintheworldwereBritishagentsprovidinginformationofmuchassistancetothewareffort.TheBritishC-in-CinSingapore,Air-MarshalSirRobertBrooke-Popham,wroteinfrustration:‘LittleornorelianceisplaceduponMI6informationbyanyauthoritieshereandlittlevaluableinformationappearstobeobtained.’Thesamewastruenearerhome.

FormanymonthsaftertheGermanoccupationofWesternEurope,theonlynationstillabletoexploitsecretsourcesonalargescalewastheneutralSovietUnion,throughitsnetworksinBelgium,

GermanyandSwitzerland.Inthosedaysitsagentsdidnotevenneedtotroublewithwireless:theysimplypassedreportstotheirnearestSovietdiplomaticmission.InMay1940theGRU’sLeopoldTreppermovedfromBrusselstoParis,takingwithhimhismistress,theexoticallynamedGeorgiedeWinter,atwenty-year-oldAmerican,andleavinghisdeputyAnatoliGourevitchtoarrangetheTrepperfamily’sreturntoMoscow.Gourevitch’sownpersonalaffairswerescarcelyuncomplicated.Underhiscoverasa‘Uruguayanbusinessman’hehadasuccessionofgirlfriends,butfeltobligedtobreakoffrelationswiththeprettiestwhensherevealedthatherfatherknewSouthAmericawell.‘Inothercircumstances,’hewrotewistfully,‘Icouldprobablyhavelovedher,butsuchgoodfortuneisdeniedtoasecretagent.’Thereafter,however,heformedafriendshipwithaneighbouringfamilynamedBarcza,whoseelderlyHungarianhusbandwasmarriedtoMargaret,amuchyoungerBelgianblondewithaneight-year-oldson.Followingherhusband’ssuddendeath,Gourevitchbegananintenseaffairwithher.MikhailMakarov,theotherGRUcareerofficerinBelgium,wasalsoleadingwhatGourevitchdescribedprimlyas‘anexcessivelydissipatedlife’,inwhichprostitutesplayedaconspicuousrole.TheGermaninvasionofBelgiumgaveGourevitchsomebadmoments:Brusselspolicearrested

hissupposedEnglishfriendandlanguageteacher,whoturnedouttobeanAbwehragent;themanwaspromptlyliberatedwhenhiscompatriotsoverranthecapital.TheGRUnetwork’scovercompany‘AuRoi’collapsedwhenitsJewishfrontmenfledandthebusinesswassequestered.MoscoworderedGourevitchtotakeovercontroloftheBelgianoperation.HeenteredMargaretBarczaonCentre’sbooks–allegedlywithoutherknowledge–asasourceunimaginativelycodenamed‘theBlonde’.Themostbelievableaspectofhisownlateraccountofthewholesagaisitsemphasisontherickety,racketynatureofaspyringthathistory–especiallySoviethistory–hasdignifiedasoneofthegreatsecretoperationsofalltime.GourevitchassertedthatLeopoldTrepper ’smuch-vauntedintelligencenetworkinFranceandBelgium‘wascomposedalmostentirelyofhisoldPalestinianfriends’,andprovidedMoscowwithnousableintelligenceaboutGermany’sdescentsonPoland,ScandinaviaorWesternEurope.ItseemsunlikelythattheRussianslearnedmuchmorefromitsactivitiesduringtheyearthatfollowedthanChurchillandhisgeneralsgleanedfromtheirmorningpapers.

IntheabsenceofseriousBritishmilitaryoperationssaveinNorthAfrica,secretwarbecameamassivegrowthactivity,impelledbytheprimeministerhimself.SpecialOperationsExecutivewascreatedinJuly1940,to‘setEuropeablaze’,whilethearmedforcesspawnedcommandos,paratroopersandastringof‘privatearmies’,notablyintheMiddleEast.NewrecruitsofallkindsfloodedintoBroadway,someofthemexotic.‘Writersofthrillers,’wrotethesupremelycynicalMalcolmMuggeridge,‘tendtogravitatetothesecretserviceassurelyasthementallyunstablebecomepsychiatrists,ortheimpotentpornographers.’ThuswasGrahamGreenedispatchedtoFreetown,SierraLeone,Muggeridgehimself–aveteranforeigncorrespondent–toLourenço

Marques,inPortugueseMozambique,andthejournalistKimPhilbywelcomedintoBroadway.Itbecameasourceofdismaytocareerintelligenceofficers,protectiveofMI6’sreputation,thatitswartimerecruitswholatercommandedmostpublicattentionwerealleithermavericksortraitors.LackingitsownagentsontheContinent,BroadwayturnedtotheEuropeanexilegovernmentsin

Londonforassistanceinidentifyingsources.ThePolesbegantobuildimpressivenetworksintheirowncountry,thoughtheysufferedgrievouslyfromthefact–thenofcourseunknowntothem–thattheGermansreadtheciphersinwhichtheycommunicatedwiththeiragents.FrantišekMoravecandhisCzechgroupachievedformalrecognitionastheintelligencearmoftheirgovernment;MI6providedthemwithwirelessfacilitiesanddocuments.TheCzechsestablishedanewbaseinthreelittleadjoiningsuburbanhousesinRosendaleRoad,WestDulwich,untiltheseweredestroyedbytheLuftwaffe,thenlatein1940movedtoanewbuildinginBayswater.MI6didnot,however,givethemmoney.Moravec,afterspendingthelastofthecashhehadbroughtoutofPrague,wasobligedtonegotiatealoanof£50,000,topayhisnetwork’soutgoingsof£3,000amonth.ForsometimehecontinuedtoreceiveEastEuropeanmaterialviaZürich–CaptainKarelSedlacekhadservedasMoravec’sstationchieftheresince1934,undercoverasanewspapercorrespondent;sincehelackedanyliterarygiftshewasobligedtopayaghosttowritecopyinhisname.TheAbwehr ’sPaulThummelusedtheCzechofficerashislinktoLondon;whenhewasarrestedbytheGestapoinMarch1942,Moravec’slittlegroupranoutofsources.TheBritishenjoyedoneimmensepieceofgoodfortunefollowingtheirevictionfromthe

Continent:nowheredidtheGermanscapturepeopleordocumentsthatbetrayedAlliedprogressincrackingEnigma.Between1940and1944manyFrenchmen,includinghundredsofthousandsofservantsoftheVichypuppetregime,collaboratedwiththeiroccupiers.ButVichy’smilitaryintelligenceofficers,andseveralPolesattachedtothemwhowereprivytothepioneeringEnigmacodebreakingoperation,revealednothingevenlaterinthewar,whentheywereexposedtoenemyinterrogation.ThecapaciousnetscastacrossEuropebytheNazisfocusedoverwhelminglyonhuntingdissenters,notmachines.Intheearlyyearsofoccupation,whenmostpeopleintheconqueredsocietiesacquiescedintheirfate,Berlin’sspiesandpolicemenuncoveredlittletoruffletheirmasters’complacency,andmercifullynothingthatcausedthemtodoubtthesecurityoftheirowncommunications.Inthewinterof1940–41,noneoftheprincipalbelligerentsknewmuchmoreabouteachother ’s

affairsthantheylearnedfromstudyingtheinternationalpressandwatchingsuchmovementsastheycouldseeoftherivalarmies,naviesandairfleets.MostofthesuccessfulcodebreakingthatwastakingplacewasbeingdonebytheGermans,andespeciallybytheKriegsmarine’sB-Dienst.TheBritishlackedpowertoaccomplishanythingsavethefeedingoftheirownpeople.Hitlerpreparedtolaunchthemostdramaticandambitiouslungeofhiscareer,theassaultontheSovietUnion,anactthatcouldonlyhavebeenundertakenbyamaneitherbereftofaccurateintelligenceaboutthe

economicstrengthofhisintendedvictim,orrecklesslyindifferenttoit.

2 SHADOWINGCANARIS

TheGermanshadmadethemselvesmastersofEurope,andshowntheWehrmachttobethemostformidablefightingforceintheworld.Bycontrast,whateverthelimitationsoftheBritishandotherAlliedintelligenceservices,thoseofHitler ’sAbwehrwereincomparablyworse.Inthesummerof1940thechiefsoftheNazis’information-gatheringmachinetoyedwithaschemetoplantanagentonawreckedshipofftheEnglishsouthcoast,thoughtheynevercameupwithacrediblenotionofwhatsuchahaplesscastawaymightachievethere.TheyalsodiscussedlandingagentsinKent,whowouldbeinvitedtoscalethewhitecliffs,aplanthatwasfrustratedbyashortageofspieswithmountaineeringskills.MeanwhiletheLuftwaffe’sintelligencedepartmentmisjudgedeveryaspectoftheBattleofBritain,fromrespectiveaircraftstrengthsandlossestotargetselection.InSeptember1940,followingtheinterrogationsofthefirstenemyspieslandedinBritain,KennethStrongofWarOfficeintelligenceprofessedhimselfbaffled.HecouldnotreconcilehislifelongrespectforGermanefficiencywiththerisiblemanagementoftheNazis’espionageactivities.TheAbwehrbungledtheselection,training,briefingandequipmentofagentsforserviceabroad;

seldomweretheyevenprovidedwithdecentforgedpassports.Itishardtodistinguishbetweenrealityandfantasyinthedoingsofitsoperationalsection,AbwehrII,becauseitswardiarywascompiledtoimpresshigherauthority,andthusincludedreportsfromagentswhoneverexisted,aboutoperationsthatnevertookplace.Itschief,AdmiralWilhelmCanaris,whowasregardedfordecadesafterthewarasanimportantpersonalityandevenasaherooftheResistancetoHitler,wasinrealityatemporiserwholackedboththemoralcouragetochallengetheNaziswhomhedespised,andtheskillstorunaneffectivesecretserviceintheirinterests.ThefirstmantograspthiswasnotaGerman,butayoungEnglishhistorianwithadisdainfor

mankindingeneral,andprofessionalsecretserviceofficersinparticular.ThemannerinwhichHughTrevor-RoperbecamenotthenemesisofCanaris,butinsteadhisshadow,isoneofthemoreremarkablestoriesofthesecretwar.Thebrilliant,testy,supremelyarrogantOxforddonwho,whilenothomosexual,professedadeepdislikeofwomen,hadjustwrittenhisfirstbook,astudyofArchbishopLaudwhichheoftenrereadduringthewaryears:‘Iamforeverdiscoveringyetmoreexquisitebeauties,lurkingunsuspectedamongyetprofoundertruths.’Hespenttheyearsbetween1940and1945monitoringthewirelesstrafficoftheAbwehr,firstforMI5thenforMI6.Trevor-RoperlivedandbreathedCanarisandhisorganisation,exceptondayswhenhewentfoxhunting.Ingrowingdegree,andcomprehensivelyfrom1943onwards,theEnglishacademiclearnedmoreaboutGermany’sintelligenceservicesthananymanintheNazihighcommandknew–certainlymorethanCanarishimself,becauseTrevor-RopercouldidentifytheAbwehr ’smanyfalseinformants,

controlledbytheso-called‘TwentyCommittee’ofintelligenceofficersinLondonchairedbyMI5’sJ.C.Masterman.Theyoungacademicmayhavenurturedaprivatelonging,notunusualamongintellectuals,toshowhimselfalsoamanofaction.Hewasimmenselyrespectfulofalankythoughnever-metcousin,RichardTrevor-Roper,ownerofasmallestateinWales,whojoinedtheRAF’sBomberCommandandservedasrear-gunnertothedambustingVCGuyGibson,winningaDFMandDFCbeforebeingkilledinactiononhisfiftiethoperation,agedtwenty-nine.InDecember1939HughTrevor-Roper,thentwenty-five,wassummonedfromMertonCollegeto

workalongsideWalterGill,alecturerinelectricitywhohadachievedcelebrityascollegebursarbyinstallinglightinginMerton’squadrangles.DuringWorldWarI‘Gilly’hadservedinanarmywirelesssectioninEgypt,whereherananaerialuptheGreatPyramid.HelistedhisrecreationsinWho’sWhoasriding,wirelessresearchand‘rebukingsin’.NowheandTrevor-RoperformedthenucleusoftheRadioSecurityService,abranchofMI5initiallyquarteredinthecellsatWormwoodScrubsjailinwestLondon.Dayafterday,PostOfficeoperators,previouslyemployedtocatchunlicensedprivatewirelesstransmissions,scouredtheairwavesforsignalsfromenemyagentstransmittingfromBritain,whomitwouldthenbetheroleoftheMertonpairtoscotch.GillandTrevor-Roperfoundthemselvesfrustratedbytheemptinessoftheether,orratherbythe

absenceofsuchtrafficastheysought.Theywerefailing,soitseemed.Onlyslowlydidtheycometounderstandthatthiswasnotbecausetheirowneavesdropperswereincompetent,butbecausenoGermanspiesweresignallinghome.Findingtheiroriginalfunctionredundant,ontheirowninitiativethetwodonswidenedtheirresearches:theybegantogatherinterceptsfromstationsinEuropethatusedknownAbwehrcallsigns.Oneevening,intheflattheysharedinthewestLondonsuburbofEaling,overteaandbiscuitstheycrackedanAbwehrhand-cipher–alowerencryptionsystemusedbyCanaris’sbasesforcommunicationswithout-stationsandagentslackingEnigmamachines.Trevor-Roper,afluentGermanlinguist,startedtoreaditsmessages.WhenthiscametothenoticeofAlastairDenniston,chiefofBletchleyPark,hewasnotamused.

TheRSS’samateursweretoldthattheyweremeddlinginmattersofnoproperconcerntothem.DennistonaddedcrosslythattheAbwehrmaterialwasunimportantanyway.Infairness,hisdismayabouttheRSS’sfreelancingreflectedmorethanpettyjealousy.Months,indeedyears,layaheadbeforeBletchley’scodebreakingoperationsachievedmaturity,butfromtheoutsetitwasobviousthatiftheGermansgainedaninklingofwhatwasbeingachieved,thegamewouldbeover.ThemorediffusedwasBritishcryptographicactivity,thegreatertheriskofaleak.Broadwaysteppedin,toventitsownjustifiedanger,whenitwaslearnedthatTrevor-Roper ’sreportonAbwehractivitiesinNorthAfricawascirculatedtoadistributionlistthatincludedthePostOfficewirelesssection.GillandTrevor-Roper,stubbornandmischievousmenboth,persistednonetheless;theyweresoon

readingmuchoftheAbwehr ’strafficwithitsout-stations.Tothedons’glee,evenwhenBletchleyestablisheditsowncelltomonitorthesameCanarislinks,itwasRSSandnotGC&CSwhichbroke

thenextfourhand-ciphers.Inthespringof1941RSSacquiredanewinterceptioncentrewithAmericanequipmentatHanslopeParkinBuckinghamshire,andbegantoestablishitsownout-stationsabroad.Inthecourseofthewar,thelittleservicepassedonamillionsignalstoBletchley.MI6eventuallymadeasuccessfultakeoverbidforRSS,whichwaslogical,givenBroadway’s

suzeraintyoversignalsintelligence.Trevor-RoperfoundhimselfworkingwithStewartMenzies’communicationssupremo,oneofthesecretservice’smoreexoticfigures,ColonelRichardGambier-Parry.Thecolonelwasoneofmanyluminariesof‘secretshows’whowasabletoexploittohisownadvantagetheirfreedomfromaccountabilitytoaservicehierarchy.Gambier-ParryestablishedMI6’scommunicationscentreatWhaddonHallinBuckinghamshire,whichhealsomadehispersonalresidence.Akeenhorseman,hetookoverthepre-warowner ’spackofhoundsandplacedthehuntsmenonBroadway’spayroll;ononenotableoccasion,thehoundsinhotpursuitstreamedthroughthesecuritygateofBletchleyPark,arousinginthemindofamountedspectatorintheknowaboutitsactivitiesanidyllicvisionofthebrutesgorgingonhalf-digesteddecrypts.Gambier-Parrylivedlikeamedievalbaron.Trevor-Roper,whoknewhimasafellow-foxhunter,marvelled:‘Intheworldofneuroticpolicemenandtimidplacemenwhorulethesecretservice,hemoveslikeFalstaff,orsomefigurefromBalzac,ifnotRabelais.’ItshouldbeaddedthatfortherestofthewarGambier-ParryranMI6’scommunicationswithenergyandflair.HughTrevor-RoperbecameheadoftheintelligencesectionofMI6’sRadioAnalysisBureau,run

byFelixCowgill,aformerIndianpoliceman.Cowgillintenselydislikedhisnewjunior,whomhedeemedguiltyof‘irreverentthoughtsanddangerouscontacts’.TheOxfordhistoriantookituponhimselftogowellbeyondtheproductionofrawintelligence,conductingevaluationandanalysisinafashionMI6hadalwaysspurned,becauseitlackedofficerscleverenoughtodosuchwork.TheRABbegantoproduce‘purpleprimers’,localguidestoAbwehrpersonalitiesandagentsaroundtheworld,whichsoonrantomanypages.ThebureaunotedthattheItalians,whobeforethewarhadenjoyedsomenotableintelligencesuccesses,werenowalmostentirelydependentformaterialontheGermans,andthusacquiredtheirweaknesses.Inthesummerof1941Trevor-Roperacquiredanassistant,twenty-one-year-oldCharlesStuart,

whohadjustleftChristChurchwithaFirstinhistory,andthetwowerejoinedbyanotherOxfordman,GilbertRyle.PatrickReilly,agiftedyoungdiplomatwhobecameStewartMenzies’personalassistant,thoughttheirlittlecell‘ateamofabrillianceunparalleledanywhereintheIntelligencemachine’.Trevor-RoperbegantoserveassecretaryofthejointMI5–MI6WirelessCommittee,inwhichrolehecametoknowalmosteveryonesignificantinthesecretworld.Thepeering,bespectacledhistorianbecameoneoftheoutstandingBritishintelligenceofficersofthewar.HismasteryofGermanoperationsincreasedsteadily,especiallyafterBletchley’sDillwynKnoxbrokeintotheprincipalAbwehrmachinecipherinDecember1941.WhilethechiefsofBroadwaybelieved–moresofollowingtheVenlofiasco–thattheirenemies’intelligenceofficerswerewizardsof

guile,fromanearlystageTrevor-RoperbecameconvincedoftheGermans’institutionalincompetence.AsfortheAbwehr ’schief,hesaid,farfrombeingamasterspyCanariswasalostlittlemandriftingonthetidesoffate.AdmiralWilhelmCanariscamefromafamilyofRhinelandindustrialists.AfterserviceasaU-boat

officerinWorldWarIhebecameengagedinright-wingpolitics,whileplayingaroleinrebuildingtheGermannavy.Aseniorofficer ’s1926personalreportextolledhisskillsatthemilitary-politicalinterface:‘Withthefinestfeelforforeignpsychologyandmentality,togetherwithuncommonlinguisticability,heknowsinexemplaryfashionhowtodealwithforeigners(fromthelowesttotheprominent).’Interestingly,however,othernavalofficers,includingErichRaederandKarlDönitz,dislikedCanaris,thinkinghimsly.DuringtheearlyyearsofHitler ’sruleheingratiatedhimselfenthusiasticallyandsuccessfullywith

theforemostNazis.In1935,agedforty-eight,hewasappointedchiefofGermany’sintelligenceservice,controllingbothespionageabroadandcounter-espionageathome,thoughHimmlerranhisowndomesticsecurityservice,theRSHA,underErnstKaltenbrunner,withtheGestapoasitsenforcementarm.AsTrevor-Ropernoted,‘AllGermanpoliticiansofconsequencesoughttosetuptheirowninformationbureaus(justastheyalsosoughttoestablishprivatearmies)asadditionalsupportsfortheirpersonalauthority;anditwasessentialtothepurposeofthesebureausthattheirresultsshouldbetheprivatepropertyoftheirchiefs.’TheRSHAwasnomoreefficientthantheAbwehr,butitwieldedmoreinfluencethroughitsdirect

subordinationtoHimmler.MI6notedthatitachievedgoodpenetrationofneutralembassiesinBerlin,whichyieldedusefulinformation.Meanwhile,Canaris’sservicehadstationsaroundtheworldandintelligencecellswithineveryformationoftheWehrmacht.Theadmiral’searlyyearsofofficesawadramaticexpansionofhisempire;heachievedareputationforadministrativeefficiencyanddiplomaticskills,bothinhishandlingoftheNazihierarchyandindealingwithprominentforeigners.Untilatleast1942,theservice’sprestigestoodhighbothinsideGermanyandabroad.Canariswasinstinctivelysecretive,evenbeforehebecameaspymaster,andmoresothereafter.

WithintheramblingwarrenofofficesinarowofconvertedmansionsonBerlin’sTirpitzüfer,wheretheAbwehrhaditsheadquartersuntilitwasbombedoutin1943,heseemedtoglidealmostinvisiblyfromoneroomtoanother.Sohedidtooonhisfrequenttravelstoothercountries,especiallySpain:asignedportraitofFranco,itsdictator,adornedhisofficewall.Heseldomworeuniform–anoddityinNazisociety,whichwasobsessedwithfancydress.Hewaselaboratelycourteous,notleasttosubordinates,andsomethingofahypochondriacwhotooktoomanypills.Herelaxedbyridingregularlyandplayingasmartgameoftennis.Hispassionforanimalswasmuchremarked:hewasfollowedaroundAbwehrheadquartersbytwodachshunds,towhichhetalkedconstantly.OneofthemoncefellillwhileCanariswasvisitingItaly,andhetelephonedatlengthtoBerlintodiscussitscondition.HisItaliancompanionsassumedthathewasspeakingincodeaboutgreatissuesofstate,

buthisobsessionwiththedogwasauthentic.Heoftensaidthathetrustedanimalsmorethanpeople;itwasprobablymoreaccuratetosaythathelikedthembetter.Inconversation,whetherprofessionalorsocial,hewasamasterofequivocation.FewpeoplewereeversurewhatCanarisreallythought,whichwassupposedbycontemporariestoreflecthisdepthofcharacter.Morelikely,itmaskedchronicindecision.AlthoughtechnicallyabranchofOKW,theAbwehrquicklybecameCanaris’spersonalfiefdom.

ThroughoutthewarhismenachievedconsiderablesuccessinsuppressingdissentandcapturingWesternAlliedagentsoperatinginHitler ’sempire,whichdidmuchtosustaintheadmiral’sstandinginNazihighplaces:Col.FranzvonBentevegni,whorancounter-espionage,wasoneofCanaris’sfewimpressivesubordinateappointments.YettheRussianswereabletosustaintheirastonishingespionageactivitiesinsideGermanyuntil1942,andmilitaryleakagespersisteduntil1945,evenifthehugematterofGermany’sbrokencodeslaybeyondCanaris’sremit.Theagentshisofficersdispatchedtogatherinformationabroadwerealmostallunfitfortherole.It

isoddthatBerlinneverattemptedtorecruitspiestodispatchtoBritainwhomighthavepassedforgentlemen.Evenin1940,theaccentandmannersoftheupperclassremainedapassporttosocialacceptanceinChurchill’sembattledisland.ThewriterCyrilConnollywroteanangrylettertotheNewStatesmancomplainingthatwhenhehimselfwasdetainedasapossiblespy,hewasimmediatelyreleasedwhenitwasdiscoveredthathehadbeeneducatedatEton.TheexperienceoftheCambridgeSpies,deemedbeyondsuspicionasmembersoftheupper-middleclass,suggeststhatiftheAbwehrhaddispatchedtoBritainafewNaziswithpassabletablemannersandsomeskillasfly-castersorgrouse-shooters,theywouldhavebeenaskedtoallthebesthouses.Asitwas,however,whentwoofCanaris’skeymen,Col.HansPieckenbrock,theheadof

intelligence,andCol.ErwinLahousen,headofsabotage,weresackedin1943,thiswasnogestureofNazispite,madeforpoliticalreasons;itwastheconsequenceoftheirobviousincompetenceandoftheirdepartments’failure.Germansecretoperationsabroaddeployedimmenselabourfornegligibleresults.OneoftheAbwehr ’smostnotablerecruitswasnavallieutenantHeinrichGarbers.Hewasavegetablefarmer ’sson,apassionateNazi,whoin1938hadsailedacrosstheAtlanticinathirty-footyacht,theWindspiel,whichheconstructedhimself.AmidtheAlliednavalblockade,theGermansdevisedthenotionofdispatchingagentstofar-flungplacesinsailingboatstoohumbletoattracttheattentionoftheenemy.In1941and1942GarbersmadeepicforaystoSouthAfricaandNamibiarespectively.ThereafterhecaptainedthelittleschoonerPassim,whichmadetwoimmensevoyagesatanaveragespeedofsixknots.TheboatsailedunderthenameoftheSantaMaria,andflewsuccessivelyFrench,SpanishandPortuguesecoloursasGarbersdeemedappropriate.In1943hecarriedthreeAbwehrmen,codenamed‘Walter ’,‘Fred’and‘Jim’,toArgentina,inwhatheafterwardsdescribedlaconicallyas‘anuneventfulvoyageof65days’.Inanauticalsenseitmaybetruethatnothingmuchhappened,butrelationsonboardwerepoisoned

bythemutualloathingofWalterandFred,whileJimwasperpetuallyprostratewithsea-sickness,whichcosthimadrasticweightloss.ThepassengersweresuccessfullydeliveredtoareceptioncommitteeofArgentinesympathisersatRiodelPlata,whopresentedthePassim’screwwithcoffeeandorangesbeforethelittlevesselturnedaboutandsailedhome.Garbers,plainlyamanofiron,seemedwhollyuntroubledbyhisexperiences.HereturnedsafelytoEuropeandreceivedtheRitterkreuz.Thereisnoevidence,however,thathispassengerscontributedanythingtotheNaziwareffort.Likewise,theHungarianairforceofficerCountLászlóAlmásycrossed2,000milesofNorthAfricandeserttodelivertwoagentstoEgyptinMay1942,aremarkableachievement,andAlmásylaterinspiredthenovelandfilmTheEnglishPatient,thoughitsversionofthisenthusiasticNaziwasfanciful.Hispassengers,however,didnothingonarrivaltojustifytheirepicjourney.Nearerhome,itbecameincreasinglycleartotheBritishmonitoringtheAbwehr ’swirelessedreportsthatitsnetworkofoverseasstationsandinformantsproducedalmostnothingthatwasbothnewandtrue.AsTrevor-Roperpursuedhisresearchesthroughtheever-growingharvestofBletchleydecrypts,

‘Wesoonbecameawarethat“thelittleAdmiral”wasafarmorecomplexandcontroversialcharacterthanwehadsupposed.Astheincompetenceofhisorganisationwasprogressivelyrevealedtous,wediscovered,ordeduced,somethingofthepoliticsinwhichhewasinvolved,andwenotedhisfeverishtravels,ineverydirection,butespeciallytoSpain,whichdistinguishedhimsharplyfromourownmoresedentarychief’–StewartMenzies.Forseveraldecadesafterthewar,Canariswastreatedasamajorfigureoftheera,thesubjectofseveralweightybiographies.TheforemostelementintheCanarismythologywasaclaimthathehadbeenasecretcrusaderagainstHitler,whohadgivenactiveassistancetotheAlliedcause.SeveralGermanwritersenergeticallypromotedthisview,becausetheirpost-warsocietywasdesperatetoidentifyvirtuousmenwhohaddaredtoraisetheirhandsagainstthevastevilofNazism,andsufferedmartyrdominconsequence.Itisnowplainthatsuchclaimswereunfounded.Until1938Canariswasanardentsupporterofthe

Nazis,andforyearsthereafterHitlerfrequentlyusedhimasapersonalemissaryabroad.TheadmiralworkedamicablywithReinhardHeydrichoftheRSHA.Thetwofamiliessocialised:FrauCanarisandtheexecutiveplanneroftheHolocaustsometimesplayedtheviolintogether.From1939onwards,theadmiralbecameincreasinglygloomyandnervous–colleaguesnotedhimdrinkingheavily.Trevor-RoperregardeditasanabsurddelusionthatCanariswasthedirectingbrainof‘theotherGermany’.TheAbwehr ’schief,inhisview,wasamanoflimitedgifts,whoconfinedhisanti-NaziactivitiestomakinghisorganisationahavenforofficerswhosharedhisrisingdistasteforHitlerandhissupporters,andwhoresistedactivecomplicityintheNazis’atrocities.Canaris’sfastidiousnaturerecoiledfromthecoarsenessoftheirconduct,perhapsmorethanfromitsinsensatebarbarity.TheonlyAbwehrofficerknowntohavebeenasourceforMI6wasHans-BerndtGiseviusin

Switzerland,aPrussianlawyerofgiantphysicalproportionswhoservedfiveyearsintheGestapoandhatedit,beforetransferringtotheMinistryofInternalAffairsin1938andthencetotheAbwehr.

CanarissenthimtoZürichunderdiplomaticcoverasvice-consul,andthereafterhepassedinformationtoHalinaSzymańska,whomheknewwasaninformantforbothBritishandPolishintelligence.Giseviusprovidedmaterialfortwenty-fivereportsdispatchedfromBerntoBroadwaybetweenAugust1940andDecember1942,someofthemcitingCanaris’sprofessedopinions;alsoamonghissourceswasHitler ’sfinanceminister,HjalmarSchacht.Szymańska,theconduit,wastheformidableandbeautifulwifeoftheformerPolishmilitaryattaché

inBerlin,andoncedinedwithCanarisinBern.MuchofGisevius’smaterialwasaccurate:inJanuary1941SzymańskapassedonhisreportaboutGermanaircraftstocks,togetherwiththeAbwehrman’sopinionthataninvasionofBritainwas‘off’.InAprilshequotedGisevius’sview,basedoninformationfromSchacht,thatHitlerwouldinvadeRussiaduringthefollowingmonth–whichindeedwasthenhisintention.But,asusualwithintelligence,theGermanalsopassedonsomerubbish:on28March1941hetoldSzymańskathatGermanforceswouldnottaketheoffensiveinLibya–twodaysbeforeRommellaunchedamajoronslaught.Gisevius’scontribution,andthoseofahandfulofhiscolleagues,scarcelymadetheAbwehra

pillarofResistanceagainsttheNazis.Itswartimeshortcomingsweretheproductofindolenceandincompetenceratherthanofconsideredtreachery.Canariswasapoordelegator,whochoseweaksubordinates.Germanintelligencehadonenotablesuccessabroad,insuborningYugoslavofficersaheadoftheirarmy’s1941emergencymobilisation,intimetosabotagetheprocess,butthereafteritsespionageoperationswereuniformlyunsuccessful.TheadmiralwasnonethelesstoomuchaGermanpatriotactivelytoassisthiscountry’senemies.Likemanysuchpeopleofthetime,heharbouredmuddledpoliticalviews.Amonarchistandaconservative,Franco’sSpainwashisspiritualhome;hetravelledthereasoftenashecould,notmerelytovisitthelargeMadridAbwehrHQatCalleClaudioCoello151,butalsotocommunewithlike-mindedSpanishpoliticiansandgrandees.TheAbwehr ’sship-watchingserviceinSpain,theUnternehmenBodden,monitoringAlliedmovementsthroughtheStraitsofGibraltarwiththeaidofadvancedinfra-redtechnology,andreportingthemtotheKriegsmarineandtheLuftwaffe’sAirFleet1inItaly,formedthemostimpressiveelementintheorganisation’soverseasoperations.YetifCanarisbearsmuchresponsibilityfortheshortcomingsofGermany’s‘bigpicture’

intelligence,hecouldneverhaverunanhonestoperationunderthedeadhandofHitler,anymorethanMoscowCentrecoulddosointheshadowofStalin.ReportsontheconditionandprospectsoftheenemywerepermittedtoreachconclusionsonlywithinparametersacceptabletotheFührer.ThiscripplingconstraintwassymbolisedbyHitler ’sannotationonanimportantintelligencereportaboutRussianagriculturalconditions:‘Thiscannotbe.’KurtZeitzler,chiefofthearmygeneralstaff,wroteon23October1942,theeveofStalingrad:‘TheRussiansnolongerhaveanyreservesworthmentioningandarenotcapableoflaunchinglarge-scaleoffensives.’Himmlerin1944declaredwithoutembarrassmentthathisfirstrequirementfromGermany’sintelligenceserviceswasnottruth,

butloyaltytotheFührer.Thiswasanimportantstatement,themostvividexpressionofthehugeweaknessoftheAbwehrandtheRSHAthroughouttheSecondWorldWar.HistorianMichaelHandelhaswritten:‘Leadersinademocraticsystemaregenerallymoreinclined

toconsiderawidevarietyofoptionsthanthosewhohavealwaysfunctionedwithinauthoritarianortotalitarianpoliticalsystems.Inauthoritariancountries,wheretheclimbtothetopisanunrelentingstruggleforpower,habitsofcooperationandopennessareusuallylessdeveloped…Toleranceforideasthatdeviatefromthe“partyline”…areseenaspersonalcriticism.’ThesefeaturesofalmostalldictatorshipscrippledGermanintelligenceactivitiesbeyondthebattlefield,andsometimesalsowithinit.Himmler ’sdeputyReinhardHeydrich,forinstance,wasfarmoreinterestedinusingtheRSHAasaweaponagainsttheNaziempire’sinternalenemiesthanasameansofsecuringinformationaboutitsforeignfoes.Hitlerneverwishedtouseintelligenceasaplanningorpolicy-makingtool.Herecogniseditsutilityonlyatatacticallevel:theNaziswerestrikinglyincuriousaboutAbroad.YetthefactthattheAbwehrwasanunsuccessfulintelligence-gatheringorganisationdidnotmean

thatHitler ’sarmedforceswereblindonthebattlefield:theiraccesstotacticalintelligencewasgenerallygood.InthefirsthalfofthewarGermany’swirelessinterceptorsandcodebreakersenjoyedsuccesseswhichwouldtodayseemimpressive,weretheynotmeasuredagainstthoseoftheBritishandAmericans.TheWehrmachthadexcellentvoice-monitoringunits,whichineverytheatreofwarprovidedimportantinformation.‘TheYServicewasthebestsourceofintelligence,’saidHans-OttoBehrendt,oneofRommel’sstaffinNorthAfrica.InAugust1941,aidedbyanItalianemployee,twoagentsoftheSezionePrelevamento–the‘extractionsection’ofItalianintelligence–openedthesafeofthemilitaryattaché’sofficeattheUSembassyinRome.Theyremovedhiscodebook–MilitaryIntelligenceCodeNo.11–andphotographedit.ThisenabledtheAxistoreadsubstantialtrafficthroughtheensuingtenmonths,andprovedaseriouslysignificantintelligencebreak.In1942ithadespeciallygrievousconsequencesforEighthArmyinthedesert,sincetheUSmilitaryattachéinCairo,Col.BonnerFellers,reportedindetailtoWashingtononBritishplansandintentions.AGermanintelligenceofficerpaidgeneroustributeto‘thisincomparablesourceofauthenticandreliableinformation,which…contributedsodecisivelyduringthefirsthalfof1942toourvictoriesinNorthAfrica’.Atsea,someoftheRoyalNavy’scipherswerefoundaboardtheBritishsubmarineSeal,captured

offtheGermancoaston5May1940,owingtoanextraordinaryandculpablefailurebytheminelayer ’sofficerstodestroyitsconfidentialpapers.TheKriegsmarinewasabletoreadmuchoftheRoyalNavy’sNorthSeatrafficuntilAugust1940,andsomewarshipcommunicationsuntilSeptember1941.Throughoutthefirsthalfofthewar,theKriegsmarine’sB-DienstreadtheRoyalNavy’sconvoycodes,withgrievousconsequencesforAlliedshippinglosses.Evenwheresignalscouldnotbedecrypted,radio-trafficanalysisenabledAxisintelligencestaffstojudgeenemy

deploymentsremarkablyeffectively,atleastuntilthesecondhalfofthewar,whenAlliedcommandersbecamemoreastuteandsecurity-conscious.Patrolling,airreconnaissanceandPoWinterrogationsallprovidedstreamsofusefuldatatoGermanoperationalcommanders,asdidopen-sourceinformation–enemynewspaperandbroadcastmonitoring.Inthefirstphaseofthewaruntil1942,whiletheWehrmachtwastriumphantonbattlefieldsacross

Europe,thesesourcessufficedtotellitscommandersallthattheyfelttheyneededtoknowabouttheworld,andabouttheirenemies.VictoriesmaskedtheabjecthumintfailuresoftheAbwehr.AslongasGermanywaswinning,whyshouldanyonemaketroubleaboutimperfectionsinthewarmachine?ItwasonlywhenHitler ’sarmiesstartedlosingthathardquestionsbegantobeaskedabouttheReich’sabysmalpoliticalandstrategicintelligence.Hitlerhimselfwas,ofcourse,muchtoblame,butCanarisexercisedoperationalresponsibility.Theadmiralfellfromgrace,thoughitwasbythenfartoolate–probablyimpossible,forreasonsinstitutionalisedintheNazisystem–torepairhiscorruptandineffectiveespionageorganisation.Whileanxiousnottobeabadman,Canarislackedthecouragetobeagoodone.Farfrombeinga

substantialhistoricalfigure,hewasasmallone,grapplingwithdilemmasanddifficultiesfarbeyondhiscapabilities.Trevor-RoperprofessedtoseeacloseresemblancebetweentheadmiralandMenzies,hisBritishcounterpart.Bothmenwereconservative,honourable–andweak.Byatriflingcoincidence,CanarishadamistressinViennawhosesisterwasmarriedtoMenzies’brother.Trevor-RopercametoregardtheAbwehras‘amirrorimageof[MI6],withmanyofthesameweaknessesandabsurdities…Irecognised,acrosstheinterveningfogofwar,oldfriendsofBroadwayandWhaddonHalltransmutedintoGermanuniformintheTirpitzUferoratWansee.’TheadmiraldidlittletomerithiseventualfateatthehandsofHitler ’sexecutioners:hefrequentlytalkedtreason,butdidnothingtofurtherit.Farfrombecomingamartyrtothecauseofa‘goodGermany’,hewasmerelyanincompetentservantofanevilone.

3

MiraclesTakeaLittleLonger:Bletchley

1 ‘TIPS’AND‘CILLIS’

Inthewinterof1939,MI6cameunderscrutinyandfiercecriticismwithinWhitehall,intensifiedbytheVenlofiasco.StewartMenzies,knowingtheprecariousnessofhispositionas‘C’,compiledatwenty-six-pagedocumentdefendinghisservice,inwhichheriskedplayingonecardwhichmight–anddid–savehisbacon.Hepromisedhismastersthatthecountrywas‘abouttoreapthefruits’ofMI6’sliaisonwithAlliedsecretservicesinafashion‘whichshouldbeofinestimablebenefitstotheAirMinistrywithinafewweeks,andprobablytotheAdmiraltywithinamonthortwo’.ThesignificanceofthisvaguelyexpressedclaimwasthatMenziesbelievedthatBletchleyPark,withthehelpoftheFrenchandPoles,wasclosetocrackingsomeGermanciphers.SuchsuccessescouldgofarindeedtowardscompensatingforMI6’shumintfailure.Hisexpectationswouldremainunfulfilledformuchoftheyearthatfollowed.FewevenwithintheintelligencecommunitydaredtohopethatBritaincouldemulate,farlesssurpass,the1914–18triumphsofRoom40.AdmiralGodfrey,headofnavalintelligence,wrotetoMenzieson18November,sayingthat‘whetherornotCryptanalysiswilleveragaingiveustheknowledgewehadofGermanmovementsinthelatewar ’,MI6shouldexertitselftoplantagentsinenemyportstoreportshippingmovements.Godfreydidnotseemtoexpectmuchfromthecodebreakers.Inpeacetime,fewnationscommittheirfinestbrainstonationalsecurity.Brilliantpeopleseldom

choosecareersinintelligence–or,forthatmatter,inthearmedforces.Astrugglefornationalsurvivalalonemakesitpossibleforagovernmenttomobilisegenius,orpeoplepossessingsomethingclosetoit,intheinterestsofthewareffort.TheBritish,andlatterlytheAmericans,didthismoreeffectivelythananyotherparticipantsinWorldWarII.Aremarkableproportionoftheirnations’brightestandbestsoonerorlaterfoundthemselvesperformingtasksworthyoftheirtalents–inhigherarmystaffpostsalongsidethelikesofEnochPowell,JohnFreeman,TobyAldington;inscientificortechnicalresearch;andespeciallyinintelligence,whichabsorbedthousandsofoutstandingintellectsfrommanywalksoflife.TheoutbreakofwarenabledtheGermansectionofBritishmilitaryintelligence,forinstance,torecruitsuchwritersandacademicsasNoelAnnan,EricBirleyandAlanPryce-Jones.Annan,aCambridgedonwhohadonlyapassableacquaintancewith

GermanandFrench,observedwonderingly:‘WithinaweekIwaspiecingtogetherthereportsofagentsintheBalkansandtheearlystutteringsofUltra.’DonaldMcLachlan,ajournalistwhoservedunderGodfreyattheAdmiralty,afterwardsarguedthat

allwartimeintelligencedepartmentsshouldberunbyciviliansinuniform,becausetheyareunburdenedbythelifetimeprejudicesofcareersoldiers,sailorsandairmen:‘Itisthelawyer,thescholar,thetraveller,thebanker,eventhejournalistwhoshowstheabilitytoresistwherethecareermentendtobend.Careerofficersandpoliticianshaveastronginterestincookingrawintelligencetomaketheirmasters’favouritedishes.’MI6remaineduntil1945undertheleadershipofitsoldhands,butmostofBritain’ssecretwarmachinepassedintothehandsofableciviliansinuniformwho–afteranintervalofmonthsorinsomecasesyearswhiletheyweretrainedandtheirskillsrecognised–progressivelyimprovedthequalityofintelligenceanalysis.TheAdmiralty’sSubmarineTrackingRoomwasdirectedbyRodgerWinn,abarristerandfuturejudge.Gen.SirBernardMontgomery’schiefofintelligencefromAlameintoLuneburgHeathwastheOxforddonEdgar‘Bill’Williams,latterlyabrigadier.RegJonesmadehimselfalegendinscientificintelligence.Thesemen,andafewhundredothersthroughoutthearmedforces,spentmuchofthewar

exploitingandassessinginformationderivedoverwhelminglyfrominterceptionanddecryptionoftheenemy’swirelesstraffic.BillWilliams,whoservedintheMediterraneanuntil1943andinEuropethereafter,statedinanimportant1945report:‘ItmustbemadequiteclearthatUltraandUltraonlyputintelligenceonthemap.’Untildecryptsbegantobecomeavailableinbulkin1942,‘IntelligencewastheCinderellaofthestaff…Informationabouttheenemywasfrequentlytreatedasinterestingratherthanvaluable[though]ofcoursethisattitudevariedaccordingtothecommander.’Scepticismwasoftenmerited,becausemuchmaterialwasdownrightspecious.The1940wardiary

ofthearmy’sMiddleEastintelligencesectioninCairoincludedcomicallyfrivoloussnippets:‘AllHungariancabaretartisteshavebeenorderedtoleavethecountrybytheendofMay.’DataabouttheItalianarmywasscanty,sothaton9Augustthesectionrecorded:‘ThepresentlocationandorganisationofLibyantroopsinEasternCyrenaicaisobscure.’Adespondentstaffofficeraddedaweeklater:‘Therehasbeennofurtherreliableinformationoffresh[Italian]groundunitsorformationsarrivinginLibyafromoverseas.’On27September,theBritishhighcommand’sweeklyintelligencesummaryincludedaparagraphondomesticconditionsinGermany:‘AneutraltravellertotheLeipsicfair,whosepersonalobservationsarebelievedreliable,reportsthatrelationsbetweenthe[Nazi]PartyandtheArmyarenotgood.’Threemonthslater,theheadofMI6’sPoliticalSectionwrunghishands:‘Itispiteoustofindourselvesinthisstateofignorance’aboutbothGermany’sinternalconditionandeconomy.OnlywhenAlliedwarlordswereempoweredtoreadthemessagesbeingexchangedbetween

enemygeneralsinthefieldandtheirhigherheadquarterswasscepticismaboutthevalueof‘intelligence’replacedbyincreasinglyferventbelief.Ultraforcedcommanders-in-chief,notto

mentiontheprimeminister,totreatseniorintelligenceofficerswitharespecttheyhadseldomreceivedinthepre-Bletchleyuniverse.BrigadierIanJacobofthewarcabinetsecretariatsaid:‘MyimpressionisthatoncetheUltrabusinessgotwell-established,Churchilldidn’tlookatanythingelse.’Eisenhower ’sintelligencechiefKennethStrongwrotein1943,inamemorandumontrainingstaffofficers:‘Wenolongerdependonagentsandcloak-and-daggersourcesforourinformation.Modernmethodshavecompletelytransformedintelligence.’Hemeantcodebreaking,ofcourse,andinBritainthefountainheadofsuchactivitywasthe

GovernmentCode&CypherSchoolatBletchley.Inthemonthsfollowingtheoutbreakofwar,GC&CSexpandeddramaticallywiththearrivalofastreamofacademics,manyofthemearmarkedbyitsrecruitersbeforethewar.Thoughsomeweresecondedfromthearmedforces,itwasunderstoodthattherewasnoneedtotraintheuniversities’contingenttomarch,blancowebbing,andnamethepartsofarifle.Theyremainedtheirsallow,tweedy,pipe-smokingyoungselveswhenhousedinlodgingsaroundthedrearysuburbantown,andenlistedonthegovernmentpayrollwithoutuniformorceremony.Twenty-year-oldmathematicianKeithBateyfoundhislandladydemandinganassurancefromhisemployerthathewasnotadespised‘conchy’–conscientiousobjector–beforehejoinedthegrowingbodyofacademicsworkingonataskofsupremeimportancetotheircountry,fulfilmentofwhichmightdosomethingtoassuageitsshockingvulnerability.Whatwasthetask?Bletchley’slittleband,169strongin1939includingsupportstaff,understoodonlythatthenation’senemiescommunicatedinamultitudeofcodesandciphers,vulnerabletointerception.Ifevenaportionofthesecombinationsofnumbersandletterscouldberenderedintelligible,informationmightbegainedofpricelessvaluetothewareffort.Nobodyknew,inthebeginning,whetheragivenmessagehijackedfromtheairwavesmightbean

orderfromHitlerforhisarmiestomarchonWarsaw,orarequestfromaLuftwaffeairfieldineasternGermanyforadeliveryoffilingcabinets.Aheadofthecodebreakerslayamammothmenuofrequirementswhichcouldonlybeaddressedasmobilisationsluggishlymadeavailableears,brainsandhandstomonitortheenemy’sfrequenciesaroundtheclock,logsomeofhisvastoutputofmessages,fixthelocationsandpossibleidentitiesofthesenders–diplomatic,police,military,navalorairforce.Thencamethemuchgreaterchallenge,ofdiscoveringwhatthemessagesmeant.Allradiocommunicationsinvolvedatrade-offbetweenspeedandsecurity.Atthesimplestlevel,

battlefielddirectionbyland,seaandairrequiredsomevoicelinkage.Thisenabledtheinstantaneouspassageofordersandinformation,atthecostofbeingoverheardbyanybodyelsewhocaredtotunetoagivenfrequency.Crudesecuritycouldbeintroducedbyusingcodedcallsignsinplaceofnamesandsuchlike–duringtheBattleofBritainfightercontrollersadded5,000feettoindicatedaltitudes,toconfuseeavesdroppers.Butvoicemessagingwasinherentlyinsecure:sensitiveinformationshouldneverbepassedverbally,thoughitoftenwas.MostmilitarymessageswereinsteadwirelessedbyMorsekey.Low-levelmaterialcouldberapidly

encryptedunderbattlefieldconditionsbyrelativelyunsophisticatedpersonnelusingso-calledhand-orfield-ciphers,usuallyinvolvinggroupsoftwoorthreelettersornumbers–theKriegsmarineemployedtwenty-sevenvariants.Moresensitivetraffic,issuingfromhigherechelons,wastranslatedbymachine-generatedormanualciphers,usuallyinvolvingcombinationsoffourorfivelettersornumbers.TheBritishthoughtjustifiablyhighlyofthesecurityoftheirType-Xmachines,thoughtheyneverhadenoughofthem.*TheAmericansrightlytrustedtheirSigaba,afifteen-rotorsystem.Forsubstantialperiodsbetween1939and1943theGermansbrokesomeAlliedcodes,including

thoseoftheUSStateDepartmentandmilitaryattachés,alongwiththetrafficofseveralexilegovernments,notablythePolesandFreeFrench.TheysometimesalsoaccessedmessagesofallthreeBritishservices,includingtheRAF’sfour-charactercipher,andlaterhadsuccessesinattackingproductsoftheUSArmy’sM-209field-cipheringmachine.ItdeservesemphasisthatAlliedcode-securityweaknesses,andenemyachievementsinexploitingthem,gavetheGermansmuchmoreoperationalassistancethansomeWesternhistoriansacknowledge,especiallyintheBattleoftheAtlantic.However,higherBritish,AmericanandRussiancommunicationsdefiedenemyscrutiny:NazieavesdroppingontransatlantictelephoneconversationsbetweenChurchillandRoosevelttoldBerlinlittleofvalue.ModernclaimsthattheGermansbrokeintoRussianhigherciphersdeservetobetreatedwithcaution:certainlyfrom1942onwards,thereisnoevidencethatHitler ’sgeneralsprofitedfromanysuchinsights;iftheyhad,theywouldhavebeenlessoftendeludedbySovietdeceptions.MostGermanseniorofficers–thoughbynomeansalltheircryptographers–wereconfidentthat

Enigmacipheringmachines,whichscrambledmessagesbymeansofshiftingrotorsandaplugboard,andrenderedthemcomprehensibleonlybyamatchingmachinewithidenticalsettings,wereimmunetotheattentionofanyenemy,andindeedtotheworkingsofthehumanbrain.Itisunsurprisingthatin1939theydiscountedthepossibilitythatelectro-mechanicaltechnologymightdramaticallyaccelerateexposureoftheEnigma’ssecrets,becauseitdidnotthenexist.Itisextraordinary,however,thatsuchsereneconfidencepersistedthroughsixyearsthatfollowed,evenfollowingthediscoverythatthePoleshadbrokensomepre-warEnigmatraffic,andseveralwarningsfromtheirownexperts.AmazinghubriswasexpressedbytheWehrmacht’slastsignalschief,Lt.Gen.AlbertPraun,whopreenedhimselfbeforehisAlliedcaptorsafterthewarended:‘TheachievementsofGermancommunicationsintelligence…mayspeakinfavouroftheGermantypeofintelligenceorganisation.’Hisorganisation,hesaid,‘gaveGermancommandersahithertounattaineddegreeof[signal]security’.TheBritishbreakingoftheEnigma,thensubsequentlyandseparatelyofGermanteleprintertraffic,

wasaprogressive,incrementaloperationwhichattainedmaturityonlybetween1943and1945,andwasneveruninterruptedorcomprehensive:evenatpeaks,onlyabouthalfofallinterceptswereread,manyofthemtoolatetoprovidepracticalassistance‘atthesharpend’.WhatwasdoneatBletchley

Parkwasindeedmiraculous,butthecodebreakerswereneverabletowalkonallofthewater,allofthetime.The1939–40PhoneyWarconferredfewbenefitsonBritain,butitgrantedGC&CSprecioustime

tobolsteritsstrengthandrefineitsmethods.WithoutmechanicalaidsBletchley’sbrainstormersmademodestanddelayedbreachesinasmallnumberofenemyciphers.TheGermansemployedacronymsandcodenameswhichtookweeksormonthsfortheirenemiestointerpret.TheimportanceofwhathappenedatBletchleyinthefirsttwoyearsofwarwasnotthatitenabledBritain’sgeneralstoavertorarrestadisastrousrunofdefeats,whichitcertainlydidnot,butthatitlitacandleofhopeaboutwhatthecodebreakersandtheirembryotechnologymightaccomplishinthefuture.Itenabledthedirectorsofthewarefforttolayupontheboardafewscatteredpiecesofavastjigsaw,whichwouldbefilledonlyduringtheAllies’yearsofvictory.

BletchleyPark–StationX,Box111c/oTheForeignOffice–wasanotablyuglyVictorianpileofbastardarchitecturaloriginssurroundedbyfifty-fiveacresoftreesandgrassland,locatedfiftymilesfromLondon.Itwaspurchasedin1938tohouseGC&CSatasafedistancefromGermanbombsbyAdmiralSirHughSinclair,thenheadofMI6;aslegendhasit,heused£7,500outofhisownpocket,butmoreplausiblyhepaidwithsecretfundsunderhiscontrol.WhateverMI6’shumintweaknesses,theservice’schiefs,especiallySinclair,deservefullcreditforbackingtheestablishmentofBletchleyatatimewhenresourcesweredesperatelyconstrained.WorkbeganatonceonlayingdirectphoneandteleprinterlinestoLondon,andinthefollowingyearMI6’sskeletonteamofcryptanalystsmovedfromBroadwaytothePark,wheretheycameundertheordersofAlastairDenniston.OneofhiscolleaguesfromtheoldAdmiraltydays,DillwynKnox,anexpertonancientEgyptianpapyri,becameanearlyBletchleystalwart.ThemostprominentoftheyoungerrecruitswereGordonWelchmanofSidneySussexCollege,Cambridge,HughAlexander,StuartMilner-Barry,JohnJeffreys–andAlanTuring.Thislast,thetwenty-seven-year-oldsonofanIndiancivilservantandtheproductofanaustereand

emotionallyaridchildhood,hadjustreturnedfromastintatPrincetonclutchingoneofhisowncreations,aso-calledelectricmultipliermachinemountedonabreadboard.HisheadmasteratSherbornehadoncewritten:‘Ifheistostayatapublicschool,hemustaimatbecomingeducated.IfheistobesolelyaScientificSpecialist,thenheiswastinghistime.’Intheheadmaster ’sterms,Turinghadindeedbeen‘wastinghistime’:hehadevolvedintoashy,narrow,obsessive.NoelAnnanwrote:‘Ilikedhissly,secrethumour…Hisinnerlifewasmorerealtohimthanactuality.Hedislikedauthoritywhereverhewas…[and]enjoyedgamesandtreasurehuntsandsilliness…Turingwasthepuresttypeofhomosexual,longingforaffectionandlovethatlasted.’Moreeventhanbyhissexualityandhisoftenchildlikeimmaturity,however,histragedywastobeafflictedbytheexquisitelypainfullonelinessofgenius.

Otherdraftsofyoungacademicsfollowed,variouslycodebreakersandlinguists,togetherwiththefirstofwhatbecamesuccessivewavesofyoungwomen,whowouldplayavitalroleintheoperationsof‘BP’.ThefirsttwooftheseweredaughtersofgolfingpartnersofDenniston,reflectingtheimportanceofpersonalconnectionsinBletchley’srecruitmentprocessintheearlydays,beforeindustrialisationbecameinescapable.Indeed,thewholewartimeintelligencemachineemphasisedthecosinessoftheupperreachesofBritishlife.OxfordUniversityPresswasentrustedwithresponsibilityforprintingvastquantitiesofcodes,mapsandreports,becauseofitspre-warexperienceproducingexaminationpapersundersecureconditions.TheAdmiralty’sliaisonwithOUPwashandledbyMargaretGodfrey,wifeofthedirectorofnavalintelligence.TheRoyalNavy’sTopographicalPhotographicLibrarywashousedinthebasementofthenearbyBodleianLibrary,whicheventuallydispatched300,000imagesamonthtooperationalareas.TheWorldWarIintelligenceveteranAdmiralSirWilliam‘Blinker ’HallintroducedGodfrey,hismodernsuccessor,totheCityofLondonbankinggiantsMontaguNorman,OlafHambroandtheRothschilds,whohelpedtoidentifysuitablerecruitsfortheNID.CandidatesbeingscrutinisedforBletchleywereoftenasked:‘Doyouhavereligiousscruplesabout

readingotherpeople’scorrespondence?’Twenty-year-oldHarryHinsleywasinterviewedatStJohn’sCollege,CambridgebyAlastairDennistonandCol.JohnTiltman,theseniorcodebreaker.Theysaid:‘You’vetravelledabit,weunderstand.You’vedonequitewellinyourTripos.Whatdoyouthinkofgovernmentservice?Wouldyouratherhavethatthanbeconscripted?’Hinsleywouldindeed,andjoinedtheNavalSectionlocatedinBletchley’sHut4.Throughtheicywinterof1939–40,suchmenandwomenwrestledwithEnigmatraffic.Workingconditionsweredismal,withstaffmuffledinovercoatsandmittens.ThefirstbreakintoaLuftwaffeEnigmakey–designated‘Green’–isthoughttohavebeenmadeon25October1939.InDecember,byunaidedintellectualeffortAlanTuringisbelievedtohavebrokenfivedays’worthofoldnavalmessages.BytheendofMarch,theFrench–orrather,thePolesworkingatFrance’sStationBruno–hadbrokentwentydays’worthofoldsignalsandBPaboutthirty,allLuftwaffetraffic.Turingwasmuchmoreimportantlyengaged.Hecompileda150-pagetreatiseonEnigma,studded

withschoolboyishblots,deletionsandillegibilities.Whilemostcodebreakersaddressedeachotherbyfirstnamesornicknames,heedlessofageandstatus,almosteveryoneknewTuringas‘Prof’ratherthanasAlan.WhenhisEnigmastudywascirculatedlaterin1940,itbecameknownas‘theProf’sbook’.Healsosetaboutfulfillinghisconceptfora‘bombe’,aprimitivebutrevolutionaryelectro-mechanicaldeviceforexploringmultiplemathematicalcombinations.Thisborroweditsname,thoughnotitsdesign,fromthePolish‘bomby’,andwouldbecapableofexaminingthe17,576possiblewheeldeploymentsforathree-rotorEnigmainabouttwentyminutes:theorderforthefirstmachinewasplacedinOctober1939,andtheprototypebecameoperationalsixmonthslater.Meanwhile,outsideinthepark,workmensawedandhammeredatanever-wideningarrayoflow

woodenbuildingswhichhousedthegrowingstaff.Eventually,onlyadministratorsworkedinthemainbuilding,wherethetelephoneswitchboardwasestablishedintheballroom.Inthehuts,signalswereshiftedfromonesectiontoanotheronasmalltrolleypushedalongamakeshiftwoodentunnel.Hut8attackedGermannavaltraffic,whichwasthenpassedtoHut4fortranslationandprocessing.

Hut3performedthesamefunctionforWehrmachtandLuftwaffetrafficdecryptedbyHut6.TheformerwouldeventuallyplayapivotalroleinAlliedwartimeintelligence,butinitsearlyincarnationithadastaffofjustfour.FrankLucas,whowasoneofthem,wrote:‘OnasnowyJanuarymorningof1940,inasmallbleakwoodenroomwithnothingbutatableandthreechairs,thefirstbundleofEnigmadecodesappeared.[We]hadnoideawhattheywereabouttodisclose.’Afewscoreyardsaway,Hut6runbyGordonWelchmanwrestledwitharmy-Luftwaffe‘Red’keytraffic,whichwasthefirsttobebrokeninbulk.

Fromtheoutset,painsweretakentodisguisefromallbutthemostsenioroperationalcommandersthefactthatinformationwasbeinggainedfromcodebreaking.ThisgaveanunintendedboosttotheprestigeofMI6,andtothatofStewartMenziesinparticular.WhenRegJonesgaveadisguisedreportbasedonanUltradecrypttotheRAF’sdirectorofsignals,AirCommodoreNutting,theairmanprofessedastonishedadmirationforthecourageofthepresumedspieswhohadprovidedtheinformation,saying,‘ByJove,you’vegotsomebravechapsworkingforyou!’Theever-growingscaleoftheenemytraffictobetrawledwasintimidating.ItisameasureoftheexpansionofcommunicationsasabranchofwarfarethatbyAugust1943,305,000personnelamongtheLuftwaffe’stotalstrengthof2.3millionwereemployedonsignalsduties–transmitting,receivingorprocessing–andthesamewastrueonbothsidesofthewar,andofallarmedforces.AtGC&CStherewereinevitablepersonalityclashes.GordonWelchman,whosecreative

contributionbecamesecondonlytothatofTuring,andwhoseorganisationalskillswerealsopriceless,foundithardtoworkwiththehighly-strungandfractiousDillwynKnox,acontenderforthehotlycontestedtitleofBletchley’sstareccentric.Anotoriouslyawfuldriver,Knoxgiggled:‘It’samazinghowpeoplesmile,andapologisetoyou,whenyouknockthemover.’HesustainedastreamofintemperatecomplaintsanddemandstoDenniston,hisoldcomradefromRoom40,aboutstaffshortages,workingconditions,lowpay,togetherwiththeintrusionofandexcessiveauthorityconcededtonon-cryptanalysts:serviceintelligenceofficers‘whomaulandconcealourresults’.KnoxwasseriouslyillwiththecancerthatwouldkillhiminFebruary1943,butmeanwhileheandWelchmanbickered:theoldermanaccusedtheyoungerofexceedinghisnarrowinitialbrief,andwasalsoimpatientofTuring,writing,‘Heisverydifficulttoanchordown.Heisverycleverbutquiteirresponsibleandthrowsoutamassofsuggestionsofalldegreesofmerit.Ihavejust,butonlyjust,enoughauthorityandabilitytokeephimandhisideasinsomesortoforderanddiscipline.Butheisveryniceaboutitall.’TuringpromptedmirthbyjoiningBletchley’sHomeGuardbecausehewasseizedbyanimpulsetolearntoshoot,thenprovokedtheapoplecticrageofitscolonelbyabsentinghimselffromparadesoncehehadfulfilledthisprivatepurpose.Hisunworldlinesscouldprovokerealexasperationamongthoseunderrelentlesspressuretoproduceresults.AcolleaguespokeofTuring’s‘almosttotalinabilitytomakehimselfunderstood’.Therewereplentyofminortantrumslowerdownthehierarchy,unsurprisingwhenstaffwere

performingstressfultasksthroughlonghoursinbleakworkingconditions.AngusWilson,thelaternovelist,onceventedsuchastormofragethatacolleaguesaidwearily,‘Dostopit,Angus,otherwisewe’llputyouinthelake!’Wilsonretorteddefiantly,‘Don’tworry,I’lldoitmyself,’anddulyplungedintothewaterinfrontofthehouse;onanothersuchoccasionhehurledabottleofinkataWren.Manywartimecodebreakerssufferedtemporaryorpermanentphysicalormentalcollapses,broughtonbytheirwork:WilliamFriedman,oneofAmerica’spioneerpractitioners,underwentanervousbreakdowninJanuary1941whichincapacitatedhimforthreemonths.HughTrevor-Roper

languishedforseveralmonthsataboutthesametime,andothersregularlysuccumbed.Germansignalswereatfirstinterceptedbyabatteryofarmywireless-operatorsstationedinanold

navalfortatChatham,arolelaterassumedbyGambier-Parry’sorganisationatWhaddonHall.Intheearlywaryearstherewereneverenoughoperators,andboththeRAFandthearmywerereluctanttoacknowledgethepriorityofmeetingGC&CS’sdemands.SignalswerebroughtinbatchestoBletchley’sguardroombymotorcyclecouriers,atallhoursandoftenindreadfulweather,thendistributedbetweentherelevanthuts.Fromanearlystage,thecodebreakerslearnedtoidentifyGermansendersbytheunencryptedpreambletotheirmessagetexts,noneofwhichwaslongerthan250words.Itwasthenamatterofsittinghunchedoveradealtablethroughthehoursofashift,ponderingajumbleofnumbersandlettersfromwhichonlymen–andBletchley’shandfulofwomen–withremarkablelogicalormathematicalpowersmighthopetoextractfragmentsofmeaning.‘Theidealcryptanalyst,’StephenBudianskyhaswritten,‘wasBeethovenwiththesoulofanaccountant.’WhenChristopherMorriswasanewrecruittoBletchleyheheardoneofhisseniorcolleagues,askedtherequirementsforthejob,respondlaconically,‘Oh,Isupposeasharppencilandapieceofsquaredpaper.’Morrishimselfthoughtthatthemainrequisites–exceptattheexaltedlevelofKnox,Turing,WelchmanandlaterMaxNewman–were‘patience,accuracy,stamina,areasonablyclearhead,someexperienceandanabilitytoworkwithothers’.Theyopenedwhatbecamevastcardindexes,stackedinshoeboxesalongthesidesofthehuts,

cataloguingenemyunits,personnel,codenames,locations,abbreviationsandmilitaryhardware;differentEnigmakeysweredistinguishedbycolour–forinstance,yellow,green,redandblue,respectivelyindicatingNorway,Wehrmacht,army-Luftwaffeandairtrainingcodes.‘Whenanewwordcameupinthemessageyouweretranslating,’wroteHughSkillen,‘anewtypeofjetfuel,ormachinepart–youlookedforit,andifitwasnotthere,theindexerputitinwithareferencetimeanddatestamp.’Bletchley’smeticulousrecord-keepingbecameacriticalelementinitstriumphs.Forsecurityreasons,thePark’soperationswererigidlycompartmentalised,andtherewaslittle

exchangeofinformationorgossipbetweensections.EvenWelchmanremarkedyearslaterhowlittleheknewaboutwhatcolleaguesweredoingafewyardsawayfromhisownHut.Asthestaffgrewfromhundredsintothousands,facilitieslaggedbehind:asectionheadcomplainedthattwohundredmenandwomenenjoyedtheuseofjustonelavatory.ThefoodintheBletchleycanteenwaspoorevenbywartimestandards.FormerdebutanteSarahNortononenightfoundacookedcockroachinhermeat:‘IwasabouttoreturnittothecateringmanageresswhenmyfriendOsla,whohadtheappetiteofalionesswithcubs,snatchedtheplateandsaid:“Whatawaste–I’lleatit!”’ThenearestavailabledelicaciesoutsidethewireweretobefoundattheStationInninBletchleytown,whichofferedoxheart.Welchmanrecalledhavingtoprovidehisownnewspapertowrapfishandchipsatthelocalshop.Thecodebreakersworkedaroundtheclockinthreerotatingshifts,startingwith8a.m.to4p.m.Whentheexhaustedmenandwomencycledortookabusthroughtheblackouttotheirlodgings,they

foundfewcomforts:dimlighting,hotbathsoftenrationedtooneaweek,draconianrulesaboutinter-sexvisiting.ItisdeeplyimpressivethatthosewhoworkedatBletchleysustainedsuchdedicationwhileworking

dayafterday,monthaftermonth,inadrabworlddevoidofglamour,excitement,variety,gloryanddecorations.InHut3,thewatchsataroundahorseshoetable,translatingdecipheredsignals,eachoneresemblingatelegraphflimsy,forwardedfromHut6.Ideally,decryptswerecomposedofcompleteGermanwords,butoftentherewereinterruptionsandcorruptionsinthetexts,whichdemandedleapsofimaginationfromthelinguists.WilliamMillwardrecalledwithshameanightwhenheinventedaplacenamed‘Senke’,nearQataraintheNorthAfricandesert–havingforgottenthatSenkewastheGermanwordforageographicaldepression.Schoolmastersprovedidealaswatchchiefs,wrotePeterCalvocoressi,becausetheywerenaturallymeticulous:‘Ifnotsatisfied,theywouldthrowbackatranslationatevenaneminentprofessor.ItremindedmeofChiefExaminersat“A”LevelwhowouldsendbackscriptstoanAssistantExaminertore-mark.’NoonecouldworkatGC&CSwhodidnotlovebraingames.Thereweredreary,idleyetsleeplesslulls,whennotrafficarrivedforthewatchestoworkon.PeterHiltononceusedsuchadoodletimetocomposeapalindrome:‘DOCNOTE,IDISSENT,AFASTNEVERPREVENTSAFATNESS.IDIETONCOD’.AlthoughAlanTuringwasacknowledgedasthehighestintellectatBletchley,itsachievementwas

supremelyateameffort;thecreativeinputofsomeothers,Welchmanprominentamongthem,wasalmostasimportantasthatofTuring.OnenightinFebruary1940,severalmonthsbeforethearrivalofthefirstbombe,twenty-one-year-oldCambridgemathematicianJohnHerivelwassmokingapipebeforethefireinhisbillet,andconcentratingfuriouslyonencodedmessagesevenashedriftedinandoutofadoze.Aninspirationstruckhimashegazedwiththemind’seyeataGermanEnigmaoperator.Heperceivedsuchamanstartinghismorning’sworkboredorwearyorhungover,andthusnottroublingtochangethepreviousday’sringsettingonhismachinebeforestartingtociphermessages.Herivelscarcelysleptthatnight,ashewentontodeducehowsuchanactofcarelessnessmightbedetected,thenexploitedtobreakamessage.Welchman,whohadsupervisedhimatCambridge,immediatelysawtheimportanceofthisflashof

insight,amarriageofmathematicalbrilliancetoagraspofhumanweakness.Hetoldtheyoungmanferventlythathe‘wouldnotbeforgotten’,andindeedhisinspirationbecameknownas‘theHeriveltip’.DillwynKnoxhadalreadyidentifiedanotherentrypointtomessages,rootedinoperatorerrorsandtextsettings–whatthecodebreakerschristened‘Cillis’or‘Sillies’.WelchmanwrotelaterthatBletchleyremained‘entirelydependentonHeriveltipsandCillisfromtheinvasionofFrancetotheendoftheBattleofBritain’.Inotherwords,untilthearrivalofthebombes,codebreakingwasbeingdonebyrawbrainpower,withoutsignificantmechanicalassistance:atthisearlystage,theBritishlaggedbehindtheirAmericancounterpartsinexploitingtechnology–boththeUSArmyandUSNavycodebreakingteamsusedHollerithpunched-cardsorters,ofakindthatonlybegantoappearat

BletchleyinMay1940,becausechiefcodebreakerCol.JohnTiltmanhadbeenscepticalaboutthem.Ultraprovidednoimportantmaterialduringthesummerof1940,butseveralindicationsaboutthepostponementof‘Sealion’,theNaziinvasionofBritain,notableamongthemaSeptemberLuftwaffemessageorderingthedismantlingofairtransportequipmentatDutchairfields.FredWinterbotham,theMI6officerwhoeventuallybecameoverseerofthe‘SpecialLiaisonUnit’

networkwhichfedUltradecryptstocommandersinthefield,describedthefirstbombe–christened‘Agnus’,corruptedto‘Agnes’–asresembling‘someEasterngoddesswhowasdestinedtobecometheoracleofBletchley’.ItwasinstalledinHut11on14March1940,butsufferedsubstantialteethingtroubles.GordonWelchmanmadeanimportantcontributiontoTuring’screationbydevisinga‘diagonalboard’,anelementintroducedintothefirstreallyeffectivemodel,whichcameintoserviceinmid-August.Agnesanditsmanysuccessorswerenotcomputers,becausetheyhadnomemory.Theywereinsteadelectro-mechanicalkey-findingaids,sixandahalffeethighandsevenwide,mountedinbronze-colouredcabinets,andcontainingthirty-sixbanksofhigh-speedelectrically-drivenEnigmareplicas.Eachbombecontainedelevenmilesofwiringandamillionsolderedcontacts.BuiltbytheBritishTabulatingMachineCompanyatLetchworth,theydependedpartlyoncomponentsassembledinscoresoflocalvillagehalls,bycasualworkerswhohadnoclueoftheimportancetothewareffortofthetwenty-six-waycablesandothersmallelectricalpartstheycontributed.Withtheassistanceofaclueor‘crib’–avitalidentifyinglink,usuallyacodebreaker ’sguessabout

thenatureofpartofagivensignal–abombecouldtestmillionsofmathematicalpossibilitiesforthesettingsofthreeEnigmarotors.Figuratively,Agnesandherkinwerebloodhoundsneedingaslipperorhandkerchieftotakeupascent.Iftherewasno‘crib’,thebombecouldnotsolvethekey–butmercifullyoften,therewasone.Subsequentmachines,miraclesofreliabilitygiventheircontinuousoperation,weregiventheirownnamesbytheWrenswhomannedthemaroundtheclock,usuallythoseofwarships–Warspite,Victoryandsuchlike.ThebombesdidnottakeinenemyciphermessagesanddisgorgetheminfluentGerman.Theywereinsteadpricelessaccelerators,oncethecodebreakerssecuredaninsightintothenatureofagivensignalortrafficstream.AlsousefulwasabatteryofBritishType-Xciphermachines,modifiedtomatchthebehaviourofEnigmas,onwhichWrenoperatorstestedspeculativemessagesolutions.Oneoftheprincipalconstraintsoncodebreaking,especiallybetween1940and1942,wasthataccesstothescarcetechnologyhadtobeapportionedbetweencompetingclaimantsofthethreeservices,andtherewasneverenough‘bombetime’togoaround.Throughout1940,humanbrainpowerremainedthedominantelementinBletchley’ssuccesses,

whichincreasedwitheverypassingweek.Itwas‘theHeriveltip’,notbombes,thatenabledtheteamtocrackthearmy-Luftwaffe‘Red’keyinMay.Theoverwhelmingbulkofenemytrafficreadthroughtherestoftheyear–aroundathousandmessagesaday–wasthatoftheLuftwaffe,anduntiltheend

ofthewarairforcematerialwasaccessedmoreswiftlythanthatoftheotherservices.Animportantrequirementforsuccesswaswhatthecodebreakerscalled‘depth’–possessionofsufficientmessagesinagivenkeytogivethemplayingspaceforcalculationsandspeculations.LuftwaffesignalsprovidedmanycluestotheWehrmacht’sparallelactivities,butintheearlydays

interpretationwasimpededbylackofunderstandingofGermanterminologyandabbreviations.InSeptember1940,BletchleybrokesometrafficfromGöring’spathfinderunit,KGr100,whichenabledittoforecastthetargetsofseveralbomberraids.Butwarningwasoflittlepracticalusefulnesstothedefenderswhenhardpower,intheformofradar-guidedRAFnight-fighters,waslackinginbothnumbersandeffectiveness.Asmorebombeswerebuilt–by1945therewere211ofthem–theyweredispersedaroundthe

LondonsuburbsasaprecautionagainstanenemyairattackonBletchley.Theoperators,chieflyyoungwomenoftheWRNS,foundlonghoursbesidethehot,smelly,clatteringmachinesextraordinarilygruelling,especiallywhentheywereobligedtousetweezerstoadjustthedelicateelectricalwiring.Somegirlswereunnervedbythemonotonousracket.Oneofthemsaid:‘Itwaslikealotofknittingmachinesworking–akindoftickety-clicketynoise.’Theywenthomewiththeirshirtcuffsblackenedbyafinesprayofoilfromthebombes’revolvingdrums.NavalEnigmaremainedformanymonthsimpenetrable.Thiswaspartlybecauseitssystemofeight

rotors,ofwhichthreewereusedatanyonetime,posedgreaterdifficultiesthanthearmy’sfive,andpartlyalsobecausetheKriegsmarine’soperatorsweremoredisciplinedthantheirLuftwaffecounterparts,andcommittedfewererrorstoprovideopeningsforBletchley.TherewasabriefspasmofsuccessinlateApril1940,whenfivedays’trafficwasread,butthereaftermorethanayearelapsed–aneternityinthemindsofthosewhowrestledvainlywiththeproblemdayafterday,weekuponweek–beforethebigbreakthrough.DennistonsaidgloomilytoFrankBirch,a1918veteranofRoom40whonowheadedthenavalsection:‘Youknow,theGermansdon’tmeanyoutoreadtheirstuff,andIdon’tsupposeyoueverwill.’AlanTuringhimselfhadbeendallyingwiththeKriegsmarine’strafficalmostsincehisarrivalatBletchley.Acolleague,HughAlexander,observedthathebecameengagedbecausenobodyelseseemedtobemakingheadway,andinhisremotefashionhewasfascinatedbytheabstractchallenge.ItwasTuringwhodevisedanewmethodchristened‘Banburismus’,employinglongpunchedpaper

sheetsmanufacturedinthetownofBanbury,whichassistedthefirstimportantbreaksintoKriegsmarinemessagesbyreducingthenumberofpossibleEnigmarotororderstobetestedfrom336toaroundeighteen.Thissystemwasintroducedinthespringof1941,justasBritishlossestoU-boatsbegantobecomealarming.Onland,theBritishinthosedayslackedpowerandopportunitytodomuchwithsuchknowledgeoftheWehrmacht’smovementsastheysecured,andtherewasalargeelementofluckaboutwhatmessageswerebroken.InNorthAfricainearly1941,theBritishArmyprofitedfromsomegoodsigintderivedfromeavesdroppingontheItalians,butfewEnigma

messageswerebrokenquicklyenoughtoassistdecision-makingonthebattlefield.Atsea,bycontrast,therewasanearlygoldenprizeforGC&CS’slabours.Theimpetustowardssuccesswasprovidedbyaseriesofcapturesfaroutontheocean,which

dramaticallyincreasedBletchley’sknowledgeoftheenemy’snavalcommunications.On23February1941,BritishcommandosraidingtheLofotenIslandsseizedtheGermanarmedtrawlerKrebs,fromwhichsparerotorsforanavalEnigmawererecovered,thoughthemachineitselfhadbeenthrownoverboard.This‘pinch’promptedtheRoyalNavytolaunchanoperationexplicitlydesignedtocapturemoreEnigmamaterial,targetingGermanweather-reportingtrawlersbetweenIcelandandJanMayenIsland.On7May,asweepbythreecruiserslocatedandseizedtheMünchen–buttoolatetosaveitsEnigmaandassociatedcodingdatafromtheArcticdeep.On25JunethenavycaughtitssistervesseltheLauenburg,againminusitsEnigma,butwithausefulhaulofciphermaterial.Hut8nowhadenoughinformationtoreadsomeU-boatsignals,buttheseizurewhichopenedthe

traffictofluentdecryptionwasthefruitofchanceandhighcourage,ratherthanofdesign.On9May1941aconvoyescortgroupattackedandforcedtothesurfaceJuliusLempe’sU-110.AboardingpartyfromHMSBulldogcommandedbySub-LieutenantDavidBalmesecuredthesubmarine,preventeditssinking,andbroughtbacktohisdestroyerpearlsbeyondprice:documentationforcurrentEnigma.ThoughU-110latersankundertow–fortunatelyso,fromasecurityviewpoint–theshortsignalbook,officercipheringinstructionsandothermaterialreachedBletchleysafely,andthesecretofthesubmarine’scapturewaspreservedbeyondthewar ’send.AnEnigmamachinewasalsorecovered,butperverselythiswastheleastusefulelementofthebooty,becauseBletchleyhadonealready,togetherwithassortedrotorsseizedinother‘pinches’.Withindays,Hut8wasreadingasteadystreamofGermannavalmessages.RalphErskine,oneoftheforemostexpertsoncodebreakingatBletchley,believesthattheParkwasalreadyclosetoreadingtheKriegsmarinetraffic,evenwithouttheU-110haul.Whatisforcertain,however,isthatitwasimpossibletobreaktheU-boatcipherswithouttheassistanceofcapturedmaterial,whichwouldagainbecomeavitalissuelaterinthewar.ThebreakthroughintotheKriegsmarinecipherscamejusttoolatetoinfluencethepursuitofthe

BismarckinthelatterdaysofMay1941.Conventionaldirection-findingonthebehemoth’swirelesstransmissions,supportedbyairreconnaissance,werethekeyfactorsinenablingtheRoyalNavytointerceptandsinkitonthemorningofthe27th,thoughassistedinthelaststagebydecryptionofaLuftwaffesignalrevealingBrestasBismarck’sdestination.Thereafter,BletchleyproducedasteadystreamofmessagesthatrevealedU-boatpositionsandintendedcourses.Theso-calledHydracipherwaslaidbare,andotherkeyswereprogressivelybroken:themoretheParkknew,themoreitwasabletodiscover.Theflowofdecryptswasneverassured,however,anddisturbingdelayssometimestookplace.‘Huff-Duff’–High-FrequencyDirection-Finding–playedanimportantsecondaryroleinthelocationofU-boats.TheoutcomewasarelentlessshiftinthebalanceofadvantageintheBattleof

theAtlanticthrough1941andinto1942.Herewasacasewhereintelligenceindisputablyandimportantlyinfluencedevents.BletchleywasalsoreadingasignificantportionofItaliannavaltraffic.On25March1941,oneof

thesmallnumberofwomendecrypters,nineteen-year-oldmathematicianMavisLeverinDillwynKnox’steam–hewasfamouslysupportiveoftalentedgirlsinamale-dominatedinstitution–playedacriticalroleinbreakingamessagewhichrevealedthattheItalianfleetwouldshortlyputtoseatoattackBritishconvoys.ThewarningenabledtheMediterraneanC-in-CAdmiralSirAndrewCunninghamtocontriveanencounteroffCapeMatapanduringtheafternoonandnightof28MarchwhichendedinastrikingvictoryfortheRoyalNavy.Bydawnonthe29th,threecruisersandtwodestroyershadbeensunk,whilethebattleshipVittorioVenetowasdamaged,anoutcomethatdeterredtheItaliansurfacefleetfrommakinganyfurtherattempttointerdictBritishtroopmovementstoGreece.SpringbroughtanincreasingflowofdecryptsaboutWehrmachtoperationsintheEastern

Mediterranean.SeniorofficersstrovetostreamlinethetransferofinformationfromBletchleytobattlefields,sothatmaterialreachedcommandersinrealtime.Oneofthemostsignificantintercepts,detailingGermanplansfortheMay1941invasionofCrete,reported‘probabledateofendingpreparations:17/5.Proposedcourseofoperation…Sharpattackagainstenemyairforce,militarycampsandA/Apositions…TroopsofFliegerkorpsXI:parachutelandingtooccupyMaleme,CandiaandRetiomo;transferofdive-bombersandfighterstoMalemeandCandia;air-landingoperationsbyremainderofFliegerkorpsXI;sea-transportofflakunits,furtherarmyelementsandsupplies.’Churchillpersonallyannotatedtheflimsy:‘InviewofthegtimportanceofthisIshdliketheactualtexttransmittedbyMOSTSECRETtogetherwithwarningsaboutabsolutesecrecy.’ThisinformationwaspassedtoWavellandFreyberg,therelevantcommanders,at2340on6May.ThelossofthesubsequentBattleofCrete,followingtheGermaninvasionwhichbeganonthemorningofthe20th,emphasisedafundamentalrealityaboutEnigmadecrypts:theycouldchangeoutcomesonlywhenBritishcommandersandtroopsonthegroundweresufficientlystrong,competentandcourageouseffectivelytoexploitthem.StuartMilner-BarryofHut6saidthatheandhiscolleagueslookedbackonCreteas‘thegreatestdisappointmentofthewar.Itseemedanearcertaintythat,with…everydetailoftheoperationspeltoutforusinadvance…theattackwouldbeignominiouslythrownback.’TheCretansignal,informingBritishgeneralsofGermanintentionsintimetorespond,wasan

exceptionratherthanacommonplacein1941.Bletchleywasabletoprovideanever-growingflowofinformationaboutthedeploymentsoftheenemy,notleastinEasternEurope,mostofitderivedfromLuftwaffeandarmy-Luftwaffedecrypts.Wehrmachttrafficstubbornlyresistedpenetration,butGermanrailwaycodesprovidedinformationabout–forinstance–troopmovementstoYugoslavia,GreeceandEasternEuropeinthesummerof1941.Hitler ’sloominginvasionoftheSovietUnion,thetoweringeventofthewar,wasalsothefirstgreatstrategicdevelopmentforwhichUltraintelligence

providedexplicitwarning.WhileBritainhadnopowertoinfluenceorimpedeHitler ’sOperation‘Barbarossa’,itwasclearlyofthehighestimportancetoChurchillandhisgeneralstobeabletomonitoritsunfolding.ItbecameasourceofincreasingfrustrationtotheprimeministerthatBritishtroopsinNorth

AfricafailedtofrustrateordefeatRommelwhentheyhadnotonlysuperiorityinmen,tanksandguns,butalsoanever-growingstreamofinformationaboutGermandeploymentsandmovements,forinstanceatHalfayaPassinMay.ChurchillporedintentlyoverhisowndailyfileofUltramaterial.WhenhereadadecryptreportingpetrolstocksatvariousLuftwaffeairfieldsinLibya,hescrawledonitinhisredink:‘CAS[ChiefofAirStaff]Howmanyhoursflyingcantheira/cdoonthis–about?WSC.’AirChiefMarshalSirCharlesPortalrespondedtestily:‘UnfortunatelyitisnotpossibletomakeanygeneraldeductionsincethefiguresonlyrelatetothestockatBenghazi.WedonotpossesscompletefiguresforthesupplyandconsumptionofoilandpetrolthroughoutLibya.Allweknowisthatthereareindicationsofanoverallshortagewhichislimitingoperationsintheforwardarea.’Thisproblemwasendemicwhendecryptswerefragmentary.StewartMenziesperformedanimportantservicebydissuadingtheprimeministerfromfulfillinghisfrequentdesiretodispatchrawUltradirecttocommanders-in-chiefinthefield,ashehaddoneinthecaseofCrete.‘C’wassurelycorrect,onsecuritygrounds,andalsobecausedecryptsthatlackedthecontextofotherintelligencecouldbehighlymisleadingtountrainedeyes.Onland,in1941Bletchleyprovidedmoreguidancetostrategythantotactics:itgaveChurchill’s

highcommandanauthoritative,thoughnevercomprehensive,pictureofGermandeploymentsineverytheatreofwar.UltracoulddolittletoassisttheRAF’songoingstrugglewiththeLuftwaffeformasteryoftheskies.OnlytheRoyalNavygainedimmediateadvantage,bothintheMediterraneanandtheAtlantic.Nothingalteredthefactthat,untiltheworldwidebalanceofstrengthbegantoshiftintheAllies’favourinthelatterpartof1942,theoperationalsuperiorityofGermanandJapaneseforcesenabledthemtokeepwinningvictories.Bletchleywasanincreasinglyimportantweapon,butitwasnotamagicsword.

ThepracticesanddisciplinesofGC&CSevolvedprogressively,withmanywranglesandturfwarsalongtheway.DeputydirectorNigeldeGreycomplainedaboutthe‘verylowstandardsofmilitarybehaviour ’prevailinginwhatwassupposedtobeamilitaryestablishment.Buthowcoulditbeotherwise?NoelAnnanwrote:‘ManyofthecryptanalystswhoproducedUltrawereagnostic,heterodoxdonswhodidnotsetmuchstorebythenormalinterpretationsofpatriotismanddemocracy.’Itwasnoteasytocombinethedisciplineessentialtotheoperation’ssmoothfunctioningwithsensitivitytothewaywardandfranklyeccentriccharacterofsomeofitsresidentgeniuses.Col.Tiltmanwroteruefullyon2March1941:‘Cryptanalystshavetobehandleddelicatelyanddonottakekindlytoservicemethodsofcontrol,whichareessentialtothegoodworkingofsignals.’Whenthe

directoroftheRoyalNavy’swomenpersonnelvisitedthePark,shedemandedindignantly:‘WhyaremyWrensworkingwithcivilians?’WAAFsintheteleprinterroomexpressedresentmentabouttakingordersfromcivilians.InDecember1940theWarOffice’sdirectorofmilitaryintelligencestagedagrabforBletchley’smilitaryoutput.Until1941,theAdmiraltytriedtocontinuesomecryptographicworkunderitsownroof.InHut3,rowseruptedbetweenrepresentativesofthethreearmedservices.StewartMenziesreceivedaconstantstreamofcomplaintsfromrivalinterests,whileBletchleystaffreferredtoBroadwaywithoutenthusiasmas‘theotherside’.Oneofthemostdurablecriticismsof‘C’isthathewasevereagertoacceptcreditfortheachievementsofthePark,whiledecliningtoengagewithitschronicresourceproblems,whicheventuallypromptedtheOctober1941lettertoChurchillsignedbyTuringandhiscolleaguespleadingformorestaff,thatcausedChurchilltosendhisfamous‘ActionThisDay’message:‘Makesuretheyhavealltheywantonextremepriority.’ItisaseriouschargeagainstMenzies,thathewasanabsenteelandlordofGC&CS.Yetallthismademercifullylittleimpactontheworkofthecodebreakers.EdwardThomas,anaval

officerwhoworkedatthePark,wasimpressedbytheabsenceofhierarchicaldistinctions:‘Despitethehightensionofmuchofthework…anyoneofwhateverrankordegreecouldapproachanyoneelse,howevervenerable,withanyideaorsuggestion,howevercrazy.’Fewpeopleofanyrankorstatusfeltdeniedavoice–anunusuallyrareandprivilegedstateofaffairsinthewartimeinstitutionsofanynation.From1941,theCambridgescientistandnovelistC.P.SnowbecameakeyWhitehallintermediary,responsibleforchannellingsuitablemathematiciansandotherscholarstoBletchley.GC&CSalsoemployedthousandsofhumblerfolk,recruitedchieflyfortheirlanguageskills.ItsfilesrecorddetailsofsomeRAFpersonnelinterviewed,suchasLeadingAircraftsmanBerry,agedtwenty-three,whohadstartedtrainingasapilotbutre-musteredowingtohisconscientiousobjectionstodroppingbombs.HisGermanlanguageskillsweregradedonly‘B’,andtherecruitersnoted:‘ifinterestedinworkmightdowell,butneedscarefulhandling’.LACGraywasalsoex-aircrew,‘groundedasresultofcrash’,had‘B’gradeSpanish.CplHodges,

agedtwenty-six,wasunfitforaircrew,‘anxioustousehisGerman“A”,incivillifeworkedinarchitect’soffice’.AC1Tew,atwenty-eight-year-oldclerk,hadGerman‘A’,aswellassomeSpanish,FrenchandDanish,acquiredwhileworkinginhisfather ’sleather-tradingbusiness.TherewasmuchsnappingbetweenBletchleyandtheAirMinistryaboutthelatter ’sreluctancetograntcommissionedranktoRAFmensecondedtocipherorwirelessinterceptionduties.Group-CaptainBlandyoftheYServicecomplainedthatsuchpeoplewere‘pickedindividualshavingconsiderablelinguisticqualificationsandahighstandardofeducation…[MereAircraftsmen]andNCOslackthenecessaryauthorityrequiredtocarryouttheirdutiesefficiently.’NotallthepersonnelpostedtoBletchleyprovedsuitedtoitsdemands.AMarch1941reportonan

RAFofficerreturnedtogeneraldutiesafteraspellatBPnoted:‘Althoughanexcellentlinguist,hedoesnotappeartometohaveanyaptitudeorinclinationfortheresearchsideofthework.Hehad

beenrelegatedtoclericaltasks,butdidnotseemthustojustifyhispay.’Therewereequallybleakverdictsontheperformanceofsomewomenstafferslowerdownthehierarchy:‘WrenKenwickisinaccurate,veryslowandnotabitkeenonherwork,notveryintelligent.WrensBuchananandFordareunintelligentandslowandseemunabletolearn.WrenRogerssuffersfrommildclaustrophobiaandcannotworkinawindowlessroom.’Thereportconcluded:‘Theremainder…aredoingmostexcellentwork,’buttheselectorswereurgedtorecognisetheimportanceofthejobsthewomenwererequiredtofulfil,‘andnottosendustoomanyoftheCookandMessengertype’.Enfoldedwithintheiroppressivesecurityblanket,Bletchley’speoplelived,lovedandlargely

playedwithintheirowncommunity.Almostallwerepaidapittance:nineteen-year-oldmathematicianMavisLever,oneof‘Dilly’Knox’steam,initiallyreceivedthirtyshillingsaweek,ofwhichshepaidtwenty-oneshillingsforherlodgings.Whenstaffdidescapeintotheworldbeyondtheperimeterfence,thecivilianstatusoftheyoungmenincurreddarksuspicionsamongtheuninitiatedabouttheirabsencefromanybattlefield.ThedramasandpantomimesperformedbythePark’samateurdramaticsocietybecamehighspotsintheannualcalendar:FrankBirch,formerlyofKing’sCollege,CambridgeandnowheadofHut4,wascelebratedforhisappearancesastheWidowTwankeyinproductionsofthepantomimeAladdin.By1942,commonsensehadachievedsomeimportantsuccessesinthePark’smanagement.Each

sectionworkedtoitsappointedhead,irrespectiveofrankorlackofit.CryptanalysisforallBritain’sarmedforceswashandledentirelyatBletchleyanditsIndianout-stations,aconcentrationofeffortthatneitherGermanynortheUnitedStatesevermatched.GordonWelchmanemergedastheforemostlubricator,curbingfeuding;severalnotoriouslystupidserviceofficersweretransferredout;thepopularEricJoneswasappointedtoheadHut3.Itwasacknowledgedthattheciviliancodebreakersmustberiddenonthelightestpossiblerein,thoughthedirectorwaspronetooccasionalsurgesofauthoritarianism.On1February1942,AdmiralKarlDönitzintroducedareflectororfourthrotorintotheAtlantic

U-boatservice’sEnigma,withimmediateandcalamitousresultsforAlliedfortunesintheBattleoftheAtlantic:thisimposedatwenty-six-foldincreaseintherangeofpossiblesettings,andblindedBletchley.Sinkingssoared.Atsea,theRoyalNavywasobligedtorelyupon‘Huff-Duff’tolocateenemysubmarinesuntiltheseapproachedwithinrangeofunderwaterdetectionbytheAsdicsofconvoyescorts,whichwereimpotentagainstnightsurfaceattackers.Breakingwhatwasnowdesignatedthe‘Shark’submarinekeybecamethePark’sforemostpriority,achallengeunresolvedforninefrighteningmonths,byfarthemoststressfulperiodofthewarforthoseengagedinthetask.Theyknew,astheysathunchedovertheirlaboursinthoseausterehuts,thatatseamenweredyingeverydaybecauseoftheirfailure–thoughnorationalpersonwouldhavecalleditsuch.Alsoon1February,coincidentally,AlastairDennistonwaspushedasideintoasubordinateLondon

role,tobereplacedbyhisdeputy,EdwardTravis.Insomemeasurethisdevelopmentreflectedaclash

ofpersonalities–DennistonandStewartMenziesdislikedeachother–togetherwiththeinfightingcharacteristicofanylargebureaucracy.ButitwaswidelyfeltatBletchleythatitsoperationalheadwasbeingoverwhelmedbythestrainsofrunninganestablishmentthatsincetheoutbreakofwarhadincreasedfourfoldinsize,andmanytimesthatmuchinitsimportancetothewareffort.Powerstruggleswereunavoidable.Dennistonwasagoodandkindmanwhohaddonemanythingswell,butBletchleyhadoutgrownhim.Travis,whoseedictswereissuedinacurioustrademarkbrownink,wasgenerallyconsideredasuccessinhisnewrole,notleastbysuchinfluentialcreativefiguresasWelchman.Whenanothercodebreaker,RalphBennett,returnedthatsummerfromdetacheddutyintheMiddleEast,hefoundthattheatmospherehadchangedmarkedly:‘Ihadleftasoneofagroupofenthusiasticamateurs.Ireturnedtoaprofessionalorganisationwithstandardsandanacknowledgedreputationtomaintain.Successwasnolongeranoccasionalprize,butthenaturalrewardofrelentlessattentiontodetail.’Throughout1942,Bletchley’sactivitieswerehamperedbyadesperateshortageofbombes,and

thusbyargumentabouttheirbestemployment.InJanuarythearmy-LuftwaffeHut6wasreceiving1,400interceptsaday,ofwhichanaverageof580werebroken,aproportionthatslowlyincreased,reachingabout50percentbyMay1943.Oftennomorethanonethree-wheelbombewasavailableatanygiventimetoworkontheSharkU-boatcipher,becausetheothersofwhatwasstillonlyahandfulofmachineswerecommittedtobreakingarmyandairtraffic.Thecodebreakerssaidlaterthattheywouldhaveneededtenfour-wheelbombes–whichdidnotthenexist–significantlytoacceleratetheirprogress.ByNovember,anoteofdesperationhadenteredtheAdmiralty’spleastotheParkaboutShark.TheBattleoftheAtlantic,saidthenavy’sOperationalIntelligenceCentre,was‘theonecampaignwhichBParenotatpresentinfluencingtoanymarkedextent–anditistheonlyoneinwhichthewarcanbelostunlessBPdohelp’.Acriticalbreakthroughwasimminent,however.On30OctoberintheEasternMediterraneanU-559wasattackedbyanescortgroup,andforcedtothesurfacebydepth-charging.TonyFasson,thirty-year-oldfirstlieutenantofthedestroyerPetard,alongwithAbleSeamanColinGrazier,hastilystrippednakedandswamsixtyyardstothestrickensubmarine,thenhauledthemselvesintotheconningtower.Thecrewhadopenedtheseacocksbeforeabandoningtheirboat,andtheseawasfloodinginevenasthetwomensearchedthecontrolroomwithdesperateurgency.Theyfoundtreasure:thesecondeditionoftheWetterkurzschlussel,orweathershortsignalbook,

foritsEnigma.Havingwrappedthisandotherdocumentsinwaterproofing,FassonandGrazierhandedthemupthehatchtosixteen-year-oldNAAFIcanteenassistantTommyBrown,whohadfollowedinswimmingtotheU-boat.Heinturnpassedthepackagestothecrewofawhaleboat,whicharrivedalongsideinthenickoftime.Brown,acivilian,livedtoreceiveaGeorgeMedalforhisdaring,butthetwosupremelydedicatedBritishsailorspushedtheirluckbyplungingoncemoreintothesubmarine’scontrolroom,possiblyinthebeliefthatthattheymightretrieveaciphermachine.

Bletchleydidnotneedthis,forithadalreadyreconstructedthewiringofafour-rotorEnigma:itwasthesignalbooksthatmattered.U-559suddenlyvanishedintotheMediterranean,takingwithitFassonandGrazier,bothofwhomreceivedposthumousGeorgeCrosses.ThecaptureddocumentsreachedBletchleyon24November,andmadepossiblethecriticalbreakintotheSharkkeyon13December,assistedbydatafromweatherdecryptssecuredbyHut10.Thatday,thecodebreakersteleprintedtotheAdmiralty’sOperationalIntelligenceCentrelocations

fortwelveAtlanticU-boats.Theirpositionswerebynowaweekoutofdate,buttheysufficedtoprovidecriticalguidanceabouttheGermans’likelycourses.Thereafter,Sharksignalswerefrequentlybrokenwithintwenty-fourhours,thoughthedelaysometimesextendedtoforty-eight.Thiswasoneoftheindisputablydecisivemomentsoftheintelligencewar.OnceregularSharkdecryptsbegantoflowthroughtotheRoyalNavy,thebalanceinthewaratseashifteddramatically.ThoughHut8latersufferedmoredelaysanddifficultieswithShark,neverthereafterwasBritishcontroloftheAtlanticsearouteseriouslythreatened,andU-boatsinkingssoared.

AmongmuchelseremarkableaboutBletchleywerenotitsperiodicrowsandtantrums,butthatthefront-linecodebreakers,whoseaverageagewastwenty-three,sustainedsuchadegreeoffellowship.DerekTauntdescribedhowtheyfelt‘devotedtothetaskofoutwittingtheenemyandhappytobepartofacomplicatedorganizationdesignedtodojustthat’.RolfNoskwithpaidtributetowhathedescribedastheHuts’‘exemplaryleadership’.TheintegrityofthedecodingoperationwasmuchassistedbythepersonalfriendshipbetweenStuartMilner-BarryofHut6andHughAlexanderofHut8.Buttranquillitycouldneverbeattainablewhenthousandsofmenandwomenwereworkingunderappallingpressurearoundtheclock,monthuponmonth,yearafteryear,knowingthatlivesdependedupontheirefforts.On15May1943WelchmanwrotetoNigeldeGrey,apologisingforanexplosionofrageduringadiscussionaboutorganisationandshortageofresources,anongoingbugbear.‘Mytouchiness,’hewrote,‘isprobablyduetothefactthatIalwayshavetheextremevalueandurgencyofourworkverymuchonmymind.ThroughoutthewholehistoryofHut6therehasneverbeenatimeatwhichIfeltthatwewerebeingasefficientaswecouldbeandyoucanimaginethatthishasbeenaheavyandcontinualstrain…Thepresentsituationisanabsolutescandal,butthereisnothingwelacknowthathasnotbeenaskedforagainandagain.Sopleaseforgivemeforbeingsomewhatbitterandill-tempered.’Headded:‘Agreatdealoftheworkisterriblymonotonousanddeadlydull,andthishasavery

seriouseffectonmoraleoveralongperiod.SomeofthegirlsarealmostphysicallysickatthesightofaType-Xmachine.Now,ifourgirlscrackupasmanyhavedone,weareabsolutelysunk,andnoamountofbelatedassistancewillsaveus…Incidentally,couldyoupossiblypersuadeTravistoget[Air-MarshalCharles]Medhurst[RAFdirectorofintelligence]and[theCIGSGen.SirAlan]Brooketospendevenoneminutetellingthegirlsthattheirworkisimportant?YourseverGordon.’But

difficultiespersistedinsecuringqualifiedpersonnel,notleastbecausesofewpeopleinWhitehallhadanyinklingofthesupremepriorityofGC&CS’swork.WhenBPneededpersonneltooperatepunch-cardmachines,itsrecruitersturnedtoemployeesoftheJohnLewisPartnership,thedepartment-storechainwhichhadpersonneltrainedtousethem.Astoundingly,aftertenwomenhadbeenselected,theMinistryofLabourinsistedthattheyshouldinsteadbedispatchedtodolandwork.AninternalmemoattheParkseethed:‘TheJohnLewisepisodeisadisgrace.’ThegirlswereeventuallyreleasedtoGC&CS,butonlyafterabitterwranglewiththecivilbureaucracy.Fromthewar ’sfirstdaytoitslast,securitywasanobsessionofeveryAlliedofficerprivytothe

Ultrasecret.In1941acertainCol.Gribble,whohadservedasanairliaisonofficerwiththeRAFinFrancein1940,publishedabookentitledDiaryofaStaffOfficer,whichcausednear-hysteriawhenWhitehallnoticed,becauseitcontainedreferencestounidentified‘secretsources’.Gribble’sworkhadbeenpassedbyacensorwhoknewnothingofBletchleyPark.WhatifsomebodyinBerlinreadit,anddrewlethalinferencesaboutthevulnerabilityofGermany’sciphers?MI5boughtupandpulped7,000unsoldcopiesofthebook,trustingtoluckthatnoneofitsexistingbuyershadGermanfriends.BeforethefallofSingaporeinFebruary1942,thekeylocalUltraandYServicepersonnelreceivedpriorityforevacuation,asdidtheirAmericancounterpartsonCorregidortwomonthslater.Hadtheyfallenintocaptivity,notonlywouldtheyhavesufferedaghastlyfatealongsideotherBritishandAustralianprisoners,andtheirrareskillshavebeenlost,buttherisktoAlliedcodebreakingwasfrighteningiftheywereexposedtointerrogationandtorture.MostofBletchley’sstaffdisplayedmarvellousconscientiousnessaboutsecrecy,allthemore

remarkableamongyoungmenandwomen–StationX’sfootsoldiers–performinghumdrumfunctions.In1941aciviliandoctorinNottinghamwrotetotheGC&CSauthorities,reportingthatoneofhispatients,aWrennamedAdeleMoloney,wasinbedwithahightemperature,havingoverstayedherleavewithsymptomsofacuteexhaustion.Hewrote:‘MissMoloneyhashypertrophyoftheconsciencetosuchanextentthatshewillnotdivulgethesmallestdetailofwhatshedoes,eventhoughitisagainstherinterests.AsIfinditdifficulttobelievethatthisyounggirlisonworkwhichissoimportantthatherdoctormusthavehishandstiedbylackofknowledge,IthoughtIwouldwritetoaskforyourcomments.’Bletchleyrespondedblandlythat‘thereisintheordinarywaynothingthatweknowofintheworkthatshedoesthatisinanywaylikelytobeprejudicialtoherhealth.Thesameworkisdonebyalargenumberofothergirls,noneofwhomsofarasweknowhavesufferedinanyway.’ButBPtoldthedoctorthatMissMoloney’sdiscretionwasnotmerelycorrect,but‘highlycommendable’,andsoindeeditwas.Therewasmuchuneaseamongtheadministratorsaboutthesecurityriskposedbytherolling

populationofcooks,cleanersandworkmenwhoservicedStationX.A1941reportreflecteduneasily:‘NewfacesarebeingsentdailyfromtheLabourExchangetoBletchleyPark.’Aseriesofflagrantbreachesinthespringof1942promptedamagisterialmemorandumtoallpersonnelfromthePark’s

seniorsecurityofficer:‘Therehavebeenrecentinstancesamongyouofaspiritofsuchrecklessdisregardfortheconsequencesofindiscretionaswouldseemtoarguenotonlyaconditionofignoranceorfolly,butacontemptforthelawsbywhicheachoneofusknowshimselftobebound.Inoneinstance[aBPstaffer]disclosedthenatureoftheirdutieswithinherfamilycircle…[this]wasrepeatedbyoneofitsmembersinmixedcompany,actuallyatacocktailparty,whenceitwasdulyreportedtome.Inanotherinstanceoneofthemostvitaltasksinwhichtheorganisationisengagedwasdisclosed,possiblyinaspiritofprideorostentation,inanafter-dinnerconversationtotheSeniorsofthisperson’soldCollege,whenceareportreachedme…Itwouldbeareflectiononyourintelligencetosupposethatyoudonotrealise…thatanidlepieceofboastingorgossip…maybepassedtotheenemyandcause,notonlythebreakdownofoursuccessfuleffortshere,butthesacrificeofthelivesofoursailors,soldiersandairmen,perhapsyourownbrothers,andmayevenprejudiceourultimatehopesofvictory.’Ifthisbroadsidewasfiercelyworded,itwasnotinthesmallestdegreeextravagant.BletchleyPark

wasthejewelinthecrownofBritain’swareffort,oneofitsprincipalassetsinthestruggletosavethenationfromNazienslavement.AlanBrookewroteinhisdiaryaftervisitingGC&CSinApril1942:‘Awonderfulsetofprofessorsandgenii!Imarvelattheworktheysucceedindoing.’Betrayalofitssecretscouldovernighthavecrippledthecauseoffreedom–mostimmediatelybydenyingtotheRoyalNavyitskeytothelocationsofDönitz’sU-boats.WellbeforetheSovietUnionbecameasupposedallyinJune1941,BritishtraitorswerepassingtoNKVDagentswhateverpearlsofUltratheythoughtmightbeofinteresttoMoscow;itwasfortunatethatStalindidnotinformHitlerofBletchley’sdoings–inthemonthsbefore‘Barbarossa’,hewasdesperatetoappeaseBerlin.ItwasanevenlargerstrokeoffortunethatGermany’scommanderssustainedtheirdoggedbelief

inEnigma’sinviolability.Earlyinthe1930stheheadcryptanalystofGöring’sForschungsamtcipherunit,DrGeorgSchröder,assertedpassionately:‘thewholeEnigmaisgarbage!’Noheedwastakenofhiswarning,whichwasdeemedonlyrelevanttothecommercialmachine,whichlackedaplugboard.InOctober1939Lt.Col.Ruzek,formerheadofCzechcryptanalysis,revealedtoGermaninterrogatorsthatthePoleshadbeenworkingwiththeFrenchtobreakEnigmatraffic.IncapturedPolishfiles,theNazisdiscoveredthree1938plain-languagetranslationsofsignalsfromaGermancruiserinSpanishwaters.PolishPoWswereexhaustivelyinterrogatedinattemptstodiscoverhowthesemessageshadbeendecrypted,buttheAbwehrdrewablank:almostallthemenwhoknewtheanswerswereatthattimebeyondtheirreach.OKW/Chi’scryptanalystsinBerlinfeltintenselyfrustratedthat,whiletheyweresupposedlyresponsibleforensuringthesecurityoftheWehrmacht’scommunications,theywereexpresslyforbiddentoconducttestsonbreakingEnigmatraffic.Theynonethelessbelievedthesysteminstitutionallysafe,andarguedthatoccasionalsignalscouldonlybebrokenifdispatchedbycarelessoperatorswhoneglectedprocedure.Evenin1946theWehrmacht’schiefcryptanalyst,WilhelmFenner,maintainedstubbornly:‘TheEnigmawasregardedasantiquated,

butitwassecurewhenproperlyused.’ItispossibletoidentifyseveralmomentsofthewaratwhichBritishblunderscouldhaveenabled

theGermanstorecognisethattheircipherswerecompromised,andplugthegusherofintelligenceflowingfromBletchleyPark.On24August1941,ChurchillmadeaBBCbroadcastinwhichhealludedtoexplicitnumbersofJewsknowntohavebeenmurderedbytheSSbehindtheEasternFront.TheGermansnoticed,andwithindaysOberstgruppenführerKurtDaluegeissuedanorderthatdetailsofsuchkillingsshouldnolongerbementionedinradiotraffic:‘Thedangerofenemydecryptionofwirelessmessagesisgreat.Forthisreasononlynon-sensitiveinformationshouldbetransmitted.’OneconsequenceofChurchill’sslipwasthatwheninOctober1942theForeignOfficecompiledareportonknownGermanatrocities,especiallythosecommittedagainstJews,thiswasnotpubliclyreleased,toavoidanynewriskofcompromisingintelligencesources.ItwasremarkablethattheGermanhighcommandfailedtodrawfar-reachingconclusionsfrom

Churchill’sAugust1941words,andlikewiseayearlaterwhenGermaninterrogationofAlliedprisonersrevealedthatMontgomery’sEighthArmyhadbeenexpectingtheAfrikaKorps’attackatAlamHalfainNorthAfrica.Earlyin1942also,DönitzbecameacutelysuspiciousthattheAlliesweremonitoringhiscommunicationswithU-boats.HewaspersuadedthathisfearsweregroundlessbyBritishcarelessnesswiththeirownconvoycodes,whichwerebeingbrokenbytheKriegsmarine’sdecryptionservice,theB-Dienst.IfEnigmawasindeedinsecure,theadmiralreasoned,theBritishwouldhavelearnedaboutthisyawningchasmintheirownsecurity:anationcleverenoughtocrackU-boatsignalswouldemploybettercodesofitsown.TheU-boatchiefwascarefulenoughtointroducethefour-rotorEnigma,butinsufficientlysotoquestionthefundamentalbasisofthesystem.PotentiallythemostdangerousthreattotheUltrasecretalsocamein1942.On5MaytheAustralian

freighterNankinsailedfromFremantleforCalcuttawithacargoofexplosives,180crewand162passengers.IntheIndianOceanearlyonthemorningof10May,asmallfloatplanecircledtheship.Soonafterwardsitsparent,theGermanraidingcruiserThor,closedinandopenedfire.Nankinsignalled‘Raidersighted,’andhercaptainjettisonedtheconfidentialbooksbeforesurrenderinganhourafterthefirstshot.ThepassengersandcrewweretransferredtoThoranditsaccompanyingsupplyship,alongwithhundredsofsacksofmail.Amongthese,theGermansidentifiedaconsignmentfromtheCombinedOperationsIntelligenceCentreatWellington,NewZealand.Itscontentsincludeda‘MostSecret’summaryfortheperiod21Marchto20April,largelybasedonUltramaterial,whichgavethepositionsofeveryknownAlliedandenemywarshipandmerchantvesselinthePacificandIndianOceans.Withcriminalcarelessness,thesedocumentshadbeendispatchednotbyhandofNankin’scaptain,butinsteadwiththegeneralmail.EventhoughtheCOICdatawaswelloutofrealtime,imaginativeanalysisoftheintelligence

summarybytheAbwehrwouldhaveshowntheGermansthatsomeatleastoftheirciphers,aswellasthoseoftheJapanese,werecompromised.Suchscrutinyappearsnevertohavetakenplace.The

Thor’scaptainsawnospecialurgencyaboutsendingthecaptureddocumentstoBerlin.OnlyattheendofJuly,aftertheraidingcruiser ’ssupplyshipdockedatYokohama,didGermany’snavalattachéinTokyoreceivetheCOICpapers.AfurthermonthelapsedbeforeBerlinauthorisedhimtopassthedocumentstoitsAsianally.Thereafter,theJapanesenavychangeditsmaincode,sothattheUSNavylacked‘realtime’decryptstoempoweritsoperationsduringthe11–12OctoberBattleofCapeEsperance,the26OctoberBattleofSantaCruz,andthe13–15NovemberGuadalcanalactions.ItwouldbefancifultosuggestthattheNankincapturesthusalteredthecourseofthenavalwar,

becausethecodealterationwaspartofaregularroutine:theJapanesestilldoggedlyrefusedtoacknowledgethattheirentirecommunicationssystemwasvulnerable.ButiftheyhadreadtheAlliedCOICdocumentssoonaftertheGermansgottheirhandsonthem,andhadpossessedamoresophisticatedcapabilityforassessingintelligence,theywouldhavechangedtheirciphersweeks,insteadofdays,beforelaunchingtheirJuneassaultonMidway,withmomentousconsequences.TheBritishdonotappeartohavetoldtheAmericansabouttheNankinloss.Thismayhavebeenbecausetheysufferedanattackofwell-deservedembarrassmentaboutamajorbreachofsecurity.ItwasthesamestorywhenthesecondoftwocopiesoftheJapanesePurpleciphermachine,presentedtotheBritishbytheirAmericancreators,wasdispatchedtotheUltrateaminSingaporebyfreighter.ItisknowntohaveleftDurbaninDecember1941,butthereaftervanishedwithouttrace,itsfateunknownfromthatdaytothis.NoWhitehallcorrespondenceconcerningtheNankinhasthusfarbeenfoundinBritisharchives,

anditwouldbeunjustifiedtobuildtoohighatowerofspeculationarounditsstory.TheAlliesescapedsignificantconsequencesfromtheirblunder–andfromtheotherscitedabove–becausetheintelligencesystemsofGermanyandJapanlackedthecoherenceandimaginationtoprofitastheyshouldhavedonefromtheirhaulofAlliedsecrets.Onefurthercriticallydangerousmomentshouldbementioned:inNovember1942theGermanssweptacrossunoccupiedFrance.AmongthosewhomtheytookintocustodyinVichywerethreePoleswhohadservedinGustaveBertrand’scodebreakingdepartmentsince1940,andbeforethathadbeenengagedinPoland’sowncryptographicoperation.InMarch1943,twosuchprisonerswereinterrogatedbyGermansigintexpertsinthepresenceofanAbwehrofficer.Hadthementoldwhattheyknew,orcouldhavesurmised,abouttheAllies’progressincrackingEnigma,theworstcouldhavehappened.Fortunately,beforebeingquestionedthePoleswerebrieflyalonetogether,andcoordinatedexplanationswhichwereaccepted:thatwhilesometraffichadbeenbrieflybrokenin1938,improvedGermansystemsthereafterclosedthebreach.HereweretwomorepeopletowhomtheAlliesowedadebtfortheirrolepreservingtheUltrasecret.CleverermeninBerlinandTokyomighthavemademuchofthematerialandprisonersthatfellintotheirhands,andabruptlyhaltedthemusicfortheAllies’wondrousdanceacrosstheether.

2 FLIRTINGWITHAMERICA

FromthedayWinstonChurchillbecameprimeministeruntilPearlHarbornineteenmonthslater,hisforemostpoliticalpurposewastodragtheUnitedStatesintothewar,becauseonlythuscouldtheembattledislandhopetoaccomplishmorethanitsownsurvival.Tothatend,theBritishsoughttheclosestcooperationtheAmericanswouldcountenance.Theyprofessedtowishtoextendthistointelligence,butintruthsoughtanotablyone-sidedrelationship,whichprotectedmostofBritain’ssecrets.Inthespringof1940,StewartMenziesaskedtheCanadianbusinessmanSirWilliamStephensontotrytoopenalinktoJ.EdgarHoover,directoroftheFBI.Stephenson,eagerforatop-tableroleforhimself,setaboutthismissionwithawill,usinganunlikelymutualacquaintance,theformerworldheavyweightboxingchampionGeneTunney,withwhomhehadsparredinFrancebackin1918.InthosedaystheCanadianhadbeenafighterpilot,whowentontomakeafortunebeforecreatinghisownindustrialintelligencenetworkinthe1930s,fromwhichheofferedmaterialtotheBritishgovernment.ThisopenedarelationshipwithDesmondMortonandDickEllisofBroadway,whichcontinuedaftertheoutbreakofwar.Hoover,beforemeetingtheebullientCanadian,tookcaretosecureWhiteHouseapproval.StephensonreportedbacktoLondonthattheFBIchiefwaskeentocooperatewithMI6,andhadsuggestedthathisvisitorshouldsecuresomeofficialtitletoformalisehisstatusintheUS.MenziespromptlygaveStephensonamodestcoverroleasPassportControlOfficerinNewYork,

wherehesetupshopon21June1940.ThereaftertheCanadianbuiltasubstantialorganisationwhichinJanuary1941acquiredthetitleofBritishSecurityCoordination.BSC,quarteredonthe35thand36thfloorsoftheRockefellerCenteronFifthAvenue,waschargedwithsabotagingAxisoperations,liaisingwiththeAmericansandgatheringintelligenceaboutenemyactivity.Italsomanagedanti-AxispropagandathroughouttheAmericas.Initsroleasaflag-carrierforBritainanditsspies,itenjoyedconsiderablesuccessuntiltherespectivenationalintelligenceservicesbegantobypassBSCinfavourofdoingbusinesswitheachotherdirect,inthespringof1942aftertheUScameintothewar.NewYorkbecameMI6’smostimportantout-station,fromwhichitsagentssetforthtotryto

penetrateAxis-runcompaniesandforeignembassies.BSCcouldclaimcreditforsuchcoupsastippingofftheFBIinNovember1940,whenaMexicoCityinformantrevealedthatfourGermanshipsintendedtoruntheBritishblockadeacrosstheGulfofMexico:theUSNavystoppedtheships.Likewise,J.EdgarHooverwarnedBSCthattheItaliansintendedtotransfertoSouthAmericaalmost$4millionincash,whichmightbeusedtobankrollsabotage.Two-thirdsofthemoneygotthrough,butaBSCagentalertedpoliceinMexicoCityaboutthesmugglingoperation:theyopenedthebagsandconfiscated$1.4million.Onthedebitside,however,Stephensonwasallegedtohaverecruitedsomefranklydisreputableofficers.GuyLiddellofMI5fumedaboutoneinparticular,IngramFraser,whowasallegedtohavebeen‘runningamistressinWashingtonDCwhowassupposedtobeactingasanagentontheFinns.Shewasgetting$500amonthforherflatand$500forherservices,allpaidoutofofficefunds.’BSCwastedasmuchenergyonabsurditiesaseveryotherintelligence

organisation:threeofitscleverestofficers–OxforddonsFreddieAyer,BillDeakinandGilbertHignet–spentweeksplanningaresponsetoapossibleJapaneseinvasionofSouthAmerica.Whatmatteredmost,however,wasStephenson’sliaisonrole:heforgedclosepersonalrelations

withmanyprominentadministrationfigures,andespeciallywithColonelWilliamDonovan,whowouldbecomethemostinfluentialsinglepersonalityinAmerica’swartimeforeignintelligenceoperations.Donovanwasanaturalshowman,wheretheotherbelligerents’spymastersweremenoftheshadowsor–inthecaseofStalin’sintelligencechiefs–creaturesofthenight.Bornin1883,‘WildBill’rosefromapoorIrishbackgroundinupstateNewYorktobecomeaclassmateofFranklinRooseveltatColumbiaLawSchool;helaterbecameaninfluentialfriendofthepresident.HefoughtwithPershingagainstPanchoVilla,thencommandedtheNewYorkIrish69thRegimentontheWesternFrontin1917–18,returninghomeashisnation’smostdecoratedsoldier,acolonelwiththeMedalofHonorandareasonablyauthenticreputationasahero.Thereafterhefulfilledseveralfact-findingmissionsfortheWhiteHouse.Followingthefirstofthese,tothenewSovietUnionin1919,DonovanurgedWashingtonagainstsupportingWhiteRussia,describingworkersinSiberiaas‘yearningforBolshevism’.AsUSAttorneyfortheWesternDistrictofNewYork,hebecamefamous–ornotorious–forhisenergeticenforcementofProhibition.Later,thoughhimselfaRepublican,hevisitedAbyssiniaandSpainasanemissaryforRoosevelttheDemocrat.HereturnedhomeanimplacablefoeofHitler,andadvocateofUSengagementinEurope.In1940and1941,DonovanmadetripstoLondonduringwhichStephensonensuredthathe

receivedred-carpettreatment,includinglunchwiththeprimeminister.SomeBritishofficersrecoiledfromthevisitor ’sbrashness.Maj.Gen.JohnKennedy,directorofmilitaryoperations,wroteinhisdiary:‘Donovan…isextremelyfriendlytous&ashrewdandpleasantfellowandgoodtalker.ButIcouldnotbutfeelthatthisfat&prosperouslawyer,acitizenofacountrynotinthewar…possessedverygreatassurancetobeabletolaydownthelawsogliblyaboutwhatweandotherthreatenednationsshould&sh[oul]dnotdo.’Donovan’sinfluenceattheWhiteHousenonethelessensuredcontinuingBritishgratitudeand

goodwill.InSeptember1940hepersuadedRoosevelttocommittheUStoapolicyofintelligencecollaborationwithChurchill’snation.WhenGodfrey,thedirectorofnavalintelligence,visitedtheUSinMay1941withhispersonalassistantCommanderIanFleming,inNewYorkthetwomenstayedatDonovan’sapartment.Theadmiral’stripwasnotanunqualifiedsuccess:hewasshockedbythedepthofhostilitybetweentheUSArmyandUSNavy,andgotlittlechangeoutofHoover,whowaslessinterestedinjoiningthewaragainsttheAxisthaninsecuringtheFBI’smonopolycontrolofthenation’sintelligenceactivities.Inthis,Hooverwasunsuccessful.WhilehisBureauretainedresponsibilityforcounter-espionage–theroleofMI5inBritain–GodfreyandStephensonplayedsomepartinconvincingtheRooseveltadministrationthatthecountryneededanewintelligenceorganisation,andthatDonovanwasthemantorunit.FromJuly1941heheldthetitleofCoordinator

ofInformation,thoughinrealityhisnewOfficeofWarInformationwasanembryosecretservice,andhesetaboutsupervisingitsbirthandprecociousgrowthwithenergyandexuberance.DonovanandStephenson–thelatterknownintheUSas‘LittleBill’ratherthan‘Intrepid’,which

wasmerelyhistelegraphicaddress–werebuccaneersboth,whosharedcreditforsecuringareasonablyfreehandforBritishintelligenceoperationsintheAmericas,againstthewishesoftheFBIandtheStateDepartment.Theirrapportdidnot,however,changeanoverarchingreality:thewartimerelationshipbetweenBritainandtheUnitedStateswascharacterisedbytensionsandsuspicions,merelypaintedoverbythemagnificentrhetoricofChurchillandRoosevelt.In1940–41theBritishwerefightingfortheirliveswhileAmericanswerenot,andindeedoperatedacash-and-carrypolicyforthemodestquotaofweaponsandsuppliestheysoldtoChurchill’speople.MostofAmerica’sdefencecommunityhadsomerespectforBritain,butlittleaffection.TheBritishofficersprivytotheUltrasecretknewthattheywerecustodiansofoneoftheir

country’smostpreciousassets,whichwouldbecomeinstantlyforfeitifanyhintoftheirgrowingsuccessesreachedBerlin.Americansecuritywaspoor,asmightbeexpectedofapeoplenotyetcommittedtothestruggle,whowereanywayconstitutionallyill-suitedtokeepingsecrets.BritishintelligencechiefswereeagerforAmericangoodwill,butdoubtfulhowmuchofpracticalvaluetheirUScounterpartscouldtellthem.Pendingevidencethatatwo-waytrafficcouldbenefittheirembattledisland,theydeterminedtogiveawayaslittleaspossible.Moreover,asananguishedWhitehallhandscribbledduringthe1941debateabouthowmuchtotellavisitingUSdelegation:‘Whatwilltheythinkiftheyfindwehavebeenreadingtheirownstuff?’–amildembarrassmentaboutwhichChurchillcamecleantoRoosevelton25February1942,withtheassurancethatdecryptionofUSmaterialhadstoppedimmediatelyafterPearlHarbor.Thesparse1940–41meetingsandexchangesbetweenthetwonation’scodebreakersand

intelligenceofficerstookplaceinaclimateofmutualwariness,anditwastheAmericanswhodisplayedgreaterfrankness.On31August1940theBritishweretoldthattheSignalsIntelligenceServicehadbrokentheJapanesePurplekey.ThisrevelationpromptednoimmediateinvitationtoBletchley:whentheTizardmissionvisitedtheUSinSeptembertoshowoffsuchrevolutionarytechnologyasthecavitymagnetron–atemptingmorsel,keytonew-agetacticalradar,andintendedtopromoteAmericanreciprocity–informationaboutUltrawasexplicitlyexcluded.OntheAmericanside,LauranceSaffordoftheUSNavy’sOp-20-GcodebreakingteamwaslikewiseopposedtosharingitssecretswiththeBritish.InDecember1940thetwonationsreachedanagreementtopoolinformationaboutcodebreaking,butbothwereslowtobringthisintoeffect.OnlyonJapanesematerialwasthereimmediateclosecollaboration:inFebruary1941theBritishcryptanalysisteaminSingaporeanditsAmericancounterpartinthePhilippinesexchangedliaisonofficers,whodiscoveredthatbothwereinaboutthesameplacewithTokyo’scodes.IntheearlywaryearstheBritishdidbetterthantheAmericansinmonitoringsomelow-levelJapanesearmedforcestraffic,

thoughtheyfailedtobreakintotheirhigherciphers.Nonetheless,whenBritishforcesin1941requestedurgentAmericanassistanceinsecuringhigh-altitudephotographsofJapan’snavalbases,Washingtonvetoedtheproposal.AttheheightoftheLuftwaffeBlitzonBritaintwoFBIagents,HughCleggandClarenceHince,

visitedLondontostudy‘lawenforcementintimeofwar ’.GuyLiddellofMI5thoughtthatwhilethevisitorslookedsomewhatthuggish,Cleggseemed‘averygoodfellow’.Suchwarmthwasnotreciprocated.Ontheirreturn,thetwomendeliveredtoHooverareportdepictingtheBritish,explicitlyMI5andtheMetropolitanPolice,intermsofwitheringscorn.Theycomplainedthatitwasdifficulttoarrangemeetingsbefore10a.m.orafter4p.m.because‘thetransportsituationisverydifficult,youknow’.Theysaidthat‘Thefact“exploratoryluncheons”wereusuallytwohoursinlengthmadeourworkingdayratherlimited,particularlywhencomparedtothecustomaryhoursthatofficialsoftheFBIareengagedinofficialbusiness.’TheyconcludedthattheBritish‘mightwinthewariftheyfinditconvenient’.ThisreportsetthetonefortheFBI’sviewoftheBritishfordecadesthereafter.InJanuary1941,whenanAmericancodebreakingteam–twoarmy,twonavy–paidapioneering

visittoBritain,theybroughtwiththemaremarkablygenerousgift:amimickedPurplemachine,ofwhichasecondcopywashandedoverlater.TheBritish,however,reciprocatedcautiously.WithWinstonChurchill’sexplicitsanctiontheyadmittedthevisitorstoBletchley,andexplainedtheHutsystem.Theyrevealedthebombes,GC&CS’smostcriticalinnovation,butthereafterprevaricatedaboutfulfillingAmericanrequeststobegivenanexampleofwhatWashingtondescribedas‘acypher-solvingmachine’.Therewereverygoodreasonsforthis–theUSwasnotinthewar,andthebombeswerescarcepearls.TheAmericansrecognisedthattheyhadseeninactionasystemwayaheadofanythingtheUSarmedforcesweredoing.AlfredMcCormack,whobecamethesecretaryforwar ’sspecialassistantoncomint,saidlaterofBletchley:‘It’snotgood–it’ssuperb.’SomepeopleinWashington,however,wereirkedbyapparentBritishpusillanimity.They

themselvesmadelittleseriousheadwayinreadingEnigmatrafficuntilfloodgatesopenedin1943,and–inthewordsofanexasperatedBritishofficer–‘showednoappreciationoftheextentoftheproblemsfacingBletchleyParkandBritain’.ThePark’sWashingtonrepresentative,CaptainEdwardHastings,reportedinNovember1941that‘thereisgraveunrestanddissatisfactionaboutfreeexchangeofspecialintelligence’.SomeAmericansweredoggedlyconvincedthattheBritishwereholdingoutonthem.AslateasDecember1942,whenAlanTuringvisitedtheUS,hewasdeniedadmissiontotheBellLaboratoriesinrevengeforallegedBritishfoot-draggingaboutcollaboration,andwasfinallyallowedinsideonlyafterahugeandprotractedtransatlanticrow.AlthoughWilliamFriedmanlaterforgedwarmpersonalrelationswithBP’sseniorpersonnel,hehimselfmadehisfirstvisittoBritainonlyinMay1943,aboutthetimeaformalandindeedhistoricintelligence-sharingpactwasagreedbetweenthetwonations.Meanwhilecollaborationremainedwaryandincomplete.

EvenafterPearlHarbor,BletchleyanditsownersremainedfearfulnotonlyaboutAmericansecurityshortcomings,butalsoaboutthedangerthatthisbrightestjewelintheimperialcrownmightsomehowbesnatchedfromthembytheboundlesslyrich,irresistiblydominantnewpartnerintheGrandAlliance.AlastairDennistonwrotethatforBritainUltrawas‘almostlifeblood’,whereastheAmericansseemedtoviewEnigma,withthedetachmentofdistanceandfreedomfrommortalperil,merelyas‘anewandveryinterestingproblem’.TheWarOffice’sdeputydirectorofmilitaryintelligencewroteon17February1942,tenweeks

afterPearlHarbor,thatintalkingtotheAmericans,‘thegeneralpolicyistobeasfrankaspossiblebutnoinformationwillbegivenregardingourownfutureoperations,orsourcesofinformation,norwillanyinformationbepassedwhichemanatesfromspecialmostsecretsources[Ultra]’.On16MarchthecabinetsecretarySirEdwardBridgeswroteamemorandumwarningthattelephoneconversationsbetweenLondonandWashington‘stillrevealinstancesofgross[American]lackofdiscretion’.StewartMenziesandhisofficersatMI6remainedreluctanttoopentheirheartsandfilestotheirnewbrothers-in-arms.Unfortunately,theBritishobfuscationwhichpersistedthroughmuchof1942prompted

misunderstandingsandmountingangeramongsomeAmericans.Thesecrystallisedaroundabelief–entirelymistaken–thatBletchleyhadbrokenintotheU-boatSharkkey,butwasrefusingtotelltheUSNavyaboutit.Op-20-G’seventualexasperatedripostetoBletchley’sunwillingnesstosurrenderabombewastoannounceinSeptember1942–andtobegintofulfilinAugustthefollowingyear–itsowncommitmenttobuildfour-rotormodelsbythehundred.ThiswasatimewhentheBritishhadjustthirty-two.TheAmericanmachinesprovedtechnicallysuperiortotheBritishmodels,andalsomorereliable:inOctober1943thirty-ninewereoperationalandbyDecemberseventy-five,thoughbythetimethesebecameoperationalmuchoftheircapacityprovedsuperfluoustoUSNavyneeds.Intheearlywaryears,BritishintelligencecollaborationwiththeUSwascautious;onlyfrom1943

onwardsdiditbecomewholehearted.AswithsomuchelseaboutAnglo–Americanrelations,however,itislesssurprisingthattherewassomuchsquabblingattheoutset,intheyearsofAllieddefeat,thanthatthepartnershipeventuallyachievedtheintimacythatitdid,intheyearsofvictory.

*TheType-Xwasdevelopedin1934byWing-CommanderO.C.LywoodandErnestSmithofAirMinistrySignals,improvinguponaborrowedcommercialEnigma,andenteredBritishservicethreeyearslater.

4

TheDogsthatBarked

1 ‘LUCY’S’PEOPLE

TheextraordinaryincidentoftheKremlin’sdogsinthenightwasthattheybarked,andbarked.Operation‘Barbarossa’,theJune1941NaziinvasionoftheSovietUnion,wasthedefiningeventoftheSecondWorldWar–anditsmostbaffling,becauseitachievedsurprisewhenitsimminencewasmanifest.ItwasatributetothelengthandstrengthofStalin’sarmthathumint–agentsofinfluenceabroad–providedhimwithcomprehensivewarnings.AsearlyasJuly1940,NKVDmenoperatinginGerman-occupiedPolandwerereportingintenseWehrmachtactivity,barrack-buildingandtroopmovements.Thatautumn,heinstructedCentretoopenaspecialfileonHitler ’sintentionscodenamed‘Zateya’–‘Venture’.InSeptemberthisshowedmassiveGermanredeploymentsclosetotheRussianborder,togetherwithcontinuingconstructionoftroopaccommodation.TheGermans’MoscowembassywasreportedbyaSovietagentwithinitswallstobestrivingtorecruitWhiteRussiansandintellectualdissidentsfortheAbwehr.InNovember1940Stalinwastoldthateighty-fivedivisions,comprisingmorethantwo-thirdsofHitler ’sinfantry,weredeployedalongtheRussianfrontier.Duringthemonthsthatfollowed,however,someofthesetroopswereshiftedtothreaten,andthen

tooccupy,RomaniaandGreece.Neitherin1941norsincehavemostWesternersgraspedtheintensityofStalin’sconvictionthatHitler ’sambitionswerefocusedontheBalkans,whereRussiaalsohadvitalinterests.NordotheyacknowledgethedepthofhishatredanddistrustofBritain.ItwasbarelytwentyyearssinceWinstonChurchillhadledacrusadetoreversetheBolshevikRevolutionbyforceofarms.Stalinsawhimself,bynomeansmistakenly,astheobjectofasustainedChurchilliancampaigntodriveawedgeintohispactwithHitlerandforcehimtofightGermany,againstRussia’sinterestsandinpursuitofthoseoftheBritishEmpire.ThemasteroftheKremlinrecognisedthatwarbetweentheNazisandtheSovietUnionmight

ultimatelyproveunavoidable.AnAugust1940GRUreport,quotingHitler ’sambassadorinBelgrade,showedthatthiswascertainlytheotherparty’sview:‘ForGermanytheBalkansarethemostsignificantassetandoughttobeincludedinthe[Nazi-controlled]neworderofEurope;butsincetheUSSRwouldneveragreetothat,awarwithherisinevitable.’Stalin,however,remainedconvincedthatitwasoverwhelminglyagainstHitler ’sintereststobreaktheNazi–SovietPactthatwasdelivering

hugesuppliesofoilandcommoditiestoGermany.HebelieveditwasintheKremlin’sgifttoappointthehourforashowdown,whichwasnotyet.Heclungtotheview,slavishlyendorsedbyBeria,thatHitlerwasengagedinamassivebluff,designedtocowRussiaintolettingGermanyhaveitswayintheBalkans.AugustoRosso,theItalianambassadorinMoscow,wroteon21September1940:‘TheGermanshaveraisedabarrier[againsttheRussians]:themarchtothesouthhasbeenstopped,theoilisatthedisposaloftheGermans…TheDanubeisaGermanriver.ThisisthefirstdiplomaticdefeatofComradeStalin…andthedefeatisevenmorehumiliatingbecauseitexplodesthedreamwhichthroughoutthecenturieshasoccupiedaspecialplaceintheRussiansoul:[dominance]ofthesouthernmeridian.’FriedrichvonderSchulenberg,Germany’sambassador,helpedtoassuageMoscow’sfearsabout

Berlin’sintentions,becausehisownhonestyandsincerityweremanifest,anddirectedtowardspreservingpeace.BeriatoldStalinthatonceVichyFranceandSpainhadjoinedtheAxisasexpected,HitlerplannedtoinducehimtojoinapactthatwouldcloseasteelringaroundBritain:‘PressurewastobeexertedonRussia,’theSovietintelligencesupremowroteon24October1940,‘toreachapoliticalagreementwithGermanywhichwoulddemonstratetotheentireworldthattheSovietUnionwillnotholdaloof,andactivelyjointhestruggleagainstBritain,tosecureanewEuropeanorder.’InNovemberMolotovwasdispatchedtoBerlin,todiscover‘therealintentionsofGermany’sproposalsfortheNewEurope’.TheforeignministermadeplainthatStalinstillsoughtcontrolofthemouthoftheDanube,whichHitlerhadnointentionofconceding,andthevisitconfirmedGermany’sleaderinhiscommitmenttowar.TheNKVD’sinformantsinLondonasserted,correctly,thatmanyofBritain’sbusinessmenand

bankersfavouredacompromisepeace.Moscowwasappalledbysuchaprospect,whichwouldmakeHitlerunstoppable.TheKremlinaspiredtoseeGermanyweakened,tomakeHitlermorebiddable.Thus,forallStalin’sdisdainforChurchillandhispeople,hewasdelightedbyBritishsuccessesagainsttheLuftwaffeathomeandtheItaliansinNorthAfrica.IvanMaisky,theSovietambassadorinLondon,waxedlyricalabouttheprospects,writingon3November1940:‘Englandhasnotmerelysurvived,buthasstrengtheneditspositioncomparedwiththatwhichprevailedafterthefallofFrance…inthe“BattleofBritain”.Hitler,likeNapoleon135yearsearlier,hassufferedadefeat,hisfirstserioussetbackofthiswar;theconsequencesareimpossibletoforesee.’Throughthewinterof1940–41,Stalinwasbatteredbycontrarywindsandfears.TheNKVDand

GRUreportedinsistentlyandaccurately,ontheauthorityofitssecretWhitehallinformants,thattheBritishwereconsideringabomberassaultonhisBakuoilwells,whichweresupplyingRussianfueltotheLuftwaffe.TheKremlinwasevenmoredismayedbyAxispreparationstoinvadeGreece,whichcouldpresageseizureoftheDardanelles,acenturies-oldRussiannightmare.IfTurkeycameintothewaroneitherside,StalinthoughtitsarmyliabletoinvadetheCaucasus,ofwhichtheOttomanshadbeendispossessedbarelyseventyyearsearlier.VsevolodMerkulov,Beria’sdeputy,reportedintense

TurkishintelligenceactivityontheRussianborder.MeanwhiletheTurks,fortheirpart,werefearfulofNaziaggression,andinJanuary1941theirembassiesbegantobrieftheRussiansabouttheGermanbuild-upinRomania.TheGRUassertedon27January1941thattheBalkans‘remainedthedecisivefocusofpoliticalevents,particularlysinceaheadlongclashofGermanandSovietvitalinterestshasarisenthere’.ButalthoughStalinwasreceivingastreamofintelligenceabouttheNazithreattotheBalkans,

therewasatorrentaboutthedirectmenacetotheSovietUnion.On5December1940VladimirDekanozov,SovietambassadorinBerlinandaveteranintelligenceofficer,receivedananonymousletter:‘ToComradesStalinandMolotov,veryurgent.Russia,pleasebealert,asHitlerissoongoingtoattackyou.Itwillsoonbetoolate,butRussiaisasleepnow.Can’tyouseewhatishappeningontheborders,fromMemeltotheBlackSea?EastPrussiaisfilledwithtroops,newunitsarearrivingdayandnight…’MoscowwasinformedbyitsBerlinmilitaryattachéjustelevendaysafterHitlersignedhisDirective21on18December,callingontheWehrmacht‘tocrushSovietRussiainarapidcampaign’.Inmid-March1941theSovietmilitaryattachéinBucharestreportedaGermanofficertellingafriend:‘Wehavecompletelyalteredourplans.WeaimattheEast,attheUSSR.WeshallseizetheSoviets’grain,coalandoil.WeshallthenbeinvincibleandwillbeabletocontinuethewaragainstEnglandandtheUnitedStates.’BeriaandStalinnonethelessagreedthattherewasalternativeevidencetoshowthistobemere

sabre-rattling:HitlerwasmakingashowofforceonRussia’sbordertoadvancehisBalkanpurposes.A20March1941GRUassessmentbyGen.FilipGolikovstatedwhatheknewhisreadershipwishedtohear:‘ThemajorityoftheintelligencereportswhichindicatethelikelihoodofwarwiththeSovietUnioninspring1941arederivedfromAnglo-Americansources,whoseimmediateobjectiveisundoubtedlytopromotetheworseningofrelationsbetweentheUSSRandGermany.’TheSwedishministerinMoscow,VilhelmAssarasson,wasconsistentlywellinformedaboutNazidecision-making,andknewaboutthecommitmentto‘Barbarossa’.ButAssarasson’stipwasdiscounted,becauseitwasforwardedtotheKremlinbyStaffordCripps,theBritishenvoy.TheNKVDinterceptedthedispatchesofTurkishambassadorHaydarAktay,whoalsocitedAssarasson’sinformation,alongwithreportsofHitler ’sindiscretionstoPrincePaulofYugoslavia,predictingwar.Aktay’sviewwasalsodismissed.InMarchSovietintelligencesufferedashock.Moscowconsidereditanimportantinteresttokeep

YugoslaviaoutofHitler ’sgrasp.WhenitbecameawarethatPrincePaul,therulingregent,intendedtothrowinhislotwiththeAxis,Gen.SolomonMilshteinandabandofGRU‘illegals’weredispatchedtoBelgradetoorganiseacoupagainsthim.TheywereconfoundedwhenBritain’sSOEpre-emptedthem,launchingitsowncouptoinstallKingPeterII.Moscowwasevenmoreappalledafewdayslater,whentheWehrmachtsweptacrossYugoslaviainthefaceofnegligibleresistance.YeteventhoughtheRussianssympathisedwithitspeople,asfellow-Slavs,Stalindismissedtheirpleasfor

militaryassistance.HeremainedstubbornlydeterminednottobeprovokedbytheBritish–ashesawit–intoanarmedstruggleagainstGermanyoverYugoslavia.Hemerelysignedameaninglessnon-aggressionagreementwithBelgrade,shortlybeforeGermantroopssweptitsnewgovernmentaside.Hehadsetacourse–tobuytimebeforeconfrontingHitler–andwasdeterminednothingshoulddeflecthimfromit,leastofalltheintelligencereportsthatswampedMoscowCentrebetweenSeptember1940andJune1941.

ItishardtoassessthecontributionofSovietagentsinSwitzerlandatthistime,becausemodernknowledgeisalmostentirelydependentontheprincipals’latermemoirs.Allwerecompulsiveliars,bentuponinflatingtheirownroles.Thus,whatfollowsisevenmorespeculativethanmostaccountsofRussianactivities.TheonsetofwarhadcreatedfinancialandlogisticaldifficultiesforAlexanderRadó.TherewasnoSovietlegationinBernthroughwhichcashcouldbechannelledtohim,andhiscartographicbusinesslanguished.Hewasleftwithlittlemoneytofundhimselfandhisfamily,farlessaspynetwork.AlexanderFoote,trainedbyUrsulaHamburgertoserveasRadó’swireless-operator,wasstrivingwithequallymeagrefundstosustainamasqueradeasaBritishgentlemanofleisure,hopingtositoutthewarinthecomfortofLausanne.WirelessassumedanewimportanceforthenetworkafterthefallofFrance,becauseRadócouldnolongerusecourierstoshiftpaperreportsviaParis.ToprovidegreatersecurityfortheRing’scommunications,heopenedasecondtransmitteroperatedbyaGenevaelectricalengineernamedEdmondHamel,whowastrainedbyFoote.Hamelinspiredmockerybecausehewasaverysmallmanmarriedtoaverylargewife,Olga,buthecherishedanidealisticenthusiasmfortheSovietUnion.InMarch1940,MoscoworderedAnatoliGourevitch–‘MonsieurKent’–totravelfromBrussels

toGenevatohandoveranewcodeto‘Dora’–Radó.Thiswasabreachofeveryruleofespionage,barringcontactandthustheriskofcontaminationbetweennetworks,buttheGRUmanwaspleasedtobegivensuchanopportunitytospreadhiswings.Asasupposedrichyoung‘Uruguayantourist’,VincenteSierracommissionedThomasCooktomakehisarrangements,andtookafatbookoftravellers’chequestosupporthiscover.OnthetrainfromParistoGeneva,amanwholookedfamiliartooktheseatoppositehim.GourevitchwasamazedwhenhiscompanionintroducedhimselfasJeanGabin,greatestFrenchfilmstaroftheage,onhiswaytoGenevatoseehissonmakehisdebutasacircusperformer.Thetwoexchangedvisitingcards.TheenchantedyoungRussiandecidedthatbeingasecretagenthadmanycompensations.InstalledinGeneva’sHôtelRussie,hedividedhistimebetweentourism,nightclubvisitstosupport

hiscover,andacautiousreconnaissanceof113,RuedeLausanne,theaddressCentrehadgivenhimforRadó.HecalledtheHungarian’snumberfromatelephonebox,thenwenttoacinemaandleftinthemiddleofthefilm,towalktoRadó’shouse.Hewaswelcomedwarmly,butwithsurprise,accordingtoGourevitch.ThevisitorlaterclaimedthathehadbeenbemusedbyRadó’s‘carelessair ’,

andbytheagent’sclaimthat,despitethedepredationsinflictedbywar,hestillhadsomemoneybecausehismapbusinesswasnotdoingbadly.RadóintroducedhiswifeLena,thenthetwomenclosetedthemselvesinhisstudy.GourevitchhandedoveraFrenchnovelwhichprovidedthenewkeyforcodingmessages.Overthecourseofthenextfewhourstheypractisedtheroutinerepeatedly,untilbothweresatisfiedthatRadóhadmasteredit.Thentheyparted,agreeingtomeetagaininLausanne,whichwasconvenientlynearMontreux,wherethe‘Uruguayantourist’hadbookedastayofseveraldays.Followingthissecondmeetingtheylunchedtogetherinarestaurant,thenwanderedthestreets.MostRussiansabroadsufferedseverelyfromhomesickness.WhenSovietagentsmetandhad

leisureenoughtogossip,thefirstquestiontoamanorwomanfreshfromMoscowwasalmostalways‘Whatnewsfrom“thevillage”?’,astheycalledtheirowncountry.ThoughRadówasHungarian,accordingtoGourevitchtheytalkedindiscreetlyabouteachother ’sexperiencesofCentre.RadóallegedlybeggedhiscontacttoemphasisetoMoscowtheloftynatureofhissourcesinBerlin.TheGenevaagentalsotoldhimtheGermanswereplanningtoattacktheSovietUnion.YetitisimplausiblethatinApril1940RadóshouldhavesaidGermanywaspreparingtoinvadeRussia,becauseatthattimeHitlerhadmadenosuchdecision,norevencomeneartoit.Whatseemscertain,however,isthatCentrewasrashinsendingGourevitchtoGeneva,andthatitsspiestoldeachotherthingstheyshouldnothavedone,dangeroustobothnetworks.AttheendofDecember1940UrsulaHamburgerleftSwitzerlandforEngland,whereherGerman

communistbrotherwasalreadylivinginexile.ShewassoonfollowedbyherhusbandLenBrewer.Herset–a‘musicalbox’intheirjargon,justasaforgerwasa‘cobbler ’andpolice‘thedoctor ’–wastakentoGeneva.AlexanderFootemovedbacktoLausannewithhisowntransmitter.Itwastoodangeroustoinstallanexternalaerialonhisapartmentbuilding.Instead,hepersuadedanearbywirelessshoptosupplythedeficiency,sayingthathewantedtolistentotheBBC.Formonths,however,heprovedunabletoraiseMoscow.DespitepassingcountlesshourshunchedoveraMorsekeyinthekitchen,hisurgentpulsesvanishedintoavoid.Thenon12March1941cameanelectrifyingmoment:intohisearphonesflickeredaresponse‘NDA,NDA,OK,QRK5.’HewasintouchwithCentre.SwissintelligencemusthavebeenawareoftheRadógroup’stransmissions,butatthatstagethey

madenoattempttointerfere,evenwhentheGestapoprotestedfiercelytoBernaboutthefloodofsignalsitsoperatorsmonitoredfromacrosstheborder.Thespiesnowboastedathirdtransmitter:RadóhadmetayoungwomannamedMargritBolli,daughterofstronglysocialisticparents,whosaidthatshewaseagertohelpthecommunistcause.TheRingtrainedthetwenty-three-year-oldgirlinMorsetechnique.InitiallyshetransmittedfromthefamilyhomeinBasle,butwhenherparentsnotunreasonablybaulked,shemovedtoGeneva.TheGestapo,listeninginfrustrationtothesignals–stillunintelligibletothem–floodingacrosstheetherfromBolli,FooteandtheHamelschristenedthem‘DieRoteDrei’–‘TheRedTrio’.

WhowasgivingRadótheinformationfromGermanywhichwasforwardedtoMoscowinanaverageoffivemessagesaday?Theactivitiesof‘Cissie’,RachelDübendorfer,hadnowbeenmergedintothoseofhisgroup.ColleaguesdescribedherasacharmlesswomanofBalkanorigins.ShelivedwithPaulBöttcher,aformerGermancommunistillegallyresidentinSwitzerland:DübendorfermorethanonceusedhernominalSwisshusband’sidentitydocumentstopreserveBöttcher ’sneck.Itisallegedthatoneofhersourcesprovidedanexplicitwarningof‘Barbarossa’.MeanwhileoneofRadó’smessages,dated21February1941,quotedaSwissintelligenceofficer,MayrvonBaldeggor‘Luise’,predictingaGermaninvasionattheendofMay,aforecastperhapssecuredbytheSwissVikingintelligencenetworkinsideGermany,andendorsedbyaprominentJapanesediplomat.ThenetworkalsobecameaconduitthroughwhichsomeCzechintelligencewaspassedtoMoscow,mostofitultimatelyderivedfromtheAbwehr ’sPaulThummel.AttheendofMayRadócitedaFrenchdiplomat,LouisSuss,predictinganinvasionon22June–thismessageprovokedanicyresponsefromMoscow.SodidanotherreporttothesameeffectfromRudolfRössler,whowouldhenceforwardbecometheforemostsourcefortheRadónetwork.Hiscodename‘Lucy’haspassedintohistory,sincetheGRU’sSwissoperationbecamefamiliarlyknownasthe‘Lucy’Ring.Rössler,asmall,grey,bespectacledGermanémigrébornin1897,wasanimpregnablyenigmatic

figure,ofakindthatpopulatesmanyspysagas.Asocialistjournalist,hefledfromtheNazisin1935andsetupalittlepublishingbusinessinLucerne–thecitythatpromptedhiscodename.HebeganwritingunderthenameofR.A.Hermes,describingtheNazipersecutionofJewsandwarningthattheNaziswouldreoccupytheRhineland.Berlinidentified‘Hermes’,andin1937deprivedRösslerofhisGermancitizenship.Henonethelessretainedmanyconnectionsinhishomeland,especiallywithintheWehrmacht.ShortofbothfriendsandcashinSwitzerland,hebegantoprovideinformationtoaprivateintelligenceagencycalledBuroHa,basedattheVillaStutzsouthofLucerne,andrunbyanardentanti-NazinamedCaptainHansHausamann.BuroHahadinformallinkstoSwissintelligence,whichforaseasonthereafterprovidedsomeprotectionforRössler.HesecuredasteadyflowofinformationfromGermany,andapportionedvaryingquotastoSwiss,

British,CzechandSovietpurchasers.Thoughhisanti-Nazicredentialswerenotindoubt,hewasprincipallyandofnecessityamercenary–allhiscustomershadtopaycash.By1942hehadbecomebyfartheGRU’smostimportantSwisssource,thekeyfigureintheRadónetwork.MoscowCentre,mistrustfulofthisshadowyfigure,insistentlydemandedthatRadóshouldmakeRössleridentifyhissources,andthejournalistequallystubbornlyrefusedtodoso.Forallhislaterimportance,itremainsunclearhowmuchintelligenceheprovidedin1941.Rösslerwenttohispost-wargravestillsilentabouttheidentityoftheGermanswhohadprovidedhimwithuseful,evensensationalmaterial.SubsequentspeculationhasfocusedonCol.HansOster,deputyheadoftheAbwehr;HansGisevius;formerLeipzigmayorGördeler;andtwounnamedWehrmachtgenerals.UncertaintyalsopersistsaboutthetimingandwordingofsomeoftheSwissRing’smessagesand

theirsupposedwarningstoMoscow,bothbeforeandafter‘Barbarossa’.AllthatcanconfidentlybesaidisthattheGRUreceivedastreamofmessagesfromSwitzerlandinthespringof1941,someofwhichstronglyindicatedthatHitlerintendedtoattackRussia.EquallysignificantforthestrategicdebateinMoscow,CentrelearnedthatRudolfRösslerhadbeen,andprobablycontinuedtobe,aninformantofMI6’sBernstation.ItwasonlyonestepfromthisknowledgetoabeliefinsidetheKremlinthatthe‘Lucy’RinghadbecomeaninstrumentofChurchill,peddlingfalseinformationtodragRussiaintothewar.

2 SORGE’SWARNINGS

Stalin’sJapanesesourcestoldmuchthesamestoryashisSwissones,thoughsincetheoutbreakofwarinEuropethestrainofsustainingtwinlives,occupyingamuchhigherprofilethanthe‘Lucy’spies,hadexactedaneverworseningtollonitsprincipalagent.RichardSorgestrovetousehisinfluencetodissuadetheGermansfromwarwithRussia.HetoldtheTokyoembassythatNomonhan–thesummer1939Russo–Japaneseborderclashes–hadbeenadisasterfortheJapanese,andthatBerlinshouldnoticetheeffectivenessoftheRedArmyandofZhukov,itslocalcommander.ThencamethehugeshockoftheNazi–SovietPact,whichstunnedtheJapanesegovernment.AndSorge.Thespyreportedon12August1939themovementoftwelveJapanesedivisionsto

KoreaandManchuria–therealtotalwastwenty–incasethegovernmentdecidedonwar,butheexpressedhisownconvictionthatJapanwouldholdback,andindeedon4SeptemberTokyoformallyannouncedapolicyofnon-intervention.SorgetoldMoscow,onHotsumiOzaki’sauthority,thatthecountrywouldenterthewaronlywhenitwasconfidentthatithadidentifiedthewinner.HeaddedthattheGermanembassyexpectedtheJapanesetoremainneutral,andwasevennervoustheymightjointheAlliedcamp.Sorge’ssurrealrelationshipwithCol.Ott’smissiontookanewtwistwhenhewasofferedastaff

postasitspressattaché.Hedeclined,asusualbecausehewasfearfulofthesecuritychecksintohispastthatacceptancewouldhaveprovoked,butheworkedfourhoursadayintheembassybuilding,whileassuminganewjournalisticroleasastringerforFrankfurterZeitung.ItwasscarcelysurprisingthatinOctobertheJapanesepoliceforeignsection,theTokko,committedanagent–twenty-eight-year-oldHarutsuguSaito–toshadowSorge.Theysuspectedthathewasspying…forGermany.SaitonoticedMaxClausenandbegantotakeaninterestinhim,too.Duringthemonthsthatfollowed,stressesonthenetworkintensified.BrankodeVoukelitch

disclosedhisworkfortheSovietstohisadoredJapaneseloverYoshiko.In1940thecoupleweremarried,andsheneverbetrayedhim,buthisindiscretionwasappallinglyrisky.MaxClausenbecamegrosslyoverweight,andhishealthdeteriorated.Bedriddenforsometime,hehadtogethiswifeAnnatoassemblethetransmitterbeforetappingoutmessagestoMoscowfromhissickroom.His

employerswereunsympathetic.ClausenwasperemptorilyinformedbytheFourthDepartmentthatfundingwastight:paywasbeingreduced.Hislittleblueprintreproductioncompanyemployedfourteenpeople,hadopenedabranchinMukdenandwasfulfillingassignmentsfortheJapaneseWarandNavyMinistries.Moscowsaidthathemusthenceforthsubsidisehimselfoutofitsprofits.Inafarcicaltwist,ClausenbecameincreasinglyadmiringofHitler–whowas,afterall,nowsupposedlyStalin’sfriend.Buttheradiomankeptsending:in1940hetransmittedsixtytimes,sending29,179wordsofSorge’s

wisdom.Prominentamongthespy’sscoopswasthedraftofaproposedJapan–Chinapeacetreaty.ItwasdeemedavitalSovietinteresttokeeptheChinawargoing,becauseitsterminationwouldfreetheJapanesearmytostrikeatRussia.Whenthetreatyleakedandthedraftwastornup,Sorgewasalsoabletosupplythesubstituteversion–thoughthis,too,remainedunsigned.FromtheGermanembassyhesecureddataontheMitsubishiandNakajimaaircraftfactories.HeprovidedaccurateforecastsonJapan’saggressiveintentionstowardsFrenchIndochina.Hewasnotinfallible,however,andgaveMoscowsomecauseforscepticism.Hepredicted,forinstance,thattheBritishwouldrejectTokyo’sdemandforclosureoftheBurmaRoadsupplyroutetoChinashortlybeforetheydidsoforthreemonths.Asissooftenthecasewithintelligence,Sorge’soriginalreportwasnotmistaken:Churchillsimplychangedhismind.Bytheendof1940,Sorge’sstandingwashigherinBerlinthanintheKremlin.Indeed,the

excellenceofhisreportsfortheNazisalmostcausedhisundoing:SchellenbergoftheRSHAranasecuritycheckwhichrevealedhiscommunistpast.TheGestapo’sJosephMeisingerwaspostedtoTokyoasembassysecurityofficer,withorderstolookcloselyatSorge,thoughasyettheNazishadnosuspicionofhissupremeduplicity.Meisingerwasill-equippedforhistask:acreatureofReinhardHeydrich,hewasathugwhosereputationresteduponafewmonthsoforchestratingbrutalityinWarsaw.Muchmoreseriousforthespyringwasthefactthatsomeofitsprincipalmemberswerebreakingdown.ThoughSorgesustainedhisjournalisticcareer,penningfifty-onearticlesforFrankfurterZeitunginthefirstsixmonthsof1941,hisnerveswereshredded.Hisdrinkingworsened,andHanakofoundhimanincreasinglyviolentlover.Whenshesobbedandbeggedhimtoexplainhimself,herespondedsullenly,‘Iamlonely.’Shesaid,‘Howcanthisbe,whenyouhavesomanyGermanfriendshereinTokyo?’Hemuttered,‘Theyarenotmytruefriends.’InaSeptember1940signaltoMoscow,hesaidthathewasforty-fouryearsoldanddesperatelytired.Heyearnedtobeallowedtogo‘home’toRussia,thoughhemusthaveknownthatCentrewouldnevercountenancethisuntilthewarended.MaxClausenbecametoosicktokeeppacewithtransmissionofSorge’sfloodofmaterial,and

begansecretlytodestroyunsentasubstantialproportion,arbitrarilyselected.Thus,whileitisknownwhatinformationSorgeclaimedtohavepassedontotheFourthDepartment,itisunclearwhatactuallyreachedthemin1941:Russianreleasesofsomeofhismaterialinthe1990smustbetreated

withcaution,becauseselective.Fromtheendof1940onwards,SorgewaspersonallyconvincedthatGermanyandtheSovietUnionwouldgotowar.Hewasdeeplytroubledbytheprospect,andbyitsimplicationsforhimself.Duringtheearlymonthsof1941hereportedanincreasingJapanesefocusona‘Strikesouth’strategyagainsttheEuropeanAsianempires.On10MarchhewroteofGermanpressureonJapan‘toinvigorateherroleintheTripartitePact’byattackingtheSovietUnion.ButSorgeaddedthatthiswarwouldonlystart‘oncethepresentoneisover ’.InMayheassertedthatHitlerwasresolved‘tocrushtheSovietUnionandkeeptheEuropeanparts

…inhishands’,butsuggestedthattherewasstillscopefordiplomacytopreventwar.LaterthatmonthhesaidthathisGermancontactsexpectedaninvasiontobelaunchedbeforeJune,butthenaddedthatsomeimportantvisitorsfromBerlinbelievedthattheprospectofsuchactiontakingplacein1941hadreceded.BoththesesignalsprobablyreflectedSorge’sconversationswithLt.Col.Schol,aWehrmachtofficerpassingthroughTokyoenroutetotakingupthepostofmilitaryattachéinBangkok.On30Mayhewirelessed:‘BerlinhasinformedAmbassadorOttthattheGermanoffensiveagainsttheUSSRwillbegininthesecondhalfofJune.Ottis95percentsurethatthewarwillbegin.TheindirectproofsthatIseeatthepresentareasfollows:TheLuftwaffetechnicaldelegationin[Tokyo]hasbeenorderedhome.OtthasrequestedthemilitaryattachétohaltthetransmissionofimportantdocumentsviatheUSSR.TheshipmentofrubberviatheUSSRhasbeenreducedtoaminimum.’Sorge’sreportswereasgoodasanygovernmentatanymomentinhistorycouldaskfromasecret

agent,buthewasoneamongmanyvoicesthatcriedinthewildernesssurroundingtheKremlin.StalinwasnomorewillingtotrustthewordofhisTokyomanthanthatofanyothersource.HeoncedescribedSorge,aboutwhomhehadbeenbriefed,as‘alyingshitwhohassethimselfupwithsomesmallfactoriesandbrothelsinJapan’.AlthoughtheSovietwarlordwasnotoriouslywrongabout‘Barbarossa’,fewnationalleadershavelostempiresbydecliningtoaccepttheunsupportedwordofsecretagents.Historianscarvespies’coupsinlettersofgold,butseldomdetailthevastlylargervolumeofhumintthathasbeenpartiallyorwhollymisleading.Molotovsaidinoldage:‘Ithinkthatonecannevertrusttheintelligence…Theintelligencepeoplecanleadtodangeroussituationsthatitisimpossibletogetoutof.Therewereendlessprovocateursonbothsides…Peoplearesonaïveandgullible,indulgingthemselvesandquotingmemoirs:spiessaidsoandso,defectorscrossedthelines…’StalinwouldhavebeenmorelikelytobelieveSorgehadthespyreportedthattheGermans’posturingsformedpartofaplotconcoctedbythefarawayBritish.

3 THEORCHESTRAPLAYS

ThemostauthoritativeintelligencesenttoMoscowinadvanceof‘Barbarossa’camefromtheRussians’Berlinnetworks.WhatbecameknownastheRoteKapelle–theRedOrchestra–wasnota

singleentity,thoughsupposedtobesuchbytheGermans.ItwasaclusterofseparateGRUandNKVDnetworks,whichonlycarelesstradecraftandoperationalemergenciescausedtobecomeentwined.TheRoteKapellewaslessimportantforitsimpactonthewar,whichprovedslight,thanforthefactofitsexistence.TheWesternAlliessecuredextraordinarymilitaryintelligencethroughUltra,butneverhadhumintsourcesofanysignificanceinsideGermany–unlessweincludeaproductofPurple,describedlater–untilsomemembersoftheanti-HitlerResistancecontactedAllenDullesoftheOSSin1943.TheRussians,bycontrast,controlledashafttoagoldmine.TheHarnack/Schulze-BoysennetworksuppliedMoscowwithinformationfromanever-widening

circlehostiletotheNaziregime.Althoughtheythemselveswerepeopleoftheleft,theyappeartohaveforgedlinkswithsomeconservativeResistancefiguressuchasDietrichBonhöffer,andalsotohavehadcontactwiththeWhiteRosegroupinMunich.Giventhenumberofinformantsinvolved,andtheirrecklessinsoucianceaboutsecurity,thegroup’ssurvivaluntil1942wasareflectionofAbwehrandGestapoblindnessratherthanoftheRoteKapelle’sguile.ArvidHarnackwassopassionateinhiscommitmenttothecausethatheinvolvedhisgroupinprintinganti-Nazipamphletsandevenactedpersonallyasawatcherwhileothergroupmemberspastedwallpostersbynight.Suchgrandstandingwascourageous,butendangeredhismuchmoreimportantintelligencework.Throughoutthefirsttwenty-twomonthsofthewar,whiletheBritishstrovetopiercethefog

obscuringtheirviewoftheContinent,theRussianswereabletocontinuespyingalmostunimpeded.Asneutrals,theychannelledtoMoscowthroughtheirdiplomaticmissionsagentreportsfromallovertheworld,withoutneedforusinghazardouswirelesslinks.InBerlin,theGestapo’sWillyLehmannhadlanguishedsinceMoscowshutdowncontacttohiminthewakeofthe1939Nazi–SovietPact.Lehmannwasaloner,andhisself-purposehadcometorevolvearoundhisintelligenceactivitiesfortheRussians.Whyhadtheyabandonedhim?InSeptember1940,seasonoftheBattleofBritain,heriskedslippingaletterintotheSovietembassymailbox,addressedto‘themilitaryattachéorhisdeputy’.Init,‘Breitenbach’pleadedforaresumptionofrelations.HesaidthatunlesshecouldservetheNKVDoncemore,‘myworkattheGestapowillbecomepointless’,andprovidedapasswordfortelephonecontact.Thisletter,andthequestionofwhethertoreactivateLehmann,werereferredtoMoscow.

DraconianinstructionsfromtheKremlindecreedthattheBerlinNKVDshouldneitheroffernorrespondtoanyprovocationthatmighthelptojustifyGermanaggression.Nonetheless,afteradebateCentredispatchedanableyoungofficer,AlexanderKorotkov,codename‘Stepanov’,tobecomedeputystationchief.HecontactedLehmann,andreportedbackafteralongmeeting:themanseemedsincerelydesperatetoreopenhislinetoCentre.On9September1940,apersonalorderfromBeriareachedBerlin:‘Nospecialassignmentsshouldbegivento“Breitenbach”.[But]youshouldacceptallmaterialthatfallswithinhisdirectsphereofknowledge,andalsoanyinformationhecanofferabouttheoperationsofvarious[German]intelligenceservicesagainsttheUSSR.’‘Breitenbach’s’

extravagantenthusiasmkeptaliveBeria’ssuspicionthathewasaGestapoplant,testingthesincerityoftheKremlin’scommitmenttotheNazi–SovietPact.HencethesecuritychiefemphasisedthattheBerlininformantshouldbepressedtoprovidedocumentaryevidenceforeveryassertionhemade.SoimpoverishedwastheNKVD’sstaffinthewakeofthePurgesthatacompletenovicewasdispatchedtoactasLehmann’scourier:BorisZhuravlevscarcelyspokeanyGerman,andafterarrivinginBerlinhisfirststepwastohirealanguagetutor.Theyoungmanalsoboughtabicycle,inordertostartlearninghiswayaroundthecity.FromtheoutsethewasalmostoverwhelmedbytheflowofdocumentsLehmanndeliveredateveningmeetings,whichhadtobecopiedovernight,thenreturnedbeforetheinformantsetoffforhisoffice.On20September1940,forinstance,theGestapomanwarnedMoscowthattheAbwehrwas

planningahoneytrapforSovietmilitaryattachéNikolaiShornyakov,usingasingerfromtheRio-RitabarnamedElisabethHolland,anAustrianfriendoftheattaché’slandlady.BreitenbachgaveadetaileddescriptionoftheAbwehrcaseofficer,SiegfriedMuller:tall,blue-eyed,blackhair,smallmoustache,sunkencheeks,piercingstare,withbigearsandathinneck.MullerwasrashenoughtoseektopasshimselfoffasamemberoftheGestapo.WhenthiswasbroughttotheattentionofReinhardHeydrich,Himmler ’sdeputydispatchedastingingrebuketoAdmiralCanarisforallowingtheAbwehrmantoflyfalsecolours.MeanwhileAlexanderKorotkovwasalsochargedbyMoscowtoreopencontactwiththe

Harnack/Schulze-Boysengroups.Toachievethis,inmid-SeptemberheriskedrepeatedlycallingonHarnackathishome.OnseveraloccasionshewasinformedbyahousekeeperthatHerrHarnackwasout.Onlyonthe16thdidKorotkovatlastmeethisman.Theirinterviewwasinitiallytense,forHarnackwaswary.Whenatlasthewasconvincedofhisvisitor ’sbonafides–ifthatisnotacontradictorytermforanNKVDofficer–hehadplentytosayabouthisownrangeofcontacts.Mostsignificantly,hetoldtheRussianthatheandhisfriendswereconvincedthatHitlerintendedtoinvadetheSovietUnioninthefollowingyear,1941.Backattheembassy,KorotkovmessagedLt.Gen.PavelFitin,headoftheforeignsectionoftheNKVDinMoscow,underthesignatureofhisnominalboss,AmayakKobulov,‘Zakhar ’:

TopsecretTocomradeViktor‘Corporal’haslearnedfrom‘Albanian’whohasspokentoatopWehrmachtofficer,thatGermanyintendstoinitiateawaragainsttheSovietUnionearlynextyear…16September1940Zakhar

YetMoscowhadreasontobescepticalaboutthesesensationaltidings.Historyshowsthattheywerecorrect,buton16September1940Hitlerhadnotyetcommittedhimself.AninvasionofRussiawasbeingfeverishlydebatedbyprominentNazisandthearmyhighcommand.ButOperation

‘Barbarossa’remainedacontroversialoptionratherthanasettleddecision.ThefactthatArvidHarnack’spredictionwasultimatelyfulfilleddoesnotaltertheimportantfactthatitremainedspeculativeatamomentwhenheasserteditsfinality,asdidtheearlierreportofthe‘Lucy’Ring’sAlexanderRadó.OnlyinNovemberdidHitlerdecide.TheaffairsoftheBerlinNKVDweremuchcomplicatedbythefactthatKorotkov,theirbestman,

washatedandresentedbyhisstationchief.TheCzechFrantišekMoravec,whohadextensivedealingswiththeRussiansbeforethewar,hastestifiedtothebrutishpersonalitiesofmostoftheirintelligenceofficers.Onesuch,AmayakKobulov,nowrantheNKVD’sBerlinstation,whereheprovedablunderermoreineptthanMI6’sBestandStevens.Kobulov’sonlyclaimonrankwasaslavishdevotiontothePartyhierarchy.BornintoafamilyofArmeniansmalltradersinTbilisi,heworkedasabookkeeperbeforejoiningthesecurityforcesin1927.Heowedhissurvival,andindeedrapidadvancement,tohiselderbrotherBogdan,anintimateofBeria.KobulovservedasanotoriouslymurderousdeputycommissarforUkraine,andwasthenappointedtoBerlindespitenotspeakingawordofGerman.Onarrival,hetoldhisstaffthatherequiredtheirabsolutesubservience.Whenayoungintelligenceofficerprotestedaboutbeingobligedtoserveasthechief’sdomesticvaletratherthantorunagents,hisbossthreatenedtodispatchhimtorotinthedungeonsoftheLubyanka.KobulovalsotookviolentexceptiontoKorotkov,andseizedanexcusetoreturnhimtoMoscow

withahighlyadversepersonalreport.Beria,receivingthis,summarilysackedtheyoungofficerinJanuary1941.Hesoonretractedthisdecision,butforsomemonthsKorotkovwasconfinedtodeskworkintheLubyanka.MeanwhileKobulovarrangedapersonalmeetingwithHarnack.ThisencounterwentunnoticedbytheGestapo,butcouldeasilyhavebeenfataltothenetwork.Attheturnoftheyear,CentreacknowledgedthatonlyKorotkovwascompetenttohandleliaisonwithitsBerlininformants.HewassentbacktoGermany,withanewbrieftopassontoHarnack.TheNKVDwantedtheGermaninformant’sgrouptoconcentrateoneconomics,notstrategy.TheNKVDFifthDepartment’sordersinstructedKorotkovtoexploretheextentoftheGermandomesticopposition,andhowfaritmightbeexploited.NothingwassaidaboutprobingGermany’smilitaryintentionstowardstheSovietUnion–fromresidualcautionlestHarnackproveaGestapoplant,orfindhimselfundertorture.Theorderwasendorsedinredpencil:‘ApprovedbythePeople’sCommissar.[Pavel]Sudoplatov.

26.12.40.’Korotkovcounter-signedthelastpage:‘Read,learnedandreceivedasanorder.“Stepanov”,26.12.40.’HedulypassedonthemessagetotheBerlingroup,bypassingKobulov,hisnominalchief.Throughthemonthsthatfollowed,theGermansdeliveredasteadyflowofintelligence.On29January1941,HarnackreportedthattheEconomicsMinistryhadbeenorderedtocompileindustrialtargetingmapsoftheUSSR,similartothosewhichhadbeenmadebeforetheBlitzonBritain.HetoldMoscowthattheheadoftheRussianDepartmentinBerlin’sBureauforForeignLiteraryExchangeshadbeenwarnedforpossibledutyasamilitarytranslatorandinterpreter;and

thattheRussianDepartmentoftheEconomicsMinistrywascomplainingbitterlyaboutshortfallsinpromiseddeliveriesofcommoditiesfromtheUSSR,underthetermsoftheNazi–SovietPact.HarnackmadeexplicithisownconvictionthatHitlerwaspreparingtoinvadeRussia.Healso

providedcopiousdetailsonGermany’seconomicsituation–coal,ironandsteelproduction;syntheticrubberconsumption;industrialmanpowerdifficulties,togetherwithGermanplanstomakethesegoodbyrecruitingworkersfromoccupiedEurope–informationMI6wouldhavegivenrubiestoaccess.Harnackconcluded,intermsthatweakenedhiscredibilityinMoscow,byrevertingtogossip:‘AccordingtoHitler ’scircle,heisnowinaveryunbalancedstate,suddenlyrunstowatchafilmduringthenight,or–ashashappenedmorethanonce,toredownthecurtainsinafitoffury.’TheNKVD’sBerlinstationreportedtoMoscowon26February1941:

TopSecretToComradeViktorAccordingtoinformationthatHarnackobtainedfromErnstvonArnim,[DrKarl]Gördeler’s[anti-Hitleropposition]grouphasmadeanattempttoachieveanagreementwiththearmyleadershiptoformanewGermangovernment…Thenegotiationshadanegativeresultduetothenegativereactionfromthemilitaryleadership.However,accordingtoErnst,sometopgeneralssympathisewithGördeler’splan…Zakhar

TheBerlinstationwasnotaloneindispatchingwarningstoMoscowabouttheinvasionthreat:on7February1941theNKVD’sThirdDepartmentciteditssource‘Teffi’inAnkaraasdiscussing‘rumoursaboutapossibleGermanoffensiveagainsttheUSSR.AccordingtooneversionthiswillonlyhappenaftertheGermansdefeatEngland.Accordingtoanotherversion,whichisregardedasmoreprobable,GermanywillattacktheUSSRbeforestrikingatEnglandinordertosecureitssupplies.’NextdaycameanotherreportfromHarnack,declaringawidespreadbeliefatOKWheadquartersthatfullGermanoccupationofRomaniawouldbecomeapreliminarytoaninvasionoftheUSSR.ThiswasfollowedbyafurthermessageearlyinMarch,claimingthattheworseningfoodsituationinGermanywasintensifyingthepressureontheNazileadershiptoattackRussia.Col.Gen.FranzHalder,saidtheBerlininformants,wasplanningalightningstrikesimilartothe1940FrenchcampaigntooccupyUkraine,beforetheWehrmachtdrovesouthtoseizeStalin’soilfields.HarnackalsodescribedconcernsinhighplacesthatGermany,insteadofprofitingeconomicallyfrominvadingRussia,wouldfindsuchawardraining.Inanotherreportafewdayslater,hedescribedintensiveLuftwaffeaerialreconnaissanceactivityoverRussia,andoperationalplanningforanoffensivethatwouldreachtheUralsinforty-fivedays.Merkulov,Beria’sdeputy,readthe11MarchreportfromBerlin.LikeallSovietofficialswho

wishedtosurvive,hewassupremelycautious.Bornin1895,hehadworkedwithBeriainthetrans-Caucasianregion,androseyappingathisheelsthroughtheSoviethierarchy;hismostrecenttriumphhadbeentopresideoverthemassacreof25,000PolishofficersatKatyn.Now,hedemandedofFitin,

‘Aren’tthereothersourcesonthisexceptHarnack?Howcanwechecktheinformationwithoutlettinganyinformantsknowwhatitis?Thetaskshouldbepresentedtotheminageneralandcautiousform.’TheMarchreportsfromHarnackwerecorrect,thoughMoscowCentrealsoreceivedplentyofnonsense.‘Breitenbach’reportedthattheBritishwerepreparingtounleashchemicalwarfareagainstGermany,andthattheGermansintendedtousepoisongasontheRussiansintheeventofwar.Schulze-Boysenclaimedthathe‘knowsforsure’thattheAmericanairforceattachéinMoscow‘isaGermanagent.HepassestotheGermanstheintelligencedatawhichhe,inturn,receivesfromhiscontactsintheUSSR.’On15MarchCentreincreasedtherisklevelforitsBerlininformantsbyorderingKorotkovto

establishadirectlinkwithSchulze-Boysen,cuttingoutcouriers,soastohastenevaluationofhisreports.TheirfirstmeetingtookplaceinHarnack’sflat,whereSchulze-BoysengavetheRussianamomentaryfrightbyturningupinhisLuftwaffeuniform.‘Ididn’thavetimetochange,’heexplained.KorotkovreportedtoMoscow:‘Wetalkedexclusivelyabouttheinformationonanti-Sovietplansthatwasavailabletohim.HeisabsolutelyconsciousofthefactthatheisdealingwitharepresentativeoftheSovietUnion[asdistinctfromtheComintern].Myimpressionisthatheishappytotelluseverythingheknows.Heansweredourquestionswithoutequivocationoranyattempttoobfuscate.Moreover,itwasobviousthathehadpreparedforthismeeting,bywritingdownsomequestionsforusonascrapofpaper…WehopetoestablishacloseconnectionwithSchulze-Boysen.However,atpresentheisconfinedtobarracksandisonlyoccasionallyandunpredictablyfreetotravelintotown,oftenwhileitisstilllightandeveninhisuniform,ashappenedwhenImethim.Anyrendezvousmustbeflexible.’Ontheeveningof19April,inHarnack’sflatKorotkovmetAdamKuckhoff,awriterandtheatre

director,whowaspromptlyrecruitedwiththecodename‘OldMan’.KorotkovmessagedMoscowabouthiminfranklycondescendingterms:‘KuckhoffstrikesoneasaculturedandeducatedmanwhoseviewshavebeeninfluencedbyreadingtheworksofLenin.HestillkeepssomeofLenin’sworksandthinkshimselfacommunist.’InMoscowtheCominterncheckeditsfilesonKuckhoffandendorsedhiscredentials.TheytoldKorotkovthat‘OldMan’‘wasdeeplyaffectedbythegeneralcrisisofthebourgeoiscultureandbecameclosetothe“unionofIntellectuals”’.ThewriternowbecameaprominentmemberoftheHarnackgroup.TheinsistentthemeofallthereportingtoMoscowwasthatofloomingNazionslaught.On8May

1941‘Zakhar ’reported:‘rumoursaboutGermany’sattackontheSovietUnionareconstantlyincreasing…Warisgoingtobedeclaredinmid-May.’A.S.Panyushkin,whounusuallycombinedtheroleofSovietambassadortotheChinesegovernmentinChongqingwiththatofNKVDstationchief,reportedtoMoscowearlyinMaythatHitlerwasexpectedtoinvade.TheChinesemilitaryattachéinBerlineventoldtheRussiansoftheGermans’intendedaxesofadvance.TheNKVDteaminBerlinwasfortunatetoescapedisaster,livingthroughthisuniquelysensitive

periodinRusso–Germanrelationswithanoafasitsstationchief.Kobulov’sfallfromgracebeganwithadrunkenrowataMay1941embassybanquetforavisitingSovietdelegation:hepubliclyslappedthefaceofthedeputytraderepresentative.ThisepisodepromptedtheambassadortodemandtheNKVDofficer ’srecall.KobulovcounterattackedbyaskingBeriatobringhimhome;heclaimedtodislikethefeudinginsidetheembassyasmuchastheBritishbombingofBerlin.BeriafeltobligedtoreportthebanquetepisodetoStalinandMolotov,butrejectedthedemandforhisman’srecallinreturnforKobulov’smaudlinpromiseoffuturegoodbehaviour;hewasorderedbyMoscowtorisknofurtherpersonalcontactwithHarnack.TheNKVDmanattemptedtoredeemhimselfasaspymasterbyrecruitingasaninformanta

Latvianjournalistcodenamed‘Lycéestudent’,who,heassuredMoscow,was‘mostreliable’.Thisman,OresteBerlings,wasalreadyontheGestapo’sbooksasagent‘Peter ’,adoubleofwhomRibbentropsaidcomplacently,‘Wecanpumpwhateverinformationwewantintohim.’ThisfoolishnesswouldhavebeentrivialhaditnottakenplaceinthelastweeksbeforetheGermanslaunched‘Barbarossa’,whenintelligencefromBerlinshouldhavebeenofcriticalimportancetoSovietdecision-making.Kobulov’sblunderingcontributedtotheKremlin’sstubbornscepticismaboutNKVDreporting.On18April1941,heedlessofStalin’sinsistencethatnoclashwithGermanywasimminent,

Russia’sintelligenceservicesformallyshiftedtoawarfooting:theGRUandNKVDwarnedtheirnetworksacrossEurope,andstrengthenedtheirstationsinSwitzerlandandBerlin.Buttheydidlittletoimprovethemanagementofinformantsinthefield,chieflybecauseexperiencedhandlerswereinsuchshortsupply.Evenmoreserious,theyfailedtoprovideagentswithmeansoflong-rangecommunications.Russian-builtwirelesseswereofpoorquality:NKVDcommunicationsimprovedonlylaterinthewar,whentheLubyankasecuredAmericansets.Intheprotractedmeanwhile,contactbetweenMoscowanditsoverseasagentsremainedprecarious.On1May1941theBerlinstationurgentlyrequestedtransmittersfortheHarnackgroup,incasecontactthroughtheembassywaslost.Harnackhimselfwasreluctanttoacceptsuchequipment;hesaidthatwhileheknewnothingaboutwireless,hewasacutelyconsciousoftheubiquityoftheAbwehr ’sandGestapo’sdirection-finders.Eventually,however,heacquiescedinastepwhichmerelyreflectedthelogicofhisconvictions:thatwarwasimminent,andhewishedtocontinuetoworkagainstHitler.Afterseveralweeks’delay,inmid-Junehishandlerspresentedhimwithtwosets.ThefirstwasaportableD-6,witharangenotmuchoverfivehundredmilesandbatterieswithtwohours’life.TheNKVDmanpromisedmorebatteries,butthesewereneverforthcoming.Thesecondsetwasalittlemorepowerful,butrequiredmainselectricity.Korotkovexplainedthatcodingprocedurewaseasy:thespiesneededonlyrememberthenumber

38745andthekeyword‘Schraube’.HeurgedHarnacktomakeKarlBehrenshissecondwireless-operator,buttheGermanbaulked.Thiswasahugelyriskyassignment,hepointedout,andBehrens

hadthreesmallchildren.Hewouldneverforgivehimselfifthemanwascaught,andpaidtheprice.BehrenswasanywayunderGestaposurveillance,havingprovidedfalsepapersforaJewishbrother-in-law.Asecondpossiblecandidate,KurtSchumacher,wascalledupformilitaryduty.EventuallythesecondwirelesssetwasplacedinthehandsofamannamedHansKoppi,suggestedbySchulze-Boysen.Withinweeks,however,Hitler ’shostshadsweptacrossRussia,drivingtheSovietsmanymilesback,beyondreachofBerlin’sfeeblesignals.ThesetsgiventoHarnackfellsilent.Hecontinuedindustriouslytogatherintelligence,butlackedmeanstopassiton.ThisimpassepersistedthroughthefirstfivemonthsoftheEasternwar.MeanwhileWillyLehmann’smaterialalsobegantoincludeevidenceofGermany’scommitmentto

warwithRussia.On28Mayhetoldhishandlerthathehadbeenorderedforundisclosedreasonstoorganiseatwenty-four-hourdutyrosterforhissection.Afewdayslaterhishealthcollapsed,andhewasobligedtotakesickleave,fromwhichhereturnedonlyon19June.WhathethenlearnedinhisofficecausedhimtodiscardtradecraftandcallanimmediatemeetingwithZhuravlev,hiscourier:theGestapohadbeenformallyinformedofanordertoinitiatemilitaryoperationsagainsttheSovietUnion.ThisreportwasimmediatelyforwardedtoMoscow,butitseemsunlikelythatBeriashowedittoStalinuntilthelasthoursbeforetheGermaninvasion.AnothersignificantNKVDGermansourcewasCaptainWalterMariaStennes,onceanenthusiastic

NazistormtrooperandfriendofHitler.Stennes–‘Friend’inMoscowCentre’sbooks–hadsinceexperiencedadramaticchangeofheart,becominganardentfoeoftheregime.Havingsurvivedabrieftermofimprisonment,hedepartedforChinawherehebecameChiangKai-shek’sairadviserandwasrecruitedbytheRussians.On9June1941,followingaconversationwithahigh-rankingWehrmachtvisitor,heinformedVasilyZarubinthattheinvasionhadbeenplannedforMay,thenpostponed,andthatathree-monthcampaignwasnowscheduledtostarton20June.ZarubinalsotoldMoscowthatStenneshadmetSorgeinShanghai,whohadheardthesamestory.Schulze-BoysenwrotetohisNKVDbosseson11June,warningtheRussiansto‘preparefora

surpriseattack’.HeurgedMoscowtobombtheRomanianoilfieldsandrailjunctionsatKönigsberg,StettinandBerlin,aswellastolaunchathrustintoHungary,tocutoffGermanyfromtheBalkans.ThiswasanextraordinarystepforaGermanofficertotake,evenoneasdisaffectedfromhisowngovernmentasSchulze-Boysen–explicitlytourgeaforeignpowertobombhisowncountry.Buttosuchapasshadmatterscome.Inall,betweenSeptember1940andJune1941,HarnackandSchulze-Boysenprovidedforty-tworeportswhichremainextant–andperhapsmorewhichhavebeenlostorneverreachedMoscow–offeringevermorecircumstantialdetailaboutHitler ’spreparationsandoperationalplanning.Moreover,on20JuneaRomesourceinformedCentrethattheItalianambassadorinBerlinhadsenthisForeignMinistryacodedtelegramreportingthattheGermaninvasionoftheSovietUnionwouldstartbetween20and25June.

4 THEDEAFMANINTHEKREMLIN

Thus,fromearly1941onwardsafloodofintelligencereachedMoscow,conveyingacommonmessage:Hitlerwasonthebrink,thoughthereweremanydivergencesofopinionaboutwhenhewouldattack–unsurprising,sincetheWehrmacht’stimetablewasrepeatedlypushedbackbyoperationaldelays.Inthosedays,however,theSovietUnionwasbetterprotectedagainstitsownpeoplethanagainstforeignfoes.Russia’sintelligencechiefswerepreoccupiedwithenemieswithin.TherewerefearsaboutrisingUkrainiannationalism.BeriareportedsubversiveactivitybyJewishandZionistorganisations–headvancedtheimplausibleclaimthatthesewereactingonbehalfoftheNazis.Merkulovdescribedsuccessfulpurgesof‘anti-Sovietelements’intheBalticrepublics,with14,467peoplearrestedand25,711exiledtoSiberia.ThemanchieflyresponsibleforanalysingincomingintelligencewasLt.Gen.PavelFitin,whohad

headedtheforeignsectionoftheNKVDsince1939,whenheascendedtoofficeinthewakeofthePurges.Hewasanunlikelyappointment,selectedforpoliticalreliability.AformerKomsomolleaderandPartyofficial,hehadstudiedatMoscow’sagriculturalmechanisationschoolbeforeworkingforsomeyearsatafarmingadviceservice.OnlythenwasheselectedtoattendSHON,theforeignintelligencetrainingschoolestablishedatBalashikha,fifteenmileseastofMoscow.Students–120inthefirstthreeyears,justfourofthemwomen–wereperfunctorilyintroducedtobourgeoisWesternliving:teacherswithEuropeanexperiencelecturedthemondress,manners,‘goodtaste’.Traineesspentfourhoursadaystudyinglanguages,twoonintelligencetradecraft.Fitinwasalreadythirty-ninein1938,whenhestartedworkattheNKVD.AvisitingAmerican,gazingathislongfairhairandblueeyeswhichconveyedanillusionofinnocence,suggestedthathelookedmorelikeacruisedirectorthanaspymaster.Althoughnofool,FitinwouldneverpresenttohissuperiorsMerkulov,BeriaandbeyondthemStalinanythinglikelytoincurtheiranger.Wheninmid-June1941anNKVDagentinHelsinkireportedlarge-scaleFinnishtroopmovements,anervousFitinscribbledtohisdeputy,‘PleaseprocesscarefullyforHozyain’–‘theMaster ’,asStalinwasalwaysdescribed.

Thelastlinkintheforeignintelligencechainbefore‘Barbarossa’wasWinstonChurchill.BritishperceptionsoftheSovietUnion,andofthepotentialoftheRedArmy,werecolouredbytheloathingofmostsoldiers,diplomatsandTorypoliticiansforeverythingtodowiththebloodstainedBolsheviks.Moreover,theirexpectationsofGermanstrategyweredistortedbyanationalisticconvictionthatHitlersawvictoryoverBritainashisforemostobjective.WhenSirVictorMallet,Britain’sambassadorinStockholm,reportedinMarchthat‘allmilitarycirclesinBerlinareconvincedofconflictwithRussiathisspringandconsidersuccesscertain’,theForeignOfficedismissedhisdispatchasreflecting‘theusualcontradictoryrumours’.On24March1941,StaffordCrippscabledfromMoscow,reportinghisSwedishcounterpart’sinformation:‘Germanplanisasfollows:theattackonEnglandwillbecontinuedwithU-boatsandfromtheair,buttherewillbenoinvasion.AtthesametimeadriveagainstRussiawilltakeplace.Thisdrivewillbebythreelargearmies:thefirstbasedatWarsawundervonBock,thesecondbasedatKonigsberg,thethirdbasedatCracowunderList.’TheJointIntelligenceCommitteerejectedthiswarning.InearlyApriltheJIC’sassessmentwasnot

dissimilarfromthatofStalin:‘1.ThesereportsmaybeputoutbyGermansaspartofthewarofnerves2.GermaninvasionwouldprobablyresultinsuchchaosthroughoutSovietUnionthattheGermanswouldhavetoreorganiseeverythingintheoccupiedterritoryandwouldmeanwhilelosesupplieswhichtheyarenowdrawingfromtheSovietUnionatanyrateforalongtimetocome3.Germany’sresources,thoughimmense,wouldnotpermithertocontinuehercampaignintheBalkans,tomaintainthepresentscaleofairattackagainstthiscountry,tocontinueheroffensiveagainstEgypt,andatthesametimetoinvade,occupyandreorganisealargepartoftheSovietUnion…5.TherehavebeenindicationsthatGermanGeneralStaffareopposedtowarontwofrontsandinfavourofdisposingofGreatBritainbeforeattackingSovietUnion.’Herewasamanifestationoftheforemostsininintelligenceanalysis:theJICreachedconclusions

foundeduponBritishandnotNazilogic.Theprimeminister,however,hadlongnursedahunchthatHitlerwouldturnEast.On21AprilhedispatchedapersonalwarningtoStalin,inspiredbyCripps’smessageandsomeUltraindications.Thiswasreceivedwithderision.Maisky,theSovietambassador,tauntedBrendanBracken:‘SincewhendoesChurchilltendtotaketheinterestsoftheSovietUnionsocloselytohisheart?’HetoldBracken,Churchill’sintimate,thatsuchmissivesfromLondonhadentirelytheoppositeeffecttothatwhichwasintended.Hedidnotaddavitalcorollary:thatWhitehall’straitorshadbriefedtheKremlinabouttheJIC’sdisbeliefthatHitlerwouldinvade.Aslateas23May,theCommitteereportedthatanewagreementbetweenGermanyandRussiamightbeimminent.Foolishthoughsuchspeculationsoundstoday,itwasthenlessthantwoyearssincejustsuchasatanicpacthadbeensigned.Ifthetwotyrantshadstruckabargainbefore,whyshouldtheynotdosoagain?NorwasMoscowtheonlyplacewhereChurchill’ssinceritywasquestioned.BjornPrytz,theSwedishambassadorinLondon,toldMaiskyhethoughtBritain’sprimeministerhadno

ideahowtowinthewar,savebytryingtodragtheRussiansin.CrippstoldtheAmericanambassadorinMoscowthathecouldwellimaginetheBritishacquiescinginaGermaninvasionofRussia,ifHitlermadeacompromisepeaceoffertoBritain.Wheninformedandinfluentialforeignersclungtosuchopinions,Stalin’scynicismaboutwar

warningsfromChurchill,whomheknewtobedefyingtheviewsofhisownadvisers,becomeslessbaffling.InApril,HozyainorderedtheRedArmyandtheintelligenceservicestoignorebothallegedGermanmilitarypreparationsbeyondtheborder,andrepeatedLuftwaffeviolationsofSovietairspace.AttheendofthemonthMerkulovsubmittedareportdesignedtosilencethe‘warmongers’andtalkupprospectsforadiplomaticrapprochementwithBerlin.HesaidthatGermansuccessesinNorthAfricahadencouragedHitlertofinishoffBritainbeforeopeninganynewfront.MuchwasmadeofthedissensionbetweenHitlerandhisgenerals,whichwasrealenough.TheNKVDalsosuggested–atravestyofthetruth–thattheLuftwaffewasunwillingtofightRussiabecauseoftheRedAirForce’srecognisedsuperiority.Stalinbriefedhisintelligencechiefsthattheirfirstobjectivewasnowdiplomatic:toclarifyHitler ’sdemands–thepricehewouldseektoextractfromMoscowforkeepingthepeace.TheyrespondedthatBerlinwaslikelytowantanincreasedflowofgrain,oilandothercommodities.VonderSchulenberg’sdiplomacyplayeditspartinfeedingStalin’sdelusions:aslateasmid-May,theGermanambassadorurgedtheSovietdictatortowritetoHitler,exploringcommonground.MeanwhileRussia’sNeutralityPactwithJapan,signedon13April1941,representedasincereanddesperateSovietattempttoavertwarbetweenthetwocountries,andthustoreducetherangeofthreatsfacingtheSovietUnion.WhenforeignministerYōsukeMatsuokaleftMoscowbearingthesignedtreaty,inanalmostunprecedentedgestureStalinwenttothestationtoseehimoff.SovietembassiesandintelligencestationsadheredrigidlytoordersfromMolotovandBeriato

reportnothingwhichsuggestedtheinevitabilityofwar.On24May,whentheFinnishambassadorinIstanbulgavehisSovietcounterpartdetailsofGermanformationsdeployedontheSovietborder,Stalin’smanaskedcontemptuouslywhethertheFinnhadcountedthesoldiershimself.Aweeklater,TimoshenkoandZhukovweresummonedtotheKremlin,andarrivedexpectingorderstoputSovietdefencesonfullalert.InsteadtheywerehandedStalin’sacceptanceofatransparentlyfraudulentrequestfromBerlinthatsquadsofGermansshouldbeallowedtoroaminsideRussia’sborderinsearchof1914–18wardead.ThegeneralswereobligedtofumeinimpotencewhileHitler ’sscoutssurveyedtheirchosenbattlefields,protectedbyspadesandHozyain’sorders.TheBritishgovernment’sclumsyhandlingofthe10MayparachutedescentonScotlandbyDeputy

FührerRudolfHessconvertedwhatshouldhavebeenapropagandadisasterforHitlerintoamajorembarrassmentforhisenemy.ItpersuadedStalinthatboththeGermansandtheBritishweretoyingwithhim,whilepreparingtomakeaseparatepeacewitheachother.LordBeaverbrook,asuprememischief-makerwhoseinterventionswereallthemoredamagingbecausehewasaknownintimateof

Churchill,toldMaiskyinLondon,‘OfcourseHessisanemissaryofHitler.’Thepresslordclaimed,rightlyenough,thatHesssoughttopromoteacommonfrontagainstBolshevikbarbarism.MaiskydeducedthatBritain’sfutureconductdependednot–ashehadhithertosupposed–onChurchillianresolution,butinsteadontheacceptabilityoftheGermantermsheassumedHesstohavebroughtwithhimfromHitler.Inthelatespringof1941StalindailyexpectedtoreceivedetailsofanAnglo–Germancompromise

peace,followedbyademandfromBerlinthatRussiashouldjointheAxisandaccelerateitseconomicsupportforGermany.AslateasOctober1942StalinwrotetoMaisky:‘AllofusinMoscowhavegainedtheimpressionthatChurchillisaimingatthedefeatoftheUSSR,inorderthentocometotermswiththeGermanyofHitlerorBruningattheexpenseofourcountry.’Withbreathtakinghypocrisy,hechosetoforgetthatinthemoodofpanicthatovertooktheKremlinafter‘Barbarossa’began,theNKVD’sPavelSudoplatovhadbeenorderedtopasstotheBulgarianambassador,forforwardingtoBerlin,asecretKremlinmessageinvitingacompromiseRusso–Germanpeace.OnlybecauseHitlerwasuninteresteddidthatapproachgonowhere.AtanOctober1944dinnerintheKremlinStalincouldstillofferamockingbutatleastsemi-serioustoastto‘theBritishintelligenceservicewhichhadinveigledHessintocomingtoEngland’.InJune1941theNKVDdraggedfromacellintheLubyankaCaptainAleksandrNelidov,an

erstwhileAbwehrmaninWarsaw,toinvitehisopinionofHess’sflighttoBritain.Theoldsoldierrespondedimmediately:‘Thismeanswar,withoutanydoubt.HessisrecruitingEnglandasanallyagainsttheUSSR…’Nelidov,bornin1893,wasaformertsaristgunnerofficerwhohadroamedTurkey,FranceandGermanyfollowingtheWhiteArmy’sdefeatinRussia’scivilwar.HestruckupfriendshipsintheGermangeneralstaff,andattendedseveraloftheir1930swargames.Earlyin1939hewasfoolishenoughtoacceptfromCanarisanassignmenttoWarsaw,wherehewaspromptlyseizedbythePoles.WhentheRussiansoverraneasternPolandandfoundhimlanguishinginLvovprison,asaknownNaziintelligenceagenthewasdispatchedtoMoscow.BythetimeZoyaRybkina,thetall,strikinglyattractivesenioroperationsofficeroftheGerman

sectionoftheNKVD,washandedhisfileinmid-1940,Nelidovwasabrokenman.Rybkinawrotecontemptuouslyinher1998memoirs:‘Hisbehaviourwasservile…Ifeltamusedbyhimbutalsoashamedofhim,asanofficeroftheoldschool.’ThewretchedcaptainwasrepeatedlysummonedfromhiscelltobequizzedabouttheWehrmachtthroughthedayandfarintothenight:‘Hislunchwasbroughtfromourcanteen,andwhenhesawaknifeandforkforthefirsttime,hepushedthemawayandsaidinterrorisedtones:“ButIamnotsupposedtohavethese.”’RybkinasetNelidovtoworkcomposinganarrativeoftheGermanwargameshehadattended,

completewithmapsandorder-of-battledetails.HetoldtheNKVDofficerthattheGermanplanforinvadingRussiaassumedthatMinskwouldfallonthefifthday.Rybkinawrote:‘Iburstoutlaughing.“Howcome,onthefifthday?!”Hewasembarrassedandsworebyeverygodthatthiswaswhat[Gen.

Wilhelm]Keitel[chiefofOKW]reckonedon.’ShepassedonthejoketoFitin,whosnarled,‘Thisbastardissuchaliar.Justthinkaboutit,Minskonthefifthday!’Golikov,theRedArmy’schiefofintelligence,laughedevenlouder:‘Sotheyhavedecidedtodrivewedgesforward.Andimagine–theyplantotakeMinskonthefifthday!Welldone,Keitel,youareastrongman,suchastrongman!…’ButNelidovalsotoldhisjailersthatGen.HansvonSeekt,thehoaryoldformerarmychiefofstaff,predicteddisasterforaGermaninvasionoftheSovietUnion,becausethelogisticswereunsustainable.Doubtspersist,unlikelyevertoberesolved,astowhatpreciselytheRedArmyknewbefore

‘Barbarossa’.MarshalZhukovinsistedtotheendofhisdaysthathewaskeptinignoranceofmuchoftheforeignintelligencethatwenttotheKremlin.IftheGermansinvaded,hehimselfexpectedthemtodrivesouth-westwardstosecureUkraineanditsimmensenaturalresources,thoughhethoughtpossibleanalternativeattackonanaxisRiga–Dvinsk.Sovietmilitaryattachés,especiallythoseintheBalkans,provideddetailedandbroadlyaccurateinformationaboutGermandeployments.Russianfrontier-watcherscontributedsubstantiallymorethantheNKVD’sorGRU’sforeignagentstotheStavka’sgraspoftheWehrmacht’sorderofbattle.ByAprilZhukovrealisedtheimportanceofthecentralfrontinGermanplanning–largeforceswereconcentratedinEastPrussiaandPoland.ButconflictingevidencereflectedcontinuingargumentsbetweenHitlerandhisgenerals.ItisoftenstatedthattheRedArmywaswhollysurprisedwhentheGermansattacked.Thisisless

thantrue.Intheweeksbeforewar,despiteStalin’sscepticismheallowedlargeforcestoberedeployedintheWestandbroughttoarelativelyhighstateofreadiness.ThedisasterssubsequentlysufferedbytheRussianswereoverwhelminglyattributabletotherottenconditionofthearmedforcesandtheirleadership,ratherthantolackofimmediatepreparedness.StalindeservesmostoftheblameforwhatbefelltheSovietUnionin1941,butsurprisewastheleastofthereasonsforcatastrophe.TheRedArmywasoutfoughtbytheWehrmachtateverylevel,savethatsomeofitsunitsdisplayedananimalsacrificialcouragethatastonishedtheirfoes.Beforetheinvasion,on12MayZhukovhadmovedintoforwardpositionsfourSovietarmies,800,000men.On2JuneBeriatoldStalinthattheGermanswereatahighstateofreadinessalongtheentireborder.Onthe12thafurtherreportonGermandeploymentswenttoStalin,notingahighlevelofhostileintelligenceactivity:theWehrmachthadsometwohundred‘line-crossers’scoutingintheSovietborderregion.Inresponse,Stalingrudginglyagreedthatwarreadinessshouldbereducedtotwohoursforrifledivisions,threeformotorisedandartillerydivisions.Thisscarcelyconstitutedabsolutepassivityinthefaceofthethreat.BoththeRussiansandtheBritishwerenaïveenoughtoexpectanultimatumtoprecedehostilities.

On11June,SirStaffordCrippsreturnedhome‘forconsultations’.Thepurposeofhisrecallwasexactlyasstated–toenabletheBritishgovernmenttodiscusswithhimthebewilderingandmomentousdevelopmentsthatwereunfolding.LondonwasdismayedbyaGermanpropaganda

campaign,designedtopersuadetheworldthatanewRusso–Germanrapprochementwasimminent.TheKremlinwasshockedbyCripps’sjourney,fortheoppositereason:StalinassumedthattheBritishwerepreparingsomebyzantinediplomaticstroke,whichwouldleavetheSovietUnionisolated.On16JuneMaiskywassummonedtoBritain’sForeignOfficeandgivenacoolrecitalofitslatestintelligenceonGermandeployments,basedonUltra.TheWehrmachtwasthoughttohaveeightydivisionsinPoland,thirtyinRomania,fiveinFinlandandnorthNorway,115inall.Thiswaslittlemorethanhalfthereality,substantiallyfewerthantheGRUhadalreadyidentified.ItwasareflectionofthelimitationsofUltrain1941,andoftheWarOffice’spooranalyticalcapabilityatthisstage,thattheygotthenumberssobadlywrong.ButevenformerscepticsontheJICnolongerdoubtedtheoverarchingreality:HitlerwasabouttoinvadetheSovietUnion.InMoscow,theNKVDadoptedadesperatelast-minuteploy:itsoperativesinterceptedtwoGerman

diplomaticcouriers,abouttoleaveMoscowforBerlinwiththeGermanembassy’sdispatches.Onemanwastrappedinahotellift,whiletheotherwaslockedinthebathroomofhissuite.Inthefiveminutesbeforethelift-boundcourierwasfreed,theNKVDphotographedtheGermanambassador ’scorrespondencebeforerestoringittoitsbriefcase.Thecontents,whenexaminedintheLubyanka,provedequivocal:SchulenbergreportedthathewasconfidentSovietintentionsremainedpeaceful.ButhealsostatedthathehadobeyedinstructionsfromBerlintoreducehisstafftoanabsoluteminimum,anobviouspreliminarytowar.OnCripps’swaybackfromLondonhestoppedinStockholm,wherehetoldthedirectorofthe

ForeignMinistryaboutrumoursofanewRusso–Germanagreement.Rubbish,saidtheSwede.Hiscountry’sintelligenceservicehadinterceptedorderstoGermanforcesinNorway,whichmadeplainthattheywouldattackbetween20and25June.TheSwedishambassadorinMoscow,doyenofthediplomaticcommunity,reported:‘TheonlycertainthingisthatwefaceeitherabattleofglobalsignificancebetweentheThirdReichandtheSovietEmpireorthemostgiganticcaseofblackmailinworldhistory.’ZoyaRybkina,keyNKVDanalystofGermany,describedhowon17JuneshepreparedasituationreportforPavelFitintopresenttoStalin,basedchiefly,butnotentirely,ontheRedOrchestra’smessages–Sorge,ofcourse,reportedtotheGRU.Shelaterprofessedtohaveconcludedthatwarwasinevitable:‘AllofGermany’smilitarypreparationsforarmedaggressionarecomplete,andanattackcanbeexpectedatanytime.’Inreality,however,thedocumentwasmoreequivocalthanitsdraftersafterwardstriedtoclaim.Tocoverthemselves,theyrepeatedlyusedsuchphrasesas‘Itisnotindicatedonwhatdatathesourcehasreachedhisconclusions…Harnackdoesnotknowwhere,when,orinwhatconnectionHalderhadexpressedthispointofview…HarnackdoesnottakeatfacevaluethestatementofGöring,andreferstohisnotoriousbragging.’KnowingthattheKremlinstillstubbornlyrejectedtheirownnear-certainty,theyfeltobligedtoassertdoubtstheydidnothave.MerkulovandFitinwenttogethertotheKremlinatnoonon17June.Thelatter,whohadseldom

metStalin,afterwardsacknowledgedhisowntrepidation,whichmightmorejustlybecalledterror.Thetwogrey,bleak,mercilessheroesofsomanystatekillingsagreedtheirlinebeforeenteringHozyain’spresence:theywoulddescribetheirownintelligenceassessmentasmerely‘likelytobetrue’,ratherthancertain.TheyfoundStalincalm,pacingtheroomaswashiscustom.FitinsawthemostrecentdecryptfromBerlinlyingonhisdesk.‘Ihavereadyourreport,’murmuredStalininhisaccustomedslow,understatedfashion.‘SoGermanyisgettingreadytoattacktheSovietUnion?’AndhestaredatbothFitinandMerkulov.Theyhadnotbeenexpectinghimtoaddresstheissuesobaldly,andfeltlost.‘Weweresilent,’

recalledFitin.‘Onlythreedaysbefore,on14June,newspapershadpublishedtheTASSstatementsayingthatGermanywasstillunwaveringlyadheringtotheconditionsoftheSoviet-Germanpact.’BothheandMerkulovpreservedthestone-facedsilencethatseemedtooffertheirmostplausiblepathtosurvival.StalinfiredastringofcontemptuousquestionsabouttheNKVD’ssources.FitindescribedtheSchulze-Boysen/Harnacknetworks,thenStalinsaid:‘Listen,intelligencechief,therearenoGermansthatcanbetrusted,exceptWilhelmPieck’–theComintern’ssecretary,nowexiledinMoscow.ThenfollowedasilencethatseemedtothevisitorsinterminablebeforeStalinoncemorelookedup,gazedhardatthemandbarked,‘Misinformation!Youmaygo.’Inanotherversionoftheconversation,heinstructedtheintelligencechiefstogobacktothesources,checktheirinformationandoncemorereviewtheNKVDassessment.WhatiscertainisthatStalinrejectedthewarwarning.Rybkinawrotelater:‘ItishardtodescribethestateofourteamwhileweawaitedFitin’sreturn

fromtheKremlin.Hecalledtohisofficemeand[Pavel]Zhuravlev’–theveterandirectoroftheGermansection,muchadmiredbycolleagues.Fitintossedthestapleddocumentontothecoffeetableatwhichhistwosubordinatessat.‘I’vereportedtotheBoss,’hesaid.‘IosifVissarionovichstudiedyourreportandthrewitbackatme.“Thisisbluff!”hesaidirritably.“Don’tstartpanic.Don’tdealwithnonsense.You’dbettergobackandgetaclearerpicture.”’Fitintoldthenonplussedintelligenceofficers:‘Checkthisonemoretimeandreporttome.’Oncealonetogether,ZhuravlevsaidtoRybkina,withtheparadeofconvictionindispensabletosurvivalintheSovietuniverse:‘Stalincanseefurtherfromhisbell-tower.ApartfromourreportsheisbeingbriefedbytheGRU,ambassadors,trademissions,journalists.’Rybkinaprofessedtoagree,butadded:‘Thismeansthatouragents,whohavebeentestedoveryears,mustbeconsidereduntrustworthy.’Zhuravlevshrugged,withauthenticRussianfatalism,‘Weshalllive,weshallsee.’Beria,ingrovellinganticipationofHozyain’swishes,orderedthatfortyNKVDofficerswhohadpassedonwarningsofwarshouldbe‘groundintolabourcampdust’.HewrotetoStalinon21June:‘IagaininsistonrecallingandpunishingourambassadortoBerlin,Dekanozov,whokeepsbombardingmewith“reports”onHitler ’sallegedpreparationstoattacktheUSSR.Hehasreportedthatthisattackwillstarttomorrow…ButIandmypeople,IosifVissarionovich,havefirmlyembeddedinourmemoryyourwiseconclusion.Hitlerisnotgoingtoattackusin1941.’

MuchinkhasbeenexpendedbyhistoriansonattemptstodeterminewhatproportionoftheintelligencegarneredbyRussia’ssecretservicesreachedtheKremlin,ratherthanremaininginthedeskdrawersofBeria,MerkulovandFitin.Thiscontroversyseemsspurious.Beyonddoubt,StalinwasprovidedwithoverwhelmingevidenceabouttheGermanmilitarybuild-upontheSovietborder.TheHomericblunderlayinhisanalysisofitssignificance.PosterityderidesStalinforrejectingobvioustruth.ButhemerelychosetosharethestrategicviewheldbytheBritish,andespeciallytheirJointIntelligenceCommittee,withthesoleexceptionofChurchill,untilthelastdaysbefore‘Barbarossa’.Thisseemsimportantincomprehendingthetyrant’sconduct.ThankstoWhitehalltraitors,theKremlinknewthatBletchleyParkhadbeguntoreadGermanwirelesstrafficonasubstantialscale,whichincreasedStalin’sbeliefinLondon‘somniscience.AperverselyexaggeratedrespectfortheskillofBritain’ssecretservicesandtheguileofitsdiplomacythuscausedhimtoacceptWhitehall’sviewofHitler ’sintentionsinpreferencetothatofhisownmarvellousnetworksofspies.HecouldneverbelievethatChurchill’spersonaljudgementaboutHitler ’sintentiontoattackRussiawasbothhonestlyexpressed,andsuperiortothatofBritain’sintelligenceapparatus–untiltheJICchangeditsmind,thankstoUltra,justbeforeHitlerstruck.HerewasthemostremarkableaspectofKremlinbehaviourinadvanceoftheinvasion:

‘Barbarossa’didnotrepresentafailurebytheSovietintelligence-gatheringmachine.Fewmilitaryoperationsinhistoryhavebeensocomprehensivelyflagged.Therewas,instead,simplyahistoricmisjudgementbytheheadofstate.Stalin’sdeafnessduringtheovertureto‘Barbarossa’emphasisedtheindissolubilityofthelinksbetweenintelligence,diplomacyandgovernance.Unlessallthreedidtheirparts,eachonewasuseless.

Intheearlyhoursof22June1941,theLubyankawasalmostsilent.TheNKVD’sheadsofdepartmentcustomarilywenthomeat8p.m.,thoughneverwithoutanodfromBeriaorMerkulov.PavelSudoplatovwasamongthebuilding’sfewoccupantsabovecelllevelwhen,at3a.m.,thetelephonerang.ItwasMerkulov,whoannouncedthataGermaninvasionoftheSovietUnionhadbegun.Sudoplatovbeganhastilycallingstaffintothebuilding,includinghiswifeEmma,whohadabandonedoperationalworktobecomeanagenttrainer.LeonidEitingon,hisdeputy,almostinvariablycrackedajokeortwoonarrivalintheoffice;butlikeeveryotherRussianthatfatefulmorninghefoundnothingtojustifybreachingthebuilding’smoodofstunnednear-paralysis.ThememoirsofSovietintelligenceofficerssometimesconveyanillusionthatlifewithinthe

LubyankawaslittledifferentfromthatinBroadway,butglimpsesnonethelessbreakthroughoftheinstitutionalisedterror.TheWhiteRussianofficerAleksandrNelidov,oneofthosewhohadpredicted‘Barbarossa’,wastoldnothingofitsoccurrenceuntilon22July1941hewasdraggedfromhiscellintotheofficeofZoyaRybkina.Hegrewwide-eyedwhenhefoundhersittingbehindblack-outcurtainsamidthecrumpoffallingbombsandanti-aircraftfire.‘ZoyaIvanovna!’heexclaimed.‘They

arefiringrealshells.Thisiswar!’Shenoddedandsaid,‘Todayisexactlyamonthsinceitstarted.AndMinskdidfall,notonthefifthdayasyousaidthattheGermanspredicted,butonthesixth…’Aguardcamerunning,outofbreath,totakeNelidovbacktohissubterraneanquarters.Theoldtsaristsaidgloomily,‘Farewell,ZoyaIvanovna.YoucantrustallthatIhavewrittenhere,inthisroom.’Hecrossedhimselfandbowedashedeparted,plainlyexpectingtobeshot.Twodayslater,however,hewasreturnedtoRybkina’soffice,abruptlyhandedasuitcaseofclothes

toreplacehisprisonrags,andorderedtogointoanadjacentroomandchangeintothem.TheguardreturnedafewminuteslaterandreportedthatNelidovwassittingsobbing,paralysedbyfear.Theprisonerkeptaskingwhytheyneededtodresshimsosmartlybeforekillinghim.Rybkinamarchednextdoorandtoldthewretchedmantopullhimselftogether.‘Comeon,AleksandrSergeevich,howcouldyouletyourselfgolikethis?Youneedtogetagrip.Iamtakingyoutomeetmybosses.’TheyproceededfirsttotheofficesofPavelZhuravlevandhisdeputyPavelSudoplatov,thenalltogetherpresentedthemselvesbeforePavelFitin.ThegeneralinvitedtheastoundedNelidovtobecomeanNKVDagentinTurkey,acountryheknewwell.Nelidovsaidwithachoked,hystericalgiggle,‘ButfirstofallIshouldbe…executed…’Fitin

respondedimpatiently,‘IamaskingwhetheryouwouldagreetoworkinTurkey.Turkey,asyouknow,isneutral.’Nelidovmuttered,‘Whateveryouwant.’Rybkinastaredreproachfullyatherungraciousprotégé,whosimplymutteredagainandagain,‘Whateveryouwant…’Shetookthestupefiedmanbacktoheroffice,whereheaskedwhyallthechiefshemetwereintroducedasPavel;wasthisacommoncodename?No,no,saidhisnewemployerirritably,merelyamatterofchance.SheledhimoutofthebuildingtoanearbyrestaurantcalledtheAragvi,wheretheysatamongtablesoccupiedbyRedArmyofficers,andsherecommendedthekebab.Herguestremainedtootraumatisedtoeat.Whensheorderedwine,fearfulofbeingpoisonedhe

beggedtobeallowedtoswapglasses.Atlasthetookacautioussip,thenasked,‘Sowhenaretheycomingforme?’Rybkinarespondedwearily,‘Didn’tyouheartheorderforyourreleasebeingread?’Herguestpersisted:‘Idon’tunderstand.HowcanIbeforgiven?’Afterlunchshesuggestedthatsheshowhimaroundanearbyagriculturalexhibition,andtheydrovedownGorkyStreet,whereeveryshopwindowwassandbaggedandthetrafficpolicemencarriedgasmasks.ShelefthermanthateveningattheMoskvahotel,tellinghimthatVasilyZarubinhadbeenappointedashiscaseofficer.Rybkina’snarrativeoftheseeventsisshotthroughwithmercilesscontemptfortheweaknessof

Nelidov.Forallherstrikinglooks,shewasnotawomantowhomanyprudentmanwouldofferhisback,farlesshislips.NelidovneverwenttoTurkey.WhenZarubinknockedonhisdoornextmorning,itremainedunopened.Onbreakingin,hefoundhisnewrecruitsuspendedfromaropemadeoftornsheets.ThetransitionfromdoomedprisonertofavouredprotégéoftheLubyankawastoomuchforhisbrokenspirit.WhocansaythatNelidov’slastdecisionwasill-judged?

5

DivineWinds

1 MRSFERGUSON’STEASET

TheJapanesemadelesseffectiveuseofintelligencethananyotherwarringnationbetween1942and1945.Butinthemonthsbeforetheywenttowar,theirdecisionsweresignificantlyinfluencedbyanextraordinaryBritishindiscretion.ItwouldbeanexaggerationtosaythatMrsVioletFerguson’steaset,scarcelyamasterpieceofthepotter ’sart,causedJapantoattacktheBritishEmpire.Buttheincidentinwhichitplayedapartwasanexampleofanintelligencecoupthathelpedtodecidethefateofnations.On11November1940SSAutomedon,ahumble7,528-tonBritishmerchantshipoftheBlueFunnel

Line,exoticallynamedforAchilles’charioteer,wasploughingalonelycourseforPenang,inastretchoftheIndianOceanwestofSumatrafarfromanyactivetheatreofwar.Nonetheless,at7a.m.whentheofficerofthewatchspottedadistantship,hewokehissleepingcaptain.‘Theoldman’,veteranseafarerWilliamEwan,quicklymadehiswaytothebridge,justforwardoftheship’sspindlyfunnel.Ewanpeeredhardthroughhisbinoculars,decidedthatthestrangerwasaDutchliner,andheldcourse.At8.03theothervesselwaslessthanamiledistantwhenitbrokeouttheinternationalflaghoists‘Donotraisethealarm’and‘Stop’,thenfiredawarningshotacrossthebowsofthefreighter,whichhadleftLiverpoolon24September,justastheBattleofBritaingavewaytotheBlitz,carryingamixedcargoofaircraft,cars,machineparts,microscopes,militaryuniforms,cameras,sewingmachines,beer,550casesofwhisky,2.5millionChesterfieldcigarettes,andsixmilliondollarsinnewlyprintedStraitscurrency.TheinterloperwasthedisguisedGermanarmedmerchant-cruiserAtlantis,oneofthemost

successfulcommerceraidersofthewar,whichhadalreadycapturedandsunktwelveAlliedvesselssinceleavingBremenon31March.Theships’11Novembermeetingwasnotamatterofchance.TheAtlantis’scaptain,forty-one-year-oldBernhardRogge,hadcapturedasetofBritishMerchantNavycodesaboardthefreighterCityofBaghdadon11July,whichassistedhimininterceptingothervesselsthereafter.Moreover,anItalianintelligenceunitintheMediterraneanforwardeddecryptswhichhelpedtopinpointthefreighter.Automedon’sbridgecrewfailedtoreadtheGermanflaghoist,andtheship’sradio-operatorbegantappingoutan‘RRR’emergencysignal.ThedoughtyCaptain

Ewanshouted‘Hardonthewheel!’andhisshipbegantosheeraway.Hethensaid,‘Comeoneveryone,let’sdoit–we’regoingtofight.’Onthesterndeckofthemerchantmanwasmountedasingleelderly4-inchgun.UnfortunatelyfortheBritish,however,Atlantiscarriedfive5.9-inchgunsandasophisticatedfire-controlsystem.HavinginterceptedtheBritishship’sdistresscall,theGermansstartedshootinginearnest.ThefirstshellofAtlantis’sopeningsalvo,firedatpoint-blankrange,smashedintothebridge,followedbyafurthersuccessionofhammerblowswhichbroughtdownthewirelessantenna,killedorwoundedalmostascoreofmenandtransformedAutomedon’supperworksintoatangleoftwistedsteelinterruptedbygapingholes.BynowAtlantiswassoclosethatwhenaBritishseamanranaft,aGermanofficercalledthroughaloudhailerinEnglish,‘Donotapproachthegun,orwewillblowyououtofthewater!’SecondOfficerDonaldStewartregainedconsciousnessonthebridgetofindhiscaptainlyingdead

besidehim.FirstOfficerPeterEvan,knowingthatprotractedresistancewasimpossible,haddashedfortheship’ssafetodestroytheconfidentialpapersassoonastheenemyopenedfire,butfellvictimtothesameshellthatkilledEwan:Evancollapsedseriouslywoundedonthethresholdofthecaptain’scabinwherethesafekeywaskept.Inall,sixcrewmemberswerenowdeadandtwelveotherswounded.Bothshipsstopped.StewartandthedeckhandswatchedgrimlyasalaunchboreaboardingpartyfromAtlantistoAutomedon.AstreamofshockedandscaldedChinesefiremenemergedfromahatchwayleadingtothefreighter ’sengineroom,whereblasthadcausedsteamleaks.TheGermanshadplannedtocommandeerAutomedonasasupplyship,butonseeingthescaleof

damagecausedbytheirshells,insteadtheybegantosetscuttlingcharges.Lt.UlrichMohr,Atlantis’sadjutant,madeahastytourofthecaptureduringwhichheblewopenitssafe,removingcashandconfidentialpapersalongwithaweightedgreencanvasbagfoundinthechartroom,whichAutomedon’sdeadofficershadbeentaskedtothrowoverboardinanyemergency.TheGermansenlistedtheaidofBritishseamentoshiftfrozenmeat,whiskyandcigarettestoAtlantis,beforethecrewwastransferredtotheGermanship.Personalmoneywasconfiscated,thoughtheircaptorsissuedreceiptsforthecontentsofeachman’swallet.CaptainRoggewasnotonlyanexcellentseamanandtactician,butamanofhonourwhotookpainsforthewelfareofprisonersfromtheshipsheseizedonhisremarkableeight-monthcruise.AmongtheBritishpersonneltransferredtoAtlantiswerethreepassengers,includingachiefengineeroftheStraitsSteamshipCompanynamedAlanFerguson,andhisthirty-three-year-oldwifeViolet,onpassagetoSingapore.EncounteringtheAtlantiswasonlythelatestofseveralunfortunateadventuresthathadbefallenMrsFergusonsincehermarriagein1936,includingamiscarriageandanenforcedflightfromFranceinJune1940aboardthelastferryoutofBordeaux.Now,intenselyemotional,shewenttoCaptainRoggeandpleadedwithhimthroughtearstosaveherluggage–twotrunkswhichcontainedalmostallherworldlypossessions,includingaprizedteaset.TheGermantookpity.HesignalledMohr,stillonthedoomedAutomedon,tomakeaquicksearchfortheFergusons’luggage.

DonaldStewart,theonlyBritishofficerremainingaboard,didhisbesttodeflectMohrfromthelockedstrongroombelowthebridgewheretheluggagewasheld,buttheAtlantis’sadjutantwouldbrooknodistraction.SeeingadoorthatansweredMrsFerguson’sdescriptionofthebaggagespace,hehaditblownopen.Beyond,aswellashertrunkshefoundsackuponsackofmailbags,someofthemprominentlylabelledascontainingofficialcommunications.ThelaunchthatboreMohr,StewartandtheboardingpartytoAtlantis’ssidesoonafterwardsrepeatedthetripheapedwithmailbags,aswellasMrsFerguson’sluggage.ThefreighterwasdispatchedtothebottomafewhoursafteritsfatefulencounterwithAtlantis.As

theGermanraiderhastenedtoputdistancebetweenitselfandAutomedon’slastknownposition,RoggeandMohrsettoworkonthetreasuretroveofdocumentsbroughtacrossfromtheBritishship.TheMerchantNavy’scodesandsailingorderswerefamiliarstuff.ButthenthetwoGermansfoundthemselvesscanningmuchmoreinterestingmaterial–amassofreportsandcorrespondencedestinedforBritishmilitaryandintelligenceoutpostsinSingapore,Shanghai,HongKong.ThemostsecretpapersofallincludedcorrespondenceaddressedtoAir-MarshalSirRobertBrooke-Popham,Britishcommander-in-chiefintheFarEast.ThisgavedetailsofawarcabinetmeetingtodiscussthestrategicsituationinAsia,heldatDowningStreeton8August1940,presidedoverbyWinstonChurchill.AppendedtothiswasahighlydetailedreportonthedefencesofBritain’sFarEasternempire,preparedforthegovernmentbythechiefsofstaff.Roggeimmediatelyrealisedtheurgencyoflandinghiscatch.TheBritishofficialmailwasplaced

aboardthecapturedNorwegianfreighterOleJacob,whichsailedwithmostofAtlantis’sprisonersandasmallprizecrewtoKobe,inneutralJapan,whereitarrivedon5December.TheBritishdocuments,nowreposinginalockedchest,wereforwardedunderescorttotheGermanembassyinTokyo,wherenavalattachéPaulWennekerstudiedthemwithalltheattentiontheydeserved–itisunknownwhetherhesharedtheirsecretswithRichardSorge.HecabledadigestofthehighlightstoBerlin,thensenthomecopiesofthekeymaterialviatheTrans-Siberianrailway,inthehandsofLt.PaulKamenz,CaptainRogge’sprizeofficer.Fivedayslater,Wennekerwasgivenorders,personallyendorsedbyHitler,topassthedocumentstotheJapanesegovernment,withonestipulation:theAbwehrwantedthecredit.TheembassywastoldtosaynothingaboutthepapershavingbeenremovedfromaBritishfreighter–perhapspartlybecausethismightsuggesttotheJapanesethatChurchill’sgovernmentdidnotmuchvaluethematerial.Instead,WennekerwastoldtoconveyanimpressionthattheprizehadbeensecuredbybrilliantGermansecretservicework.On12DecemberWennekertookthedocumentsandtranslationspersonallytotheofficesofthe

Japanesenavalstaff,placedthemwithoutcommentonthedeskofVice-AdmiralNobutakeKondo,Yamamoto’svice-chief,andsatinsilencewhiletheywereread.Kondowasappropriatelystunned–andgrateful.ThateveningheentertainedWennekertothebestdinnerTokyocouldprovide,expressingrepeatedthanksandsayingwonderingly,‘suchsignificantweaknessesintheBritish

Empirecouldnotbedetectedfromoutwardappearances’.Whatdidthedocumentscontain,thatcausedKondosuchamazement?Byfarthemostimportantrevelationwasafifteen-pageBritishchiefsofstaffreport,presentedtothewarcabineton8August,entitled‘TheSituationintheFarEastintheEventofJapaneseInterventionAgainstUs’.Itwasheaded:

SECRETCOPY72COS(40)302(alsoW.P.(40)302)TOBEKEPTUNDERLOCKANDKEYItisrequestedthatspecialcarebetakentoensurethesecrecyofthisdocument.

TheBritishchiefscorrectlypredictedthelikelihoodofdeeperJapaneseincursionsintoFrenchIndochina,threateningMalaya.Churchill’sgovernmentasserteditsunwillingness,foundedonavowedmilitaryweakness,togotowarwithJapanoverIndochina.ItacknowledgedthatHongKong,pearloftheBritishEmpireontheChinacoast,wasindefensible:intheeventofwar,onlytokenresistancecouldbeofferedtoaJapaneseassaultonthecolony.TheRoyalNavywaspatheticallyweakinFarEasternwaters,butuntilthetideofwarhadturnedintheMediterranean,theBritishacknowledgedtheirinabilitytosendmajorreinforcements.Atbest–orrather,indireemergency–onlyabattlecruiserandasingleaircraft-carriercouldbesparedfortheIndianOcean.IfJapanattackedAustraliaorNewZealandtheonlycredibleresponsewouldbeanappealtotheUnitedStatestosendforcestotheiraid.Thedominantthemeofthechiefsofstaff’sreporttogovernmentwasanassertionofBritain’sstrategicweakness:‘TheforcesinMalayaarestillfarshortofrequirements,particularlyintheair…OurowncommitmentsinEuropearesogreatthatourpolicymustbedirectedtowardstheavoidanceofanopenclashwithJapan…Ourgeneralpolicyshouldbetoplayfortime;tocedenothinguntilwemust;andtobuildupourdefencesassoonaswecan.’ThepaperalsoshowedthattheBritishwereunawareofJapan’sformidablestrengthinnavaltorpedo-bombers,amongthedeadliestweaponsinitsarmoury.This,then,wasthethrustofthedocumentshandedoverbytheGermansinDecember1940,ata

momentwhenBerlin’sforemostforeignpolicyobjectivewastodragJapanintothewar.Thehaulwaspassedtothearmy’snewlyestablishedAsiaDevelopmentAgency,headedbyLt.Col.YoshimasaOkada,whichwasexplicitlytaskedtostudythedefencesofBritain’sAsianempire.HisfirstinstinctivereactionwastoassumethatthepapersmustbeaGermanplant,fabricatedforpoliticalpurposes–theJapaneserightlydeclinedtobelievethatanymerespycouldhavesecuredsuchmaterial.ButasOkadaandhiscolleaguesstudiedtheBritishorderofbattle,theyfoundthatthiscloselymatchedassessmentsmadebytheintelligencestaffsofboththeJapanesearmyandnavy.Beliefgrew,andfinallybecameabsolute,thatthepaperswereauthentic.TheywerepassedtoJapan’sprimeminister,whowasasimpressedashadbeenAdmiralKondoandCol.Okada.ItwouldbeasabsurdtosuggestthattheAutomedonpapersdeterminedJapantoriskwarin

December1941asitistoattributeanyotherdecisiveeventinhistorytoasinglecause.ButtheevidenceisplainthatthecaptureddocumentsacceleratedtheseachangeinJapanesethinkingthattookplaceduringthewinterof1940–41.HavingbeenallowedtodiscoverthattheBritishthemselvesbelievedtheirSouth-EastAsianempiretobeacutelyvulnerable,theJapanesearmyandnavybecameincreasinglypersuadedthatthe‘southernstrategy’ofassaultingtheWest’soverseasempiresofferedamoreattractiveoptionthanthealternative‘northernstrategy’ofengagingtheSovietUnion.Asisthewayofwarlords,becausetheAutomedonmaterialencouragedthemtowardsacoursetheyweremindedtotakeanyway,Japan’sleaderswilfullyneglectedotherintelligencefromEurope,especiallyreportsfromtheirnavalattachés,whichcastdoubtupontheprospectofGermanvictory,andespeciallyuponitsimminence.TokyoadheredstubbornlytoabeliefthatHitlerwasdestinedtotriumph.ConvictiongrewuponthegeneralsthatiftheywishedtoshareinthespoilsofloomingAxisvictory,toavoid‘missingthebus’theymuststrikesoonagainsttheWesternPowers.AtlantiswasscuttledbyherowncrewsouthofStHelenaon22November1940,afterreceivinga

firstsalvofromthe8-inchgunsoftheBritishcruiserDevonshire.TheGermanraiderthusbecameitselfavictimofsecretintelligence:ithadbeenorderedtomakearefuellingrendezvouswithU-126,atapositionintheSouthAtlanticrevealedtotheRoyalNavybyBletchleyPark.BernhardRoggeandhiscrewtooktotheboats,escapedcapture,andsurvivedthewar.TheAutomedondocumentswererecognisedinTokyoasthecaptain’snotablecontributiontoJapan’s1941–42triumph:afterthefallofSingaporeRoggewaspresentedwithasamuraiswordbyagratefulJapaneseEmperor–GöringandRommelweretheonlyotherGermanrecipientsofthiswartimehonour.AlanFergusonandhiswifeVioletcamethroughthewar,afterenduringyearsofinternment.So

too,remarkably,didherteaset.ThetrunkinwhichitreposedaccompaniedhertoGermany,thenwasrecoveredintactbyBritishforcesin1945.ItwasdispatchedtoSingapore,whereFergusonresumedhiscareerasanengineeringofficer,whileenjoyinghiswife’sgenteelafternoonentertainingashore.AsfortheBritishgovernment’spricelessdocuments,theircapturewithAutomedonreflectedanotableandbynomeansuniquecarelessnesswithsecretpapers.Whitehallwenttoelaboratelengthstoconcealtheblunderfromtheworlduntilitwasrevealedaccidentallymanydecadeslater,bydiscoveryofsomeofWenneker ’smessagesinaGermanarchive.Thesagavividlyillustratesthefactthatsomeremarkableintelligencecoupsarethefruitsofrawluck,ratherthanofinspiredespionage.

2 THEJAPANESE

TheAutomedondocumentscontributedtoTokyo’simpressivelycomprehensivelocalintelligencepicturebeforeitsforcesattackedPearlHarborandtheWesternEuropeanAsianempiresinDecember1941.TheJapanesetookmoretroubletoinformthemselvesabouttheirimmediateobjectivesaheadoftheoutbreakofwarthanevertheydidafterwards.FormonthstheiragentscycledacrossMalaya,

exploredtheUSPacificFleet’sHawaiianchorages,parleyedwiththeHongKongTriads.This,althoughthebulkoftheJapanesearmy’sattentionandresourcesremainedfocusedonChina,whereitsmenhadbeenfightinganddyingsince1937,andwhereintelligence–joho–waseasilysecuredandNationalistcodesreadilybroken.InMay1940,duringtheYichangoffensive,armycodebreakersenabledTokyo’sarmiestoanticipatethemovementsofalmosteveryChinesedivision.Inthesummer1941BattleofSouthShanxi,thankstodecryptstheyinflicted80,000casualtiesonmuchlargerChineseforces,whilethemselveslosingonly3,300men.CaptainKatsuhikoKudowashailedasJapan’sacecryptanalyst,andbecamethefirstintelligenceofficertobeawardedtheKinshiKunsho–‘GoldenKite’–decorationforhisachievementsinChina.TheJapanesearmy’s‘Chinahands’wereknownasShina-tsu,ofwhomthemostcelebratedwas

Gen.KenjiDoihara,dubbed‘LawrenceofManchuria’forhisespionageactivities.InJuly1940KioyaIzaki,theShanghaiintelligencecentre’sdeputychief,spentamonthvisitingHongKong,CantonandTaipeiundercoverasatrader.Thestationrancovertoperationswithcodenameslike‘Sakura’(‘CherryTree’),‘TakeBambo’,‘Fuji-Wisteria’.Oneofthese,in1941,floodedChinawithforgedcurrency,printedbytheArmyInstituteforScientificResearchonspeciallyimportedGermanhigh-speedpresses.MeanwhiletheShanghaicounter-intelligencebranchboastedastrengthof1,500men.Thenavy’sSpecialDutiesSectionuseddisguisedfishingboatsforoffshoresurveillanceoffreightmovementstotheNationalists,especiallybytheBritish,andopenedaprivatetradingcompanyasacoverforagent-running.YetTokyolearnedlittleaboutthecommunists,partlybecauseMaoZhedong’sforcesused

intractableSovietcodes.Anddespitealltheactivitydescribedabove,aningrainedsenseofculturalsuperiority–whichalsocausedthemtocondescendtoAnglo-Saxons–madetheJapaneseunwillingseriouslytoengagewithChinaforintelligencepurposes.Astaffofficeracknowledgedafterthewar:‘WefailedtorealisethatwewerefightingtheChinesenotonlyinthemilitaryfieldbutalsointhepolitical,economicandculturalfields.Wewerealmostblindinthelatter.’OneJapaneseagentinShanghaiwasreducedtoforwardingtoTokyoassourcematerialAgnesSmedley’sbestsellingbookChina’sRedArmyMarches.Untilatleast1942theRussians,acrosstheborderinManchuria,werethetargetsofmuchmore

ambitiousJapanesecovertoperationsthantheWesternPowers.Tokyowasmorbidlyfearfulofitscommunistneighbours,andafteritsdrubbingatNomohanin1939theImperialArmysustainedaprofoundrespectfortheirmilitaryabilities.Mostofthe22,000KempeitaimilitarypolicedeployedoverseaswereeitherperformingsecuritydutiesinChinaorwatchingtheRussians.SoprimitivewastheirtrainingthatJapanesespiesweretaughttomeasurethelengthofbridgesintheSovietUnionfrominsideclosedtrainsbycountingthenumberofbumpsaswheelspassedoverrailjoins.AttheManchurianpostofHsinking,320listenerstappedphonesandmonitoredvoiceradiocommunication.EightsigintsitesmonitoredRussianwirelesstransmissions,andtheJapanesesometimeschanged

borderguardsatSakhalinjusttoprovoketheRussiansintosendingsignals,inthehopethatthesecouldbedecrypted.In1940aformerPolisharmycodebreakerassistedtheJapanesetocracksomelow-gradeRedAirForceanddiplomaticcodes.ThreehundredJapaneseofficersayearattendedtheRussianlanguageschoolinHarbin.Sevenhundredsoldierswerecontinuouslyemployedpeeringthroughbinocularsacrosstheborder

fromManchuriaintotheSovietUnion,recordingthemovementsofeveryman,horseandvehicle,togetherwithallshiptrafficinandoutofVladivostok.Severalex-tsaristofficersscrapedalivinginHarbinscanningPravda,IzvestiaandotherSovietpublicationsforTokyo’sbenefit.Aceaselesspingponggamewasplayed,whereintheJapaneserecruitedRussianexpatriates,dispatchedthemacrosstheManchurianborderonlyfortheSovietsto‘turn’them:theaverageJapaneseagentsurvivedatlibertyforjustaweek.In1938Gen.GenrikhLyushovoftheNKVD’sFarEasternDirectorateescapedafiringsquadbyfleeingintoManchuria.HespenttheensuingsevenyearsunderhousearrestinTokyo,buthishostsfoundthattheirprizehadfrustratinglylittletotellofpracticalvalue.Inthewakeof‘Barbarossa’,asteadystreamofRussiandeserters–130ofthembytheendof1941–crossedintoJapaneseterritory,butmanyprovedtobeNKVDplants.SomeJapaneseinitiativeswerespectacularlyunprofitable:theIntelligenceDepartmentenlistedthe

aidoftheArmyInstituteforScientificResearchatNoboritotodeviseachemicaltoparalyseRussianguarddogs’powerofscentandstimulatetheirsexualappetite,tomakethemlessmanageable;bothdogsandhandlersremainedunmoved.AttemptstouseassourcesJapanesebusinessmenvisitingRussiaachievedlittle,forwheneversuchvisitorslefttheirhotelstheyweredoggedbyNKVDwatchers,aswereattachésinMoscow.Anintelligenceofficer,Lt.Col.SaburoHayashi,complainedthatprobingSovietsecretswas‘likesearchingforveryfinegolddustinmud’.Japan’sideasaboutgatheringforeignintelligencefocusedoverwhelminglyuponespionage.Its

agentspenetratedtheSovietembassyinBeijing,andin1941oneconcealedhimselfinacupboardofthelibraryoftheBritishconsulateinTaipei,wherethesafewaslocated.Themancollapsedunconsciousinhisstiflingconfinement,butherevivedintimetowatchtheconsulopenthesafeandtomemoriseitscombination,whicheventuallyyieldedafewcrumbs.JapaneseagentnetworksoperatedinCaliforniaandMexicoundercoverasfishermen,dentistsandbarbers;therewasachainofJapanesebarber/agentsinthePanamaCanalZone.SomeBritishandAmericanrenegadeswererecruitedassources:formerRoyalNavysubmarinerLt.CmdrCollinMayersprovidedinformationforcashuntilhisarrestin1927.Anex-USNavyyeomannamedHarryThompsonreceived$200amonthfromhisJapanesehandleruntilsentencedtofifteenyears’imprisonmentin1935.CmdrFredRutlandwasadecoratedBritishairmanwhomadehislivingafterretirementby

briefingtheJapaneseandpromotingdudcompaniesattheirexpense–foratimetheymaintainedhiminamansioninBeverlyHills.BothMI5andtheFBIwerewellawareofhisactivities.ThelatterdecidedthathewasJapan’sprincipalagentintheUS,thoughaMay1935reporttoTokyofrom

RutlandinCaliforniawasafairsampleofhisunimpressivewares:‘The[US]ArmyandNavywantwarandinmyviewthismightbeputoffforafewyears…EveryoneIhavemetinAmericathinksawarwithJapanisinevitable.’Lt.CmdrArataOka,Japan’snavalattachéinLondon,arguedthat‘itwouldbewrongtorelyonRutlandaloneincaseofwar ’,whichwasanunderstatement.TheJapanesenonethelesslikedtheirtametraitorsufficientlytogivehimanother£4,000whenherevisitedJapanin1938.TheungratefulRutlandthensailedtoAmericaandapproachedCaptainEllisZacharias,theUSNavy’sAsianintelligencespecialist,toproposeasaleofJapanesesecrets.ThislefttheFBIbewilderedaboutwhichsideRutlandwason,buthewasplainlyatroublemaker,andwasfinallyarrestedon6June1941.London’sanxietytoavoidapublicscandalcausedhimtobedeportedtoBritain,wherehewasinterned.Fouryearsafterhisreleaseattheendofthewar,Rutlandkilledhimself.CmdrOkadidnobetterwhenhehiredHerbertGreene,anephewofWilliamGreene,asenior

AdmiraltyofficialandbrotherofthenovelistGraham.Okacodenamedhim‘Midorikawa’–‘GreenRiver ’–paidhim£800andcherishedhopesthatGreenehadanentréetothesmartLondonclublandwheresecretswerediscussed.Instead,inDecember1937Greeneproclaimedhishalf-heartedtreacherytotheDailyWorker,whichblazonedalloveritsfrontpagehisannouncementthathewasaJapanesespy.InJuly1941,whenJapanwasstillaneutral,itsnavalattachéformallyrequestedfromtheBritishgovernmentdetailsofthenationalelectricitygrid.GuyLiddellofMI5brandedthis‘characteristicimpertinence’,sinceBritishsurveillanceofficershadjustseenamemberoftheJapaneseembassystaffpassGermancashtoanAbwehragentoperatingunderDoubleCrosscontrol.TheonlyadvantagesenjoyedbyJapanesespies,saidLiddell,wasthattheywereveryhardtowatch‘astoaEuropeantheyalllookalikeandthereistheadditionaldifficultyoftheblackoutandfourexitsfromthemilitaryattaché’soffice’.TheJapanesenavy’smostusefulintelligenceconnectioninLondonwasRear-AdmiralLordSempill,anenthusiasticNazisympathiser.WhenitwasfoundthathehadbeensellingclassifiedinformationtoTokyo,in1941hewaspermittedtoresignquietlyfromtheRoyalNavyandretiretohisScottishcastle;Churchillflinchedfromatreasontrialattheheartoftheoldaristocracy.ThelastsignificantJapanesespyinAmerica–ifshecanbedignifiedassuch–wasVelvalee

Dickinson,whopassedinformationonnavalmattersthroughafriendinBuenosAires.BorninSacramentoin1893,aStanfordgraduate,sheworkedforsomeyearsinaSanFranciscobank,thenassistedherhusbandLeeinabrokeragebusinessthatfailed.ThereaftershefoundworkinNewYorkCityasadollsaleswomanatBloomingdale’s,beforestartingamodestlysuccessfuldollstoreofherownonMadisonAvenue.HerassociationwithTokyobeganwithherhusband’smembershipofaJapanese-Americansocietybeforehisdeathin1943.AsaninformantforJapaneseintelligenceshereceived$25,000,atthecostofalsoreceivingaten-yearjailsentencefromafederalcourtforviolationofcensorshipstatuteswhenarrestedandconvictedin1944.OtherclumsyJapanese

espionageeffortsonbothsidesoftheAtlantic,includingtheextensiveCalifornianTachibananetwork,werecurtailedwithoutmuchdifficulty,andwithnegligiblelossofAlliedsecrets.TheleadersofJapan’sarmedforcesdisagreedaboutalmosteverythingelse,butwereofonemind

inregardingintelligence-gatheringasamechanicalprocesswhichcouldreadilybecarriedoutbyjuniorofficers–theirviewwasevenmoremyopicthanthatofHitler ’sOKW.Analysis,suchasitwas,wasconductedbythearmy’s2ndDepartmentandthenavy’s3rd.ThenavydesignatedsigintasToku-jo–specialinformation;codebreakingasA-jo;telephonetapsasB-jo;DFdirection-findingasC-jo.Itidentifiedfourlevelsofreliabilityforinformation:Ko–certain;Otsu–almostcertain;Hei–alittleuncertain;Tei–uncertain.Aswithothernations,intheJapanesearmyandnavyapostingtointelligencewasacareerdead-end.Evenwhenwarcameandcleveruniversitygraduateswereconscriptedintouniform,almostallweredispatchedtobecomecannonfodder,ratherthanassignedtomilitaryornavalroles–intelligenceinparticular–wheretheirbrainsmighthavebeenuseful.Japan’snavalcodebreakersachievedlittlesuccessinbreakinghigherBritishandAmerican

ciphers,andthusconcentratedinsteadonradiodirection-findingandtrafficanalysis.Sobitterwastherivalrybetweentheservicesthatwhenthearmybrokesomelow-gradeAmericanstripcodes,thesoldiersconcealedtheirknowledgefromthesailorsuntil1945.Atnotimebefore1943didJapandevoteanythinglikethepersonnelandresourcesnecessarytomakeeavesdroppingandcodebreakingmajorsourcesofintelligenceagainsttheWesternPowers,nordidtheircommandersseemmuchtocareaboutthisweakness.Withnationalisticcomplacency,Japantookforgrantedthesecurityofitsowncodes,diplomatic,

militaryandnaval.CaptainRisaburoItowarnedthenavythatitstrafficwasvulnerable,butwasignored.Japan’sType91and97ShikiO-bunInjikiciphermachines,createdbynavalengineerKazuoTanabeandknowntotheAmericansas‘Red’and‘Purple’respectively,weredeemedimpregnable–theForeignMinistryusedthelatter,andthenavy’s‘Coral’and‘Jade’employedsimilartechnology,differingfromEnigmabecauseitemployedtelephonestepping-switchesinsteadofrotors.Thearmy’s‘Green’machinealoneusedthelatter.SupremelyfortunatelyfortheAllies,TokyoignoredanApril1941warningfromtheGermanembassyinWashington,derivedfromanAmericantraitor ’stiptotheSoviets,thatUScodebreakershadcrackedPurple.WhenBerlinpresentedtheJapanesewithseveralEnigmasandurgedthemtomanufacturecopiesfortheirownuse,themachineswerelefttorust;Japanpersistedwithitshome-grownmodels.GiventhedifficultiesexperiencedbyAmericanandBritishcodebreakersinreadingtheJapanesearmy’straffic,theymaywellhavebeenbetteroffdoingso.

Japan’smilitarycounter-espionageorganisationwasbizarrelynamedthe‘ConspiracySection’,devotedtorootingoutplotsagainstthenation.InDecember1937anintelligencetrainingcentrewasopened,laterknownastheNaganoSchool.Thisofferedtheusualtradecraftcourses,withoptionalextrasinlock-picking,ninjamartialartsand‘Kokutai-gaku’–‘StudyforNationalStructureandMind’,ideologicalindoctrination.Nagano’steachingwasunusual:itencouragedofficerstostayalive,ratherthantoconductbanzaichargesandcommitritualsuicideintheeventoffailure.Aweaknessofthecounter-espionageservicepersisted,however:itlavishedextravagantenergyonmonitoringJapan’sowncivilianpoliticians,notforevidenceoftreason,buttoensurethattheydidnotdeviatefromtheirownarmy’sforeignpolicyobjectives.InJuly1937,whenPrinceKonoyeasprimeministerdispatchedenvoystoNankintodiscusspossiblepeacenegotiationswiththeChineseNationalists,thearmydecryptedcablesaboutthetalks,andpromptlysentmilitarypolicetoarrestKonoye’scouriers.HachiroArita,apre-warforeignminister,moaned:‘InJapanweareinaverydifficultpositionfor

conductingrealdiplomacy,becauseJapanesepoliticiansarealwayswatchedbythemilitary.Icannotmakegooduseofflatteringordiplomaticlanguage…IfIsaysomethingwronginatelegram,theJapanesearmyandnavyinterceptitandimmediatelycriticiseme…Thesituationissoawkward.’JapanhadaCabinetIntelligenceDepartment,intendedtobrieftheprimeminister,butthenavyandarmyinsistedonsustainingmonopolyinfluenceoverthenation’sinnercouncils,andsecureditsemasculation:theCIDbecameamerepropagandaorgan.TheWarMinistryhaditsowncounter-intelligenceorganisation,withafifty-strongstaffcharged

withconcealingJapan’spreparationsforwar.InMitsubishi’sNagasakishipyard,workonthenewbattleshipMusashiwascarriedonbehindvasthempcurtains,screeningitfromview.Theluggageofforeignrailtravellerswasroutinelyexamined.TheKempeitai’s6thSectionmaintainedRDFsurveillanceforillegalwirelesstransmissionsbyforeignagentsinJapan.Almostallforeigners’correspondencewasinterceptedatTokyo’sCentralPostOfficeandphotographedbeforeonwarddispatch.OutsidetheUSembassyJapanesesecretpolicemen,strippedtotheirunderpantsagainsttheheat,maintained24/7surveillancefrombehindcurtainsinasupposedlybroken-downcar–‘thespywagon’,asitwasknowntodiplomats.In1936,militarypolicechancedonaletterinEnglish,signedonly‘Jimmy’andpostedattheTeikokuhotelinTokyo;itgavedetailsoftherefittingofthebattleshipNagato.AninvestigationswiftlypinnedauthorshiponlocalReuterscorrespondentandMI6informantJamesCox.Hewasarrested,andthreedayslaterdiedafterbeingthrownorthrowinghimselffromthefourthflooroftheTokyopoliceheadquarters.ItwasneverestablishedwhetherCoxcommittedsuicideorwasmurdered–thelatterseemsmore

plausible,giventhebrutalityoftheKempeitai.TheBritishForeignOfficegavehiswidowa£5,000pay-off,presumablytosecurehersilence.Norwasherhusband’stheonlymysteriousdeathofanEnglishman:inOctober1938aRoyalNavylieutenantnamedPeacockealsovanishedwithouttrace.In

July1940alone,fifteenBritishcitizenswerearrestedonsuspicionofespionage,thoughmostwerelaterreleased.IfthesecasesrepresentedsupposedsuccessesforJapanesecounter-intelligence,itremainsstrikingtobeholdthat,forallJapan’sincreasinglyfeverishxenophobiaandintensivesurveillanceofforeigners,theSorgespyringfunctionedforeightyearsattheheartofAxisstrategy-making.Japan’sintelligence-gatheringmachinefailedmiserablywhereitmatteredmost:inprovidingthe

nation’srulerswithanunderstandingoftheprincipalenemywhomtheyproposedtoattack–theUnitedStates,mostpowerfulindustrialnationonearth.AfterJapan’sdefeatCol.ShinobuTakayamaofthearmy’sOperationsDepartmentacknowledgedruefullythatitwouldhavebeenprudenttoresearchAmerica’sactualandpotentialwarmakingpowersbeforeembarkingonaconflictwithit.ThemoststrikingcharacteristicofJapan’sleadershipwasitsrefusaltoexamine,farlesstoactupon,unpalatableinformation.Nosinglebranchofgovernmentwasresponsibleformakingandcoordinatinggrandstrategy.Thechiefofarmyintelligence,Major-GeneralYuichiTsuchihashi,wasnotconsultedabouttheimplicationsofjoininganalliancewithGermanyandItaly,becausehewasknowntoopposeit.ThearmypaidlittleattentiontoAmericanmatters,whichitsgeneralsconsideredthebusinessofthenavyandtheForeignMinistry.Theyreadsomelow-gradediplomaticwirelesstraffic,andgainedalittleintelligencefromniseis–immigrantslivingintheUS–butmostlyreliedonopensources,whichmeantattachésreadingnewspapers.SeveralofficersexploredthePhilippinesanditsgarrison,buttherewasnoseriousanalysisoftheUSArmy’sactualandpotentialstrength.Oncethewarbegan,someofficerswhohadspenttheirentirepreviouscareersstudyingtheSovietUnionwerearbitrarilytransferredtomonitorAmerica.Japan’sSouthAreaArmyeventuallyabolisheditsUSandBritishintelligencesections,becauseitsseniorofficersdecidedthattheywereproducingnothingofpracticalvalue.Operationsdepartmentsdespisedintelligenceofficersasoldwomenwhoraisedobjectionstointendedcoursesofaction,andthemselvespreferredtorelyuponfront-lineeyeballobservationbysoldiersinthefield.WhenthearmymovedintoIndochinain1940,itsOperationsDepartmentsummarilyappropriatedallintelligenceresponsibilitiestoitself,andrantheinvasionasiftheintelligencestaffdidnotexist.TheattitudeoftheJapanesenavybeforePearlHarborreflectedaprofoundcontradiction:thoseof

itsseniorofficerswhousedtheirbrainsrecognisedtheirownnation’sstrategicvulnerability,becauseofitsdependenceonimportedoilandcommodities,butmadelittleattempttoimposetheirviewsupontheTokyogovernment.TheyknewthatitwouldbeeasytoannihilatetheRoyalNavy’ssmallforcesintheFarEast,butrecognisedtheimmensepoweroftheUSNavy.OperationschiefCaptainTasukuNakazawawrotebeforehostilitiesbegan:‘Wehavenochancetowinawar[withBritainandtheUS].Wargamesresultedinheavylossesinshippingandlossofcontrolofoverseasshippinglanesandlinesofcommunication.’AdmiralIsorokuYamamotowasforemostamongthosewho,whiledislikingandresentingtheUnitedStates’policies,recogniseditseconomicandindustrial

supremacy.Heandhiscleverestsubordinatesknewthatiftheyfailedtosecurevictoryfast,theywouldnotgetitatall.AFebruary1941assessmentconcluded:‘After1944,theUSNavywouldbeconfidentofvictory.’In1941also,anewNationalInstituteforTotalWarStudiescarriedoutexhaustivewargaming,

presuminganadvanceintoSouth-EastAsia.ThisconcludedthatwithintwoyearsJapanwouldbeonitsknees,withSovietentryintothewardeliveringacoupdegrâce.Gen.HidekiTojo,soontobecomeprimeminister,readtheInstitute’sreport,thencommented:‘Youdidagoodjob,butyourreportisbasedonakindofarmchairtheory,notarealwar…Warisnotalwayscarriedoutasplanned.Weshallfaceunpredicteddevelopments.’TojochoseinsistentlytobelievethatthesewouldoperateinfavouroftheAxis.InSeptember1941theEconomicPlanningSectionoftheWarMinistryreachedthesameconclusionastheWarStudiesInstitute,butonceagainthefindingswererejectedbythehighcommand.TheImperialJapaneseArmy’schiefofstaffdeclaredthat‘thereportisagainstournationalpolicy’,andorderedittobeburnt.Thearmy’sironmenalmostalwaysprevailed,recitingtheirmantrathatthegovernmentand

peopleoftheUnitedStateswouldsuccumbtoamoralcollapseaftersufferingtheearlydefeatsandhumiliationsthatJapanwasrightlyconfidentofbeingabletoinflictuponthem.ThesoldierswerealsoconvincedofGermaninvincibility,andspurneddoubters.In1940Japan’snavalattachéinLondonandmilitaryattachéinStockholmemphasisedBritishsuccessesinresistingtheGermanonslaughtontheirisland,andthescaleofLuftwaffelosses.On25Julythearmy’smonthlyintelligencereportexpressedrespectforthestrengthofBritain’sresistanceintheairbattleovertheisland:‘TheUKismaintainingthefightagainstGermanywithgreatdetermination…Britishpublicopinioncontinuestosupportthegovernment’shard-linepolicy.’ThereporthighlightedthepostponementofHitler ’sinvasion,Operation‘Sealion’,becauseofGermanlackofamphibiouscapability,andfailuretoachieveairsuperiority.IJAheadquartersdismissedtheauthorsofthesereportsashavingsuccumbedtoBritish

propaganda,andinsteadembracedthesupremelyoptimisticdispatchesofBaronŌshima,theJapaneseambassadorinBerlin.UntilJune1941theForeignMinistrymadepolicyonanassumptionthatfollowingBritain’sdefeat,theNaziswouldforgeanalliancewiththeSovietUniontodividethespoils.Japan’sgeneralssuccumbedtoeuphoriafollowingthesigningofthe13April1941Soviet–Japaneseneutralitypact,whichtheyconvincedthemselvesmadethenationsafefromatwo-frontwar.WhenŌshimareportedthatHitlerplannedtoinvadetheSovietUnion–hiswarningsbecameexpliciton18April1941andwerereinforcedon4June–theJapanesegovernmentsimplyrefusedtoconsiderthisnewandunwelcomescenario.OnlyafortnightbeforetheGermanonslaught,foreignministerMatsuokadoggedlyinsistedthattherewasonlya40percentprospectofsuchanevent.WarministerTojosaid:‘Idonotthinkitisanurgentmatter.’ThecabinetdeferreddiscussionoftheimplicationsofaRusso–Germanwar,clingingblindlytoitspolicyofsupportingtheNazismoreor

lesswhatevertheydid.Withoutreferencetothecivilianpoliticians,thearmydispatchedlargereinforcementstoManchuriaincaseadecisionwasmadetojoinHitler ’sassaultonStalin.Before‘Barbarossa’waslaunched,intelligenceofficerLt.Col.SaburoHayashisuggestedthatif

theRussianscouldgetthroughwinterundefeated,theirarmiescouldregroupandsustainalongstruggle,buttheOperationsDepartmentandhighercommandersdismissedthisassessmentoutofhand.HayashiwroteagaininAugust:‘ItisexpectedthattheGermanswilloccupyMoscow,buthavenomoresuccesswithin1941.WhenwintercomestheSovietArmywillhaveanopportunitytocatchitsbreath,andwillneversurrender.TheCommunistPartyisstrongandsolid.FollowingthefallofMoscow,theGermanswillbeobligedtocontinuethewar,whilemaintainingcontrolofhugecapturedterritories.Tosummarise:thewarwillnotendquickly.’Yettheall-powerfulOperationsDepartmentinsteadpredictedStalin’sloomingoverthrowbyhisowngenerals.InJapanasinNaziGermany,ithadbecomeaninstitutionalpreceptthatnointelligenceassessmentcouldbecountenancedbypolicy-makerswhichrancontrarytoadesirednationalcourse.Againandagainbetweenthe1930sand1945,strategywasdistortedtoconformwiththevisceralinclinationsandambitionsofcommanders,ratherthanwithrealities,ofwhichbyfarthemostimportantwereAmerica’seconomicsuperiorityandGermany’sprecariousstrategicpredicament.ThemostpenetratingappreciationofJapan’sprospectsbeforePearlHarborwaspresentedto

Tokyonotbyitsownanalysts,butbyWinstonChurchill.InApril1941hedispatchedamemorandumtotheJapaneseforeignministerwhichwasdesignedtodeterwar.‘Iventuretoaskafewquestions,’wrotetheBritishprimeminister,

whichitseemstomedeservetheattentionoftheImperialJapaneseGovernmentandpeople.

1.WillGermany,withoutthecommandoftheseaorthecommandoftheBritishdaylightair,beabletoinvadeandconquerGreatBritaininthespring,summerorautumnof1941?WillGermanytrytodoso?WoulditnotbeintheinterestsofJapantowaituntilthesequestionshaveansweredthemselves?

2.WilltheGermanattackonBritishshippingbestrongenoughtopreventAmericanaidfromreachingBritishshores,withGreatBritainandtheUnitedStatestransformingtheirwholeindustrytowarpurposes?

3.DidJapan’saccessiontotheTriplePact[withGermanyandItaly]makeitmorelikelyorlesslikelythattheUnitedStateswouldcomeintothepresentwar?

4.IftheUnitedStatesenteredthewaratthesideofGreatBritain,andJapanrangedherselfwiththeAxisPowers,wouldnotthenavalsuperiorityofthetwoEnglish-speakingnationsenablethemtodisposeoftheAxisPowersinEuropebeforeturningtheirunitedstrengthuponJapan?

5.IsItalyastrengthoraburdentoGermany?IstheItalianFleetasgoodatseaasonpaper?Isitasgoodasitusedtobe?6.WilltheBritishAirForcebestrongerthantheGermanAirForcebeforetheendof1941,andfarstrongerbeforetheendof1942?

7.WillthemanycountrieswhicharebeinghelddownbytheGermanarmyandGestapolearntoliketheGermansmore,orwilltheylikethemlessastheyearspassby?

8.IsittruethattheproductionofsteelintheUnitedStatesduring1941willbe75milliontonsandinGreatBritainabout12½,makingatotalofnearly90milliontons?IfGermanyshouldhappentobedefeated,asshewaslasttime,wouldnotthe7milliontonssteelproductionofJapanbeinadequateforasingle-handedwar?

FromtheanswerstothesequestionsmayspringtheavoidancebyJapanofaseriouscatastrophe,andamarkedimprovementintherelationsbetweenJapanandthetwogreatSea-PowersoftheWest.

Tokyo’sanodynereplywasinevitable:‘TheforeignpolicyofJapanisdetermineduponafteranunbiasedexaminationofallthefactsandaverycarefulweighingofalltheelementsofthesituationsheconfronts.’YetsuchaprocessnevertookplaceinTokyo.Japan’srejectionofstrategicintelligenceassessment,andofrationaldecision-making,wasresponsibleforitscommitmenttoapathtocatastropheon7December1941.

TheonlyspeciesofintelligencetheJapanesehighcommandtreatedseriouslywasthatwhichconcernedimmediateobjectives.Thus,inthemonthsbeforethearmyandnavywenttowar,bothenergeticallyprobedthedefencesoftheEuropeanSouth-EastAsianempires,thePhilippinesandPearlHarbor.Tokyo’sappetiteforanadvanceintoIndochinawassharpenedbytheJuly1940decryptionofatelegramtoWashingtonfromtheAmericanconsulinSaigon,sayingthattheBritishwouldmakenomilitaryresponsetosuchaJapaneseinitiativewithoutapromiseofUSsupport,whichwouldnotbeforthcoming.FurtherdecryptsofdiplomaticmessagesinAugust,notablyincludingthoseoftheVichyFrenchauthoritiesinIndochina,confirmedtheinabilityorunwillingnessoftheWesternPowerstoresistaJapanesetakeover.Thus,on22September,theJapaneseforcedaFrenchsignatureonanagreementwhichadmittedtheirtroopsnextday.Herewasacasewhereintelligenceplayedasignificantrole,albeitinconfirmingJapan’scommitmenttoacourseitsrulersfavouredanyway.Thearmy’sSouth-EastAsiaGroup,establishedin1939,wasresponsibleforexploringthe

defencesoftheEuropeanempires.BecauseThailandwastheonlyindependentcountryintheregion,theJapanesemadeitthehuboftheirintelligence-gathering,directedbymilitaryattachéCol.HiroshiTamura,whofocusedespeciallyonidentifyingMalayaninvasionroutes.HissoldiersmeasuredeveryroadandbridgefromIndochinaandThailandintoMalaya.AgentsexploredthehugeDutchoilrefineriesatPalembangsodiligentlythatwhenJapaneseparatroopslaterdescendeduponthem,eachmankneweverydetailofthetarget.TheJapaneseacknowledgedthattheBritishhadsomeformidablecodebreakingtalent,focusedintheirFarEastCombinedBureauinSingapore,whichworkedcloselywithBletchleyPark.Anavalcodebreakerwhomonitoreditstraffic,CommanderMonotonoSamejima,decryptedmaterialwhichshowedthattheBritishhadbeenreadingsomelow-gradeJapanesesignalswithintwenty-fourhoursoftransmission.Samejimarecalledlater:‘IbecameawareofthetremendouscapabilityofUKintelligence.’Hissuperiors,however,caredonlyaboutcountingtheirenemies’soldiers.Bytheendof1940athousandJapanese‘tourists’,allgraduatesofthearmyintelligenceschool,wereworkingoutofThailand.BritishtroopsexercisinginMalayafoundthemselvesfollowedeverywherebybicyclingJapaneseequippedwithpencilsandnotebooks.Their

findingswerecirculatedthroughoutthearmyasan‘IntelligencerecordofBritishMalaya’,whichincludedmapsoftheSingaporegarrison’sinstallations.Thegeneralstaffconcludedfromsuchagents’reportsthattheethnicdiversityofBritishimperialforceswasaweakness.ItwasdismissiveoftheAustralians:‘Theirqualityisbad.Thetroopsarecomposedchieflyofjoblessmenandroughindividuals.Theyarenotawell-disciplinedarmy.Theirvalourinbattleisfamous,buttheirtrainingandequipmentarenotadequate.’TokyoassertedthatmanyIndiansoldierswerebothill-trainedandanti-British;theycouldfightbravelyinahead-onpositionalclash,butwerevulnerabletorapidflankingmovements–ashrewdassessment,vindicatedbyeventsinthesubsequentcampaign.Inthecourseof1941JapaneseagentsmadecontactswithIndian,MalayanandBurmesenationalist

groups,offeringcovertsupportfortheirambitionsforindependence,whichmanyfoundanattractiveproposition.AJanuary1941telegramfromTokyotoJapan’sconsul-generalinSingaporeorderedhimtoaccelerate‘agitation,politicalplots,propagandaandintelligence’.InMay,Japan’sForeignServicecabledallitsmissionsintheregion,urgingthemtohastentheexpansionofclandestinenetworksontheperipheryoftheIndianOcean,becausewarwasobviouslylooming.TheIndians,especially,wereurgedtopromotedisaffectionamongsoldiersoftheRaj,andbegantodosoin1939;whentheassaultonMalayawasunleashed,thepoorperformanceofseveralIndianregimentssuggestedthattheJapanesepropagandaoffensivehadachievedsomesuccess:the1stHyderabads,forinstance,arebelievedtohaveshottheirownBritishcolonelandadjutantatanearlystageofthebattalion’sdisintegrationonthebattlefield.TokyothoughtBritishaircrewgreen,anditwastruethatmostofthepilotsdeployedinMalayaand

Burmawerelessexperiencedthantheirenemycounterparts.TheJapaneseprobablyreceivedsomeinformationfromatraitorintheBritishranks:forseveralmonthsduring1941CaptainPatrickHeenanof300AirIntelligenceLiaisonSectionappearstohavewirelessedinformationaboutRAFdispositionsfromasecrettransmitter.Thirty-one,borninNewZealand,HeenanhadinheritedfromhisfatherawarmsympathyfortheIrishRepublicanArmy.HewasrecruitedbyTokyoduringa1938leavespentinJapan,andendedhisespionagecareerbybeingshotagainstaharbourwallinSingaporejustbeforeitsfall.AsforPearlHarbor,inAugust1941twenty-eight-year-oldEnsignTakeoYoshikawaoftheUS&

BritishsectionofJapanesenavalintelligencearrivedinHawaiiwithdiplomaticcover,andspentthemonthsthatfollowedexploringeveryaccessibleareaofinteresttotheplannersbackathome,whileconductinganuncommonlyenergeticoff-dutylovelife.HereportedthreetimesaweekbyPurplecipher,andthoughhismessageswereroutinelyintercepted,theUSSignalsIntelligenceServiceinWashingtonwasoftenthreeweeksinarrearsdecryptingthem,notleastbecauseithadonlytwofluentandaccurateJapaneselinguists.InOctober,Yoshikawa’sbossLt.CmdrMinatoNakajimamadeapersonalvisitonaJapaneseliner,andreceivedtheensign’swrittenreportontheUSNavy’slocalstrengths,deploymentsanddefences.ThoughYoshikawawasinternedafterPearlHarbor,hewas

subsequentlyallowedtoreturnhomeundertheagreementonexchangeofdiplomaticpersonnel.Furtherinformationwasacquiredbythelocalconsularstaff,assistedbythelargeJapanese

expatriatecolonyonHawaii–41,346ofthem.TheirdataconfirmedthenavyinitsdeterminationtostrikeatPearlHarborratherthanagainstthealternativeAmericananchorageatLahainaPort.NeitherthearmynortheMinistryofForeignAffairswasinformedabouttheagreedobjectives,andPearlwasneverexplicitlymentionedinnavalradiotraffic.Thecriticalmistakeintheplanningoftheonslaughtwasnotoneofintelligencecollection,butofanalysis:theadmiralsbackinJapanfailedtorecognisetheimportanceofPearl’shugeoil-tankfarmsandrepairfacilities,andneverincludedtheseintheirtargetprogramme.AsforJapaneseperceptionsoftheUSArmy,theyassessedAmericantroops–especiallythePhilippinesgarrison–asindividualistswholackedstayingpowerandfightingspiritforaprotractedstruggle.Japan’sgeneralsplannedforavictoriousterminationofthePacificwarinthespringof1942,whereupontheywouldlaunchamajorassaultontheSovietUnion.

ThusJapanwenttowarknowingmuchaboutitsimmediateobjectives,butwilfullyignorantandnaïveaboutwhatwouldfollow.Yamamoto’sairsquadronstookoffforPearlHarboron7December1941atjustthemomentwhenGermanfailurebeforeMoscowwasbecomingapparentinBerlin.TheonlysuccessoftheadvocatesofcautioninTokyowastopersuadeJapan’srulerstoconfinethemselvestoassaultingtheUSandWesternEuropeanempires,andtoavoidjoininghostilitieswiththeSovietUnionuntilGermanvictoryseemedimminent.ThejudgementsonwhichtheJapanesebasedtheirdecisiontofight–toshacklethemselvestoatotteringgiant–werefantasticallyill-informed.TheyovervaluedGermanmight,underratedthatoftheUnitedStates.Moreover,theypersuadedthemselvesthattheycouldconductalimitedwar,whichtheycouldterminatebynegotiationatamomentoftheirownchoice.Instead,ofcourse,theyfoundthemselvesengagedinanexistentialstruggleinwhichtheymusteitherachievetotalvictoryorfacealmostannihilatorydefeat.

3 THEMANWHOWONMIDWAY

ThesurprisesufferedbytheUnitedStatesatPearlHarborwasasgreatasthatwhichtheSovietUnionincurredatthelaunchof‘Barbarossa’,andequallyinexcusable.ItsarmycodebreakersledbyFrankRowletthadachievedanextraordinaryfeatbycrackingJapan’s‘Purple’diplomaticcipherinAugust1940.DuringtheweeksanddaysbeforetheJapaneseattackonHawaii,almostasmuchinformationbecameavailabletotheUSgovernmenttoindicatetheimminenceofwarasStalinreceivedbeforeHitlerattackedhim.ButtheUSadministration’sresponsewasassupineashadbeenthatoftheKremlin.JustastheBritishrequiredmanymonthsunderthestimulusofwarbeforetheydevelopedeffectivemachineryformanagingandexploitingintelligence,sotheAmericanarmedforcesbegantodosoonlyamidthewreckageofthebattleshipsofitsPacificFleet.

AdmiralJohnGodfrey’sJuly1941BritishreportonUSintelligenceconcludedthat‘cooperationbetweenthevariousorganisationsisinadequateandsourcesarenotcoordinatedtothemutualbenefitofthedepartmentsconcerned.Thereislittlecontactbetweentheintelligenceofficersofthedifferentdepartmentsandthedesiretoobtaina“scoop”isfairlygeneral…ThevalueofthematerialobtainedbytheUSintelligenceorganisationsfromEuropeisnotconsiderable,thoughinformationonthePacificareaandSouthAmericais…onthewhole,high-grade…TheOfficeofNavalIntelligenceisindangerofdegeneratingintoagraveyardforstatisticsbecauseitisinclinedtoregardintelligenceasanendinitself…ManyofthefaultswhichhavebeenenumeratedwillberecognisedassimilartothosefromwhichBritishIntelligencesufferedbeforethewar.’GodfreyconcludedthatonceWilliamDonovan’snewintelligence-gatheringorganisationgotgoing,manygoodthingsmightbepossible,‘butitwouldbeprudenttoconcludethatUSIntelligenceisunlikelytobeofmuchassistancetothejointwareffortformanymonthstocome’.Thisprovedtobetrue.TheUSArmyandUSNavycontributednothingsignificanttoAllied

knowledgeofAxismotionsformonthsafterPearlHarbor.Butthen,inJune1942,fromoutofadankbasementintheNavyYardonOahucameasinglepiercingshaftoflightthatilluminatedtheentirePacifictheatre.ItmadepossibletheUSNavy’svictoryatMidway,whichinsideforty-eighthourstransformedthecourseofthewaragainstJapan.Itwasarguablythemostinfluentialsingleintelligenceachievementoftheglobalconflict.WhiletheBritishevenbeforethewardeployedbrilliantcivilianstospearheadtheircodebreaking,

theUSNavychosetorelyinsteaduponanalmostrandomlyselectedgroupofcareerofficers,amongtheleastvaluedoftheirservice.Withpitifullyslenderresources,theirachievementcouldnotmatchinscalethatofBletchleyPark,nordiditsavetheUSfromhumiliationontheDecember1941‘DayofInfamy’.ButtheofficerwhomadethegreatestsinglecontributiontosubsequenttriumphatMidwayretiredfromhisservicewithlittlehonour,andwenttohisgraveknownonlytohistorians.JosephRochefortcutanawkwardfigure:hewasapoorseaman,withnotalentformaking

importantfriends.Withouthisgifts,however,itisunlikelythatadecisivebattlewouldhavebeenfoughtinthePacificbetween4and7June1942,andevenlessplausiblethatitwouldhavebeenwonbytheUnitedStates.Whathappenedthatdaywastheoutcomenotofasuddenflashofinspiration,butoftwodecadesofweary,thanklesslabour.Rochefortwasbornin1900,youngestsonofIrishparents;hisfatherwasanOhiorugsalesman.

Anuntidychild,inhighschoolheexcelledonlyatmaths.AtseventeenheenlistedintheUSNavyasanelectrician3rdclass,thenscrapedacommissionasareservistandbecameanengineer.Attwenty-onehemarriedElmaFay,hischildhoodsweetheart,thoughhewasCatholicandsheaBaptist.In1921hemanagedtotransfertotheregularnavy,buthiscareerlanguished:henarrowlyescapedcourt-martialwhenatankeronwhichhewasdutyofficerdraggeditsanchorinSanFranciscoBayamidsixdestroyers.In1925hewasdetachedfromserviceonthebattleshipArizonatostudycryptanalysis,for

whichskillatbridgeandcrosswordsseemedtofithim.HeworkedintheNavyDepartmentonWashington’sConstitutionAvenue,buttheassignmentdidnotrepresentpromotion:intelligencerankedlowontheservice’stotempole.TheUSNavyhadthusfarachievednothingtomatchtheachievementofthearmy’scodebreakingdepartment,the‘BlackChamber ’establishedin1917underHerbertYardley,whichbrokeaJapanesediplomaticcipherasearlyas1921.Thenavywaslearning,however.RochefortstartedbyreadingthebookElementsofCryptanalysis,

writtenbytheWarDepartment’sWilliamFriedman.HeworkedunderthebrilliantLt.LauranceSafford,aformerchiefyeomanintheUSNavalReserve,whobecamehistutorandmentor.Theywereassistedbyacivilian,AgnesMeyerDriscoll,whoalsomadeanotablecontribution.Rochefortfoundhimselfenjoyingthework.Breakingacode,hesaidlater,‘makesyoufeelprettygood,becauseyouhavedefiedthesepeoplewhohaveattemptedtouseasystemtheythoughtwassecure…Itwasalwayssomewhatofapleasuretodefeatthem.’InFebruary1925Safforddepartedforanalmostmandatoryspellofseaduty,leavingRochefortinchargeoftheresearchdesk.Thisconsistedofonlythreefull-timers:himself;anex-actornamedClausBogel,whodidlittletojustifyhisrations;andDriscoll,dubbed‘MadameX’,whocursedfluently,despisedmake-up,butrubbedalongprettywellwithRochefort.Japan’ssecretswerealwaystheprincipaltargets.In1920theOfficeofNavalIntelligencehadruna‘blackbagjob’,photographingacopyoftheJapaneseRedCodefromtheNewYorkconsulate.Itbecameobviousthathigherlanguageskillswereindispensableifthecodebreakersweretomakeseriousheadway:Lt.CmdrEllisZacharias,acareerintelligenceofficerandfluentJapanesespeaker,wasdraftedintothesectiontoworkalongsideRochefort.Zachariaswrotelater:‘Thefewpersonswhowereassignedtothissectionweretaciturn,secretive

peoplewhorefusedtodiscusstheirjobs…Hourswentbywithoutanyofussayingaword,justsittinginfrontofpilesofindexedsheetsonwhichamumbo-jumbooffiguresorletterswasdisplayedinchaoticdisorder.’GiventhattheUnitedStateswasatpeaceanddeterminedtostaythatway,theintensitywithwhichahandfulofnavalofficerslabouredattheirarcanecraftseemsextraordinary,andfarremovedfromthelazytempothatprevailedelsewhereintheUSNavy.Thosemenandthatoneremarkablewomanwereobsessives,whoworkedallhoursandignoredSundays.Theofficewaspermanentlyshroudedintobaccosmoke:Rochefortchain-smokedcigarettes,apipe,theoddcigar.Theysometimeswenthometootiredtoeatuntiltheyhadunwoundforseveralhours.Alllostweight.SaffordhadestablishedachainofinterceptstationsinShanghai,Hawaiiandelsewhere,which

liftedJapan’ssignalsfromtheether.OncethemessagesreachedRochefort’soffice,thesectionworkedtogethertocrackthem,withAgnesDriscollprobablytheablestanalyst.Occasionally,newofficersweresenttothem,totesttheirsuitabilityascodebreakers.Mostwerewashedout:theylackedthepeculiar,indispensablesensefortherhythmofpuzzles.Aftertwoyears,Rocheforthadhadenough–notofcodebreaking,butofNavyDepartmentpolitics.

Hissection’sactivitiescameunderCommunications,butIntelligencewagedconstantwartotakeitover.Stillalieutenant,Rochefortbecameexecutiveofficerofadestroyer.Atseahistactlessness,carriedtothepointofboorishness,exasperatedsuperiors.InhissparetimehecheckedouttheUSNavy’scodes,andtoldthecommander-in-chiefthatthecommunicationssystemwascloggedwithtrivialmessagesthatshouldneverhavebeenencrypted.Thiswaspoorlyreceived.In1929hisoldcolleagueEllisZachariasarrangedforhimtobepostedtoJapan,tolearnthe

language.Whileservingthereforthreeyears,RochefortbecameaclosefriendofanotherAmericannavalofficer,EdwinLayton;itisameasureofhisalmostmorbidsenseofdiscretionthatinalltheirhourstogether,hetoldLaytonnothingabouthisbackgroundincryptanalysis.Thereafter,Rochefortspentmostofthe1930satsea,successivelyasagunnery,intelligenceandnavigationofficer.InOctober1939hewaspostedtoPearlHarbor,wherehewasappalledbythecasualroutines,butsharedthedelusionsofhissuperiorsthatnoenemywoulddaretoattackHawaiiorthePhilippines.LauranceSaffordnowheadedOp-20-G,thenavy’scodebreakingoperation.Withhalftheworldat

warthiswasmodestlyexpanding,whileJapaneserelationswiththeUSdeteriorated.Between1934and1939theUSgovernmentandarmedforceshadfaithfullyrespecteddomesticlaw–explicitlySection605ofthe1934FederalCommunicationsAct,whichbarredinterceptionofmessagesbetweenUSandforeigncountries,radioorcable.Thereafter,GeorgeMarshallgrantedsomelatitudetothevariouscodebreakingagenciesandtheireavesdroppers,whichmadepossiblethesmallmiracleofPurple.Safford’sactivities,likeFriedman’s,nonethelessrepresentedlawbreaking.HeaskedforRocheforttoheadupthePearlstation,knownasCOM14.Rochefortacceptedthepostingreluctantly,becauseofhismemoriesofthedepartmentalstruggles.Butwhereelsewashetogo,atforty-one,withnobodyclamouringforhisservices?InJune1941hetookuphisnewresponsibilities,reportingdirecttoAdmiralHusbandKimmel,PacificFleetC-in-C.Onlybelatedly,fourmonthslater,didhereceivealong-delayedpromotiontocommander.COM14–‘StationHypo’–whereRochefortandhisteamweretomakehistory,wasquarteredin

theechoing,unlovelybasementoftheNavyYardadministrationbuilding,enteredthroughatime-lockedunmarkeddoorguardedbymarines.‘TheDungeon’,asitwasdubbedbyinmates,lookedlikeasmall-townpoolhall,evenuntothechronicsmokehaze,becauseeverybodyworkedwithacigarettestuckinhismouth.Achiefpettyofficer,TexRorie,satatadeskbythedoor,screeningvisitors.Thefloorwasundressedconcrete,thewallswerepaintedwithmud-colouredsealant,andtheprimitiveventilationsystemrecycledstaleair.WhenRochefortfirstjoined,muchofthebasement’shundredfeetbyfiftywasemptiness,butthroughthemonthsthatfollowed,itfilledrapidly.AbatteryofIBMHollerithpunch-cardtabulatingmachinesclatteredrelentlessly:theircontributiontoHypo’ssuccesses,asindeedtoallUScodebreaking,deservesemphasis.InSeptember,fiveJapanese-languageofficersjoinedthesection.Soonthereweretwenty-threemen,workinginfoursectors:thelanguageteam,trafficanalysts,ship-plotters,cryptanalysts.Lt.CmdrThomasDyer,ashort,dark

officerwithheavyspectacleswholookedmorelikeaneccentricprofessorthananavalofficer,wasconsideredthebestofthelatter,andbecameaheroofAmerica’scryptographicwar.OthersincludedLt.HamWright,whoboreapassingresemblancetotheactorWallaceBeery;andLt.CmdrJackHoltwick.Rochefortnolongerthoughtofhimselfasacryptanalyst;instead,hesaid,‘[I]fanciedmyselfatranslator.’Theyworkedintheatmosphereofauniversitylibrary–therewasnochatterorloudtalk,insteada

fierceearnestness.WhenJasperHolmes,anex-submarinerinvalidedoutoftheservice,joinedtheteam,hewasawedbytheintensityofitslabours:‘HadInotwitnesseditIneverwouldhavebelievedthatanygroupofmenwascapableofsuchsustainedmentaleffortundersuchconstantpressureforsuchalengthoftime.’Butheadded:‘theresultstheyachieveddidnotappearproportionatetotheirefforts’.In1941–42,whenBletchleyParkwasalreadyoperatingadozenbombes,thetoolsmostusedbyRochefort’steamwerepaper,pencilandtheIBMtabulators,thoughHoltwickexperimentedwithanothercrudemechanicalaid.Thecryptanalystsusedmathematicalskillstoexposethecodegroupsinamessage–iftheycouldgetthatfar–thenturneditovertothelinguists.Theintroductorybriefingfornoviceswassimple:‘Gentlemen,hereareyourdesks.StartbreakingJapanesecodes.’TheDungeon’spersonnelworkedinanatmosphereofalmostdefiantinformality.Theyaddressedeachotherbyname,notrank,andcarednothingfordress.Rochefortaffectedslippersandamaroonsmokingjacket,whichheclaimedprotectedhimfromthechronicchill.JasperHolmesfoundnothingcompanionableabouthischief,butimmediatelyrecognisedhisstrengthofleadership.Theyworkedaneight-dayweek:sixon,thentwooff.Apaintedsignwasaffixedtoapillarnearthedesks:‘Wecanaccomplishanything…provided…noonecareswhogetsthecredit.’Rochefort,alwaysobsessedwithsecurity,causedHypotobeofficiallydesignatedas‘NavyCommunicationsSupplementaryActivity’.ThosepersonnelintheNavyYardwhoknewwhattheteamwasdoingregardedthemwithcondescensioninthosedays;theycommandednorespect,becausetheyhaddonenothingtoearnit.AsatBletchleyinthebeginning,onlythecodebreakersthemselvesunderstoodwhattheymightbeabletoachieve,andhowvastcouldbethesignificanceofsuccess.Pearl’slisteningstationswerelocatedatWahiawaandLualuale,withadirection-findingfacilityat

thelatter,somethirtymilesfromtheNavyYard.OperatorsrecordedmessagestransmittedintheJapaneseversionofMorse:thiscustomarilyusedablendofthekanasyllabaryandromanjiitransliteratedcharacters,superimposedonatelegraphiccode–‘JN-25’messagescontainedonlynumbers.Inthelateautumnof1941,astartlinglackofurgencycharacterisedthelogisticsofthecodebreakingoperation.AlthoughboththeinterceptoperatorsandHypohadbeguntomaintainwatchesaroundtheclock,therewasnosecureteleprinterlinkbetweenthereceivingstationsandtheDungeon,onlyapartyphoneline.Onceeverytwenty-fourhours,thelatestcropofmessageswascollectedbyjeepfortheforty-minutetriptotheNavyYard.USNavycodebreakersaroundtheworldcouldcommunicatewitheachotherbyprivateciphersystem,usinganECMIImachinewithfifteen

rotorsinthreerows,butliaisonbetweenthemwascriminallypoor.Rochefort’steamwasnotinformedthatthearmyinWashingtonwasbreakingtheJapanesePurplecipher,norabouttheONI’sMay‘pinch’oftheOrangecodefromaJapanesefreighterinSanFranciscoharbour.Indeed,Hypowastoldnothingaboutwhereitsownlaboursfittedintoabiggerpicture.AtPearl,theofficeofFleetIntelligenceOfficerEdwinLayton–Rochefort’soldcomradeinTokyo–waslocatedamilefromtheNavyYard,attheFleetsubmarinebase.MostoftheweaknessesofUSNavyintelligence,matchingthoseoftheUSArmy,wererootedin

Washington,foundedintheinabilityofseniorofficerstograspthepropernatureofinformation-gatheringandmanagement,whichtheyunderstoodlittlebetterthandidtheirJapanesecounterparts.TheyunderratedJapan’sairpower–whenTokyonavalattachéStephenJurickasawaZeroonthegroundatanairshowandsenthomeadetailedreport,hewasrebukedfortakingtheplanesoseriously.In1940afriendlyinformantinJapangavetheUSembassydetailsofthenewType93‘LongLance’,anoxygen-fuelledtorpedothatwasthebestofitskindintheworld.TheBureauofOrdnancedismissedthisreport,declaringsuchaweapontobeimpossible.Herewasareflectionofthetribalismofmanynations’armedforces:ifWehavenotcreatedsuchaweapon,howcouldTheyhavedoneso?ItwasastoundingyetcharacteristicthatBrigadier-GeneralHayerKroner,headofthearmy’sintelligencedivision,toldaPearlHarborinquiryin1942thathehadnotbeenprivytohisownservice’sJapanesedecrypts.Meanwhilewithinthesignalsdepartments,achildishinter-serviceagreementhadbeenreachedin1940,wherebythearmyandnavyreadPurpleonalternatedays,anddelivereditsoutputtotheWhiteHouseinalternatemonths.Thedysfunctionbetweenthenavy’soperationsandintelligencedivisionswasnotimprovedbythefactthatin1941thelatterhadthreesuccessivedirectors.OnlybrutalwarexperiencecausedtheUSarmedforcesslowlytolearntotreatintelligence,andespeciallycodebreaking,withtheseriousnessandsensitivityitmerited.

InDecember1941,HypohadnotcomeclosetobreakingtheJapaneseFlagOfficers’Code,notleastbecausetherewastoolittletraffictoworkon,butitwasenjoyingsomesuccesswithsecondarysystems.Formostof1941,justtenmembersofOp-20-GwereworkingontheJapanesenavy’sJN-25.AtthatstagethemostimportantweaponinRochefort’sarmouryforproducingradiointelligencewastrafficanalysis–locatingJapanesewarshipsthroughtheirwirelessmessaging,eventhoughthecontentwasunreadable.Evenforachievingthis,theUSNavylackedthetechnologytheBritishhaddevelopedandemployedintheirFarEastCombinedBureauinSingapore:‘radiofingerprinting’throughcine-camerarecordsoftheoscilloscopeimagesofeachuniquesignalpattern,enablinginterceptorstoidentifyindividualships.InthedaysbeforePearlHarbor,itwasevidenttotheteamintheDungeonthattheJapanesewere

planningsomethingbig,thoughtheyhadnonotionwhatitmightbe.Theydetectedanunprecedentedconcentrationofnavalairpower,butAdmiralYamamotoputdownadenseelectronicsmokescreento

maskitspurpose.FormonthsRocheforthadbeentrackingthemovementsofmajorunitsoftheJapanesefleet,butinmid-Novemberhelostitssixcarriers.HiscounterpartsattheCaststationinthePhilippinessaidtheywereconfidenttheflat-topswerestillinhomewaters.NothoughtofanassaultonPearlcrossedRochefort’smind:knowingJapanashedid,andasadoggedlylogicalman,hethoughtitimplausiblethatHirohito’snationwouldstartawarwiththeUSwhichitwascertaintolose.SopoorwasintelligenceliaisonthatRochefortwastoldnothingofthe24SeptembermessagefromTokyotoitsHawaiiconsulate,askingforthepreciselocationsofUSbattleshipsinsidePearlHarbor.ThiswassentintheJapaneseconsularcode,designated‘J-19’,whichwasdeemedalowpriorityforbreaking,andthusthecodedmessagewasnotflowntoWashingtonuntil6October,amidamassofothermaterial.Evenwhenthesignalwasread,neithertheUSArmynorUSNavyintelligencedirectoratesthoughtitsignificantenoughtoreplaytoHypo.ButRochefortwassufficientlysureoftheimminenceofsomemajorJapaneseinitiativethaton29

Novemberhedispatchedfourofficerstotheinterceptstationtomaintainalisteningwatchfora‘Winds’actionmessagethattheyknewmustbecoming.Nextday,theJapanesechangedalltheirships’identificationcallsignsforthesecondtimeinamonth–yetanotherindicationthatabigoperationwasimminent.On3December,WashingtonatlastcondescendedtoinformPearl–andRochefort–thattheJapanesehadorderedalltheirdiplomaticmissionstodestroycodesandciphers.AnFBItapontheJapaneseconsulinHonoluluconfirmedthathetoohadbeentoldtoburnhiscodes.Butstillno‘execute’ordertotheJapanesefleetwasinterceptedonHawaii.Intheweekbeforethestormbroke,RochefortpleadedguiltytoneglectingonemessagetoaJapanesesubmarinethatwasnotbrokenuntil12December.Butevenhadthisbeenread,giventheinstitutionalisedpassivityoftheUSgovernmentandarmedforces,itishardtosupposethatitwouldhavechangedanything.OnSaturday,6DecemberanexhaustedRochefortwenthomeatlunchtime.ThatafternoonalastcodedcablefromtheJapaneseconsulate,detailingthepositionsofbarrageballoonsandtorpedonetsaroundthePearlanchorage,washandedinattheRCAofficefordispatch.ButthecopyearmarkedforAmerica’scodebreakerswentuncollecteduntilmuchlater.ThelegendoftheDayofInfamybeganatBainbridgeIslandinPugetSoundearlyon7December,

whenaUSNavylisteningpostinterceptedciphermessagesdispatchedfromTokyotoWashingtononthecommercialcircuitoftheMackayRadio&TelegraphCompany.Bainbridgere-transmittedthemtotheNavyDepartment’s20-GY,wheretheywerereceivedbyLt.(JuniorGrade)FrancisBrotherhoodasheapproachedtheendofhisnightshift.BrotherhoodhadalreadyseenthirteenpartsoftheJapanesemessagetoitsembassy,inresponsetotheUSdiplomaticnotedemandingJapan’swithdrawalfromChina.Now,ashortfinaldecryptclatteredofftheprinter–inJapanese.Itwasjustafter5a.m.Lt.CmdrAlwinKramer,chiefUSNtranslator,arrived150minuteslater,at7.30a.m.,andwithinminutesrecognisedthatthelastmessage,breakingoffnegotiations,mustmeanwar.AnarmymessengersetforthwithacopydestinedfortheWarDepartment,whileothersweresenttotheWhite

HouseandtheNavyDepartment.At9a.m.–3.30a.m.inHawaii–RufusBratton,chiefoftheFarEasternsectionofmilitaryintelligence,readthedecrypt,fourhoursbeforetheJapaneseambassadorwasinstructedtodeliverhismomentousmessagetotheStateDepartment.BrattonattemptedtocontactGen.GeorgeMarshall,andwastoldthathewasoutriding.Anaidewhowentinsearchofthechiefofstafffailedtofindhim.At10.30,BrattonatlastspoketoMarshall,stressedtheurgencyofthenews,andofferedtodashouttohisquartersatFortMyer.MarshallinsteaddrovetotheWarDepartment,whereheinsistedonreadingallfourteenpagesoftheJapanesemessageinsequence,thoughKramerurgedhimtogostraighttotheend.At11a.m.,withtwohoursstilltogobeforePearlwashit,thechiefofstaffvetoeduseofthescramblerphonetocontactHawaii,onthebizarregroundsthatitwasinsecure.InsteadhesentawarningcableviatheWarDepartment’smessagecentre,whichreachedHonoluluviaRCAat7.33a.m.ItwasfinallydeliveredtoGen.WalterShort,localarmyC-in-C,at2.40p.m.,asfiresragedaroundthefleetanchorage.InHawaiiat7.55onSundaymorning,JoeRochefortwaspackinguphiscarforafamilypicnic

whenthefirstJapaneseaircraftstreakedacrosstheskyabovePearlHarbor.Momentslater,Dyercalledhimtoproclaimemotionally,‘We’reatwar.’OneofRochefort’smensaidmuchlater,‘[All]ofusfelttheremorseofparticipatinginatremendousintelligencefailure.’Thissentimentwasquiteunjustified.Whattookplacerepresentedapoliticalandoperationalfailure,matchingthatoftheKremlinlessthansixmonthsearlier.Rowlett’sachievementinbreakingPurplewasentirelywastedwhenitsrevelationsmatteredmost.ThankstotheSignalsIntelligenceService,overwhelmingevidencewasinthehandsofthenation’sexecutivebranchandarmedforceschiefstoindicatethattheJapanesestoodpoisedonthebrinkofoffensiveaction.WhiletherewasacaseforsupposingthattheBritishandotherEuropeancolonialpowersinAsiamightbeTokyo’stargets,ratherthantheUnitedStates,failuretoplacethenation’sdefencesinthemaximumstateofreadinessreflectednegligenceatthehighestlevel.ItwasonlybecauseGeneralGeorgeC.Marshallcommandedsuchaffectionandrespectthatheescapeddevastatinganddeservedpersonalcensurefortheblowthatfelluponhiscountryon7December.Thesamemightbesaidaboutthepresidentandhisdepartmentalheads.Instead,however,blamewasallowedtostopwiththeservicecommanders-in-chiefonHawaii,andwiththeUSNavy’schiefofoperations,anoutcomejustifiedonpragmaticgrounds,thoughnotonprincipledones.Whatmatterednowwastostrikeback.Rochefortsaidlaconicallytohisteam,‘ForgetPearlHarbor

andgetonwiththewar.’InthefirstdaysofJanuary1942,thenewPacificC-in-CAdmiralChesterNimitzvisitedtheDungeon.Itwasnotahappyoccasion.Rochefort,preoccupiedwithaJapanesesignalhewasworkingon,gaveaperfunctoryreceptiontothisnewarbiterofhisdestiny.Nimitzwasanywayinnomoodtobeimpressed,becauseheregardedthe7Decembercatastropheasrepresentingaculpablefailurebythenavy’ssignalsintelligenceofficers.FromWashington,LauranceSaffordwarnedRochefortthattheNavyDepartmentsharedNimitz’sview.ItconsideredthatHypowas

blameworthy,becauseithadbeenfooledbyJapanesedeceptions.InthefollowingmonthSaffordhimselfjoinedthecasualtiesoftheDayofInfamy,beingremovedandreplacedbyCommanderJosephRedman,anofficermoreskilledinself-promotionthancryptanalysis.Redmanhadonesignificanttalent:heunderstoodtheimportanceofradiodeceptioninmodernwar,andhadwrittenapaperaboutitforthechiefofnavaloperations.ButhewasnofanofRochefort,whowouldprobablyhavelosthisownjobbutforthesupportofEdwinLayton,whomNimitzretainedasfleetintelligenceofficer.Hypowasnowinundatedwithwork,createdbyacontinuoustorrentofintercepts.Onemorning

JasperHolmeswastalkingtoanavalfriendoutsidetheintelligenceloop,whosawThomasDyeremergefromtheDungeonunshaven,dishevelled,utterlyexhaustedafterhoursoftoil.TheotherofficergazedatDyerwithoutenthusiasmandsaid,‘Now,theregoesabirdwhoshouldbesenttoseatogetstraightenedout.’Onereasonthecodebreakersheldlowlyrankswasthattheyhadspentinsufficienttimeafloattoqualifyforpromotions.Holmes,evermindfulofRochefort’sinsistenceonsecurity,merelymumbledastheywatchedDyerwalkaway,‘Oh,he’sallright.’Afterwards,however,hefeltthathehadletdownHypo’smostbrilliantcryptanalyst,‘likePeterwhenhebetrayedtheLord’.Thechallengewastocracktheenemy’snewJN-25bFleetCode.Dyer,WrightandHoltwickwereat

theforefronthere–Rochefortfocusedontryingtoanalysethesignificanceofthefragmentarytraffictheyread.Nowthattheimportanceofmechanicalassistancewasrecognised,moremenwereneededtoruntheIBMsorterswhichconstitutedHypo’smemorybank;eachinterceptrequiredsometwohundredpunchcards.TheonlyhandsavailablewerebandsmenfromthewreckedbattleshipCalifornia.WhentheFBIsetaboutscreeningthemenforhigh-securityduty,severalwithforeignnamesweremarkedforexclusion,butRocheforttookthemanyway;LaytongotanodfromNimitz.Intheweeksthatfollowed,theDungeon’sstandingwiththecommander-in-chiefremainedlow.He

repeatedlydemandedinformationfromRochefortaboutthemovementsofJapan’scarriers,andagainandagaintrafficanalysisproducedthewronganswers.ButthenRochefortandhismennotedthebuild-upofJapaneseforcesatTruk,andcorrectlyguessedthattheywereheadingforRabaul.Hisstockrose.HehighlightedJapaneseweaknessintheMarshallsandtheGilbertIslands,whichpromptedstrikestherebyHalsey’sandFletcher ’staskforces.HypobeganpassingintelligenceaboutprospectivetargetstoFleetsubmarineheadquarters,thoughthisyieldedmeagreresultsbecauseAmericantorpedoesfailed–astheycontinuedtodountiltheendof1943.NimitztransferredsomeofRochefort’sJapaneselinguiststotheUScarriersatsea,tomonitorthevoicetrafficofenemypilots.Thiswasasignificantlosstothecodebreakers,butprobablyavalidswitchofadesperatelyscarceresource.Frommid-January1942onwards,HypowasreadingfragmentsofJN-25bmessages,albeitwith

manywordsmissing.On2MarchRochefortpredictedanairraidonHawaiionthe4th.Sureenough,twobigflying-boatsattackedatnight–theJapaneseenjoyedtheassistanceofbeingabletoread

Americanweatherreports.SomebombsfellharmlesslyinthemountainstenmilesfromPearl,othersinthesea;USfightersfailedtointercepttheattackers.ButRocheforthadproducedanaccurateprediction,anddidsoagainwhenhewarnedofaMarchairraidonMidwayisland.ThemostimportantaspectofthislastbreakwasthatitgaveHypotheJapanesecodedesignationforMidway:‘AF’.BytheendofMarchtheAmericanswerereadingasubstantialnumberofJN-25bmessages.WhentheCastcodebreakingteamwasevacuatedfromdoomedCorregidoritwasre-establishedasajointoperationwiththeAustraliansinMelbourne,andwassoonmakingitsownsignificantcontribution.TheunrelentingstressafflictingtheinmatesoftheDungeonwasnowintensifiedbyovercrowding

–fortyofficersandahundredenlistedmenwerecrammedintothebasement,whereJasperHolmescomparedtheatmospheretothatofanoperationalsubmarine.Heandothersupportingstafffeltguiltythattheycoulddonothingtoalleviatethestrainonthehandfulofcryptanalysts,whocarriedsomuchoftheload.RochefortandDyerstartedanewroutineoftheirown,eachalternatingtwenty-fourhourson,twenty-fouroff.Hypo’schief,scarcelyasunnysoulnoranenthusiastforsmalltalk,seemednevertorelax.HespokelessandlessaboutanythingsavetheJapanesesignalofthemoment.Heworkedtwentyhoursadayandsometimesmore,breakingoffonlytosnatchalittlesleeponacotinacorneroftheDungeon.Dyer,meanwhile,subsistedonadietofBenzedrineinthemorning,Phenobarbitalatnight.Eventhoseoftheirstaffwhomanagedlongerbreaksfoundthemselvesboredandlonely,existinginasweat-stained,subterranean,monasticallymasculineworld.HamWright’squartersnearthesubmarinebasebecamealoungewhereofficerscouldlistentohisoperarecordsandtakeadrinkiftheyleftaquarterbehind.Rochefort’srecordatthistimewaspatchy,thoughnolesssothanwasthatofBletchleyinitsearly

days.BetweenDecember1941andJune1942,whileOp-20-GinWashingtonrecovered16,000Japanesecodeadditives,Hyporecovered25,000–theIBMmachinesplayedanimportantrolehere,usingtwotothreemillionpunchcardsamonth.On8April1942,itschiefcorrectlypredictedthattheJapanesewereheadingforPortMoresbyinPapuaNewGuinea,havingidentified‘RZP’asitscodedesignation.Butmanyotherlocationsremainedobscure,andRochefortprovedmistakeninsupposingfiveJapanesecarrierstobeatsea–atthattimetherewereonlythree.HemadeanaccurateappreciationofJapaneseintentionsaheadofthe7–8MayBattleoftheCoralSea,butmisjudgedtwocriticalJapanesecarriermovements.Theoutcomeoftheclashwasadraw,butastrategicsuccessfortheAmericans,becausetheJapaneseabandonedtheirthrustagainstPortMoresby.EarlyinMay,RochefortinformedNimitzthatitwasplaintheJapanesewereplanningamajornew

initiative,thoughhewasunsurewhat.Amonghisvirtueswasafabulousmemoryforplaces,words,callsigns.TheNavyDepartmentdecreedthatthethreecodebreakinggroupsinWashington,MelbourneandHawaiishouldeachaddressenemymessagesrelatingtodesignatedgeographicalareas.Rochefortignoredthisclumsyconstraint,andstrovetograspthestrategicbigpicture.Hypo

wasnowreceivingbetweenfivehundredandathousandinterceptsaday,about60percentofallJapanesetransmissions,ofwhichitsofficersmanagedtoreadfragmentsofsome40percent.By9May,RochefortwasabletotellNimitzthattheJapanesefleetwouldsailforamajoroperationonthe21st,butadded:‘Destinationoftheaboveforceisunknown.’TheC-in-CspeculatedthattheJapanesemightintendanewassaultonPearl,orevenagainsttheUS

WestCoast.Hypo,awarethatYamamotowasinterestedintheUSbaseintheAleutians,ponderedthepossibilitythathemightlaunchnotjustonemajoroperation,buttwo.13Maywasacriticalday:decryptsmadeplainthatPearlandtheAleutianswerenottheforemostJapanesepriority.Instead,thiswastobeMidway,themostforwardofallAmericanPacificbases,1,200milesnorth-westofHawaii.AninterceptedmessageinstructedthesupplyshipGoshuMarutoloadstoresatSaipan,thenproceedto‘AffirmFox’–AF.RochefortrecalledsignalsbackinMarchwhichidentifiedAFasMidway.HepickedupthesecurephonetoLayton,tellinghim,‘It’snotcutanddried,butit’shot!’Theintelligenceofficersaid,‘Themanwiththeblueeyeswillwanttoknowyouropinionofit.’Nimitzwasassuredlyinterested,butpreoccupiedwithotherbusiness.Onthemorningof14Mayhe

sentCaptainLyndeMcCormick,hisnewwarplansofficer,todiscussthepossiblethreattoMidway.OnplysheetslaidupontrestlesintheDungeon,Rochefortandhisteamsetouttheirexhibits–asuccessionofkeyintercepts,togetherwithequallyimportanttraffic-analysisdata,andtalkedMcCormickthroughthem.Thisprovedafiercelyintense,protractedconversation,whichcontinuedformostoftheday.Attheendofit,McCormickreturnedtoNimitz’sofficeandreportedthathebelievedRocheforthadgotthestoryright.ThoughHypohadnoindicationofthefullJapaneseorderofbattle,itseemedplainthatYamamotointendedtocommitfourcarriersinsupportofanamphibiousassaultonMidway.Thiswasadebateofsupremeimportanceanddelicacy,ofwhichWashingtonwasinformed.The

USstrategicpositioninthePacificwasstillrelativelyweak,theJapanesefleetverystrong.Amidtheocean’smillionsofsquaremiles,mostwarshipstooktwenty-fourhourstotraversesixorsevenhundredmiles.Withonlytwo,oratbestthree,operationalcarriersofhisown,Nimitzcouldnotdividehisforces.Ifhewishedtoengagetheenemy,hemustbettheranchonasinglerendezvous.AmisjudgementabouttheintendeddestinationofthebulkofJapan’snavalairforcewouldbealmostimpossibletoundointimetoavertanewdisasterforAmericanarms.AdmiralErnestKing,chiefofnavaloperations,gavehisPacificC-in-Clittlehelpwiththedecision-making.WhileKingprofessedtofavourengagingtheJapanesewhereverpossible,hewaswaryofanycourseofactionthatmightinflictfurtherattritiononAmerica’sdangerouslysmallcarrierandcruiserforce.TheOfficeofNavalIntelligencestillthoughtthemostlikelyenemyobjectivewasJohnstonIsland,

anatoll720mileswestofPearl;itwasafurtherreflectiononthenavy’slamentablecoordinationthattheONIdidnotknowthatRocheforthadalreadyidentifiedJohnstonasJapanesedesignation‘AG’.MeanwhiletheCaststationinMelbournethoughtYamamotowouldcommithismainforceagainstan

islandintheMarshalls.LaytonclungtoabeliefthatPearlcouldbeatarget.RedmaninWashington,noadmirerofRochefort’sviewaboutanything,simplyrejectedthisone.BySaturday,16May,however,themanwhomatteredwasincreasinglyconvincedthatRochefortwasright.NimitzacceptedthattheJapanesewereheadedforMidway,andhisjudgementwasconfirmedbyanimportantnewinterceptthatday,givingthefly-offpositionfortheJapanesecarriers.YetthistoofailedtoconvinceWashingtonthatMidwaywastheirtarget.Rochefort,exasperated,dismissedRedmanandhiscomradesas‘thoseclowns’–buttheywerealsohissuperiorofficers.Earlyon19Mayanimpromptuconferencetookplaceinthebasement,aroundthedeskofJasper

Holmes.HowcouldthedoubtsaboutMidwaybedispelled?ItwasHolmeswhoconceivedasolution,whichwasimmediatelyadopted:thenavalairstationonMidwaywassentacipheredmessagebyunderseacable,instructingitsoperatorstosendaplain-languagewirelesssignaltoPearl,reportingdifficultieswithitsdistillationplantandrequestingsuppliesoffreshwater.AnAmericannotinonthesecretexclaimedfuriously,‘ThosestupidbastardsonMidway,whatdotheymeanbysendingoutamessagelikethisinplainlanguage?’Holmes’srusewasbrilliantlyjudged,however:thewaterissuewasjusttriflingenoughtobecrediblyflaggedinaplain-languagesignal,yetitssubstancewassufficientlyinterestingtoJapaneseeyestomeritforwardingtonavalheadquarters.On20MaytheDungeon’sRedLasswellbroketheJapaneseoperationorderforMidway,though

unknowntotheAmericans,thisdisclosedonlyapartofYamamoto’splan:theyhadnohintofthefactthathismainforceofbattleshipswouldtrailsixhundredmilesbehindthecarriergroup,poisedtocloseinandfinishofftheUSPacificFleetwhenthisappearedontheMidwaybattlefield–asTokyoanticipatedthatitbelatedlywould.Nimitznowlaunchedaneffectivelittledeception:theseaplanetenderTangierwassenttoflyoffplanestostageatokenairraidonTulagi;thisperfectlyserveditspurpose,convincingtheJapanesethataUScarriergroupmustbewithinrange,andthusthousandsofmilesfromMidway.NextdaytheCastteaminMelbournedeclaredthatitwasnowpersuadedRochefortwasright.On

22MaytheBritishFarEastCombinedBureaualsoconcludedfromitsowndecryptactivitiesthatMidwaywastheJapaneseobjective.ButinWashington,RedmanandOp-20-GwerefuriousthatRocheforthadpersuadedNimitztoundertakethewater-signalrusewithoutreferencetothem.Stimson,attheWarDepartment,saidtheUSArmystilldoubtedRochefort’sassessment,andfearedHypowasfallingvictimtoanelaborateJapanesedeception.Nimitzwroteuneasilyinhisownassessmenton26May:‘oursolesourceofinformationis[sigint]…Theenemymaybedeceivingus.’ItishardtooverstatethepersonalstrainonRochefortinthosedays.Thisunloved,awkwardman

wasmakingacaseagainstthejudgementofmostofhispeers,especiallyinWashington.Seldominhistoryhassomuchhunguponthewordofasinglejuniorofficer.Ifhewaswrong,theUnitedStatescouldsufferastrategicdisasterinthePacific.Onthemorningof27May,Rochefortdonnedaclean

uniform:hewasscheduledtobriefNimitzandhisstaff.JustashewasabouttoleavethebasementfortheC-in-C’soffice,JoeFinneganandHamWrightbrokeasignalthatidentifiedthedatesoftheJapanesestrikes:3JuneagainsttheAleutians,the4thforMidway.ThiscausedRocheforttoarrivehalfanhourlateforNimitz’smeeting,toacorrespondinglystonyreception.Hewastoldtodescribewhathethoughtheknew,withoutmentioninginthepresenceofofficersnotinonHypo’ssecretthemeansbywhichtheinformationhadbeensecured.HeoutlinedtheJapaneseplanfortwinstrikes,thoughmistakenlysuggestingthattheAleutians

thrustwasamerediversion:inreality,itwasmuchmoresubstantial.Inconsequenceofthatwrongcall,Nimitzsentonlycruisersanddestroyersnorthwards.ButthePacificC-in-CmadethepivotaldecisiontocommitallhisthreecarrierstomeettheenemyatMidway,justbeforeabitterblowstrucktheAmericans.TheJapanesechangedtheircodes,introducingJN-25c.Thisdevelopmenthadbeenexpected,buttheconsequencewastoslamshut,foraperiodofseveralweeks,Hypo’speepholeonthemotionsoftheirfoes.Rochefortandhisteam,duringthedaysofelectrictensionbefore4June,wereobligedoncemoretorelysolelyupontrafficanalysisofenemytransmissions,andtherewerepreciousfewofthese:Yamamotohadimposedwirelesssilenceonhisattackingforces.AmericancarelessnessjeopardisedNimitz’strap.Ashisshipssetforthtomeettheenemy,they

talkedtoomuch:therewasasharpincreaseinUSNavywirelesstraffic,andtheJapanesenoticed.ButYamamotoscentedonlyamousewhenheshouldhavesmeltagiantrat.Inoneofhismajormisjudgementsofthewar,hedecidednottobreakwirelesssilencetoinformVice-AdmiralChuichiNagumo,commandinghiscarriergroup,thattheAmericansmightbeuptosomething,perhapsevenheadingforMidway.Herewasamomentwhenacommander ’sfearoftheconsequencesofdispatchingastreamofMorseacrosstheetherprecipitatedaworseoutcomethanhadhedoneso.AtPearl,tensionrosetoanalmostunbearablelevelthroughthelonghoursof3June,asMidway’sreconnaissanceaircraftgainednoglimpseoftheexpectedenemyflat-tops.Then,at5.30a.m.nextday,exactlyinaccordancewithRochefort’sprediction,atlastaCatalinaflying-boatsentamomentoussignal:theenemy’sprincipalcarrierforcewasinsight.TheAmericantriumphthatfollowedwasanythingbutordained.DestructionofNagumo’sfour

carriers,thetransformationofthebalanceofthewarinthePacific,wasachievedbyphenomenalluckaswellastheskillandcourageoftheUSNavy’sdive-bomberpilots.WhileNimitzhadgambledcourageouslytobringabouttheclash,theoutcomecouldhavegonedisastrouslytheotherway.Onlyon5JunedidHypodiscoverYamamoto’sbattleshipsclosinginonthescene,whichpromptedtheAmericancarriergroupstobeatahastyandprudentretreat.ButMidwaywasaboveallelseanintelligencevictory,sharingwithBletchley’sbreachoftheGermanU-boatcodesthestatusofmostinfluentialWesternAlliedintelligenceachievementsofthewar.NimitzrecognisedthiswhenhesentacartobringRocheforttoattendhisowncelebrationparty.TheHypochief’sluckwasaslousyasever:hearrivedonlyaftertheguestshaddispersed.ButNimitz,inthemidstofconductingastaff

conference,usedtheopportunitytopaytributetothecodebreaker:‘ThisofficerdeservesamajorshareofthecreditforthevictoryatMidway.’ThosewordsweretobeRochefort’sonlyreward.WhenhewasproposedforaDistinguished

ServiceMedal,thecitationwasquashedbyRear-AdmiralRussellWillson,theCNO’schiefofstaff:‘Idonotconcurintherecommendation…hehasmerelyefficientlyusedthetoolspreviouslypreparedforhisuse.Itwouldbeinappropriatetoawardamedalonlytotheofficerwhohappenedtobeinapositiontoreapthebenefits,ataparticulartime,unlessinactualcombatwiththeenemy.’JasperHolmeswroteofthepost-MidwaymoodintheDungeon:‘therewasnogreatmomentofexhilaration’.RochefortenjoyedonemoreimportantsuccessaschiefofHypo:herevealedtheJapaneselandingonGuadalcanalon5July,whichprecipitatedadramaticandultimatelytriumphantAmericanripostewithland,seaandairforces.HewasalsoabletoalertMacArthur ’scommandtotheJapaneseattempttocrosstheOwenStanleyrangeandfallonPortMoresby.SofarasWashingtonwasconcerned,however,farfromRochefortbeingdubbedtheheroof

Midway,hewassimplyaninsubordinatecusswhomnobodyliked.On14October1942hewasrelievedofhispostandassignedtocommandafloatingdrydockinSanFrancisco.HewassucceededbyCaptainWilliamGoggins,anofficerwithnopreviousexperienceofcryptanalysis,whowasdeemedacompetentadministrator.Althoughallhierarchiescommitsomearbitraryinjustices,thiswasanexceptionallybrutalandmean-spiritedone.Intheautumnof1944RochefortgainedsufficientrehabilitationtobeputincommandofthePacificStrategicIntelligenceUnit,buthediedundecoratedin1976.Onlyin1985washeposthumouslyawardedtheDistinguishedServiceMedalthathadbeendeniedhimin1942.

ItwasasortofmiraclethatRochefortandhisteamachievedwhattheydid,withthemakeshiftresourcesavailable.Thearmy–navyfeudwhichcausedtheUSforsolongtodivideitscodebreakingoperationswasworsenedbythelowpriorityaccordedtointelligence.By1942,BletchleyandtheBritishserviceintelligencedepartmentsdeployedhundredsofthefinestcivilianbrainsinthecountryalongsideahandfulofcareerprofessionalsoldiers,sailorsandairmen,togetherwithtechnologyinadvanceofanythingbeingusedbyHypoorCast.Rochefortwasmerelyahighlyexperienced,notpersonallybrilliantcrypto-linguistandanalyst,andhisteamwasagroupofhithertolowlyregardednavalofficers.Thepost-warnarrativeoftheUSNavy’sPacificCombatIntelligenceCenterstatedbluntly:‘Inthe

defensivestagesofthewar[1941–43]radiointelligencewasnotonlythemostimportantsourceofintelligenceintheCentralPacific,itwaspracticallytheonlysource.Therewereveryfewcaptureddocumentsorprisonersofwar.Therewerenophotographsofenemypositions…ExcludingtheSolomonsandNewBritain,spiesandcoast-watchers’reportsneversuppliedanyimportantintelligence.’TheoperationaldiaryoftheJapanesenavygeneralstaffrecordedbitterlyafterMidway:

‘theenemyhadgraspedourintentionsbeforehand’.ButnotforamomentdidYamamotoorhisofficersconsiderthepossibilitythattheircipherswerecompromised;theyattributedthedisastermerelytothemischancethattheircarriershadbeenspottedbyAmericanreconnaissanceaircraftorsubmarines.JoeRochefortwasnotpersonallyindispensable.AfterhisdeparturetheUSNavy’sintelligenceand

codebreakingoperationsbecameevermoresophisticatedandeffective,althoughthedifficultiesofbreakingJN-25’svariantspersisteduntil1944,andsometimesevenbeyond.Thecottageindustryof1941–42becameFRUPAC–FleetIntelligenceRadioUnitPacific–adepartmentemployingfivehundredmen,aformidabletoolinNimitz’shand.ButRochefortdeservestoberememberedasamanwhochangedhistory,whilethehonouroftheUSNavywastarnishedbythescurvyingratitudewithwhichitschiefsrewardedhim.

6

MuddlingandGroping:TheRussiansatWar

1 CENTREMOBILISES

NoonewhocherishesillusionsabouttheskillandomniscienceofRussia’ssecretservicescouldsustaintheseafterstudyingtheirwartimerecord.Itwascertainlynobetter,andinmostrespectsworse,thanthatoftheWesterndemocracies.Hitler ’sinvasionon22June1941precipitatedacrisisforStalin’sintelligenceorganisations,whichliketheRedArmyhadbeencrippledbythePurges.PavelSudoplatov’srewardfororganisingTrotsky’skillinginAugust1940,togetherwithhisunflinchingparticipationinmanyotherliquidations,wasanappointmentamonthafterthestartof‘Barbarossa’toheadtheNKVD’s‘AdministrationforSpecialTasks’,officiallyresponsiblefor‘sabotage,kidnappingandassassinationofenemies’,ajobdescriptionworthyofIanFleming’snovels.SudoplatovhandedBeriaalistof140intelligenceofficersconfinedinprisonsorthegulagforpoliticaloffenceswhoseserviceswerenowvitallyneededbythestate,eithertospyortorunspies.HenotedthatthefilesshowedallthosenamedtohavebeendetainedonthepersonalordersofeitherStalinorMolotov.Now,Beriaaskednoquestionsabouttheprisoners’guiltorinnocence,merelydemanding,‘Areyousureweneedthem?’Thenewheadofspecialtasksresponded,‘Yes,Iamabsolutelycertain,’andwasorderedtoarrangetheirrelease.Unfortunately,asSudoplatovobservedunemotionallyinhismemoirs,threeofthebestmenprovedalreadytohavebeenexecuted.Theremainderreturnedtointelligenceduties,invaryingconditionsofreliefandtrauma.IfthelivesoftheNKVD’sofficerswereprecarious,theyalsoenjoyedtheperquisitesthataccrued

tofavouredservantsoftheSovietstate–forinstance,thechildrenof‘illegals’operatingabroadwereadmittedtouniversitieswithoutbeingrequiredtopassentranceexams.SudoplatovoccupiedarelativelyspaciousapartmentabovetheDynamosportsstoreonGorkyStreet,inablockexclusivelytenantedbytheKremlin’ssecretsoldiers,includingforeignintelligencechiefVsevolodMerkulov.AftertheJune1941massreleaseofpoliticalsuspectstoresumeintelligencework,severalmovedintemporarilywithSudoplatov,theirdeliverer.OnenightMerkulovsuddenlytelephonedtoannouncethathewascomingdowntotalk.Thenewly-liberatedofficerswerehastilyherdedintohidinginthebedroom,lesttheirpresencepromptembarrassment.Sudoplatovhadsufficientsenseofself-preservationtohavetakencarenottosigntheirrehabilitationdocumentspersonally.Insteadhegot

Fitintodoso–which,hesaid,probablysavedhislifein1946,whenhisownsurvivalhungbyathread.Theintelligenceofficersrescuedfromthegulagrejoicedintheirfreedom,insomecasestoosoon.

Oneofthem,IvanKavinsky,dancedaboutSudoplatov’sflatinthethree-piecesuitwithwhichhehadbeenissuedinplaceofprisondenims.Howwonderfulitwas,Kavinskyexulted,tobeacknowledgedatlastasapatriot.Hourslater,hewasdispatchedtoserveasastay-behindagentinZhitomir,deepinUkraine,whichwasabouttobeoverrunbytheGermans.There,hewasalmostimmediatelybetrayedbyUkrainians,asmanyotherservantsofMoscowwerebetrayed.Arrivingatarendezvousandsensingatrap,Kavinskyshothimself.TheremainderofhiscellperishedinasubsequentgunbattlewiththeGestapo.InthesamefashionseveralotherimportantNKVDresidentswereswiftlyeliminatedbytheGermans.OneofBeria’smostcynicalruseswascarriedoutinAugust1941:NKVDagentsdisguisedasNaziparachutistsweredroppedintotheVolgaGermanautonomousregion,totesttheloyaltyofitscitizens.Villageswherethenewarrivalswereofferedshelterwereliquidatedwholesale;theentireregion’ssurvivingpopulationwaseventuallydeportedtoSiberiaandKazakhstan.Someintelligenceofficersliberatedforwarservicehadsufferedunimaginablehorrorsinjailsof

thekindtowhichtheyhadbeenaccustomedtodispatchothers.DmitriBystroletov,apre-waragent-handlerinBerlin,wastorturedwithaball-bearingswungonasteelcable.Aftersigningaconfession,in1939hewassentencedtotwentyyears’imprisonment.HiswifeShelmatovawassenttothegulag,wheresheslitherthroatwithakitchenknife;Bystroletov’selderlymothermeanwhilepoisonedherself.Itishardtosupposethatrehabilitationnowsecuredhimmuchhappiness.AnothersuchfigurewasPyotrZubov,whohadbeendisgracedforfailingtocarrythroughanattemptedcoupinYugoslavia.Since1939SudoplatovhadbeenurgingZubov’squalitiesasanintelligenceofficer–withoutmentioningtheman’simportantroleinBeria’sascenttopower.Inprisonherefusedtoconfesstonon-existentcrimesagainstthestate,evenafterhiskneesweresmashedwithahammer,renderinghimalifelongcripple.ZubovwasconfinedinthesameLubyankacellasCol.StanislasSosnowski,formerheadofPolishintelligenceinBerlin,andhiscompatriotPrinceJanuszRadziwiłł.TheNKVDsetaboutturningbothfortheirownpurposes,andZubov’sroleinachievingthisenabledSudoplatovtosecurehisrelease.Zubovbecameoneofhissectionheads,limpingandshufflingaroundtheLubyanka.SosnowskistartedworkingfortheRussians,whosoughttoexploithisoldsourcesinBerlin,most

ofthemwomen.HisoldnetworkhadbeenbrokenupbytheNazisbackin1935,whenhehimselfwasimprisonedforespionage,thenobligedtowitnesstheguillotiningofhisagentsatPlötzenseejail.HewaseventuallyexchangedfortheleaderoftheGermanminoritycommunityinPoland,butwassackedfollowingafinancialscandal.HewaslivinginretirementwhentheRussiansscoopedhimupduringtheir1939invasion.HeclaimedjusttwosurvivingGermansources,andreactivatedtheseattheNKVD’sbidding.Sudoplatovassertedthatheprovidedsomevalueforhisjailersuntil1942,and

thereafterwaskeptintheLubyankafortheusualSovietreason:‘Hewasamanwhoknewtoomuch.’PrinceRadziwiłł,aformerconservativepolitician,sixtyyearsold,washandledpersonallyby

Beria,becausehewasthoughttohavefriendsinNazihighplaces,amongthemGöring.OncetheNKVDwassatisfiedthathewasunderitscontrol,RadziwiłłwaspermittedtoreturntoBerlin.Beriatoldhim,‘Peoplelikeyou,Prince,willalwaysbeneededbyus.’ButtheRussiansoverestimatedthenobleman’sintimacywiththeReichsmarschall,andindeedhisintelligencevaluegenerally.HebrokecontactwithMoscowin1942,andpaidthepricethreeyearslater,whenoncemorehefellintoRussianhands,thistimewithhiswife,whodiedinaSovietprison.Thefamily’svastpossessionswereconfiscatedbythenewPolishcommuniststate.Evenmoresothantheplotsofmostintelligenceservices,thoseoftheNKVDlurchedbetweenthe

imaginativeandtheridiculous.Inthewinterof1941,atStalin’spersonalbehestaplanwasdevisedforthekillingofHitler,involvingbothPrinceRadziwiłłandOlgaChekhova,actressnieceoftheplaywright,whowasaSovietagent,albeitanineffectualone,livinginBerlin.TheprincipalassassinwastobeanNKVD‘illegal’namedIgorMiklashevsky,aformerboxingchampion.InDecember1941hesucceededingainingaccesstoGermany,posingasadefector.Hisauthenticityinthisrolewasattestedbyhisuncle,agenuineexiledopponentofStalin.Miklashevsky’ssubsequentcareeralmostdefiesbelief.HefoughtaboutwithGermany’sheroMax

Schmeling,whichhecontrivedtowin.HereportedtoMoscowthatwhileitseemedimpossibletoreachHitler,itwouldbeeasytoassassinateGöring.Centrerejectedthisproposal,forGöring’sremovalseemedmorelikelytoassisttheNaziwareffortthantheSovietone.MiklashevskyremainedinGermanyuntil1944,whenhemurderedhisuncleandescapedtoFrance.StalinmeanwhilewithdrewhisorderforHitler ’sassassination,fearinghisremovalwouldprompttheWesternAlliestoseekaseparatepeacewithasuccessorGermanleadership.AftertheliberationofFranceMiklashevskyspenttwoyearsintheWesthuntingdownUkrainianrenegadesofHitler ’swartime‘Vlasovarmy’,thenreturnedtoMoscow,whereheboxeduntilhisretirement.AstheGermansclosedinonMoscow,theNKVDstruggledtoorganisestay-behindespionage

groupsagainsttheeventualityofthecapital’sfall.Theypreparedkeyinstallationsfordemolition,includingPolitburomembers’dachas.SomanyNKVDstaffhadquittheLubyankathatSudoplatov’sSpecialTasksgrouptookoversomeofficesforthesaboteurs.ZoyaRybkina,whowasoneofthem,describedhowsafeswereclearedofsecretfilesandinsteadcrammedwithweapons,ammunition,compasses,explosives,fusesandevenMolotovcocktails.Duringthehoursofdarkness,teamssetforthtoburyarmsdumpsinthecity’sparks.‘Wedidnotgohomeforahundreddays,’wroteRybkina,‘sleepinginsteadinairraidshelterswithagasmaskcaseinplaceofapillow.’Eachstay-behindgroupwasorganisedasa‘family’,witha‘grandpa’or‘grandma’asitshead–usuallyanoldBolshevikchosenbytheveteranColonelGeorgyMordinov;somewereveteransoftheInternationalBrigadeinSpain,thoughmostofthesewereformerspiesnowtoooldformilitaryservice.Radio-

operatorsandcipherclerkswereappointedastheir‘grandsons’and‘granddaughters’.RybkinaoncecalledatMordinov’sapartmentinBegovaya,andfoundtheoldrevolutionaryasleeponabedcomposedoftrotylexplosiveblocks.Seniorofficersdespairedofamassingsufficientchargestominethelargeststructures,forinstance

theDynamostadiumandrailstations.SudoplatovclaimedinhismemoirsthatSpecialTaskscouldcallupontheservicesofamotorisedbrigadeof20,000menandwomen,includingtwohundredforeignersofmanynationalities–Germans,Austrians,Spaniards,Americans,Chinese,Vietnamese,Poles,Czechs,Bulgarians,Romanians.HealsoboastedofaparatroopunitonpermanentstandbytocounterattackanyGermancommandoattack–forinstance,againsttheKremlin–withitsownsquadronoftransportaircraft.SomeoftheUSSR’sfinestathleteshadbeendraftedintoservice,andsomeofthesewerepromptlydesignatedforpartisanoperations,workinginplacesandcircumstanceswheresupremefitnessandhardinesswereneeded.Sudoplatovfailstoacknowledge,however,thatmostoftheseeliteunitsbecameavailableonlylater

inthewar:inthewinterof1941theNKVDwasreducedtopitifulimprovisations.ARussianofficerrecordedthecaseofoneofthousandsof‘line-crossers’deployedatthistime,aprettyyoungUkrainiangirlnamedOksana.TheSovietTwelfthArmyseveraltimesdispatchedherthroughtheenemyfrontintheDonbasin.Shewaseventuallydenounced,however,ashavinggoneovertotheAxis.Afterinterrogationsheadmittedthatshehadbeencaught,andchosetosaveherownlifeby‘acceptingtheprotection’ofanItalianofficer.TheSoviettribunalwhichtriedherallegedlywaivedthedeathpenaltyandinsteadgaveheralongprisonsentence,butalmostallsuchpeopleofbothsexesweresummarilyexecuted.Itishardtocreditthatmercywasshowninthiscase,atthisworstofalltimesforSovietfortunes.Withthenewimportanceofspecialforces,SudoplatovroseintheSoviethierarchy.InFebruary

1942hebecameacommissarofstatesecurityandlieutenant-general,andinAugusttravelledwithBeriaandMerkulovattheheadofanNKVDmissiontotheCaucasus,flyinginAmerican-suppliedC-47stoarrangetheblockageofmountainpassesandstay-behindsabotageoperations.TheSpecialTaskschiefadmittedlaterthathavingnomilitarytraining,hefeltoutofhisdepthatawarfront.Sodidhisfollowers,whohadbeenchosenfortheirskillsasmountaineersratherthanassoldiers:thosewhostayedtofightintheCaucasussufferedheavylosses.BeriasuggestedthatProfessorKonstantinGamsakhurdia,aprominentlocalintellectual,shouldbedesignatedtoheadtheCaucasusgroups.Sudoplatovthoughtthiswasaterribleidea:GamsakhurdiawasonlyontheNKVD’sbooksbecausehehadbeenblackmailedintoserviceasaninformeryearsearlier,througharashattachmenttotheGeorgiannationalistmovement.NowhemettheprofessoratTbilisi’sIntouristhotel,andwasunimpressed:‘Heappearedtomeunreliable,andbesideshisexperienceasanagentwasnotininspiringpeople,onlyinformingonthem.HewastoopreoccupiedwithwritingversesandwhathebelievedtobegreatnovelsintheGeorgianlanguagesuchasAbductionoftheMoon,amediaeval

saga.’SudoplatovpreferredfortheleadershiprolealocalplaywrightnamedGeorgiMachivariani,who

wasentrustedwithasmallfortuneingoldandsilvertofinancepartisanoperations.IntheeventTbilisiwasnevertakenbytheGermans.Afterthetideofwarhadturned,theNKVDchiefdescribedhisamazementwhenMachivarianirefundedhistreasureundiminished,thoughhedoesnotspeculateaboutwhetherhisconductreflectedhonestyorterror.WhenBeriaandhisdeputiesreturnedtoMoscow,Stalinreprimandedthemforhavingventuredintoacombatzone.Heneededhisspymastersclosertohome.

2 THEENDOFSORGE

JapanassumedapivotalimportanceafterGermanyinvadedtheSovietUnion,adevelopmentwhichdeeplydistressedRichardSorge,asallthosearoundhimobserved.Moscowneededtheanswertoacriticalstrategicquestion:wouldtheJapaneseseizetheopportunitytostrikeatRussiafromtheeast,forcingtheRedArmytofightontwofronts?Sorge’sinformantHotsumiOzakiwieldedsignificantinfluencethroughhismembershipoftwogovernmentadvisorygroups,uponbothofwhichheurgedthatJapanshouldmovesouth,againsttheEuropeans,ratherthanagainsttheRussians.On29JuneMaxClausenwirelessedtoMoscowaSorgemessagereportingthatJapanwasstagingatestmobilisationforwarwithRussia,butthatprimeministerKonoyeremainedopposedtobelligerence.Theoperator ’smentalhealthcannothavebeenimprovedbyaroutinevisitfromtheKempeitaimilitarypoliceduringthistransmission.On10July,SorgetoldMoscowthatwhileJapanwouldcontinuecontingencypreparationsforwar

withtheUSSR,themainthrustofitspolicywouldbetopursuenegotiationswiththeUnitedStatesandtoplanforwarwiththeEuropeanempires.TokyowouldattacktheSovietUniononlyifitscollapseseemedimminent.Nonetheless,itisimportanttonotethatthewordingofhisdispatchesremainedequivocalandinconclusive.TheyreflectedthefactthatwhileSorgeandWenneker,theGermannavalattaché,thoughtJapanwouldnotfightRussiain1941,Ottandhismilitaryattachédisagreed,believingthatTokyowouldbecomeabelligerentbyautumn.SorgeseveraltimesassertedthatJapanwouldprobablybetippedintoattackingtheSovietUnionbythefallofLeningradandMoscow,butatnotimedidheexplicitlyanduncompromisinglyassureMoscowthatRussiawassafefromanyJapanesethreat.Contrarily,hereportedthehighcommand’sconvictionthattheWehrmachtwouldenterRussia’scapitalwithinweeks–whichwouldalmostcertainlyprompttheJapanesetoattackthereelingSovietsfromtheeast.ForyearsitwasclaimedthatSorge’sintelligencechangedthecourseofhistory,byenablingStalin

toshiftmajorformationsfromtheEast,tochecktheNazionslaughtintheautumnandwinterof1941.Intruth,sucharedeploymentbeganasearlyasMay.AmodernRussiansourceassertsthatMoscow

Centrereceivedinformationfrommanyforeignsourcesinthelatterpartof1941confirmingthatJapanhadnointentionofattackingRussia,allegedlyonthebasisofdocumentsintheMoscowintelligencearchive.On17July,theNKVDinLondonsentthetextofaBletchleydecryptofatelegramfromtheJapaneseForeignMinistry,announcingthedecisionofanimperialconferencenottojoinHitler ’sattackontheSovietUnion.TheTokyospy’sdispatchesmayhaveincreasedtheStavka’swillingnesstoreducetheRedArmy’sAsianforces,butasinallmattersrelatingtointelligence,manysourcesandfactorsinfluencedStalin’sdecision,andthecodebreakingoperationdescribedbelowmayalsohaveplayedapart.Thereportsofspies,howeverwellplacedandhoweverromantictheirstories,canneveroffernationalleaderscertainty,norevenprobability.J.C.Masterman,orchestralconductoroftheBritishDoubleCrosssystem,haswritten:‘Itisamistaketosupposethatthewell-placedperson,friendly,letussay,withaCabinetministeroranofficialintheForeignOfficeorahighlyplacedstaffofficerisnecessarilyinthehighestgradeofagents.Theindividualremarksofministersorgeneralsdonotcarrymuchconviction,anditisatruismofhistoricalresearchthatwhendealingwithdiplomaticconversationsandtherumoursofembassies,weareintheveryrealmoflies.’NomorethananyotheragentcouldSorgecompletestrategicjigsawpuzzles,norevenprovide

piecesinthesamefashionasdidsignaldecryptsorcapturedenemydocuments.Hecouldmerelyoffercluesandpointers,forinstanceaboutthedispositionsoftheJapanesearmy,thoughOzakiachievedanimportantcoupbysecuringdetailsofJapan’spetroleumreserves.InJuly,OttdispatchedSorgetoShanghaitoinvestigatetheprospectsofamediatedJapan–Chinapeace.Onhisreturn,Hanakosaidthatshehadbeenquestionedabouthimbythepolice.Whenanofficervisitedthehouseagainshortlyafterwards,Sorgewasangryenoughtohittheman.Heescapedarrestfortheassault,butitisplainthathewasclosetoanervousbreakdown.HereportedtoMoscowthattheJapanesehadbeenreinforcingtheirtroopsinManchuria,butever

moreofhismaterialwasfailingtoreachtheGRU–forinstance,asignificantmessageaboutshrinkingJapanesepetrolstocks–becauseClausencouldnothandlethestackofmessagesawaitingencryptionandtransmission.On20August,however,asignaldidgettoitsdestination,sayingthatJapan’smilitaryleadershipwasstillunwillingtoenterthewar,pendingdecisiveGermansuccessintheWest,butthisended–again,inconclusively–‘Japanmightnotjointhewarthisyear,althoughthedecisionhasnotyetbeentaken.’InAugustalso,OzakivisitedManchuriainhisroleasanimportantadvisertotherailwaymanagement.On14SeptemberthisyieldedareporttotheRussiansthattheJapanesewerereducingtheirimmediatemilitarycommitmentinManchuria,butwerebuildinganewstrategicroadtothefrontierinpreparationforapossiblewarwiththeSovietUnionin1942.OnSaturday,4October,afurthermessagestatedthatanearlyJapaneseattackonRussiawasnowhighlyunlikely.ThisprovedtobethelasttransmissionMaxClausenevermade.On10October1941theTokkosecuritypolicearrestedfirstTomoKitabayashi,thenYotoku

Miyagi,bothformermembersoftheAmericanCommunistParty.Inthelatter ’sroomsearchersfoundareportonJapan’soilstocks,unlikelyreadingmaterialforaprofessionalartist.Duringhisinterrogation,Miyagisuddenlysprangtohisfeetandleaptoutofawindow,inasuicidebid.Hefelltwostoreys,asdidapoliceofficerwhojumpedinpursuit.Bothmensurvived.UnderfurtherquestioningMiyagitoldallheknew,revealingthenamesofClausen,Voukelitch,Ozaki–andSorge.AtfirsttheTokkoflatlydeclinedtoconsiderarrestingthelastofthese,becauseofhisstatusasaprominentmemberoftheGermanembassycommunity.On15October,however,Ozakiwasarrestedathishome,andatMeguropolicestationbegantotalkalmostimmediately.Hebecameoutspokentohisinquisitors,declaringconfidentlyonthe18thwhentheTojogovernmentsucceededthatofPrinceKonoye:‘ThiscabinetistheonewhichisgoingtowaragainsttheUnitedStates.’Clausen,VoukelitchandSorgewereallarrestedintheirhomesonthatsameday.Thewireless-operatormadenoattempttodestroyhiscodes,andhadpreservedcopiesofscoresofmessageshehadtransmitted.Insteadofkillingthemselves,astheircaptorsexpected,mostoftheprisonerstalkedtheirheadsoff.Itremainsdisputedwhetherthiswasaconsequenceoftortureor–quiteplausibly–becausetheyweremorallyexhausted.AllwerequestionedinEnglish.Sorge,alone,initiallyheldout.HewasvisitedbyEugenOtt,whowasnotmerelyfuriouslyangry

withtheJapanesepolice,butalsostubbornlydisbelievingofhisfriend’sguilt–asheremainedintooldage.On24October,however,thespysuddenlybroke.Hewrotewithapencil:‘IhavebeenaninternationalCommunistsince1925,’thenburstintotears.Hisinterrogators,overwhelmedbythecompulsivefloodofdisclosuresthatfollowed,providedhimwithatypewriter.Hesetaboutcomposingadetailednarrativeofhisexperiences,mostofwhichwassubsequentlydestroyedinthe1945Tokyofire-bombing.HeaskedhisjailerstocontacttheRussiansandattempttoarrangeanexchange,aproposalwhichelicitedastonyresponsefromtheSovietembassy.TheGermanmissionsuccumbedtoasustainedtrauma,shockwavesfromwhichreachedBerlin.TheGestapo’sJosephMeisingerwasdisgracedforhisegregiousfailureassecurityofficer,andWalterSchellenbergwasreprimandedbyHimmler.Ottwassummarilyrecalled,andHitlerinformed.Yetinaccordancewiththeerraticconductoftyrannies,theFührerchosenottoexactdrasticpenalties.Theambassadorsuffereddismissal,butescapedtheexecutionerswhowouldsurelyhaveawaitedhiminMoscow,hadhebeenStalin’sservant.ThespiesmeanwhilelanguishedinTokyoprisons.DuringtheSecondWorldWartheJapanese

behavedwithinstitutionalisedbarbaritytowardsvastnumbersofenemiesintheirpower.Itisbizarre,therefore,thattheTokkoandthejusticesystemappeartohavetreatedRichardSorgeandmostofthemembersofhisringrelativelyhumanely,thoughtheyspenttheensuingthreeyearsinprisoncells.Whileallwererepeatedlyandsometimesharshlyinterrogated,thereisnoevidencethattheyweretortured,asTokyo’sprisonersweresooftentortured;noneoftheirfamilymembersorassociateswerepersecutedorkilled.Japaneserestraintwasprobablypromptedbyareluctancegratuitouslyto

provokeMoscow,atatimewhenTokyowasincreasinglydesperatetoavoidwaronanewfront.VoukelitchdiedinprisononHokkaidoon13January1945,butClausensurvivedthewarandwasreleasedon8Octoberthatyear.HeflewtoMoscow,andthereafterlivedinretirementwithhiswifeinEastGermany.ThetrialsofSorgeandOzakidraggedonuntilSeptember1943,whenthetwomenbecamethe

onlymembersoftheringtoreceivecapitalsentences.Thesewerecarriedouton7November1944,atTokyo’sSugamoprison.Itsgovernor,KikuyasaIchijima,attendedindressuniform.Ozakichosetodonablackceremonialkimonoandblacktabibeforehewashoodedandbound.Fourexecutionerssprangthetraptogether,sothatnoonemanboretheresponsibilityforkillinganother–this,inthemidstofawarinwhichtensofmillionswerebeingslaughtered.Sorgewasthensummoned,wearingdarktrousers,anopen-neckedshirtandloosejacket.Thegovernordemandedformally:‘AreyouRichardSorge?’andthecondemnedmanassented.Thenheasked,‘Isittoday?’anditwasthegovernor ’sturntonod.SorgestatedthathewishedhispropertytogotoAnnaClausen,wifeofhiswireless-operator,andshedulyreceivedtheyenequivalentofsomeUS$4,000–Hanako’sslavishloyaltytohimwasnotreciprocated.Hewasofferedtheritualteaandcakes,whichhedeclined,askinginsteadforacigarette.Thegovernorsaidthiswasagainsttherules.TheattendingTokkoofficerurgedallowingthislastrequest,butIchijimawasfirm.Sorgeremainedcalmashewasbound,thencriedoutinhaltingJapanese,‘Sakigun!’–theRed

Army;‘KokusaiKyosanto!’–theInternationalCommunistParty;‘SovietKyosanto!’–theSovietCommunistParty.TheTokkowitnesssaidlaterthathespokelikeamanutteringaprayer.OtherversionsofSorge’slastwordshavebeensuggested,butthisoneseemsthemostcredible:hesoughttodignifythelaboursofhislifeatitsending,andspokeinthelanguagewhichwouldensurethathewasunderstood.At10.20a.m.thetrapwassprung,andafternineteenminuteshewaspronounceddead.NeithertheGermannortheSovietembassywantedanythingtodowithhisbody,andthusitwascommittedtotheprisongraveyard.Likemostsecretagents,RichardSorgewasanabnormalhumanbeing,whogainedanemotional

chargefromhiscomplexexistenceandmultipledeceits.HehadmorethanalittleincommonwithKimPhilby–charmandastreakofrecklessnesswhichrenderedastonishingthelongevityofbothmenintheirroles.Sorgeretainscelebritybecausehewasaremarkablepersonality,andalsobecauseveryfewspies,andcertainlynowartimeBritish,AmericanorGermanagent,gainedsuchaccesstohighplaces.Itismuchmoredoubtful,however,thathealonechangedanyhistory:‘Allthingsarealwaysonthemovesimultaneously.’

3 THESECONDSOURCE

ThearrestofRichardSorgeandthebreak-upofhisnetworkisoftensupposedtohavemarkedthe

endofSovietpenetrationofwartimeJapan.Yetthiswasnotthecase.CentrehadanotherimportantsourceonTokyo’saffairs–andpossiblyalsoaccesstosomeofitscodes.CaptainSergeiTolstoy,theJapanesespecialistintheNKVD’sFifth(Cipher)Directorate,becamethemostdecoratedSovietcryptanalystofthewar,closelyfollowedbyBorisAronsky.SomemodernRussianwriterssuggestthatTolstoy’steamthusprovidedtheKremlinwithinformationaboutTokyo’sintentionsbasedonbetterauthoritiesthanSorgeoffered.InOctoberandNovember1941eightSovietrifledivisions,athousandtanksandathousandaircraftweremovedtotheWesternFront.TheRussiansclaimtohavereada27NovemberinstructionfromTokyotoBaronŌshimainBerlin:‘seeHitlerandRibbentrop,andexplaintotheminsecretourrelationswiththeUnitedStates…ExplaintoHitlerthatthemainJapaneseeffortswillbeconcentratedinthesouthandthatweproposetorefrainfromdeliberateoperationsinnorth[againsttheSovietUnion].’ThissignalwasallegedlyforwardedtoMoscowbyKimPhilby,viatheNKVD’sLondonstation.Allthatseemscertainisthatinthemonthsfollowingtheonsetof‘Barbarossa’theRussianshadplentyofinformantsotherthanSorgetellingthemthattheireasternflankwassafe.TheyneverremotelymatchedtheachievementsofBletchley,ArlingtonHallandOp-20-G,because

theywereincapableofbuildingbombes,andwouldneverhavelicensedthesortofyoungiconoclastswholedtheBritishoperation.Westerncryptographicexpertsalsoarguethat,tohavereadPurpleconsistently,theywouldneedtohavematchedtheAmericanachievementinbuildingareplicaofthemachine,forwhichSoviettechnologicalskillswerealmostcertainlyinadequate,andforwhichtheRussianshaveneverproducedevidence–theGermans’OKW/ChifailedtobreakPurple.ItisnotunlikelythatTokyo’scabletoŌshimawaspassedtoMoscowfromWashingtonorLondonbyanAmericanorBritishtraitor,ratherthanbrokenbytheFifthDirectorate.YettheRussianshadmoresuccessinreadingatleastlowerenemywirelesstrafficthanis

sometimesrecognised.ThereisnownodoubtthatvaluablecodingmaterialwasprovidedtoCentrebyaJapaneseinformant,IzumiKozo,whosestorydeservestobebetterknown.HewasanunusuallygiftedlinguistwhospokebothRussianandEnglish.Attheageofthirty-threein1925,hewaspostedtohiscountry’snewlyopenedMoscowembassy.Herentedaroomfromageneral’swidownamedElizavetaPerskaya,whosedaughterElenawasaliteraturegraduatewhoworkedinthelibraryoftheInternalAffairsMinistry.KozofellinlovewithElena,andtheyweremarriedtwoyearslater.Thewholefamilywas,inevitably,onthebooksoftheOGPU,notleastbecauseElizaveta’ssonhadbeenexecutedforanti-Bolshevikactivities.ItseemsalmostcertainthatElenawasorderedbyacaseofficertostartarelationshipwithKozo.

WhenhewasrepostedtotheJapaneseconsulateinHarbin,hiswife,mother-in-lawandababyboyaccompaniedhim.Thereafter,however,ElenabrokeoffcontactwiththeNKVDandwasdeprivedofherSovietcitizenship.WhenhermotherElizavetawasrashenoughtoreturntoMoscow,shewaspromptlyarrestedandsentencedtotenyears’imprisonmentforespionage.Aseconddaughter,Vera,

wasshotalongwithherhusband,thoughthefamilywastoldthatshewasconfinedinapsychiatrichospital.ItishardtobelievethattheKozofamilydiscoveredmanycausesformirthintheirlives.In1935IzumibecamethirdsecretaryattheJapaneseembassyinPrague.Twoyearslater,Elena

presentedherselfatthelocalSovietembassytodeliveraformalrequestforhercitizenshiptoberestoredsoshecouldreturnhomeandbringuphersoninMoscow.Theboywasnot,shesaid,thesonofKozo,thoughthediplomathadadoptedhimassuch.MoscowCentreconsideredthisproposal.Thetroubledwomanwasaskedifherhusbandworkedinintelligence;shesaidsheonlyknewthathehadbeenlearningFrenchandGerman,andspentalotoftimereadingtheRussianémigrépress.TheNKVD’sverdictwasthatitshandlersshouldreopencontactwithElena,inhopesofsecuringaccesstoJapan’sdiplomaticcodes.Theyhadtwolevers:whateverElenafeltaboutherhusband,hewaspassionatelycommittedtobothherandtheboy;moreover,hedeploredJapan’saggressiveforeignpolicy.CashprovidedafurthermotivetoMrsIzumi,ifnottoherhusband:atameetinginPragueon3

May1938,ElenaofferedsevenJapanesecodebooksfor£10,000,andwhenthisdealwasrejectedshetookthematerialbacktotheembassy.InSeptembersherenewedthenegotiation,thistimeaskingfor£5,000and£100amonth.Itremainsuncertainhowmuchshefinallyreceived,buttheNKVD’sPragueresidentdulyreceivedsevencodebooksandassortedsecrettelegramswhichwerewelcomedinMoscow,andappeartohaveenabledtheSovietstoreadsomeTokyodiplomatictraffic.Amidthepost-Munichcrisis,JapaneseembassyfamilieswereevacuatedtoFinland,butKozoremainedinPragueuntillateOctober.Thoughnotaprofessionalintelligenceofficer,hewasperformingsomeintelligencetasks,andwassoonabletodiverttohisNKVDcaseofficertelegramsanddetailsofTokyo’slocalagents.On4Octoberhedeliveredabatchoftwenty-fivemessagesfromBerlin,twenty-ninefromLondon,thirteenfromRomeandfifteenfromMoscow.AweeklaterheprovidedamemorandumontheorganisationofJapaneseintelligenceabroad.TheNKVDremainedcautiousaboutKozo,however,anddecidedtoworkchieflythroughhiswife,whomtheywereconfidenttheycouldcontrol.TheveteranintelligenceofficerZoyaRybkinawaspostedtoHelsinkitohandleher.Attheirfirstmeeting,ElenabesoughtRybkinatobeallowedtoreturnhome,butMoscowdecided

thiswasunacceptable,becauseherdeparturewouldbeboundtorouseTokyo’ssuspicionofKozo.Throughmuchof1939theJapanesediplomat–codenamed‘Nero’–channelledastreamofreportstotheNKVDviaElena,aboutJapan’sintentionstoseekamilitaryalliancewithGermany,includingdetailsofaconferenceinBerlinaboutajointintelligenceassaultonRussia.KozohadjustbeenaskedfordetailsoftheJapaneseWarMinistry’snewcodewhentheRusso–Finnishwarerupted,andcontactwaslostuntilthespringof1940.ThediplomatwasthenpostedtoSofia,whereonefinemorningElenaarrivedunannouncedattheSovietembassy,anddemandedtoseetheNKVDresident.ShetoldhimherhusbandwashappytoresumehisactivitiesonbehalfofMoscow,butthatsheherselfwantedtodivorcehimandtocomehome.Onceagain,Centreprevaricated,whilewelcomingthematerial

fromKozo.InNovember1940hehandedoverthelatestJapanesediplomaticcodes–bynow,ofcourse,Purplewasinforce–followedbyothermaterial,climaxinginApril1941withanotherbatchofciphertelegrams–302pagesinall–whichappearstohaveenabledMoscowthroughthesummertoreadsometrafficbetweenTokyo’sembassies.InMay1941,afterdomesticsceneswhichcanbeimaginedbetweenthelovelornJapaneseandhis

bitterlyalienatedRussianwife,ElenawasatlastgrantedherwishtoreturntoMoscowwithherson.AfterherdepartureKozocontinuedtoforwardinformation,butneveragainsoughtcash;heaskedthatpaymentsshouldgotoElena,thoughitisunknownwhetherthiswasdone.Hissubsequentofferingsincludeda21MayreportdescribingGerman–JapanesediscussionsinBerlinaboutanattackontheSovietUnionintendedtostartwithintwomonths.On22June,followingtheonsetof‘Barbarossa’,Tokyochangedallitsdiplomaticcodes,butKozowasquicklyabletoprovidethenewonesforEurope,themoreeasilybecausehehimselfwaspromotedtoactingchargéd’affairesinSofia.HewentonpassingMoscowimportantcodinginformationuntil1944,whenamidthegeneralturmoilofEuropecontactwithhimwasbroken.AfterthewarheresumedhisworkfortheNKVD,whichcontinueduntil1952.Nothingisknownof

thelaterfortunesofElenaorhermother.AslongastheintelligencefilesoftheNKVDandGRUremainclosedtoresearchers,itisimpossibletoknowhowmuchJapanesediplomatictrafficwasreadinMoscow.AsBletchley’sexperienceshowed,itwasnotenoughtosecuredetailsoftheenemy’scipheringtechnologyandcodebooks:immenseintellectualinputandelectro-mechanicalaidswerealsorequiredinordertoreadenemysignalsquicklyenoughtobeofoperationalusetotheRedArmy.But,givenKozo’sundoubtedroleasaninformant,itseemsplausiblethathismaterialenabledtheRussianstoaccessatleastsomeofthesameinformationasSorgesentfromTokyoaboutJapan’sdecisionnottoattackStalinuntiltheSovietUnion’sdoomwasassured.Andunlikethespy,hecontinuedtopasscodingsecretsuntilthelaststageofthewar.

4 GOUREVITCHTAKESATRAIN

AwirelessmessagefromCentretoMoscow’sforeignstationsconfirmedthenewsof22June1941:‘Fascistbeastshaveinvadedthemotherlandoftheworkingclasses.YouarecalledupontocarryoutyourtasksinGermanytothebestofyourability(signed)Director.’TheagentsofthevastSovietspynetworksinEuropewereprofoundlyshaken,aswelltheymightbe,byearlyGermansuccesses,anddiscussedthemfeverishlywhenevertheymet.InSwitzerland,the‘Lucy’Ringintensifieditseffortsanditsreporting.On2July,AlexanderRadóreportedthatMoscowwasHitler ’smainobjective,andthathisarmies’otherthrustswerediversionary.Germany’sgeneralscertainlywishedthatthiswastrue,whichmayhelptoexplaintheinformationpassedtoRadófromBerlin.Inreality,however,tothegeneralstaff’sfuryHitlerhadinsistedonstrikingsouthwithequalvigour,towardstheoilofthe

Caucasus.On7AugustRadócitedanassurancebytheJapaneseambassadorinBernthattherewasnoquestionofhiscountryattackingtheSovietUnionuntilGermanywasvictorious.Before‘Barbarossa’,AlexanderFootetransmittedtoMoscowonlytwiceaweek,at1a.m.Nowhewasdispatchingmessagesalmostdaily,someofthemcontainingdetailedGermanorder-of-battlematerial.FundingbecameaproblemforthespiesonceRussiabecameabelligerent,sincecashcouldno

longerbechannelledthroughitsdiplomaticmissions.MoneywasthelifebloodoftheRing,notleastbecause‘Lutzi’–RudolfRössler,themercenary–wouldnotsingwithoutit.Once,absurdly,CentreinstructedAlexanderFootetotraveltoVichytoreceiveapayment,asifanEnglishmancouldstrollatwillintoalienterritory.EventuallyMoscowdevisedasystemwherebymoneywaspaidintoaUSbank,whichwasthencreditedtoitsGenevabranch.ThissuitedtheAmericans,whomadea100percentprofitoneverytransactionbyemployingtheofficialdollar–francexchangerate,ratherthantherealblack-marketone.Hundredsofthousandsofdollarswereeventuallytransferredinthisway,thoughCentreneverentrustedanagentwithmorethan$10,000atatime,lestthetemptationto‘goprivate’becameirresistible.RösslerwasrepeatedlypressedbyMoscow,throughRadó,torevealhissources,andequally

insistentlyhedeclinedtodoso.DrChristianSchneider,aGermanémigrécodenamed‘Taylor ’,joinedRössler ’sbusiness.AsatestofhisworthhewasinvitedtoidentifyGermanformationsdeployedontheSouthernFrontinRussia,togetherwiththenumberofWehrmachtPoWsinSoviethands.Whenherespondedcorrectlytobothquestions,Moscowwassuitablyimpressed.WehrmachtchiefofstaffGen.FranzHalderlaterragedabouttheleakinessofOKWandOKH:‘Almosteveryoffensiveoperationofourswasbetrayedtotheenemyevenbeforeitappearedonmydesk.’Speculationhaspersistedintothetwenty-firstcenturyaboutthesourceofRössler ’sextraordinaryinformationstream.HehimselfindicatedthathehadarangeofcontactsintheGermanhighcommand.EasternFrontintelligencechiefReinhardGehlenlaterclaimed,absurdly,thatMartinBormannwasinRössler ’spay.RadórevealedafterthewarthatthesourcesheandRösslerhadguardedsozealouslyforsolong

were…stripsofpunchedpaper.Eachdayofthewar,morethan3,000teleprintermessagesweredispatchedfromOKW’scommunicationscentretotheFührerquartier,unencryptedsincethelinkwasasecurelandline.OneofRössler ’sagentspersuadedtwofemaleteleprinteroperatorstopasstohim‘spent’ribbons,intendedfordestruction.Bythismeansthespyreceivedcopiesofsome4,500topsecretmessagesandeighthundredspecialreports,whichweresubsequentlycarriedbycouriertoSwitzerland.Ifthisversionofeventsisaccurate,thenRössler ’snotionalsub-agents–codenamed‘Olga’,‘Werther ’,‘Teddi’,‘Anna’,‘Ferdinand’–wereinrealitymerepapercreations.Thetruthwillneverbeknown.AllthatiscertainisthatRösslersuppliedtoRadóforonward

transmissiontoMoscowanastonishingvolumeofhighlyclassifiedinformation,ofwhichfragments

interceptedbytheAbwehrhavebeenpublished.HewarnedinMarch1943oftheGermanintentiontoattackatKursk.On15AprilhepassedonHitler ’soperationalorderfortheoffensive,thenon20and29Aprilflaggedsuccessivedelays,finallyreportingthatOperation‘Citadel’wasscheduledfor12June.On17Aprilhecataloguednewtankandinfantryformationsbeingcreated,withtheirlocationsandidentifications;a28JunesignaldetailedtheLuftwaffe’sorderofbattle,whileanothersummarisedPanthertankproduction.On25SeptemberheprovidedminutesofaneconomicconferenceheldatHitler ’sheadquarters.IfRadó’sstoryofthestolenteleprintertapesseemsimplausible,onlythatoranotherequallyastonishingnarrativecanexplainthequalityofhismaterial.ThoughtheSwissring’sintelligencedidnotmatchthevolumeandprecisionofthatwhichtheBritishgarneredthroughBletchleyPark,itprovidedtheRussianswithincomparablybettermaterialthantheGermanssecuredaboutAlliedmilitaryoperations.Theevidencesuggests,however,thatMoscowappreciatedthe‘Lucy’Ring’soutputbelowitstrue

worth.Inparticular,insteadofrecognisinginconsistenciesandinaccuraciesasreflectionsofchangesofplaninBerlin,thefamiliar,corrosiveSovietparanoiapromptedarisingconvictioninthemindsoftheNKVD–whichpersistedtothewar ’send–thatRösslerandRadóoftheGRUwereconsciouslyorunconsciouslyinvolvedinaNazideception.ThemostfantastictwistherewasthatSovietsuspicionssoaredwhentheyfoundthatsomeGermanmaterialbeingpassedtothembyBritishtraitorsmatchedthatemergingfromSwitzerland.Could‘Lutzi’andherfriendsbepartofanelaborateBritishplot?NobodyinMoscow,asfarascanbediscovered,hitupontherealandsimpleexplanation–thattheGRU’sSwissagentswereforwardingsomeofthesameGermansignalsbeinginterceptedbyGC&CSatBletchleyPark.

CommunicationbetweentheRedOrchestraandMoscowwaslostfromJunetoNovember1941,whentheWehrmachtswepteastwardsintoRussia,drivingtheNKVD’swirelessreceiversbeyondrangeoftheirBerlinagents’weaktransmitters.ItbecameamatterofurgencyfortheRussianstoregaincontactwithHarnack,Schulze-Boysenand‘Breitenbach’,andifpossibletodiscoverthefateoftheirnetworkinPrague,whichhadalsogonesilent.InconsequenceCentrebrokeeveryruleofespionagebyorderingtheGRU’sLeopoldTreppertofindmeanstocontacttheNKVDnetworksinHitler ’scapital.Thoughthespies’wirelesseswereoutofreachofMoscow,ifprovidedwiththenecessarycodesandschedulestheycouldtransmitmessagestoBelgium,forforwardingtoCentre.InSeptember,TrepperreturnedtoBrusselsfromParistodiscussthisassignmentwithAnatoliGourevitch,‘MonsieurKent’.Gourevitch’smostnotableachievementsince1940hadbeentocreateinBelgium,withMoscow’s

moneyandloansfromfriends,anentirelynewtradingcompany,christened‘Simexco’andbasedinelegantrentedofficesontheRueRoyale,toprovidecoverforthenetwork–and,eventually,amazinglysubstantialprofits.Heboughtacompanycarandhiredachauffeur.Heworked

energeticallyatcreatingrelationshipswiththenewGermanmastersofBrussels,mostofwhomprovedeminentlycorruptible,especiallyMajorKranzbühler,aprominentfigureintheNaziadministrationwhocheerfullyprovidedpasses,curfewlaissez-passersandlettersofintroductionforthecompany’sdirector-general,whowassopleasinglyeagertocollaborate.GourevitchcementedKranzbühler ’sgoodwillbyprocuringanabortionfortheGerman’slocalmistress.WithhisownloverMargaretBarczaactingashostess,theGRUagentbegantoprovidelavishentertainmentsforGermansandfellow-collaborators,whobaskedinCentre’slargesse.HeacquiredontheblackmarketpetrolcouponswhichenabledhimtodrivewithMargaretintothecountrysidetobuyhams,chickens,butterandsuchlikedelicaciesnowdeniedtoordinaryBelgians.HeforgedbusinessrelationshipswithGermancompanieseagertobreakintotheprofitable

marketsofoccupiedEurope,andespeciallywiththeNazis’TodtOrganisation.FromthelatterhesecuredandfulfilledalargeorderforcheapspoonsandforkstobeissuedtoGermany’smultitudeofprisoners,politicalandmilitary.AParisbranchofSimexco,calledSimex,openedanofficeabovethefamousLidorestaurant,fromwhichitservicedmanyofTrepper ’sagents.WhilethisremarkableandexpensiveoperationwasusefulforsustainingtheGRUnetworks’cover,thereisnodoubtthatGourevitch,thepharmacist’ssonfromKharkovandformerstalwartoftheYoungCommunistmovement,alsohugelyenjoyedhismasqueradeasarichbusinessman,playboyandpatronoftheblackmarket.Heprovidednotestimonyabouttheattitudeadoptedtowardshimselfandhiscirclebyordinary

Belgians,whohatedtheoccupationandlivedinterroroftheNazis,butitiseasytoguess.Thereislittleevidenceaboutwhatintelligence‘Kent’s’informantscollectedforMoscow,thoughheprofessedthathisTodtOrganisationcontactsenabledhimtojointhe‘Lucy’RinginwarningoftheforthcominginvasionofRussia.WhatiscertainisthatCentre’sfundingofthenetworksstoppedabruptlyinJune1941,withtheexpulsionofSovietdiplomatsfromWesternEurope.Thereafter,GourevitchandTrepperweredependentforcashupontheprofitsofSimexcoandSimex.Itwasadrolltwistthatthetwoagentswerethusobligedtobecomeenergeticandnotablysuccessfulcapitalistentrepreneursaswellascommunistintelligence-gatherers.Now,inSeptember1941,herewasTrepperaskingGourevitchifsomebodyfromSimexcocould

findacredibleexcusetovisitPragueandBerlin.‘Kent’saidthathehimselfwastheonlypersonwiththecoverandconnectionstosecurethenecessaryauthorisations.Hebeganbythrowingalavishruralpicnic,followedbyadinnerathome,forhisforemostGermanfriends,atwhichhetoldKranzbühlerofthebusinesstriphewantedtomake.TheNaziofficerrespondedwithouthesitationthat‘VincenteSierra’hadalwaysbeenhelpfultoGermaninterests;hewassurethenecessarydocumentscouldbeprovided.Andsotheywere.InOctober1941GourevitchtravelledwithouthindrancethroughGermanytooccupiedPrague,wherehesetaboutreconnoitringtheaddressessuppliedtohimbyMoscow.Hedislikedwhathefound.Thepremisesechoedempty.Hefeltaninstinctiveunease–and

walkedaway.Hishunchwasright:theGermanshadrolleduptheGRU’sPraguegroupmonthsearlier.GourevitchmovedontoBerlin,wherehecheckedintothecity’sgrandExcelsiorhotel.Hethen

addressedthecontactsnamedbyCentre:IlseStöbe,HarroSchulze-Boysen,ArvidHarnackandothers.Inresponsetoaphonecall,Stöbe’smothertoldhimthatIlsewasinDresden,anduncontactable.NexthetriedKurtSchulze,theformertaxi-driverwhoactedastheStöbenetwork’swireless-operator–andmetwithmoresuccess.HevisitedSchulze’shouseandspentseveralhoursbriefinghimonnewradioschedules,alsosupplyingthebookphrasenecessarytoencodemessages.ThenGourevitchsetofftoreconnoitre19AlternburgerAllee,whichhedescribedas‘abig,

imposinghouse’–theSchulze-Boysens’home.HereturnedtotheExcelsiorwithoutapproachingit,havingmerelysatisfiedhimselfthathewasnotbeingfollowed,thenfilledthefollowingmorningwithbusinessmeetingsonbehalfofSimexco.Thatevening,atlasthetelephonedtheSchulze-Boysens,andgaveanagreedpasswordtoHarro’swifeLibertas.Shecheerfullyurgedhimtocomeonover;herhusbandwasatworkintheAirMinistry,butshewouldbehappytoseehim.GourevitchsuggestedthatinsteadtheyshouldmeetatanearbyU-Bahnstationandtakeawalk.Hewouldbereadilyidentifiablebythecigarhewassmokingandthecrocodilebriefcasehecarried.Fifteenminuteslater‘anelegantyoungwoman’,walkingrapidly,approachedhimwithouthesitationandextendedherhand.‘CallmeLibertas,’shesaid.HerfriendlinessdispelledtheRussian’sapprehension.Hewasimpressedbyherprofessionalism:nowatcher,hesaid,wouldguessthattheyweremeetingforthefirsttime.‘IneverforgetthatIamactingapart,’shesaid.Sheaddedthatherhusbandhadlongawaited‘Kent’s’arrival–hewantedtheGRUmantomeetsomeoftheirfriends.Thenetworkwasinfineshape,shesaid–‘weareallsafeandsound’–workinghardandabsolutelycommittedtotheircommonideals.Tobesure,lifewasnoteasy,‘butthefuturelooksbrightertodaythanitdidyesterday’–becauseoftheSovietagent’sarrival.Shewarnedhimnottotelephoneagain,becausetheyassumedthattheirlinewastapped;forallhis

fluencyinGerman,Gourevitch’saccentwasobviouslyforeign.Sheaskedhisname,whichmomentarilyembarrassedhim,becausehewasunabletoreciprocateherfrankness.‘CallmeValdes,’hesaid.Theybothlaughed.LibertastalkedaboutherworkforthePropagandaMinistry,producingcartoonfilmsfortheregime.Shewarnedhimthathisclothes,inwhichtheGRUmantooksuchpride,markedhimoutasaforeigner.Thentheyparted,andtheRussianreturnedtotheExcelsior.Thefollowingevening,amidaheavysnowfall,heapproachedanagreedrendezvous,atwhichhe

almostsufferedheartfailurewhenapproachedbyauniformedofficer.ThenHarroSchulze-BoysenoftheLuftwaffeintroducedhimself,sayingeagerly,‘I’mthrilledtoseeyou.’HeledGourevitchtohishome,wheretheydonnedslippersastheycameinoutofthewhiteness.Thevisitorwasshownintoahandsomelibrary,inwhichhenoticedRussianbooksalongsideGermanones,someofthemSovietpublications.Schulze-Boysencouldscarcelybedescribedassecurityconscious,thoughhe

saidthathecouldexplainawaysuchreadingmattertotheGestapoasnecessaryforhisworkattheAirMinistry.HetoldGourevitchthatnotonlydidhelovepoetry,healsowroteversehimself,thoughhenowfoundthetimesunsympathetictohismuse.Heprofferedaglassofvodka,observinglaconically,‘spoilsofwar ’.Thentheysatdowntodinner.Astheytalked,Gourevitchreflectedlater,‘Icouldnotridmyselfofasenseofunreality.Itseemed

completelyincrediblethat,amidareignofterror,wheneverybodywasspyinguponeverybodyelse,agroupofmencouldhavesuccessfullypenetratedtheorgansofstateandthearmedforcesatriskoftheirlives,sothatGermanycouldregainitshonourandtheGermanpeopletheirfreedom.’HesufferedadifficultmomentwhenSchulze-BoysenaskedhimdirectlyhowitwaspossiblethatRussiawassurprisedinJune1941,whenhisowngrouphadwarnedrepeatedlyof‘Barbarossa’s’imminence.Neither‘Kent’noranymansaveStalincouldprovideananswer.Gourevitchrecordedthat,inconversationalonewithSchulze-BoysenwhenLibertasleftthemafter

dinner,theyagreedthattherewasnopurposeinhismeetingothermembersofthegroup;itsufficedthatthevisitorhadgiventhevitalcommunicationsinstructionstoKurtSchulze.Theypartedafterwarmembraces,andtheRussianreturnedtohishotel.HethenspenthourscomposingadetailedreportforMoscowontheconversation,writteninsecretinkinapocketnotebook.Byyetanotheroftheblackcomicchancesinseparablefromespionage,onreachingBrusselsinthefirstdaysofNovember1941hefoundthathis‘invisible’noteswereperfectlylegible,probablyexposedbytheheatintherailwaycarriagefromBerlin–‘Kent’wouldhavebeenatthemercyofanyinquisitiveborderpoliceman.Butnosuchfigureintervened,andhesurvivedhisperilousjourneyunscathed.HedispatchedalongreporttoMoscow,detailingtheGermanarmedforces’predicamentinRussiaasdescribedbySchulze-Boysen.ThiswassupposedlyshowntoStalin,thoughitincludedonefalseandhighlydamagingpieceofinformation:aclaimthatCanarishadsuccessfullyrecruitedtotheAxiscauseAndréDewavrin,‘ColonelPassy’,GeneraldeGaulle’schiefofintelligenceinLondon.TheBerlinnetworksnowbegantorelayreportstoMoscowviatheTreppergroup’stransmitters.It

wasduringthemonthsthatfollowedthattheGermanspickeduptheirsignals.WhilestillignorantoftheidentitiesofHarnack,Schulze-Boysenoranyoftheircontacts,theydeducedthatthesewerecommunistagents,addressingMoscow,andchristenedthenetworkDieRoteKapelle–theRedOrchestra.Thisnamedistinguisheditfromtheregime’sotherimportantsecretenemy–DieSchwartzKapelle,theBlackOrchestra,thenamegiventothosestrivingtoencompassHitler ’sdeath.AmongearlyfruitsoftheOrchestra’srenewedlabours,asrelayedtoStalin’sStateDefence

Committeeon2December1941,wasareportontheWehrmacht’sfuelstate,showingreservesadequateuntilFebruaryorMarch;thereafter,theGermanswerepinningtheirhopesonexploitingtheSovietoilwellsatMaikop.MoscowwastoldthattheLuftwaffehadsufferedseverelosses,especiallyinCrete,andwasreducedtoaserviceablestrengthof2,500aircraft.AfurtherDecemberreportwarnedofanewMesserschmittvariantarmedwithtwocannonandtwomachine-guns,capableof

600kph;aproximity-fusedanti-aircraftshell;developmentworkonhydrogen-peroxide-fuelledaircraft.ArmyGroupB,saidtheRoteKapelle,wouldattackonanaxisthroughVoronezhinthespring–asindeeditdid.Berlinintendeditstroopconcentrationstobecompletedby1MayfortheadvanceontheCaucasus.On17JanuarytheStavka–armedforceshighcommand–alsoreceivedaninterceptedItalianciphertelegramfromBucharest,reportingablockonRomanianrailtraffic,toallowthroughhundredsofGermantrooptrains,headedforsouthernRussia.TheRussianswerewarnedofaGermandeceptionplancodenamed‘Kremlin’,designedto

promoteexpectationsthatHitler ’sforceswouldrenewtheirwinterassaultonMoscow–conspicuousLuftwaffereconnaissanceofthecityapproaches,afakeattackorderdated29May1942,signedbyField-MarshalKlugeofArmyGroupCentre.By23MarchtheGRUwasasserting:‘ThissummertheGermanswillattemptnotmerelytoreachtheVolgaandCaspian,butalsotocarryoutmajoroperationsagainstMoscowandLeningrad.’TheRedOrchestraremainedinsistentthatMoscowwasasecondaryobjective–thatStalingradandtheCaucasuswereHitler ’sprimetargets.TheStavka,however,chosetoignoreitsagents;Stalindeployedhisarmiesforthe1942fightingseasonontheassumptionthatthethreattothecapitalwasthemostserious.TheinformationgarneredbytheRedOrchestraandthe‘Lucy’Ring,atsuchrisktosomanylives,alteredlittleintheKremlin’sdecision-making,butwouldsoonsweepawaythespies:Germany’scounter-intelligenceagenciesbegantofumbletheirwaytowardsexposureofthenetworksledbyHarnackandSchulze-Boysen.

7

Britain’sSecretWarMachine

1 THESHARPEND

Britain’sintelligencemachineryworkedbetterthanthatofanyothernationatwar,andexercisedanespeciallycriticalinfluenceonthewaratsea.Acasehistory:justafterthefallofdarknesson8November1941,asquadronoftheRoyalNavy,ForceK,ledbythelightcruisersAuroraandPenelope,sailedfromMalta’sGrandHarbour,thensteamednorthathighspeed,thrashingthesea.At4a.m.,140mileseastofSyracuse,theBritishwarshipsmetanItaliansupplyconvoyboundforNorthAfrica.Havingworkedup-moonwithouttheirpresencebeingdetected,thecruiserstrainedtheirsix-inchgunsandopenedfire,burstingopenthenightwithstarshellbeforeraininghighexplosiveonthehaplessenemy.Forhalfanhourtheywroughtdevastation:sevenmerchantmentotalling39,000tonswereleftsinkingorsunk,togetherwithoneofthesixdestroyersoftheItaliancloseescort.FromAurora’sbridge,CaptainWilliamAgnew’sonlysignaloftheactionwasawarningtohisships,‘donotwasteammunition’,becausestocksatMaltawerelow.Anenemycoveringforceoftwoheavycruisersandfourmoredestroyers,lackingradar,failedtointervene.At1p.m.thetriumphantBritishsquadronreacheditsMalteseanchorageunscathed,toreceivethecongratulationsofAdmiralSirAndrewCunningham,C-in-CMediterranean,onanactionthathedescribedas‘abrilliantexampleofleadershipandforethought’.Mussolini’sforeignministerCountCianofumedinhisdiaryabouttheengagement,‘theresultsofwhichareinexplicable.All,Imeanall,ourmerchantshipsweresunk.’TheRoyalNavyhadfallenonthem‘aswolvesamongthesheep’.On24November,ForceKrepeatedthissuccess.Itscrewswereenjoyingaroisteringshoreleave

whennewsreachedVallettaofanotherAxisconvoyintransit.Thesailorswerehastilyherdedbackonboard,thenthesleekcruiserssetforthtosea.Afterhoursofmanoeuvringtodeceiveenemyreconnaissanceaircraftabouttheircourse,at3.45p.m.theycaughttwoGermanfreighters,MaritzaandProcida,carryingfueltotheLuftwaffeatBenghaziinjerrycansstackedasdeckcargo.Escortingtorpedoboatsfled.TheBritishcruiserslaunchedadramaticattackduringwhichtheiranti-aircraftgunsfoughtoffLuftwaffeJu-88bombers,whilethemainarmamentrangedbyradaronthemerchantmen.Thecrewshastilyabandonedshipasthefuelcargoeseruptedinflames.ThedestroyerLivelypickedupGermanandItaliansurvivorsbeforethesquadronretiredtoMaltaattwenty-eight

knots.Thesesuccesses,andothersinthesameseason,werenotthefruitsofmere‘forethought’bynaval

officers,asCunningham’scongratulatorysignalsuggested–theyrepresentedearlyachievementsofUltrainthewaratsea.FromJune1941BletchleywasreadingnotmerelytheLuftwaffe’straffic,whichhighlighteditschronicallypoorfuelpositioninNorthAfrica,butalsoanincreasingstreamofsignals–sixhundredinJuly1941,risingto4,000ayearlater–reportingenemyMediterraneanconvoymovements,andRommel’slogisticaldifficultiesashore.ItwastruethattheGermansalsohadsignificantwirelessintelligencesuccessesintheMediterraneanwar–theB-DienstwasbreakingandreportingBritishmessageswhichrevealedsomeoftheirownconvoymovements,andtheAfrikaKorpsenjoyedthefruitsofexcellentsigintaboutBritain’sEighthArmy.ButUltra’scontributionwascriticalinenablingCunningham’swarshipstointerdictAxissupplytrafficuntilearly1942,whenBritishnavallossesandGermandominance,especiallyoftheair,forseveralmonthsmadeitimpossibletoexploitdecrypts,intheabsenceofwarshipstomountattacksandfighterstocoverthem.Here,aseverywhere,theunchangingrealitywasthatintelligencealonewasuseless,unless

sufficientforcewasavailableatsea,inthesky,oronthegroundtousesecretknowledgeeffectively.UltraneverprovidedforewarningofallGermanmovements.Untiltheveryendofthewar,therewereperiodsinwhichtheenemy’simpositionofwirelesssilence,delaysorinterruptionsinthedeliveryofdecrypts,preventedtheAlliesfromputtingthemtopracticaluse.ChurchilldemandedtestilyofAuchinleck,thenhisMiddleEastC-in-C:‘Areyougettingthesepricelessmessages(whichhavenevererred)ingoodtime?’TheresponseacknowledgedthatUltrawas‘ofgreatvalue’,butadded,‘somearriveintimetobeoperationallyofuse,othersnotso’.Eventhecombinationofspies,airreconnaissanceandUltrafailedtopreventoneofthenotableBritishhumiliationsof1942,thepassageup-ChanneloftheScharnhorst,GneisenauandPrinzEugen,prideofHitler ’sfleet,withintwentymilesofthecliffsofDover.ThiswasaneventthatshockedParliamentandChurchill’speopleinthatseasonofheavydefeatsinthedesertandtheFarEast.TheshipshadbeendeployedtoBrestinthespringof1941,atahigh-watermarkofNazi

expansionism,butithadsincebecomeplaintoBerlinthattheyservednousefulpurposeontheAtlanticcoastsavetoprovidetargetsfortheRAF’sBomberCommand,whichhaddamagedallthree.ThedestructionoftheBismarckinMayshowedthatHitler ’sbigshipscouldnolongerhopetoventureintotheAtlanticshippinglanes.HethusdeterminedthattheyshouldreturntoaGermanport–whichbecameknowntotheBritish.FrenchagentsofMI6maintainedaharbourwatchatBrest,whileRAFphotographicreconnaissanceaircraftdailymonitoredtheships’condition.On24DecembertheAdmiraltyinformedRAFCommandsthataGermanbreakouteastwardcouldtakeplaceatanytime.LateinJanuary1942,UltrarevealedScharnhorst’sguncrewsexercisingaboardtheheavycruiserScheerintheBaltic.MultipleintelligencesourcesreportedallthreebigshipsslippingoutofBrestfornightsteamingtrials,thenreturningbeforedawn.TheyalsonotedthereinforcementofGermanlight

forcesintheChannel,andintensiveminesweepingactivity.TheFirstSeaLord,AdmiralSirDudleyPound,toldthechiefsofstaffon3FebruarythataconcentrationofLuftwaffefightersontheChannelcoastsuggestedthatScharnhorstanditsconsortsintendedtobravethepassage,thoughhewasunawarethatHitlerhadgivenordersforthemtotackletheNarrowsindaylight,whenGermanairsuperioritywouldbemosteffective,andwouldalmostcertainlydetertheRoyalNavyfromcommittingitsownheavymetal.HowdidtheBritishproposetodealwiththeGermanrunforhome?Acriticalpointwasthatno

capitalshipsoftheHomeFleetweredeployedanywherewithinrange.ItwasindeeddeemedunthinkabletoriskthemwithineasyreachoftheLuftwaffe,especiallyafewweeksafterthedestructionofPrinceofWalesandRepulsebyJapanesetorpedo-bombers.ResponsibilityforstoppingVice-AdmiralOttoCiliax’ssquadronwouldrestwithdestroyerandtorpedo-boatflotillasstationedalongtheEnglishsouthcoast,andevenmorewiththeRAFandFleetAirArm,whosesquadronswerebroughttoshortnoticeinaccordancewithaplanforthiscontingency,codenamed‘Fuller ’.JusttwoBritishsubmarineswerealsoavailable,topatroloffBrest.On5February,UltrarevealedCiliaxhoistinghisflagaboardScharnhorst.Threedayslater,AOC

CoastalCommandwarnedRAFFighterandBomberCommandsthatabreakoutwaslikely‘anytimeafterTuesday10thFebruary’.Onthe10th,however,C-in-CBomberCommandstooddownhalfofhismodestFullerforce,withoutinformingtheAdmiralty.Thismaynothavebeeninkeepingwiththespiritofeffectiveair–seacooperation,butitreflectedtheRAF’scavaliermindset,whichresistedanyresponsibilitytoassistthenavy,whenitsownoverridingprioritywastobombGermany.AstreamofUltrainterceptsshowedtheKriegsmarineconductingintensiveminesweepingoperationsinHeligolandBight,whichremovedthelastlingeringdoubtsabouttheGermanships’destination.AdmiralCiliax’ssquadronsailedfromBrestat10.45p.m.on11February,andfromthatmoment

everythingthatcouldgowrongfortheBritishdidso.BletchleyParkencounteredunusualdifficultiesbreakingintonavalEnigma:messagesfor10,11and12Februarywerenotdecrypteduntilthe15th.ThesubmarineSealion,havingbravedimmenseriskstopenetrateBrestapproachesontheafternoonofthe11th,withdrewtorechargeitsbatterieshavingseennothingunusual.HadtheGermanssetforthasplannedat5.30p.m.,Sealionmusthaveseenthem,butCiliax’ssailingtimewasputbacktwohoursbecauseofanRAFbombingraid.ThreeCoastalCommandnight-reconnaissanceaircraftwerealoft,monitoringthetracktakenbytheGermansquadron,buttheASVradarofthatperiodwasprimitive.Amidthedarkness,onecrewsawnothingonitsscreen;asecondfounditssetunserviceable;athirdwasrecalledearlybecauseoffogatbase,beforetheGermanshipsreacheditssearcharea.EvenwhendaylightcameandaphotographicreconnaissanceaircraftoverflewBrest,lowcloudandaGermansmokescreenpreventeditscrewfromseeingthatthebigshipsweregone.Britishcoastalradarstationsfailedtodrawappropriateconclusionsfromconcentrationsofenemyfightersintheairandattemptstojamtheirownwavelengths.

TwoSpitfirepilotswerefirsttosighttheGermansquadron,at10.42a.m.,justwestofLeTouquet.Theyobservedstandardoperatingprocedure,however,whichmeantwirelesssilence,andreportedthesensationalnewsonlyafterlandingat11.09a.m.SixteenminuteslatertheirtidingswerebroadcasttoallBritishcommands,precipitatingasuccessionoffutileassaults.Lt.CmdrEdwardEsmondreceivedaposthumousVCforleadingalow-levelattackbysixpitifullyold,slowSwordfishtorpedobiplanesfromManstoninKent,allofwhichplungedintotheChannelamidahailofanti-aircraftfire.TheGermanswerealreadythroughtheNarrowswhenthe‘Stringbags’madetheirrunsat12.42p.m.,andallof825Squadron’storpedoesmissed.FiveMTBsdashedoutfromDoverharbour,ofwhichonequicklybrokedown.Theleaderoftheotherfour,onsightingtheGermanships,decidedthatitwasimpossibleforhisboatstopenetratetheescortingscreen.Theythuslaunchedtheirtorpedoesatextremerange,withouteffect.Anotherthreeboats,boundingforthfromRamsgateinworseningweather,failedtofindtheScharnhorstanditsconsorts.Inthecourseoftheafternoonofthe12th,asuccessionofnavaltwin-enginedBeaufortsand

HudsonsstagedpiecemealtorpedoandbombattacksontherecedingGermans,withouteffectandwiththelossofseveralaircraft.At3.43p.m.fivedestroyersfromHarwich,underfierceGermangunfire,launchedatorpedoattackatarangeof3,000yards,againwithouteffect.Meanwhile242BritishbomberswerelaunchedagainstCiliax’ssquadron,ofwhichjustthirty-ninedroppedtheirloadsinthevicinitywithoutscoringahit,andfifteenwereshotdown.TheRAFalsolostseventeenof398fighterscommitted.TheGermandashup-ChannelhadprovedatriumphfortheKriegsmarine’splanning,skill,daring

andluck.Orhadit?ScharnhorststruckoneBritishair-droppedmineat2.31p.m.,withoutmucheffect,asdidGneisenauat7.55p.m.At9.34p.m.,however,offTerschellingclosetohome,Scharnhorsthitasecondmine,whichinflictedgravedamage.TheshipeventuallycreptintoWilhelmshavenearlyon13Februarywithitsportenginesunserviceable,itsconsortsfollowingat7o’clockthesamemorning.TheBritishpeopleknewnothing,however,ofthelatedisasterwhichbefelltheGermans,causingHitler ’snavalstafftocharacterisetheepisodeas‘atacticalvictory,butastrategicdefeat’.Churchill’scountrymensawonlythatanenemysquadronhaddefiedthemightoftheRoyalNavyinbroaddaylight,withinsightofthewhitecliffs.TheTimesthunderedthatAdmiralCiliaxhadsucceededwheretheSpanishArmadahadfailed.Ajudicialinquirywasheld,ofwhichthefindingsreflectedpoorlyonalltheBritishforcecommandersinvolved.Intruth,thoughtheChannelDashcausedtheBritishgovernmentdeepembarrassmentatabadtime,

itwasunimportant.UltrainformedtheAdmiraltyofthedamagetoScharnhorst,whichwasrestoredtooperationalfitnessonlyinJanuary1943,whenitjoinedTirpitzintheNorwegianfjords.Meanwhile,on26February1942,RAFbombershitGneisenauindockatKiel,cripplingthecruisersoseverelythatitneversailedagain.Itwasdeemedimpossible,however,tobroadcastanyofthisgoodnewstotheBritishpeoplewithoutcompromisingBletchley’ssecurity.TheGermanshipswere

thusgenerallysupposedtohaveescapedscot-free.Publicbitternesslingeredforyearsaboutyetanotherpresumeddefeat.BlameforfailuretodestroytheshipsintheChannelNarrowscertainlydidnotliewith

intelligence,whichprovidedcommanderswiththebestinformationtheycouldconceivablyhaveexpectedabouttheenemy’sintentions,uptothemomentofsailing.Commandersdrewappropriatedeductions,andwerealerttoCiliax’slikelycourse,savethattheyexpectedhimtoclosetheEnglishcoastbynightratherthanbyday.Theproblem,assooften,laywithlackofappropriateforcestochallengetheGermansquadron.Anti-shippingcapabilitywasachronicweaknessofboththeFleetAirArmandtheRAF.Itisoftensuggestedthat,iftheBritishhadknownearlierthatCiliaxhadputtosea,theoutcomecouldhavebeendifferent.Thisseemsunlikely.Inthecourseoftheconflict,manyBritishairattacksagainstenemysurfaceshipsfailed.Asever,knowledgewasnotenough,unlessmatchedbypower.

2 THEBRAIN

ThewaryieldedplentyoffailuresanddisappointmentstomatchthatofFebruary1942intheChannelNarrows,buttheydonotdiminishtheachievementofBritain’s‘brain’,thecommandstructureandbureaucracywhereinthecollection,analysisanddistributionofintelligencewereintegrated.BletchleyPark’scodebreakerswouldhaveachievedmuchless,butfortheexistenceofathreshingmachinefortheirgoldenharvest.Thiscouldhavebeencreatedonlyunderthehandofawiseprimeminister,whothoroughlyunderstoodthemakingofwar.Churchilldominatedhisnation’sdecision-makingmuchmorethandidRooseveltthatoftheUnited

States.Althoughheoftenbaulkedatassessmentswhichdidnotconformtohisownviews,unlikethedictatorsheneverquestionedtherightanddutyofthechiefsofstaffandtheirintelligenceofficerstospeaktheirminds.HewasacriticalforceinmakingBritain’ssecretservicestheleastineffectiveintheworld.Becausehehimselfrespectedintelligence,heensuredthatitsagencies,andespeciallyBletchleyPark,wereadequatelyresourced.Theprimeministeruseddecryptsasoftenasweaponsinargumentwithhisownchiefsofstaff,as

againsttheenemy.‘Churchillhadatendencytocreatehisownintelligence,’saidtheJointIntelligenceCommittee’schairmanVictor‘Bill’Cavendish-Bentinck,somewhatdelphically.Butthechiefsseldomdeviatedfromtheprincipleofattemptingtoanalyseevidenceobjectively.‘Thebestarrangement,’wrotealaterchairmanoftheJIC,PercyCradock,‘isintelligenceandpolicyinseparatebutadjoiningrooms,withcommunicatingdoorsandthinpartitionwalls,asincheaphotels.’ThisiswhathappenedinWhitehall.Atleastinthesecondhalfofthestruggle,asBritain’swareffortbecamemorecoherent,animpressivelyrobustyetsensitivesystemcollatedandexaminedinformation,thentransferreditfromthesecretdepartmentstooperationalcommanders.

BillBentinckthoughttheRAF’sAirChiefMarshalSirCharlesPortalthecleverestofBritain’sthreeservicechiefs,whilebeingirkedbyCIGSGen.SirAlanBrooke’ssurgesofstubbornnessinpursuitofhisownhobby-horses.Inlate1941,forexample,againstthefirmopinionoftheJICandalltheevidencefromBletchley,BrookepersuadedhimselfthattheGermansretaineda‘massofmanoeuvre’,uncommittedtotheEasternFront,whichmightstillinvadeBritain.ItwaswidelythoughtthatsuccessiveWarOfficedirectorsofintelligenceweretooeagertotellthehighlyopinionatedarmychiefwhathewantedtohear.TheJIC,bycontrast,didnothingofthesort:itsreportingwasalmostunfailinglyhonest,evenwhenitwaswrong.TheJointIntelligenceSub-Committeeofthechiefsofstaff–togivetheJICitsfulltitle–assumed

unprecedentedimportanceafterthe1940ascentofChurchillandthefallofFrance.ItmetinahouseownedbyBillBentinck’suncleinRichmondTerrace,abriskwalkfromthewarcabinetoffices.Thechairmanenjoyedimpeccablyaristocraticorigins,andhimselfendedlifeasthelastDukeofPortland,buthehadanunusualandunenviablepersonalhistory.Bornin1897,hewaseducatedatWellingtonCollege,wherehewasunhappy.In1918heservedbrieflyinthearmywithoutreachingthefront,thenjoinedthediplomaticservice,wheregoodlooks,easymannersandanairofbenignwisdommighthavespedhimtothetophadhenotmadeadisastrous1924marriagetoanAmericannamedClothildeQuigley,withwhomhehadtwochildren.AsayoungersonBentinckwasrelativelypoor–moreso,aftersomerashstockexchangespeculations.Hiswifenonethelessspentlavishlyandquarrelledspectacularlywithotherdiplomaticwiveswhereverherhusbandwasposted.BentinckwastransferredfromtheprestigiousParisembassyfirsttoAthens,thentoSantiago,leavingeverywhereatrailofacrimonylaidbyClothilde.BackinLondonin1939,hewasappointedchairmanoftheJICwhileitwasstillinitsembryophase,becausenobodycouldthinkwhatelsetodowithhim,aslongasheremainedencumberedbyhistermagantofaspouse.Soonafterwarbegan,hereceivedathisofficeanalmostincomprehensibletelephonecallfromthe

family’sHungarianmaid,whoeventuallymadehimunderstandthatMrsBentinckhadpackedherbagsanddepartedwiththechildren,apparentlyforGlasgowtocatchaboattoAmerica.‘ItwaslikeaFrenchfarce,’saidtheJICchairmandrylylongafterwards.Bentinckadoptedamaskofpatricianstoicismtoconcealthetraumathiseventmusthavecausedhim.Thereafter,thoughhiswifemadetroubleuntiltheyweremessilydivorcedin1948,hedevotedhimselfsingle-mindedlytohisjob,andmostobserversthoughthimwellsuitedtoit.NoelAnnanfoundBentinck‘veryimpressive…Hehadatemperamentofextremescepticism,yettotalbeliefthattheAlliesweregoingtowin.’ForatimewhenMenzies’thronetottered,BentinckwastoutedashispossiblesuccessoratMI6.Thechairmanwasnobrainbox,buthehadanativeshrewdness,impeccablemannersandarelaxed

charmwhichenabledhimforsixyearstomanagethepassionsthatoftenswirledatJICmeetings.TheCommittee’scleverestandmostassertiveservicerepresentativewasJohnGodfrey,directorofnavalintelligence,buttheadmiral’sarroganceexasperatedthosewhohadtoworkwithhim.Meanwhile

Godfrey’sarmyandairforcecounterpartswereunimpressiveofficers,andtheMinistryofEconomicWarfare’srepresentativeonlybegantoexertrealinfluencelaterinthewar,whenSirGeoffreyVickerswasappointedtotherole.Thoughalawyer,hewasaWorldWarIVCwhohadoncecommandedaninfantrybattalion:theservicerepresentativeswouldhavefoundithardtosnubVickers.TherangeofissuesaddressedbytheJICwasextraordinary.Inadditiontothebigstrategic

questions,inJulyandAugust1941itsstaffproducedreportsonsuchmattersas‘MilitaryPreparationsbyVichyFranceagainstChad’,‘RumoursDesignedtoMisleadtheEnemy’–arunningtheme,‘Madagascar ’,‘Press,CinemaandBroadcastingCorrespondentsinIceland’,‘AnadvancebytheAxisintoSudanandArabia’.EveryTuesdaymorningat10.30,theCommittee’smembersreportedtothechiefsofstaffintheCabinetWarRoomsbeneathGreatGeorgeStreet–whatBentinckreferredtowrylyas‘leadingmychoir ’.Theirassessmentsmight,ormightnot,influencethechiefs’decisions,whichwerepassedtotheJointPlanningStafffortranslationintooperationalproposalsandorders.TheJPS’sofficers,famouslyclever,oftenworkedallnighttoprepareappreciationsforthechiefs’next8a.m.meeting.ChurchillgrumbledtoAlanBrooke,‘Thesedamnedplannersofyoursplannothingbutdifficulties.’UtterlyunlikeHitler,however,theprimeministeracknowledgedthatthiswastheirjob–evenifitafterwardsbecametheirdutytoidentifysolutions.ThemostimportantelementoftheJICwasitssupportingbody,theJointIntelligenceStaff,which

wascreatedin1941andthereafterprovidedtheCommitteewithin-houseanalysisofmaterialfromallsourcesbeforemembersdebatedit.Thenewageoftechnologyprovidedanalmostinfinitelywidefieldforexploration,aswellasmeansofaddressingthis:thetrickwastofocusattentionwhereitmattered.Group-CaptainPeterStewart,whorantheRAF’sphoto-reconnaissanceoperations,wasexasperatedbyaseniorofficerwhoaskedfor‘allavailablecover ’ofoneEuropeancountry.Stewartrespondedthathecouldonlyprovidehelpfulinformationifheknewroughlywhatintelligencethesuppliantwanted–‘naval,military,airorecclesiastical’.R.V.Jonesmadethepointthat,especiallywhentechnologywasinvolved,itwasessentialtomakeacleardecisionaboutwhatcommandersneededtoknow,thentoexploitanappropriatemixofaerialreconnaissance,PoWinterrogationandsignaldecrypts,‘ratherasanarmycommandermightusehisvariousarmsinabalancedattackwithartillery,tanksandinfantry.Thespecificobjectivetobeattackedmightbesuggestedbywhatweknewwasbeingdevelopedbyourownside,andwhichthereforemightalsobeunderdevelopmentbytheenemy,radarandatomicbombsbeingtwosuchexamples.’TheJISrecruitedsomeoutstandinglyableciviliansinuniform.OnceaweekBentinckassembled

itsthirty-oddofficersfora‘brainstrust’,anopendiscussionabouttheenemy’sdispositionsandactivities.Juniormemberswereencouragedtospeaktheirminds–whichtheydid,aboutforinstancetheman-for-mansuperiorityoftheWehrmachttotheirowntroops.NoelAnnanputitbluntly:‘TheBritisharmiesandthenewAmericanarmieswerenotthematchoftheGermanarmiesin

professionalismandperhapsbravery.’TheJIC’sjudgementwasfarfromperfect,butmoreoftenrightthanwrong.Itopposedtheill-fatedSeptember1940descentonDakar,arguingthattheFreeFrenchwerefartoooptimisticabouttheirlikelyreceptionfromVichyforces.Itdeservescreditforacknowledginginitsreportsthroughout1940–41thatmuchoftheworldexpectedChurchill’speopletolosethewar,thoughitwassufficientlynationalisticnevertowaverfromtheassumptionthatBritainwasGermany’sprincipalenemy.Thusinmid-June1941theCommitteeviewedtheloomingNaziinvasionoftheSovietUnionasameregambitinHitler ’scampaignagainstBritain.TheJISarguedthatoneofhiskeyobjectiveswouldbe‘tousetheSoviet[front]toembarrassandextendusineveryway,therebyhelpingtoachievehissupremeobjective,thedefeatoftheBritishEmpire’.Throughoutthesummerandwinterof1941,theBritishassumedSovietdefeattobeinevitable.A

28JulyreportbytheJISmitigateditsowngloomonlybyexpressinggratitudeforthebreathingspacegrantedtoBritainby‘Barbarossa’:‘AssumingthatthecampaignagainstRussiaresultsinamilitarysuccessforGermany,theremustbesomepauseforregroupingandrefittingbeforetheGermanArmycanembarkonmajoroperationselsewhere.’TheJICdisplayedbetterjudgementinmonitoringincreasingJapaneseaggressioninAsia.On25June1941itweighedtheprospectsofJapanseizingtheopportunitytostrikeatRussia,thenconcluded:‘WethinkherinclinationwillbetoabstainfrominterventionagainstSovietUnionatpresentstageandtocontinuepolicyofSouthwardexpansioninwhichcasenextmovewillprobablybeintensifiedpressureonIndo-Chinaforbasesandfacilities…ItisagreedthatGermanattackontheSovietUniondoesnotinanywaylessentheneedtopressonwithourownpreparationsforresistingJapanoraidingChina.’Thereafter,theJICassessedwithnotableshrewdnesslikelyJapanesebehaviouruptotheirDecemberattackontheEuropeanempires.InJuly1941theJICdiscussedanapproachthrougha‘mostsecretsource’byDrCarlGördeler,ex-

mayorofLeipzig,‘aGermanintouchwitharmyelementsinGermanywhowasinfavourofacompromisewiththiscountrybeforetheoutbreakofwar ’.TheJIScommenteddisdainfully:‘Heisnot,however,regardedasreliable,anditmaybethatheisbeingusedconsciouslyorunconsciouslybytheGermangovernment.’Gördelerhadtoldhiscontact,accuratelyenough,thatGen.FranzHalderandotherseniormembersofthegeneralstaffhadopposedthelaunchingof‘Barbarossa’.ButtheJIScommentedprimlythatsuchaclaimdidnotaccordwith‘otherreliableinformation’reachingLondon.Moreover,Gördelerandhisfriendsproposedconditionsfordiscussionswhichwereboundtobe

unacceptabletotheBritishgovernment:‘asapreliminary…theyrequiredaguaranteethatGreatBritainwouldagreetoanarmisticeandthatshewould,withtheUnitedStates,forcetheRussianstocometoreasonabletermswithGermanyoverthedemarcationofthePolishfrontier ’.Thisapproachwasrebuffedascoollyaswereotherslaterinthewarbyprominentmembersoftheanti-Hitleropposition,forinstancethelettersenttoLondonviaStockholminMarch1943byHelmuthvon

MoltkeoftheAbwehr.TheconsequenceofthisfastidiouspolicywasthattheRussians,andlatertheAmericansthroughAllenDullesinBern,enjoyedanear-monopolyofwartime‘humint’frominsideGermany,thoughthisdidlittletoinfluencetheirpolicies.Theintelligencemachinesometimesreachedconclusionswhichwerethenrejectedbytheprime

ministeroroneofthechiefsofstaff.Inthespringof1942asuccessionofreportshighlightedthefailureofAxisairforces’attemptstodestroytheBritishsubmarineflotillabasedatMalta,andemphasisedthedifficultiesofpenetratingthevastconcreteU-boatpensatBrestandLorient.TheRoyalNavynonethelessinsistedthattheRAFshouldpersistwithitscostlyandfutileattacksonthebases.AsFirstSeaLordinJuly1942,AdmiralSirDudleyPoundoverruledhisownintelligencestafftomakeadisastrouspersonaljudgementthatArcticconvoyPQ17wasthreatenedbyGermancapitalships,andmustscatter,ablunderwhichprecipitateditspiecemealdestruction,andforwhichheshouldhavebeensacked.Intelligencecouldachievenothingifitwasthusignored.Yet,whilesuchfollieshaveincurredjustcensurefromhistorians,itisimportanttoemphasisethatunliketheirenemycounterparts,Britain’sleadersrelativelyseldomdefiedthecounseloftheirintelligenceandoperationalstaffs.Thisdidnotpreventargumentaboutthesignificanceofcontradictoryevidence.In1944,for

example,theMinistryofEconomicWarfarearguedthatGermany’smanpowersituationwasdeteriorating,whiletheWarOfficesawanalarminggrowthintheWehrmacht’sstrength,asrecordedintheJIC’stwice-yearlyEnemyStrengths&Dispositionsreport.OnlybelatedlywasitdiscoveredthatHitlerwasmanipulatinghisarmies’divisionalnumberstoinflatetheirapparentmight.Inthesameway,inthesummerof1944theJICalloweditselftobepersuadedbyGeoffreyVickersofMEWthatlackofoilwouldprecipitateanearlyGermancollapse.TheCommitteewascorrectinacknowledgingtheimportanceofoil,andHitler ’sdireshortageofit,butwasover-optimisticaboutthespeedatwhichhisarmies’resistancewouldbecomeunsustainable.TherewasanothernotoriousJICmisjudgementon5September1944,inthewakeoftheliberationofFrance,whentheCommitteealloweditselftosuccumbtoeuphoria:‘WhereastheGermanshaveatthemomentanorganisedfrontbetweentheRussiansandtheGermanfrontier,intheWesttheyhavenothingbutdisorganisedremnantsincapableofholdingtheAlliedadvanceinstrengthintoGermanyitself.’Theprimeministerflatlydisagreedwiththisview,arguingthatHitler ’speoplewerestillfarfrombeaten.HisowninstinctprovedsounderthantheJISanalysis.Everyintelligencepractitionerwasawareofthedistinctionbetweensecrets,whichwereknowable,

andmysteries,whichwereusuallynot.Onceadatewassetforagivenoperationitbecameasecret,vulnerabletodiscoverybytheotherside.Buthowtheenemywouldbehaveinas-yet-unrealisedcircumstanceswasoftenamystery,becausehehadnotmadeuphisownmind.TheJISmadesomeimportantmisjudgementsinpredictingGermanstrategicresponsestoAlliedinitiatives–forinstance,theNovember1942‘Torch’landingsinNorthAfrica,andtheJune1943invasionofSicily.Oneofthe

JISstaffwroteafterthewar:‘OurfailureslayreallyinourinabilitytoappreciatetheextremeobstinacyofHitler.MorethanonceweforecastthathewouldwithdrawtoshorterlineseitherinItalyorRussiaortheBalkansinordertoeconomiseondivisions.’Headdedwryly:‘Istillbelievethathewouldhavedonebetterifhehadfollowedouradvice.’TheconsequencesoftheJIC’s1941scepticismaboutaGermaninvasionofRussiahavebeendiscussedabove–itmademoreimpactinMoscowthaninLondon,byfeedingStalin’sexpectationofChurchillianconspiraciesagainsthimself.Butifthedifficultiesofintelligenceassessmentinwartimeareaccepted,evenwiththeassistanceofUltra,theJIC’srecordseemsimpressive.ThehistorianG.M.Trevelyanoncewroteofasixteenth-centuryEnglishqueen’srelationshipwithherintelligencechief:‘IfElizabethhadtakenWalsingham’sadviceoneveryoccasionshewouldhavebeenruined.Ifshehadnevertakenitshewouldhavebeenruinednoless.’ThesamemightbesaidoftherelationshipbetweenChurchillandtheJIC.TheBritishcommandstructurewasmuchmorecentralisedthanthatoftheUS:whileChurchill’s

generalsinthefieldwereinnodoubtthattheytooktheirordersfromLondon,acrosstheAtlanticinWashingtonintelligencestaffsbecamedispiritedbyconsciousnessthatlocaltheatrecommanders,andespeciallyGen.DouglasMacArthurintheSouth-WestPacific,madedecisionsalmostheedlessofPentagonorNavyDepartmentopinions.Moreover,althoughamongtheBritishtherewerefrequentinter-servicedisputes,theprincipleof‘jointery’wassincerelyembraced,asitwasnotbetweentheUSArmyandUSNavy.Meanwhile,PresidentRooseveltrarelybecameengagedinoperationaldebates,andseemsseldomtohavebotheredtoreadmuchoftheUltramaterialdeliveredtohim.Itwasmucheasiertoachieveinter-servicecooperationonBritain’ssideoftheAtlanticbecauseits

rulingvillagewassuchasmallplace.TheseniornavalrepresentativeontheJISwasanablesailornamedCharlesDrake.TheprimeministerapproachedhimonedayathisofficeinGreatGeorgeStreet:‘Ithink,Captain,’saidChurchillinthatfamiliarslow-marchdrawl,‘wemustbekin.’Drakereplied,‘Ithinkweare,’whichpromptedChurchilltotesthimbyasking,‘Whydoyousaythat?’Thenavalofficerachievedatriumphbyrespondingthathehadreadbothvolumesofthestatesman’sLifeofMarlborough,inwhichChurchillrecordedthefirstduke’spedigree,assonoftheseventeenth-centurySirWinstonChurchill–andhiswifeElizabethDrake.Theprimeministerquizzedthenavalofficerfurther:‘Andyoubelieveit?’Yes,indeed.‘Good,Captain,thenwe’rekin.’ThisanecdotehelpstoexplainwhyBritain’ssupremelywhimsicalprimeministerwassobeloved;andhowitsbureaucraticbrainfunctionedamidanintimacyunmatchedbyanyotherwarringpower.Thechiefsofstaffsometimesdeploredtheinfluenceexertedbyloosecannonoutsidetheformal

hierarchy,amongthemDesmondMorton,whomChurchillhadfirstmetinFrancein1916.InMay1940hetookthemajorintoDowningStreettoserveashisliaisonofficerwiththeintelligenceservices.Mortonwasbrieflyinfluential,buthisauthoritydeclinedashismeagrediplomaticskillsbecameapparent.HughDalton,ministerresponsibleforSOEuntilFebruary1942,wrotethatthenotoriouslyill-temperedmajor‘spokeillofmanyandwellofno-one’.TheAmericansreferredto

himwithoutenthusiasmas‘DesperateDesmond’,whileRobertBruceLockhartdubbedhim‘theP.M.’sKitchenDoor ’.BillBentinckdescribedMortonunenthusiasticallyas‘acuriouscreature.Anawfullotoftalk.Hedidn’treallyplayanimportantrole.’ThoughMortonlikedtobrandishChurchill’snameinsupportofhisinterventionsinWhitehall’swars,hefailedinseveralattemptstomakehimselfsupremoofthesecretservices.Farfrombeingtheprimeminister ’séminencegrise,heshrankintoasuperiorclerkandrunneroferrands,mostlywiththeFreeFrench.AlthoughheknewwhatBletchleydid,hisnamewasconspicuouslyabsentfromthedistributionlistforitsoutput.From1942onwardsUltradominatedtheJIC’sandJIS’sactivities.Althoughthousandsofpagesof

paperwerealsogeneratedbyMI6andMI5,few,ifany,couldmatchtheauthorityofdecrypts.Itisremarkablethatthehierarchiesofbothservicessurvivedthewarunreformed.AtMI5,the1940–41actingdirector-generalwastheincompetentBrigadierOswald‘Jasper ’Harker,replacedbytheslightlymoreeffectiveSirDavidPetrie,formerlyofMI6,whosedeputyhethenbecame.KathleenSissman,oneofthesecurityservice’sfewwomenandanintelligenceofficerofthehighestgifts,fiercelydenouncedHarker ’sunfitnessforhisduties,andinconsequencefoundherselfsackedandobligedtotransfertoMI6.FortunatelyforMI5,HarkerandPetriehadseveraloutstandingsubordinates,suchasGuyLiddellandLt.Col.TomRobertson,togetherwithsomeofthecivilianswhojoinedforwartimeservice.ThesamewastrueatMI6,thoughStewartMenziesandhisseniormen–Dansey,Vivian,Cowgill–sustainedanuneasyrelationshipwiththeir‘hostilitiesonly’staff,HughTrevor-Roperprominentamongthem.‘WhenIlookedcoollyattheworldinwhichIfoundmyself,’thedonwrote,‘Isometimesthoughtthat,ifthiswasourintelligenceservice,weweredoomedtodefeat.’ThehistorianconsideredMenziesanhonestanddecentman,ashismostseniorsubordinateswerenot,but‘Idonotthinkheeverunderstoodthewarinwhichhewasengaged.’Trevor-Roperhadlittletroublecollaboratingwithsuchfellow-amateursasthearmy’sBrian

Melland,hisowncousin;theRAF’sJohnPope-Hennessy,anarthistorian;barristerEwenMontaguattheAdmiralty.HehadthehighestrespectfortheBletchleystaff,andforLiddellatMI5.ButhecomplainedtoLordSwinton,chairmanofWhitehall’soversightbodytheSecurityExecutive,aboutthefailingsofMI6,andwroteinequallysavagetermstotheprimeminister ’sintimate,LordCherwell,whomheknewwellfromChristChurch,throwinginforgoodmeasureadenunciationofGambier-Parry,hisownsuperior.TheseinterventionsquicklybecameknowninBroadway,andearnedTrevor-RoperaformalreprimandfromMenziesandVivian.Quiteunperturbed,followingBletchley’sChristmas1941breakingoftheAbwehr ’sprincipal

EnigmacipherTrevor-RoperdemandedthatanewMI6sectionshouldbecreatedtostudyCanaris’sorganisationbyexploitingtheflowofnewUltra.FindinglittleenthusiasmforthisproposalinsideBroadway,hetookitinsteadtoCherwell.Itisscarcelysurprisingthatthissortofhigh-handednessincurredtherageofTrevor-Roper ’sbosses.NigeldeGrey,deputychiefofBletchley,wrotecrossly,‘Isitnecessarytoarguewithajuniorofficer?…PersonallyifhewereinmyemployIshouldtell

himtoshutup–ifhepersistedIshouldsackhim.’ForsometimedeGreydeclinedtoallowTrevor-RoperaccesstothePark,assertingthathewas‘notasuitableperson’.Internecinewarfareescalatedin1942.Trevor-RoperfoundhimselfintroubleafteraholidayinIrelandduringwhichFrankPakenhamprecipitatedhisarrestbyIrishpoliceasaBritishspy,anepisodewhichdidnotamuseBroadway.ThenTrevor-RoperleakedtoGuyLiddell’sstaffthefactthatMI6waswithholdingfromMI5interceptsaboutBritishagentsabroadwhomtheGermanshadidentifiedorsuspected.VivianandCowgill,learningofTrevor-Roper ’sresponsibilityforthedisclosure,clamouredforhissacking,thoughLiddellwarnedthemthattheywouldbedeprivingBritishintelligenceofahugetalent.Amazingly,andtothecreditofMenzies,Trevor-Ropergothisway,becomingchiefofanewAbwehrsection,witheventualpromotiontomajor.‘C’kepthisownjobpartlybecauseDesmondMortonandotherWhitehallcriticslackedthecloutto

unstickhim.Moreimportant,MenziesexploitedhissupervisoryroleoverBletchleyParktodeliverpersonallytotheprimeministerchoicespecimensofUltraintelligence,codenamed‘Boniface’,whichwentfartoobscurethedeficienciesofMI6’shumintactivities.Insecretservicesmorethanmostinstitutions,inthewordsofR.V.Jones,‘Ifgoodworkresultsinsuccess,thecreditwilltendtofallonthoseofficerswhopresenttheresultstotheforumwheretheyaremadeknowntotheoperationalorpoliticalstaffs.’LikewiseBillBentinck:‘OnlyBletchleykept[Menzies]inhisjob.Hewasnotaverystrongmanandnotaveryintelligentone.’WhereasmanyBritishinstitutionswereturnedontheirheadsandremadeinthecourseofthewar,BroadwayBuildingsescapedsuchafate.But,giventhatnonationalsecurityapparatusisperfect,whatseemsremarkableisnotthatMenziesandhissubordinatesconstitutedaweaklink,butthatotherpartsofthemachineworkedwell.ArthurSchlesingerofOSSwrote:‘Intelligenceisonlyaseffectiveasitsdissemination…eventhe

best-designeddisseminationsystemcannotpersuadebusypeopletoreadpoliticalanalysisunlessitaffectsthedecisionstheyareabouttomake.’TheprimeministerandchiefsofstaffwerefarmorelikelytotakeheedofUltradecrypts,fillingatmostonesideofaflimsy,thanlongJISanalyticalpapers,howeverablydrafted.ItwouldbemistakentopretendthatbecauseChurchillcreatedanadmirablesystem,thisalwaysworkedsmoothassilk.Howcoulditbeso,whenhehimselfwasauniquehumanbeing,whoseattitudesanddemandswereneverpredictable?ItbecameafamiliarmoanthroughoutWhitehall,thechiefsofstaffs’officesandthesecretwarcommunitythatChurchillabusedsnippetsofintelligencewhichreachedhim,tomakefoolishorill-informedinterventions.SirAlexanderCadogancomplainedtohisdiaryonedayin1941:‘It’shopelessconductingbusinesslikethis.AnthonyEden[theforeignsecretary]seesnopapers,heisdraggeduptoLondonfor24hours,dineswithP.M.Theybothhappentoseean[Ultra]interceptwhichmakesitlookasifwemightgetGermansoutofAfghanistan.Sotheygetonthehop,andIgetmessagestosaythatitmustbedoneatonce.Butthereareconsiderationsofwhichtheyareblissfullyunaware,poorchildren.’Onthecreditsideoftheledger,however,thesystemfordistributingUltradecryptsto

commanders-in-chiefinthefieldbecameevermorerefined.On5March1941,BletchleyParksentamomentoussignaltothedirectorofmilitaryintelligenceinCairo,announcingthatthenceforwarddecryptscontainingoperationaldataaboutGermanforceswouldbesenttohimdirect,sothathourswouldnolongerbewastedintransitviaserviceministriesinLondon.Suchmessageswouldbeprefixed‘OL’:‘Theyaretoberegardedasabsolutelyreliable,butmustreceiveutmostsecurity…Sourceofthisinformationthoughknowntoyouisnevertobementioned.Endeavourtocheckanylaxityofsecurityanddrasticallyconfinepersonnelwhoseesignalstoabsoluteminimum.’ThesystemofSpecialLiaisonUnitswascreated:cellsatmainheadquarters,whosemembers–MI6personnelinuniform–livedandworkedentirelyseparatelyfromthelocalarmyintelligencestaff,andwerealoneresponsibleforreceivingandprocessingincomingEnigmadecrypts.Thesewerethenpassedtoseniorofficerswithappropriatewarningsabouthowbesttodisguisetheircontentsbeforeanypartwaspasseddownthecommandchain.Theorganisation,anditssecurityarrangements,workedwell,thoughonlyinthelatterhalfof1942didUltraflowsufficientlyregularlyandspeedilytosecurethefullconfidenceofBritishgeneralsinthedesert.Moreover,itremainedforeveralongmarchtotranslateknowledgeoftheenemy’sdeploymentsintovictoryoverhisforcesonthebattlefield.TheBritishservicewhichusedintelligenceleastimaginativelywastheRAF.Foralltheundoubted

clevernessofPortal,fromOctober1940chiefoftheairstaff,itsintelligencedepartmentwasweak.Itwashardertomeasuretheenemy’soperationalairstrengththantocounthisshipsortanks.Throughoutthewar,allairforceswildlyoverstatedtheirpilots’combatsuccesses,andthusthenumberofenemyaircraftdestroyed.PerhapstheworstAlliedintelligencefailureofthewarwasmisjudgementoftheGermaneconomy.ThiswaspartlybecauseUltraprovidedfarlessassistanceininformingtheAlliesabouttheenemy’sindustries,whichexchangedinformationonpaperorbytelephonelandlinemorethanbywireless.TheweaknesswaswellillustratedbythereportoftheLloydCommitteeonGermanoilresources,whichestimatedthatRAFbombinghadbyDecember1940alreadyachievedacutof15percentinenemyfuelavailability,atamomentwhenBerlinwasunawarethattheBritishwereevenengagedinasystematicairattack.Mattersdidnotmuchimprovelaterinthewar.SirGeoffreyVickerswroteinaretrospective5

February1945reportoneconomicintelligence:‘Thescienceofdestroyingorganisedwarindustry…aninfinitelycomplexsocialandmaterialorganism,wasunbornwhenthiswarbegan…Servicecommanders,whenattackingindustry,areevenlessprofessionallyqualifiedthantheirserviceadvisers…Thechoiceofindustrialobjectivesdependsonananalysisoffactorsfarmorecomplexthanthosewhichdeterminethestrategyofacampaignandcanrelylessonscienceoronexperience…Thecorrectionofappreciationsisverifiedbyeventsmuchmorecloselyandmuchlesscertainlythanthosewhichdeterminestrategyinthefield…Economicintelligenceinthiswarhassufferedcontinuouslyfrominadequatecontactwiththosewhowereplanningandorganisingourownwar

economy.’Acombinationofmeagreevidenceandpooranalysis,basedonmistakenassumptionsaboutthe

Naziindustrialmachine,togetherwithobsessivewishfulthinkingbytheRAF’s‘bomberbarons’,causedtheairmenconsistentlytooverstatewhatairbombardmentmightachieve,wasachievingandhadachieved,especiallyagainstGermany.TherewasalsotheproblemthatUltraprovidedmuchlessindustrialdatathanmilitaryandnavalinformation.Ingeneral,thisbookarguesthatwhatdistinguishedtheWesternAllies’wartimeintelligenceprocessesfromthoseoftheAxiswasthattheystroveforhonestyandobjectivity,eveniftheywerenotalwayssuccessful.Inthecourseoftheairwar,however,thisprinciplewasbreached.SofixatedwereseniorRAFandUSAAFofficerswiththeirdeterminationtodemonstratethatstrategicairbombardmentcouldwinthewar,thatthehistoryofthebombercommands’intelligencedepartmentsshowsaninstitutionalisedcommitmenttofantasy,ofakindmoreusualintheGermanandJapanesehighcommands.TheUSAAF,liketheRAF,wasforyearsmoreresistanttointelligenceinputfromoutsideagencies

thantheAlliedarmiesornavies,preferringtoemployitsownairmentomaketheirownassessments,especiallyaboutbombingtargets.In1939,Gen.‘Hap’Arnoldconvenedaboardoffourofficerstostudybombingtargets.Inthesummerof1941Gen.HeywoodHansellreturnedfromavisittoBritainwithatonweightofRAFtargetfolders,andhisownopinionthatAmericansknewmoreaboutGermany’soilandpowersystemsthandidtheBritish,thoughtheRAFseemedquitewellinformedaboutenemyaircraftproductionandtransportsystems.ArnoldtoldHanselltosetuphisownorganisationtoscourciviliansourcesforintelligenceabouteconomictargets,andanofficewasdulyestablishedinNewYorkCity.Thisrecruitedabandofcivilianacademics,someofthemveryable:WilmaBrun,whotaughtGermanatColumbia;MarvinDickey,aGermanprofessoratCornell;abusinessmannamedMalcolmMoss,whoprovedhighlyeffective–itwashewhosuggestedhiringafriendnamedMcKittrick,whohadstudiedGermanandAustrianpowerstationsforAmericanbanks.McKittrick,accordingtoHansell,proveda‘goldmine’.Byautumn,alongtargetlisthadbeencompiled,dominatedbyeconomicratherthanmilitaryobjectives.Implausibly,somewerelocatedinSouthAmerica,whereWashingtonhadsomefearsofaGermandescent.Yet,until1944,theresultsofallthisenergeticdelvingweremeagre.TheUSAAFjoinedtheRAFinconductingbomberoperationsagainstGermanythatrepresented,inChurchill’sphrase,‘abludgeonratherthanarapier ’.Scientistsandstatisticianswhosoughttoconductobjectiveanalysisofwhatairattackwas,orwas

not,achieving,suchasFreemanDysonofRAFBomberCommand’sOperationalResearchDepartment–afamousfigureintheUSafterthewar–foundthemselvesmarginalised,theircounseldismissed.OnlyinthelastfifteenmonthsofthewardidtheAmericanairstaffsdosomewhatbetter,assistedbyanevermoreformidableincreaseinhardpower–bomberandfighternumbers.TheUSAAFachievedthedestructionoftheLuftwaffeintheair,andcorrectlyidentifiedsyntheticoilplantsastheweakestlinkinHitler ’swareffort.ItisstrikingtonoticethatBletchleyPark’sAir

SectionconsideredtheUSAAF,andnotBritain’sownairmen,itsclosestpartnersandmostenthusiasticconsumersofintelligence.TheAirMinistrycouldclaimnomatchingaccessofwisdom.

3 ATSEA

TheRoyalNavy’sintelligencedepartment,indeedtheentireAdmiralty,fulfilledaverydifferentrolefromtheWarOfficeandAirMinistry,whichmerelysetpolicyandadministeredtheirrespectiveservices.Theoccupantsofthemagnificenteighteenth-centurybrickcomplexonthenorthsideofHorseGuardsParade–thefirstpurpose-designedofficebuildinginBritain–notmerelyadministeredBritain’sfleet,butalsoactedasitsoperationalheadquarters,dailydirectingthemotionsofhundredsofshipspatrolling,oiling,convoying,repairing,fighting.Fromthedawnofnavalwarfare,theforemostchallengeforcommandershadbeentolocatethevesselsoftheirfoes:Nelsonspentyearsofhislifeploughingtheseasattheheadofafleet,merelyseekingtofindtheFrench.Inthetwentiethcentury,however,wirelesstransformedthestory:itenabledcommandersashoreatamoment’snoticetogiveorderstochangethecourseofwarshipsthousandsofmilesdistant,andalsomadepossiblethedetectionandlocationofthoseoftheenemy.TwothousandmenandwomenservedintheNavalIntelligenceDivision,amongwhomAdmiral

JohnGodfrey’spersonalstaffoffifteenclusteredintheAdmiralty’sRoom39.Thiswasformallyknownas‘NID17’,flagbridgeoftheintelligencewaratsea,withitsbigwesterlywindowslookingdownontheDowningStreetgarden,theForeignOffice,thelakeinStJames’sPark,andHorseGuardsParade,thelastdisfiguredbywartimeclutter–barrageballoons,vehicles,temporaryhutments.DonaldMcLachlan,oneofGodfrey’swartimestaff,admiredhischief,butunderstoodwhyothersweregalledbyhim:‘Likethedriverofasportscarinatrafficqueue,hesawnodangerordiscourtesyinacceleration.’Godfrey’simpatienceandirascibilitypromptedhisreplacementattheendof1942,thoughthemachinehecreatedremainedalmostunchangeduntiltheendofthewar.Outsidetheadmiral’sgreenbaizedoorsathispersonalassistant,thedashingformerjournalist

CommanderIanFleming.McLachlanagain:‘ifnotthewisestofthestaffinRoom39,themostvivid…Hisgiftwasmuchlessfortheanalysisandweighingofintelligencethanforrunningthingsandfordrafting.Hewasaskilledfixerandavigorousshowman…agiantamongname-droppers.’TheNIDalsoemployedwritersandhistoriansincludingHilarySaunders,WilliamPlomerandCharlesMorgan;anarthistorianwhohandledPoWinterrogationreports,CharlesMitchell;andtheformerheadofThomasCook’sWestEndoffice,whorantheScandinaviansection.Room39wasknowntothe‘secretladies’andtypistsas‘theZoo’.McLachlanitemisedinorderofimportancethematerialfromseventeensourceswhichwas

collatedandreviewedbyGodfrey’sstaff.Unsurprisingly,thelistwasheadedbydecryptedenemywirelesstraffic:untiltheendof1943AdmiralKarlDönitzandhissubordinatesashoresoughtto

micro-manageGermany’sU-boatcampaign,andthusconstantlyexchangedsignalswithcaptainsatsea,muchtotheadvantageoftheBritish.Thereafterintherollcallofintelligencesourcesfollowedcaptureddocuments;bearingsonenemyshippingsecuredby‘Huff-Duff’;interceptedvoicemessages;airphotographs;shipsightingsbyaircraft;informationfromagentsorfriendlysecretservices;PoWinterrogations;wirelesstrafficanalysis;enemycommuniqués;hintsfrominterceptedciviliancorrespondence;topographicalandtechnicalinformationfromopensources;friendlyandneutralobservers;tacticalinformationgatheredduringoperationsatsea;sightingsbymerchantshipsandcoast-watchers;intelligenceforwardedfromotherservices;instructionsfromenemyintelligenceorganisationstodoubleagentsunderBritishcontrol.Allmaterialwasgradedinreliabilityandimportance,from‘A1’to‘D5’.Therewasincessant,fractiousandsometimesfierceargumentabouthowfarprotectionofthe

Ultrasecretshouldbeallowedtoconstrainoperationsagainsttheenemy.On11March1942C-in-CPlymouthwrotetoGodfrey,asDNI,complainingthatinformationaboutanenemyvesselthatwasbeingtowedtoCherbourg,andaboutanescortedGermantankeronpassage,hadbeeninBritishhandsintimetoattackthem,butreachedoperationalcommanderstendayslate.AdmiraloftheFleetSirCharlesForbes–knowntohisownserviceas‘WrongWay’ForbessinceheshiftedtheHomeFleetbeyondreachofNorwegianwatersjustbeforetheApril1940Germaninvasion–fulminated:‘Theintensesecrecywhichshroudsallinformationconveyedby“Ultra”messageshasbeenfoundtomilitateagainsttheusefulemploymentofthisinformationforoperationalpurposes.Thereis,indeed,atendencytoplacetheclaimsofsecuritybeforetheclaimsofoffensiveaction…Idonotthinkitcanbetoostronglyemphasisedthathoweversecretmaybethesourcesfromwhichintelligenceisobtained,suchintelligencecanneverbeanendinitself,andifitdoesnotleadtoactionitisvalueless.’Forbes’sletterissignificant,becauseithighlightsthedailydilemmasfacedbytheguardiansof

Ultra.Moreover,itillustrateshowwiselyandwellBritishandmost–thoughbynomeansall–AmericanofficersservedtheAlliedwareffort,byresistingmanytemptationstoexploitdecrypts,inorderthattheymightprotecttheAllies’widerinterestsinthesecretwar.Inthelatterhalfof1942,whenairinterdictionofRommel’sMediterraneansupplylinesattaineddevastatingeffectiveness,guidedbyUltra,almosteveryRAFattackwasprecededbyareconnaissanceoverflight,tomaskthesourceofBritishknowledge.IfBletchley’soutputwasthemostimportantsourceofintelligence,supplementaryaidswere

indispensable.Sigintcouldnotbereliedupontoprovide–forinstance–warningofsailingsofGermancapitalships,oftenscreenedbywirelesssilence.NorwegianagentsmonitoringthefjordanchoragesofTirpitzanditskindprovidedvitalalertsaboutwhethertheywerepreparingtoputtoseaorhaddoneso.Anavalintelligenceofficerwrote:‘Soreliablewasthisservice…thattheOICinLondonhadcompletefaithin[theagents’]accuracyandregularity.’HerewassomethingMI6did

well.Meanwhile,aerialreconnaissancewasinvaluablewhentheweathermadethispracticable,thoughitremainedaninexactscience,especiallyifnavalintelligenceofficerswereobligedtorelyonapilot’srememberedglimpses,ratherthanonphotographswhichcouldbesubjectedtoexpertinterpretation.Itwashardforaircrew,thousandsoffeetup,todistinguishbetweenabattleship,aheavycruiserandabigdestroyer.InJuly1942aLuftwaffepilot’ssightingofasingleBritishplaneintheskyoffNorwaydeterredtheGermansfromdispatchingTirpitzagainstPQ17.Theairmanreportedseeingacarrieraircraft.Inrealitythishadbeenamerefloatplane,buttheKriegsmarinedeclinedtheriskthataRoyalNavycarriergroupmightbewithinrangeoftheirpreciousmonster.IntheearlywaryearsBritishtechnicalknowledgeaboutU-boatswaspoor,partlybecausetheNID

lackedsophisticatedinterrogatorswhoknewwhatquestionstoaskprisoners.By1942,mattershadimproved:U-boatcrewmeninBritishcampsrevealedtheexistenceofthePillenwerfer,thebubble-ejectiontechniqueforfoxingAsdicdetectors;alsodetailsofGermantorpedoesandsearch-receiversforradartransmissions.Interrogatorslearned–asdidtheirLuftwaffecounterpartsquizzingAlliedairmen–toconfoundprisonersbyshowingoffknowledgeoftheirdomesticaffairs,forinstancethecharmsofthered-hairedwaitressatLorient’sCafédeRennes.Aproblempersisted,thattheRoyalNavywasunwillingtobelievethattechnologyitsownshipslackedmightworkfortheenemy–severalU-boatrefinements,andbig5.9-inchgunsmountedondestroyers.Someinterrogatorsfavouredofferingrelativelylavishhospitalitytocelebrityprisonerswhomight

provideimportantinformation.InOctober1944thedirectorofintelligencethrewuphishandsinhorrorwhenhelearnedthathisofficershadspent£2onwininganddiningaU-boatcaptain.TheDNIissuedaformalwarningagainst‘entertainingattheRitzandthepurchaseofconsiderablequantitiesofgin.Ifthesefactsbecameknown,theremightbegoodcauseforscandal.Furthermore,Iandmanyothersarequiteunabletoenjoytheseluxuries,anditisoutofallproportionthatourenemiesshould.’Theinterrogatorrespondedimpenitentlythatitseemedworth£2oftaxpayers’moneytoconvinceascepticalNazithattheRitzwasstillstanding.Perversely,evenasthetideofwarturneddecisivelyagainsttheGermans,someofDönitz’s

crewmeninAlliedhandsbecamestubbornlysecurity-conscious.On12March1944theDNIbriefedtheFirstSeaLordonrecentPoWinterrogations.Some70percentofU-boatcrewsbythenacceptedthatthewarwaslost,and25percentwouldfranklyavowthistoaBritishofficer.Butcrewswerebettertrainedtoresistinterrogation;evenatthislatehourfortheNaziempire,‘thereisageneralbeliefthatthosewhodivulgeinformationwillbepunishedafterthewar ’.WhencensorsdiscoveredthatcapturedU-boatcrewmenwereusingasimplecodetoconveysensitivematerialinlettershometoGermany,thetrafficwasallowedtocontinue,inhopesthattheNIDwouldfindusesforsuchdisclosures.NextdoortotheAdmiralty,theOperationalIntelligenceCentrewaslocatedinthenewCitadel

building,adankconcretemass,muchovercrowded,whoseinmatessufferedfromchroniccoldsand

viralinfections.TheOIC’ssurface-shipsection,runbyCommanderNormanDenning,tookcentrestageinBritishnavaloperationsduringsuchcrisesasthepursuitoftheBismarck,the‘ChannelDash’andtheArcticagonyofConvoyPQ17.Duringhoursanddaysofintensedebateandharshdecision-making,theFirstSeaLordandhisacolytesbecamefrequentvisitorstotheOIC.Intheearlywaryearstherewerepersistentdelaysinimplementingoperationaldecisionsfollowingthereceiptofdecrypts.TheFarEastCombinedBureau,Bletchley’sSingaporeout-stationthereafterevacuatedtoColombo,brokeJapanesesignalsreportingthesightingofPrinceofWalesandRepulse,aswellastheenemy’sattackorders,fourhoursbeforethefirstbombsandtorpedoesstruckthegreatwarships.ButAdmiralTomPhillips,onPrinceofWales’sflagbridge,learnedofthisonlywhentheJapanesewerealreadyoverheadandhisdoomwassealed.FortunatelyfortheRoyalNavy,thetransmissionofsuchurgentmaterialwasmuchacceleratedthereafter.Thetacticalwaratseawasmorepowerfullyinfluencedbysigintthanthelandcampaigns,partly

becauseconvoysandsubmarinestravelledmoreslowlythantanks.Giventhatdecryptionofenemysignalsrequiredatbesthours,andsometimesdays,itsfruitsweremorelikelytoreachcommandersintimetotriggeranoperationalresponseontheoceanthanwasusuallypossibleonalandbattlefield.Onmanydaysbetween1941and1945,themostimportantplaceinBritishnavalheadquarterswasitsSubmarineTrackingRoom.There,CommanderRichardHall–sonof‘Blinker ’–gaveorderstorerouteconvoys,inaccordancewiththelatestappreciationsofU-boatpositionsmadebytheRoom’soverlord,theimmenselyrespectedCommanderRodgerWinn.TheRoom’swrybutdeadlyearnestmottowas‘Neverthetwainshallmeet.’Winnhimself,cursedsincechildhoodpoliobyalimpandatwistedspine,wasaremarkablepersonality,whotreatedseniorofficerswithsuitablerespect,liketheformerbarristerhewas,inthecompanyofajudge,suchashelaterbecame.Yetheneverfailedtoasserthisownconvictions.Hismoststrikingcharacteristic,whichdistinguishedhimfrommanypeersonbothsidesofthewar,wasmoralcourage.Hedrovehisstaffhard,rebukedmistakeswithabitingtongue,andinsistedthattheTrackingRoomdeliveredasinglecollectiveviewoneveryissue.Informalitynonethelessprevailed:colleaguesweretreatedasequals,heedlessofrank.Civilian

watchkeepersandresearchersmaintainedtheRoom’ssignallogandcompileditsrecordsandstatistics.Onthewalls,graphsrecordedpeaksandtroughsofmerchant-shipandU-boatsinkings,togetherwiththeprogressofnewconstruction.TheRoom’shubwasan8ftx8fttable,onwhichwasmountedachartoftheNorthAtlantic.Here,foruptofourteenhoursaday,Winnorhisdeputysatchininhand,plottingdistancesandcalculatingspeedsandangles,withoneeyeontheteleprinterthatspasmodicallyclatteredintolife,disgorgingflashesfromBletchley.Ontheplot,thelimitsofAlliedaircoverwereshownbyredarclinespaintedacrosstheocean.U-boatpositionswereindicatedbycolouredpins:redforafirmfix,whiteforasighting,blueforaDFbearing.SometimesduringaU-boatwolf-packattack,theRoyalNavy’sescortsmightsecureuptofortyDF

‘fixes’inanhouronDönitz’ssubmarines.Tosecureareasonablyaccuratebearing,ashipneededto

bewithinfortyandfiftymilesoftheU-boat’stransmissions;togetapreciseone,tentofifteenmiles.Ingoodweather,aconvoymightaverageaspeedofseventonineknots.ThoughasurfacedU-boatcouldmanageelevenknots,itssubmergedspeedslowedtojusttwoorthree.ThusitwasthatAlliedaircraftexercisedacriticalinfluenceaslongasconvoyssailedwithintheirsweepradius,byforcingsubmarinestodiveevenifair-droppeddepth-chargesfailedtosinkthem.Sincethesenavalbattlestookplaceinrelativelyslowmotion,divertingthecourseofaconvoycouldrenderitimpossibleforDönitz’shunterstocatchup.EverymorningWinnorhisdeputyheldatelephoneconferencewiththeC-in-CWestern

ApproachesinLiverpool,andthechiefofstafftotheC-in-CofRAFCoastalCommand,duringwhichWinndescribedthemaineventsoftheprecedingnight.AtmiddayHalldispatchedafour-pagesituationreporttoChurchill’sWarRoom.Onceaweek,theentiretableplotfromtheTrackingRoomwastransferredtonewchartsheets,astheoldonesbecamepepper-pottedwithpinpricks.AcolleaguewroteofWinn’s‘uncannyflairforguessingaU-boat’sbehaviour ’.Duringrunningconvoybattlesthatpersistedthroughseveraldaysandnights,‘theintenseintellectuallabourthatwentintothisbattleoftacticswastolerabletothehumanbeingsengagedonlyifitbecameforthemvirtuallylikeagameofchessorbridge…theyhadtokeepincheckanyleapofimaginationwhichwouldhavepicturedintermsofappallinghumansufferingtheirfailuresay,toextricateatankerconvoyfromtheassailingpack.Otherwisethestrainwouldhavebeentoogreat.’Thus,theywereonceobligedtopreserveanicycalmwhileoneoftheirownformercolleaguesintheTrackingRoom,acertainCommanderBoyle,ledaconvoyfromTrinidadofwhicheleventankersweresunkonebyone,untiljustoneshipreachedport.InDecember1942,WinncameunderimmensepressuretodetachfromasouthboundAtlantic

convoytheWhiteStarlinerCeramic,carryingairfieldspecialists,becausethesemenwereurgentlyneededatTakoradiinWestAfrica.Forfourdaysherefused,assertinghisconvictionthattheGermansweretrackingtheconvoyandwouldsoonattack.ThenheyieldedtotheinsistenceoftheMinistryofShipping.Ceramicracedahead–andwassunkwithonlyasinglesurvivor.By1943,sogreatwasrespectforWinn’sjudgementthatanAdmiraltystandingorderwasintroducedthatnoshiporconvoyshouldberoutedagainsthisadvice.YetsogreatwasthestrainimposedbyhisresponsibilitiesthatforamonththeCommanderhadtoquithispost,aftersuccumbingtonervousexhaustion.

SomuchhasbeenwrittenaboutBletchley’striumphinbreakingtheU-boatcodes–whichwasrealenough–thatthestoryoftheBattleoftheAtlantichasbecomedistorted.ThematchingachievementoftheKriegsmarine’sB-Dienstintelligenceservicedeservesmorenotice.Foraboutayear,fromJuly1942toJune1943,thoughwithsomeintermissionsanddelays,Dönitz’scodebreakersprovidedtheU-boatcommandwithanextraordinarywealthofinformationaboutconvoymovements,whichmade

almostasimportantacontributiontosoaringAlliedshippinglossesasdidthedeadlycoincidenceofBP’sinabilitytobreaktheSharkcipherformuchofthesameperiod.U-boatoperationswerecontrolledbyatightly-knitgroupoffivestaffofficersaroundDönitz,at

BdUheadquarterslocatedsuccessivelyinLorient,Paris,and–fromJanuary1943–Berlin.AmongthemostimportantpersonalitieswasthesignalsspecialistKapitänzurSeeHansMeckel.Thelossofeverysubmarinewassubjectedtometiculousinquiry,notleasttoconsiderwhetheranybreachofsecuritymighthavecontributedtoanAlliedsinking.TheB-Dienst,headedbyKapitänzurSeeHeinzBonatz,wasbasedinnavalheadquarters,situatedliketheAbwehrinBerlin’sTirpitzüfer,andgrewtoastrengthof6,000menandwomen.TeleprintersdisgorgedsignalsfromlisteningstationsalloverEurope,ofwhichthelargestwasinHolland.Itscodebreakers,ledbytheveteranformernavalwireless-operatorWilhelmTranow,benefitedfromthefactthatDönitzwasoneofthefewGermanseniorofficersofanyservicetotakeintelligenceseriously.LikehisAlliedcounterparts,herecognisedthatthefirstimperativeofthewaratseawastolocatetheenemy.Duringthespringandsummerof1940,theB-Dienstreckonedtoreadaround2,000British

messagesamonth,thoughthisdeclinedsteeplyinAugustaftertheRoyalNavychangeditscodes.From1940until1944,Bonatz’smenachievedreasonablyregularbreaksintotheMerchantNavycode.Aftercapturingitslatestversion,‘MersigsII’,inMarch1942,theyconsistentlypenetratedconvoysignals,allottingnamestodifferentvarietiesofBritishtrafficinthesamefashionasdidBletchleytoGermanones:Köln,Frankfurt,MünchenBlau,MünchenRot.AtthistimealsotheybegantomakeeffectiveuseofIBM-typepunch-cardtechnology.OneofthemostseriouswartimefailuresofBletchleyParkwasthatitssmallciphersecurity

sectionfailedformanymonthstorecogniseandalerttheAdmiraltytothevulnerabilityofsomeofitscodes,despiteseveralrequestsforadviceandassistancefromthenavalofficerresponsible.TheGermansreadthesignalsofNewYork’sharbourcaptain,whogavethecompositionandoftencourseupdatesofeastboundconvoys,evenwhenreroutedbyRodgerWinn.TheB-Dienst’sbreakintotheRoyalNavy’sCypherNo.3wasnotcomprehensive:manymessageswerereadonlyafteranintervalofdays,andonlyaboutoneintenbecameavailablefastenoughtoconcentrateU-boats.Butthankstosigint,Dönitz’sgeneralviewofAlliedoperationswasstrikinglywell-informed.Thepost-warAmericanstudyofGermannavalcommunicationsintelligence,basedonexhaustive

interrogationsofpersonnelandstudyofcaptureddocuments,inthiscasetheB-Dienst’s,concluded:‘TheenemypossessedatalltimesareasonablyclearpictureofAtlanticconvoyswithvaryingdegreesofaccuracyastotheroutesandday-by-dayplotting…Convoydiversionsweresometimeslearnedfromdecryptionintimetore-arrangeU-boatpatrollinesaccordingly…ThemostcompletesinglestatementofGermanconvoyintelligenceeverseenhereinGermannavaltrafficcameinaseriesofmessages…inDecember1943andJanuary1944.Thesemessagesapparentlyreproducedthe[Allies’]currentconvoychartfortheNorthAtlantic…Theconvoysthenatseawerecorrectly

identifiedbothbydesignatorsandnumbers,andaccurateinformationgivenonconvoycycles,speedsandgeneralrouting.’TheAmericanstudymakesabundantlyclearthatthewirelesswaratseawasbynomeansone-

sided.BritishsinsofomissionandcommissionbothattheAdmiraltyandBletchleycostshipsandlives.TheB-Diensthadcodebreakersofconsiderableskill,ifnotquiteintheclassofHut8’speople.Inthetendays9–19March1943,duringtheperiodwhentheKriegsmarinewaswinningthesigintwaragainsttheRoyalNavy,fourconvoys–SC121,HX228,SC122andHX229–eachlostoneinfiveofitsships,adisastrousattritionrate.Yetactionsorlapsessometimeshadperverseconsequences.ThisveryfailureoftheRoyalNavy’scodesecurityconferredapricelessboonontheAlliedcause,albeitatheavycost.Atintervalsthroughoutthewar,andinitiallyasearlyas1941,DönitzentertainedserioussuspicionsthatEnigmahadbeenpenetrated.On28September,aBritishsubmarineambushedU-67andU-111atarendezvousneartheCapeVerdeislands,offSenegal.Itstorpedoesmissed,anditwasitselframmedbyathirdU-boatonthescene,buttheadmiralsaidwhentoldofthisdramaticincident:‘ABritishsubmarinedoesnotappearbychanceinsucharemoteplace,’andlaunchedamajorinquiry.Yetthisconcludedthat‘themoreimportantciphersdonotappeartohavebeencompromised’.AsecondinvestigationinFebruary1943reachedthesameconclusion,onceagainreassuredbythevulnerabilityofBritishcodes,whichpersisteduntilJune.IftheRoyalNavyhadthepowertoreadtheGermanhand,itschiefswouldsurelyhaveclosedthiscostlyhole.MeanwhiletheU-boatcommandignoredtheurgingsofWilhelmTranowtouseacodebookrather

thanaciphermachineforitswirelesstraffic,suchasgravelyinconveniencedUScodebreakerswhentheJapanesearmydidso.Later,inAugust1943,aninformantinSwissintelligencetoldanofficerofthelocalAbwehrstationthattheAllieswerebreakingU-boatcodes,awarningpromptlypassedtosubmarinecommandinBerlin.Dönitzorderedyetanotherinvestigationintociphersecurity.Yetatitsconclusion,amazingly,heallowedhimselftobereassured.Theadmiralwroteafterthewar:‘Whetherandtowhatextenttheenemyreactedtoradio

transmissionswassomethingwhich,tryaswemight,wewereneverabletoascertainwithanycertainty.Inanumberofcasesdrasticalterationsinthecourseoftheconvoyledustoassumethathedid.Ontheotherhand,manycasesoccurredinwhich,inspiteofU-boatradioactivityinthearea,enemyshipssailingindependently,andconvoysaswell,wereallowedtosailstraightonandintothesamearea.’HavingsatisfiedhimselfaboutEnigma’ssecurity,DönitzchosealsotoignoreawarningofitsvulnerabilityfromLt.Hans-JoachimFrowein,basedonhisownresearchesusingpunch-cardtechnology.IftheAllies’conductoftheBattleoftheAtlantichadsuggestedomniscienceratherthanfallibility,however,itisoverwhelminglylikelythatDönitzwouldhaveguessedtheUltrasecret.On1June1943theRoyalNavyabandonedNavalCyphersNo.3andNo.4,introducingNaval

CypherNo.5,alsoadoptedbytheAmericansandCanadiansforAtlanticoperationson10June,whichtheB-Dienstprovedunabletobreak.Bletchleywasfuriousthattheswitchtooksolong,having

warnedeightmonthsearlierofthepreviousciphers’vulnerability,buttheAdmiraltypleadedthehugeadministrativechallengeofissuingnewcodestothousandsofships.Moreover,GC&CS’sCipherSecuritysectionhadalsobeenblameworthy.

Whilethewaratseawasfarmoredecisivelyinfluencedbycodebreakingthanwasanylandcampaign,itisquitemistakentoviewtheBattleoftheAtlanticexclusivelyasastrugglebetweenBletchleyandtheB-Dienst–here,aseverywhereelse,hardpowerwasvital.In1943,beyondGC&CS’striumphinbreakingtheSharkcipher,theAlliesenjoyedasurgeofnavalandairstrengththatembracednewescortgroups,escortcarriersandVeryLongRangeAircraft,mostlyLiberators,togetherwithimprovedtechnology.ThispromptedapolicyshiftawayfromreroutingconvoysinfavourofgoingheadtoheadwithattackingU-boats.Bythewinter,whiletheB-DienstwasonceagainachievinggoodbreaksintotheBritishMerchantShipcode,Dönitz’sforcelackedthecapabilityeffectivelytoexploitthem.TheGermanslaunchedspasmodicattacksonconvoysuntilthelastdaysofthewar,buttheircampaignwaslonglost.TheprincipalreasonthatDönitzfailedtostrangletheAtlanticsupplyroutewasthathelackedU-boatsinsufficientnumberstoachievesuchafeat.UltramuchassistedtheAllies’slaughterofenemysubmarinesinthesummerof1943,especiallyinprovidingtargetsfortheairwingsofUSNavyescortcarriers,buttorevisitChurchill:‘Allthingsarealwaysonthemovesimultaneously.’AfterthewarDonaldMcLachlancataloguedwhatheandhiscolleaguesconsideredtheRoyal

Navy’sIntelligenceDepartment’sprincipalwartimeblundersandlapses.ForemostwasfailuretorealisethattheKriegsmarinewasreadingimportantBritishwirelesstraffic.TheScharnhorst’sChannelDash,andindeedseveralotherforaysbyGermanbigships,remainedlastingsourcesofembarrassment.TheAdmiraltyunderratedthethreatfromItalianfrogmen,whoinflictedsomecripplinglossesin1941,andrespondedtoolittleandtoolatetorevelationsofthechronicvulnerabilityofwarshipstoairattack.ItfailedtoreviveusefullessonsaboutGermanU-boattacticsfromWorldWarI,andformanymonthsrefusedtobelievethatDönitz’scraftwereattackingonthesurfaceatnight.Beforethewar,theAdmiralty’sdirectorofsignalsopposedanextensionoftheDFwirelessnetworkforfixingwarshippositionsbydirection-finding:hedeclaredthatsuchequipmentwouldbeawasteofresources,becauseinoperationalconditionstheenemywouldmaintainwirelesssilence.AlltheaboverepresentedcasesinwhichtheBritishacquiredsufficientinformationtocounterorforestalltheenemy’smoves,hadtheAdmiraltymadeimaginativeuseofthis.YettheNIDwasthebestofthethreeBritishservices’intelligencedepartments,anditswartimerecordwasmoreimpressivethanthatofitsfoes.Dönitzneveracknowledgedthegapingholeinhismostsensitivecommunications,whiletheBritishpluggedtheirownintimetosecurevictory.

8

‘Mars’:TheBloodiestDeception

1 GEHLEN

HowcantheincompetenceandmyopiaofGermanintelligencebeexplained?Herewasanationofthehighestcultural,technologicalandscientificachievements.Hitler ’sarmyshoweditselfforatimetobethefinestfightingforcetheworldhaseverseen,albeitinaghastlycause.ItisnolongersupposedbyresponsiblehistoriansthatAdmiralCanarisassistedtheAlliedcause–inotherwords,thathewasexplicitlyatraitor.TheAbwehrandGestapowereproficientinsuppressingResistanceactivityandcapturingAlliedagentsinoccupiedterritories,eveniftheRedOrchestraescapedtheirattentionforsevenyears.Canariswasrisiblyunsuccessful,however,inconductingintelligence-gatheringactivitiesabroad.BeyondlosingeveryspydispatchedtoBritain,hisagentsfarednobetterintheUnitedStates.Theadmiral’sJune1942Operation‘Pastorius’landedeightwould-besaboteurs,whofellintoFBIhandswithinafortnight.Sixofthemwenttotheelectricchair,andGermanoperationselsewhereweresimilarlybungled.Partoftheexplanationforthisinstitutionalfailure,banalasitseems,isthatmostoftheAbwehr ’sofficersdidnottryveryhard.AlargeproportionofthosepostedabroadwerecontentmerelytoenjoyanexistencemuchmorecomfortablethanwasavailableintheReich,tofiddletheirexpensesandtransmittoGermanyanyhotchpotchofinformationfertileimaginationscouldcontrive,assistedbyinputfromdoubleagentscontrolledbyMI5.NobodyinBerlinsoughttoimposepurposeandrigour.TheGermansinvadedRussiawithsucharecklesslyarrogantmindsetthatforsomeweeksthey

madenoseriousattempttobreaktheRedArmy’scodes,becausetheywereconfidentofvictorywhatevertheirfoesdid.ThismoodchangeddramaticallyasSovietresistancehardened.Hitler ’sforcesreceivedtheshockoftheirlivesafteroccupyingKiev:aseriesofmassiveSovietdemolitionseruptedaroundthem,triggeredbyradiocontrol.TheWehrmachtbegantoacknowledgethenecessityofmonitoringtheairwaves.Inthewinterof1941,themostdisturbingintimationofthevastresidualstrengthoftheRedArmycamefromGermaninterceptionofmessagesfromdivisionswithnumbersina‘400’series–this,whenattheoutsetBerlindismissedanynotionthatStalincouldmustersuchvastforces.ThedistancesofRussiacreatedchronicsigintproblems:evenwhenahundredWehrmachtinterceptionstationsweredeployedontheEasternFront,theseneversufficedfor

comprehensivemonitoring.TheGermanslearnedmuchaboutSovietwirelessproceduresaftercapturingCol.Kurmin,signals

chiefoftheRussianTwelfthArmy.TheBritishwerealarmedwhenBletchleyinterceptedsignalssuggestingthatmuchSovietcommunicationstrafficwasvulnerable:‘theGermanscanreadimportantRussiannaval,militaryandairforcecodeswithpromptitude…[Yet]thisgravehandicapisnotintheleastrealisedbytheRussians.’ThereisnodoubtofthevulnerabilityoflowerRedArmycodesin1941–42,northatGermanradiointelligencereadatleastsomecommandmessagessentbyoperatorswhore-usedone-timepads.But,inordertobelievethattheGermansachievedusefulandconsistentpenetrationofSoviethigherciphers,evidencewouldbenecessarythatthiswasexploitedbyHitler ’sarmycommanders.Instead,thereisonlyathinpatchworkofdecryptedStavkamessages,noneofmuchsignificance,togetherwithobvioussignsthatsomeinterceptsderivedfromRussiandeceptions.ThedominantfactsofthefirstyearofthecampaignontheEasternFrontwerethat,withorwithoutbreaksintoSovietcodes,theGermansfailedtosecureMoscowandLeningrad,theirprincipalstrategicobjectives.Theflowofdecryptsslowedgreatlyafter1April1942,whentheRedArmyintroducednewcodesandcallsigns.Lt.Col.ReinhardGehlen,seniorintelligenceofficeroftheWehrmachtontheEasternFrontfrom

thattimealmostuntiltheend,nonethelessachievedthehighestwartimereputationofanyGermaninhisfield.HewasborninErfurtin1902,sonofabookseller.Hejoinedthearmyin1920,servedintheartilleryandmarriedadescendantofadistinguishedPrussianmilitaryfamily,HeratvonSeydlitz-Kurzback.Hegraduatedtothegeneralstaffin1935,andintheearlywaryearswongoldenopinionsasanoperationsofficer.InJuly1941hewaspromotedlieutenant-colonelandattachedtotheFremdeHeereOst,orFHO,theintelligencesectionofthehighcommand,ofwhichhebecamechiefinApril1942,afterhispredecessorwassackedforpoorperformanceduringthewinterbattlesaroundMoscow,oneamongmanyscapegoatsfortheWehrmacht’sfailure.Gehlenwasanausterefigure,taciturnandphysicallyundistinguished,whoskilfullyingratiated

himselfwithhissuperiors,atthesametimemaskingfromhiscomradesruthlessambition.Hebroughttohisworkanewenergyandimagination:whilemostofhiscounterpartsthroughoutthearmyrecruitedconventionalstaffofficers,Gehleninsteadhiredclevermenheedlessoftheirmilitaryaccomplishments.HecombedtheWehrmachtforlinguists,geographers,anthropologistsandlawyers,whodramaticallyraisedthequantity,ifnotthequality,ofreportingandanalysis.Hemadegooduseofpatrols,togetherwithinterceptionoflow-gradeRussiansignalsandvoicetraffic.GehlenalsofocusedenergeticallyonPoWinterrogation,exploitingthemanyseniorRussianofficersinGermanhands.Herana‘celebritycamp’inEastPrussia,knownasFesteBoyen,whichheldanaverageofeighty‘guests’,ofwhomthemostimportantwereaccordedsinglerooms.AllprisonersreceivedfullWehrmachtrations,andthemostcooperativestayedindefinitely,toprovideinstantresponsestoquestionsFHOneededansweringfromdaytodayandweektoweek.

SomePoWsstubbornlyrefusedtotalktoGehlen’sofficers,whonotedanoddity:better-educatedmenoftencollaborated,whilehumbleronesstayedmute.Muchdependedonprevailingbattlefieldconditions.WhentheRussiansseemedtobelosingandmoralewaslow,asoneveryfrontprisonersweremorewillingtogiveinformation.Whenthetideofwarturned,cooperationdeclined,becauseprisonerswhoaidedtheNazisfearedtheirfate–withgoodreason–ifStalinprevailed.ThechiefimpedimenttogettingintelligenceoutofRussiansoldierswasthattheyservedthemostsecretivesocietyintheworld:fewevenamongseniorofficersknewmuchaboutanythingbeyondtheirownunit.Gehlenwasnofool,andmoreofarealistthanmanyofhiscolleagues,buthewasalsoaskilled

waffler.Consider,forinstance,his29August1942analysisofRussia’scondition,andofMoscow’soptionsintothewinter.Thiswasacriticalmomentofthewar,theeveofStalingrad.FHO’schiefofferedtheGermanhighcommandanextensivemenuofalternativescenarios.Thisdeservesattention,becauseitwastypicalofthematerialproducedbytheWehrmacht’smostcelebratedintelligenceofficer.Gehlenassumed,hesaid,thatLeningrad,StalingradandthenorthCaucasuswouldbeoverrunbyGermanforces,andacontinuousfrontestablishedbetweenPersiaandtheArctic.Russianactionsthereafterwouldbedeterminedby‘theresultsofthesummer–autumncampaign;relativeresourcesavailabletoGermanyandRussia;theevolvingviewsoftheRussianleadership;Russianobjectives’.TheRussianswantedtohusbandresourcesandfightingroomforawintercampaign,saidGehlen.‘TheyseemwillingtoacceptthelossofLeningrad,Stalingrad,thenorthandperhapsalsosouthern

Caucasus,andevenMoscow.Russianlossesin1942havebeenlowerthanin1941.TheyseemcontenttohaveinflictednotinsignificantGermanlosses,andarethemselvesachievingmanpowergainsbycuttingexemptionsfrommilitaryservice,mobilising1.4millionmenbornin1925,andreducingthestrengthofdivisions.Itmustbeanticipatedthatthiswintertheenemywillagaincommitalargenumberofnewformationstothebattlefield.Onthewhole,thereisnosignthat,intheforeseeablefuture,theGerman–RussianbalanceofstrengthwillshiftdecisivelytothedisadvantageoftheRussians’–herewasacircumlocutionworthyoftheNKVD.GehlensuggestedthatBritish-suppliedwarmaterialcouldbecomeasignificantfactor,especially

intheCaucasus.TheRussians,hesaid,werelearningfast,andhadadoptedmanyGermantactics:airforceclosesupportfortheRedArmy,aggressivepatrolling,deploymentoftanksindefenceonlybehindaforwardinfantryscreen.However,Russianmiddleandjuniorleadershiphaddeclined.‘Allinall,’wrotetheintelligencechief,‘itmustbeexpectedthattheenemywillkeepmovingonhisautumnandwinteraxes,usingtriedandtestedmethods,especiallywithguerrillasandairborneforces.TheRussianswillseektoachievedisruptionoftheGermanfrontatasmanypointsaspossible,shiftingtomajoroffensiveswhereopportunitypermits…ThispossibilityseemstoexistespeciallyonArmyGroupB’sfront(Stalingrad)andthatofAGCentreatSmolensk…OnAGA’s

front,afterthelossoftheNorthCaucasustheenemyhasconvenientdefensivefacilitiesintheCaucasusmountainswhereitmustbeanticipatedthathewillprogresstoheavycounter-attackswherethegroundseemssuitable,aimedespeciallyatdisruptingGermanoilproduction.’GehlenconcludedthattheSovietarmieswouldapproachwinter‘enfeebledbutnotyetdestroyed,

andthuswithanoptiontoinitiatenewoperations…DependingontheforcesavailabletotheRussianleadershipandthefrontpositionsfollowingthesummer–autumncampaign,heavyRussianoffensiveswillbelikelyata)StalingradandwestofStalingrad.b)WeaksectionsoftheAllied[Axis]front,especiallywheretheRussiansholdbridgeheads.c)Voronezh.d)Mtsensk–Orel.e)Sukhinichi.f)Rzhev.g)InthegapbetweenArmyGroupsCentreandNorth.h)Leningrad…OnlyiftheRussiansfailtoachievesubstantialsuccessesinthewinterof1942/43;ifasecondfrontin[Western]Europebecomeslesslikely;andiftheeconomicconsequencesofthisyear ’slossesofterritory(includingBaku)makearealimpact,canwereckononfinallybreakingRussianresistance.Thiswillpresumablynottakeplacebeforethesummerof1943.’Thiswasnotastupiddocument:itreviewedperfectlyrationallytheoptionsopentotheRussians.It

mentionedStalingrad,thoughonlyinthecontextofsixotherpossibleobjectivesforSovietoffensives.Ascepticalreadermightbetemptedtocompareitsequivocationstoapredictionthat,ifamanturnsoverthefifty-twocardsinadeck,hewillfindfouraces.Butduringthemonthsandyearsthatfollowed,GehlengravelymisjudgedmostofthebigmomentsontheEasternFront.HefirstinsistedthattheRussians’Operation‘Mars’,theirnorthernoffensiveagainstArmyGroupCentre,wasStalin’sbigpush,towhich‘Uranus’–theStalingradpincermovement,turningpointofthewar–wasmerelyopportunisticandsubsidiary.On25July1943,afortnightaftertheacknowledgedfailureofGermany’sgreatoffensiveatKursk,

GehlenassuredthehighcommandthattheRussianshadnoplansforabigassaultoftheirown–onlylocalattacks;ninedayslater,theRedArmydrovewestahundredmiles.On30March1944,Gehlen’sassessmentofthefrontshowedhimobliviousoftheloomingSovietoffensiveagainstCrimea,whichbroughtnewdisasterupontheWehrmacht.BeforetheRussians’summerOperation‘Bagration’,greatestAlliedoffensiveofthewar,hedismissedSovietpreparationsonArmyGroupCentre’sfrontas‘apparentlyadeception’,andpredictedthatStalinwouldinsteadstrikesouth,intotheBalkans.YetCol.Gehlenretainedhisjob,andtherespectofGermany’sgenerals,almosttotheendofthe

war.Thiswaspartlybecauseofhisunflaggingplausibilityandpalacepoliticalskills,butchieflybecauseofhissuccessinrunningagentsbehindtheSovietfrontwhoprovidedinformationofextraordinaryquality,reportsthatmadearealimpactonGermandeployments,andthusonthefateoftheEasternFront.GehlenmaythusbeconsideredoneofthemostinfluentialintelligenceofficerstoserveoneithersideintheSecondWorldWar.Butwhoseinterestsdidheserve?ThelatestevidencesuggeststhathewasthevictimofSovietmanipulation–maskirovka–onanastoundingscale;thatfarfrombeingthewizardofhisself-createdlegend,Gehlenwasasupremelygullibledupe.

2 AGENT‘MAX’

Earlyin1942,duringthedisastrousphasewhenStalinstillinsisteduponexercisingpersonalcontrolofRussia’smilitaryoperations,hedecreedawholesalereorganisationofmilitaryintelligence,dissolvingitsmachineryforhandlingbattlefieldinformation,whichpromptedchaosinitsactivitiesthroughthefirsthalfofthatyear.IgorDamaskin,oneofthemorecrediblemodernRussianhistoriansoftheperiod,haswritten:‘ThechaosintheGRUduringthisperiodblightedoperationsandwasresponsibleforheavylosses,asfieldheadquartersweredesperatelyshortofinformationabouttheenemy.’Stalinrejectedallreportsthatflewinthefaceofhisowninstincts:inMarch1942,forinstance,theGRUcorrectlypredictedHitler ’sOperation‘Blue’:‘PreparationsforaspringoffensiveareconfirmedbythemovementofGermantroopsandmaterials…Thecentralaxisof[theenemy’s]springadvancewillshifttothesouthernsectorofthefrontwithanadditionalthrustinthenorthandasimultaneousdemonstrationattheCentralfrontagainstMoscow…Themostlikelydateoftheoffensiveismid-ApriltoearlyMay1942.’StalincastigatedmilitaryintelligenceforsuccumbingtowhathedescribedasobviousGermandeceptions.HeinsistedonlaunchingtheMayoffensiveatKharkov,whichprecipitatedanewdisasterforSovietarms.Evenaslateas19June,whendocumentsfoundinashot-downGermanaircraftconfirmedHitler ’semphasisonthesouthernthrustsagainstStalingradandtheCaucasus,HozyaindismissedthemasanobviousGermanplant.Withinweeks,however,hewasforcedtoacknowledgetheterrificstrengthofPaulus’sSixthArmy,

drivingeastforStalingrad.Atlast,themasteroftheKremlinbowedtoreality:thesummerof1942witnessedaseismicshiftinthemannerinwhichtheSovietUnionmadewar.StalinimplicitlyacknowledgedhisownfailureasastrategistanddirectorofRussia’shosts.Hedelegatedauthoritytohisgenerals,atleastuptoarmygrouplevel,andallowedintelligencedepartmentsonceagaintofunctioninacoherentandprofessionalmanner.Fromtheautumn,whenthebattleforStalingradbegan,theRussiansbegantodoremarkablethingsinthefieldofstrategicdeception.TheirOperation‘Monastery’becameoneofthegreatestsuchschemesofthewar,atleastasimportantastheAnglo-American‘Fortitude’,whichbroadcastconfusionaboutD-Day.‘Monastery’wasoriginallyconceivedinJuly1941,withthelimitedobjectiveofpenetratingthe

enemy’sintelligenceapparatusandidentifyingtraitorscollaboratingwiththeNazis.Itseemsremarkablethatsuchaplancouldhavebeeninitiatedinthosedarkdays,whentheRedArmywasfallingbackeastwardsinheadlongretreat,butsoitwas.TheNKVDandGRUworkedtogethertocreateamythicalanti-Soviet,pro-GermanResistancemovementoperatingattheheartoftheRussianhighcommand,codenamed‘Throne’.ItwasfoundeduponanetworkofdoubleagentsamongtheoldRussiannobleclass–thoseleftaliveafterdecadesofpersecution.‘Monastery’mobilisedhistoricRussianconspiratorialskills.AnoldmannamedGlebov,whosewifehadservedatthecourtofAlexandra,thelasttsarina,wasdesignatedasthe‘Resistancemovement’s’figurehead.Helived

almostasabeggarinNovovevichymonastery,butwaswellknowninWhiteRussianémigrécircles.However,theprincipalactiveNKVDparticipant,oratleastglovepuppet,wasanagentnamedAlexanderDemyanov,whowasassignedthemostperilousrole.Bornin1911,hisbackgroundwasimpeccablyaristocratic.HisgrandfatherfoundedtheKubanCossacks;hisfatherwaskilledfightingforthetsarin1915;hismotherwasafamousMoscowbeauty.ThefamilylivedinpovertyaftertheRevolution,andAlexander ’soriginsdebarredhimfromhighereducation.Hewasobligedtoscratchalivingasanelectrician,andin1929wasarrestedonachargeofspreadinganti-Sovietpropaganda.Heescapedexileorexecutionbytheusualmeans–agreeingtoserveasaninformer,forwhichpurposehewasgivenajobintheelectricalbranchoftheCentralCinemaStudio,Moscow’sHollywood.Acheerfulextrovert,Demyanovbecameapopularfigureamongthestarsandliterati.TheNKVDpaidforhimtoacquireahorse,torideoutnotonlywiththefilm-makersbutalsowithforeigndiplomatsandbusinessmen,includingagoodmanyGermans.HemarriedagirlnamedTatianaBeresantsov,arespectedtechnicianatMosfilms,whosefatherwasaphysicianpermittedtheextraordinaryprivilegeofmaintainingaprivatepractice.CentredecidedthatDemyanovwassopromisingadeep-penetrationagentthatheshouldnotbe

thrownawayonmereinformanttasks.Hebecamewell-knownandtrustedinanti-Sovietandnationalistcircles.TheNKVD’sgleeknewnoboundswhen,shortlybefore‘Barbarossa’,theyoungmanreportedanapproachfromamemberofaGermantrademission,whowasobviouslyworkingfortheAbwehr.Demyanov’shandlerinstructedhimtoshownointerest,lestover-eagernessfrightenofftherecruiter.BerlinanywayopenedafileonDemyanov,whowasgiventhecodename‘Max’.WhenwarbrokeoutheenlistedinaRedArmycavalryregiment,butwasquicklyretrievedbyPavelSudoplatov,whoregardedhimasanidealSpecialTasksagent,withadecade’sexperienceofrole-playing.Inthelatesummerof1941SudoplatovtoldBeriathiswasjustthemantotakealeadinOperation‘Monastery’.ThusitwasthatonedayinDecemberthatyear,duringthedarkestdaysofthestruggleforMoscow,

AlexanderDemyanov–codenamed‘Heine’byCentre–setoffonskisfromtheRedArmy’slinesnearGzhatsk,120milessouth-westofthecapital,todefecttotheGermans.Hisextraordinarilyperilousmissionalmostcollapsedattheoutset:whenhereachedtheWehrmachtpositionsandannouncedhimselfasaNazisympathiser,nobodybelievedhim,partlybecauseheclaimedtohavecrossedthelinesbyaroutethattraversedaGermanminefield.DemyanovlatertoldtheNKVDhehadbeensubjectedtoamockexecutiontoinducehimtotalk.Whetherornotthiswastrue,heobviouslycameclosetobeingshotoutofhand.Instead,however,hewashandedovertotheAbwehr.Itsofficersproveduninterestedinhistaleaboutthe‘Throne’Resistancegroup,butimmediatelyenlistedhimasanagent–oneamongthousandsofsuchpeoplewhowereperfunctorilytrained,deployedandexpended.TheGermansbecamemoreexcited,however,whenacheckwiththeirfilesshowedthatDemyanov

hadbeenearmarkedasaprospectiveagentbefore‘Barbarossa’.Hisbackgroundamong‘formerpeople’–aristocrats–wassuchthathecouldpassmusterinémigrécirclesasananti-Sovietzealot.ThoughtheAbwehrstillshowednoenthusiasmforfollowingtheoriginalNKVDscript–supportingaphoneycounter-revolutioninsideRussia–itshandlersthoughtDemyanovsufficientlysmartandwellconnectedtobecomeanimportantspy.Hismainproblem,duringthetrainingthatfollowed,wastohidethefactthathewasalready–forinstance–anaccomplishedwireless-operator.OnenightinFebruary1942,aLuftwaffeaircraftcrossedthelinestoagridreferencewestofMoscow,whereDemyanovandtwootheragentstaskedtoassisthimhurledthemselvesintodarknessoverSovietterritory.Theymadetheirparachutedescentsinterribleweather,andlostcontactwitheachotherasthey

stumbledthroughasnowstormnearYaroslavl.AlexanderpromptlyreportedtothenearestNKVDheadquarters,andadayortwolaterhisassistantswerepickedup.DuringtheweeksandmonthsthatfollowedCentre’soperation,overseenbySudoplatov,becameevermorebyzantine.Demyanov’sMoscowflat,wherehelivedwithhiswifeandfather-in-law,becamethefocusofthesupposedResistancegroup–thewholefamilywasmadeprivytothescheme.AsuccessionofAbwehrcouriersreportedthere,someofwhomwereforatimeleftatliberty,toseewhomtheymet.Otherswere‘turned’,othersagainwerejailedandpresumablyshot.AfewwerepermittedtoreturntotheGermanlinestoreport.ForDemyanovhimself,thesupremelyperilouspartoftheoperationwasover:hewasbackwith

hisownside.Italmostdefiesbeliefthatanyman,howeverhighlydevelopedhissenseofadventureandtasteforthesecretlife,couldhavedoneashedid,exposinghimselftothepowerandwrathofNaziGermanyinagameofsuchsubtletyanddeadliness,butMI5deployedtheBritishEddieChapmaninthesamefashion,thoughtomuchlessadvantage.Demyanovwasthereafterrequiredonlytoplayoutapartundertheeyesofhisownspymasters.TheGermanshadequippedhimwithawirelessset.Centre’s‘WilliamFisher ’wasdeputedtomanagethesubsequentradiooperation–thiswasnoneotherthanRudolfAbel,borntoRussianparentsinNewcastleuponTyne,whoafterthewarbecameaSovietagentintheUS.ThechallengewasforSudoplatovandhiscolleaguestoplayoutthehandagainsttheAbwehr.

BeriawarnedtheSpecialTaskschiefthathewouldbeheldpersonallyresponsibleifanyactofsabotagewascommittedonSovietterritoryinthecourseofthe‘Max’operation.Attheoutset,theRussianshadnoconceptionthattheyhadstartedsomethingthatwouldcontinueforyears–mostradiogamesweredetectedbytheenemywithinweeks.TheNKVD’sfirstobjectivewastobuildup‘Max’s’credibilitywiththeGermans.Hereportedtothemthatthe‘Throne’groupwasconductingrailwaysabotagenearGorky,andSovietnewspapersdutifullycarriedreportsoftrainaccidentstosupportthestory;theBritishoccasionallyusedthesameruse,usingdoubleagentstocarryoutallegeddemolitionsinBritain.

Inthelatterpartof1942,DemyanovreportedtotheAbwehr,andthencetoReinhardGehlenandFHO,thathehadbeenassignedasajuniorcommunicationsofficerattheSoviethighcommandheadquartersinMoscow,apostingwhichexplainedhow,thereafter,heappearedtoenjoyextraordinaryaccesstoRussiansecrets.Throughthemonthsandyearsthatfollowed,hesignalledtoGehlen’sstaffamassofmaterialabouttheRedArmy’sorderofbattleandstrategicintentions,whichreachedBerlinandFHOviaSofia.TheGermanarmyintheEast–inthepersonofGehlen–becameconvincedthatitwasreceivingintelligenceofthehighestquality,andincreasinglyeagertoacknowledgeitsauthenticity.AstreamofFHOsignalswaxedeuphoricaboutitsman’sproduct.Moscownowsawopportunitiestoexploit‘Max’s’reportsinsupportofamajordeception

operation,forwhichtheNKVDandGRUcollaborated.Thelatter ’schief,Col.Gen.FedorKuznetsov,fulfilledtheroleoccupiedbyCol.JohnnyBevanasheadoftheLondonControllingSectionandBillBentinckoftheJIC–overseeingtheschemeandsupplyingmenusofmingledinformationanddisinformationforpresentationtotheGermans.Byfarthemostimportantandhistoricallycontroversialdevelopmentof‘Monastery’cameinNovember1942,apivotalmomentoftheSecondWorldWar.Onthe19th,theRedArmylaunchedOperation‘Uranus’,itshistoricdoubleenvelopmentbehindtheGermanSixthArmyatStalingrad.Fourdayslater,however,asecondthrustbysixarmieswasunleashedontheKallininfrontatRzhevahundredmilesnorth-westofMoscow–Operation‘Mars’.ThisengagedlargeGermanforces,butendedinacostlyrepulse,withallfourthrustsbeingsmashedbytheWehrmachtatacostof70,000Russiandead.MarshalGeorgiZhukovlateracknowledged‘Mars’asoneofhisownfailures.Morethanhalfacenturylater,however,PavelSudoplatovassertedinhismemoirsthat‘Mars’was

betrayedinadvancetotheGermans,withoutZhukov’sknowledgeandontheexplicitordersofStalin,aspartofthedeceptionoperationtodivertGermanforcesfromthecritical‘Uranus’atStalingrad.AlexanderDemyanovwastheinstrumentbywhichtheinformationwasconveyedtotheenemy’shighcommand.Thisversionofeventsremainsdisputedamonghistorians,butislargelyacceptedbyRussianones.SomeWesternersfinditinconceivablethatevenStalincouldhaveknowinglyconsignedhundredsofthousandsofhisownpeopletodeathordisablementmerelytosupportarusedeguerre,albeitforhugestakes.Buttheevidenceseemsstrong,indeedalmostconclusive,thatSudoplatovtoldthetruth.ThereisnodoubtthatDemyanovwasanNKVDoperative,workingunderMoscow’scontrol.ItisalsocertainthattheGermansregardedhimastheiroutstandingSovietsource:ReinhardGehlenwenttohisgravein1979stillproudlyassertingthebrillianceofhisownhandlingof‘Max’s’material.Mostsignificant,‘Max’s’voluminousreportsarereadilyaccessibleintheGermanmilitaryarchiveinFreiburg.Amongthemoststrikingmessagesisonedated6November1942andheaded‘ForeignArmies

East–ImportantIntelligenceReports’.Thisreads:

Agent(Max):On4November,councilofwarinMoscow,chairedbyStalin.Present12marshalsandgenerals.Atthismeeting,thefollowingprincipleswerelaiddown:a)Carefulapproachtoalloperations,avoidingmajorlosses.b)Lossesofterritoryareunimportant.c)Preservationofindustrialandsupplysitesbyearlyremoval[ofplant]fromendangeredareasisvital,onthisaccount:directivetoremoverefineriesandmachinefactoriesfromGroznyandMakhachkalatoNew-Baku,Orsk,andTashkent.d)Relyonownforces,notonassistancefromallies.e)Severemeasuresagainstdesertion,thatisontheonehandbyexecutionandintensifiedcontrolbytheStatePoliticalDirectorate,ontheotherbystrongerpropagandaandimprovedrations.f)Executionofallplannedoffensiveoperations,ifpossiblebefore15November,asfarasweatherconditionspermit[‘Mars’waseventuallydelayedbypoorweather].Chiefly:

–fromGroznytowardsMozdok–closetoNizhnyandWerchny-MamonintheDonarea–closetoVoronezh–closetoRzhev–southofLakeIlmenandLeningrad.

Necessaryforcesshouldbebroughtforwardfromthereservetothefront.

Thissignal,whilesomeofitscontentisgeneralandvagueratherthanexplicitabout‘Mars’,seemstoprovideconclusiveevidencethatunderordersfromMoscowCentreDemyanovgavetheGermansgoodwarning,ornamentedwithcircumstantialdetail,aboutaloomingSovietthrustagainstArmyGroupCentre,contemporaneouswiththeRussianencirclementofHitler ’sSixthArmyatStalingrad.The6Novemberreportshouldbereadinthecontextoffrequentorder-of-battledispatchesfrom‘Max’duringtherun-upto‘Mars’,suchasthesamplesbelow,whichdeservequotationbecausetheyillustratethecreativeeffortinMoscowthatwasexpendedoncompilingthem:

ImportantIntelligenceReports:1.)8October,agent(Max):1cavalrybrigade,1horsedartilleryregiment,and1pioneerbattalion,allfromthefront,arrivedinTuapse.Theywillremainthereinreserve.2.)8October,agent(Max):1rifledivision,3tankbattalions,andartilleryaswellasseveralspecialdivisionsconductingdemolitionsinthecourseofretreats,allfromMakhachkala,arrivedinGrozny.3.)8October,agent(Max):120Englishand70Americantankswith60EnglishandAmericaninstructorsarrivedinZarev,assignedtotheStalingradfront.4.)8October,agent(Max):1cavalrydivision,4mixedtankbattalions,2artilleryregiments,and40anti-tankgunsarrivedinKaluga.TheyareassignedtothewesternsectionoftheKalugafront.5.)9October,agent(Max):InMischina(45OWRzhev),combatgroupsarebeingassembledfromtankbattalions.Manyanti-tankgunsandafueldepot[arelocated]inMischina.6.)8October,agent(Max):Amilitarydelegationconsistingof2infantrygenerals,1tankgroupgeneral,1airforcegeneral,2admiralsand2militaryengineers,leftMoscowforLondonbyair.

TheGermansloveditall.Itwaspricelesstotheself-esteemoftheAbwehrandFHOtobelievethattheirchiefsweresuccessfullyrunningagentsinsidetheSovietcorridorsofpower.Asfarasisknown,onlyoneseniorAbwehrofficer,DrWagnerDelius,headoftheAbwehrstationinSofia,questionedtheauthenticityofthe‘Max’material.ButaninquiryhadscarcelybegunbeforeFHO–afuriousReinhardGehlen–intervened.The‘Max’reportswere‘indispensable’,hesaid,‘andmustonnoaccountbejeopardised’.Theinvestigationstopped.TheNKVD,knowingthatDemyanov’sstandingstoodsky-highafterthefailureof‘Mars’,continuedtofeedasteadystreamofintelligence

totheenemy,suchasthis3Decemberreport:

Fromagent(Max):ConferenceinMoscow,chairedbyStalinwithZhukov,Timoshenko,andKosslow:InthenorthernsectionoftheRzhevfront[where‘Mars’hadtakenplace][sacking]of5divisioncommanders.Theywerereplacedby5majors,whowereappointedcolonels.StalinisdissatisfiedwiththecourseoftheoperationsbetweenRzhevandVelikiyeLuki.Zhukovasksforarmouredandinfantryreinforcements.Stalin[saysthathe]issurethattherehavetobetreacherousinformantsatthetop,sincetheGermansaresowell-informedaboutSovietmovements,plans,andtroopstrengths.HeordersaStatePoliticalDirectoratecommitteetobecreated,forstrictcontrolandinvestigation[ofpossibletraitors].

Thereisafascinatingcross-bearingonthisstory:intheautumnof1942theBritish,inthepersonofHughTrevor-Roper,begantoponderdecryptsofthistrafficwhichwascausingsomuchexcitementintheenemycamp.Trevor-Roperrecognisedthatthematerial,classifiedbyFHOandtheAbwehrunderthegeneralcodenameof‘Klatt’,was‘veryhighlyvaluedbytheGermans’.Heandhissectionpuzzledendlesslyoverwhether‘Max’andhisallegedsub-agentsinsidetheSovietUnionweredoublescontrolledbyMoscow.Atfirstthisseemedhighlylikely–especiallysowhenLondonwarnedtheRussiansabouttheleaks,andtheyshowednointerestinstoppingthem.On31July1943,however,theRadioSecurityServicesaiditsformerview–thatthe‘Max’reportswereRussianplants–mustbereviewedinthelightofthefactthatrecentdispatches‘appearedtocontainaccuratepredictionsofRussiantacticalmoves’.‘Max’hadforecastimpendingSovietinitiativesinthecriticalKursk–Orelsector.TheWarOffice

MI14’sMajorBrianMellandcommented:‘Thepossibilityof“MAX”reportsbeing,perhapsinpart,plantedmaterialmust,wefeel,bediscarded…ThereisampleevidencethatGermanintelligenceandOperationsconsider“MAX”reportstobeofgreatvalue;anditisquitepossible,infact,thatthesereportsformthebestfieldintelligenceobtainedbytheenemy.’ByAugusttheBritishwereconvinced–temporarilyatleast–that‘Max’andhisfriendsweregenuinearticles–orrather,authentictraitorsintheSovietcamp:‘ArecentexaminationhasshownthemtohavebeensingularlyaccurateinforecastingRussianoperations.’GuyLiddellofMI5wroteon12August:‘MAXmustberegardedasasuccess[fortheAbwehr]…reportshavebeensingularlyaccurateinforecastingRussianoperationsandthetheorythatitisaRussiandouble-crossrathergoesbytheboard.’Trevor-Roperwasstilluncertainabout‘Max’whenhewrotehisApril1945valedictoryreporton

theAbwehr.Hesaidthatthematerialseemedtohisteam‘suspiciouslyfreefromtheadministrativehitchestowhichmostspy-systemsareliable’.InformationwastransmittedtotheGermanspunctuallyandinbulknotonlyfrom‘Max’himselfinMoscow,butalsofromallegedsub-agentsinLeningrad,Kuibishev,Novorossiysk.‘AlthoughweinformedtheRussiansofthefacts,andthenamesofthepersonsinvolved,noactionwastakenbythemtosuppressthisapparentdangerousleakage.Afteravarietyofotherhypotheseshadbeenfounduntenable,itwasconsideredinthisoffice(althoughitcouldneverbeconclusivelyproved)thattheevidenceshouldonlybesatisfactorilyexplainedbytheassumptionthat“Klatt”,atleastinrespectofthe“Max”Reports,wasaRussian-controlleddeception

agent(althoughitispossiblethathehimselfmayhavebeenunconsciousofthefact).’TheBritish,inshort,neverentirelyfathomed‘Monastery’,partlybecauseitwasbeyondtheimaginationoftheirintelligenceofficers,eventhesupremelycynicalTrevor-Roper,thattheRussiansshouldsurrendersomuchauthenticinformation,atapricepaidintorrentsofblood,topromotestrategicdeceptions.TheSovietintelligenceserviceswereastrangecombinationofbrutishincompetence,exemplified

bytheir1939–42mismanagementoftheRedOrchestrainBerlin,contrastedwithsuperbsophistication,ofwhichOperation‘Monastery’wasperhapsthemasterstroke.OnlyinStalin’sdreadfulworldcould70,000liveshavebeensacrificed,withoutsentimentorscruple,toservethehigherpurposesofthestate.Thebetrayalof‘Mars’totheGermansmayhelptoexplainwhy,untilthelastyearsofthetwentiethcentury,theRzhevbattlereceivedsolittleattentioninSoviethistories.AlexanderDemyanov’sdoublecareercontinueduntiltheendofthewar–laterSovietdeceptionoperationsthroughAgent‘Max’willbedescribedbelow.HereceivedtheOrderoftheRedBannerfromtheNKVDforhisservices–andtheIronCrossfromReinhardGehlen.Hiswifeandfather-in-lawalsoreceivedmedals,inappreciationoftheirsupportingrolesinthewebofdeceitwovenaroundthefamily.Itshouldnotbesupposed,however,thatthetriumphantmanagementofDemyanovsufficedtowin

bouquetsallroundinMoscow.ViktorIlyin,hispersonalhandlerintheLubyanka,sufferedadreadfulfateinoneoftheendemicpowerstruggleswithinSovietintelligence.ItsuitedStalintosustainViktorAbakumovasacounterweightandrivaltoBeria.In1943,hemadeAbakumovheadofSMERSh,chargedwiththedetectionandliquidationoftraitors,anddeputytohimselfasministerofdefence.Inanearlyexerciseofpowerinthisrole,AbakumovtrumpedupchargesagainstIlyin,directoroftheNKVD’sSecretPoliticalDepartment.Ilyinhadrun‘Heine’forfiveyears,andwasregardedbythelikesofPavelSudoplatovasoneofthefewhonestmenintheupperreachesofSovietintelligence.HewasafriendofMaj.Gen.BorisTeplinsky,designatedtobecomechiefoftheheadquartersdepartmentoftheRedAirForce.AbakumovdenouncedTeplinskyasanenemyofthepeople,andassertedthatIlyinhadconspiredtopreventhisexposure.Stalinauthorisedthearrestofbothmen.AbakumovpersonallyconductedTeplinsky’sinterrogation,breakingtwoofhisfrontteethonthefirstnight.Batteredintoawreck,thewretchedmanconfessedthathehadtoldIlyinyearsbeforeofhissympathyformenexecutedinthePurges,andthatIlyinhadcoachedhimabouthowtoescapeexposure.WhenthegeneralwasconfrontedwithIlyininthebasementoftheLubyankaandrepeatedhis

farragoofnonsense,theNKVDmanslappedhimandtoldhimtobehavelikeaman.Ilyinresolutelyrefusedtoconfesstoanything.Defiancedidnotsavehim,however.Hewasheldinsolitaryconfinement,repeatedlyinterrogatedandbeatenforfouryears,between1943and1947.Throughitallheretainedagallowshumour,oncedemandingofoneofhistorturersthenatureoftheribbononhischest.Whenthemananswered‘theOrderofLenin’,Ilyinsaidthathewasgladhisowncasewasdeemedsoimportant.Evenwhentheinterrogationswereabandonedin1947hewasheldinjailfora

furtherfiveyears,until–inthedementedfashionofhigherSovietaffairs–hewassuddenlybroughtforthtotestifyagainstAbakumov,nowhimselfdisgracedandimprisoned.Teplinskyremainedaprisoneruntil1955.

PavelSudoplatovistoomodesttomentionseveralSovietdeceptionoperationsthatfailedtofooltheGermans–forinstance,whentheRedArmylaunchedattacksintheDonbasinJuly1943,andintheChernyov–PripyatregionduringAugustandSeptember.PoorRussianradiosecurityenabledGermaneavesdropperscorrectlytopredicttheSovietaxisofattack.Ingeneral,however,theStavka’sstrategicdeceptionsinthesecondhalfofthewarwerenotablysuccessful.Asecondmajoroperation,‘Couriers’,alsorequiredStalin’sendorsement,toprotectitsparticipantsfromfiringsquads:nomandaredcreateevenafictionalanti-Sovietmovementwithouthispersonalauthority.Fifty-four-year-oldBishopVasilyRatmirovoftheRussianOrthodoxChurchworkedinKalinin

underthecontroloftheNKVD’sZoyaRybkinawhenitwasoccupiedbytheGermans.HavingthusestablishedhispatrioticSovietcredentials,MoscowCentreturnedtohimtoprovidecoverfor‘Couriers’.AstheGermanswerepushedwestwardsin1943,thebishopwasinstalledinSamara,intheVolgaregion.HedispatchedtwoclericalnovicestoPskovmonastery,south-westofLeningrad,inGerman-controlledterritory,supposedlybearinginformationforitschief,whowascollaboratingwiththeenemy.ThesemenwereinrealityNKVDagents,oneofthem,VasilyIvanov,trainedbyEmmaSudoplatov.Themission’splanningwasnotwithoutdifficulties.Thebishopaskedforanassurancethatthemenwouldnot‘committhesacrilegeofbloodshedinGod’ssanctuary’.Inthecourseoftrainingtheagentstopassaspriests,helostpatiencewithacoarse,brashex-Komsomolwireless-operatorwhomockedthesacrament,saying,‘OhFather,butterthepancakesinheaven.Bringthepancakestothetable!’Thismanwasreplacedbytwenty-two-year-oldSergeantIvanKulikov,whowasbaffledtobequizzedinadvancebyanNKVDofficerabouthisownhistoryofchurchattendance,andonlyacceptedwhenhedisplayedanappropriaterespectforthevestmentshewasrequiredtowear.TheysetforthinAugust,firstforKalininandthereafterforPskov,appropriatelyheavilybearded,

supposedlyasrepresentativesofaChurch-basedanti-SovietResistancegroup,andpresentedthemselvestotheGermansinthisrole.TheAbwehrprovidedthemwithwireless-operators,SovietPoWs,whoprovedreadilyconvincedinprivateconversationwiththetwo‘novices’thatitwasintheirbestintereststofollowCentre’sorders,ratherthanCanaris’s.Thereafter,theGermanscomplacentlysupposedthattheywereinregularcommunicationwithaclericalnetworkfarbehindtheRedArmy’slines,whichwasinrealitycontrolledbytheNKVD.WhentheRussiansatlastoverrantheirlocation,BishopRatmirovandhistwonovicesweredenouncedbylocalpeopleasGermancollaborators;theywerethreatenedwithexecutionbySMERShuntiltheNKVDintervened,togarlandthemasheroes.

Oneconsequenceofthemission’ssuccesswastopersuadeStalinthattheOrthodoxChurchwasloyal;heamazedhissubordinateswhenherewardedthepriesthoodbyallowingitsmembersoncemoretoelectapatriarchin1943,aceremonyattendedbyPavelandEmmaSudoplatov.Afterthewar,Ratmirovbecameanarchbishopandwasawardedagoldwatchandamedalinrecognitionofhiscontribution.IvanKulikov,promotedtocaptain,marriedagirlhehadmetinhiscongregationinKalinin.Beyond‘Monastery’and‘Couriers’,SudoplatovtestifiesthattheRussiansranafurtherforty

wartimeradiodeceptionoperations,whichwerecontrolledbySMERShratherthantheNKVD.Russianwirelesssecurity,andtacticalpenetrationofGermancommunications,wereimproveddramaticallyfollowingthecaptureofPaulus’sSixthArmyheadquartersatStalingradon2February1943,despiteitsstaff’sattemptstodestroysecretdocumentsandciphermaterial.Maskirovkaachieveditsgreatesttriumphinthesummerof1944,whentheRussianssuccessfullypersuadedtheWehrmachttoexpecttheirmainassaultinsouth-eastPolandratherthanBelorussia,thenhavingsmashedthreeGermanarmiesswitchedaxistoPolandintheautumn.ThoughReinhardGehlenkepthisjobasGermany’sEasternchiefofintelligenceuntilthelastdaysofthewar,themodernevidencesuggeststhathewasbear-ledbytheStavkainMoscowevenmoreeffectivelythanwereOKW’sWesternintelligenceofficersbytheBritishandAmericansin1944.WhateverthelimitationsofSovietwartimeintelligence,itsdeceptionoperationsweremasterpiecesofconspiracy.

9

TheOrchestra’sLastConcert

Fromtheautumnof1941,alltheRussians’Europeanspynetworksoperatedonthebrinkofaprecipice,renderedmortallyvulnerablebytheexposureoftheidentitiesofthemainplayersinboththeNKVD’s‘Lucy’RingandtheRedOrchestratoLeopoldTrepperandAnatoliGourevitch,togetherwiththerecklessconductofMoscowCentreandoftheGermandissidentsthemselves.ToomanypeoplealloverEuropenowknewtoomanynames,sothatasingleinitialarrestprecipitatedavastandterribleunravelling.TheOrchestra’sdoomwassealedbytheGermans’capturethroughdirection-findingofthewireless-operatorMikhailMakarov–‘CarlosAlamo’or‘Chemnitz’–intheRuedesAtrebates,Brussels,intheearlyhoursof13December1941.OnthepreviousdayTreppermadeasudden,unheraldedreappearanceinBrussels.Relations

betweenhimselfandGourevitch,alreadyshadowedbymutualsuspicionandjealousy,thereafterdeterioratedrapidly.Twodaysafter‘Otto’s’arrival,GourevitchwasatSimexco’soffices,dealingwiththeastonishinglyprofitablebusinessissuesentwinedwithitschiefs’espionageactivities,whenhewassummonedbyphonetoanurgentmeetingwithTrepperathisapartment.Whenhearrivedthere,hefoundhisvisitorinastateofalarm.TreppersaidthathehadjustbeenquestionedbytheGermans,andproposedtoreturntoFrancebythefirsttrain.Gourevitchwasappalledthatthechiefshouldhavecalledathishomewhenalreadyundersuspicion.Heranamentaleyeovertheentirenetworkforweaklinksandfixedhisattentionon‘Chemnitz’,whoembracedlouchetastesandanextravagantlifestyle,thoughGourevitchhimselfscarcelypractisedausterity.Thewireless-operatorknewMargaretBarcza,Gourevitch’slover,andmanyofthegroup’sothercontacts.Suddenlythedoorbellrang,andtheRussianwasdisconcertedtoopenittoaBelgianacquaintancewhoworkedfortheGermanKommandatur.Thismaninvitedhimselfin,andaskedforaloan.Gourevitchhandedoversomecashtogetridofhim,thenaccompaniedTreppertothestationtocatchaParistrain.GourevitchnowtoldBarczathatBrusselswasbecomingtoowarmforcomfort.HehimselfproposedtodecamptoFrance,andheurgedhertotrytoreachherparents,refugeesintheUnitedStates.Shepromptlyburstintotearsandinsistedonaccompanyinghimwhereverhewent,withheryoungsonRené.Gourevitchacceded,thoughheknewthatCentrewasboundtobeenragedbytheirrelationship,whichwasnolessdangeroustohisdutiesthanTrepper ’sliaisonwithGeorgiedeWinter.Theyquittheirflatimmediately,andtooktemporaryshelterinabighouseoccupiedbythe‘front’

directorofSimexco,whichherentedfromthenephewofBelgium’sforeignminister.Gourevitchgavehisservantsseveralmonths’wages–theyoungGRUagenthadcertainlyrisenintheworld–tosupportthepretencethathewouldbecomingback.Heoccupiedthenextfewdays‘puttingtosleep’theagentsofhisnetwork.ThenheboardedatraintoParis,followedtwodayslaterbyMargaretandRené.TheytookupquartersinahouseneartheBoisdeBoulognewhichGourevitchhadusedonpreviousvisitstotheFrenchcapital.AssoonashemetTrepper,itwas‘leGrandChef’s’turntoventviolentdismay.Gourevitch’sarrival,hesaid,couldcompromisehisFrenchcovercompany,aswellastheintelligencenetwork.Heinsistedthathisdeputyshouldleave,fast.TheydecidedheshouldheadforMarseillesinunoccupiedVichyFrance,whereSimexhadabranchoffice.MargaretandRenéBarczaleftfirst,travellingsouthwithoutdifficulty,usingtheTreppergroup’scontactsandtakinguplodgingsinMarseilleswithaCzechfamily.Meanwhile,GourevitchmetHerschandMyraSokol,twoyoungPolishcommunistswhoactedas

Trepper ’sPariswireless-operators.ThefugitiveafterwardsclaimedthatheusedtheSokolstosendamessagetoCentretoreportthethreatenedcollapseofhisnetwork,andhisownflightfromBrussels.Buthiswarnings,hesaid,weretransmittedatamomentinDecemberwhentheGRUhadevacuateditsheadquartersinthefaceoftheGermanassaultonMoscow,andlackedhiscode.ThushisemployerslearnedoftheBrusselscrisisonlymuchlater,inFebruary1942,adelaywhich,hebelieved,contributedtohis1945indictmentfortreason.GourevitchreachedMarseillesinJanuary1942,afterajourneywithoutincident.Heremainedthereinnotuncomfortablehidingfortheensuingtenmonths,makingnopretenceofconductinganyespionage,andchieflyamusinghimselfwithMargaret.ThankstoCentre’sremittancesandSimexco’shandsomeprofits,theyhadamplemoney.Thisidyll–asMargaretafterwardsrecalledit–continueduntil9November;onthatday,Gourevitch,hisloverandanimpressivecacheofcigarsandsilkstockingswereabruptlyseizedintheirflatbyFrenchpolice.ThetwoprisonerswerehandedovertotheGermans,thensweepingacrosstheVichyzonetocompletetheiroccupationofFrance.TheGermanshadatlastbrokenintotheRedOrchestra,andeachsuccessiverevelationfromacapturedagentproducedreverberationsthroughoutEurope.Moscow’scontributiontowhatbecameadreadfuldébâcledatedbacktothespringof1942,when

thefortunesoftheNKVD’sAlexanderKorotkovwereoncemoreascendantwithintheLubyanka.Hetookagamble.GiventhedifficultiesandupsetsinBelgiumandFrance,hesoughttore-establishdirectcontactbetweenBerlinandCentre,byprovidingtheOrchestrawithnewcodesandcrystals,andthereafterwithmorepowerfultransmitters.ZoyaRybkinadescribesinhermemoirshowsheandherhusband‘Kin’,whonowrantheNKVDstationinStockholm,wereinstructedtoidentifyacourierwhocouldmakeadeliverytoSchulze-BoyseninBerlin.Afterconsiderabledifficulties,theyfoundaSwedishbusinessmanwhowaspersuadedtodothejob.Shesewedthecodesandinstructionsintoatie,andputthecrystalsintoacufflinkbox,tobeleftinacemeteryfortheLuftwaffeofficer.TheSwedereturnedfromhisnextvisittoGermanytoconfessfailure:hehadbeentooterrifiedtofulfil

themission,hesaid–everyoneontheBerlinplaneseemedtobestaringathistie.Afterasecondtripthefollowingweek,however,hereportedsuccess;heclaimed–truthfullyorotherwise–thathehadleftthecodesandcrystalsatthedesignated‘deaddrop’.MeanwhileKorotkovinMoscowselectedtwoagentstotraveltoGermany,carryingnewwireless

setstotheRoteKapelle,andwithfurtherorderstocontact‘Breitenbach’,theGestapoofficerwhoseexistencewasunknowntotheOrchestra.ThemessengerswereveteranGermancommunists,AlbertHesslerandRobertBart,bothintheirearlythirties.HesslerhadcommandedacompanyoftheInternationalBrigadeinSpain,wherehewasbadlywounded.HehadsincemarriedaRussiangirl,andaftervolunteeringfortheRedArmywastrainedasawireless-operator.Bartwasaprinterbytrade,whoservedaspellinPlötzenseejailduringtheearlyNaziyearsbeforebeingconscriptedintotheWehrmacht,withwhichheearnedanIronCrossduringthe1940Frenchcampaign.SoonafterbeingpostedtotheEasternFront,hedefectedtotheRussians.BothmentookafantasticriskbyagreeingnowtotraveltoBerlin,allegedlywillingly,thoughthis

deservestobedoubted.Theywereprovidedwithfalseidentities,respectivelyasalieutenantandsergeant-majoronleave,thendispatchedaboardaC-47ofNo.1Long-RangeAviationDivisionfromPodlipkinearMoscow,andparachutedtoapartisanreceptioncommitteebetweenBryanskandGomelinoccupiedBelorussiaduringthenightof5August1942.Guidesledthemtoarailstationfromwhich,afteraweek-longjourneyviaBialystok,WarsawandPoznan,theyreachedBerlinwiththeirtworadiosets,initselfaconsiderableachievement.TheywentinitiallytotheapartmentofaRoteKapellecontact,KurtSchumacher,whoreceived

them,thenseparatedthevisitorstotakerefugeinthehomesofsympathisers.HesslerinitiallytransmittedfromthestudioofanexoticdancernamedOdaSchotmüller,afterwardsfromtheapartmentofCountessErikavonBrokdorf.Inmid-AugusthetoldMoscow:‘everythingisgoingwell.Thegrouphasexpandedconsiderablythankstothestrengthoftheanti-fascistmovement,andisworkingactively.IwillsendadditionalinformationfromHarnackandSchulze-BoysenwhenIreceiveanacknowledgementofthismessage.Ampresentlybusyfindinglodgings.’Fromanearlystage,bothNKVDmenappeartohavebeenunderGestaposurveillance.LeopoldTrepper ’sBrusselswireless-operator,aGermannamedJohannWenzel,hadbeenseizedon30June1942,againafterhistransmissionsweretrackedbydirection-finders.Thoughthetruthwillneverbeconclusivelyestablishedaboutwhogaveawaywhomandwhen,underinterrogationbothMakarovandWenzelseemtohavetoldalltheyknew,whichwasagreatdeal.RipplingwavesofarrestsfollowedacrossEurope.TheGestapoformedaspecialSonderkommando,headedbyHaupsturmführerHorstKopkow,toinvestigatetheSovietring.Itsofficerswereappalledbywhattheydiscovered:penetrationofsomeofthehighestheadquartersoftheThirdReich;systematicbetrayalofGermanybyhundredsofGermans.InAugust,theGestaponetbegantocloseonHarnackandSchulze-Boysenandtheirgroups.TheNKVD’sAlbertHesslerwasarrestedinmid-September,alongwiththosewhohadshelteredhim.

Hemadehislastapparentlygenuinetransmissionon3September;althoughhemessagedagainonthe21st,bythenhewasalmostcertainlyactingunderGestapocontrol.Moscowwasslowtorealisewhathadhappened.Centre’sfirstdetailedaccountofthedisasterwas

delayeduntilApril1943,andthenarrivedbyatortuousroute:WolfgangHavemann,anephewofHarnack,wasinterrogatedbytheGestapo,thenreleasedforlackofevidence.HewassenttotheEasternFront,whereatthefirstopportunityhegavehimselfuptotheRedArmy.HeconfirmedtotheNKVDthetotaldestructionoftheBerlinring,accompaniedbyforty-eightexecutions.Amongthoseseizedwereamarriedcouple,HansandHildaCoppi.He,aradio-operator,waskilledalmostimmediately.She,however,heavilypregnant,waskeptaliveuntilhersonhadbeenbornandattainedtheageofeightmonths.ShewasthendecapitatedinAugust1943,andherchildhandedovertohisgrandparents,withwhomhesurvivedtopursueacareerasahistorianofGermanResistance.RobertBartwastrappedbecausehecouldnotresistseeinghiswifeandson.Unbeknownto

Moscow,theGestapokeptthefamiliesofallmissingpoliticalsuspectsundersurveillance:Bart’sdesertiontotheRussianshadbeenassumed.Hiswifefellsick,andinAugust1942languishedinacliniconBerlin’sNollenstrasse.TheSovietagenttooktheunderstandablebutinsaneriskofvisitingher.Hewasbetrayedbyanurse,andarrestedattheclinicon9September.AlmostimmediatelythereafterhebegantotransmittoMoscowunderSDcontrol.HelaterclaimedtohavegivenanagreedMorsewarningon14October,whichaninexperiencedCentreoperatorfailedtonotice–exactlyashappenedwhenSOEwirelessesinHollandbecamepartofanotherAbwehrradiogame.Centreobliginglyrespondedbyprovidingdetailsoftheprocedureformeeting‘Breitenbach’.Inmid-December1942WillyLehmann,nowfifty-eightyearsoldandsurelyawearymanafterhisprotractedsecretservice,wastelephonedathomeonenighttohearMoscow’scodedintroductionofthecalleras‘collegePreuss’–‘colleaguePreuss’.Lehmannpresumablygavetheappropriateresponse:‘Comeandseemeinmyoffice.’Thissignifiedarendezvousat5p.m.nextdayonthepavementofKantstrasse,betweentwocinemasofwhichonewasnamedtheOlympia.ThecontactprocedurewastoapproachLehmannandaskdirectionstohisstreet.Hewassupposedtoreplythathelivedthere,andwouldwalkthemantoit.TherendezvouswasdulymadebyayoungGestapomannamedOlenhorst.Lehmannwasarrested

andinterrogated,nodoubtexhaustively,thensecretlyexecutedafortnightlater,andhisbodycremated.Hiswife,whoknewnothingofhisworkfortheSoviets,wastoldthathehadperishedwhileonamission;theGestapowasprobablyanxioustoconcealthefactthatoneofitsownhadbeenatraitor.Lehmann’sfatewasconfirmedonlyinMay1945,whenanNKVDteamfounddocumentationmentioninghisdemiseintheruinsofGestapoheadquartersinBerlin’sPrinz-Albrecht-Strasse.BartsurvivedthewarandsurrenderedtotheAmericans,whopromptlyhandedhimovertotheRussians.Hewasexecutedbyfiringsquadon23November1945,thoughheenjoyedthedoubtfulsatisfactionofbeingrehabilitatedbytheRedArmy’schiefmilitaryprosecutorin1996.

ZoyaRybkinarecordsthatsheandherhusbandinStockholmweresubjectedtobitterrecriminationsfromCentrefollowingthecollapseoftheOrchestra;inthecourseofatrawlforscapegoatsthatstraddledhalfEurope,itwassuggestedthatSchulze-BoysenandtheresthadbeenbetrayedbytheSwedishbusinessmanwhomtheyhadrecruitedtocarrycodestoBerlin.‘Kin’wasrecalledtoMoscowinthesummerof1943,andformonthshiswifewasobligedtocontinueservingtheNKVD’sStockholmstationwhileignorantofwhetherhehadbeenshot.Shewrote:‘Centrekeptsendingtelegramsenquiringaboutcasesthat“Kin”hadbeeninchargeof,andIcouldn’tunderstandwhy.’SheherselfreturnedtoMoscowinMarch1944,whereshefoundthatherhusband’sentireJewishfamily,saveoneyoungerbrother,hadperishedatGermanhands.AfterprotractedinvestigationsandmonthsunderfantasticsuspicionofhavingthrownintheirlotwithBritishintelligence,bothRybkinandhiswifewererehabilitatedandrestoredtofavourascolonelsintheLubyanka.ExposureoftheRoteKapellehadtwoimportantconsequencesforHitler ’sregime.First,it

representedavictoryfortheRSHA,whosemenclosedthenetwhiletheAbwehrremainedoblivious.Second,itseverelydamagedthestandingofGöring,whoseministrywasshowntoberiddledwithcommunisttraitors:theReichsmarschallhadgivenawaythebrideattheSchulze-Boysens’wedding.IfthefailureoftheLuftwaffeintheairwasamoreimportantcauseofGöring’sfallfromgrace,theRoteKapelleaffairwasasubordinateone.InRussia,‘thefatman’wouldhavebeenshot.AsfortheAlliedcause,muchhasbeenmadeoftheAbwehr ’sdestructionofSOE’sandMI6’sDutchnetworks(describedbelow),butthefateofMoscow’sRedOrchestrawasafargravermatter,becauseitssourceshadaccesstomoreimportantsecrets.BetweenthemtheRoteKapelle,‘Lucy’RingandTreppernetworksclaimed117informants:forty-eightinGermany,thirty-fiveinFrance,seventeeninBelgium,seventeeninSwitzerland.LeopoldTrepperhimselfforsomemonthsescapedarrest,thoughhisinformantsinFrance,BelgiumandHollandweresweptup.Theveteranspywasseizedonlyon24November,inaParisdentist’swaiting-room.ThereafterheappearstohavetalkedfreelytotheGermans,apparentlywithoutneedforrecoursetoviolentmethods;heevendispatchedinvitationsforinformantstoattendrendezvousesatwhichtheywerearrested.AlltheRussians’codesfellintothehandsoftheSD.

ThevictoriousGermansdealtswiftlyandruthlesslywiththeirhome-growntraitors.HarroSchulze-BoysenhadbeenarrestedattheAirMinistryon31August1942.Aweeklater,HarnackandhiswifeMildredwereseizedwhileonholiday.ThecondemnedprisonerFlorestansingsinBeethoven’sFidelio,‘MyheartisatpeaceforIhavedonewhatisright,’andHarnackseemstohavecherishedthesamesentiment.WhileFlorestanwassavedatthelast,however,theBerlinspieswerenot.On22December1942,sixmenandthreewomen,membersoftheRedOrchestra,wereguillotinedatPlötzenseejail.OnthesamedaySchulze-BoysenandHarnack,togetherwiththeformer ’swifeLibertas,sufferedcontrivedlylingeringdeathsbyhanging.HarnackwroteinalastlettertoMildredthat‘despiteeverything’,helookedbackonalife‘inwhichthedarknesswasoutweighedbythelight’.Alltheirbodiesweredispatchedforanatomicaldissection,inorderthattheremainsshouldbeunidentifiable.

TheGestaporetained116otherRoteKapelleprisoners,ofwhomalmosthalfwereexecutedonceprotractedinterrogationshadbeencompleted.AmongthesewastheAmericanMildredHarnack.Shewasinitiallysentencedtoameresixyears’hardlabour,butHitlerintervenedpersonallytoinsistuponaretrialatwhichshewascondemnedtodeath.ShespentsomeofherlasthourswithPastorHaraldPölchau,aprisonchaplainwhosolacedhundredsofHitler ’spoliticalvictims;sheaskedhimtorecitethe‘PrologueinHeaven’fromFaust,beforeherselfsinging,‘Ipraytothepoweroflove’.Herlast,wonderingwordsbeforebeingbeheadedon16February1943were:‘AndIhavelovedGermanysomuch.’Shewasjustforty,andherfairhairhadturnedwhiteduringhermonthsofconfinement.Shemusthavefeltafar,farjourneyfromWisconsin.SomuchsentimenthasbeenlavisheduponthemenandwomenoftheRedOrchestrathatit

deservestobenoticedthattheirespionageactivitiesrenderedthemequallyliabletocapitalpunishmentunderBritishorAmericanjurisdiction.ButthecouragewithwhichtheyworkedagainstHitlercommandstherespectofposterity,foralltheirillusionsabouttheSovietUniontheysoughttoserveinstead.Cynicsmayask:whatrenderedHarnack,Schulze-BoysenandtheircomradesmorallysuperiortosuchBritishandAmericantraitorsasKimPhilbyandAlgerHiss?Tobesure,theyresistedonetyranny,buttheychosetoserveanotherthatwasequallyrepellent.Anyanswertothatquestionmustbesubjective,butitseemsincomparablyeasiertojustifytreasonagainstamurderousdictatorshipthanagainstademocracygovernedbytheruleoflaw.

AnatoliGourevitchwroteinhismemoirsaboutthedaysfollowinghisarrestinNovember1942:‘Thenopenedthedarkestperiodofmylife,andthatofMargaret.’TheGermansatfirsttreatedthecouplewithremarkablecourtesyastheytravellednorthfromMarseilles.Theywerefedinrestaurantsandgenerouslypliedwithwine.Initialexchangeswiththeircaptorstooktheformofconversationsratherthaninterrogations.Atnightduringthelongcarjourneytheywereallowedtoshareabedroom,thoughtheirclotheswereremovedandtheyweredeniedknivesandforksatthebreakfasttable.TheygavetheescortmoneytobuythecigarettesGourevitchsmokedincessantlyashestrovetodecidewhattoconfessortodeny.AfterthreedaysontheroadthelittlepartyfoundthemselvesoncemoreinBelgium,atthefortofBreendonk,whereGourevitchandMargaretwereplacedinseparatecells.Theirfoodcontinuedtobeexcellent,however,andthequestioningwascivil.HansGiering,leaderoftheRedOrchestrainvestigation,wasjoinedbyanAbwehrofficer,HarryPipe,whomtheRussianfoundthoroughlyinformedabouthisactivities.GourevitchpersuadedtheGermansthatheneededtranslationoftheirquestions,tobuytimetodeviseresponses.Helateradmittedthathewasdisorientatedbyhiscaptors’affabledemeanourandconsiderateconduct.WhilepartsoftheGRUman’smemoirofhisexperiencesseemcredible,thenarrativeofevents

followinghisarrestcontainsirreconcilableinconsistenciesandobviousimplausibilities.He,andafterwardsTrepper,weretreatedgenerouslynotbecausetheGestapodiscoveredvirtueinhumanity,

butbecausetortureprovedunnecessary.Itwillneverbeknownhowfartheirrevelations,asdistinctfromthoseofotherGRUagentsandwireless-operators,wereresponsiblefortheGestapo’sround-upoftheirinformants.Alllaterblamedeachother.TheGermanstoldGourevitchthatMakarov–‘Chemnitz’–hadnamedhimaschiefofSovietintelligenceinBelgium.WhentheGRUmandeniedthis,GieringorderedguardstofetchanothercapturedMoscowagent,‘Bob’–HermannIsbutski–whowasbroughtforthfromhiscellabrokenman,plainlythevictimoftorture.HeimmediatelyidentifiedGourevitch,whowasstunnedbytheencounter.Theinterrogationscontinuedforhoursonend,thoughGieringprovidedplentifulfood,coffeeandevenbrandy.Afteraboutaweek,theGermanproducedtwodevastatingdocuments:first,Moscow’sinstructionfor‘Kent’totraveltoBerlintomeetHarroSchulze-Boysen;second,hissubsequentreporttoCentre.Itwasplain,saidtheRussian,thattheGestapohelddecryptsofsomeofhiswirelessmessages,retrievedfromoneoftheoperators.HewasallowedameetingwithMargaret,lateatnight,andfoundhershatteredbyherexperiences,

whichisunsurprisingsinceGourevitchclaimedthatshehadnopreviousknowledgeofhisespionageactivities,noreventhathewasnottheUruguayan‘VincenteSierra’.AnorderarrivedatBreendonk:GourevitchandBarczaweretobetakenforthwithtoBerlin.Nextdaytheysetoffathighspeed,thetwoprisonersseatedbetweenarmedguards.Thecarscarcelyhalteduntilitdrewupoutsideahuge,greybuildinginHitler ’scapital:thiswas8Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse,Gestapoheadquarters.TheRussianwastakentoacell,whilehiscompanionwasremovedtoawomen’sprisononAlexanderplatz.AlthoughGourevitch’smemoirssaynothingabouthisterrors,theweeksthatfollowedmusthavebeenrepletewiththem.HemetGestapochiefHeinrichMuller,andwasshowntheevidenceofhisdealingswiththeRedOrchestra.HewasconfrontedwithIlseStöbe,whomhehadfailedtomeetonhisearliertriptoBerlin,butwhowasnowravagedbytorture,herappearance‘terrifying’.AninterrogatorsoughttosuggestthattheSchulze-Boysensweresexuallydepraved,andproducedphotographsofLibertasnakedtosupporthiscase.GourevitchwastoldthatLeopoldTrepperwasnowheldinFresnesprison,andwascooperating.HehimselfremainedinsolitaryconfinementinthecellsofPrinz-Albrecht-Strasseformorethanamonth.OnemorningashewasbeingescortedtothelatrinehepassedHarroSchulze-Boysen.Neithermangaveanyhintofrecognition.TheRussiansaidthathisformerdiningcompanionshowednovisiblesignsofhavingbeentortured:‘Ididnotknowthathehadonlyafewdaystolive.’AttheendofDecember1942,GourevitchwastakenbacktoParis.Hewastobecomeaparticipant

withTrepperinaGestaporadiogamewithMoscow,whichcontinuedthroughmanymonthsthatfollowed.HehimselfwasbrieflyheldinFresnes,thentransferredtoHansGiering’sheadquartersintheRuedesSaussaies.GourevitchafterwardsclaimedthatheresistedforsomemonthsGermanblandishmentsactivelytojointheFunkspiel.ItisamatterofrecordthatTrepper ’stransmitterbegantooperateunderGermancontrolonChristmasDay1942,whilethatofGourevitchcametolifeon3March1943,butthelattercanonlyhavebeenallowedtoleaveBerlinforParisoncetheGermans

wereconfidentoftheirdominionoverhim.Afewmonthslatertheentire‘turned’Sovietteamwasmovedintoaspacioushouseonthe

BoulevardVictorHugoinNeuilly,outsideParis.TrepperandGourevitchalikeoccupiedspaciousquarterswiththebestoffood,abletowashandirontheirownclothes.InJuly1943,advancedthroatcancerobligedGiering–whodiedinthefollowingmonth–toresignhispostinfavourofHeinzPannwitz.InSeptemberTrepperescapedwhileonanescortedshoppingtripintoParis,withoutapparentlycausingmuchconcerntohisjailers,whohadbythenextractedfromhimalltheywereevergoingto.HesuccessfullyresumedcontactwithGeorgiedeWinter,andthetworemainedinhidingwiththeassistanceoftheso-called‘Spaak’Resistancegroup.TheGermanssofarrelaxedGourevitch’scaptivitythathereturnedtoParis,wherehewaspermittedtocohabitwithMargaretBarcza;sheproducedasonnamedSachainmid-April1944.TheSonderkommandowhichpresidedoverthiscosyarrangementwasastrangelyill-assortedgroupthatincludedaprettyyoungEnglishgirlnamedToniaLyon-Smith,whosestatuspuzzledvisitors:shemendedclothesandmadetea,andwasneverallowedoutofthebuildingunescorted,butitlateremergedthatshehadbecomethemistressofGestapointerpreterKarlGagel.Herstorywaspathetic:thedaughterofaBritishArmyofficer,attheageoffourteenshehadbeencaughtinBrittanyin1940withhernannyandteddybearwhentheGermansoverranFrance.Thereaftershespentsometimeinaninternmentcamp,thenroamedthecountryforawhilebeforetakingtemporaryresidencewiththeSpaakResistancegroup.SheappearstohavehadsomecontactwithTrepperandGeorgiedeWinterontherun,andindeedwrotealettertoafriendaskinghertohousedeWinter–whichtheGermansfoundontheAmericangirlwhenshewascaptured.TheBritishlatersuspectedLyon-SmithofrevealingSpaakgroupsecretswhensheherselffellintoGestapohandsinmid-1943,achargeshedeniedfortherestofherlife.HerexperienceisyetanotherofthecountlesssmallmysteriescontainedinthestoryoftheTrepperring.ItwillneverbeknownhowfarPannwitz’sindulgencetowardsGourevitchreflectedthedepthofthe

latter ’scollaboration,ortheformer ’sconcernforhisownfuture.AccordingtotheGRUman,theGestapoofficerrecognisedthatthewarwaslost,andhadbecomedesperatetoavoidWesternAlliedcaptivitybecausehehadledNaziretributionforthe1942murderbySOE-trainedCzechsofReinhardHeydrich,includingthemassacreoftheinhabitantsofLidice.GourevitchpersuadedtheGermanthathewouldreceiveawarmwelcomeinMoscow,andnodoubtbelievedthathecouldimprovehisownprospectsbyreturninghomewithaseniorGestapoofficerasapersonaltrophy.GourevitchsustainedacloserelationshipwithPannwitzuntiltheyretreatedtoGermanybeforePariswasliberated,returningonlyinMay1945.MeanwhileLeopoldTrepperremainedsafelyinhidinguntiltheAlliesoverranhisrefugeinSeptember1944.Afterthebreak-upoftheRedOrchestra,the‘Lucy’RingbecameMoscow’sonlymeansofaccess

toBerlin’shighplaces.Unfortunately,however,justasunauthorisedsexualpassionshadcausedcomplicationsforTrepperandGourevitch,sotheydidalsofortheSwissspies.AlexanderRadó

suddenlydecidedthathewasinlovewiththewireless-operatorMargritBolli,whowashalfhisage.Withalmostinsaneindiscretion,hebeganvisitinghereveryday.TofacilitatetheirmeetingshehimselfstayedinGenevawhilerentingaflatforhisfamilyinBern.Thisstorydescendedintoblackfarcewhenthegirldecidedthatshewasinlovewithsomeoneelse

–ahandsomeyounghairdressernamedHansPeter,whowasaplantcodenamed‘Romeo’,controlledfromtheGermanconsulatebyAbwehrofficerHermannHensler.TheTreppernetwork’smeninGermanhandshadidentifiedRadó,andtheGermanssetaboutclosingdownboththeagentandhiscontacts.Bolliwassobewitchedbyher‘Romeo’thatsheinvitedhimtodallyintheflatwhereshekepthertransmitter.TheSwisspolicehadhithertoshownastubbornreluctancetoactagainstthe‘Lucy’Ring,butitsactivitieshadnowbecometooconspicuoustoremainignored.On27October1942,EdmondandOlgaHamelwerearrested.Theymanagedtohidetheirtransmitter,andwereeventuallyreleased,buttheirdaysinMoscow’sservicewereended.TheAbwehrsucceededinreadingsomeoftheGRU’sSwissmessagesduring1942,whichrevealedastringofagents’codenames.On16March1943thebesottedBollisentanenclairwirelesssignalto‘Romeo’,whichfurtherassistedGermanintelligence.TheAbwehrnowhadRadóandmostoftheRingunderintensivesurveillance,andexertedimmensediplomaticpressureontheSwisstoarrestthem.FromJune1943onwards,AlexanderFooteknewthathetoowasbeingwatchedby‘thedoctor ’–

localpolice.HetoldMoscowthathecouldnotsafelytransmitmorethantwiceaweek,buttheGRUwithcharacteristicruthlessnessinsistedthatheshouldmaintainamuchmoreintensiveschedule,whichmadethedirection-finders’taskeasy.Earlyonthemorningof20Novembertherewasadramaticrushofmenintohisflat.OneofthempresentedapistolandcriedinGerman,‘Händehoch!’ForaghastlymomentFootefearedthathisvisitorswerefromtheAbwehr.ItusuallysuitedthewarringnationsthatthereshouldbenoviolencebetweentheirrespectiveagentsinSwitzerland,buttherecouldalwaysbeafirsttime.TheEnglishmanwasoneofthefewlocalspieswhocarriedagun,a.32automatic:‘itgavememoralcomfortatsomeofmymoredifficultrendezvous’.ButnowthatFootewascornered,itneveroccurredtohimtotrytoshoothiswayout.HeexperiencedasurgeofreliefwhenhefoundthathewasmerelyinthehandsoftheSwisspolice,

whoseinterceptorshadpinpointedhistransmitter.Beforebeingtakenawayhemanagedtoswallowsomemessagesandnamesconcealedinsideatorch.Heafterwardsclaimednottohavedislikedtheprisontowhichhewascommitted:‘ForthefirsttimeforyearsIwasabletorelaxcompletely.’Hewaspermittedtowearhisownclothesandeatfoodbroughtinfromoutside.On8September1944hewasreleased,thoughhisroleinthe‘Lucy’Ringwasatanend.Onebyone,Moscow’sotheragentsinSwitzerlandwereremovedfromcirculation.Amongthem

wasAnnaMueller,aveteranSovietinformantwhomAlexanderFootedescribedas‘amotherlyoldsoulwholooked–andIhavelittledoubt,inthepast,hadactedas–asuperiorcharwoman’.Muellerwasthecut-outbetweenthenetworkandacorruptofficialintheSwisspassportoffice.Shewaslured

toGermanybyaphoneymessagesayingthathersister-in-lawinFreiburgwassick,discoveredtoolatethatitwassentbytheGestapo,andspenttherestofthewarinaconcentrationcamp.FootenoteddrylythattheGRUneverpaidherasinglemarkorfrancinrecompenseforhersufferingsforthesocialistcause.RachelDüberndorfer–‘Sisi’–afterbeingarrestedbytheSwissandchargedwithespionage

claimedathertrialthatshewasworkingfortheBritishsecretservice,inhopesthatthiswouldsecuremoregeneroustreatmentfromthelocalauthorities.Althoughsentencedtotwoyears’imprisonment,shewasindeedsoonbailedandallowedtodisappear.ButtheclaimfuelledtheNKVD’sdarkestsuspicions,andcausedherarrestandconfinementintheLubyankaonarrivalinMoscowin1945.AlexanderRadówentintohidingfollowingthearrestsofhiswireless-operators,andeventuallycrossedsecretlyintoFrance,wherehelivedundergrounduntiltheliberation.RudolfRösslerwasarrestedbytheSwisspoliceinMay1944andremainedincustodyuntilSeptember.Hewasthenreleased,butthe‘Lucy’Ring’sgamewasplayedout.TheRussiansafterwardsclaimedthatinearly1944theyhadninety-sevenagentsoperatinginside

Germany,ofwhomtenwereGermans.Amongthemostactive(saidMoscow)was‘Ian’–FerenzPataki,aHungarianwhohadonceworkedfortheCheka,whowaseventuallybetrayedandexecuted.‘Dozen’,HermannSalinger,wasaformerInternationalBrigadefighterwhowasdroppedintoGermanyinJanuary1944–withBritishhelp,accordingtotheRussians,thoughthereisnorecordof‘Dozen’inWesternfiles.‘Sharp’,HeinzGlodjai,wasparachutedintoEastPrussiain1943,andprovidedintelligenceuntilhewaskilledintheRAF’sAugust1944bombingofKönigsberg.Nonetheless,itisonethingtoboast,asdothemodernofficialchroniclersofRussianintelligence,

abouttheNKVD’sandGRU’sGermansourcesinthelatterphasesofthewar,andanothertoshowthattheseproduceduseful,usableinformation,whichseemsunlikely.Followingthebreak-upoftheRedOrchestra,AbwehrinterceptorsfailedtofindanyfurtherevidenceofAlliedagentstransmittingoutofGermany,anditseemsreasonabletodiscountsuggestionsthattheNKVDandGRUdeployedsubstantialnumbersofactiveagentsinsidetheReichbetween1943and1945.CertainlynoRussiancovertsourceinGermanygeneratedintelligenceremotelyasauthoritativeasthatproducedearlierbytheRedOrchestraandthe‘Lucy’Ring.Inthelastyearsofthewar,however,strategicintelligencehadbecomemuchlessimportant,becauseRussiandominanceofthebattlefieldwasoverwhelming.Moreover,despitetheSoviets’convictionthattheWesternAlliesdeniedthemimportantmaterial,theBritishandAmericansroutinelyinformedMoscowaboutallGermanmilitaryactivityrevealedbyUltrawhichthreatenedtheirinterests,ormightassistSovietoperations.Centredidnot,ofcourse,returnthecourtesy.

10

Guerrilla

1 RESISTERSANDRAIDERS

Veryoccasionallyinthecourseofthewar,amarriagebetweenintelligenceandmilitaryactionprovedperfectlyarranged.AthisParisflatintheavenuedelaMotte-Picquet,onthenightof24January1942,GilbertRenault–theGaullistResistancenetworkchief‘ColonelRémy’–decryptedaradiomessagefromLondon.Itdeliveredarequestwhichconstitutedaverytallorderindeed:toobtain,atutmostspeed,detailsofconditionsprevailingaroundaGermanChannelcoastalinstallationatSaint-Bruneval,nearCapd’AntiferinNormandy;andmeanwhile‘todeceivebochesineventyouragenttakenbereadytoreplytosamequestionnotonlyforplacechosen,butforthreeorfourothersimilarplacesoncoast’.Renault,thirty-sevenyearsold,leanandintenselypatrioticbutrejectedasover-ageformilitaryservicein1939,wasoneofthemoreremarkablefiguresofthesecretwar.HisCatholicismwasasignificantmotivationalforceinhisworkasanagent,andhewroteferventlylater:‘Iwouldneverhavebeenabletocarryoutthisassignmentinaforeigncountryorforalessrighteouscause.’HedescribedhisResistanceroleas‘puttinglivingtileuponlivingtile’,andrecruitedinformantsfromaremarkablerangeofbackgrounds:ex-militarymenandarchitects,peasantsandaristocrats.Thoughhimselfanextremeconservative,inthesacredcauseofFrancehesuppedwithcommunists.HewasviewedinLondonastoocarelessaboutsecurityandtradecrafttobeagreatspymaster,butheenjoyedaremarkablerunbeforetheseweaknessesundidhim.NowhedispatchedRogerDumont,aformerairforceofficercodenamed‘Pol’–forPolRogerchampagne–toreconnoitreBruneval.AttheendofJanuaryanother‘Rémy’contact,aLeHavregarageproprietornamedCharles

Chauveau,drovetoParisinhisSimca5topickupDumont,adoptingfalsenumberplatesforthelastkilometresintothecapital.ThetwomenthenreturnedtoLeHavre–amidGermansurveillancethatmerecarjourneywasadangerousventure.Attheporttheagenttookaroominashabbyhotelsocoldthathecouldnotsleep,butinsteadshiveredthroughthenight,fullydressedonachair.NextmorningheandChauveaurattledtwelvemilesnorthtoBruneval,withchainsontheSimca’styrestocontendwithafreshsnowfall.TheownerofthelittleHôtelBeauminetinthehamlet,PaulVennier,wasafriendofChauveau,amanwhomthegaragisteendorsedas‘oneofthebest’.Vennierwasable

toenumeratetheLuftwaffecrewbilletedinthebigfarmcompoundatTheuville,andtotellthemaboutaguardpostatavillabythebeach,‘StellaMaris’.HereportedthatthelocalWehrmachtgarrison,aplatoonstrongcommandedbyanefficientandenergeticFeldwebel,waslodgedintheBeauminet.Vennierknewnothingaboutwhatwashappeningatthelonelyhouseandneighbouring‘radiostation’halfamileawayontheclifftop,butatDumont’surgingheledhimdowntotheGermanwireentanglementjustshortoftheseasidetoseeforthemselves.Aconversationwithafriendlysentryrevealedtothespythatasupposedminefieldabovethebeachwasafiction,todeterintruders.Havingexploredtheareaaswellasanymancould,DumontreturnedtoLeHavre,andthencetoParis.Onthenightof9February,GilbertRenault’sSOE-trainedwireless-operator‘Bob’–RobertDelattre–MorsedtoLondontheagent’sreportonBruneval.Thefactthatthemissionhadsucceededwithoutincidentshouldnotforamomentmaskthefactthatithadinvolvedallthepartiesconcernedinmortalrisk.Dumont’saccountofBrunevalmadeplainthatitwasgarrisoned,butnotingreatstrength.

Thequestfortechnicalintelligenceabouttheenemy’sweaponssystemswasanuntiringpreoccupationofeveryparticipantinthewar.Itwaspursuedthroughspies,photographicreconnaissance,patrollingandprisonerinterrogation.Ifsoldiers,sailorsandairmenweresometimessceptical,indeedcynical,aboutstrategicandpoliticalintelligence,theycouldallgrasptheimportanceofsecuringdataabouttechnologybeingemployedbytheenemy,sothatmeanscouldbedevisedtocounterit.TheairwaroverEuropeengagedthemostsophisticatedequipmentavailabletobothsides,andinspiredcorrespondinglyfeveredeffortstounderstandeachother ’s.TheGermanshadtheeasiertask,becausetheycouldexplorethewreckageofBritishandAmericanaircraftshotdownoverEurope,fittedwiththelatestdevicestoaidnavigationandbomb-aiming.TheBritish,however,separatedfromtheairbattlefieldbytheChannel,dependedonthebrainpoweroftheirintelligenceofficersandscientiststopenetratetheLuftwaffe’ssecrets.Inthewinterof1941theyrealisedthatGermannight-fighterswereguidedfromthegroundbytwo

linkedradarsystems,codenamed‘Freya’and‘Würzburg’.R.V.Jones,thetwenty-nine-year-oldassistantdirectorofscientificintelligenceattheAirMinistryandadvisertoMI6,togetherwiththe‘boffins’oftheTelecommunicationsResearchEstablishmentthenatSwanage,identifiedtheseaskeyelementsintheso-called‘KammhuberLine’,anetworkofguidancestationsthatenabledtheLuftwaffetoinflictpunitivelossesontheRAF’sBomberCommand.TheyknewthatFreyas,withtheirhugeaerialarrays,monitoredBritishbombers.TheyguessedthatWürzburgsguidedthefighters,buthungeredforanopportunitytodissectaspecimen.On5December1941,ayoungSpitfirepilotoftheRAF’sPhotographicReconnaissanceUnit,TonyHill,carriedoutalow-levelsweepofthelonelyclifftopchâteauatBruneval,fromwhich53-cmradartransmissionshadbeendetectedinBritain.JonesporedoverHill’spictures,whichshowedaFreyasetashortdistancefromthehouse,andwhat

thepilotdescribedasa‘bowlheater ’sometenfeetindiameter–obviouslyaparabolicreceiverwhichwassurelythatofaWürzburg–somefourhundredyardssouthwards.Thesitewasonlyastone’sthrowfromthesea,lessthanaquarterofamilefromabeach.Itwas

protectedbynovisibleobstacles,suchaswireentanglements.Surelyitshouldbepossibleforadaringraidingpartytogetin–thenmoreimportant,out,havingsecuredpricelessbooty.JoneshadalreadyachievedanentréetotheinnermostcouncilsoftheBritishwarmachinebyhisbrilliant1940workontheLuftwaffe’selectronicnight-bombingguidancesystems.Now,hisproposalforadescentonBrunevalwasenthusiasticallyacceptedbytheAirStaff,DowningStreetandCombinedOperationsHQ.Itwasdecidedthattheattackersmustlandfromtheair,thenescapebysea.AcompanyofthenewlyformedParachuteRegiment,the‘RedBerets’,commandedbyMajorJohn

Frost,wasbriefedandtrainedtolandjusteastofthehouseanditsnearbyinstallation,thenseizebothinaswiftcoupdemain.AsectionofengineersledbyLt.DenisVernonwasdetailedtodismantlethesetandremoveitskeycomponents,aidedbyanRAFradarmechanic,Flight-SergeantCharlesCox.CoxwasrushedthroughthejumpschoolatRingway,thenheandVernonwerebriefedbyJonesandsettopractisingtheirroleonaBritishgun-layingradarset.AlltheraidersspenthoursmasteringthetopographyonadetailedscalemodelofBruneval.TrainingontheDorsetcoastwasdoggedbyvileweatherandrepeatedmishaps,wherebybothdroppingaircraftandshipsmadethewrongrendezvous.Thelastexercise,onthenightofSunday,22February,endedwiththeparatroopersstrugglinginchest-deepfreezingwaterassailorslabouredtoextricatethelanding-craftfromsandbanks.Allthisauguredillforthemission,asalsodidthegloomoverhangingtheRoyalNavyandtheBritishpeopleaftertheChannelescapethepreviousweekofScharnhorstandGneisenau.Theraidmusttakeplacewithinthefivenightsofafullmoon,toprovidelightfortheRAFand

Frost’smentoseetheirobjectives.Onthefirstthreepossibledatestheweatherwasunsuitable,dampeningthespiritsoftheraiders.Fridaythe27thofferedthelastpossiblewindow;itwasavastreliefwhen,at5p.m.,wordcamethattheoperationwas‘on’.TheassaultshipPrinsAlbert,carryingtheseaborneelement,setforthundermotorgunboatescort.At9.52p.m.sixlanding-craftwerelowered,eachcarryingCommandobren-gunnersaswellasnavalcrews.Bycoincidence,evenastwelveWhitleybombersoftheRAF’s51SquadronflewsouthacrosstheChannelthatnight,bearingFrost’sparatroopers,aLysanderlightaircraftpassedthemheadingnorth,taking‘ColonelRémy’fromFranceforameetinginLondonwithdeGaulle’sintelligencechief.Rémy’spartinOperation‘Biteback’wasdone,evenasthatoftheraidersbegan.Justbeforetake-offfromThruxtoninWiltshire,thepartylearnedofafreshsnowfallinnorthern

France.ThewhitecoverallspreparedforthiseventualityhadbeenleftbehindintheirtemporarybarracksatTilney,butonbalanceFrostthoughtthesnowabonus,becauseitwouldgivehismenmorelight.Abagpiperplayedawailingpibrochastheparachutistsboardedtheaircraft,whichpleasedtheScotsamongthem.Theweatherwassuddenlyclearandfine,afterawildweek,andthe

raiderstookoffwarmedbymugsoftealacedwithrum.Onceairbornetheysangoldfavourites–‘AnnieLaurie’,‘TheRoseofTralee’,‘Lulu’.Aftertwohours,atafewminutespastmidnightthefirst‘stick’plungedinsuccessionthroughholesinthefloorsoftheWhitleys,andaminutelatermostfoundthemselvesmakingperfectlandingsinsoftsnow:Bruneval’sproximitytothecoastmadepossibleuncommonlyaccuratenavigation.Mostofthemenurinatedbeforedoinganythingelse–intheair,Thruxton’steahadwreakedhavocwithbladders.AsFrostassembledhismen,hereflectedruefullythatonthisclearnighttheymustalreadyhavelostsurprise.Yetawonderfulsilencepersisted,andtherewasonlyonepieceofbadnews:twosections,twentymeninall,weremissing,havingobviouslylandedoff-target.Therewasnotimetowaste,noquestionofsearchingforabsentfriends.Withintenminutesof

landing,Frostledhisassaultpartyatafasttrottowards‘LoneHouse’–thechâteauwheretheWürzburgwasinstalled–whileasecondgroupsetforthtosecurethebeachfortheirretreat.Reachingthebuilding,themajorwasastonishedtofinditsdooropen.Heblewhiswhistleandchargedin,findingonlyoneGerman,whomtheykilledashefiredatthemfromupthestairs.MeanwhileLt.PeterYoung’spartyhadoverruntheWürzburgposition,whoseoccupantsfled,bewilderedbythecrackleofsmallarms.Flight-SergeantCoxtoreasidethecurtainmaskingtheentrancetothecabinintheradarpit,andfoundthesetstillwarm–ithadobviouslybeentrackingaGermanfighternotmanyminutesearlier.Lt.Vernon,leaderoftheRoyalEngineersteam,begantakingflashlightphotographs,whichprovokedGermangunfirefromsomewhereoutinthedarkness.TheBritishfoundthattheWürzburgoccupiedarotatingplatformonaflatbedtruck,protectedby

thickstacksofsandbags.Onesapperattackedthecasingwithahammerandchisel,removingTelefunkenlabelsandserialnumbers.Coxwasobligedtouseacrowbartopriseoffthetransmitter ’sfascia.Then,amidincreasinglyheavythoughill-directedgunfirefromGermansafewhundredmetresaway,theBritishloadedkeycomponentsontoatrolleytheyhadbroughtforthepurpose.OneofFrost’smenwaskilledbyastraybullet,butVernon,Coxandtheothersremainedunscathed.TheplancalledforthesapperstobegiventhirtyminutestoguttheGermanset.Afteronlyten,however,truckheadlightsshowedenemyreinforcementsapproaching.ThemajortoldVernontosettleforwhatheandhismenhadgot–whichincludedalltheelementsthatmatteredtoRegJonesandhiscolleagues–andgetmoving.ThepartytaskedtoclearthebeachfoundthemselvesbrieflypinneddownbytheGermans;

machine-gunfireseriouslywoundedCompanySergeant-MajorStrachan.AsFrost,Coxandtheothersbegantomovetowardsthecoast,theysawthattheGermanshadalreadyreoccupiedthechâteau.Suddenlytherewasanoutburstofheavyfiringfromthesouth-east:thetwosectionsdroppedoff-targethaddoubledtowardsBruneval,andnowattackedtheGermansfromtherear,aluckydiversionwhichenabledtheircomradestoclearthewaytothebeach.Afewminutesofacutetensionfollowed:Frost’sradiobeacon,summoningthenavy,failedtoelicitaresponse.OnlyaftertheBritish

firedasuccessionofgreenflaresdidthelanding-crafthasteninupontherendezvous,totheintensereliefofthewaitingparatroopers.Shortlybefore3a.m.theraiders,togetherwithFlight-SergeantCoxandhispreciouscargo,wereloadedaboard.OnceoffshoretheWürzburg’scomponentsweretransferredtoanMGBwhichdashedforPortsmouthattwentyknots,leavingFrost’smentofollowatamoresedatepaceinthelanding-craft,towedbyothergunboats.Theattackersleftbehindonlytwomenkilledandsixmissing,whospenttherestofthewarincaptivity;theGermanslostfive,andthreemorewerebroughtbacktoBritainasPoWs.At6o’clockthateveningof28FebruarytheentirepartyboardedthePrinsAlbert,whereatriumphantpressconferencewasheld.Inthatchillseasonofdefeats,herewasatinybutinfinitelyprecioustriumphtowarmtheheartsoftheBritishpeople.TheBrunevalraidwasthemostsuccessfulsuchoperationofthewar.Throughasmallinvestment

ofresources,andatnegligiblecost,MajorFrost’sparatroopersandFlight-SergeantCoxbroughthomeforBritaintheintimatesecretsoftheWürzburgradar:itsaerial,receiver,receiveramplifier,modulatorandtransmitter.ThesesufficedtoenableR.V.JonesandhiscolleaguestograspthesystemonwhichtheKammhuberlinewasbased–achainof‘boxes’,withineachofwhichFreyaandWürzburgradarsetsguidedanight-fighterontothetrackofabomber.Oncethiswasunderstood,theRAF’sresponsebecameobvious:topushaircraftthroughthenightskyoverthelineatmaximumdensity,swampingtheelectronicdefences.‘Streaming’worked,andrenderedKammhuber ’ssystemobsolete.Althoughbomberlossesremainedsevere,BrunevalprovidedapreciousintelligencebreaktotheAllies.Moreover,initswaketheGermansfeltobligedtofortifytheircoastalradarchainsoheavilythatthereaftereverystationwaseasilypinpointedbyphotographicreconnaissance.Theattackrepresentedatextbookcollaborationbetweenthe‘boffins’,ledbyJones,whoidentified

whattheyneededtoknow;spiesontheground–‘ColonelRémy’s’men–whoreconnoitredthetargetforMI6;planners,whomarriedtheagentreportstodatasecuredbyairphotography;andspecialforces,whichexecuted‘Biteback’.Inadditiontothedecorationsawardedtotheairborneforce,JoneswasmadeaCBE.TheattackerswereaidedbythefactthatacoastaltargetwasrelativelyeasyfortheRAFandnavytofindandreach.InFebruary1942theFrenchcoastwasdefendedmuchlessheavilythanitbecametwoyearslater.Perhapsmostimportant,theBritishhadluckontheirside.‘Rémy’s’agentswerenotcaught,assomanyspieswerecaught;theparachutedropwasrelativelyaccurate,asmanydropswerenot;theGermansputuplittleeffectiveresistance;andCoxwasabletocarryawaythetreasure.Manytimesbetween1940and1945,Britishplannershadcausetolamentthatthecourseofsecretwarseldomransosmooth.

2 SOE

FollowingthefallofFranceinJune1940,foralmostfouryearsWinstonChurchillwagedwarwiththeconvictionthatBritain,evenaftertheaccessionofRussiaandtheUnitedStatesasfellow-foesof

Hitler,lackedpowertoconfronttheNazis’militarymightontheContinent.Thismadeitessentialtochallengetheenemybyothermeans–thestrategicbomberoffensiveagainstGermanyandguerrillacampaignsintheoccupiedcountries.ThecreationofBritain’sSOEandthePoliticalWarfareExecutive,followedlaterbythatoftheAmericanOSSandOfficeofWarInformation,wasencouragedbyadelusionthatHitler ’s1939–41Blitzkriegshadsucceededpartlybyexploitationofa‘FifthColumn’ofsecretsupporterswithinthevictimnations.Manypeople,theprimeministernotableamongthem,believedthishadplayedthesameroleintheenemy’sonslaughtsassappersinsiegesofold,whotunnelledbeneathcitywallsbeforestormingpartiesattacked.HethussoughttocreatehisownFifthColumntoservetheAlliedcause.HefearedthatifthepeoplesofoccupiedEuropewerelefttotheirowndevicestheywouldremainsunkinpassivity,acquiescence,collaboration–andhewasprobablyright.InpromotingraidsandResistance,theprimeministerhadfourobjectives.Thefirst,andleast

important,wastofulfilmilitarypurposes,whereinthereweremanyfiascossuchasOperation‘Colossus’,a1941CombinedOperationsparachutedroptodestroyaCalabrianrailviaduct,theAugust1942Diepperaid,andsomeearlysabotageattemptsinNorway.ThesecondpurposewastopromoteamongBritishpeopleandacrosstheworldabelief–ill-foundeduntilatleastlate1942–thatthewarwasbeingenergeticallyandeffectivelycarriedon;whatthisauthorhaselsewheredubbed‘militarytheatre’.AthirdobjectivewastoobligeHitlertoexpendresourcesontheinternalsecurityofhisempire.Thefourth,andmostimportant,wastostimulatetension,recrimination,hatredbetweentheNazisandtheirsubjectpeoples.FarfromacknowledgingthatactsofrepressionshouldpromptacurbonResistanceactivity,ChurchillsawNazisavageryasfurtheringhisaims.‘Thebloodofthemartyrs,’hetoldameetingoftheCabinetDefenceCommitteeon2August1943,‘wastheseedoftheChurch.’Thefactthatbythewar ’sendmostofEurope’soccupiedpeoplesloathedtheGermanswaspartlyaconsequenceofpoliciesHitleranywayadopted;butitwasalsoattributabletotheinsurgenciessponsoredbyBritainandlatertheUS.ThemilitaryachievementsofResistancewereverymodest,themoralonesimmense.Operationsbyarmedciviliansbehindenemylineswerefarremotefromthedoingsofbespectacled

mathematiciansandchessplayershuddledovercryptogramsatBletchleyPark,ArlingtonHallandtheNKVD’ssigintcentreintheoldSelecthotelonDzerzhinskyStreet.Nonetheless,guerrillacampaignsbecamecriticalelementsofthesecretwar,eventuallycommandingresourcesaslargeasthoseexpendedonintelligence-gathering,andoftenoverlappingwithit.InJuly1940SpecialOperationsExecutivereceivedtheprimeminister ’smandateto‘setEuropeablaze’.Inhisdeterminationtowageanewkindofwarwithnewmenandnewmeans,heentrustedhisbrainchildtoHughDalton,theraffishministerofeconomicwarfareandaLabourMP,ratherthantothechiefsofstafforBroadway.Acabinetcolleaguetoldtheforeignsecretary,LordHalifax,‘Youshouldneverbeconsultedbecauseyouwouldneverconsenttoeverything;youwillnevermakeagangster.’Thoughtheoldsecret

servicefoughtasfiercelyagainstitsupstartrivalasitdidagainsttheGermans,SOEeventuallybecameamoreeffectivebodythanMI6,andwasrunbyablerpeople.Between1940and1943,however,itsoperationsweredoggedbythefactoftheAxisPowers’

dominationofthestruggle.GermanyandJapanwereseenbymostinhabitantsofoccupiedterritoriesaswinners,whomitwasmadnesstochallenge.BentinckoftheJICtoldDaltonhewasthoroughlyopposedtorousingthecivilianpopulationsofEurope:‘Thetimeisnotripe,andalotofunfortunatepeoplewillbeshot.’Daltonshrugged:‘Thesearetheprimeminister ’sorders,andmustbecarriedout.’Theminister,anambitiousandindiscreetmanmistrustedbymostofhiscolleagues,yearnedforalivelierroleinthewareffortthanhisaridresponsibilityforadministeringblockade:stewardshipofBritain’sguerrillaoperationspromisedtoprovidethis.AnSOEofficerwrotelaterthatDalton,whoaspiredtosupplantAnthonyEdenasforeignsecretary,‘tendedtogiveChurchillandothercabinetministersforecastsofResistanceactivitiesbasedonassumptionsofawilltoresistinexcessofanyrealisticviews,untiltheaccessionoftheSovietUnionandUnitedStatestotheAlliedcausegavethepeoplesofoccupiedEuropearealhopeforanAlliedvictory’.Until1944,whenitbecameplainthatHitlerwouldsoonbedefeated,mostoftheContinental

societieswantedtohavenothingtodowithrevolt,thefrightfulperilstotheirownhomesandfamiliesofassistingthedistantallies.JeanCocteau,amongthemorenotoriousFrenchintellectualcollaboratorswiththeNazis,saidscornfullytoayoungpoetwhotoldhimthatheintendedtojointheResistance,‘Vousaveztort.Lavieestplusgravequeça’–‘Youarewrong.Lifeismoreseriousthanthat.’PosterityisconfidentthatitwasCocteauwhowaswrong,butespeciallyintheearlywaryearshisviewwaswidelysharedamongthesocialandpoliticalelitesoftheEuropeannations.InthedaysbeforetheGermansoccupiedYugoslaviain1941,SOEdistributedsevenwirelesssetstoprospectivelocalstay-behindoperators,butnoneevertransmitted.ThehandfulofextraordinarilybraveinhabitantsoftheoccupiednationswhostartedResistancenetworksinthoseearlydays,suchpeopleasMichelHollardandMarie-MadeleineFourcadeinFrance–intheircasesworkingwithMI6–deservethehighestadmirationforbreakingrankswiththeircowedfellow-countrymenlongbeforetheAlliedcausebecamefashionable.

RobertBruceLockhart,director-generalofthePoliticalWarfareExecutiveandaveteranofBritishsecretserviceoperationsinRussiaaftertheBolshevikRevolution,spoketothechiefsofstaffon29May1942aboutthelimitationsofResistance.Enthusiasts,hesaid,sometimesforgotthatlocalsupportmustebbandflowwiththeAllies’perceivedmilitarysuccessorfailure.Britishprestigehadbeengrievouslydamagedbyyearsofdefeats.Moreover,aruthlessoccupierenjoyedgreatadvantagesovercivilianResisters:‘IntheRussianrevolutionof1905–6workerswithriflescouldstillgetbehindbarricadesandputupashowagainsttroops,’readBruceLockhart’snotesofthemeeting.‘Todaynochanceagainstafewtanksandadive-bomberortwo.Taskofcontrollingmucheasier…Gestapo,anti-sabotageunitsveryruthless.’Heconcluded:‘Idon’tthinkmuchhopeofstimulatingresistancetoamoreactivestageuntilthereissomeconsiderablemeasureofAnglo-Americanmilitarysuccess.Propagandacan’treplacemilitarysuccess…Weshouldnottrytopromoteaprematurerevoltwhichcanbeeasilycrushed.’TheGermanpolicyofrepressionwashighlyeffectiveinstiflingrevoltamongmostoftheoccupiedpeoples.SOE’schiefsattributedtheslowgrowthofResistance,especiallyinFrance,tolackofarms:the

RAFdeclinedtodivertbombersinsignificantnumberstosupplypartisansuntil1944,whenDowningStreetinsisted.However,theonlylikelyconsequenceofarmingResistersearlierinthewarwouldhavebeenthattheGermanskilledmoreofthem.Untrainedciviliansgivengunswerecapableofassassinationsandnuisanceattacks,butlarge-scaleclasheswiththeWehrmachtandSScouldhaveonlyoneoutcome–bloodydefeat–aswasrepeatedlyprovenaslateas1944–45.AnOSSofficer,MacdonaldAustin,saidofthemaquis:‘Sometimestheywoulddomarvellousthings,butonehadtorealisethatonthenextoperationtheycouldhaveforgottentocrankupthegazogènes’–thecharcoal-fuelledcarsonwhichoccupiedFrancedependedformobility.ABritishSHAEFintelligenceofficersaid:‘Youcouldnevermakeanymilitaryplandependentontheparticipationofguerrillas,becauseyoucouldneverbesuretheywouldturnup.’From1938untiltheestablishmentofSOE,MI6maintainedasmallsabotageunitknownas‘Section

D’,runbyatall,lanky,absurdsappermajornamedLaurenceGrand,whoaffectedalongcigarette-holderandacarnationinhisbuttonhole.Grandwasafountofexoticideas,noneofwhichcametomuch.IntheearlydaysofthewarhepromotedsuchstuntsaspayingSloveniangangstopoursandintotheaxle-boxesofrollingstockboundforGermany.AnewassistantwhojoinedGrandwasdisbelievingwhenorderedtofundsomeEastEuropeansabotagegroupsbysendingthemcashthroughthepost.NobodybelievedinGrand.TheForeignOffice’sGladwynJebbpressedforhisremoval,writingcontemptuouslytoCadogan:‘TheonlygoodpointthatIhavebeenabletodiscoveristhatheisgenerous&likedbyhisstaff,whichincludesoneortwoablepersons.ButtopitsuchamanagainsttheGermanGeneralStaff&theGermanMilitaryIntelligenceServiceislikearranginganattackonaPanzerdivisionbyanactormountedonadonkey.’Hearingallthis,theprimeministerintervenedtoinsistthataneworganisationshouldbe

establishedtomakemayhemacrossEurope,theBalkansandlatertheFarEast.SpecialOperationsExecutivewasinitiallyrunbySirFrankNelson,aformerimperialmerchant,MPand1914–18intelligenceofficer.NelsonwasreplacedinMay1942bythebankerSirCharlesHambro,ofwhomdeGaulle’sintelligencechiefAndréDewavrinsaid:‘Acharmingfellow,butalmostinvisiblebecauseofhisinnumerableresponsibilitieselsewhere.’FromanearlystageSOE’smosteffectivepersonalityprovedtobeColinGubbins,itsdirectorofoperations,aHighlandsoldierwithabackgroundinmilitaryintelligencewhohadservedattheWarOfficeunderthefamouslyimaginativeirregularwarriorCol.JohnHolland.InSeptember1943Gubbinsbecameamajor-generalandsucceededHambroasheadoftheorganisation.SOE–‘theracket’,asmanyofitsstaffirreverentlyreferredtoit–startedlifeat64BakerStreet,

withacovernameastheInter-ServiceResearchBureau.By1945ithadexpandedtooccupysixacresofofficespacebetweenBakerStreettubestationandPortmanSquare.Itrecruitedstaffvariouslyamongservicepersonnel,civilianswithspecialistknowledgeofoccupiedcountries,refugees,andadventurerswhofittedinnowhereelse.ItestablishedtrainingschoolsinsabotageatStevenage,blackpropagandaatWatford,fieldcraftatLochAilortandguerrillatechniquesatArisaig.Themostcelebratedinstructorsattheschoolforsubversion,basedinAstonHousenearKnebworth,weretwoex-Shanghaipolicemen,CaptainsFairburnandSykes,whowereallegedtoconcludealllessonsinunarmedcombatwiththewords,‘andthenkickhimintheballs’.AnotablefailingofMI6wasthatitmadelittleattempttotrainitspersonnel,whowereexpectedtolearnonthejob,initsgentleman-amateurtradition.EvenBroadway’sofficialhistorianacknowledgesthatSOEprovidedgoodinstruction:severalofitstrainingschoolswereincorporatedintothepost-warsecretservice.

FielddutywithSOEdemandedalmostentirelydifferentskillsfromthoseofMI6’speople.‘Themanwhoisinterestedinobtainingintelligencemusthavepeaceandquiet,andtheagentsheemploysmustneverifpossiblebefoundout,’wroteBickhamSweet-Escott,whoservedinbothorganisations.Bycontrast,theagentsentintothefieldtopromoteguerrillawarisboundtomakeanoise,‘anditisonlytoolikelythatsomeofthemenheuseswillnotescape’.Intheearlydays,SOEmademanymistakesthatemphasiseditsinexperience.JackBeevor,alawyerandWorldWarIgunnerofficer,waspostedtoitsstationinneutralLisbon,whereherentedaflatinhisownname.HethenallowedhisMI6counterpartstouseitforameetingwithinformants,whichthelandlordreportedtothePortugueseauthorities,whopromptlyexpelledtheSOErepresentative.Inthespringof1942amemberofanSOElandingpartywascapturedbytheItaliansontheMediterraneanislandofAntiparos;heprovedtobecarryingalistofBritishcontactsinAthens,anactofcarelessnesswhichcostthosehaplessGreekstheirlives.InIstanbulharbour,SOEplantedlimpetmineswhichfailedtoexplodeontankerscarryingRomanianoilfortheAxis.Sweet-Escottdescribedhow,intheworstearlydays,hesharedthewidespreadWhitehallbeliefthat

theneworganisationwas‘nothingmorethanawickedwasteoftime,effort,andmoney…Ourrecordofachievement…wasnegligible.Butoursuccessorfailuredependedinthelastresortonthewillingnessofmenandwomeninenemy-occupiedterritorytorisktheirlivesintheAlliedcause…Theirreadinesstodosowastemperedbydoubtsastoourfinalvictory.Thisattitudeontheirpartlimitedthescopeforsuccessfuloperationsonours.’In1941–42,SOEwasbesiegedwithrequeststoattacktargetsdeepinenemyterritory–forinstance,theLuftwaffe’sCondorlong-rangemaritimereconnaissanceaircraft,basedatairfieldsaroundBrest–butitsFrenchsectionlackedanylocalsupporterstoundertakesabotage.TheAbwehrwasbemusedthattheBritishdidnotattackGermany’svitalRomanianoilfields,astheyhaddoneinWorldWarI,butthereagainBakerStreetlackedmeans.AmongSOE’searlyassignmentswastoorganisedemolitionpartiestodestroyvitalinstallationsin

thewakeofaGermaninvasionofBritain.Thereafter,itsetabouttrainingyoungmenandwomentobelandedinoccupiedcountrieswherevercontactcouldbemadewithlocalsympathisers–noeasytask–andwhenevertheRAFwouldprovideaircraft,anevenbiggerconstraint.BakerStreet’sfirstbigsuccesswasOperation‘Rubble’inMarch1941,whereinGeorgeBinneystage-managedtheescapefromGothenburgofaconvoyofeightfreightersladenwithscarcecommoditiesandindustrialmaterials,amissionthatuniformedpersonnelcouldnotundertake,becauseitbreachedSwedishneutrality;asecondsimilarcoupwasstagedlaterintheyear.MeanwhiletheflamboyantGusMarch-PhillipsledaWestAfricanraidto‘cutout’the7,600-tonItalianlinerDuchessad’Aosta,whichwasenjoyingPortuguesesanctuaryoffFernandoPó.Heseveredtheship’scablebeforetowingitintointernationalwaters,wheretheRoyalNavytookover.Operation‘Postmaster ’,asMarch-Phillips’raidwaschristened,madeusefulpropaganda,becauseitshowedthelengthofBritain’sreach.SomeSOEschemesexploredthewildershoresoffantasyinafashionworthyoftheAbwehr.A

January1942BakerStreetpaperproposedthatagentsshouldbedispatchedtorallyAfghantribes–Barakzais,FopalzaisandAlizais–onaprospectiveGermanlineofadvancetoIndia.TherewasalsoaplantolaunchbiologicalwarfareagainstJapanbyparachutinghostileinsectsontoitscrops.AnofficerwhodiscussedwaysandmeanswithoneoftheNaturalHistoryMuseum’sexpertsinLondonreportedafterwards:‘Hetellsmethatbollweevilisnotthebestinsect.Afarmoreseriousthreatwouldbethepinkbollworm,platyedraGossypiellaSaunders,whichdoestenmillionpounds’worthofdamageannuallyinEgypt.’UnliketheJapanese,however,whodidindeedlaunchbiologicalwarfareinChina,BakerStreetneitherexperimentedonhumanguineapigs,norimplementedthebollwormplan.SOEhadmanycritics.Ascornful1941cabletoLondonfromtheBritishembassyinBelgrade

denouncedsuchyoungofficersasJulianAmery,committedto‘actionforaction’ssake’.Thiswasawidespreadcomplaintbydiplomatswhofailedtounderstandthat‘actionforaction’ssake’wasexactlywhattheprimeministerwanted.WhiletheEuropeangovernmentsinexileinLondonfavouredalow-profilepolicytowardsResistanceuntilthedayofliberationwasathand,Churchillsoughtimmediate,conspicuousactsofarmeddefiance.TherewerefurthercriticismsabouttherealusefulnessofSOE’sproclaimedachievements.ThedestructionoftheGorgopotamosviaductinGreecewasanotablefeatofarms,butthelong-intendeddemolitiondidnottakeplaceuntiltheendofNovember1942,whenBritain’sEighthArmywasalreadyadvancingwestwardsfromEgypt,andthustheGermansupplylinethroughGreecehadbecomeirrelevanttotheNorthAfricancampaign.EvenBakerStreet’sownmenconsideredthatsomeoperationsdidmoretofulfilthefantasiesofits

adventurousyoungofficersinthefieldthantohastenAlliedvictory.BickhamSweet-Escottopposedoneoftheorganisation’smostfamouscoups,theCretankidnappingofaGermandivisionalcommander,becauseoftheinevitabilityoflocalreprisals.‘Thesacrificemightpossiblyhavebeenworthwhileintheblackwinterof1941whenthingsweregoingbadly,’helaterwrote.ByApril1944,however,whenSOE’sintrepidbuccaneerscarriedouttheoperationwhichbroughtthemfame,themurderousGen.FriedrichMüllerhadbeenreplacedbya‘comparativelyharmlessgeneralcalled[Heinrich]Kreipe…Theresultofcarryingitoutin1944,wheneveryoneknewthatvictorywasmerelyamatterofmonthswould,Ithought,hardlyjustifythecost.’Manylocalpeoplesinalloccupiedcountriesweremoreinterestedintheirownfactionalstruggles

thaninacceptingordersfromLondonabouthowtoservetheAlliedcause.Bold,brashyoungmenandafewwomenfromSOEandOSSarrivedontheirthresholdsdemandingthattheyshouldsetasidelocaldifferencestopursuethesupremepurposeofdefeatingtheAxis.ButmanyFrenchmen,Greeks,Yugoslavs,Italians,Albanians,MalaysandBurmesespurnedsucharguments.Itmightsuitforeigners’intereststofighttheGermans,Italians,Japanesetotheexclusionofallelse,butitdidnotsuitmanypartisans.NoneoftheseBritishorUSofficersplannedtoliveintheircountriesafterthewar;thevisitorshadnostake,beyondtheirownlives,whichtheyheldcheapastheyoungandunattacheddo,

inthesocietiesonwhichtheysoeagerlyurgedrevolt.NigelCliveofMI6signalledareportfromGreeceinApril1944whichemphasisedthepopular

expectationofliberationbymid-summer,andofferedashrewdforecast:‘Whatmattersmostiswhatwillhappenthereafter.Thereisuniversalapprehensionoftheimmediateaftermathofliberationwhenitlooksasifthetownswillbecomethebattlefieldsofwhatisnowamountaincivilwar.Publicclamourisforthefollowingthingsinthisorder:food,freedomfromtheGermanoccupationandaminimumofsecuritysothatasemblanceofdemocraticlifemaybeginagain.NopoliticalmovementinfreeGreeceiscapableofmeetingthelastrequirement.Allarmedpoliticalmountainpartiesengenderdifferentdegreesofmistrust.’ThesamewastrueinYugoslavia,whereunorthodoxlocalrulesofthegameprevailed:theGermanswereinfuriatedtodiscoverfromawirelessinterceptthatanItaliangeneralcapturedbyGen.MihailovićandhisCetnikshadsubsequentlybeenfreedinexchangeforthesurrenderofafieldgunandammunitiontothepartisans.InJanuary1943StewartMenziesstagedoneofhisfrequentexplosionsofwrathaboutSOEto

RobertBruceLockhart,whorecordedtheconversation:‘Couldnothingbedoneaboutthisshow,whichwasbogusthroughandthrough?’‘C’demanded.‘Theyneverachievedanything,theycompromisedallhisagents,andtheywereamateursinpoliticalmatters…[Menzies]reckonedthatiftheycouldbesuppressedourIntelligencewouldbenefitenormously.’GuyLiddellofMI5wroteon3April1943:‘Lackofunitybetweenourselves,[MI6]andSOEisaseriousmenace.’Fractioushorse-trading,aswellasbittersquabbles,someofthemcomic,doggedtherelationships.InNovember1941therewasanegotiationaboutcodenameswhichresultedinAirCommodoreArchieBoyleofSOEminutingClaudeDanseyatBroadway:‘TheGreekAlphabet,togetherwithnamesofmotorcars,biggame,fruitandcoloursarereservedfor[MI6]…IhaveabandonedfruitsforSOEpurposes…Iunderstandthatyouwillsuggestto[MI6]asadditionalcategories,musiciansandpoets,andIshallthereforekeepoffthem.’ChildishrivalrycausedBroadwayandBakerStreettorunseparatewirelessorganisations.Differencesinthefieldcouldbecomeextreme:SOEofficerSpikeMoranshotdeadCostaLawrenceofMI6,anunhingedGreekwhobecamesofanaticallyenthusiasticaboutthecommunistELASfactionthathetriedtobetraytotheGermanstheBritishteamattachedtotherivalEDES.SOEalmostprecipitateditsowndemisebyasuccessionoffolliesthatcostlives,togetherwith

massiveembarrassmentwhentheywererevealed.ByfartheworsttookplaceinHolland,andalsoinvolvedMI6.Inthesummerof1941oneofBroadway’sagentswascapturedwithalargepileofbackmessages–acommonsinofcommissionbysecretwireless-operators–whichenabledtheAbwehr,withtheaidofaGermancipherexpertnamedSergeantMay,tobreakitstraffic.On13February1942twomoreMI6agentswerecaptured,oneofwhomtalkedfreely.MeanwhiletwoDutchSOEagentsweredroppedundercircumstanceswhichsuggestedfantastic

carelessnessinBakerStreet:bothwereissuedwithforgedidentitycardsonwhichtheroyalarmsof

Hollandwererepresentedbytwolionswhichbothfacedthesameway,insteadofaddressingeachother.Evenmoreincredible,HubertusLauwersandThysTaconiswereissuedwithidenticalcivilianclothes.WhentheyremonstratedwiththeirconductingofficerinthebriefingshedatNewmarketbeforebeingdroppedonthenightof6–7November1941,hewavedasidetheirconcerns,sayingthatnoonewouldnotice.Theyarrivedsafelynonetheless,andwenttoworkrespectivelyinTheHagueandArnhem.TaconisreceivedassistancefromalocalmannamedRidderhof,whowasasecretV-Mann–aVertrauensmänner,orGermaninformer,ofwhichHollandhadmanyin1941.EverythingTaconisdidwasreportedtotheAbwehr ’seffectiveandingeniousMaj.HermanGiskes.On6March1942Lauwerswasseizedinmid-transmissionataflatinTheHague,carryingcopiesofseveraloldmessages.Whenheresumedtransmission,thereceivingoperatorfailedtonoticethathegavetheagreedsecuritywarningthathewasunderenemycontrol.Thereafter,agentafteragentwasparachutedintoHollandtobereceivedbyGiskes’men.Amidtheirshock,andbitternessatbetrayal,mostoftheprisonerstalked,sothateachnewsubjectforinterrogationwasdisorientatedbythediscoveryofhowmuchtheGermansalreadyknew.Lauwersinsertedfurtherwarningsinsubsequenttransmissions,includingtheword‘CAUGHT’,buttheNSectioninLondonblithelyignoredthem.TherapidexpansionofSOEmeantthatmanyagents,andespeciallywireless-operators,were

dispatchedintothefieldhastilytrained,asweremostoftheirWhaddonHallcounterparts.AnAbwehrinterceptionspecialistlatercapturedbytheBritishexpressedscepticismaboutSOEradiodisciplineinFrance.AloisSchwarze,atwenty-four-year-oldNCO,saidthatmanyAlliedagentstransmittedveryslowly;theyreportedtheintendedtimingsoftheirnextscheduleinplainlanguageorverysimplecode;theirthree-lettercallsignswereeasytopickup,asweretheir‘hellos’and‘goodbyes’.Heandhiscolleagueswereamazedhowoftencapturedwireless-operatorshadfailedtonoticethattheywerebeingmonitoredbyGermandirection-finders.Theywerealsooftencaughtinpossessionofcopiesofoldsignals,inthefashionoftheDutchmen.Muchofthislackofprofessionalismwasinevitablewhencivilianswererushedthroughtrainingasspiesanddispatchedintothefield,butmorethanafewmenandwomenpaidforitwiththeirlives.Itisamyth,vividlyexposedbytheDutchexperience,thatAlliedagentsandResistanceworkers

whofellintoGermanhandsseldomtalked.Almosteveryprisonerofanynationalitygaveawayalittleormuch,withorwithoutundergoingtorture.Controllersexpectedonlythattheirfieldofficersandagentsshouldwithholdnamesforaminimumoftwenty-fourorforty-eighthours,toenablemeetingstobecancelled,contactstoflee.TheGestapoinParisemployedLatvian,DutchandindeedFrenchcollaboratorstoconductthetortureofprisoners,whileGermanofficersaskedthequestions.Capturedagentswereusuallyoffereda50percentchanceoflifeiftheytalked,andsuchbargainsweresometimeskept.AnSDinterpreternamedCorporalWeigel,whotookpartinmany‘extremeinterrogations’atVersailles,recalledthenamesofjusttwoprisonerswhoremainedsilent:onewasaMadameZiegler,whomhebelievedtobeAlsatian,theotheraCaptainTinchebray,takeninJune1944

atSaint-Marcelle.Thosewereexceptionstoaharshgenerality,recognisedalikebyoccupiers,ResistersandtheirLondonsponsors.Thebroadtruthaboutspiesofallnationalitieswhofellintoenemyhandswasthattheywerekeptaliveaslongastheycouldserveapurpose,andshotwhentheirusefulnessexpired.Theemotiveword‘murdered’isoftenusedbypost-warwriterswhenmentioningSOEagents,andespeciallywomen,killedbytheGermans.Intruth,allofthemknewthatiftakendeathwouldalmostcertainlybetheirfate,legitimisedbythelawsofwar.Everycapturedagentwhowantedtolivestruggledtodecidehowmuchheorshemightrevealwithoutbecomingatraitor,andsomemisjudgedtheanswer.GiskeseventuallyoperatedfourteenBritishwirelesssetsinhisEnglandspiel,whichcontinuedfor

morethantwoyears,withsuccessiveconsignmentsofarmsandexplosives,togetherwithsaboteursandwireless-operators,parachuteddirectlyintoGermancustody.Fifty-onemenfromSOE,ninefromMI6andonewomanfromMI9wereeventuallytaken,ofwhomallbutahandfulwereshot.WhenfivemadeanescapeinAugust1943andsentamessagetoLondonwarningofthedisaster,allunknowingtheyentrustedittoaV-Mann,andthusitwasneverforwarded.WhiletwooftheescaperswereontheirwaytoBritaintheAbwehrsignalledtoSOEononeofitsownsets,reportingthementobeunderGestapocontrol,withtheresultthatwhentheyarrivedtheywereconfinedforsomeweeksinBrixtonprison.ItwasGiskeshimselfwhodecidedthathehadexhaustedthepossibilitiesofhisOperation‘NorthPole’,andonAllFools’Day1944sentafinalmockingsignaltoSOE:‘WHENEVERYOUWILLCOMETOPAYAVISITTOTHECONTINENTYOUMAYBEASSUREDTHATYOUWILLBERECEIVEDWITHTHESAMECAREANDRESULTASALLTHOSEYOUSENTUSBEFORESTOPSOLONG.’BeyondtheMI6andSOEagentswhowerelost,hundredsoflocalResistanceworkersperishedasaresultofthegrossmisconductofSOE’sNetherlandssectionbyMajorCharlesBlizardandMajorSeymourBingham.HughTrevor-Roperwroteon19June1944,acknowledgingthatforallhisdisdainforGermanintelligence-gathering,itsofficersdisplayedformidableeffectivenessincounteringResistance:‘WhatevertheRSHA’sdeficienciesintheevaluationofintelligence,itscompetenceincounter-espionagecannotbequestioned.’ThosewhomocktheGermansforhavingswallowedforsolongtheproductionsoftheBritish

DoubleCrosssystemshouldtakeheedofthegullibilityofSOEandMI6intheirDutchoperations.AllthatwasdifferentwasthatwhiletheintelligencetransmittedbytheAbwehrdoubleagentsunderBritishcontroladdressedissuesofhighstrategicimportancetoGermany,theDutchconnectionhadonlylocalsignificancefortheAlliedwareffort.Thescandal–forsuchitwas–soenragedtheNetherlandsgovernmentthatforatimeafterthewartheybelievedMajorBinghamtohavebeenadouble,servingtheNazis.Intruthhewasmerelyincompetent,buthewiselyemigratedtoAustralia,tostartanewlifeinacontinentwherehisshamewasunknown.SOEnarrowlysurvivedWhitehalldemandsthatitshouldbewoundupafterthefiascoinHollandwasrevealed,becauseChurchill

rejectedanywholesalereorganisationofthesecretservicesuntilthewarended.Ananonymouspost-warcritic,obviouslyfamiliarwiththesecretworldandperhapshimselfa

veteranoftherivalMI6,wrotethatmanyofSOE’sseniorpersonnel‘displayedanenthusiasmquiteunrestrainedbyexperience,somehad[communist]politicalbackgroundswhichdeservedarathercloserscrutinythantheyevergot,andafewcouldonlycharitablybedescribedasnutcases’.YetBillBentinck,whoknewallthesecretservices’topmenintimately,inhisoldageofferedwarmpraiseforSOE,assertingthatithad‘goodpeople,verygoodpeople’.IfColinGubbinswasnotbrilliant,hewasacapableorganisersupportedbysomeableciviliansinuniform.BentinckemphasisedMI6’sweakness,bycontrast:‘Therewerealotofoldboys,peoplewho’dbeentherefromWorldWarIandhadbeenhangingon…Theyfanciedthemselvesasspy-masters.’NigelClive,himselfanMI6fieldagent,said‘SOEwasunquestionablythebest.’Bothatthetimeandsince,someextravagantclaimshavebeenmadeabouttheabilityofResistance

movementstoinfluencethemaincourseofthewar.R.HarrisSmith,anadmiringchronicleroftheAmericanOfficeofStrategicServices,wrote:‘Partisanwarfarewasaviablealternativetofrontalassault,butSOEandOSSofficerssenttoestablishlinkswiththeResistancewerehamperedbyanti-partisanprejudiceatAlliedheadquarters.’BritishandAmericanseniorsoldierswereindeedscepticalabouttheusefulnessofguerrillas,buttherewereexcellentreasonsfortheircaution.Partisansmadeamarginalcontributiontothewareffortinseveraltheatres,buteveninYugoslaviaandRussiatheycouldnotprovideasubstituteforthemightandmassofregulararmies.Resistanceinmanysocieties,especiallywithintheBalkans,hadmuchmoreinfluenceonpost-wareventsthanonthedefeatoftheAxis.From1943onwards,YugoslaviabecamethefocusforSOE’smostambitiousoperationsinsupport

ofTito’spartisanarmy,whichreceivedvastlymoreweaponsthananyothernationalguerrillaforce;butFranceremainedBakerStreet’smostcelebratedtheatre.Itprovedrelativelyeasytoinsertagentsbylightaircraftinthenorth,andbyparachutefurtherafield.Between1941and1944theRAFflew320Lysandersorties,ofwhich210weresuccessful,landing440passengersandevacuating630,atacostofonlysixpilotskilled.Inthecountryside,manyBritishagentsandwireless-operatorssurvivedatlibertyforlongperiods.ButinFrenchcities,inasocietyruledbycollaboratorsandriddledwithinformers,therateofattritionwashorrific.On5June1943,SirDavidPetrie,chiefofMI5,notedinageneralbroadsidetoMenziesthatbothMI6andSOEhad‘formonthspastbeensufferingseriouslossesofagentsonthecontinent’becauseofGermanpenetration–andthatwasbeforetheDutchdisasterwasrevealed.AmajorityofallAlliedagentscapturedbytheGermansinEuropewerevictimsofbetrayal.Oluf

Reed-OlsenwroteofhisexperienceasaBritishspyinNorway:‘Onewasmostafraidofone’sownpeople;Ithinkallagents,saboteursandother“visitors”inNorwaywillagreethiswasso.Andthereweremanywhostoodaside,fromhateandfearofRussia,wheneventhesmallestcontributiontothe

causewasaskedofthem,becausetheyconsideredtheAlliedcausetobetoomuchaffectedbyCommunism.’Olsen’sstricturesappliedequallyinFrance,whereafewBritishtraitorsalsodidterribleharm.Theescape-lineleader‘PatO’Leary’–CaptainAlbertGuerisseoftheBelgianarmy–usedasoneofhishelpersinthenorthduringthewinterof1941amanwhocalledhimselfCaptainHaroldCole,supposedlyanevaderleftbehindaftertheBEF’s1940evacuation.MI9–thesecretescapers’branchoftheWarOffice–foundnoofficerofthatnameontheBritishArmy’sbooks,butinsteadaSergeantHaroldColewhohaddesertedfromhisunit,takingwithhimitsmessfunds.GuerissewasalreadysuspiciousthatColewassquanderinghisLine’scashonextravagantliving.Afteratensemeeting,hedispatchedthemantoLilleindisgrace.WithinafewdaysofhisarrivalinthecityinDecember1941,ColehadassistedtheGermansto

arrestoneoftheLine’smostdevotedhelpers,theAbbéCarpentier,whohadbeenprintingdocumentsforescapersonaprivatepress.Longafterwards,itwasdiscoveredthattheAbwehrhadbeenusingtheEnglishmanformonths,undervariousaliases.AnorderwentouttoResisterstoshoothimonsight.InMay1942,however,ColewasarrestedbyVichypoliceintheunoccupiedzoneofFranceandgivenalongprisonsentence,whichremovedhimfromResistanceview.Hereappearedonlyin1945,whenarrestedintheAmericanZoneofGermany,againmasqueradingasaBritishcaptain.HeescapedfromdetentionandfledtoParis,wherehewaseventuallykilledinashoot-outwiththepolice.MI9consideredhimresponsibleforfiftydeathsofmembersofthe‘Pat’Lineandtheirconnections.

FormuchofthewarafundamentaldivisionpersistedbetweentheBritishandFreeFrenchvisionsofResistance.Churchillwaseagertostimulateandhastenarmedrevolt,toassisttheAlliedarmiesinachievingthedefeatofNazism.Gen.CharlesdeGaulle,bycontrast,cherishedapoliticalconcept–salvationofthesoulofFrancefromthesloughofhumiliationintowhichithadbeenplungedbysurrenderin1940.HedefinedResistanceas‘anationalexpression’.FreeFrenchintelligence,whichdependedonSOEforoperationalfacilities,wasdirectedfromLondonbyAndréDewavrin,‘ColonelPassy’,anengineerofficerbornin1911,agraduateoftheParisÉcolePolytechniqueandaformerinstructoratSaint-Cyrmilitaryacademy.Dewavrin’sclevernesswasneverindoubt,norhisconsiderablepersonalpresence–tall,withthinningfairhairandadeceptivelysoftvoice.Heprovedaskilledpoliticalinfighter,aswasindispensableinthesnakepitofLondonexilepolitics.Hecustomarilyworecivilianclothes,andSOEofficersnotedthatwhenheappearedinuniform,itwasasureweatherwarningthattherewastobearowwithsomebody.Hisdepartment,theBureauCentraldeRenseignementsetd’Actionmilitaire,orBCRA,washousedat3StJames’sSquare,justacrossPallMallfromdeGaulle’smainheadquartersinCarltonGardens.Dewavrinrecruitedsomeremarkablepersonalities,prominentamongwhomwas‘Rémy’,GilbertRenault,whowasoriginallycommissionedtoorganiseanescapelinethroughSpain,withtheslendercredentialsthathehadonce

directedamovieaboutChristopherColumbus.Hisorganisation,theConfrérieNotre-Dame,becamejustlycelebrated,respectenhancedbyitscontributiontotheBrunevalcoup.Forthemostpart,however,deGaulleandDewavrinviewedtheiragentsinthefieldmoreas

emissariesof‘their ’FrancethanasinstrumentsofAlliedvictory.FreeFrenchprestigeslumpedwhenthefirstBCRAmandispatchedintothefield,latein1940,reachedhisdroppingzoneinanRAFaircraft,butthenrefusedtojumpandspenttherestofthewarasastaffofficerinCarltonGardens.Inthesummerof1941theBCRAcontrolledjusttwowirelessesinoccupiedFrance,oneofwhichwasshutdowninAugust.SOEappropriatedthemostpromisingrecruitsforsecretserviceamongtherefugeeswhoarrivedinBritainfromFrance,toreceiveprotractedinterrogationandscreeningattheQueenVictoriaPatrioticSchoolinWandsworth,‘atowerofBabel’.Moreover,deGaulle’spoliticaldesignforahighlycentralisednationalmovementrenderedtheBCRA’snetworksespeciallyvulnerabletoGermanpenetration.ThegeneralprofessedtobeinsultedbytheunwillingnessoftheBritishtoconfidetheirsecretsto

hispeople–whowererigorouslyexcludedfromtheUltraloop.MI6describedrelationswiththeFreeFrenchas‘liketryingtoliveamicablywithajealous,touchyanddomineeringwife’.Britishcodebreakingrevealed–forinstance–deGaulle’smenconductingsecrettalkswiththeChineseaboutsecuringtheirassistancetoregainIndochina.Asumof£5,000hadtobepaidfromBritishsecretfundsinMay1944tosilenceaFrenchmannamedDufours,whobroughtalegalactionagainsttheLondonGaulliststosecureredressforhisownunlawfulimprisonmentandtorturebythem.CarltonGardenswasindifferenttowhattheBritishregardedasascandal.Itschiefstooktheviewthattheyhadtherighttotreattheirownnationalshowevertheysawfit,evenintheheartofLondon.TheBCRAinheritedfromtheFrencharmyarecklessattitudetosignalsecurity,usingcodeswhich

theGermansbrokeevenafterMI6warnedCarltonGardensoftheirvulnerability.TheWehrmachthadcapturedatrainloadofFrenchintelligencedocumentsduringtheBlitzkriegwhichtooklackadaisicalAbwehranalyststwoyearstoworkthrough.In1942theydiscoveredthatamongthishaulwasalistofallFrenchsourcesinGermany,togetherwiththesumsofmoneypaidtothem.Byfarthelargestrecipientwasknownas‘Asché’,orsimply‘He’,whomtheGermansbelatedlyidentifiedasHans-ThiloSchmidt,theAllies’pre-warinformantaboutEnigma,whowasarrestedinApril1943andperishedinSeptember,thoughitisuncertainwhetherhewasexecutedorcommittedsuicide.Thatspring,AndréDewavrinmadeapersonaltourofFrance,toexploreforhimselfoccupation

conditions.Thiswascertainlycourageous,and‘Passy’returnedsafely,butitrepresentedagrotesqueriskwhenhewasprivytoallhisorganisation’ssecretsandcontacts.Flamboyancewasimmenselydangerousinsecretagents.DeGaulleandChurchillwerealikeattractedtosuchResistersasEmmanueld’AstierdelaVigerie,achildofprivilegewhobecameoneofthegeneral’smostprominentsupporters.DelaVigerie,however,wasconsideredbymanyofthosewhomethimtobeanunstablefantasist.OnatourofAmericaheoncegaveapressconferencewithasackoverhishead,

supposedlytomaskhisidentity,whichwaswell-knownfromBerlintoWashington,DC.AtameetingattheForeignOffice,‘C’andSOE’schiefexpressedtheirsharedview‘thattheleadersoftheFrenchResistancemovements,includingM.Emmanueld’Astierhimself,werenotnearlysointerestedinfightingtheGermansasinbuildingupanorganisationwhichwouldseizepowerwhentheGermansweredrivenout’.Therewastruthinthis.MI6andSOEassembledmostoftheimportanthuminttocomeoutofFrance,especiallyinadvanceofD-Day.DewavrinwasembarrassedtodiscoverthatHenriFrenay,leaderofthe‘Combat’Resistancegroup,wassellingintelligenceforhandsomesumsofcashtoAllenDullesofOSS,ratherthandonatingittotheFreeFrenchcause.BritishapprehensionabouttheelaborateGaullistpoliticalstructureinsideFrance,andits

vulnerabilitytoinformers,wasvindicatedinthespringandsummerof1943,whentheGestapoconductedmassarrests.VictimsincludedJeanMoulin,principalstandard-bearerofthe‘LondonFrench’,whowastorturedandexecuted,andGen.CharlesdeLestraint,asixty-three-year-oldnominatedbydeGaulleasleaderofhisso-calledArméeSecrète.Lestraintpossessednoaptitudeforsecretwar,norindeedmuchmeritsavehisoppositiontoFrance’sVichyrulers.Hisarreston6June1943wasnolosstotheAlliedwareffort.ThoughpropagandamadedeGaulleagiantinhiscountrybythetimeofD-Day,cynicsassertedthattheBCRAcreatedmoremartyrsthanusefulResisters.Itwashardforcitizensofdemocraciestoadapttotheirondisciplinesofintelligencework–lifein

asecretuniverseinwhichtrustinone’sfellowmanorwomanwasadangerousself-indulgence.Itmeantmuchtopeoplewhonursedtheshameofdefeatandoccupationtoconfideinothersabouttheworktheyweredoingforthecauseoffreedom,sothattheymightwalkalittletallerintheirstreets,butthiswasmortallyperilous.OlufReed-Olsenavowedthehabitualindiscretionofhisownpeople:‘itwasnotexclusivelyaNorwegianweakness…andinourcasethereasonmayhavebeenthattherehadbeennowarinourcountryforabout125years.Loquacitywasourgreatdifficulty…Itwashardtogetfellow-workerswhocouldresistthetemptationtotelltheirfriendsandrelationswhattheyweredoing.’AnoverwhelmingmajorityofdedicatedResistersweredrawnfromthehumblersectionsofsociety.TheofficialhistoriansofMI9wrote:‘Escapersandevadersfoundalmostuniformly…everysortofreadinesstohelpthemamongthepoorersortsofpeopleandeverysortofreserveamongmostoftherich.’Thesamewastrueofallbranchesofsecretactivity:itmayconfidentlybesaidthatthosewithmostmateriallytolosedidleasttoopposetheGermanoccupiers,whilethosewithleastpropertydidmost.GeorgeHiller,whoservedasanSOEagentinruralFrancein1943–44,latergaveathoughtfuland

movingaccountofhisexperiences.Therecouldbenocloserbond,hesaid,thanthatbetweenthehiderandthehiddeninsuchcircumstancesasthoseinwhichhefoundhimselfintheLot:he,aBritishagent,dailyplacedhislifeinthehandsoflocalFrenchmenandtheirfamilies–almostinvariablylittlepeople,peasantsorteachersortradesunionists–whomhehadnevermetbefore,fromwhominpeacetimehewouldhavebeenseparatedbyanunbridgeablesocialandculturaldivide.They,

meanwhile,harbouredhimintheknowledgethatiftheirhospitalitywaseverrevealed,conceivablybyhimselfasaprisonerundertorture,theirlivesandallthattheyownedwouldbeforfeit.

Civilianbystanderswhosuddenlychancedonmanifestationsofsecretoperationswerechieflyconcernedtosavethemselvesfrombeingsweptawayintherecriminationsorreprisalsoftheoccupiers.OnedayReed-OlsenfoundhimselftravellingonaNorwegiantrainwhichwassubjectedtoasurprisesearch.Hethrewopenawindowandhurledoutintothecountrysidethreepassports,arevolverandwhirlingwadsofcash,whilenearbypassengerswatchedinterror,aswelltheymight.JamesLangleyofMI9suggestedafterthewarthatoneResistanceworkerforfeitedhisorherlifeforeveryAlliedsoldierorairmanwhousedasecretescapeline.Whenthefamous‘Comet’networkwaseventuallypenetratedandmanyofitsmemberslayimprisonedandawaitingdeath,LangleydeliveredanemotionalpleatoMI6totrytosavesomeofthem.ClaudeDanseyrespondedwithaharshnessworthyofMoscowCentre:‘Yourtrouble,Jimmy,isthatyouloveyouragents.’TheMediterraneanbecametheforemosthappyhuntinggroundofSOE,sceneofsomeofits

agents’mostdramaticexploits.CriticsthoughtthatthewrongtonewassetbyGreyPillars,BakerStreet’sCairoheadquarters,whichseemedtoocomfortableforthehubofamilitaryoperation.In1941–42thebuilding’satmospherewaspoisonedbyfeudsandmutualsuspicions:onecoloneltriedtogetalisteningdevicefittedtohisphone,sothathisconversationswithcolleaguescouldberecorded.In1943therewasamajorpurgeoftheorganisation,butSOECaironeverbecameahappyship,notleastbecauseoftensionsbetweencommunistsympathisersandindeedpromotersamongitsBritishofficers,andcolleaguesofmoreconservativemien.TherewaslastingbitternessaboutthemannerinwhichSOEtransferreditssupportfromthe

royalistGen.MihailovićtothecommunistTitoinYugoslavia,causingtheincidentaldeathsofseveralBritishagents.Personalitiespowerfullyinfluencedthisoutcome:themenoperatingwithMihailovićwerelacklustrereporters,whilethedispatchesofChurchill’sformerhistoricalresearcherMajorWilliamDeakin,andlaterofToryMPCol.FitzroyMaclean,weredraftedinscintillatingandinspirationalterms,temperedbyamonumentalnaïvetéaboutTito’scharacter,politicalobjectivesanddallianceswiththeGermans.DeakinandMacleanbecametwoofthemostinfluentialsecretagentsofthewar;theirreportsweredecisiveinpersuadingtheprimeministertothrowBritishsupport,manifestedinhugedeliveriesofarmsandequipment,behindthecommunistcause.From1943,asresourcesbecamefreelyavailable,SOECairoevolvedintoamassiveoperation.By

OctoberitwashandlingeightyfieldmissionsintheBalkans,withairtransportmovementsorganisedbyanex-NottinghamTramwaysmanagernamedWigginton,whogainedareputationforformidableefficiency.Meanwhile‘Skipper ’PooleranthesuperblynamedLevantineFishingPatrol,transportingsuppliestoGreece.FactionalstrifewasanoccupationalhazardofliaisonwithResistancegroupsineverytargetnation.WhenNigelCliveofMI6wasparachutedintoGreeceinDecember1943,hespenthisfirsthouronthegroundlisteningtoalitanyofcomplaintsfromSOE’sFredWrightaboutthefrustrationofbeingunabletodomuchsabotage,because‘allhisenergieshadbeenconcentratedonthepoliticalassignmentoftryingtopreventanextensionofthecivilwarbetweenEDESandELAS’.

Clivewrote:‘Politicalratherthantechnicalorstandardmilitaryqualificationswerewhatwouldberequiredofthosewho[organised]theGreekresistance.’AproblembesettingSOEuntilthe1944eveofD-DayinFrancewasthatitlackedaclear,

overarchingstrategicdirective,settingouttheultimatepurposeofstimulatingResistance.‘SetEuropeablaze’didnotamounttoacoherentprogramme.WasBakerStreetseekingtocreateguerrillaarmiestoconductpitchedbattleswiththeGermans?Togatherintelligence?TosabotagetheAxiswareffort?ColinGubbinswroteaboutthedifficulty‘ofcarryingouttwobroadtaskssimultaneously,whichwerethemselveshardlycompatible,thatisaction,daybydayandweekafterweek,inspecificattacksagainstselectedtargetsinoccupiedcountries,andatthesametimethecreationofsecretarmies,equipped,organisedandtrained,readytocomeintoactionasorderedwheninvasionshouldcome.EveryattackcarriedoutnaturallyalertedtheGestapo.’Churchill’sromanticvisionneverattractedhisownservicechiefsofstaff,whodislikedandevendeploredthepiratesofSOE.Theywereright,inanarrowlymilitarysense,thattheContinentwouldnothavebeenfreedfromNazityrannyasingledaylaterhadResistanceneverexisted.ButposteritymaychoosetoseeitssponsorshipasasignificantelementinChurchill’sgeniusasawarleader,becauseheunderstooditsimmensemoralvalue.Asthetideofthewarturned,from1943onwards,inSweet-Escott’swords‘thereweremanymore

menandwomenpreparedtotakerisksintheAlliedcausethantherehadbeenayearbefore’.Bythemiddleof1944,SOE’soperationsinWesternEuropeweresupportedbyathousandairsortiesamonth,flownbyfivesquadronsofRAFbombers.During1944–45,GermaninterceptorsidentifiedhundredsofAlliedagent-orpartisan-operatedwirelesstransmittersoperatinginterritoriestheNaziswerestillstrivingtocontrol,orwheretheyhadimportantinterests.TheydetectedtwentyinPoland,sixinCzechoslovakia,seventeeninNorway,fourinDenmark,twenty-twoinHolland,twenty-seveninBelgium,thirty-fiveinParis,twentyinwesternFrance,sixty-oneinsouthernFrance,fifteeninNormandyandBrittany,teninSpain,fourinSwitzerland,twenty-fiveinnorthernItaly,eightinsouthernItaly,thirtyinYugoslavia–and140inRussia.TheAbwehr ’sdirection-finderspromptedthirtyarrestsin1941,ninetyin1942,160in1943and130in1944;thesefiguresillustratednotsomuchGermanvigilanceastheever-increasingenergyofResistance.Asthestorydrewtoanend,withtheprogressive1944–45liberationofGerman-occupied

societies,therewasfiercedebateaboutwhethertheoutcomeofSOE’sactivitiesjustifiedtheircost.BakerStreetcouldpointtosuchnotableachievementsastheFebruary1943sabotageoftheRjukanheavy-waterplantinNorway,andthesinkingayearlateroftheferrycarryingtoGermanyrailtankerwagonsladenwith15,000litresofpreciousproductfromtheplant.ThreeNorwegianagents,KnutHaulkelid,KnutLier-HansenandRolfSorlie,boardedtheferrydisguisedasgreasers,andlaiddelayed-actionchargeswhichexploded,sinkingthevessel,inthemidstofLakeTinnjo.OnlyafterthewardiditbecomeknownthatNaziatomicresearchhadmadefartoolittleprogressfortheconsignmenttocontributeanythingtotheirwareffort;butthisdidnotnegateeitherthewisdomof

launchingthemission,orthemarvellouscourageandingenuityoftheagentswhocarrieditout.InFrance,beforeandafterD-Day,ResistancegroupslaunchedwidespreadattacksontheGermanlinesofcommunicationwhich,thoughmuchlessstrategicallyinfluentialthanAlliedbombing,causedtheoccupiersintenseannoyance.Scepticspersisted,especiallyintheBalkans,wherecommunistinfluencewasstrongest,most

ruthlessandpernicious.DavidWallace,anSOEofficerkilledinactionon19August1944,reportedsavagelytoCairoshortlybeforehisdeath:‘OureffortinGreece,inmenandmoney,hasnotonlybeenoutofallproportiontotheresultswehaveachievedagainsttheGermans,butalsotothevalueoftheGreekpeople,whoarenotcapableofbeingsavedfromthemselves,norarethemselvesworthit.ThisisalsotheunanimousopinionofallBritishliaisonofficers,whohavebeenlonginthiscountry.’WallacewasquitewrongtosuggestthathiscynicalassessmentwassharedbyallhisBritishcomradesinGreece,orelsewhereinWesternEurope.NigelClivedescribedanexuberantpartyinthecommunityinwhichheserved,heldtocelebratethe1944GermanwithdrawalfromGreece.HeusedthesortofemotionallanguageoftenadoptedbyBritishandAmericanofficerswhosharedsecretlifeinoccupiedlands:‘Ienjoyedoneofthoseraremomentsofpride,thatIhadlived,worked,struggledandfoughtwiththekindofpeoplewhohadsharedthisevening’scelebration.Tohavegonesomewaytobeingacceptedasoneofthemseemedtohavemadethewholeoftheadventureworthwhile…Beforethesepeople,whosetitleswerenotintheirmilitaryranksbutintheirChristiannames,Icouldonlybowmyhead.Theyhadnogreatclaimsonlife.Theywerenotdreamingofmarblehallsandthegleamingtinselofvictory.Theirsimplevillageliveshadbeendisruptedbyforeigninvasionsandtheirconsequences.Inresponsetheyhadgivenallthatwasbestwithinthem:theircourageandinstinctiveguile,theirrefusaltosubmit,theirintelligentandcriticalreserveaboutthemotiveofsomeoftheirleaders…TherewasanunquestionedacceptanceofthevalueoftheBritishconnection.’Thiswasaromanticperception.Therecordshowsthatinmanycountriestheweaponsprovidedto

ResistancebytheAllieswereusedmoreenergeticallytopromotefactionalinterests–mostlycommunist–followingliberation,thantofighttheAxisduringtheoccupation.AnOSSmajordroppedintonorth-westItalyreportedthatthepartisanswere‘20percentforLiberationand80percentforRussia.WesoonfoundthattheywereburyingtheGermanarmstheyhadcaptured.’Since1945,manyfancifulaccountshavebeenpublished,whichexaggeratethematerialdamageinflictedonAxisforcesbyAlliedagentsandResistance,especiallyinthewakeofD-Day.ItissalutarytocomparethesewithGermanwardiaries,whichshowhowrelativelysmallwerethecasualtiesimposedbyguerrillas:forinstance,the2ndSSPanzerDivision,whichtravelledfromMontaubantoNormandyinJune1944,sheddingriversofinnocentbloodonitsway,lostjustthirty-fivekilledoutof15,000men.Sabotageandlocalattacksoftenrequiredacceptanceofhigherrisksandlossesthantargetsmerited

innarrowlymilitaryterms.Col.DickBarry,Gubbins’sveryablechiefofstaffatBakerStreet,saidlongafterwardsaboutitswartimecontribution:‘Itwasonlyjustworthit.’YetSOE’soperationswere

importantthen,andseemjustifiednow,bytheirmoralimpactandcontributiontofomentinginsecurity,tension,sometimesmurderoushysteriaamongGermanoccupyingforces.ItwaschieflythankstotheaidprovidedtolocaloppositionmovementsbySOEandOSSthatalegendofpopularinsurrectionwascreated,whichcontributedimmenselytorevivingtheself-respectofEurope’soccupiedsocietiesafter1945.NevercouldenemiesofdemocracyclaimthatBritainandtheUnitedStateshadabandonedtheoccupiednationstotheirfate.AcrossEurope–theAsianstorywillbediscussedbelow–themenandwomenwhoservedas

SOE’sfieldagentsofferedasacrificetothecauseoffreedomwhichbecameevidenttothepeopleofmostoccupiedsocietiesafterthewar,eveniftheyknewnothingofitduringtheiryearsoftrial.Moreovernoneofthefollies,failuresandembarrassmentsdescribedaboveshouldbeallowedtomaskthetoweringhistoricalrealitythatsomehundredsofthousandsoffineandbravepeopleintheoccupiedcountriesriskedeverythinginthecauseofResistance.OnlySOE’ssupport–withmoney,arms,wirelesses–empoweredthemtomakethatchoice.Toomuchpost-warattentionandadmirationhasfocuseduponthedeedsoftheforeigners,SOE’sBritishagents,whohazardedonlytheirownyounglivesinthecauseofagreatandindisputablyromanticadventure;toolittleuponthepeoplesofEurope,ofallagesandbothsexes,whojoinedoneofhundredsofResistancenetworks.Theircontributionshouldbejudgedmuchmorebythemagnitudeoftheirstakesandtheirsacrificesthanbythemilitaryachievements,orlackofthem.ForallSOE’sextravagancesandfollies,itbecamethemosteffectiveBritishsecretoperationsorganisationofthewar,andjustifiedtheChurchillianleapofimaginationthatinspireditscreation.

11

Hoover’sG-Men,Donovan’sWildMen

1 ADVENTURERS

‘WildBill’Donovan’snew-bornforeignintelligenceservice,theOfficeofStrategicServices,encounteredmostofthesamedifficulties,dramasandcriticismsasSOE,andmoreofthem.Onedayearlyin1945,deepineasternFranceaUSArmydivisionalstaffofficerheldforthtocolleaguesinfrontofoneofDonovan’smen:‘Gentlemen,IamgoingtotellyouabouttheOSS…themostfantasticdamnedorganizationinallourarmedforces.Itspeopledoincrediblethings.TheyseduceGermanspies,theyparachuteintoSicilyonedayandtwodayslaterthey’redancingontheStRegisroof.Theydynamiteaqueducts,urinateinLuftwaffegastanks,andplaygameswithIGFarbenandKrupp,but’–throwinguphishands–‘90percentofthishasnotagoddamnedthingtodowiththewar.’Thestaffofficer ’srantmayhavebeeninfluencedbythefactthatthevisitorwhoprovokeditwasa

Hollywoodfilmstar,thinlydisguisedasoneofDonovan’smen.Butitwastheactorwhorecordedthestory,andhimselfhalf-acceptedthecynicalviewofOSSadoptedbymanyuniformedsoldiers:theUSWarDepartmentinWashingtonrefusedtoopenitsfilestoDonovan’speople,orindeedtoincludehimontheUltradistributionlist.Maj.Gen.GeorgeV.Strong,GeorgeMarshall’sintelligencechief,regardedDonovan’sactivitieswithunremittingscorn,asdidhis1944successor,ClaytonBissell.OSSwasexuberant,ill-disciplined,unfocusedandwildlyextravagant,inkeepingwiththepersonalityofitsfounder.Acoolerfiguremighthavebuiltamoremeasuredservice.ButtheUnitedStatesfacedanextraordinarychallenge,tocreatefromastandingstartinthemidstofaworldwaranorganisationwithglobalresponsibilitiesforintelligence,sabotageandguerrillaoperations,arangeofmissionsthateveryotherbelligerentusedseveralservicestofulfil.AnSOEmanvisitingWashingtonin1942wasenchantedtoobserveasigninasidestreetnearthe

WhiteHouse:‘NOPARKING:U.S.SECRETSERVICEONLY’.America’snot-very-‘secretservice’officerswereresponsibleonlyforguardingthepresidentandsuppressingforgeryofthedollar.OSS’sfolliesandfailuresweremanyandvarious,butlittleworsethanthoseofitsAlliedandAxiscounterparts.Allthatwasdifferentwasthatwhereothernationsafterwardssoughttoburytheirexcessesandfailures,theAmericanscharacteristicallyavowedthem.Moreover,OSScouldclaimto

havecreatedthemostimpressiveresearchandanalysisarmofanyintelligenceserviceintheworld.DuringthemonthsbeforeandafterPearlHarbor,theBritishwerefearfulthatDonovan’sascentto

powerwouldbefrustratedbyanglophobes,becausethecolonelwassoconspicuouslyenthusiasticaboutChurchill’speople.ManyofhisearlystruggleswerenotagainsttheGermans,butagainstJ.EdgarHooveroftheFederalBureauofInvestigation.Incommonwiththesecurityservicesofeveryothernation,theFBIexpandeddramaticallyduringthewaryears,its1941strengthof2,280risingby1945to15,000,including5,000specialagents–the‘G-men’,astabloidslangdubbedthem.Byadirectiveof23December1941,theWhiteHouseagreedthattheFBIshouldextenditsremittocovercounter-intelligenceactivitiesthroughouttheAmericas.ThisempoweredHoovertocreateanewcorporation–ImportersandExportersServices,withquartersinNewYork’sRockefellerCenter–asacoverforitsagentsoverseas.Later,theBureaupersuadedbonafidecompaniestodotheirpatrioticdutybyprovidingcredentialsforitsmen–Reader ’sDigest,TwentiethCentury-Fox,Paramount,Procter&Gamble,H.J.Heinz.SpecialAgentRichardAuerbach,whotravelledtoBogotáasasupposedrepresentativeofWallStreet’sMerrillLynch,claimedtohavesold$100millionworthofstocksandbondsdownthere.Hooverhurriedtopre-emptDonovanbydeployinghisownmeninSouthAmerica,butthe

logisticaldifficultiesofwartimeforeigntravelwereimmense,evenforUSsecretservants,andfarfromanycombatzone.WhenSpecialAgentRichardCrowwasassignedtoLaPaz,hestartedoutbyplane,thenbecamestrandedinPanamafortendaysbeforecatchingaflighttoColombia,wherehekickedhisheelsforafurtherweekbeforeflyingtoLima.Afterfivedaysthere,heabandonedhopeofgettinganotherplaneseatandinsteadrentedacartosouthernPerubeforecatchingatrainridetoLakeTiticaca.Hecrossedthewaterinanativeboat,thengotatraintotheBoliviancapital.Whathedidwhenhegotthereisunrecorded,andwasperhapslessinteresting.WhiletheFBIcouldclaimsuccessinprotectingtheUnitedStatesfromAxisintelligence–a

relativelyeasytask,giventheclumsinessofAbwehrandJapaneseattemptsatpenetration–itschiefquarrelledwitheverybranchofthearmedforcesbecauseofhisrefusaltocollaborate,toshareinformationorinformantsthatfellintohisclutches.TheOfficeofNavalIntelligencewasespeciallyexasperatedbyHoover ’sintransigence.On13August1942oneofitsofficers,CommanderW.S.Hogg,launchedafierceattackontheBureau’s‘inabilitytofitintoaplaceinanycoordinatedmilitaryactivity.[The]FBIisacivilianorganisationwithabackgroundofpeace.Ithasbeenbuiltonitspublicity,itsfavourwiththepublicandCongressanditsreputationasaprotectorofthepeople.Itisambitious,properlysoinpeacetime,perhaps,butquestionablysointimeofwar…Ex-agentsofFBIhavesaidthateveryAgentoweshisallegiancefirsttoHooverandsecondtotheUnitedStates.’AcharacteristicepisodetookplacewhenanescapedGermanairman,PeterKrug,wasarrestedin

SanAntonio:armedforcesintelligencebrancheswerenotinformeduntilaftertheFBIhadheldatriumphantpressconference.MeanwhileLauranceSaffordofOp-20-Ghadamajorrowwiththe

BureauoverownershipofsomeGermandiplomaticcodesthatFBIagentsseizedinSanFrancisco.HooverlaunchedabitteroffensiveagainsttheinfantOSS’searlyventuresinSouthAmerica,denouncingDonovan’salleged‘interferencewiththeBureau’sresponsibilityforhandlingandcontrollingoperationsofenemyespionageagentsintheWesternHemisphere’.ThedirectorwasevenmorehostiletoChurchill’snationanditsintelligenceservices.TheFBI’sinternalhistorycomplains:‘TheBritishMI6displayeditsuncooperativeattitudetosuchadegreethatonFeb4,1944,theBureaufounditnecessarytomakeavigorousprotesttotheBritishSecurityrepresentativeinNewYorkandtotheLondonheadquarters.’Foritsownpart,MI6abandonedearlyandunsuccessfuleffortstoworkwiththeFBI’smenonthegroundinSouthAmerica,andcollaboratedinsteadwiththeUSArmy’sG-2department.Allintelligenceservicesseektopromotefactionalinterestsandinflatetheirownachievements,but

thewartimeFBIcarriedthispracticetomaniclengths.TheBritishwereexasperatedthatHooverpreferredtosnatchheadlinecreditforhigh-profilecaptures,ratherthanprivilytrackorturnenemyspies.Theywereespeciallyannoyedwhentheirownprizedoubleagent,‘Garbo’,spentsometimeintheUSin1941–42,andtheFBImismanagedhimsogrosslythathewasalmostblown.MoreovertheBureauhadthechutzpahtoboastthatitwasitselfresponsibleforthecreationandmanagementoftheDoubleCrosssystemwhichhelpedtoconfusetheGermansaboutD-Day:theFBIEspionageSection’squarterlysummaryof‘outstandingaccomplishments’,composedon1May1944forcirculationthroughoutthehigherechelonsoftheRooseveltadministration,recorded:‘OnMarch17thefirstmessagecalculatedtodeceivetheGermansastothedateoftheEuropeaninvasionbytheAllieswassentthroughthe[FBI’s]doubleagentPatJbyradio.Thismessagewasfollowedbysimilarmessagesforthesamepurpose…TheoperationofdoubleagentsduringthisquartercontinuedtoaddtotheBureau’sknowledgeofthemodusoperandiandpersonnelemployedbytheGermanintelligenceservice.’Inthewinterof1944theFBIcirculatedamemorandumwhichconcludedmagisterially:‘Considerationisbeinggiventocontinuingsomeofourdoubleagentstopenetratethe[German]undergroundaftercessationofhostilities.’ToagreaterdegreethananyotherintelligenceandsecurityorganisationtheFBI–or,moreexplicitly,Hooveritschieftain–chosetoviewthewarasprovidingatheatrefortheextensionofhisownpowerandprestige,ratherthanasamissiontodefeattheAxis.WhiletheFBIwagedasuccessfulexpansionistcampaignintheAmericas,elsewhereintheworld

Donovantriumphed,andsoonpresidedoveralargeempire.BillBentinckoftheBritishJICneverwaveredinhisviewthattheprimeminister ’screationofSOEasaseparateserviceandrivaltoMI6hadbeenamistake.HeurgedDonovantokeep‘skulduggery’andintelligence-gatheringunderoneroof,andsoindeedtheAmericansdid.InJune1942,byexecutiveordertheOfficeofWarInformationbecametheOfficeofStrategicServices.ItwashousedmostlyinbuildingsvacatedbythePublicHealthService,andsooncomprisedfourbranches:SecretIntelligence(SI);SecretOperations

(SO);psychologicalwarfareor‘MoraleOperations’(MO);counter-espionage(X-2).Washingtonbulgedwithpeople–70,000newarrivalsinthefirstyearafterPearlHarbor–and

5,000morefederalworkersarrivedeachmonththereafter,manybringingtheirfamilieswiththem.Thetelephonesystemstruggledtograpplewithincreaseddemand,especiallyforlong-distancecalls.Thegovernmentspent–andwasted–cashonsuchascaleastheworldhadneverseen.‘Tempos’,buildingsrushedupinacoupleofmonthstohousenewdepartments,appearedoneverygreenspacearoundthecitycentre.Paper,filingcabinetsandtypewriterswereindesperatelyshortsupply;amidanationalappealforusedmachines,radiostationsplayedajingle:‘AnidletypewriterisahelptoHitler.’Thecapitalwastransformedoveradecadefromaquietbackwaterintoanoisy,crowded,expensivecityboastingamushroomgrowthofacronyms,eachonesignifyinganeworganisation:WPB,OPA,WMC,BEW,NWLB,ODT–andnowOSS.TheBritishweredelighted,exceptClaudeDanseyofMI6,whoexpresseddisgust.Hatingboththe

UnitedStatesandSOE,hewasappalledthatthelatterwasnowtohaveanAmericancounterpart,bentonpursuingthesame‘noisypaths’,andrunbyaflamboyantofficerwho,inDansey’sview,was‘completelysoldonpublicity’.BroadwayjudgedthatDonovanwasmoreinterestedinthethrillsandspillsofsponsoringparamilitaryoperationsinenemyterritorythaninintelligence-gathering.OnekeyareaofUSsecretactivitieswasring-fencedbeyondOSS’sremit:thecolonelhadnoinfluenceovertheUSArmy’sandUSNavy’scodebreakers,whorepresentedbyfarthemostimportantelementsofAmerica’swartimeintelligenceeffort.Moreover,in1942,andtoDonovan’schagrin,propagandawashivedofftoElmerDavis’sOfficeofWarInformation.Hisownmenweretobespies,saboteursandsponsorsofguerrillacampaigns.Underthestimulusofitsmanicallyenergeticfounder,OSSexpandedlikeagiantpartyballoon.

DonovanpromisedFDRanorganisationbasedonmenwhowere‘calculatinglyreckless’,with‘disciplineddaring’,and‘trainedforaggressiveaction’.ItsNewYorkfacilitystruckoneofficerasresemblingapantomimerepertorycompany:‘Everyonewasworkingupascheme.Everythingshimmeredinsecrecy,anditwasararemanwhoknewwhathisfellowsweredoing.BrooksBrotherswastheunofficialcostume-makerwhileAbercrombie&FitchfunctionedasanuptownQuartermasterCorps,supplyingairmattressesandsleepingbagsandalltheparaphernaliasodeartotheheartsofsmallboysandciviliansturnedsemi-guerrillas.’WhenArthurSchlesingerjoinedtheorganisationin1943,hewrotetohisparentsthatnobodyseemedtoworktoohard,thematerialwasinteresting,andtherewereniceperquisitessuchasprivatescreeningsofHollywoodnewreleasesforDonovan’sintimatecircle.Buttheyoungacademicdeploredtheremotenessfromreality,ashesawit,oftheneworganisation:‘Forallthedeathlysecrecyofmuchofthematerial,thereisanivory-towerserenityabouttheplace.’OSSeventuallyemployedover13,000Americanstogetherwithmanymoreforeigners,and

enjoyedalmostunlimitedfundingforweapons,planes,cars,officeequipment,houses.Malcolm

Muggeridge,MI6’smaninLourençoMarques,complainedthatthearrivalthereofanOSSrepresentativepromptedsoaringinflationinthelocalbribemarket.AUSofficerdispatchedtotheMediterraneanwrote:‘ThechiefsofthevariousOSSheadquartersoverseashadaspectaculartalentforlivinginstyle.TheCairovillalookedlikeabastardversionoftheTajMahal.Thehighwallarounditwaspiercedbyatallirongate;therewerebroadverandasofinlaidtileandaprofusionofshadetreesabovevaststretchesoflawn.Aplatoonofservantsglidedinendlesscircles,thepunkahsrevolvedoverheadandthroughaleafycrevasseyoucouldgazeeachdawnonapairofyoungEgyptiangirlsastheycombedeachother ’shair.’OSSsetupitsIndianheadquartersat32FerozshahRoad,inDelhi’ssmartestneighbourhood,withanimplausiblesignonthegateproclaimingittobetheresidenceof‘DrL.L.Smith,AmericanDentist’.Donovanhadnopatiencewithadministration,andlesswithaccountancy,whichenabledsomeOSS

officerstostealsubstantialsumsofcash.MajorWilliamHolohan,aforty-year-oldHarvard-educatedformerlawyerfortheSecurities&ExchangeCommission,wasparachutedintonorthernItalyforOSSinSeptember1944with$16,000inoperationalfundsandanItalian-Americaninterpreter,Lt.AldoIcardi.IcardithereafterreportedhischiefkilledinaGermanambush.Afterthewar,however,anItaliancourtfoundinabsentiathatIcardiandhissergeant,aNewYorkfactoryworkerofSicilianextraction,hadpoisonedthenshotHolohan,dumpedhisbodyinalakeandseizedhispricelessdollarsforthebenefitofacommunistpartisangroup.Thetruthofthatepisoderemainsdisputed,butOSScheerfullyacknowledgedemploymentofsomebloodstainedcharacters,includingaccreditedmembersoftheMafia.AlthoughmostofDonovan’smenworeuniform,therewasnosalutingnordresscode.Where

everyotherwartimeintelligencechiefwasacreatureofhisrespectivegovernment,hewasentirelyhisownman,possessedofacheekfoundedonapersonalmandatefromthepresident.ThiswasasourceofexasperationtotheBritish;fortherestofthewartheirintelligencechiefsweretornbetweencondescensiontowardsDonovan,whomtheyregardedasacharlatan,andgrudgingacknowledgementofhiscloutinWashington.BruceLockhartwroteafterameetinginLondoninJune1942:‘Thecolonelhasagedandisnotveryimpressive.AccordingtoDesmondMorton…ThePresidentlikesColonelDonovan,sayshemustbehelpeddown,butthatheisnoorganiserandisachildinpoliticalmatters.’WithintheUnitedStatesthenewserviceacquiredinstantglamour,andareputationastheplacefor

anywell-connectedwarriorwhowishedtoservehiscountryonmorecongenialtermsthanlinedutycouldoffer.AmericaninfantryleadershipwasasmuchweakenedaswasthatoftheBritishArmybythediversionofofficersandNCOsto‘privatearmies’,ofwhichDonovan’swasthemostconspicuousexample.Allmannerofclever,upmarketAmericansgravitatedtoOSSwhohadcourageinplenty,butnoappetitefordisplayingitinfoxholes.FewofDonovan’srecruitshadmilitaryexperience;mostwere,instead,formercorporateexecutives.TheMadisonAvenueadvertising

agencyJ.WalterThompsonprovidedOSS’schiefofplanning,Cairo’sexecutiveofficerandCasablanca’sblack-propagandaspecialist.ThereweremanyrichIvyLeaguers,includingbothofJ.P.Morgan’ssons;inWashingtonaDuPonthandledFrenchintelligenceactivities;AndrewMellon’ssonPaulwasLondonadministrativeofficerofSpecialOperations,andhisbrother-in-lawDavidBrucebecameheadofstation.OnlyRockefellerswerelacking:Nelson,whoservedasthegovernment’sCoordinatorofInter-AmericanAffairs,gotintoaturfrowwithDonovan,asaresultofwhichthetwomenwerenolongeronspeakingterms.OSSalsorecruitedmanyWhiteRussians,including‘Prince’SergeObolensky.Thentherewerethehumblerpersonnel,manyofthemwomen,pioneerswhoseprevious

experienceoftheworldoutsidetheirownstate,nevermindtheUS,couldbedescribedonapostagestamp.ThefilesrecordthousandsofclericalstaffsuchasCeciliaChapmanJustice,twenty-four,justfivefeettwoinchestall,fromGrossePointe,Michigan:shehadbeenanairlineticketagent,thenspentafewmonthsasacryptanalystforAirTransportCommandbeforeshejoinedOSS,andwaspostedtoIndia.Shewroteinherownsubmissionforsuitability:‘ThetrainingIhavereceivedsinceIhavebeenwithOSSgivesmeconfidencethattheassignmentIamtohaveabroadwillbeoneIcanhandlewithassurance.BecauseoftheknowledgeIhaveacquiredofthepoliticsofthisorganisation,IamsureIcancomplywiththem.ForthetimeIwasemployedbyATCIlivedcompletelyindependentofmyfamily,andIfeelsurethatIshallbecompetenttotakecareofmyselfwhileoverseas.IamaProtestantandIdonotbelongtoanyorganisationwhichadvocatestheoverthrowoftheUSGovernment.’Thearchivescataloguehundredsofothersuchlittlepersonalodysseys.Posteritymaywonderwhat

MarthaBelleKershawmadeofCeylon,LauraWolcottTuckermanofCairo,orThelmaStoneCarsonofLondon.WhatwasforsurewasthatAmericandiplomatshadnomoretimeforDonovan’spushypeoplethandidtheirBritishcounterpartsforSOE.TheUSambassadorinAnkaraprotestedfuriouslyagainstdemandsthatOSSpersonnelshouldbegranteddiplomaticcover.HisofficewrotetoWashington:‘HefeelsverystronglythattheEmbassymustnotbeusedtogivecovertoOSS…Hehimselfbelievesthattheentireideaof“cover”forOSSisridiculous.’TheUSambassadorinChongqinglikewiseopposedaccreditingDonovan’spersonnelunlesshewasgrantedsomeauthorityovertheiractivities,whichthegeneralwouldnevercountenance.TheUSconsulinTangierresistedaplantosendOSS’sColonelHarryWanvigintoSpanish

Moroccodisguisedasacivilian,pointingoutthathewasalreadyknowntotheSpanishauthoritiesasanarmyofficer,andthat‘hispresenceherewouldservenousefulpurposeandwouldfurthermorebeundesirablefromsecuritypointofview’.TherewerealmostceaselessStateDepartmentprotestsagainsttheballooningscaleofOSSofficesandstaffing,asastreamofitspersonnelofallagesandbothsexesdescendedoneverymajorcitywheretheAllieshadafooting.Donovanandhissubordinates,however,wavedasidethenay-sayersand–atleastuntiltheautumnof1944,whenhis

influenceintheWhiteHousebegantodeclineprecipitously–gotawaywithplentymorethanmurder.EventhoseOSSfieldofficersnotrecruitedfromthesocialelitewereoftenexoticpersonalities.

ProminentamongthemwasSterling‘Buzz’Hayden,whobecameoneofDonovan’sstars.Hewasbornin1916,sonofanimprovidentNewJerseynewspaper-spacesalesmanwhodiedwhenhewasnine.ExposuretoNewEnglandharboursbredintohisrovingandracketychildhoodapassionfortheseawhichprovedlifelong.Atsixteenheranawaytojoinasailingschooner,andthereafterservedonaBanksfishingtrawlerbeforeskipperinganeighty-nine-footbrigantinethroughahurricanetoTahiti.Hefellinlovewithalotofgirls,andplentyofthemsuccumbedtohisruggedgoodlooksandventuresomespirit.HespenteverythinghehadsavedtobuyKaiserWilhelmII’soldyacht,onlytohaveitwreckedunderhiminastorm.In1939hisgodfather,aNewYorkbusinessman,said,‘Gollys,youngfeller,you’vehadquiteatimeforyourself,haven’tyou?Don’tyouthinkit’sabouttimeyousettleddownandmadesomethingofyourself?’Inafashion,sohedid.Hissix-foot-four,220-poundfigurecaughttheeyeofaHollywoodtalent

scout.In1940hestartedworkatParamountona$600-a-monthcontract,andwaspromptlycastoppositeMadeleineCarroll,theBritish-bornBirminghamUniversitygraduateandformerschoolteacherwhohadbecomethemosthighlypaidfemalestarintheworld.TheymadethemovieVirginiatogether,andfellinlove.Shewastenyearsolder,butsomebodyoncedescribedthecoupleas‘thetwomostbeautifulhumanbeingsintheworld.’HaydenmetRooseveltattheWhiteHousebeforerejectingtheleadinForWhomtheBellTollstojointhewar.HehatedHollywood,andstruckupanacquaintancewithBillDonovan.InNovember1941hesailedtoEngland,completingcommandoandparachutecoursestherebeforeinjuringhimselfonajumpinMarch1942andreturningtoAmerica,wherehemarriedCarroll.HaydenwasrefusedaUSNavycommission,onthegroundsthathewasalmostuneducated.Instead

hejoinedtheMarineCorpsbywayofParrisIslandbootcamp,thentransferredtoOSS.HewasbentuponsheddingtheHollywoodfamehedespised,andchangedhisnameforoperationalpurposesto‘JohnHamilton’.Hiswife’ssisterhadbeenkilledintheLondonBlitz;thispromptedCarroll,too,toquitthefilmbusiness:fortherestofthewarsheservedwiththeRedCrossinEurope.‘Lt.Hamilton’becameoneofthesmallarmyofOSSpersonnelwhocrossedtheAtlantictoplayapicaresquebit-partinthatbiggestblockbustermelodramaofall:TheWar.OSSLondonstationchiefWilliamPhillipsdescribedhisownmissionintermsechoedbyhis

counterpartsaroundtheworld:‘MydutywastopursueDonovan’sgoalofaglobalUSintelligenceservice,whileresistingalleffortsoftheBritishSecretInformation[sic]togobbleusup.’TheOSS’sLondonbaseonBrookStreet,afewblocksfromtheUSembassy,eventuallyboastedfourteenoutlyingbranches,andgrewtoastrengthof2,000people,includingastellarconstellationofacademicssuchasWaltRostow,CraneBrinton,ChandlerMorse.MostofDonovan’smenwereanti-colonialist,whichsustainedchronictensionswiththeBritishandFrench.ColonelHaroldHoskins

planneda1942expeditionthroughArabcountrieswhichhehopedtopersuadetoexpeltheBritish.Unsurprisingly,thistripwasblockedinLondon;theForeignOfficeandSOEstrove,albeitwithoutsuccess,toexcludeOSSfromtheentireMiddleandFarEast,andespeciallyIndia.TherewasanearlyDonovanplottooverthrowthepro-VichyprimeministerofTunisia,forwhichthecolonelestablisheda$50,000warchest.RobertMurphyoftheStateDepartmentvetoedtheschemebecauseitmustenrageVichyandfrustrateanyhopesofrecruitingitsarmedforcestotheAllies.AmidthecontortionsofAmericanpolicytowardstheFrenchaftertheDecember1942assassinationofAdmiralDarlan,anewOSSpro-GaullistcommandounitwasformedunderthedirectionofaHarvardanthropologistandArabistimpossiblynamedCarletonCoon.StateabortedasuccessionofotherOSSprojectswhichitconsideredlikelyto‘upsetcolonial

relationshipswithlocalnativepopulations’.ManyofDonovan’smenbegantoworkontheprinciplethat‘inintelligence,theBritisharejustasmuchtheenemyastheGermans’.FromeverycorneroftheglobeAmericanofficersfiredoffastreamofcomplaintsaboutlackofcooperationfromtheirAnglo-Saxonallies.WhentenOSSmenperishedafterplanesflownbyinexperiencedUSAAFcrewscrashedwhilecarryingthemtoNorway,itwasallegedthatthemishapoccurredbecausetheBritishrefusedtoallowtheagentstobedispatchedinRAFaircraftpilotedbyNorwegians.Mistrustanddisdainweremutual.HughTrevor-RoperwrotewithcharacteristicscorninJanuary

1943abouthisAmericancounterparts:‘thesecallow,touchy,boastful,flatulentinvaders,whoseemtothinkthemselves,aspoliticians,amatchforthecase-hardeneddouble-crossersofstruggling,torturedEurope.Willtheyneversee…thattheyareonlygreatchildren,pamperedchildrenoftherich,amongexperiencedanddesperatesharpers?’WhenajointOSS/SOEheadquarterswasestablishedinAlgiers,thetwonations’officersconcealedinformationandplansfromeachother,andtheBritishtooklunchanhouraftertheAmericans’12–1break,inordertodotheirmostsecretbusinessintheabsenceoftheirallies.BickhamSweet-EscottofSOEwasback-handedlydelightedwhenadistinguishedIndianmajorwithaDSOwoninthedesertturnedupinWashingtononatourtorecoverfromhiswounds,andwasrefusedaccesstoabarbecauseofhiscolour.Afterthatepisode,theBritishofficersaidthathefeltmuchlessembarrassedwhenOSSmenfulminatedinhispresenceabout‘Britishimperialism’.AsUSchargéd’affairesinLisbon,GeorgeKennanhadtointervenetostoptheOSSfomentinga

revoltagainstPortugueseruleintheAzores:Donovan’sagentsviewedPresidentdeOliveiraSalazarsimplyasonemorefascistdictatorwhoseremovalmustrepresentagooddeedintheworld,andweremortallydispleasedtobepreventedfromperformingit.Meanwhile,Eisenhower ’sstaffinNorthAfricaquashedanotherprojecttoassassinateGermangeneralsintheirheadquarters,thoughBritishcommandoshadalreadytriedunsuccessfullytokillRommel.In1942anOSSofficerquizzedAdolpheBerleoftheStateDepartmentaboutUSpolicytowardsThailand.Berleturneduphispalms:‘Wehaven’tgotanypolicyyet.’ThisvacuuminWashington,whichextendedtomanypartsofthe

globe,enabledDonovan’sfieldmentoinventtheirownpartylineinthenameoftheUnitedStates.DrWalterClineoftheOSSRabatstationtoldthepashaofMarrakech,‘TheFrenchhavenothingtodo[inMorocco]…excepttoleaveit,’aremarkthatnaturallyoutragedthecolonialpower.DonovanwrotedismissivelytoFoggyBottom,sayingthatClinewasdoingworkof‘greatvalue’,andauthorisedhimtocarryonregardless.An11January1944meetingattheForeignOfficeinLondondiscussedwithalarmDonovan’s

assertiontojournaliststhathewasdeterminedtocreateaUSsecretserviceregardlessofoppositionfromanyquarter.Menziessaid‘heassumedthisreferencetooppositionwasdirectedagainstMI6andSOE…InhisviewtherewasnopossibilityofpreventingGeneralDonovan[ashehadnowbecome]fromproceedingashewished,andtheonlypossiblecoursewastofightarearguardactionwithaviewtopreventinghimfromcausingunnecessarymischief.’SOEandMI6agreedaboutalmostnothingelse,butwereatoneintheirfearsofthehavocthatmightbewreakedbyOSSofficersinthefield,especiallyintheMediterraneanandSouth-EastAsia.InJuly1945,USplanesdroppedOSSleafletsonTonkin,draftedbyDonovan’sfanaticallyanti-colonialistofficerinHanoi,CaptainArchimedesPatti.TheseproclaimedtotheVietnameseonbehalfoftheUS:‘WeareshortlycomingtoIndo-Chinatofreeyou,butwedonotactliketheFrenchwhoareonlycomingtooppressyou,weareyourtrueliberators.’OneofthemostextraordinaryOSSmissionswasthatofBrookeDolanandIlyaTolstoy,exiled

grandsonofthenovelist,whoweredispatchedfromChinainSeptember1942tovisittheten-year-oldDalaiLamainLhasa.Theoverlandjourneytookthemthreemonths.TheyweregreetedamiablyenoughbytheTibetans,whorequestedaradiotransmitter.TheStateDepartmentobjectedthatthiswouldupsettheChinese,whohadclaimsonTibet,butinNovember1943thesetwasdulydeliveredtoLhasa,withoutmuchvisibleimpactonthewar.ThetwoAmericansgotbacktoChongqinginJuly,afteraseven-monthodyssey,andwerehastilydispatchedhomeincasetheymetwithan‘accident’atthehandsofChiangKai-shek’ssecretpoliceasthepriceoftheirimpudenceinhavingtraffickedwiththeTibetans,whomChinaregardedasitsownsubjects.By1944OSSspecialoperationspersonnelwereoperatingineverytheatreofwar–indeed,thesize

andconspicuousnessofsomeAmericanpartiesrenderedthemespeciallyvulnerable.Atwenty-strongteamparachutedintothelowerTatramountainson25September1943tocontactguerrillasinthefareastofCzechoslovakiaspentweeksinhidingasitssuppliesdwindled,thenwasbetrayedtotheGermansbyaSlovakian;onlytwomenescapedtotheRussianlines.FifteenwholandednorthofAnzioinMarch1944tosabotagetheLaSpezia–GenoaraillinkwerepromptlycapturedandshotbytheGermans,inaccordancewithHitler ’s1942CommandoOrder.Col.FlorimondDukeandhisfellow-membersofaMarch1944OSSmissiontotheHungariangovernmentwerehandedovertotheGermansassoonastheylanded,thoughtheywerefortunateenoughtosurvivethewar.InFebruary1945,Berlinannouncedthataseventeen-strongOSSandSOEpartycapturedinCzechoslovakiahad

beenshotatMauthausenconcentrationcamp–thisincludedJoeMortonofAssociatedPress,theonlywarcorrespondenttobeexecutedinthecourseoftheconflict.Theleft-wingenthusiasmsofmanyOSSofficersledtospecialdifficultiesinGreece,wherethey

threwtheirfullsupportbehindthecommunists.GeorgeVoumas,aWashingtonattorneyinDonovan’sCairostation,chargedthatChurchill’sofficers‘werenotinterestedinGreekliberationoreveneffectiveprosecutionofthewar,butinnaked[imperialist]politicalinterest’.BritishpolicytowardsthefantasticallycomplexGreekimbrogliowasindeedoftenfumbled,buttheOSS’smenwerenaïveinsupposingthatthecommunistsofEAM-ELASwouldimposeabenignpolityiftheygainedcontrolofthecountry.InGreeceasinneighbouringYugoslavia,allthepoliticaloptionsbeforetheAllieswereunpalatable,butitprovedmistakentoallowyoung,idealisticandusuallyignorantOSSandSOEofficersonthespottomakejudgementswhichinfluencedthefateofnations.Manysawtheirownroleinunderstandablyromanticterms,aslatter-dayLawrences,andsomemanagedtocreatenolesstroublethanhedid.‘Here,IwasAmerica,’anOSSofficerwhoservedinYugoslaviawrotewonderingly.‘Ihada

message,perhapsmerelywords,ofcourse,ofencouragementtoalong-sufferingpeople.’SterlingHaydensaidofayearhespentworkingwiththeYugoslavs:‘Weestablishedatremendouslyclosepersonalfeelingwiththesepeople.Wehadenormous,Iwouldsayunlimitedrespectforthewaytheywerefighting.Wegotquitesteamedupbyit.Imyselfwassteamedupconsiderablybyit.Ihadneverexperiencedanythingquitelikethat,anditmadeatremendousimpressiononme.’HewasfirstpostedtorunanoperationsbaseontheItaliancoastatMonopoli,southofBari,shippingarmstothepartisans.Thislifelongadventurerfoundhimselfdirectingashuttleserviceoffourteenschooners,sixketchesandtwobrigantines,runningeightymilesacrosstheAdriaticatanaveragespeedofsevenknots.Hefellinlovewiththeexperience,andwiththefourhundredYugoslavsworkingthevessels.He

wroteinthethirdpersonthathe‘foundhimselfcommittedinawayhehadneverknownbefore…Hehadneverknownsuchmen.Therewasaferocityaboutthem…strainingandsweatingforhoursonend,refusingtopauseoracceptreliefuntilorderedtodoso.’Likemorethanafewleft-wingAmericanandBritishpersonnelservinginthetheatre,hecametoidealiseTito’smen,writingtoafriendintheUSon22January1944:‘ItoldyouinearlierlettershowreluctantsomeofthelocalBritisharetoreallygoalloutfortheYugoslavs.Myeyesarebeingopenedtoalotofthings…Iknownowthatmyentirelifebeforethiswasoneendlesssearchforpleasure.Well,maybeitisn’ttoolatetomakeupforthewastedyears.’Whocouldblamejuniorofficersforsuccumbingtoromanticism,whentheirchiefwasthe

foremostromanticofall?DonovanflewoverJapanese-heldterritoryinaTigerMothbiplanetovisitanOSScampinBurma,andappearedatRooseveltandChurchill’sNovember1943Cairosummittoproposea‘Unity’planforthepartitionofYugoslaviabetweenrivalfactions,whichFDRendorsed.

Thegeneralannouncedanintentionhimselftoparachuteintothewilderness,tostage-manageareconciliationbetweenTitoandMihailović.ThisplangotnowherebecausenoneoftheYugoslavswereinterested;theAmericansafterwardsblamedChurchillforthrowinghissupportbehindTito.BothWesternAlliesmisreadYugoslavia,anditisunlikelythatanypeacefulnon-communistoutcomewasachievable.InMay1944DonovanburstintoLondon,inspectedtheOSSstationandaccuseditsstaffofdoingtoomuchplanning,notenoughfighting.Heexhortedthem:‘Throwyourplansoutofthewindow!’Confusion,supposedlycreative,wasrestored.DonovanwassokeenforevenhischairboundoperativestosmellpowderthatthatOctoberhecausedtwoacademicsfromOSS’sResearch&Analysisdivision,DavidColinandGeorgePeck,tobeparachutedintothePovalleywithonlyrudimentaryspecialforcestraining.TheywerepromptlycapturedbytheGermans,whichcausedanOSSofficertoexpresssomewhatheartlessconcernthattheirexperienceofconductingPhDoralexaminationsmighthaveleftthemill-preparedtoresist‘unusualmethodsofinterrogation’.OSSpersonnelwerefamousspenders,asattestedbyinnumerablepaymentdocketsinthearchives,

togetherwithaccompanyingprotestsfromtheStateDepartment.Atruckdrivercouldearn200,000francs–theequivalentof$US4,000or£1,000–bycarryingaboxofdocumentsacrossFrancetotheSpanishborder,withafurther50,000francsonoffertoanybodywhowouldtakesuchacargoonthelastlegofthejourney,acrosstheborderintoSpain.AcharacteristicsignaltotheUSembassyinMadriddemanded:‘PleaseturnovertoOSSrepresentativeagainsthisreceiptonemillionpesetasfromfundstoyourcreditunderauthorisation37…Youareauthorisedtopay$2000repeattwothousanddollarstoColonelW.A.Eddy…YouareauthorisedtopaytoColonelRobertA.Solborginoneorseveralpaymentsatotalof$100,000…IhavearrangedfreedollarcreditforpurchasebyyouofonemillionAlgerianfrancswithfurtherpurchaselater…YouareauthorisedtopayColonelW.A.EddyonbehalfoftheOSSthesumof$50,000…’Theabove-mentionedColonelWilliamEddywasborninSyriatomissionaryparents,servedasan

intelligenceofficerinWorldWarI,thenheadedtheEnglishdepartmentatCairo’sAmericanuniversity,whereheintroducedEgyptianstobaseball.InApril1942,inTangierduringDonovan’spre-OSSincarnation,hedemandedhalfamilliondollarsinoperationalfundstosubvertandthenarmVichyFrenchforcesinNorthAfrica.Whenthechiefsofstaffbaulked,Eddymessagedcrossly:‘If[Robert]MurphyandIcannotbetrustedwithafewmillionfrancsinanemergencythenIshouldbecalledbackandsomebodywhocanbetrustedsent.Wearedesperatelyhopingandwaiting.’OneofDonovan’smeninWashingtoncommentedhistrionically:‘ThewarmaybewonorlostbyColonelEddy,andcertainlythedayofvictorywillbeindefinitelyadvancedorretarded.’Thechiefsofstaffremaineddoggedlyunsympathetic,andEddyfailedtogethismoney.SomeswaggeringinitiativesbyDonovan’sagentsalarmedAlliedcodebreakers,amongtheman

OSSraidontheJapaneseconsulateinLisbon.ArlingtonHallandBletchleywereappalledwhentheyheardthattheAmericanshadstolencodebooks.Thelastthingtheywantedwasactionthatmight

prompttheenemytobelievethathiscommunicationswerecompromised.Towardstheendof1944FinnishintelligenceapproachedtheOSSinStockholm,offering1,500pagesofSovietcodes,includingkeys.Donovanhastenedtoaccept,andgleefullyinformedtheWhiteHouseofthewindfall.PresidentRoosevelt,however,attheurgingofEdwardStettinius,hisnewsecretaryofstate,orderedthatthecodebooksshouldbehandedovertotheRussianswithoutcopiesbeingmade.DonovandefiedtheWhiteHousebyphotographingthebooksbeforesurrenderingthem,butthiscanhavegiventheAmericanslittleadvantage,whensomanyOSSstaffersweresecretlybriefingtheNKVD.Evenbythestandardsofthesecretwar,someOSSmessagetrafficwasoutlandish,forinstancethis

on3October1944fromCaserta,inItaly,toWashington:‘WelearnthatKingMichaelofRumaniahasurgentlyrequestedOSSrepresentativesinBucharestthat4,000roundsof.45caliberammunitionand3,000of30millimetercarbineammunitionbesentbyplanefortheRoyalPalace.’InChina,theOSS’sAlghanLusey,aformerUPIcorrespondentinShanghai,requestedadeliveryofsawn-offshotgunsfortheuseofChiangKai-shek’sagentsinoccupiedterritories,whomhedescribedas‘aswellbunchofhard-hitting,honestmen,goodgunmen’.LuseywasrecalledtoWashingtoninJuly1942.Donovan’sstationheadlatercametobelievethatTaiLi,Chiang’ssecretpolicechief–themanwhowantedtheshotguns–wasresponsiblefortheliquidationofseveraloftheOSS’sChineseinformants.DavidBruce,anearlyOSSrecruitandlatterlyadistinguishedheadofitsintelligencebranch,

wrote:‘Woetotheofficerwhoturneddownaprojectbecause,onitsface,itseemedridiculous,oratleastunusual.’AlthoughSouthAmericawasnotionallyFBIturf,Donovanplungedenthusiasticallyintothecontinentanyway.BreckinridgeLongoftheStateDepartmentcomplainedthatDonovan‘isintoeveryone’sbusiness–knowsnoboundsofjurisdiction–triestofilltheshoesofeachagencychargedwithresponsibilityforawaractivity…hashadalmostunlimitedmoneyandaregulararmyatworkandagentsallovertheworld’.TheUSambassadortoSpain,CarltonHayes,sharedwithhisBritishcounterpartSirSamuelHoare

ahorrorofspecialoperationsandtheirperpetrators,whichcausedfrequentembarrassmentsintheAllies’relationswiththefascistdictatorshipofGen.FranciscoFranco.FrankSchoonmaker,authorofasuccessfulseriesofEuropeantravelguides,wascaughtbySpanishpoliceinthespringof1943passingOSScashtoaFrenchResistancecontact,andlanguishedforsixmonthsinaSpanishjailbeforebeingsprung.InJunethatyear,theBritishnavalattachéCaptainAlanHillgarth,wholiaisedcloselywithMI6,persuadedOSS’sCol.SolborgofthemeritsoflaunchingajointoperationtodeposeFrancoandreplacehimwithamilitaryjunta.Londonwiselyvetoedthisscheme,onthegroundsthatitwasbythenobviousthatFrancohadnointentionofenteringthewar.ThefrustrationofthatschemedidnotdeterDonovan’smenfromalmostimmediatelystarting

another,organisedfromNorthAfricabyDonaldDownesinsupportoftheanti-FrancoSpanishResistance.HedispatchedOSS-trainedSpanishagentstomakecontactwiththeRepublicansinMalaga.Theoutcomewasspectacularlymessy:Franco’smentrappedthemall.SomeofDownes’s

menwerecaptured,alongwiththeirAmericanweapons.Theprisonerstalked,andnamedDownesandhiscolleagueArthurGoldbergastheirsponsors.WhentheStateDepartmentconfrontedtheOSSwiththisconsiderableembarrassment,GoldbergandDonovanpleadedignorance.TheUSnonethelessmadeaformalapologyinMadrid.TheOSS-sponsoredSpaniardswereexecuted.ThereafterDonovanbowedtotheUSambassador ’sinsistencethatthereshouldbenomoreoperationsagainstFranco.SomeofthecoolerheadswithinDonovan’sorganisationrecognisedthatitsexcesseswere

squanderingresourcesandinjuringitsreputation,toscantpurpose.Inthesummerof1943,whilethebrigadier-general–Donovan’snewrank–wasoffroamingtheworld,aclutchofinternalreportsexpressedalarmaboutOSS’scondition.Oneseniorofficer,GeorgePlatt,compiledamemoranduminAugustwhichwasforwardedtoDonovan.Plattwroteof‘adeteriorationofmorale’.Nobodyexceptafewpeopleclosesttothegeneral,hesaid,‘canputhisfingeronanythingconcretethattheorganisationhasaccomplished’.Anotherseniorfigure,ElleryHuntington,warnedof‘adangerouslackofcohesion’.DonovanreturnedtoWashingtoninOctobertofindasix-pagememorandumfromagroupofseniorstaffers,whichstatedbrutally:‘OSShasgrowntoobigandisengagedintoomanydiverseactivities.’ThegroupconcludedbyproposingthatDonovanshouldrelinquishexecutivecontroloftheorganisation,effectivelybecoming‘chairmanoftheboard’whiledepartmentalchiefsranitsoperations.Itwasplainthattheseviewsweresharedbysomeoftheablestandbest-informedofOSS’sseniorstaffers.Thecriticshitabrickwall,orratherDonovan.Hedismissedtheirproposalsoutofhand,anduntilthewarendedheldOSSonthecoursehehadsetforit.Hehimselfremainedadefiantlyfreespirit,servingasringmasterforahostoflike-mindedindividualistsandadventurers.OSSearnedareputationascontroversialasthatofSOEforpromotingcommunistinterestsin

occupiedEuropeandtheBalkans.Donovanwaswarnedthathehadrecruitedmanyknown‘Reds’,ofwhommorebelow.Heshruggedinresponse,‘Inthatkindofgame,ifyou’reafraidofwolves,youhavetostayoutoftheforest.’Gen.AlbertWedermeyer,oneofAmerica’smoreruthlessproconsulsinChina,wrotesourlyafterthewar:‘Wewereverymuchinthepositionofbeinginafootballcontest,goingouttowinthegame,andthenwithvictoryachieved,proposingonlytoreturnhometocelebratethevictory.Wewerejustthatnaïve.WedidnotseemtounderstandthatinfightingwarswiththeGermansandtheItaliansinEurope,andwiththeJapaneseintheFarEast,weshouldstrivetocreatetheconditionswhichwouldbringarealisticandenduringpeace.’YetitwasaskingtoomuchofmostWesternAlliedsoldiers,politiciansandsecretagentstoconductoperationsagainsttheAxiswithaneyeovertheirshoulderstowhatwouldfollowvictory.EvenWinstonChurchillonlybegantodosolatein1944,whenthewar ’soutcomewasassured.StalinaloneamongtheAlliedwarlordsconductedpolicyandstrategyinironcladaccordancewithhisownpost-warpurposes,inwhichhisAmericanandBritishadmirersstrovemanfullytoassisthim.

2 IVORYTOWERS

ItisaseasytomockOSS’s‘trackandfieldstars’andtheirexoticoperationsasitistoderideSOE’swilderactivities.InWashington,however,Donovancreatedsomethingverydifferentandmoreimpressive.TheResearch&AnalysisdivisionrecruitedsomeofthefinestbrainsinUSacademe,whichbetween1942and1945producedanextraordinaryrangeofreports,mostoftheminteresting,afewoutstanding.Nowarringnation’sintelligenceservicesmatchedthequality–andquantity–ofR&A’sstudies.ThedivisionwasheadedbyJamesFinneyBaxter,presidentofWilliamsCollege,anddrewitsanalysts–someofthemlaterNobelPrize-winners–fromthirty-fivecampusesacrossthenation.BickhamSweet-EscottofSOEtouredthedepartmentwhilevisitingtheUS,andcamehomelamentingthelackofanythingcomparableinLondon.Britain’sJointIntelligenceStaffhadonlyahandfulofmenundertakingresearchtowhichR&Acommittedhundreds.ThedepartmentstarteditslifeintheannexeoftheLibraryofCongress,thenmovedtoabuildingat

23rdandEStreetwhicheventuallyhousedninehundredanalysts,coveringeverycorneroftheglobe,togetherwithclericalandsupportstaff.Theacademicswhodominatedthepayrollincludedadozenenemyaliensandfortyhistorians,sevenofthempastorfuturepresidentsoftheAmericanHistoricalInstitution.WhenDonovanquizzedonerecruit,PaulSweezy,followingwarningsthathewasanotoriousStalinist,Sweezysoothedthecolonelwithoutmuchdifficulty,sayingthathewasameresocialist,‘moreorlesslike[Britain’sHarold]LaskiandNyeBevan.Theonlything[Donovan]wasinterestedinwaswhetherIwasinfavourofthrowingbombsandstreetrioting.IassuredhimIwasnot,whichseemedtosatisfyhim.’R&Aalsohiredsuchwell-knownMarxistsasFranzNeumann,HerbertMarcuse–OSS’sleadinganalystonGermany–andOttoKirchheimer.Theyreadpressreports,transcriptsofenemybroadcastsmonitoredbytheFederal

CommunicationsCommission,PoWinterrogationsandcablesfromOSSstations.Inthelastyearofthewartheyalsoaddressedlikelypost-warproblems.R&AproducedreportsonsubjectsasdiverseasrailtransportontheEasternFront,thepoliticalviewsofCharlesdeGaulle,inflationinBurmaandtheguerrillacampaigninthePhilippines–thoughSWAPO’sC-in-CGeneralDouglasMacArthurrefusedtoallowDonovan’speopletooperateinhistheatre.SomeR&AanalystssharedtheOSS’scollectivedelusionsaboutthepotentialofguerrillaactionto

influencegrandoutcomes.TheCentralEuropeansectionassertedthatinternalpoliticalResistancewouldcontributeasmuchasexternalmilitaryforcetothefinalcollapseofNaziGermany:‘Therecord[ofResistance]isatributetohumanenduranceandcourage,andtherevelationofagreathope.’ThisviewreflectedthevisionaryhopesofitsGerman-bornauthors,ratherthanrepresentinganevidence-basedpoliticaljudgement.TheywereonstrongergroundintheiroppositiontotheAllieddoctrineofunconditionalsurrender,whichtheysaidfosteredNaziclaimsthattheonlychoicesforGermanywerevictoryorannihilation:‘WhatiswantedisapositivegoalforGermanywhichwill

dispelthisfearandencourageGermansoldiersandcitizensaliketorevoltagainsttheirNazileaders.’Theanalystssuggestedthattheonlycrediblegroupingaroundwhomtoformadomestic

ResistancetoHitlerwerethecommunists.TheyurgedtellingtheGermanpeoplethatiftheyoverthrewtheNazistheircountrycouldescapeAlliedinvasion.WhenthechiefsofstaffdeclaredthattheAlliesshouldaspiretooccupyGermanyaheadofanyinternalrevolution,FranzNeumannstronglydissented:‘ArevolutionarymovementaimingattheeradicationofNazismmaybehighlydesirable.’InAugust1944,whenSHAEFissueda‘HandbookforMilitaryGovernment’,thecontentofwhichwasmuchinfluencedbyR&A,USTreasurysecretaryHenryMorgenthauwasoutragedtodiscoverthatitincludedproposalsforrevivingtheGermaneconomy–hehimselfwastheprincipaladvocateofpastoralisingtheentirecountry.ThedepartmentwasmoreconsciousthananyothergovernmentbodyoneithersideoftheAtlanticaboutwhatHitlerwasdoingtotheJews,formanyofitsstaffwerethemselvesJewish.InOctober1943LeonardKreigernotedinawidelycirculatedpaperthatavisittoDenmarkbyAdolfEichmannindicatedthat‘theDanishpogromisthebeginningofthefinalcampaigntoridEuropeoftheJews’.TheOSSteamresearchingtheEasternFrontwashandicappedbythewallofsilencebehindwhich

theSovietUnionconducteditswar–evencopiesofPravdaandIzvestiareachedWashingtonsixweekslate.SolittledatawasprovidedbyMoscowthatitprovedeasiertoestimateGermanoffensivepotentialthanSovietdefensivecapabilities.AverellHarriman,USambassadorinMoscow,refusedtoacceptOSSmenonhisstaff,judgingthathehaddifficultiesandembarrassmentsenoughalready;onlyinApril1944didayounganalyst,RobertTucker,jointheembassytomonitorSovietforeignpolicy.R&AnonethelessproducedsomeprescientreportsonHitler ’spredicamentanddifficultiesinRussia,thefirstofthemin1942.ThroughmanymonthsduringwhichthemilitaryleadersofBritainandtheUSwerechronicallyscepticalaboutRussia’sprospectsofsurvival,Donovan’smenemphasisedtheGermans’hugesupplydifficulties,andquestionedtheirlikelihoodofsuccess.Thestudy’smethodologywasremarkable,includingtheuseoftechnicalinformationontheefficiencyoflocomotivesatsub-zerotemperatures,andtheproblemsofconvertingEuropeanrollingstocktoRussiantrackgauge.InovercrowdedWashingtonbackoffices,OSSresearchersstudiedthedailyforagerequirementsofthetypeofhorsesusedbyGermaninfantryandcomputedammunitionexpenditurebyinfantry,panzerandmotoriseddivisionsrespectively,atdifferentintensitiesofcombatactivity.Theydeployedmeteorologicaldatatoassessthesupplyrequirementsoftwohundreddivisionsfightingacrossa1,500-milefrontfor167days.Atwo-hundred-pagestudyoftheEasternFrontproducedinthemidstofthe1942–43StalingradbattlecorrectlyidentifiedtheinsuperablelogisticalproblemsfacingPaulus’sbeleagueredSixthArmy.R&A’seconomicsub-division,headedbyEmileDespres,attheoutsetmademanyofthesame

mistakesastheBritish,supposingHitler ’sindustrialbasefullymobilisedin1941;throughouttheyearthatfollowed,OSScontinuedtounderestimateGermanproduction.Laterinthewaritdidbetter,

tearingupBritishintelligenceestimatesofGermanaircraftandtankproductioninfavourofitsown‘deductiveproductivecurves’.OSSeconomistsrightlyjudgedthatmanpower,ratherthanoilorfood,wouldprovethekeybottleneck.SvendLarsen,aneconomistofDanishorigin,decidedthatBritishintelligenceestimatesofenemybattlecasualtiesweretoohigh.HebegantoextrapolatefromthedeathnoticesofofficersinGermany’spress–OSSinBernforwardedfifty-sevenGermannewspapers–andLarsen’sestimateswereafterwardsfoundtohavebeenamazinglyaccurate.MeanwhileR&AbecamefascinatedbythepossibilitiesoftabulatingvehicleserialnumberstocomputeGermanproduction.AfteroneofitsfieldresearcherscheckedeverywreckedpanzerontheTunisianbattlefieldin1943,thedepartmentreported–correctly–thatwhileGermanproductionwaslowerthanhadbeenthought,itwasstillincreasing.Therewasanin-housejokethatwhenanR&Amanwasaskedforaphonenumberhereplied,‘Don’tknow,butIcanestimateit.’R&A’sjudgementwasleastimpressive,mostnaïve,abouttheprospectsforfutureWestern

relationswiththeSovietUnion,thoughthisisunsurprisingwhensomanyofitsleadinglightswerecommunists.TheirreportsadoptedanalmostuniformlybenignviewofStalin’spolity.PaulSweezywarnedthattheimperialisticBritishmightforceAmericaintoanunnecessaryconfrontationwithStalin.ThedepartmentpressedforUSpolicytodistanceitselffromthatofBritain.GeroidRobinsoncabledtheLondonOSSteamon20May1944,expressinghisconviction‘thateverythingpossibleshouldbedonetoavoidaclashofinterestsbetweentheBritishandtheAmericansontheonehand,andtheRussiansontheother ’,thoughheadmitted:‘Itwillnotbeeasytodevelopaworkingcompromisebetweenanexpandinganddynamicpower(theSovietUnion),adevelopingbutessentiallysatisfiedpower(theUnitedStates),andapowerthatshowssymptomsofdecline(theBritishEmpire).’HearguedthatitbehovedtheWesttoerronthesideofgenerosityinmakingconcessionstoStalin.GivenwisdomandenergyinLondonandWashington,hesaid,peacefulco-existencewasattainable.BeforeYalta,R&Aproducedareportassertingthatattheendofthewar‘Russiawillhaveneither

theresourcesnor,asfaraseconomicfactorsareconcerned,theinclinationtoembarkonadventuristforeignpolicieswhich,intheopinionofSovietleaders,mightinvolvetheUSSRinaconflictoracriticalarmamentsracewiththeWesternPowers.’Theywerecorrect,however,inpredictingthattheUSSRcould,ifitchose,pursueitspost-wareconomicandindustrialreconstructionwithoutneedforAmericancash,whichtheStateDepartmentstillassumedwouldproveaninvincibleforceinWashington’sdealingswithMoscow.R&AwasrightalsotoacknowledgetheneedfortheUStotreattheUSSRasanequalinthenewworld.R&AcamenearerthananyotherorganisationintheworldtofulfillingtheBritishnavalofficer

DonaldMcLachlan’svisionthatproperlyconductedintelligenceworkshouldbeascholarlyprocess.Someofitsreportswerefanciful,butothersreflectedtheremarkablegiftsoftheirauthors.R&AproducedmaterialmoreimpressivethananythingissuedbyMI6,theAbwehror–sofarasweknow

–theNKVDandGRU.Unlessintelligenceservicesachieveextraordinaryaccesstothehighplacesofenemiesorprospectiveenemies,asdidRichardSorge,inHughTrevor-Roper ’swords‘morecanbededucedfromanintelligentstudyofpublicsourcesthanbyanynumberof“reliable”butunintelligent“agents”listeningatkeyholesorswappingdrinksatbars’.AsignificantpartofR&A’sachievementwasitsexploitationofopensourcesalongside,andindeedmoreintensivelythan,secretones.Howmuchdidthisterrificconcentrationofbrainpowerinfluencethewareffort?OSS’sreports

wereroutinelycirculatedacrosstheadministration.Unfortunately,however,andlikeallintelligencematerial,fewofthemgotreadbydecision-makers.America’sgeneralsinthefieldwerechronicallyscepticalaboutOSS-generateddata.OneofthecomplaintsaboutR&A’soutputwasthatoperationsstaffsfoundithardtopersuadethescholarstoproducequickbriefsinrealtimeaboutissuesthatcommanderswereobligedtoaddresswithinhoursordays.Thedivision’sintellectualspreferredinsteadtolabourforweeksorevenmonthson‘big-picture’themes.BarryKatz,thehistorianofR&A,acknowledgesthatitsactivitieshad‘atbestalimitedinfluenceontheprosecutionofthewar ’,thoughheisconsoledbythereflectionthatitrepresented‘anindisputablybrilliantepisodeinthehistoryofideas,ofintellectuals,andofintelligence’.TheBritishintelligencemachinebenefitedinthesecondhalfofthewarfromretainingaleavening

ofprofessionalsoldiersamongitsclevercivilians,whoimposedaminimumofdisciplineandemphasisedoperationalimperatives.Theuniformedcontingentunderstoodhowtosecureanaudiencefortheirwaresamongthechiefsofstaffand–onthewhole–contributedsomecommonsensetotheheadydeliberationsoftheacademics.OSS’sR&Amighthavemademoreimpactonthewarhaditpursuedthesamepersonnelpolicy,ratherthanleavingitseggheadstoploughtheirfurrowsinisolationfromthearmedforces’hierarchy.OneoftheNKVD’shighlyplacedAmericaninformants,identifiedonlyas‘Z’,reportedinlateJuly

1944:‘ThemainprincipleoftheentireOSSistheprincipleofamateurism…poorlytrained…theCinderellaoftheAmericansecretservices…TheOSSowesitsexistenceonlytoGeneralDonovan’spersonalpopularityandnottoitswork.’DonovanandhisstationheadsoccasionallycaughttheattentionofAlliedwarlordswitharemark,signalorreport.ButnonationalleaderorchiefofstaffhadtimeorinclinationroutinelytostudythecerebrationsofR&A,andmostofOSS’soutputwasignoredbyitsintendedconsumers.America’smilitaryleaders,liketheirBritishcounterparts,focusedoverwhelminglyonenemywirelessinterceptsastheirprincipalsourceofintelligence,anditishardtoarguethattheywerewrongtodoso.Nooneindividual,notevenRooseveltorMarshall,exercisedthesameauthorityovertheUSwar

effortasdidChurchillinBritain,andthustherewasnobodyinWashingtontoimposeoverarchingdisciplineontheintelligencecommunity,tocurbtherivalryandindeedanimositybetweentheUSArmyandNavy,andtametheexcessesofDonovan’sorganisationinafashionthatmighthavehelpedittosecuremorerespect.BecauseAmericaisamuchlargercountry,itsintellectualcommunityis

lessintimateandmorediffuse.Duringthewaryearsitscodebreakersrecordedextraordinaryachievements,buttheynevermobilisedanddeployedtheirnation’scivilianbrainsaseffectivelyasBritainuseditsOxbridgevillages.ThemindsetandconductofOSSreflectedthatofAmericaatlarge.Itsmenandwomenexudeda

confidenceunharrowedbythehorrorsofBlitzkriegandofdefeatssuchasRussia,Britainandmanyotherwartornnationshadknown.Theytookforgrantedawealthofresourcesnootherbelligerentcouldmatch.ArthurSchlesinger,oneofthemanyacademicsontheOSSpayroll,madethecaseforitschief’sdefence:‘Donovanwasinhiseccentricwayaremarkableman,awinningcombinationofcharm,audacity,imagination,optimismandenergy–aboveallenergy.Hewasadisorderlyadministratorandanimpetuouspolicymaker,racingfromheretotherewithideasandinitiativesandthencheerfullymovingontosomethingelse…Hewasexasperatingbutadorable.’StewartAlsopandThomasBraden,whoservedasfieldagents,declared,‘heranOSSlikea

countryeditor ’.MostofDonovan’sofficersreachedactivetheatresonlywhenthedarkestdaysoftheconflictwereover,andvictorywasnotindoubt.Theirbeliefthatnothingwasimpossiblewasinmanywaysadmirable.ButtheirimpatiencewiththecautiousandscepticalBritishreflectedalackofunderstandingofwhatChurchill’speoplehadbeenthrough,andoftheconstraintswhichBritain’srelativepovertyimposedonitswar-making.Moreover,ifsomeofthepoliticaldifficultiesanddilemmasidentifiedbytheBritishbecameexcusesforinertia,theOSS’slungesintoactionwerenotinfrequentlyill-judged.Theorganisation’smostimpressivecontributionwasthatofitseconomicanalysts,whodidbetterthananyoneelseintheAlliedcamp,BritishorAmerican,inprobingtherealitiesandvulnerabilitiesofHitler ’swareconomy.By1945Donovan’smenhadlearnedalot.BickhamSweet-EscottofSOEwrote:‘[OSS’s]bitterestdetractorswouldbeforcedtoadmitthattheyhadbecomequiteasgoodastheBritishatgettingsecretintelligenceandcarryingoutspecialoperations,andIpersonallythoughttheyweredoingitbetter.’Itiseasytolavishscepticism,evenscorn,ontheexcessesofbothAmericanandBritishwartime

specialforces,OSSandSOEforemostamongthem.TheGermansmadelittleuseofirregularunits,thoughtheNazileadershipsometimesfantasisedaboutthem:HimmlerwassufficientlyimpressedbyRussia’spartisansthatin1942heorderedWalterSchellenbergtosetupasimilarorganisation,codenamed‘Zeppelin’,whichtrainedanddispatchedreconnaissancegroupsbehindtheRussianlines,thoughnottomuchpurpose.In1943theSSchiefinstructedSchellenbergtocontactafamouspre-warmountaineer,MaxSchaefer,andinstructhimtoorganiseanewHimalayanexpedition,toincludeagentswhocouldoperateinsideIndia.Inreality,however,onlytheBrandenburgRegimentandsuchbuccaneersastheSS’sOttoSkorzenycarriedoutsignificantspecialoperations;theWehrmachtremainedinstitutionallyscepticalaboutthem.YetitisinterestingtospeculateabouttheconsequenceshadtheGermansdonemoresooner,when

theyhadbothmeansandopportunities.IfBritainhadbeenraidedin1940–41,largeresourceswould

havehadtobedivertedtodomesticsecurity:theHomeGuard–‘Dad’sArmy’–wouldnothavesufficed.AparatroopassaultonChurchill,mostplausiblyatChequers,couldhavepaidenormousdividends.Likewise,afewU-boat-launchedcommandoraidsontheUnitedStates’sshorelinecouldhavewreakedhavocandpanic,howeverslightthematerialdamagetheyinflicted.TheAlliedapproachtosecretwarmayoftenhavebeenwastefulandmisguided,butitwasmoreimaginativethanthatoftheWehrmacht,anddeliveredsomerealsuccesses,especiallyduringthelongyearsbeforeD-DayinJune1944,whenonlyrelativelysmallBritishandAmericangroundforceswereengagingtheAxis.AsWinstonChurchillbrilliantlyunderstood,specialoperationssustainedasenseofmomentuminthewareffortwhichwaspartlyspurious,butmorallyimportant.TheactivitiesofSOE,OSSandthearmedforces’‘privatearmies’consumedextravagantresourcesandsometimesdegeneratedintojuveniletheatricals.Buttheymadeapropagandacontributionlargerandmoreusefulthantheirmilitaryone.

3 ALLENDULLES: TALKINGTOGERMANS

OneAmericangainedmorepersonalcreditfromthesecretwarthananyother.AllenDulles,‘MrBurns’,OSScodenumber110,afuturechiefoftheCIA,washailedin1945asthenearestthingtoamasterspyhisnationhadproduced.HewasaNewYorker,sonofaliberalPresbyterianministerwithinfluentialfamilyconnectionsinWashington,whoattendedPrincetonandtravelledwidelyinEurope,includingadiplomaticpostinginSwitzerland.HeservedwiththeUSdelegationtothe1919Versaillespeaceconference,andthereafterspentsomeyearsattheStateDepartmentbeforetakingupacareerasacorporateandinternational-relationslawyer.InthatrolehemetpoliticiansincludingNevilleChamberlain,RamsayMacDonald,LéonBlum–andAdolfHitler.AprominentinterventionistlongbeforePearlHarbor,forsomemonthsin1941–42heservedasNewYorkbureauchiefoftheCOI,forerunnerofOSS,locatedintheRockefellerCenteralongside‘LittleBill’Stephenson’sBritishSecurityCoordination.InNovember1942DonovanpostedDulles,thenagedforty-nine,tobecomeOSS’smaninBern,

underdiplomaticcoverasspecialassistanttotheUSminister,LelandHarrison.Heacceptednosalary,butreceived$1,000amonthinexpensestosustainamodestlyluxuriouslifestyle.HiswifeCloverstayedathome,probablynogreatsorrowtotheembryospymaster,whoseinfidelitiesweremanyandvarious:inSwitzerlandheformedacloserelationshipwithCountessWallyToscanini,wifeofanItalianpoliticianwhospentthewarthere,supposedlyengagedonreliefwork.Dulleswasasmartman,whosebenign,avuncular,pipe-smokingmannerinspiredconfidence.He

establishedhimselfinaflatat23Herrengrasse,assistedbyGerovonGaevernitz,aresidentGermanbusinessmanwithaUSpassport.UntiltheAugust1944liberationofFrance,theOSSstaffinSwitzerlandwasrestrictedtofiveofficersandtwelvecipherenesandsecretaries,becauseofthe

logisticalproblemsoftransportingAmericansintothelandlockedcountry.Beyondorder-of-battlereports,adominantthemeinDulles’cablestoWashingtonwasfunding.GettingcashintoBernwascomplicated,andtheOSSteamspentplenty:by1944,thestationhadfortyinformantsongeneroussalaries.DullescomplainedbitterlyabouttheshortageofcredibleSwisssources,claimingthathehadtopaythepriceofbeingaJohnny-come-lately;between1939and1942otherAlliedsecretserviceshadsweptupalltheavailablelocalinformants–indeedmany,includingRudolfRössler,multi-taskedforseveralnations.TheOSSstationchiefhadmanyAmericanfriendsincommonwithFrederick‘Fanny’vandenHeuvel,hisMI6counterpart,buttheirrelationshipwascharacterisedbyrivalryratherthancollaboration.Dullesbecameanimportantsemi-overtdiplomaticfigure,ratherthanamanoftheshadowslike

AlexanderRadó.Hewasahigh-profileAmerican,readilyaccessibletoinfluentialGermans.ItwasevidenttoallthosewithaneyetothefuturethattheUnitedStateswouldbearbitratingthis,andrumourassertedthatDulleswasasecretrepresentativeoftheWhiteHouse.Farfromhimneedingpainstakinglytobuildnetworksofinformants,everybodywhoknewanything–togetherwithagenerousquotaoffraudsterswhopretendedto–beatapathtohisdoor.HebecamefriendlywithRogerMasson,theSwissintelligencechief,andmetHansHausamann,founderoftheBuroHa,atthehomeofZürichpublisherEmilOprecht.HeheldconversationswithMajorMaxWaibel,whoranSwissintelligence’sLucernestation,thoughWaibeldidnotdisclosehis‘Viking’intelligencelineintoGermany.AnintermediaryactingonbehalfofWalterSchellenbergalsoconductedaninconclusivedalliancewiththeAmerican.Allthepartiesexchangedagooddealofinformation,theusualblendoftruthandfalsehood.Dulleswasnothinglikeatraditionalofficerofanynation’ssecretservice;hehadambitionsforhis

ownrole,farbeyondmereespionage.NealPetersen,editoroftheDullespapers,haswritten:‘Hewasnotjustasemi-autonomousintelligenceproconsulwithintheOSS,butawould-begrandstrategistfortheWest.’ItisworthconsideringDulles’reportsinsomedetail,becausetheyvividlyillustratethevirtuesandvicesofAmerica’smostprominentoverseasintelligenceofficer.HerecognisedfromtheoutsetthatnobodyinWashingtonhadacoherentvisionofhowEuropeshouldemergefromthewar,andhimselfsetaboutfillingthatvacuum.InDecember1942hewastoutingCountCarloSforzaasItaly’smostrespectednon-fascistpolitician,andurgingthattheAlliesshouldfeedunrestinthatcountryratherthaninvadeit,withtheprospectoffightingacampaign‘againstaunitedGermanandItalianmilitaryopposition’.TotheveryendofthewarhearguedagainsttheAlliedpolicyofinsistenceuponunconditionalsurrender:‘WhateverourfinalpolicytowardsGermany,weshouldtodaytrytoconvincetheGermanpeoplethatthereishopeforthemindefeat,thattheinnocentwillbeprotected,whilethepunishmentoftheguiltywillbethroughlegalprocess.’ManyofDulles’dispatchesreadlikethereportsofanewspaperforeigncorrespondent,suchasone

of14December1942:‘ItalyisfullofGermantroops,andtotalestimatedstrengthisbetween150and

200thousand…Naples:EveryonecriticizesMussolini.Thereisunbelievableconfusion.Itisimportanttonotethatpeopleunderstandthatbombingraidsarenecessary.Rome:GovernmentofficesareallgoingtoFrosinone,Avezzano,Chaeti,AguilaandRieti;andhotelsarebeingrequisitionedforwarpurposes…Pistoia:mainconnectionbetweenBolognaandFlorence…railroadbridges.NoviLigure:twoimportantrailroadbridges.Verona:shouldbebombedimmediatelysinceitisanextremelyimportantrailroadcenter…Modena:AttheendofJanuaryaspecialschoolforflame-throwingunitswillgraduate780candidatesaslieutenants.’DullesprovidedanongoingstreamofreportsabouttheGermandomesticopposition–‘the

Breakers’,ashecalledthem–whosespokesmenvisitedhimwithafrequencythatsuggestedremarkablecarelessnessabouttheirownsecurity.TheforemostofthesewastheenormousHansGisevius,theAbwehr ’sZürichagent,whomtheOSSmandubbed‘Tiny’.Dulles’cookreportedthesevisitstotheGermanembassy,butuntilFebruary1944GiseviuswasabletocoverhimselfinBerlinbyassertingthathemettheAmericanonCanaris’sinstructions.Amongmuchelse,heprovidedalistofallegedlytrustworthyanti-Naziswhomightserveinapost-warGermangovernment.DulleseagerlyforwardedthistoWashington,andcabledinJanuary1943:‘IamoftheimpressionthatthisisthemomentforadriveofvigortoeffectaseparationoftheNazisandHitlerfromthebalanceoftheGermanpeople,andholdoutatthesametimehopetotheGermanpeoplethatsurrenderontheirpartdoesnotmeanthatdestructionwillbefalltheindividualandthestate.’On3Februaryhedescribedameetingwith‘theprominentpsychologistProfessorCGJung’:‘hisopinionsonthereactionsofGermanleaders,especiallyHitlerinviewofhispsychopathiccharacteristics,shouldnotbedisregarded’.Hedispatchedmanyreportsonenemysecretweapons,notallfanciful,fortheyhadbeensupplied

byhisGermanvisitors:robottanks;‘offensivepreparationsforwarfarebygas.Therearenowavailableinquantities,large-calibregasbombs’;testflightsoffleetsofflying-boatsdesignedtobecrashedonLondonladenwithexplosives.On8August1943heannouncedthat‘Gotham,andotherpointsonourAtlanticseaboard,willbesubjectedtobombingbyplanesthatarenowbeinginstalledinseveralU-boats.’On25April1944hesuggestedthat‘inParisdogsarebeingrequisitionedinlargenumbers’,andthatGermanandJapanesescientistswereexploringbiologicalwarfare.On2MayDullesreportedtheGermansexperimentingwithaweapontofreezetheatmosphereto250degreesbelowzerobytubesconnectedtotheundersidesoftheirfighters,whichwouldthenflyoverAlliedbombersandprecipitateicing.‘TheNazisregardtheresultsasdefinitive.’FritzKolbe,aminordiplomatbornin1900whowasservingasaGermanForeignOfficecourier,

arrivedinBernduringthesummerof1943withabriefcasebulgingwithsecretdocuments,whichheinitiallyofferedtotheBritish.MorbidfearsabouttraffickingwithsupposedlydisaffectedGermans–memoriesofVenlo–causedMI6torebuffhim.HeturnedinsteadtoDulles,whowelcomedhimwithopenarmsandgavehimasourcecodenameas‘GeorgeWood’.Thereafter,thecouriersmuggled

morethan1,600classifieddocumentstotheAmericans,includinginformationonthelocationsofV-1andV-2plants;about‘Cicero’s’raidsonthebriefcaseoftheBritishambassadorinAnkara;genocideinHungary;togetherwithamoundofJapanesematerial.TheBritish,andespeciallyClaudeDansey,continuedtoinsistthatKolbewasadoubleagent.Intruth,hewasmerelyadrabcivilservantwhoattractedlittlenoticefromhismasters,butwasmotivatedtodefyandbetraythembyaprofounddecency.DulleswasunlovedbyMI6,whosechiefsclaimedthathe‘lendshimselfeasilytoanystriking

proposalwhichlookslikenotoriety’.DanseyincludedtheOSS’sBernchiefinabroaderdismissal:‘Americanseverywhere“swalloweasilyandarenotcritical”.’BothBroadwayandHansGiseviusalertedDullesthatsomeUScodeswerecompromised,thoughtheAmericanswereslowtoheedthewarningandchangethem.DanseywasentirelywronginquestioningtheauthenticityofGiseviusandKolbeassources,buthewasjustifiedinsuggestingthatDulleswasnaïve,especiallyabouttheGermanResistance.ThoughitsmembersopposedtheNazis,mostwereconservativesandnationalistswhocherishedextraordinarydelusionsthatinanegotiationwiththeAlliesfollowingthefalloftheregimetheymightsuccessfullyupholdGermany’sclaimsontheswollenfrontiersHitlerhadseized.DullestoldWashingtonlittleaboutthegrotesqueSwissprofiteeringfromtheconflict,notablyby

traffickingwiththeNazisforashareofthespoilsoftheslaughterofEurope’sJews.Hemusthaveknownsomethingatleastaboutthis,butwasprobablyreluctanttoexposedirtylinenthatmightthreatenhisamicablerelationshipwiththeSwissauthoritiesandthesecurityofhisbaseofoperations–neitherMI6northeOSSstationeverincurredthesortofharassmentbyRogerMasson’sintelligenceservicethatfellupontheSoviet‘Lucy’Ring.TheAmericanhadplentytosayaboutGermansecretweapons,whichconfirmedreportsreaching

theWesternAlliesfromothersources.On24June1943hesentareasonablyaccuratereportonGermanrocket-testingatPeenemünde,sayingthatquantityproductionwasexpectedtobegininSeptemberorOctober,withlargermodelsatanexperimentalstage.Healsomentionedlong-rangegiantcannon,butsaidthathelackedthetechnicalknowledgetoevaluatetheirpotential.On9September1943hewarnedthatthe‘rocketbombshouldbetakenveryseriously’,andinDecemberidentified‘Professor[Wernervon]Braun’asakeyfigureinitsevolution.On10DecemberhereportedworkonnewadvancedGermansubmarinesfittedwithSchnorkelunderwaterbreathingdevices.HeprovidedinformationontheGermannuclearresearchprogramme,thoughhecouldnotofferanycluestotheonlyquestionthatmattered:howclosewereHitler ’sscientiststobuildingaBomb?AsfortheplightofEurope’sJews,on10March1943DullestoldWashingtonthatthusfarinthe

year,15,000GermanJewshadbeenarrested.On12JunehedescribedHitler ’sangertowardstheBudapestregimefordecliningtohandoverHungary’sJewishminority.Ingeneral,however,neitherfromBernnorfromotherAlliedintelligencesourceswastherewasmuchtrafficaboutthe

Holocaust,eveninthelatterstagesofthewar.Thisreflectednotaconspiracyofsilence,butratherapervasiveconsciousnessthattheNaziswerekillinglargenumbersofpeoplealloveroccupiedEurope–Poles,Greeks,French,Russianprisoners,Yugoslavs,Italians–togetherwithafailuretorecognisethatthescaleandnatureoftheJewishgenocidetranscendedallothermanifestationsofmassmurder.Alliedintelligence-gatherersfocusedoverwhelminglyontransmittingandanalysinginformationthatseemedrelevanttowinningthewar,ratherthantoilluminatingtheplightofHitler ’svictims.On12June1943,DullesforwardedtoWashingtonabrieffromGiseviusaboutHitler ’spersonal

dominanceofmilitaryoperations;thefactthattheStalingraddisasterderivedfromtheFührer ’sacceptanceofGöring’sassurancethathecouldsupplythegarrisonbyair;thatBerlin’sdecisiontoreinforceNorthAfricareflecteddefianceofhisgenerals’advice.DullesdescribedKlugeandMansteinastheablestGermancommanders,butsaidthatneithertheynoranyoftheirpeershadthecouragetoresisttheFührer ’swill.ThiswasusefulandreasonablyaccuratebackgroundforUSstrategy-makers.AlltheintelligencereachingAlliedcommandersbeforetheAnglo-AmericanlandingsinSicilyon

9July1943andatSalernoon3SeptemberconfirmedHitler ’sintentiontoabandonsouthernItaly.On7JulyDullescabledfromBern,reportinghisGermaninformants’viewthatBerlinintendedtotreattheItalianpeopleruthlessly,butthattheWehrmachtwouldoffernoseriousresistanceinthesouth,stakingeverythingonadefenceofthePovalley.On29Julyhewentfurther,saying,‘WehavereportsthatsouthernItalyisbeingvacatedbyNazitroops’–thesamemessageaswasreachingthejointchiefsofstaffthroughUltra.TheyhadnomeansofguessingthatHitlerwouldchangehismindwhenKesselring,aftertanglingwiththeAnglo-AmericanarmiesatSalerno,reportedthathewasconfidentofbeingabletocontaintheminthesouthformanymonths.ThedominantthemeofDulles’reportingtoWashingtonforthelasttwoyearsofthewarwasthatif

theUSthrewitssupportbehindtheGermanoppositionmovement,Hitlercouldbeoverthrownandapeacenegotiatedwithanewmoderateregime.On23August1943hesentanemotionalmessagesuggestingthatthedomesticmoodinGermanyhadbecomedesperate:‘TherearenopoliticallystrongGeneralsinview,butFalkenhausenandRundstedtarebothknowntobeanti-Nazis.GöringisineclipseandrumorinBerlinhasitthathemadeanattempttogettoSweden.BormannandHimmlerareincontroversy.’Nextday,hewaxedevenmoreoptimistic:‘anythingmighthappeninGermany…Ifwekeepapplyingpressure[Hitler ’soverthrow]mostlikelywillhappenbeforetheendoftheyear.’On19Augusthepleaded:‘CanwenotdosomethingduringoraftertheQuebec[Roosevelt–Churchillsummit]conferenceinthewayofappealingtothemassesintheAxiscountries?…Ifwetakeconcertedmeasuresinboththepsychologicalandmilitaryfieldsofwarfare,wecancrackGermanyandendthewarthisyear.’Formonths,WashingtonremainedscepticalaboutAllenDulles’materialfromFritzKolbe,which

seemedtoogoodtobetrue.TheOSSmanwascorrecttoemphasisethatonlytheGermanarmyhadthepowertoremoveHitler,andthatfearoftheSovietsdominatedallGermanperceptions,reportingon6December1943:‘ItispossiblydifficultforyouinWashingtontorealizetheextentoftherealapprehensionofRussiainthispartoftheworld.’MuchofhisinformationaboutthetensionsandpowershiftswithintheNazihierarchywasaccurate,forinstanceaNovember1943reportthatHimmlernolongerthoughtthewarmilitarilywinnable,andthatSpeerwasnoweconomicsupremo.InJanuary1944hebegantotellWashingtonaboutGermanResistancegroups’hopesofkillingHitler.Forthemostpart,BernOSS’spoliticalreportingaboutconditionsinGermanywasreasonablysound,butDullesrevealedashakygraspofmilitarymatters–scarcelysurprisinginalawyer.Likemanyothersecretwarriors,hewildlyoverratedthecapacityofguerrillamovements,andespeciallyoftheFrenchResistance,tomakeastrategiccontributiontotheadvanceoftheAlliedarmies,thoughhewascorrectinhisbittercriticismsoftheRooseveltadministrationforrejectingdeGaulleasthelegitimatestandard-bearerofFreeFrance.InthelaterwaryearstherewassurelyastrandofenvyintheattitudeofMI6andSOE,whichwere

facedwiththeembarrassmentthatahostofEuropeansofallpoliticalhueswhowerepeddlinginformationorstrivingforinfluencesoughtoutDulles,nowthelocalAmericangrandee,inpreferencetoBritishagents.HecabledWashingtonon30July1944,deploringBritishattemptstoclaimownershipofFrenchandItalianpartisans:‘AmsorrytostatethattheBernZulu-SOEChief’sgeneralattitudeistotrytomonopolizerelationswithResistance.’HedevotedmuchefforttocompilinganddispatchingmaterialontheWehrmacht’sorderofbattle,thoughthiswasfarlessaccurateandcomprehensivethanwasderivedfromUltra.OnoneoccasionhereportedTirpitzsettosailinninedays,thoughthegiantbattleshipwasthenunfitforsea.On29April1944heurgedparachutingOSSagents,armsandequipmentintoPoWcamps,toempowertheirinmatestorise:‘AfewsuchoutbreaksbyprisonerswouldhaveagravepsychologicaleffectinGermany.’HerewasanexampleofthesortofsillinessthatsometimesovertookOSSandSOE–implementationofsuchaplanwouldhaveprovokedwholesaleNazimassacresofAlliedPoWs,fornomilitaryadvantagewhatever.On19February1944,Dullessentalongdispatchoncemoreurgingtheimportanceofbuilding

foundationsforadefeatedGermany:‘TheonlyrealquestiontodayiswhetherconstructiveregeneratingforceswillcontrolanddirectthefateofEurope,orwhetherforcesofdisintegrationandanarchywillprevail.’HeurgedthattheWesternAlliesshouldimmediatelyembarkonacollaborationwiththeGermanResistancetocreatealeft-of-centreBerlingovernment-in-waitingthatofferedacrediblealternativetocommunism.Theflawinallthiswasthatitignoredtoweringrealitiesontheground:theRussianswerestormingwestwards,anddoingmostofthehardfightingtodestroyNazism.ThepolicyadoptedbytheBritishandAmericangovernments,offocusingonmilitaryvictoryfollowedbyanoccupationofGermany,wastheonlyrealisticcoursewhenanypolitical

designembracingGermanfactionsmustopenadisastrousbreachwithMoscow.On7April1944DullesreportedthattheGermanopposition,ledbyGen.LudwigBeck,wasready

tomoveagainstHitler.Headdedtendayslater:‘IdonotbelievethatanyableNazimilitaryofficialsarepreparedasyettothrowopenthewesternfronttous.Idobelieve,however,thatthecollapseofGermanymightfollowaveryfewmonthsafterwards,ifwecouldgetasolidtoeholdintheWest.’HeconstantlypleadedwithWashingtontoauthorisehimtoofferpoliticalincentivestoanti-HitlerGermans–andwasrebuffed.On10July1944,tendaysbeforeStauffenberg’sbombexploded,hereportedbyradiophonetoWashington:‘Arevolution[insideGermany]isnottobeexpected;thepeoplearetooapatheticandtoocloselysupervisedbythepolice.AcollapsecanonlycomeastheAlliedtroopsarrive.Further,noBadogliodevelopmentislikelyhere.Theoppositionmovementsarenotinanypositiontotakesuchastep.’Threedayslater,however,hebelatedlywarnedWashingtonthatsomebigGermandevelopmentmightbelooming,though‘Iamnotmakinganyforecastsofsuccess’.InthesamemonthhespeculatedaboutwhetherthepassivityoftheU-boatfleetindicatedthatitwas

beingheldinreadinesstoevacuatetheNazileadershiptoJapan.On9AugustheclaimedthatGen.StülpnagelinParishadattemptedsuicide.HereportedrealisticallyonthemoodinsideGermanyfollowingthefailureoftheHitlerbombplot,sayingon19AugustthatGermansweretoopreoccupiedwithcopingwiththemiseriesandprivationsofdailylifetobecomepoliticallyinterestedortoconcernthemselveswithanythingmuchbeyondtheirpersonalhorizons.HewrotelikewiseoftheirattitudetoAlliedairbombardment:‘Theirreactiontotherepeatedraidsisratherlikethatofaninjuredanimalheldatbaywithoutanyobviousmeansofescape…TheGermanscanseenowayoutexcepttocontinuethebattle.’Hereportedon18January1945:‘NorwayandItalymaywellbethefirsttheatersfromwhich

German[troop]withdrawalsstart.’HewasanenthusiasticbelieverinaNazilast-ditch‘redoubt’insouthernGermanyinthespringof1945,andwaslessthanperceptivewhenhereportedinaradiophonedispatchon21March1945:‘TheRussiansaretreatingtheGermansintheoccupiedterritoryonthewholeveryfairly…TheGermansfeelthattheRussiansaremakingasuccessoftheiroccupation,andthereisagrowingfeelingthattheywillmakeagreatersuccessthantheEnglishandAmericanswilloftheirs.’DullesledtheUScrusadeforAustriaanditspeopletobetreatedasHitler ’svictimsratherthanaccomplices,whichhelpstoexplainwhymostofAustria’smanywarcriminalsescapedindictment.IndefenceofDulles,hegotnomorewrongthandidmostintelligenceofficersofallnationalities.

Heprovidedausefulconduitforanti-NaziGermanstocommunicatewithWashington,eveniftheexchangesdidthemnopracticalgood.PerhapsthemostsignificantconsequenceofhiscontactswiththeResistancewastofuelSovietparanoiaaboutthepossibilitythattheWesternAllieswouldmakeasecretpeacewithGermany.TheRussians’Americanagentsinhighplaceskeptthemapprisedof

Dulles’contactswithGermans–andofsomemeetingsthatwereproductsofthetraitors’over-fertileimaginations.On14June1944,forinstance,theWashingtonNKVDstationreportedtoMoscowthatDulleshadtoldtheStateDepartmentofapersonalvisittohimselfinBernbyGen.WaltervonBrauchitschoftheGermangeneralstaff,offeringpeacetermsonbehalfoftheWehrmachtonconditionthatnoSoviettroopsshouldenterGermanterritory.CordellHull,theUSsecretaryofstate,hadrespondedtoDullesthat‘theAmericansarenotgoingtoconductanynegotiationswiththeGermanswithoutotherallies’.ThesamesignalalsodescribedDullesreceivingoverturesfromprominentGermanswhoofferedtoevacuateWesternAllied-occupiedterritories,iftheywereleftfreetocontinuethewaragainsttheUSSR.TherecordsuggeststhatDulles’emergencefromthewarasasupposedprinceamongspieswas

undeserved.Hegotsomethingsright,becauseinformedGermansapproachedhim,asaprominentandaccessibleAmerican,ratherthanbecauseheperformedanynotablefeatofagentrecruitment,ordisplayednotablejudgementasananalyst.Gooddiplomaticreportingoftenachievedasmuchas,ormorethan,spiesintheenemy’scamp.PavelSudoplatovwrote:‘Some80percentofintelligenceinformationonpoliticalmatterscomesnotfromagentsbutfromconfidentialcontacts.’Thesearemorelikelytobemadeinembassiesorchancelleriesthanatsecretrendezvousonstreetcorners,anditisinterestingtocomparethetoneofDulles’reportingwithsomeofthedispatchesfromAlliedambassadorsinneutralcapitals.On30November1942,forinstance,theBritishambassadorinStockholmwrotetoLondon,reportingaconversationwithawell-connectedSwedewhohadjustreturnedfromBerlin.OneofMoscow’smeninWhitehall,probablyDonaldMaclean,obliginglypassedthistotheNKVD,sothatitwasalsoreadbyBeria.SirVictorMallet,theambassador,assertedthatallimportantGermanstrategicdecisionswerenow

beingmadebyHitler,oftenagainstthestrongopinionofthearmy’sgeneralstaff.Opponentsoftheregimewithinthearmy‘couldundercertaincircumstancesbecomeleaderofanuprising’,butHimmlerandtheSSwereimmenselystrongand‘verydangerous’.IntheviewofMallet’sinformant,alongseriesofmajormilitarydefeatswouldberequiredbeforetheNaziregimebecamevulnerable.IntelligentGermanswerethoroughlyawarethattheWehrmachtfacedacrisisontheEasternFront(atStalingrad):‘CiviliansinBerlincanimaginethehorrorsoftheRussianmassacresinGermanyifGermanylosesthewar.ItisthesefearsmorethananythingelsethatrestrainoppositiontotheNazisfromactivedemarches…MilitaryandcivilianleadersoftheoppositionfullyrealizethatanytrucebetweentheAlliesandHitleroranyonefromhiscliqueisimpossible.’ThiswasasoundassessmentofthemoodinsideGermany,writtenbyanaccrediteddiplomat,andit

ishardtoimaginehowanysecretagentorsignaldecryptcouldhaveimproveduponit.Mallet’sremarkscloselymatchedthoseoftheOSSfromBern.AllenDullescouldhavefunctionedjustaseffectivelyhadhebeenUSambassador–hisprincipalsourceonHungary,forinstance,wasnospybutinsteadthelocalHungarianminister,BaronBakách-Bessenyey.TheOSSstationchiefwasa

cleverNewYorklawyerwithlessunderstandingofinternationalaffairs,intelligence,war-makingorEuropethanhesupposed.ItwasfortunatethattheadministrationinWashingtonignoredhispleasthatitshouldnegotiatewiththeGermanopposition:therewaspatheticallylittleofthis,anditspoliticalexpectationswereentirelyatoddswithreality.IftheAmericanshadopenedbilateraltalkswithGermansofanyhue,theRussianswouldhavebecomeevenmoreimpossibletodealwiththantheywerealready.Asitwas,theywhippedupastormwhenwithoutSovietconsentDullesarrangedtermsforthesurrenderofGermantroopsinItalywithLt.Gen.KarlWolffon2May1945,threedaysbeforethegeneralcapitulation.PerhapsthemostremarkableaspectofthosenegotiationswasthatDulleswasabletoplaceanuncommonlycourageousOSSwireless-operator–aCzechnamedVáclavHradecký,‘LittleWally’–inWolff’snorthItalianheadquarters,fromwhichhetransmittedtoBernforseveralweeks,andlivedtotellthetale.AftercompletinganexhaustivestudyoftheOSSwartimereportsfromBern,NealPetersenwrote:

‘Oneishard-pressedtoidentifyasingleexampleofaDullesreportofitselfhavingdirectimpactonatop-levelpolicydecision.’LikesomuchotherOSSmaterial,mostofDulles’dispatchesdisappearedintothemawofwartimeWashingtonbureaucracy,withoutchangingheartsandmindseitheramongtheUSchiefsofstafforattheWhiteHouse–whichwere,likeWinstonChurchill,muchmorereceptivetotheirdailydoseofUltra.

12

Russia’sPartisans:TerrorisingBothSides

On3July1941,Stalin’sfirstbroadcastappealtotheSovietpeoplesechoedChurchill’searlierclarioncallstotheoccupiednationsofEurope:‘Conditionsmustbemadeunbearablefortheenemyandhiscollaborators;theymustbepursuedandannihilatedwherevertheyare.’WhatfollowedacrossvasttractsoftheSovietempireinthenextthreeyearsbecamepartoftheheroiclegendofRussia’swar,ataleofitspeoplesunitedinresistingthebarbarousinvader.Contemporaryevidencenowavailable,however,tellsamorecomplicatedstory.From1943onwards,guerrillaoperationsinfluencedthestruggleontheEasternFrontmoresignificantlythananyothertheatreofwar.PartisanscouldoperatemorereadilyinRussia’sforests,mountainsandsuchwildernessesasthePripyatmarshes,thanacrossmostofWesternEurope.Stalinsufferednobourgeoissqueamishnessaboutcasualties,noraboutcollateraldamagetocivilians.Thetestimonyofmanywartimepartisansshowsthattheyconducteddualcampaignsofterror:againsttheAxis,andalsoagainstmillionsoftheirownpeoplewhofeltneitherloyaltytoStalin’spolity,norwillingnesstoriskalltorestoreit.Inthis,asinsomuchelse,thestruggleintheEastattainedanextraordinaryferocity,andtheparticipantssufferedexperiencesfarbloodierthanthoseofWesternEurope.Intheearlywaryears,Stalin’spartisansfacedthesamedifficultiesastheircounterpartselsewhere:

theylackedorganisation,arms,supplyaircraftandwirelesses.PavelSudoplatovclaimedinhismemoirsthattheNKVDhadmadeelaboratepreparationsforstay-behindoperationsinthewakeofGermanadvances.Thisisfalse.Inthe1930s,Stalinhaddismantledtheentireexistingnetworkofpartisanbasesandcadresacrossthecountry,asathreattohisownauthority.ManyveteranguerrillaleadersofthecivilwarwereshotinthePurges.Throughoutthelatermonthsof1941Sudoplatovandhiscomradeswereobligedtostriveandscrabbletoimproviseintelligence-gatheringandpartisangroups.Theirearlyoperationswereshambolic,costly,futile.Almostallthemenconscriptedwereuntrained,andmanywerealsounwilling.Theywereoftendeployedinregions–notablyUkraine–whoseinhabitantshadcelebratedliberationbytheGermansfromStalin’shatedtyranny.PartisanswereregardedbylocalpeopleasMoscow’screaturesratherthanaspatriots,asthreatstotheirhomesandcompetitorsfordesperatelyscarcefood.Moreover,untilStalingradtheGermanswereseenaswinners,theSovietsaslosers.IntheBalticstates,duringthemonthsbefore‘Barbarossa’Beriahadconductedpurgesinwhichtensofthousandsofpeoplewereexecutedorshippedtothegulag,which

explainswhysomanyLithuanians,EstoniansandLettsgarlandedthemenoftheWehrmacht.WhileBritain’sSOEmadenoattempttostimulatefull-scalerevoltinoccupiedEuropebetween1940and1944,inthedesperatecircumstancesofembattledRussiathousandsofmenwerethrustintooperationsintheimmediatewakeof‘Barbarossa’.Russiawaspayingsodreadfulaforfeitthatthepartisans’murderouslossesvanishedunnoticedintothegreatcauldronofbloodsetbubblingbyHitlerandStalin.Guerrillascanonlyswiminaseaoflocalsympathisers,toparaphraseMaoZhedong.InUkraine,

focusofMoscow’sfirstclumsyeffortstopromoteguerrillawar,therewerefewsuchpeople.ThelocalCommunistParty’ssecretaryreceivedareportfromCommissarVasilySergienko,detailingpartisanoperationsinthefirstyearofwaronSovietsoil.TheNKVD,thisstated,claimedtohaveestablished1,874groups,withatotalstrengthof29,307;ithaddispatched776agentsandcourierstoworkwiththesebands.Yeton1May1942MoscowCentreacknowledgedjustthirty-sevengroupsasoperationalinUkraine,withacombinedstrengthof1,918men.Whathadhappenedtotherest?SomesurrenderedtotheGermansatthefirstopportunity,whileotherswerecapturedorkilled.Manysimplyfadedbackintolocalcommunities,abandoningtheirmissions.TherewasnocoordinationbetweenrivalPartybodiesandintelligenceorganisations,eachofwhichcreateditsownlocalforces.Sergienkocomplainedinhis1942report:‘Responsibilityforinfiltratingpartisangroupsthroughtheenemy’sfrontisoftenentrustedtopeoplewhohaveabsolutelynoexperience…Partisangroupsaregivencontradictoryinstructionsandtasks.’TheNKVDandGRUstruggledtogainaccesstoscarceaircraft.Mattersbegantoimproveonlyin

May1942,whenacentralstaffforallpartisanoperationswascreated,followedsoonafterwardsbyapartisanair-transportorganisation,bothunderdirectPartycontrol.NKVDcellswereattachedtoallthegroups,mostofwhichnumberedbetweenfiftyandahundredmen.Armsandsuppliesremainedchronicallyshort.TheworstthatGen.FranzHalder,Hitler ’scommanderintheEast,couldsayaboutpartisansin1942wasthattheyconstituted‘ratheranuisance’.Onlyintwoareasofnorth-easternUkrainewereguerrillasthenoperatingeffectively,andevenlaterinthewarthesurvivalofsuchbandsdemandedforestbases,wheretheGermansstruggledtolocateanddestroythem.Theleaderofonegroup,acomradenamedKovpak,dispatchedtoUkrainiancommissarNikita

Khrushchevon5May1942areport,countersignedbyhisownband’scommissar,whichassertedbaldlythatcivilians‘weredemoralizedbytheretreatoftheRedArmyandtheGermanreignofterror,whilecertainstrataofthepopulationandanumberofUkrainianvillageswerehappyaboutthearrivalofoccupationtroopsandhostiletowardspartisansandtheSovietregime’.On21August1941MikhailovKartashev,anNKVDagentinKiev,wrotetoSudoplatovinMoscow,paintingableakpictureofthechaosofpartisanoperations:‘DearPavelAnatolievich!Thisletterisaprivateonesincetheissuesbelowarenotwithinmydirectcompetence.Idon’ttakepartintheoperationofourorgansinKiev…AlltheinformationbelowhasbeenobtainedwithoutreferencetoofficialsofthePeople’s

Commissariat,andisthusstrictlytruthful…Itishardtosaywhoisperformingworst,butitisclearthattheworkofourorganisationsislessthanbrilliant.’Kartashevwentontodescribethefateofone150-stronggroupestablishedinKharkov,whichwasorderedtocrossthefrontinBessarabia.Itsmensetforthwithoutguidesormaps,dressedinciviliancityclothes,carryingonlypistolsorrifles,andenoughofthosetoarmjusthalftheband.Theyhadnoorders,noradios,nopasswordsbywhichtore-enterSoviet-heldterritory.Likemostsuchparties,theywereneverheardfromagain.Kartashevcontinued:‘informationaboutthefateofpartisangroupsonlybecomesavailableifsurvivorsmakeitbackthroughthelines’.Theylackedbriefingsaboutenemydeployments:‘Youhaveprobablyreadreportsaboutinstanceswherepartisansattemptingtocrossthelinewere“drivenback”.Thisphraseisinherentlyfalsebecausethereisnocontinuousfront,onlyGermanconcentrations,andofcourseline-crossersbumpintothemiftheyhavenoideawheretheyare.’Therewasablack-comicepisodeofthissortwhenacertainSergeantBondarenkowasguidinga

partyintruckstoarendezvouswhereitsmenweretodismountandcrosstheenemylinesonfoot.ARedArmysentrywaveddowntheconvoytowarnthatonlyGermanslayinfront–andwasignored.Thepartisansdroveblithelyonuntiltheymetahailoffire,whichkilledtheircommanderandmostoftheparty.ThirtysurvivorsfledbacktotheSovietlines,withouttheirweaponsorvehicles.AnotherpartywalkedintoaGermanmortarbarragewhichaccountedforseveralmen;thesurvivorsspentfivedayshidinginaswampbeforetricklingbacktotheSovietlines.TheNKVD’sKartashevcataloguedthepartisans’deficienciesofarmsandequipment:theyhad

riflesforonly50percentoftheirstrength,andfortyroundsaman,whichtheywereobligedtocarryintheirpocketsorbootsforlackofbandoliersandpacks.Somehadnoammunitionatall.OnegrouparrivedfromKharkov,composedofhighly-motivatedandwell-armedPartycadres,whowerepromptlydeployedtoguardthelocalNKVDheadquartersratherthantofight.KartashevobservedwitheringlythatofficialreportstoMoscownotmerelyfailedtoadmitthesefiascos,butpretendedthatpartisanoperationswerebeingsuccessfullycarriedout.TheinstitutionalisedmendacityoftheSovietsystemwasunshakeable.Afewofficialreportsdidtellthetruth,however,suchasonedated21November1941,addressed

toNikitaKhrushchev.ThisrecordedtheexperiencesofabattalionoftheNKVD’s1stPartisanRegimentinAugust,whenitwassurprisedbytheGermanswhilerestinginthevillageofOsintsy,nearZhitomit.Atwo-hourbattletookplaceinwhichthebattalioncommander,hischiefofstaffandcommissarwerekilled.Justtwomensurvivedoutofahundred,toreturntotheSovietlineswiththesorrytale.ThereporttoMoscowconcluded:‘Wemayassumethatthe1stBattalion’sfailurewascausedbythefollowing:anunsuitablespotchosenforahalt;lackofnecessaryreconnaissanceandpoorsecuritywhichallowedtheGermanstoapproachunnoticedtowithin50metres;and,finally,possiblebetrayaloftheunitbytwopartisanswhohaddesertedontheeveningbeforethebattle(Levkovetsdoesnotknowtheirnames).DeputyPeople’sCommissarofInternalAffairsofUkrSSR,

Savchenko.21November1941.’YetanotherreporttoKhrushchev,dated24November1941andmarked‘TOPSECRET’,detailed

thefateofagroupcommandedbyoneKhalyava,whoreturnedfromamission.Hehadsetforthwithtwenty-fourmen,hand-pickedassupposedkeenPartyactivists,albeitlackingmilitaryexperience.Mostofthem,hesaid,surrenderedtothelocalGermanKommandaturinKrasnoarmeiskwithinhoursofthattown’soccupation,andbecamedriversfortheWehrmacht.HehimselfreturnedalonetotheRussianlineson18November.Agroupofforty-sevenmensenttoKiev,thenstillinRussianhands,wasorderedtocrossthefrontandmakeforVinnitsaandBerichev,headedbyacommandernamedRudchenko,who–unusually–wasgivenawirelesstransmitter.Withindays,KievwasoverrunbytheGermans.ThenexttheNKVDheardofRudchenko,hehadbeenspottedsurrenderingtotheoccupiers,alongwithmostofhismen.Theeyewitness,ayounglieutenantwholaterreachedRedArmypositionsfurthereast,saidthathewarnedthesupposedpartisanleaderthathewascommittingtreason,butwasignored.Thereportconcludeddarkly:‘Measureshavebeentakentoverifythisinformation.DeputyPeople’sCommissarofInternalAffairsofUkrSSR,Savchenko.24November1941.’Intheaftermathofthewar,theSovietUnionidentifiedforglorificationseveralgroupswhich

survivedformonthsinthecatacombsbeneaththeBlackSeacityofOdessa,whichwasoccupiedbyAxisforcesfor907days:in1969thetunnelswereopenedasamuseumdubbed‘TheMemorialtoPartisanGlory’.Theofficialnarrativedescribedhow,beforeOdessafellinOctober1941,localKomsomolmeetingswereheldtoplanstay-behindResistance.Laterveterans’testimony,however,toldinsteadofanorgyofdespairingdrunkenness,followedbyfist-fightsbetweenMoscowandOdessaNKVDmen.Inthelongmonthsthatfollowed,competingsecretservicegroupsfoughteachothermuchmoreenergeticallythantheyengagedtheGermans.OneMoscowofficer,CaptainVladimirMolodstov,aformerminercapturedandexecutedbytheGermansinJuly1942,waslatermadeaHerooftheSovietUnion.Followinghiscapture,however,arivalnamedLt.Kuznetsov,amemberoftheOdessaNKVD,disarmedandthenkilledallbutoneofMolodstov’smen,claimingthattheyhadbeenplottingagainsthim.On28AugustKuznetsovshotanothermanforstealingapieceofbread.Amonthlater,hekilled

twomorefortakingfoodand‘lackofsexualdiscipline’,whateverthatmeant.Amonthlater,Kuznetsovhimself–who,ifnotunhinged,wasobviouslyabrute–wasshotbyoneofhisownmeninanundergroundrefugeknownas‘theMirrorFactory’.OnlythreeNKVDofficersthereaftersurvived,andtheirmentalconditionmusthavebeendire.Abramov,themanwhohadkilledKuznetsov,urgedsurrender.Anotherofficerchoseinsteadtoleavethecatacombs,andspenttheremainingmonthsofOdessa’soccupationhidinginhiswife’sapartment.Afterthecity’sliberationheclaimedtohavekilledAbramov,butthatofficersomehowsurvived.Thelastofthethree,namedGlushenko,alsolivedtoseeOdessaoverrunbytheRedArmy,butthenreturnedtothecatacombsfor

someill-definedpurpose,andperishedwhenagrenadeexplodedinhishands.Thisaccountisriddledwithinconsistenciesandunconvincingtestimony.Theonlycertaintyisthatthe‘partisangroup’accomplishednothingsavetoendureasubterraneanordealthatkilledmostofthem.Thesamefatebefellanothersimilarparty,whosestoryisknownonlythroughanintelligence

reporttotheprimeministerofRomania,Hitler ’sallyIonAntonescu,compiledon18April1942.Itwasbasedoninterrogationsofcapturedsurvivorsfromthecatacombs,andhasaringofauthenticity.ThisRussiangroup,fortymennominatedbythelocalPartyhierarchy,wascommandedbytwocaptains,FrolovandLemichik.On10September1941theywereorderedtopenetratetheRomaniansectoroftheAxisfront,butwerespottedandreturnedindisarraytoOdessa,reducedtoastrengthofeighteen.Astheenemyswepttowardsthecity,twelvetookrefugeinitscatacombs,whichwerehastilyprovisioned,wheretheyweresupposedlytoawaitopportunitiestocarryoutespionageandsabotageoperations.OnedayinOctoberthisgroup,whichnowincludedtwowivesandwascommandedbyAleksandrSoldatenko,descendedintotheirsecretrefugethroughanentranceat47DalnitskayaStreet.Itiseasytoimaginethetension,uncertaintiesandterrorsofthedaysandnightsthatfollowed,

entombedbeneathacityinthehandsoftheenemy.Thepartywasheavilyarmed,buttowhatpurpose?ThreetimesinearlyNovemberonepartisan,LeonidCherney,riskedventuringabovegroundbynight,inanattempttocontactawomancourier.Hefailed,andreturnedtoreportmerelythattheoccupierswereeverywhere.On13NovemberRomaniansecuritypolice,whohadbeenwarnedofthepartyfarbeneaththeirfeet,soughttopenetratethecatacombs.Afirefightfollowedinthedarkness,whichpersuadedtheRomaniansthatitwouldbeeasiertoimprisontheirfoesbysealingthecatacombs’entrances.Thereafter,notawordwasheardofSoldatenko’spartyuntilFebruary1942.Theirexperienceintheinterludewasamongthemoredreadfulofthewar.Severalpartisans,succumbingtodespairandhungerwhentheirprovisionsranout,demandedthat

thegroupshouldascendintothecityandsurrender.ThispropositionwasrejectedoutofhandbySoldatenko.AmannamedByalikandhiswifeZhenya,prominentamongthoseclamouringforsurrenderandanywayvulnerableasnon-Partymembers,wereshot.Duringthedaysandweeksthatfollowed,theywerealsoeaten.Disputesandresentmentspersistedamongthesurvivors.On1February1942,fourmensuccessfullyescapedthroughanimperfectlysealedexit,andwerethenrashenoughtomakefortheirownhomes.ThreewerepromptlydenouncedbyneighboursandseizedbytheRomanians,whileonemadegoodhisescape.Odessa’soccupiersnowpumpedgasandsmokeintothecatacombstoflushouttheremaining

partisans.Thispromptedapanicunderground,andanewrevoltinwhichSoldatenkoandhiswifeElenawereshotdead.Whenescapeprovedimpossiblethethreesurvivorsreturnedtotheirundergroundlair,andsubsistedforseveraldaysbyeatingportionsoftheSoldatenkos.Then,atlast,allhopegone,thesedesperatemenmadetheirwaytothesurfaceandsurrendered.ARomanianpatrolventuredbelowandexploredthepartisans’refuge.TheyfoundthebonesoftheByaliks,togetherwith

thehalf-eatencorpsesoftheSoldatenkos.IntheannalsofWesternEurope’sexperienceofthewar,themassacreofthepopulationofthe

villageofOradour-sur-GlanebyGermantroopsinJune1944holdsaspecialplace,becausealthoughthousandsofFrenchResistantsandhostageswerekilledbytheNazis,theextinctionofanentirecommunitywasauniqueoccurrence.IntheEast,however,suchthingsweredoneconstantlybyHitler ’sforces.Fromtheearliestdaysof‘Barbarossa’hedecreeddreadfulreprisalsforanyactofcivilianResistance.On23July1941heinstructedhiscommandersthattheyshouldcreatesuchareignofterroraswould‘causethepopulationtoloseallinterestininsubordination’.On16Septemberhischiefofstaffquantifiedthis,decreeingatariffoffiftytoahundredexecutionsofhostagesforeveryGermandeathatthehandsofpartisans.ThepolicywasenthusiasticallyimplementedbyErichvondemBach-Zelewski,whowouldachievespecialnotorietyforhisblood-drenched1944suppressionoftheWarsawRising.Nazirepressionwasforsometimesuccessful:acrosstwo-thirdsofoccupiedSovietterritorytherewasnosignificantpartisanactivity.RearareasinthesouthernUSSR,wherethemajorGermanoperationsof1942tookplace,werenotablytranquil:thesteppesofferednorefugestoguerrillas.Here,onceagain,experienceinRussiamirroredthatofFrance,whereResistancewasstrongestinthecentralandsouthernwildernesses,leaststrategicallyimportanttoHitler.InBelorussia,inamonthfollowingthekillingofjusttwoGermans,the707thInfantryDivision

shot10,431people,mostofthemwomenandchildren.InJuneandJuly1942,SecondPanzerArmyconductedtwoanti-partisansweeps,codenamed‘Birdsong’and‘GreenWoodpecker ’,againstpartisansintheBryanskarea.Thefirstoperationinvolved5,500Germantroopsandendedwithclaimsof3,000partisanskilled,woundedorcaptured.Mostofthesewere,however,merelylocalcivilians,andBirdsongcosttheGermansfifty-eightkilledand130wounded.GreenWoodpeckerfarednobetter.ThereweredeadRussiansinplenty,tobesure,butmostpartisanssurvived.InArmyGroupCentre’srearareas,coveringsome90,000squarekilometres,inthefirstelevenmonthsof‘Barbarossa’8,000allegedpartisanswerekilled–anumberfarinexcessofthetotalthenoperatingintheregion,andonlyexplicablebyassumingmostvictimstohavebeencivilians–inexchangefor1,094Germanfatalitiesupto10May1943.InJanuary1943,AGCentreclaimedtohavekilledanastoundingtotalof100,000‘bandits’.SuchreportsmakenonsenseoftheWehrmacht’sdenialsofcomplicityinNaziwarcrimes.OnemanifestationofescalatingpartisanactivitywasreportedbyMaj.Gen.Nagel,inspector-

generalofoperationsforEconomicStaffEast,theinstitutionresponsibleforplunderingtheoccupiedregionsoffoodandlivestock.Duringthesummerof1942hetoldBerlinthatithadbecometoodangeroustosendpartiesintoforestsinArmyGroupCentre’ssectortocuttimberforrailwaysleepers.Moreover,localGermancommanderswereunwillingtocontinuewholesaleseizuresoflivestock,forfearofincreasingpartisansupportinlocalcommunities.Millionswhohadinitially

acquiescedinGermanoccupation,thenbecomecowedbyrepression,hadnowbeguntobelievethatonlySovietvictorymightdeliverthemfromstarvationanddestitution.SixteenthArmyHQreportedthatbetweenMayandJuly1942,thirtyattackshadbeenmadeonbridgesandeighty-fouronrailwaysinitsarea,involvingdestructionoftwentylocomotivesand130wagons.InArmyGroupCentre’ssector,betweenJuneandDecember1942therewere1,183attacksonrailways,anaverageofsixaday.Theexistenceofthepartisanbandswasbrutishintheextreme.LiketheFrenchmaquis,they

practisedbanditrytosupporttheirownexistenceswithatleastasmuchzealastheyfoughttheGermans.OnedayinSeptember1942,agroupofstarvingmencrawledintoapotatofield,andbeganfranticallyscrabblingintheearth.Oneofthem,namedKovpak,heardanoisebehindhimandturnedtoseeawomangazingcontemptuouslydownatthem.Shesaid,‘MyGod!MyGod!Hereyouare,bighealthyguys–andreducedtostealingpotatoesfromus!’Manymenfroze,starved,wereshotinclasheswithrivalbandsorfacedsummaryexecutionforsomeallegedbreachofdiscipline.‘WeshotKozhedubforfiringhisguntwicewhilehewasdrunk,causingpanicinthecamp,’wroteapartisannamedPopudrenkoinFebruary1942.‘Thiswasagooddecision.Intheeveningwehadanamateurconcert,sangtoanaccordion,danced,andtoldfunnystories…ComradeBalabai[killed]onebastard,aforesterwhowasworkingfortheGermans.’Thestorywasthesameeverywhere.‘InthemorningIreceivedareportthataformer[Soviet]prisonerofwarwhoservedinthe2ndCompanyhaddeserted,’scrawledapartisangroupleadernamedBalitskyon3August1943.‘HewascapturedinthevillageofLipno…Havinglittletodiscusswiththisspy,ImerelypulledoutmyMauserandendedthisnobody’sexistencewithasingleshot.’AlargeproportionoftheSovietfightersweremerefugitives,morethanafewofthemJews

seekingarefugefromNazipersecution,ratherthanSovietpatriotscommittedtoarmedstruggleagainsttheAxis.Aroundhalfofallpartisanswerelocalpeasants,forcedintoserviceatgunpoint.Everybandlivedindreadofbetrayal,andcollaboratorsrevealedtheirlocationstotheenemyasoftenashappenedtothemaquisardsofFrance.Casualtieswereappalling:whentheGermanslocatedandsurroundedapartisansanctuary,itwasnotunusualforeverymaninagrouptoperish.ButwhenMoscow’swillwasserved,itwasthepartisanswhodidtheattacking.Popudrenkorecordedon27February1942:‘WelearnedlastnightthatgrainwasbeingassembledfortheGermansinKlyusy.Wesentthirtymenwhobroughtbackmorethan100poods,therestwasdistributedamongcollectivefarmers.’Afortnightlater:‘WeattackedaHungarianbattalionstationedinIvanovkavillage…FirstCompanyattackedfrontally,Secondheldtheflank,ThirdandFourthgavefiresupport.Resultsofthebattle:killed92Hungariansamongthem4officers,64policemen.Capturedoneheavymachine-gunand2light,15,000cartridges,ananti-aircraftgun,103blankets,sevenrifles,onetransmitteretc.Wehavelosttenmenkilledandsevenwounded.’ItisreasonabletoguessthatmanyoftheHungariandeadwereshotafterbeingtakenprisoner,thecustomonbothsidesofpartisanwar.

On18August1942HitlerissuedanewDirective,No.46,giving‘GuidelinesforanintensifiedfightagainsttheplagueofbanditryintheEast’.Forthefirsttime,thisproposedcarrotsaswellassticksinthemanagementoftheoccupiedterritories:collaborationistcommunitieswouldreceiveenhancedrations,andbeexcusedfromforcedlabour.Inreality,however,thisbelatedconcessionwasseldomobserved.AndonlytwomonthslaterHitlerissuedaneworder,statingthattheEasternpartisanwarmustnowberecognisedas‘astruggleforthetotalextirpationofonesideortheother ’.Asubsequentgeneralorderof11November1942statedthat‘capturedbandits,unlessexceptionally…enlistedinourfightagainstthebands,aretobehangedorshot’.Germany’smodernPotsdamhistorianshavewritten:‘Theoccupyingpowerwasneitherwillingtocreatethepoliticalframeworkforpacificationnorabletoenforcesuchaconditionbymilitarymight.’TheGermansultimatelydeployedaquarterofamillionmenforanti-partisanoperationsandrear-

areasecurityintheEast,whichrepresentedarealachievementforStalin,MoscowCentreandPavelSudoplatov,whoprovidedtheNKVDagentsandwireless-operatorswhoservedwiththepartisans.MostoftheGermantroopsengagedinsecuritydutiesweremenunfitforfront-lineservice,buttheyhadtobearmedandfed,andthusbecameasignificantdrainonHitler ’swareffort.During1943thepartisans’fieldstrengthincreasedfrom130,000toaquarterofamillion.On28JulyAllenDullesinBernsignalledWashington,reportinghisBerlinsourcessayingthatpartisanswerenowmakingamajorimpactbehindtheEasternFront,seriouslydisruptingtheWehrmacht’slinesofcommunication.GermansigintofficersconsideredtheradiodisciplineofthepartisansbetterthanthatofSovietregularunits,probablybecauseeverygroupknewthatitssurvivaldependedonoutwittingGermanlocators.Intheautumnof1943amonthlyaverageof2,000telephonepolesandthreehundredcableswerecutbyguerrillasbehindArmyGroupCentre’sfrontalone.Itsheadquartersintroducedaspecial‘partisanwarning’radiochannel,broadcastingtoallunits.Wehrmacht‘specialintelligencegroups’handledsecurityandinterrogationintheGermanrear

areas,amongtheugliestaspectsoftheanti-partisanwar.ABritishfileonsomeofthepersonalitiesinvolved,mostlybasedonUltramaterial,includedsuchfiguresasVladimirBedrov:‘FormerlyemployedbytheNKVDinLeningrad.DesertedtotheGermans.Employedasaninterpreterandtranslator.Extremelybrutaltowardsprisoners.DesertedinFebruary1944andarrestedinEstonia.SenttoaconcentrationcampinEasternGermanyforpeoplewhoknowtoomuch.’Anotherman,SergeantBohme,camefromRiga,hadlivedinVienna,spokefluentRussianandEnglish,‘rananagentnetworkrecruitedfromRussiaPWandthreeorfourwomen’.FieldPoliceInspectorKarlBrenkerwasdescribedinhisBritishdossieras‘guiltyofeveryconceivablecrimeagainsttheRussianpopulation.Averitablebeast.Carriedoutexecutionshimself.Particularlybrutaltowardswomen.Decoratedwiththegoldenanti-partisanbadge.’TheNKVD’sFourthDirectoratewasresponsiblefordirectingwhatbecameknownas‘theRailway

War’becauseofitsemphasisonhittingGermancommunications.‘Anenemytrainwasblownupat1

a.m.,’apartisanleadernamedBalitskywroteinhisdiaryfor25August1943.‘Itconsistedofthirty-eightwagonsandwasheadingtowardsthefront.Wetookpartofitsloadandburnedtherest.[Mostof]thetrain’sescortwerekilledandfivecaptured,afterputtingupheavyresistanceinwhichfifteenpartisanswerewounded.’TheattackonGermanEasternFrontcommunicationsduringtheRussians’hugesummer1944‘Bagration’offensivemademoreimpactonthemainbattlefrontthandidthatoftheResistanceinFranceinsupportofD-Day.TheSovietsatlasthadtheresourcestoorchestratemajoroperationsbehindthelinesaswellasagainsttheGermanarmies.Theydeployed‘strategicintelligencesections’,eighttotwelvestrong,operatingtentosixtymilesbeyondthefront,andwerealsoabletosustainreasonablyregularairdropstohundredsofpartisangroups.Noreliablebalancesheetispossible,thoughitseemsreasonabletoassumethat–asineveryotheraspectofthewarintheEast–thepartisancampaigncosttheRussiansfarmorepeoplethantheGermans.Butinthelasttwoyearsofthewartheymadeadifference.InthewordsofaGermangeneral,partisansbecame‘formidable,well-trainedunits…aplaguewithwhichallrear-areaheadquarters,supply,transportationandsignalunitshadtocontendeveryday’.Between1941and1945,SudoplatovclaimedinhismemoirsthattheNKVDdispatchedatotalof

212teamstoleadguerrillagroups,and7,316agentsandwireless-operatorstoworkbehindenemylines.ItssabotageschoolstrainedathousandmenfortheRedArmy,andanother3,500foritsownoperations.Hesuggestedthat2,222‘operationalcombatgroups’servedbehindthefrontinthecourseofthewar.TheSovietofficialhistoryprofessedthatpartisanswereresponsibleforkilling137,000Germans–whichmustbeanabsurdlyexaggeratedfigure–including2,045allegedcollaboratorsandeighty-sevenseniorNaziofficialsexplicitlytargetedforassassination.TheSovietUnionafterthewarproducedarollofhonourofheroesofpartisanoperations,ledbysuchnamesasKuznetsov,Medvedev,Prokupuk,Vaopshashov,Karasyov,Mirkovsky.Kuznetsov–evenlessappropriatelycodenamedthanmostwartimeagentsas‘Fluff’–wasanNKVDmanofstrikingblondgoodlooks.Bornin1911,beforethewarhehadservedtheLubyankabysharingwithforeigndiplomatsseveralBolshoiballetstarsaslovers.HehadgrownupinGerman-speakingSiberia,andthuswasabletopasshimselfoffasaWehrmachtofficer,‘OberleutnantPaulZibert’,operatingbehindenemylines.InthisroleheassassinatedseveralprominentGermans.HewasnamedaHerooftheSovietUnionafterbeingkilledbyUkrainiannationalistswhiletryingtocrossbacktotheRedArmy’slinesin1944.FromStalin’sperspective,themostimportantachievementofRussia’sguerrillaswastosustaina

semblanceofSovietauthorityinregionsfarbehindthefront,andtocreateapropagandalegendofnationalunityagainsttheinvader.Inreality,theoccupiedareasoftheSovietUnionspawnedasmanydifferentresponsestoHitler–asimilarquotientofResisters,amatchingproportionofcollaborators–asdidWesternEurope.TheconsequencewasthatMoscowexactedaterribleretributionfromthosewho,followingtheGermanretreat,weredeemedtohavedonelessthantheirdutytotheMotherland.In1943BeriareportedthattheNKVDhadarrestedanddetainedforinterrogation931,549suspectsin

territoriesliberatedbytheRedArmy.Ofthese,hesaid,80,296hadbeen‘unmaskedasspies,traitors,deserters,banditsandcriminalelements’.ManypartisangroupskilledmoreRussianpeoplethanGermans,withthedeliberatepurposeof

makingthemmorefearfulofthewrathofStalinthanthatofHitler.AFebruary1942reportbythecommanderoftheKopenkingroup,operatinginPoltavaoblast,meritsquotationatlength,notbecauseitisunusual,butbecausetherearemanyotherslikeitindeclassifiedarchives,marked‘TOPSECRET’:

Idiscoveredbyinterviewinglocal[Party]activistsinOstanovkithatthreevillagers,includingthecollectivefarmforeman,wereloyaltowardstheGermansandbetrayedourpeople.Thesethreepersonswerearrestedandtakentotheforest3–4kmfromPostanovkiwhereweshotthem.Atdawnon30October1941,thedetachmentreachedKhoroshkisettlement,andspentthedaylighthoursinaschool.Newmembersofthedetachmenttooktheoath.Werestockedwithsuppliesfromthecollectivefarm’sreserves,andonecartwastakentocarrythemachine-guns.IlearnedfromlocalactiviststhattheGermanshadappointedtheformerlocalschoolteacherstarosta[villagehead]inKhoroshki.Wetookhimwithuswhenleavingthevillageandshothimafterdrivingfor3km…InCherevkiwearrestedthenewlyappointedstarostaandanothermansympathetictotheGermans.Weshotboth.InBolshayaObukhovka…wearrestedandshottwostarostas,fivepersonsrecruitedbytheGermanintelligence,seventeen

peopleassociatedwiththechurch,andthreedeserters.AllfivepersonsrecruitedbyGestapowere14–19yearsold.AccordingtothecommanderoftheMirgorodpartisandetachmentcomradeAndreev,sixlocalsfromObukhovkaweresupportingtheGermans.Isentagrouptoarrestthesesixpersons,whowereafterwardsshot.AccordingtotheinformationofcomradesIvashchenkoandAndreev,afamilywithfoursonslivinginBolshayaObukhovkawere

producinganddistributingareligiousleaflet[whichstated]:‘Everyonewhofindsthisshouldwritetenmoreandgivethemtopeople.PrayfortheGermans,ourliberators.GodhassavedusfromJewsandcommunists.’Agroupofsixpartisansweresentto[thevillage]ledbycomradeTereshchenko.Theycametothe[evangelists’]houseandaskedthemtoopenthedoor,buttheoccupantsdidnotobey,insteadbarringthedoorsandwindowswithwoodenbeams.Afterwaitingfortwohours,Tereshchenkoaskedforpermissiontobreakdownthedoor…Inthemorning,thefatherandfoursonsweretakenandshotintheforest.Ihaveestablishedbyquestioningthelocalsthatthree[Red]ArmymenhavebeenlivinginBolshayaObukhovkaforoveramonth.Iarrestedthemwithhelpfromlocalpartisans.Questioningthemrevealedthattheyhadgotmarriedandhadnointentionofreturningtothefront.Ishotthesethreemenasdesertersandtraitorstotheirmotherland.AccordingtotheinformationfromcomradesIvashchenko,AndreevandlocalactivistsinthevillagePanasovka,aformerkulak

wasappointedthestarostathere.Isentagrouptoshoothimandhisfamily,asweknewthathiswife,daughterandmotherwereactiveinspreadingunpatrioticrumours,suchasthattheSovietregimeisgoneforever,andthatGermanauthorityistheonlyauthenticone…Theirpropertywasconfiscatedforpartisanuse.AccordingtoinformationreceivedfromlocalpeopleinOlefirovka,thecollectivefarm’sagronomist,whohadbeenappointedvillagechief,refusedtoissuegrain,sayingthattheSovietregimewasnomore,andtheGermansneededit.IsentcomradeKaminyartoshoot[themanandhiswife]anddistributearoundsixtytonsofgrainamongthecollectivefarmers.

Thisreportcoveredthreemonths’activitybyasinglegroup,andsuchcampaignsofterrorweretakingplaceacrosstheentirewesternSovietUnionoccupiedbytheGermans,incompetitionwiththoseoftheNazis,andlikewiseresponsibleforahostofdeaths.TheNKVDsoughttoexercisefarmorerigorouscontrolofpartisanoperationsthandidSOEor

OSS,becauseitwasconductingastruggleinwhatthenpassedforitsownhomeland.Inoneimportantrespect,theSovietsenjoyedanadvantageovertheBritishandAmericansinpromotingguerrillawar.IfChurchillwassometimescallousaboutthehumancostof‘settingEuropeablaze’,Stalinwas

unfailinglyso.Hisindifferencetolossesamongthefighters,andtoconsequencesforthecivilianpopulation,renderedthepartisancampaignoneofthedarkestmanifestationsoftheKremlin’scommitmentto‘absolutewar ’.

13

IslandsintheStorm

1 THEABWEHR’SIRISHJIG

Manyofthenationsinvolvedinthewarwererivenbyinternalfactionalstruggles,sometimestothedeath,whichpersistedthroughouttheyearsinwhichtheAlliesgrappledwiththeAxis.ThiswastrueofChina,France,Italy,Greece,Yugoslavia,Burma,India,SouthAfrica,Canada,FrenchIndochinaandtheDutchEastIndies,tonameonlyafew.Themajorbelligerentsthusfoundthemselvesstrivingtoinducelocalactiviststodirecttheirfire–sometimesliterally–attheothersideintheglobalstruggle,ratherthanattheirowncompatriots.Thisoftenprovedmoredifficultthancalmingrivalwolfpacks.Irelandoccupiedamarginalplaceintheglobalstruggle,butbothsidescherishedmirror

apprehensionslestitshouldbecomeahavenfortheirfoes.TheIrishFreeState,orEire,hadachievedaqualifiedindependencefromBritainlessthantwentyyearsbeforewarbrokeout.Tothechagrinofnationalists,sixcountiesofpredominantlyProtestantUlsterremainedpartoftheUnitedKingdom.Memoriesoftheugly1916–21struggletoexpeltheBritishremainedraw.ThoughEirewasstillinnamepartoftheBritishCommonwealth,throughoutthewarprimeministerÉamondeValeraespousedastubbornneutrality,resistingallblandishmentstojointheAlliedcauseevenwhenAmerica,Ireland’swarmestfriend,becameabelligerent.YetwhiledeValeradefiedthewrathofWinstonChurchill,onwhomtheIrishdependedfortheirsubsistence,hewasalsoobligedtocombatdomesticfoes.Therumpoftheso-calledIrishRepublicanArmy,madeillegalinEirein1936,remainedfanaticallyopposedtotheisland’spartition,andtothesettlementwithBritain.IRAterroristssustainedacampaignofsabotageandmurderagainsttheBritish–in1939therewereextensivebombingsonthemainland–andalsodefiedtheDublingovernment.Attheoutbreakofwar,theGermansidentifiedIrelandasfertilesoil,andtheBritishagreed.Latein

September1939MI6deliveredaluridlysensationalistreportonconditionsinEire,claimingthat‘anattemptatrevolutionbytheIRAdoesnotappeartobeoutofthequestion’.AGerman-ownedhotelatInverinDonegalbecameafocusofBritishconcern,becauseHitler ’sembassystaffsometimesstayedthere–thoughsodidBritishofficers,includingyoungLt.PhilipMountbatten,RN.FromBerlin’sviewpointtherewaslittlemeritinintelligence-gathering,becauseIrelandharbourednosignificant

militarysecrets,andtherewereonly318Germanand149Italianresidentsinthewholeislandtoprovideexpatriatesupport.TheAbwehrremainednonethelessconvincedthatiftheundergroundIRAcouldbepersuadedtoresumeitscampaignofsabotageagainstmilitarytargetsintheBritishNorthandonthemainland,Berlinwouldprofit.Thus,between1939and1943aprocessionofAbwehremissariesstrovetolinkarmswiththeterroristsagainsttheircommonfoe.ApervasivestrandinallGermany’sIrishoperationswasanawesomeignoranceofthecountry,

muchgreaterthanthatoftheBritishaboutsay,Albania.Berlin’sfirstagent,dispatchedinFebruary1939beforehostilitiesbegan,wasoneOscarPfaus,whowasbriefedaheadofhisdeparturebyaCelticfolkloreenthusiastnamedFranzFromme,whoboredtheagenthalftodeath.Pfaus,havingtravelledtoDublinviaHarwich,presentedhimselftothehard-drinking‘General’EoinO’Duffy,leaderofIreland’sfascistBlueshirts,spiritualalliesoftheNazis.CouldO’DuffyputhimintouchwiththeIRA?SincetheBlueshirtsandtheRepublicansrepresentedbitterlyopposedinterests,thissuggestionoutragedthe‘general’.ButPfauseventuallycontrivedtomeettheIRAArmyCouncil,andinthebesttraditionofstagespiestoreupapoundnoteandpresentedonehalftotheRepublicans,sothatwhentheysentarepresentativetoGermanytodiscussarmsshipments,hemightidentifyhimself.ThenPfauswenthome.TheIRAdecidedtopursuetheGermanoffer,anddispatchedasitsnegotiatorJimO’Donovan,who

tookaboattoHamburgaccompaniedbyhiswife.Ontheirarrival,GermancustomsdiscoveredthatMrsO’Donovanhadconcealedaboutherpersonseveralcartonsofcigarettes,andsubjectedhertoarobuststrip-search.Thehigh-mindedO’Donovanexplodedwithrage:thecoupledepartedhomeindudgeon,withoutanyguns.Duringthemonthsthatfollowed,theAbwehrbecameincreasinglyexasperatedbywhatitconsideredtheirresponsiblebehaviouroftheIRA,whichattackedEnglishcinemas,phonekiosksandletterboxesinafashionthatcontributednothingtoGermanvictory,nortoIrishunification.InJanuary1940,whentheRepublicansstagedaspectaculararmsraidontheIrisharmy’smagazineatPhoenixPark,theexasperateddeValeraroundedupeveryIRAmanhispolicemencouldcatch,andintroducedinternmentwithouttrial.IftheprimeministerhatedtheBritish,henowdislikedhiserstwhilefellow-freedomfightersalmostasmuch.ThePhoenixParkraidwasaturningpoint,becauseitmadeIreland’sgovernmentexplicitfoesofGermany’sRepublicanallies.TheAbwehrnowdispatchedanewagent,toinstilsomeTeutonicdisciplineintoIRAoperations.

ErnstWeber-DrohlwasadiminutiveAustrian,alreadyoversixty,whohadforgedanincongruouscareerasacircusstrongman.HissolequalificationtorepresentHitlerwasthathehadfatheredtwochildrenbyanIrishgirl.JustbeforehesetoutbyU-boatfortheEmeraldIsle,hisintendedwireless-operatoravowedsuchaviolentdislikeforDrohlthatherefusedtoaccompanyhim.InMarch1940thelittlestrongmanthusfoundhimselfaloneashepaddledadinghythroughdarknessandheavysurftotheshore,clutchingawirelesstransmitterandabundleofmoney.Therubberboatcapsized,thesetwaslost,andabedraggledspyflounderedashoreandmadehiswaytoDublin.

TherehepresentedhimselfatthehouseofJimO’Donovan,whowaivedthememoryoftheHamburgcustomshumiliationandbecamehistemporaryhost.DrohldeliveredamessageaddressedtotheIRACouncilandsignedbyhimself,ofwhichthemostsignificantpassageread:‘ThePfalzgrafSectionveryurgentlyrequestsitsIrishfriendsandIRAmemberstobesogoodastomakeconsiderablybettereffortstocarryoutthe[Abwehr ’s]S-plan…andtobemoreeffectualagainstmilitaryasopposedtocivilianobjectives.’TheAustrianaddedanapology:insteadofhandingovertothesecretarmyUS$15,100entrustedtohimbyBerlin,theamountwas$600short,becauseheneededcashhimself.Shortlyafterwards,whilestayinginaDublinhotelhewasarrestedbythepoliceandchargedwithenteringIrelandillegally.IncourttheagentclaimedthathehadcometoIrelandmerelytoseekouthischildren–hiswifewasinNuremberg.TheIrishTimesreported:‘Weber-Drohl’slawyersaidthattheaccusedhadhadnoevilintentionswhenhesteppedontoIrishsoil.Rather,themotiveswhichhadoccasionedhiscourseofactionwereextremelypraiseworthy.’Althoughdischargedafterpayinga£3fine,hewasalmostimmediatelyre-arrestedandinterned.WheneventuallyreleasedtheAbwehr ’sagentstayedinIreland,ekingalivinginhisoldcircusrole,havinglostinterestinservingtheFatherland.TheGermanembassynowurgedBerlinthatNaziagentsshouldhavenofurthertrafficwiththe

IRA,whichmerelyworsenedrelationswiththeIrishgovernment.YettheAbwehr ’sfascinationwithexploitingGermany’senemies’enemiesasfriendsremainedundimmed.Athirty-five-year-oldpoliticalsciencelecturerandardentNazi,DrEdmundVeesenmayer,wasappointed‘SpecialAdviserIreland’.TheAbwehrconsultedwithFrancisStuart,anintellectualfanaticallycommittedtothenationalistcause,whoturnedupinBerlininthemidstofaworldwartolectureonAnglo-Irishliterature.AnIRAmannamedStephenHeldalsoarrivedviaBelgiuminApril1940,andpresentedtheIrishhalfofOscarPfaus’stornpoundnote.HeldadvancedanimaginativeproposalthattheGermanarmyshouldeffectanamphibiouslandingnearDerry,tooccupyBritishUlster,thoughheofferednoadviceabouthowtheRoyalNavy’sobjectionstosuchaventuremightbeovercome.Inthefollowingmonth,IRAchiefofstaffSeanRussellalsoreachedtheNazicapital,havingtravelledfromNewYorkviaGenoa.AllthesemenurgedtheGermanstoseizeahistoricopportunity.TheAbwehr ’snextemissarywasHermannGörtz–thebikerwhohadspiedhiswayintoBrixton

prisonbackin1936.Itseemedanextraordinarychoice,todispatchtoIrelandamiddle-agedlawyerwhohadneverseentheplaceinhislife,butwitnessesattheairfieldfromwhichhisHeinkelIIIbombersetforthontheeveningof4May1940wereimpressedbyhischeerfulnessandeveninsouciance.HehadtrainedwithNo.800ConstructionDemonstrationBattalion,thecommandounitwhichlaterbecametheBrandenburgRegiment,andnurturedheroicaspirations.GörtzparachutedfromthenightskywithoutaccidentbutlandednearBallivor,Co.Meath,seventymilesfromhisintendeddropzone.Duringthedescenthelostbothhiswirelesssetandthespadewithwhichheintendedtoburyhisparachute.

Hedumpedhisflyingsuit,toreuphismapsandthrewthefragmentsinariver,thenstartedwalkingsouthinsearchofMrsIseultStuart,wifeoftheRepublicanliterarylecturerinBerlin.Hewasnowcladinbreeches,ridingboots,pulloverandaberet,andalsocarriedhisWorldWarIcampaignmedals,asomewhatindiscreetgestureforasecretagent.Afteralong,hardtrekhereachedMrsStuart’sdooratLaraghCastle,justwestofDublin.ShesummonedJimO’Donovan,whodrovetocollectthevisitor.Görtzwrotelater:‘ThenIcametoDublinwhereImetsomepleasantpeoplewhoneitherknewnorwantedtoknowanythingaboutmeandImovedaroundfreely.’ButthespywasbroughtfacetofacewiththechaoticloyaltiesofIrelandwhenhemetfouryoungRepublicanswhodemandedthecashhehadbroughtfromGermany,andmenacedhimforhalfanhourbeforehewastakentothehouseoftheIRA’sStephenHeld.On7May1940,inthemidstofDublinanIRAgangsoughttoseizeacouriercarrying

correspondencetoSirJohnMaffey,Britain’srepresentativeinIreland.Thispromptedashoot-outbetweenthegunmenandthepolice,andinfuriatedtheIrishgovernment.HermannGörtzventedonhishostsapassionateharangueabouttheirresponsibilityofsuchconduct;itwasobviousthattheIrishauthoritieswouldnowharrytheterrorists.TheGermanwasfearfulofbeingimprisonedandconvictedasamerespy,ratherthan–ashesawhimself–acolour-bearerforhisnation’sall-conqueringarmedforces.HebulliedtheIRAintomountingasearchfortheLuftwaffeuniformhehaddumped.Whentheyunsurprisinglyfailedtofindthis,hedemandedthatatailorshouldbefoundwhocouldmakehimanother.Onthenightof22Maytheinevitablehappened:policeraidedtheHelds’house.TheymissedGörtz

butfoundhisparachute,togetherwithcodebooks,informationonIrishmilitaryinstallations,andathickwadofcurrency.TheyarrestedStephenHeldandIseultStuart,thoughthelatterwasswiftlyreleased.Görtz’snextmovementsremainuncertain.HelaterclaimedtohaveescapedthepolicedragnetandtakenrefugeintheWicklowmountains,wherehesufferedmuchfromhungerandrain,butthisversionisdisputed.Allthatisassuredisthatthroughthemonthsthatfollowedseveralwomen,impassionedRepublicans,shelteredhiminDublin,underanaliasas‘MrRobinson’.HedispatchedreportstohisemployersthroughseamensailingtotheContinent,noneofwhicheverreachedBerlin,andwhichwouldhavedonelittlegoodtotheAbwehriftheyhad.Thislonely,unhappy,culturedandfranklypitiablefigurebecamesodesperatetogethomethathestroveinvaintobuyaboatinwhichtosailthere.TheGermanambassadorinDublin,DrHempel,saidcrosslythatheassumedtheGörtzsagawasa

Britishplot,designedtodragIrelandintothewarontheAlliedside;theDublingovernmentwasfuriousthatBerlinwascollaboratingwithitsterroristenemiesoftheIRA.YetstilltheAbwehrrefusedtogiveup.AsplanningadvancedforOperation‘Sealion’,aninvasionofBritain,BerlinbecamedesperatetodeployagentsinIreland,incasetheislandbecamestrategicallyimportant.InJune1940,twomoreagentsofAbwehr1’sHamburgsectionweredispatched.WalterSimonwas

anotherremarkablyelderlycandidateforpartisanwar,fifty-eight,aGermanseamanwhohadspenttheFirstWorldWarinanAustralianinternmentcamp.LikeGörtz,hewasaveteranofanearlierunsuccessfulespionagemission:in1938,whilereconnoitringBritisharmamentfactoriesandairfields,hemetsomeWelshnationalistswhoclaimedawillingnesstoserveGermany,andgaveeach£20andaRotterdammailingaddress.InFebruary1939hewasarrestedatTonbridge,imprisoned,andinAugustsummarilydeported.ItmightbeexpectedthatthisexperiencewouldhavedimmedSimon’senthusiasmforsecretwar,butnowheacceptedtheidentitydocumentsofCarlAnderson,aSwedish-bornAustralian,andsetforthforIreland.HewastoldtostayawayfromtheIRAandcommunicatewithBerlinthroughacodebasedonthefirstverseofSchiller ’s‘DasLiedevonderGlocke’,whichhehadlearnedbyheart.Onthenightof12June,aU-boatstoleintoDinglebayandlandedSimon,whoburiedhiswireless

setandheadedforDublin.Hewasquicklyspotted,trailedfromTraleeandarrested.Hispossessionofalargewadofcashwasincriminatingenough,butheknewhisfatewassealedwhenhiswirelesssetwasalsoproducedincourt.CommittedtoMountjoyprison,hewaspromptlyaccostedbyastartledprisonerwhoexclaimed,‘Areyouheretoo?’Simonripostedangrily,‘Idiot!’Thetwomenwerenotsupposedtoknoweachother,but‘PaddyMitchell’wasWillyPreetz,theAbwehr ’ssecondagent,whohadbeenlandedseparatelyonthesamemission.TheBritishtippedoffDublinthatSimonwasaknownGermanagent,andthetwomensettleddownforalongwarbehindbars.AndstillAbwehrbunglerskeptcoming:theGermansconvincedthemselvesthatBretons,fellow-

Celticnationalists,mightbewovenintotheirIrishnarrative.InJuly1940aBretonhelmsmansailedthethirty-six-footyachtSoizictoIrelandbearingthreespies–DieterGaertner,HerbtTributhandHenryObed–allcarryingpapersasSouthAfricanstudents.Theirmissionwascodenamed‘LobsterI’,buttheagentswerefarfrombeingmarinecreatures,spentthevoyageprostratewithsea-sickness,andwereimmediatelydetainedonlanding.On8August,attheheightoftheBattleofBritainaU-boatsailedfromFrancecarryingSeanRussell,theIRA’schiefofstaff,togetherwithFrankRyan,aleft-wingveteranoftheSpanishCivilWar.AboutahundredmileswestofGalway,Russellbecameviolentlyill,expired,andwasburiedatsea.RyanthereuponchosetoreturntoBerlin,whereeverykindofdarksuspicionarose,asitsoondidalsoinDublin.HadRussellbeenpoisoned?Intruthhewasalmostcertainlythevictimofaburstgastriculcer.TheGermans’nextagentwasHelmutClissman,whoatleasthadtheadvantagesofknowingthe

countryandbeingmarriedtoanIrishwife.TherewasnoU-boatforClissman,however.Hispassagewasentrustedinsteadtoahighlyexperiencedsailor,ChristianNissen,aboardacutternamedtheAnniBraz-Bihen.ClissmanhadreceivedtrainingwiththeBrandenburgers,andwasaccompaniedbyawireless-operator.AlltheGermans’preparationswereconfounded,however,whenthecuttercollidedwithathree-dayAtlanticgale,gustingtoForce10.Theenginebrokedown;thecrewprovedgrosslyincompetent.NisseneventuallydecidedtotakehisexhaustedanddisaffectedchargesbacktoBrest,

wheretheyarrivedinSeptember.Intheautumnof1940HermannGörtzfoundhimselfreceivingdiscreetvisitsinhissecrethavens

fromallmannerofIrishmen,prominentpoliticiansamongthem,whowereeagertoforgelinkswitharepresentativeofthenationthatlookedsettosecuremasteryofEurope.TheGermanagentimploredhisIRAhoststomaketheirpeacewithdeValera,thoughhehadbynowrealisedthatstatesmanshipwasnotamongtheirskills.Hewrotebitterly:‘Nothingmorethanweakeningintriguesandexchangesoffirewiththepolicewereachievedinsteadofbattlewiththeenemy,whichtheyhadpromised.’StephenHayeshadsucceededRussellasIRAchiefofstaff,andGörtzrebukedJackMcNeela,hisADC:‘YouknowhowtodieforIreland,buthowtofightforityouhavenottheslightestidea!’AgrumpyIrishgovernessnamedMrsDalywaspersuadedinNovember1940tobecomea

passengerontheneutralJapaneseshipFushimiMaru,sentfromSpaintoevacuateahandfulofJapanesenationalsfromDublin.InadditiontocarryingacodebookforHermannGörtzhiddeninanalarmclockandmessagessecretedinherunderwear,shewasalsonominatedofficialcourierfortheIrishambassadorinMadrid.GörtzeventuallyreceivedMrsDaly’smessages,whichrevealedtheAbwehr ’sconfusionabouthowbesttoactinthewinterof1940–41,whenathreatofBritishinvasionseemedtoloomoverIreland.InDecember,theIrisharmy’sGeneralHugoMacNeillheldtalkswithHenningThomsen,the‘struttingNazi’whoservedascounsellorattheGermanembassy,aboutsuchacontingency.TheBlueshirts’O’Duffywasalsopresent–aferventhateroftheBritishwhoaskedthatifChurchilldidinvade,theGermansshouldparachuteweaponscapturedontheContinenttoarmIrishResistance.BerlinofferedapromisethatIrishportsweresafefromLuftwaffebombsunlessoruntiltheBritish

seizedthem.Görtzsomehowgotholdofawirelessset,andpersuadedAnthonyDeery,anIRAmemberwhohadadayjobasaDundalkpostofficeradiotechnician,todispatchhismessages.ThisDeerydid,untilcaughtbythepoliceearlyin1942andsentencedtofiveyears’imprisonment.Intheinterval,Görtz’sdispatchesdidlittleservicetotheNaziwareffort,formostmerelylamentedhisowntroubles.TheAbwehr ’snextattempttoplaceanagentinIrelandtookplaceon21March1941,whena

HeinkelIIItookofffromAmsterdam’sSchipholairportcarryinginitsbombbaytwenty-nine-year-oldSgtGuntherSchütz.ThesergeanthaddonesomeamateurespionagewhileattendingtheGermanCommercialSchoolinLondonin1938.HehadbeensecondedfromwartimeserviceintheartillerytoservetheAbwehr,briefedtotransmitweatherandshippingreports,andespeciallyinformationabouttheBelfastshipyards.Hehadbeentrainedinmeteorology,andcarriedamicroscopewithwhichtocreateandreadmicrodotmessages.AswellasacopyofanEnglishnovelentitledJustaGirlaskeytohiscoding,togetherwith3,000genuineUSdollarsandathousandEnglishpoundswhichhesoondiscoveredwereforged,hecarriedaSouthAfricanpassportinthenameofHansMarchner,

alongwithabottleofcognacandasalamitosolacehisfive-hoursojourninthebellyoftheHeinkel.Schützleaptfromtheplaneintobrightmoonlight6,500feetaboveIreland,andwasknocked

unconsciousbytheforceofhislanding.Awakingwithanosebleedtofindhimselfbeingstudiedwithinterestbyalocalman,heburiedhisparachuteandflying-suit,andstartedwalking.Forhourshedidnotdareaccostanybody,butwasfinallydriventoaskthewaytoDublin.Itwassixtymilesaway,helearned–hehadbeendroppedinCo.Waterford,farsouthofhisintendeddestination.Twopolicemenonbicyclessoonstoppedhimanddiscoveredhiswirelesssetandequipment.Heenquirednervouslywhatwouldhappennext.‘Don’tworry,wewillhangyou,that’sall,’saidtheconstableamiably.NobodyhadtoldthewretchedSchützaboutIrishjokes,andhesuffereddaysofterrorbeforefindinghimselfimprisonedwithmostofhisAbwehrcomrades.HermannGörtzwasarrestedon27November1941,duringapoliceraidinDublin’sBlackheath

Parkdistrict,launchedinsearchofIRAmen,notGermanspies.TheAbwehr ’sfinalbidtoputagentsintoIrelandendedasswiftlyandabsurdlyasalltheothers.On16December1943ayoungIrishmannamedJohnFrancisO’ReillywasparachutedintoCo.Clare,nearMorveen.Threedayslaterhewasfollowedbyasecondman,thirty-five-year-oldJohnKenny,whohadofferedhisservicestotheGermansafterbeingdetainedintheoccupiedChannelIslandsandinternednearBrunswick.OnlandinginIreland,bothmenwereswiftlypickedupbythepolice–O’ReillyhadacceptedhisassignmentmerelytosecureapassagehomefromtheLuftwaffe.Soonafterthewarended,alltheAbwehrmeninAthlonecampwerefreed,butHermannGörtzwasinformedthathewastobedeportedtotheBritishZoneofoccupiedGermany.On23May1947,onreceivingthisnewsheimmediatelytookpoisonintheAliens’RegistrationOfficeatDublinCastle.Hewasfifty-seven,apatheticandinsomewayssympatheticfigure,tormentedbyself-pityandalmostinsanelymiscastasaforeignagentoftheThirdReich.YetifGörtz’sstoryendedwithadeath,theGermanswholandedinIrelandknewthatwhatever

hardshipstheymightsufferinAthlonecamp,nobodywasgoingtokillthem.Operatinginaneutralstate,theyenjoyedthecomfortableassurancethatthepriceoffailurewouldbemereimprisonment,notarendezvouswiththeexecutioner.AndbeforelaughingtooloudlyattheabsurdityoftheAbwehr ’soperations,itshouldberecalledthatifHitlerhadconqueredBritain,Irelandwouldhaveshareditsfate.IrishjokeswouldhavestoppedasassuredlyasIrishneutralitywouldhavebeenforfeit.

2 NOMAN’SLAND

Otherneutralstateswhichoptedoutoftheirneighbours’existentialstruggleprovidedtheatresmuchmoreimportantthanIrelandforthetwosides’secretoperations.Incitieswherelightsburnedbrightlyandasemblanceoftranquillitypersisted,therivalbelligerentssustainedtheircontestformastery,butwithbuttonedfoils.Therewaschildishjostlingforadvantage:GermanattachésinAnkaraflaunted

beforetheirBritishcounterpartstinsofGoldFlakecigarettescapturedbytheFallschirmjägerinCrete.InLourençoMarques,wherethelocalBritish,GermanandItalianagentssharedquartersinthePolanahotel,therewerespatsaboutwhichnation’sradionewsbulletinsshouldbeairedinthehotellounge,resolvedonlywhenthemanagementbannedallofthem.Bern,Lisbon,Madrid,Stockholmbecameintelligencestreetmarkets,whereagent-handlers

rendezvousedwiththemenandwomenwhodevilledforthematmortalriskinenemyterritory.InthePressRoomofStockholm’sGrandhotel,BritishandAmericancorrespondentsandspiesmingleddailywithGermans.Goldandcashwerepassed–sometimeshugesumsinmanycurrencies–stolendocumentsreceived.Localpolicemengaveaidtofavouredclients:Portugal’ssecuritychiefAgothinoLourenço,anardentpro-NaziandcloseacolyteofPresidentSalazar,ensuredthatthelocalAbwehrreceivedcopiesofeverypassengerlistforBOAC’sClipperflightstoEngland.TheSpanishuntil1944indulgedahugeGermanespionageoperation.AsearchatBritishBermudaoftwoSpanishliners,theCabodeHornosandCabodeBuenaEsperanza,homeboundfromtheUS,revealedthemtobecarryingAxisagentswithdispatcheswritteninsecretink.ThejungleofallegiancesbecameespeciallyintricateinAfghanistan,wherealmosteverysenior

militaryandpoliticalfigurewasinthepayofonebelligerentoranother,andoftenofseveral.AxisintelligencechiefsconvincedthemselvesthatIndiannationalismwastheproductoftheirsubtlemachinations–thoughintruth,ofcourse,itderivedentirelyfromdomesticsentiment.BhagatRamGumassatwasthebrotherofanationalisthangedbytheBritishformurderingthegovernorofthePunjab.HebecameafrequentguestattheGermanembassyinKabul,wherehehelpedtoarrangethejourneytoBerlinofhisleader,SubhasChandraBose.(TheRussians,obscurely,convincedthemselvesthatevenwhenBoselaterrecruitedan‘IndianNationalArmy’tofightagainsttheBritish,hewasinthepayofMI6.IntheNKVD’swords:‘HemaintainedpersonalcontactswithHitlerwhichallowedBritishsecretservicestobeinformedoftheGermans’planswithregardtoIndiaandtheMiddleEast.’)GumassatarrivedonemorningattheSovietembassyinKabultoexplainthat,thoughtheGermanssupposedhimtobetheirman,hewishedinsteadtoserveMoscow.Centretookhimonitsbooksasagent‘Rom’.InFebruary1942theAbwehrgavehimsomeweaponsandahandsomesumofcash,topromotesabotageinIndia.Inafinaldizzyingtwist,RomgavemostofthemoneytotheUSSR’sDefenceFund.Ineveryneutralcapital,intelligenceofficerspuzzledovertheperennialenigmaoftheirtrade:

whichsidewasthisorthatsourcereallyserving?Oftentheanswerwasbothorneither,merelytheirownpockets.InIstanbul,anArmenianTurkishinformernamedShamlireceived650TurkishpoundsamonthfromtheJapanese,350fromtheGermans,thesameagainfromtheHungariansandasimilarsumfromEuropaPress,anewsorganisation.AlargeItaliancolonyinthesamecitygossipedintheCasad’Italia,theformerSavoyardembassynowasocialcentre.Rome’sintelligenceoperationswerecontrolledbyitsmilitaryattaché,Lt.Col.StefanoZavatarri,whomnobodyheldinmuchregard.A

Turkishsecretpolicemansaidcontemptuously:‘TheItaliansareHitler ’s“petitschiens”–“lapdogs”–theymakeuseofthelowesttypeofagent–mongrelGreeks,Armenians,moslems,Jewsfromtheslums.TheTurksgetwhatevertheywantfromthistypeofagentandthen,whentheydeemthetimepropitious,lockhimup.’TheItaliansdidnobetterinRiodeJaneiro,whereinOctober1941theypersuadedEdmonddiRobilant,aseniorexecutiveoftheLatiairline,tostartasecretshipping-movementmonitoringservice.Hewasgivenawirelessand$2,600,someofwhichheusedtorentarabbitfarminJacarepaguáfromwhichtotransmit.Thefactthathefailedtoprovideasinglereportdidnotsparehimfromafourteen-yearsentenceforespionageafterBrazilianpolicearrestedhiminSeptember1942.

SSSturmbannführerHansEggentravelledregularlytoSwitzerlandtocollectinformation,notablyfromtwobusinessmen,PaulHolzachandPaulMeyer-Schwertenbach.Each,however,briefedSwissintelligenceaboutthemeetings,andnobodywasconfidentabouttheirallegiance,evenafterOSS’sAllenDullesreceivedreportsbasedonUltradecryptsspecifyingtheinformationtheyhadgiventoBerlin.MeanwhileinStockholmCol.MakotoOnodera,theJapanesemilitaryattaché,whowasesteemedinTokyo,reliedheavilyoninformationfromaPolishofficernamedPeterIvanov–whoalsoreportedtothePolesinLondon.ForeignersarrivinginPortugal’scapitalfromthebatteredanddarkenedcitiesofEuropewere

enthralledbythejanglingwhitetrams,caféorchestras,flowerseverywhere.MalcolmMuggeridgewrote:‘Lisbon,withallitslights,seemedaftertwoyearsofblackoutlikeacelestialvision…ForthefirstdayorsoIjustwanderedaboutthestreets,marvellingattheshops,therestaurantswiththeirinterminablemenus,thesmartwomenandcaféssprawlingoverthepavements…Bynightthecabarets,thedancinglights,theburstsofjazzmusiccomingthroughhalfopeneddoors–Pleasurestalkingthestreets,withmanytrailingit.’GermanoperationsinLisbonwerebasedontheirfive-storeyconsulate,mostofitoccupiedbytheAbwehrandSD,thoughMI5alsoheldalistof135localaddressesusedbytheirstaff,oftenforprivatepurposes.Inthespringof1942theAbwehr ’sMajorBrede,aLuftwaffeofficerunwillinglypostedintointelligence,informedCanaristhathisLisbonstationwascorruptfromtoptobottom.Theadmiraldismissedthechargeoutofhand,butofcourseitwastrue.Mostmeetingsandtransactionsonneutralturfwereconducteddiscreetlyanduneventfully,because

itsuitedeverybodytopreservethetranquillityoftheinternationalbrokeragehouses.InSeptember1940theMI6officer‘Biffy’DunderdaleusedLisbon’sSanGeronimochurchasarendezvoustodeliverawirelesssetandcodestoaFrenchintelligencemanwhoborethembacktoVichy,fromwhichsomeoftheDeuxièmeBureau’smen,prominentamongthemtheFrenchcodebreakingchiefGustaveBertrand,sustainedcontactwithLondonuntilNovember1942.HethenwentontherununtilhewasextractedfromtheMassifCentralbyanRAFaircraftinJune1944.Amidalltheindulgentwininganddininginneutralcapitals,however,atintervalstherewere

dramasandspasmsofviolencewhendealswentwrong,suspectedtraitorsweresilenced,orthelocalauthoritiescheckedspies’perceivedexcesses.On20April1940MI6’smaninStockholmwasarrestedandchargedwithseekingtosabotageSwedishironoreexportstoGermany.ThisprovokedoneamongmanyexplosionsfromtheBritishambassador,SirVictorMallet,whowrotetoLondon:‘IdonotwantyoutothinkthatIamblindtothefactthatitmaysometimesbenecessarytoemploymethodsofthiskindwhenwearewagingawaragainstanenemywhohitspersistentlybelowthebelt.Butmycomplaintsare,firstly,thatoursleuthsseemtobethoroughlybadattheirjob:sofartheyhaveachievedlittleinSwedenbeyondputtingmeandthemselvesinanawkwardposition.Secondly,Iaminclinedtodoubtwhetherthegameisworththecandleinacountrywherenotonlyarethepoliceand

themilitaryverymuchonthealert…butwhereapolicyofmutualconfidencehasshownitselfrepeatedlytobetheonewhichpaysbest.’Broadway’smaninStockholmreceivedaneight-yearjailsentence,itsseverityreflectingtheperceivedmightofGermanyandweaknessofBritaininthesummerof1940.StalindemandedthedeathsofforeignenemiesevenmorewhimsicallythandidHitler.Whenhe

heardthattheformerGermanchancellorFranzvonPapen,nowservingasHitler ’sambassadortoneutralTurkey,hadheldameetingwiththePope,andwasbeingtoutedasapossibleheadofgovernmentiftheNaziscouldbeousted,hewassoangrythatheorderedvonPapenkilled.AnNKVDattempttookplaceinAnkaraon24February1942whichfailedwhenMoscow’sBulgarianassassinblewhimselfupwithhisownbomb,leavingvonPapenonlyslightlyinjured.MeanwhiletheKremlinconvinceditselfthatArgentina,hometoaquarterofamillionGerman-speakers,wasamajorNazibase,andonStalin’spersonalorderstheNKVDburneddowntheGermanbookshopinBuenosAiresandarrangedscoresofotherincendiaryattacksonenemyproperty.ChargeswereplantedinwarehousesholdinggoodsboundforHitler ’sempire,andaboardshipsthatcarriedthem.TheFBIandOSSsharedRussianparanoiaaboutArgentina,andweredisgustedbyitsgovernment’sinterpretationofneutrality,wherebywhenagivennumberofallegedNaziagentswerearrestedandjailed,thesamenumberofAlliedsympathiserswasalsoroundedup.Similareven-handednesswasdisplayedoverreleases:whenArgentina’smilitarygovernmentbelatedlybrokeoffrelationswithGermanyinJanuary1944,116knownorsuspectedAxisagentswerearrested.Most,however,weresoonsetfree,andintheFBI’sbitterwords‘areundoubtedlyonceagainactiveonbehalfoftheReich’.TheWesternAlliedsecretservicesseldommurderedanyone;assassinationwasseenasa

dangerousgametostart,aswasconfirmedbythereprisalsfollowingthe1942killingofReinhardHeydrichinCzechoslovakia.In1944MI6considered,thenrejected,aschemefortargetedkillingsofAbwehrpersonnelinFrance.BillBentinckagreed,sayingthatwhilehewasnotsqueamish,thisseemed‘thetypeofbrightideawhichintheendproducesagooddealoftroubleanddoeslittlegood’.AnepisodeinSpainbecameoneofMI6’suglierlegends.PaulClairewasaFrenchnavalofficeremployedtohelprunagentsintoFrancebysea.InJuly1941theBritishembassyinMadridreportedinacutealarmthatClairehadvisitedtheVichyFrenchnavalattaché,confessedhissecretwarrole,anddemandedhelptoescapeintoFrance.Whatwastobedone?Ifhecrossedthefrontier,hewouldbefreetotelltheGermanswhateverhechose.AlanHillgarth,thebuccaneeringnavalattaché,wasgivenadramaticmandatebyBroadway:‘liquidateClaire’orseizeamemberofhisfamilyasahostagetosecurehissilence.At1a.m.on25July,MI6officerHamiltonStokesreportedthatheandHillgarthhadsuccessfully

luredClairetotheBritishembassyand‘druggedhimintounconsciousness’.ThepairthensetoutbycarforGibraltarwithClaireprostrateonthebackseat.‘C’draftedapersonalsignaltotheRock,orderingthatthetraitorshouldbeseizedonarrival,chargedwithtreasonandheldincommunicado.

Thisorderbecameredundant,however,whenMI6’sMoroccorepresentative,whochancedtobeinGibraltar,signalled:‘Consignmentarrived…completelydestroyed…owingtoover-attentionintransit…DamageregrettedbutIsubmititisforbest.’AlaterreportexplainedthatClairehadsuddenlyrecoveredconsciousnesswhilethecarpassedthroughavillageinAndalusia,andstartedshriekingatpassers-byforhelp.Hiscaptorssilencedhimbyacrackovertheheadwitharevolverwhichprovedfatal.SirSamuelHoare,theMadridambassador,wasfuriousaboutthepotentialscandal.Menzies

admittedthatClaireshouldneverhavebeenpostedtoSpain,andtherewasindeedembarrassingfallout.VichyFrenchdiplomatsinMadridprotestedtotheSpanishForeignMinistry,andon12AugustRadioFrancebroadcastamoreorlessaccuratereportoftheaffair,describinghowClaire’scaptorshadsilencedlocalvillagerswhoheardhisscreamsbysaying,‘Don’tgetupset,it’sonlyamemberoftheembassygonemadandwearetakinghimtoaSanatorium.’On14AugusttheLondonDailyTelegraphcarriedamockingstoryheaded‘NazisInventaKidnapping’.Asisoftenthecasewithsuchsagas,thereportseemedsofantastic,andBerlinsochronicallymendacious,thatfewreadersathomeorabroadgaveitcredence.InJuly1942CommanderIanFlemingofnavalintelligenceinformedtheRedCrossthatClairewas‘missingbelieveddrowned’enroutetoBritainontheSSEmpireHurst,whichhadbeensunkbyenemyaircrafton11August1941,afortnightaftertheFrenchman’sactualdeath.MI6feltobligedtopayClaire’swidowapensiontosustainthisfiction,‘howeverrepugnantitmaybetorewardthedependantsofatraitor ’.Ontheotherside,on12May1944,BletchleydecryptedasomewhathystericalmessagetoTokyo

fromtheJapaneseministerinMadrid,complainingaboutayoungfellow-countrymanofhisnamedSakimura,whohadbeenroamingtheSpanishcapitalexpressingenthusiasmfortheAlliedcause.TheministertoldtheForeignOffice:‘Underthesecircumstancesitseemstomethatthereisnoothercourseopentousbuttosetasideallhalf-heartedorhumanemethodsandtakedrasticsteps,availingourselvesoftheassistanceofsomesuchorganastheGestapo,andeliminatinghim.’Thereisnoevidence,however,thatAxisagentsactedonthisundiplomaticproposal.Stockholmwasakeyobservationpostforeveryintelligenceservice,thoughintheearlywaryears

Britishship-watchingoperationswerehamperedbysomestronglypro-NaziSwedishnavalofficers.TheNorwegiansmaintainedanintelligencemissionledbyCol.RosherLund,whichdidusefulworkamongitsfellow-Scandinavians.ThelocalMI6stationgeneratedsevenhundredreportsamonth,mostlyfragmentsofinformationaboutGermanforcesintheregion,collectedbytravellingbusinessmen.AmongthemanycharlatanswhoofferedinformationwasaRussianémigréwho,latein1943,offeredMI6asourceintheJapaneselegation,togetherwithaneconomistinBerlinwhocouldprovidegossipfromGöring’shousekeeper.MoreprofitablewasaDanecodenamed‘Elgar ’who,formorethanayearstartinginDecember1942,deliveredsheavesofmaterialaboutNaziindustry,includingsomeV-weaponintelligence.Ononeoccasionintheautumnof1943,‘Elgar ’arrivedin

StockholmwithaconsignmentofindustrialacidbroughtfromGermany,inwhichwerehiddenglassbottlescontainingthreehundredfilmedreports.InJanuary1944‘Elgar ’wascaughtbytheGestapoandtoldeverythingheknewabouthisMI6contactsinStockholm.Forgoodmeasure,hethrewinsomefantasiesaboutBritishspygroupsinBerlin,Hamburg,Bonn,KönigsbergandVienna.TheserevelationsmayhavesavedtheDane’sneck,sincehesurvivedthewarinGermancaptivity.TheNKVD’sColonelBorisRybkin,undercoverasembassyfirstsecretary,playedakeyrolein

SovietcovertoperationsinStockholm,manyofwhichwereconcernedwithsecuringsuppliesofcommodities.ApopularSwedishactor,KarlEarhardt,becameanintermediaryforpurchasinghigh-tensilesteelforaircraftconstruction.TheWallenbergfamily,whichcontrolledtheEnskildaBank,profitedhandsomelyfromexchangingRussianplatinumforscarceindustrialmetals.Rybkin’swifeZoya,hisfellow-NKVDofficer,describedhowonedayshesawseveralingotsonherhusband’sdesk.‘Tin?’sheaskedcuriously.‘Tryliftingone,’saidthecolonel,andshefoundherselfbarelyabletodoso.Nonetheless,whateverthesuccessesoftheNKVD’sStockholmasacommercialconduit,themodernofficialhistoriansofSovietintelligencefranklyadmitthatitfailedtoestablishnetworksinneighbouringScandinaviancountries,andespeciallyinitsattemptstoexploreGermannuclearresearch,heavywaterproductioninNorwayandsuchlike.TheprincipalintelligencevalueofSwedentotheRussians,astoalltheAllies,wasasawindowonGermany.MalcolmMuggeridge,MI6’smaninPortugueseMozambique,lodgedatthePolanahotelin

LourençoMarquesalongsideDrLeopoldWerz,theGermanvice-consulandAbwehrrepresentative–‘youthful,blond,pinkandearnest’.WerzhadescapedfrominternmentinSouthAfrica.Hishistorywaswell-known,becauseluridarticlesabouthisNaziintelligenceconnectionshadappearedinnewspapersonbothsidesoftheAtlantic.AlsolivingatthePolanawasMussolini’sstandard-bearer,anItaliannamedCampiniwhostruttedinemulationofhisDuceandevenlikewiseaffectedacloak.MuchofCampini’strafficwasinterceptedatBletchley,forinstanceasignalof13January1943,reporting:‘AconvoyoftenAmericanshipswithtroops,warandaviationmaterialleftCapetownon11/1for?Sydney.’Intheweeksthatfollowed,Campinialsowirelessed:‘6LoadedtankersfromPersianGulfreachedDurbanon11/1’;‘TheEnglishhaveraisedthesalariesofsailorsto£27amonth’;‘28.1.43alargeAmericanconvoyboundforAustraliapassedthroughCapetown’;‘4tankershaveleftDurbanforPersianGulf.’On29March1943anMI5officernotedontheseintercepts:‘AssumethismaterialcomesfromLEO.SendingsamestuffasWerz.IfLEOisDoctorWERZinLourencoMarques,hewouldseemanadmirablecreaturetohavestuffplantedonhim,ashislittleitems,whichsofarseemtobewhollyinaccurate,reachthethreeAxiscapitalsinamatterofdays.’MuggeridgeenjoyedaccesstosomefacilitiesdeniedtohisAxisrivals,suchassummariesoftheir

outgoingmaterial,forwardedbyKimPhilby.Theembryospylearnedhistradebyexperience:whenhefirstattemptedtobribealocalpoliceinspector,themanspurnedhislargessewithcontempt,sayingthattheGermanspaidthreetimesasmuch,theJapaneseandItaliansevenmore.Themostinteresting

revelationtocomeMuggeridge’swayduringhisearlymonthswasthatDrWerzwenttobedinahairnet.Moreserioustasksincludingthekidnapping,andtransfertoBritish-administeredSwaziland,ofanItalian-paidship-watcher,whowasreportingAlliedconvoymovements.TheMI6agent’smostexcitingassignmentwastoorganisethehijackingofaGreekmerchantship,whosecaptainwasdiscoveredbyBletchleytobeplanningarendezvouswithaU-boatintheMozambiquechannel.ThearrangementsforthiscoupweremadeinMarie’sPlace,alocalbrothel.Membersofthecrew,subornedbylargebribes,dulyseizedtheircaptainandsailedtheshiptoDurban.Muggeridgeformedanacquaintancewithaglamorousenemyagent,thehalf-estrangedwifeofa

localGerman,andwithJohann,herlover,whohadworkedforHimmlerandreminiscedentertaininglyabouthim.TheMI6manalsoscreenedagroupofPolishJewswhomtheJapanesehadreleasedfrominternment,andwhowerethereafterdispatchedtoBritishTanganyika.Thesesmallencountersandeventswerethehighlightsofatwo-yearsojourninLourençoMarques,thoughlikeallagentshedispatchedcopiousreports,dominatedbytrivia.Inonesense,andasthecynicalspyhimselfdeclared,hisactivitieswerefatuous.Butinthemidstofaworldatwar,itwasindispensableforeverynationtoberepresentedinsuchplacesasMozambique,ifonlytoensurethattheothersidewasnotleftfreetomakemischiefthere.NeighbouringSouthAfricawasahotbedofNazisympathisers,eagertoassisttheReich.Paul

Trompke,theGermanconsul-generalinLourençoMarques,aportlyfifty-year-old,rananAfrikaneragentnetworkoutofMozambique.OneofthesewasSydneyRobeyLeibbrandt,aformerSouthAfricanheavyweightboxingchampionwhospentthreeyearsinGermany,joinedtheWehrmachtandwastrainedasaparatrooperandsaboteurbytheBrandenburgRegimentbeforereturninghomesecretlyinJune1941,equippedwithawirelesssetandardentNaziconvictions,inaschoonercaptainedbytheastonishingHeinrichGarbers.Leibbrandtfoundfriendsandsympathisershappytohidehim,butfewwhowishedtojoinarevolt.OnChristmasEve1942hewasarrestedwhiledrivingbetweenJohannesburgandPretoria,andsentencedtodeathbyacourttowhichhetestifiedonlybygivingaNazisalute.RecognisingthevulnerabilityofAfrikaneropinion,primeministerJanSmutscommutedthe

sentenceonthisnationalsportinghero.Likewise,whenMalcolmMuggeridgetriedtogetJohannesburgpolicetopickupacourierdrivingtothecitycarryingmessagesfromtheLourençoMarquesAbwehrstation,hewascrisplyinformedthattherewasnotanAfrikanerhomesteadintheTransvaalwhichwouldnotbeproudtofeedBerlin’smanandspeedhimonhisway.BletchleyinterceptedasteadystreamofwirelessmessagesfromAfrikanerpro-Nazis,whichpromptedoccasionalround-ups,suchasoneinJuly1942whichresultedintenarrestsandthediscoveryofsomeweaponsanddynamiteintendedtobeusedforsabotageinDurban.ButthesignaltrafficmadeitplainthatmostenemysympathiserswerecontenttoawaitaGermanvictoryratherthanprecipitateanimmediateuprising.Twocodedmessageswerefoundinapro-NazihouseinEastLondon.Thefirst

read:‘Everythingalrightworksomewhatsluggishpeoplealsopoor…notmuchsabotagehereinEastLondon.’Thesecondwailed:‘Itisdamnedhopelesstoworkalone.’ItwasfortunatefortheAlliesthattheAfrikanerslackedbothaccesstoinformationofvaluetoHitlerandscopeforraisingmuchmayhem.Switzerland,atthehubofEuropebetweenGermany,FranceandItaly,wasthemostimportantofall

intelligencejunctions,ateemingsoukofspies,refugees,diplomatsandcrooksofallnationalities.Inasinglemorning,amanmightvisittheBernofficesofMI6,OSS,theAbwehrandSD,allwithinafewhundredyardsofeachother.Thecityplayedhosttomanyexiledpoliticians,someofthemprominentandwell-connectedinGermany,Austria,France.SecretwirelesscommunicationsenabledtheBritish,AmericansandRussianstotransmitamassofinformationandfabricationderivedfromsourcesinsideGermany.TheNazislikewisesoughttousethecountryasawindowontheworld.InBern,theAbwehrpickedupinformationfromProfessorKeller,headoftheSwisscommercialdelegationtoLondon;fromthemanageroftheBankofInternationalSettlements;andfromafewseamenhomeonleave.Oneagentcodenamed‘Ober ’broughtbackfromGibraltardetailsoffootballmatchesbeingplayedbetweenBritishunitteams,whichsupposedlycontributedtoorder-of-battleintelligence.TheGermans’mostvaluedagentwas‘Jakob’,otherwiseWalterBosshardofSwissintelligence.TheAbwehrclaimedinalltohaveathousandinformantsinSwitzerland,whileithaditsownGestapobranchoffice,‘BureauF’,attachedtotheBernembassy.Thelocalespionageindustry,whichinvolvedrepresentativesoftheChinese,PolesandCzechsas

wellasthemajorbelligerents,posedaconstantdilemmafortheBerngovernmentabouthowfartoindulgeit.Swissintelligencehadbeenheadedsince1937bytheenergeticLt.Col.RogerMasson.FrantišekMoravecheldMassoninhighrespect,notleastbecausetheSwissnevertroubledtheCzechintelligencecellinZürich.Thecolonel’sresponsibilitywastopreserveSwitzerland’sindependencebyensuringthatnobelligerent,aboveallneighbouringGermany,feltsufficientlythreatenedorprovokedtobomboroccupythecantons.Amongthenation’spopulationofsixmillion,asmallbutvociferousminoritylobbiedanddemonstratedfortheprivilegeofincorporationintheThirdReich.BankersandindustrialistsmadelargeprofitsbyexportingcommoditiestoGermany,providingfinancialservicesfortheNazileadershipcollectivelyandseverally,andexploitingthemurderofrichJews.YetmostSwiss,asdemocrats,preferredthattheAlliesshouldwinthewar.TheGermansknewthis:followingtheir1940occupationofFrance,theylaidhandsondocumentswhichrevealeddiscussionsbetweenBernandParisaboutjointresistanceintheeventofaGermaninvasionofSwitzerland.Massonintervenedagainstforeignagentsandmadearrestsonlywhenahubbubamongthespiesof

onenationoranotherbecametooconspicuoustobeignored.HealsostrovetopreventSwisscitizensfromcausingembarrassmentbytakingsides.Inthecourseofthewar,1,389peoplewerearrestedinSwitzerlandforbetrayingsecrets.Militarycourtspassed478sentences,283onSwissnationalsand

195onforeigners.Lifewasbynomeansalwaystranquilforthelocalsecurityforces.GRUoperatorAlexanderFootereportedconsternationintheinternationalespionagecommunitywhenaSwisspolicemanwasblownupbyaninfernalmachinehechancedupon,andattemptedtodefuse.TheEnglishmanwrote:‘Weneverknewwhosebombitwas.’Inmostcapitals,diplomatswerebetterinformedthananyspy.TheGermanambassadorinLisbon,

BaronOswaldvonHoyningen-Huene,wassharp,energeticandwellliked;hewasonclosetermswiththeintimatesofPortuguesedictatorAntónioSalazar,andranaspecialunitforpurchasingforeignnewspapers,whicheverywarringnationminedasintelligencesources.MI5becameconcernedaboutsensitivematerialbeingpassedtoMadrid–andthencetoBerlin–bytheDukeofAlba,theSpanishambassadorinLondon,whowascaressedinBritisharistocraticcirclesasanimpeccably-manneredgrandee.Hisacquaintance,includingsuchmembersofthegovernmentasSirJohnAnderson,werecontenttooverlookAlba’sroleastherepresentativeofFranco’smurderoustyranny:hisdispatches–secretlyinterceptedandreadbyAnthonyBlunt–revealedhimasbeneficiaryofmorethanafewwell-sourcedindiscretions.GuyLiddellwrote:‘Probablyagooddealofinformationgoeswestoverthesecondglassofport.’Alba,likemanyotherdiplomatsaroundtheworld,almostcertainlyprovidedmorereliableintelligencethanhisnation’ssecretagents.

14

ALittleHelpfromTheirFriends

1 ‘ ITSTINKS, BUTSOMEBODYHASTODOIT’

GuyLiddellofMI5wroteinJune1943,followingthediscoveryofacommunistcellintheAirMinistry:‘Unfortunatelythelawissomewhatinadequateinthecaseofamanwhoisspyingonbehalfofanally.’Theprincipallinkinthering,InternationalBrigadeveteranDouglasSpringhall,wasattemptingtopasstotheRussiansdetailsof‘Window’,BomberCommand’stopsecret–andthenstillunused–radarbaffler.Springhalleventuallyservedfourandahalfyearsofaseven-yearprisonsentence.InthecourseofMI5’sinvestigation,itwasdiscoveredthathewasalsoincontactwithanMI6officer,RayMilne,whowaspromptlysacked,andwithCaptainDesmondUrenofSOE’sHungariansection,whoreceivedaseven-yearprisonsentence.Liddellwrote:‘PenetrationoftheservicesbytheCommunistPartyisbecomingratherserious.’TheSecondWorldWarwasneverasimpletwo-sidedcontestbetweentheAlliesandtheAxis,

convenientlydefinableasthecausesofGoodandEvil.Allmannerofforceswereinplay.Currentsswirledceaselesslywithinsocieties,assupportersofleftandright,ofimperialismandanti-imperialism,orofrivalfactionalinterests,viedforprimacyinthepost-warworld.Churchillcreatedthenecessaryrhetoricalmythofthe‘GrandAlliance’,anoblepartnershipofBritain,RussiaandtheUnitedStates.YetthethreePowerscherishedentirelydifferentvisionsofthenewuniversetheywishedtoemergefromvictory.Stalinwasthemostclear-sightedwarlord:hisaccommodationwithRooseveltandChurchilltosecurethedestructionofHitlerdidnotabatebyajotortittlehisdesirethereaftertopulldowntheedificeofbourgeoiscapitalismabouttheirheads.WhereasneithertheBritishnortheAmericansspiedontheSovietUnionduringthewaryears,Stalin’sagentsconductedhugelyambitiousespionageoperationsagainstthedemocracies.HeedlessofNaziinterruptions,theKremlinneverallowedtheRevolutiontosleep.ItwashardforWesterncounter-intelligenceservicestoassesstheriskposedbyleft-wing

sympathisersinthetumultuouspoliticalclimateofthemid-twentiethcentury.Therewasmockerythen,andhasbeenmoresince,aboutMI5suspicionsfocuseduponsuchcommunistjournalistsasClaudCockburn.Paranoiaisanoccupationalhazardofintelligenceofficers:LordCherwell’sofficeonceshowedR.V.JonesalistofBritishscientistsandengineerswhoseloyaltywasconsidered

doubtful.Amongthirty-oddnames,Jonessawseveralwhomitwasridiculoustomistrust,foremostamongthemthatofBarnesWallis,creatoroftheRAF’sdambustingmines.Ittranspiredthatasecurityofficerhadcompiledmostofthelistfromhisownfancifulimagination.Yethundredsofimpeccablymiddle-classBritishandAmericanmenandwomen–includingIvor

Montagu,brotherofEwen,thenavalofficerwhoranthe‘Mincemeat’deception–didindeedbetraytheircountrytotheSovietUnion,whileahandfulofBritishfascistsympathisers,andmanymoreEuropeanones,lenttheirservicestotheNazis.MI5initiallyrecommendedrejectingthearthistorianAnthonyBluntforemploymentinmilitaryintelligence,becausehehadvisitedRussiaandonceofferedacontributiontoaleftistmagazine.Posteritywouldderidetheuseofsuchcriteriatocastdoubtonaman’strustworthiness,hadnotBluntbeenlaterexposedasatraitor.NoelAnnan,anacademicwhospentthewarinthesecretworld,wroteabouttherecruitmentofsuchfiguresasKimPhilbyandGuyBurgess:‘TheintelligenceserviceswerestaffedinpeacetimewithmenwhoregardedStalinasthefirstenemy,andHitleradisagreeablefellowbutapotentialally;[civilisedpeople]rejoicedtoseeintelligentmenoftheleftbeingrecruitedtoredressthebalance.’Itwashardtobalancetherivalclaimsofpersonalfreedomandnationalsecurityinthemidstofa

war.MI5hadachievednotablesuccessesagainstSovietspyringsinBritainduringthe1920sand1930s.Itsofficersdisplayedimagination,indeedbrilliance,inhandlingand‘turning’Nazispies.ThesecurityservicenonethelessfailedtoidentifythemostimportantoftheBritishcommunisttraitorswhopenetratedWhitehallandthesecretcommunity.AnthonyBlunt,bythenservinginMI5,toldhisNKVDhandlerthathefounditpersonallyreassuringtodiscoverthatthepre-warSovietinformantCaptainJohnKingwasexposedonlywhenadefectordenouncedhim.FromJune1941until1945theWesternAlliedgovernments,andespeciallytheBritish,were

cautiousabouthowmuchtheytoldtheRussians,aboveallbecausetheyfearedleakageoftheUltrasecret.TheyconstantlyforwardedoperationalinformationthatmightassisttheRedArmy,butsourcedittonon-existentAlliedagentsinGermany.Evenonthoseterms,thetrafficmadeBroadwayuneasy,partlybecauseitwentexclusivelyoneway.Inthefirstweeksof‘Barbarossa’,BletchleyinterceptedanorderdirectingFourthPanzerArmytosupporttheencirclementofSmolensk,whiletheLuftwaffebombedraillinksbehindtheRedArmy’spositions.Ontheeveningof15July1941Churchill,afterreadingthisdecrypt,scribbledbelowthetextinhisredink:‘Surelyitisrighttogivethemwarningofthis.Pleasereportbeforeaction.’StewartMenziestookstrongexception,minutingtheprimeminister:‘Iamoftheopinionthatthe

source[Broadway’stermforUltra]woulddefinitelybeimperilledifthisinformationwaspassedtoMoscowinitspresentform,asitwouldbeimpossibleforanyagenttohavesecuredsuchinformationregardingoperationsforthe16thJuly.Ihave,however,arrangedwiththeWarOfficeforthegisttobeincorporatedwithothermaterial.’Menziesadded:‘IwouldpointoutthatGeneral[Mason-]MacFarlane[BritishmilitaryattachéinMoscow]wasinstructedtoinformtheRussiansthatwe

possessawell-placedsourceinBerlinwhohasoccasionalaccesstooperationalplansanddocuments.ThisexplanationhasbeenacceptedbytheRussians.Ihave,however,refusedtofurnishthemwithdetailed[unit]identifications,whichmightwellarousetheirsuspicionsastotherealoriginoftheinformation.’SuchprecautionswereconfoundedbythefactthattheNKVDandGRUwerereceivingasteady

streamofdocumentsandUltrainterceptsfromhighly-placedBritishinformants.Amongthemostnotableofthese,JohnCairncrossworkedearlyinthewarasprivatesecretarytoLordHankey,acabinetminister,andthereafteratBletchleyandelsewhereforMI6.ThereisalsoallegedtohavebeenanotherSovietinformantattheParkearlierinthewar,neveridentified,andcodenamed‘Baron’.AnthonyBluntworkedforMI5.KimPhilbybecameaseniorofficerofMI6.GuyBurgesswassuccessivelyemployedbyMI6,theBBCandtheForeignOffice.DonaldMacleanworkedintheupperreachesoftheForeignOffice.OtherBritishsourcesprovidedtechnicalintelligence,aboveallabouttheatomicbombprogramme.GuyLiddellofMI5wroteinNovember1942,amidreflectionsonthesagaofRichardSorge,

whichhadbeenreportedtoLondonbyinformantsinTokyo:‘ThereisnodoubtthattheRussiansarefarbetterinthematterofespionagethananyothercountryintheworld.Iamperfectlycertainthattheyarewellbeddeddownhereandthatweshouldbemakingmoreactiveinvestigations.Theywillbeagreatsourceoftroubletouswhenthewarisover.’Liddelldidnotknowthehalfofit.SovietpenetrationoftheBritishgovernment,scientificinstitutionsandintelligencemachinewasalreadymoreextensivethanhecouldhaveimaginedinhisnightmares.OncetheSovietUnionbecameanally,however,ChurchillwasinsistentthatnointelligenceoperationsshouldbeconductedagainstStalin’sregime.TheForeignOfficeformallyinstructedthesecretservicesthatevenscrutinyofBritishcommunistsshouldbecircumspect,andthatnoinformantsshouldberecruitedinsidetheSovietUnion.VerylittlewasdonebyMI5eventomonitorNKVDandGRUactivitiesinBritain,andBletchley’ssmallRussiansectionwasshutdowninDecember1941.ThesehonourablescrupleswerenotcreditedbyMoscow,ofcourse,farlessreciprocated.Britishfolklegendtreatstheso-calledCambridgeFiveasauniquegalleryofscoundrels,

exemplarsoftherottennesswithintheclasssystem,aknotofgildedyoungmenwhosystematicallybetrayedtheircountryasnoothersdid.Itseemsmoreappropriate,however,toconsiderthemalongsideMoscow’sBritishagentsfromlessprivilegedbackgrounds–thelikesofthelethallyeffectivenuclearspyMelitaNorwood–togetherwithhundredsofAmericanswholikewisebetrayednationalsecretstoStalin’styranny.CommunismasacreedenjoyedwidespreadsupportacrosstheWesternworld,inthaterawhenmanypeopleontheleftchosetoblindtheirconsciousnesstotheinstitutionalisedinhumanityoftheSovietUnion.Intheireyescapitalism,whetherrepresentedbyRepublicancorporateinterestsintheUnitedStatesorbytheConservativePartyinBritain,sustainedtheoppressionoftheworkingclass.‘Lookingaroundusatourownhells,’saidPhilipToynbee,the

historianwhobecameacommunistatCambridge,‘wehadtoinventanearthlyparadisesomewhereelse.’MoscowCentre’srecruitersprofitedmightilyfromtheSovietUnion’sstatusasprincipalstandard-

bearerforcommunismasacreed.ManyNKVDandGRUsourcesaroundtheworldembracedthefictionthatbygivingsecretstotheComintern,theywereaidinganinternationalidealratherthananynarrowlynationalcause.ZbigniewBrzezinskidefinesideologyascombiningtheoryandactionwitha‘consciousnessofpurposeandofthegeneralthrustofhistory.Itgivesitsadherentsasenseofconsistencyandcertaintythatistoooftenabsentamongthose…broughtupinthetraditionofshort-termpragmatism.’EvenbeforetheenormityofthefascistmenaceinGermany,ItalyandSpainbecameapparent,left-wingsocialismattractedmanyenlightenedandcompassionatepeople.Thecreedcamedressedinmanyguises.ExplicitlytoavowcommunistsympathieswasnobarriertoadmissiontoculturedLondon,ParisorWashingtonsociety,becausecommunismwasnotthenuniversallyidentifiedwiththebarbaritieslaidbareinthesecondhalfofthetwentiethcentury.JamesKlugmann,aMoscowinformantwhoworkedforSOE,saidlater:‘Wesimplyknew,allofus,thattherevolutionwasathand.Ifanyonehadsuggesteditwouldn’thappeninBritainforsaythirtyyears,I’dhavelaughedmyselfsick.’Inthe1930scommunistsseemedtobetheonlypeoplewhowerechallengingfascismwithany

conviction,andthe1936outbreakoftheSpanishCivilWardramaticallyenhancedthecredibilityoftheSovietUnioninintellectuals’eyes.TheybecameobsessedwithSpaininanevenmoreprofoundsensethanalatergenerationembracedVietnam.NoWesternersinthe1960s,howeverhostiletoAmericanpolicy,tookuparmsforHoChiMinh.YetthousandsofEuropeansandAmericansfoughtfortheRepublicansinSpain,orworkedtoassistthem.Millionsofpeoplearoundtheworldidentifiedwiththecausewithanalmostreligiousfervour.Inthisfebrileclimate,perhapsmoreintenselypoliticisedthanatanytimebeforeorsince,Moscowrecruitedyoungidealistsofallnationalitiestoserveascovertwarriorsforcommunism.Centre’sBritishandAmericaninformantswerediversecharacters,unitedbyamessianicbeliefin

theirownrightness,indispensabletoenablethemsystematicallytobetraytheiremployers,colleaguesandcountry.HughTrevor-RoperreflectedlongafterwardsthatheandmanyothersofhisgenerationhadunderestimatedtheperilsposedbycommunistswithinBritishandotherdemocraticsocieties,becausetheyhadmistakenlyperceivedadherentstothecreedas‘merelythemostradicalofouralliesagainstfascism,themilitantsontheextremeleftofacoalitioninwhichmenagreedtodifferwithmutualrespect.EducatedliberalEnglishmenandAmericansfailedtounderstandthatcommunismisareligion…[which]cantotallyparalysethementalandmoralfacultiesofitsconvertsandcausethemtocommitanyturpitudeandtosufferanyindignity,foritssake.’Yetmanyofthosewhocalledthemselvescommuniststhroughoutthe1930sfeltobligedtorecantin

thefaceofthesupremecynicismoftheAugust1939dealbetweentheNazisandtheSoviets.Trevor-

Roperwrote:‘Manyofourfriendshadbeen,orthoughtthemselves,communistsinthe1930s,andwewereshockedthatsuchpersonsshouldbedebarredfrompublicserviceonaccountofmerejuvenileillusionswhichanywaytheyhadnowshed;forsuchillusionscouldnotsurvivetheshatteringimpactofStalin’spactwithHitler.’Thus,asthehightideofenthusiasmforcommunismrecededintheWesterndemocracies,allbutthemostdoctrinaireconservativesbecamereluctanttoholditagainstyoungmenandwomenthattheyhadavowedenthusiasmforMoscowbeforetheNazi–SovietPactexposeditsturpitude.ItremainsnonethelessremarkablethattheCambridgeFive,andothersoftheirkind,sustainedfor

somanyyearsparallelrolesinthesecretservicesofBritainandRussia.Thespieshadincommondysfunctionalpersonalities,togetherwithanangeragainstfamily,classorsocietywhichimpelledtheirtreacheryand,intheirownminds,justifiedit.Allhadintellectualgiftsandvaryingdegreesofcharm.JohnCairncrosswastheoutsider,bornthesonofaLanarkshireironmongerin1913.HebecameascholarshipboyfirstatGlasgowUniversity,thenatTrinity,Cambridge.Frailanduntidyinappearance,adornedwithashockofredhair,hisearnestnessandgaucheriecausedhimtobedismissedbyChurchill’sprivatesecretaryJockColvilleas‘verybrilliant,veryboring’.Thelatterhandicapsethimapartfromtheother,famouslypersonableCambridgespies,thoughbrainssecuredhimagovernmentjob.In1936Cairncrosspassedtopofhisyearintothecivilservice.Liketheothers,hewasrecruitedtotheNKVDbyArnoldDeutsch,aVienneseJewandenthusiastic

sexualliberationistwhosince1934hadoccupiedaflatinLawnRoad,Hampstead,nextdoortoAgathaChristie.Deutschpursuedastrategyofwooingyounghighflierswhoseemedtobeintransittowardsthecorridorsofpower.KimPhilbylaterdescribedhimas‘amarvellousman’,funnyandbrilliant,whotreatedtheFiveascomradesratherthansubordinates.HelaterassertedthatheneverhesitatedforamomentbeforeembracingDeutsch’sproposal:‘Onedoesnotlooktwiceatanofferofenrolmentinaneliteforce.’DonaldMaclean,afterhis1951flighttoMoscow,justifiedhisowntreasoninmoredisdainfulterms:‘It’slikebeingalavatoryattendant.Itstinks,butsomebodyhastodoit.’CairncrosswasintroducedtoDeutschbyJamesKlugmanninRegent’sParkinMay1937.Afew

monthslater,theNKVDmanwasrecalledtoMoscowduringthePurges.HissuccessorsastheCambridgespies’handlersnever,intheireyes,matchedDeutsch’scharmandprofessionalism.Thoughhenarrowlypreservedhisownlife,heremainedsuspectedbyhisemployers,andtheFive’sassociationwithhimsustainedtheNKVD’swarinessofthem.Awinter1938assessmentbyMoscowCentrewarnedthattheLondonintelligenceoperation‘wasbasedondoubtfulsources,onanagentnetworkacquiredatatimewhenitwascontrolledbyenemiesofthepeopleandthereforeextremelydangerous’.AlthoughCentreforatimekeptopenitslinkswiththeFive,theirmaterialwastreatedwiththeutmostcaution.Earlyin1940,Russiansuspicionsmounted.LavrentiBeriabecameconvincedthattheCambridge

spieswereservingeithertheBritishortheGermans,andnotthecauseofsocialism.HerecalledtoMoscowAnatolyGorsky,soleremainingmemberoftheNKVD’sLondonlegalresidency.Forseveralmonths,whilethegreatestwarinhumanhistoryunfolded,SovietintelligenceconductednosignificantoperationsinBritain;StalinmadeitplaintohisspymastersthathewasmoreinterestedinkillingTrotskythanindiscoveringwhatHitler–or,forthatmatter,Churchill–wasdoing.Onlylatein1940didtheintelligencepolicyoftheKremlinshiftwithitsaccustomedabruptness.ThewordwentforththatCentrewastorebuilditsforeignagentnetworks,whichhadbeenallowedtoatrophy.WhenrelationswiththeFivewereresumed,thenewNKVDresidentagentarrangedmeetingswith

theminKensingtonGardens,becausetherendezvouswashandyforthenearbySovietembassy.Thespiesresumedtheircovertcrusadeforsocialism,eventhoughatthistimeStalinwassupposedlytheassociateofHitler.Cairncross’sabsenceofsocialskillscausedhimtobetransferredfromtheForeignOfficetotheTreasury,andthenin1940tobecomeprivatesecretarytoLordHankey.IftherewasanythingMoscowCentredidnotknowaboutthestructureandactivitiesofBritain’sintelligenceservices,HankeynowfilledthegapsthroughtheagencyofCairncross.TheministerhadconductedanexhaustiveinquiryintoMI6andBletchley.CairncrossslippedhisNKVDhandleracopyofHankey’sinterimreport,whichhadbeenfirstcirculatedwithinWhitehallinMarch1940.Thereafter,hespentayearasacodebreakerinBletchley’sHut3beforehishealthfailed,

promptingatransfertoMI6.Between1941and1945hepassed5,832documentstotheRussians,includingmanydecryptedGermansignals.Cairncrosswassotechnicallyincompetentthathewasincapableofphotographingmaterial:hecouldonlycopyextractsbyhand,ortemporarilyfilchthemforhishandlertofilm.TheNKVDresidentoftenfoundhimselfunabletocopewithencipheringallthematerialhisinformantsupplied,buthewassufficientlyappreciativetogiveCairncrosscashtobuyacartomakeiteasierforhimtodeliverstolensecrets.Thespy’spersonalunpopularitywithcolleaguesprovednobarriertohiscontinuedemploymentbyMI6,andMoscoweventuallypresentedhimwiththeOrderoftheRedBannerinrecognitionofhiscontributiontoitsowninterests.GuyBurgesswasanavalofficer ’sson,bornin1911,whoattendedEtonandTrinityCollege,

Cambridge,thenbegantoscrapealivingfromtheBBC,whilepartyingonthefringesofLondonintellectualandpoliticalcircles.Eveninaneraofharddrinking,Burgess’sconsumptionofalcoholamazedhisacquaintance.Hisfavouritetipplewasalargeport,whichbecameknowntowaitersattheReformClubinPallMallas‘adoubleBurgess’.AmidthedefiantsqualorofhisflatinBondStreet,hesometimescookedastewofporridge,kippers,bacon,garlic,onions‘andanythingelselyingaboutinthekitchen’tosustainhimthroughaweekend.InDecember1938hiswitandsocialconnectionscausedhimtoberecruitedintoMI6’spropagandadepartment.AftersomemonthshetransferredtotheBBC,whereheproducedtheradioprogrammeTheWeekinWestminster,apassporttousefulpoliticalcontacts.Thereafterheenjoyedaracketyexistence,commutingbetweenBroadcastingHouseandthe

Fitzroviaintellectualworld,thewildershoresofhomosexualLondonandthedarkercorridorsofitssecretworld,bothBritishandRussian,whileexcusedfrommilitarycall-upthroughthegoodofficesofBluntatMI5.HowheavoideddisastermystifiedallthosewhoencounteredhisrecklessindiscretionlongbeforehewasexposedasanagentofMoscow.Acharacteristic1942BurgesscontributiontothewareffortwastorecruitasanMI5sourceAndrewRevoi,leaderoftheso-calledFreeHungariansinLondon–whomhehimselfhadputontheNKVDpayrollbackin1938.DuringtheearlywaryearsBurgesscontributedlesstoCentre’sintereststhantheotherCambridgespies,butin1944SirAlexanderCadoganincomprehensiblyappointedhimtotheForeignOfficeNewsDepartment.BetweenJanuaryandJuly1945Burgesspassed389topsecretfilestohisSoviethandler.DonaldMacleanprovidedMoscowwithitsmostimportantsecretpoliticalintelligence.Hisfamily

wereHighlandScots,oppressivelyPresbyterianandcommittedtotemperance;hisfatherwasalawyerwhoeventuallybecameaLiberalcabinetminister.YoungDonald,bornin1913,waseducatedatGresham’s,aharshNorfolkpublicschoolwhereboyshadtheirtrouserpocketssewnuptodiscourageputtinghandsinthem.Maclean,tallandhandsome,wasoncedescribedbyanadmiringNaziashaving‘perfectAryangoodlooks’.Fromanearlyage,withhisBalkancigarettesandloungingcharm,hecultivatedaposeofmandarinease.PhilipToynbeewroteofhisfriend’s‘lazywitandsophisticatedgoodhumour ’.MacleanandtheothersrecruitedbyMoscowatCambridgeprofessedtobelieve–andperhapsinitiallydidso–thattheywereworkingfortheCominternratherthanexplicitlyfortheSovietUnion.MacleanjoinedtheForeignOfficeandbegantopassdocumentstohisNKVDcontroller.In1937KittyHarris,borntopoorRussianparentsinLondon’sEastEndandbrieflybigamouslymarriedtoAmericancommunistleaderEarlBrowder,assumedthisrole.SheandMacleanconcludedtheirfirstmeetinginbedtogether,andthereafterforsomemonthsconductedanaffair.ThefollowingyearhewaspostedtoParis.RobertCecil,whohadknownMacleaninhisyoungerdaysandwasnowanembassycolleague,thoughthisdemeanourhadbecomeuneasyandhesitant,incontrasttohisearlierself-assurance.AtthetimeCecilwasbemusedbythechange,butmuchlaterheidentifieditasreflectingguiltaboutMaclean’sdoublelife.Thehandsomeyoungdiplomatwasbynomeansuniversallyliked:typistsreferredtohimdisdainfullyas‘smarty-pants’.NonethelessMelindaMarling,anAmericangirlwhomMacleanmetinParis,gaveaglowing

accountofhimtohermother:‘Heissixfoottall,blondewithbeautifulblueeyes…Heisthesoulofhonour,responsible,asenseofhumour,imagination,cultured,broadminded(andsweet),etc.’InJune1940shefoundherselfpregnantamidthechaosofFrancebeingoverrunbytheGermans.ThesetwinshockscausedhertobrushasideearlierreservationsaboutmarryingMaclean.Afterahastywedding,theywereevacuatedtoBritain.MelindathensailedforNewYork,wheretheirfirstchildwasborn–andswiftlydied.Onlyintheautumnof1941didshereturntolivewithDonaldinLondon.Itseemsalmostcertainthatfromanearlystagetheleft-leaningMelindawasawarebothofherhusband’sworkforMoscow,andofhisbisexuality.

TheenforcedaccessionoftheSovietUniontothestruggleagainstHitlerliftedthespiritsoftheWesternspiesservingMoscow.NowthatBritainandRussia,andsoonafterwardsalsotheUnitedStates,werefightingthesamefascistfoes,suchpeopleasMacleancouldpersuadethemselvesthatpassinginformationto‘UncleJoe’wasnobetrayal,butinsteadmerelyameansofassistingacommoncause.In1942alone,thedocumentshestoleorcopiedfromtheForeignOfficefilledforty-fivefilesintheNKVD’sMoscowarchives.Maclean’srichcropincludedmuchmaterialaboutBritain’srelationswiththeSovietUnionanddetailsofBritishpositionsinnegotiationsandbeforesummitmeetings.InApril1944hewaspostedtotheBritishembassyinWashingtonasfirstsecretary,whereheplayedtenniswithLordHalifax,andraisedhisgameasapurveyorofAnglo-Americansecrets.ThestrainoflifeasaspyandbisexualshowedinMaclean’sincreasingconsumptionofalcoholandlapsesintouglyscenesunderitsinfluence.Buthisintelligenceandcharm,leavenedwithForeignOfficeandclasssolidarity,enabledhimtokeepbothhisjobandhisroleastheSovietUnion’smostimportantsourceonWesternforeignpolicy.AnthonyBlunt,avicar ’ssonbornin1907andeducatedatMarlborough,wonamathematics

scholarshiptoCambridgeandlatertookaFirstinforeignlanguages.Thereafterhebecameadonandanembryoarthistorian.Bothhishomosexualityandhisleft-wingsympathieswerewellknown–hisfriendGuyBurgessmayhavebeenresponsibleforrecruitinghimtotheNKVD.Butin1939neitherpoliticsnorsexualityprovedabartohisjoiningtheIntelligenceCorps,withwhichheservedforsomemonthsinFrance.FindinghimselfhomelessafterDunkirk,hebecameatemporaryLondonlodgerofVictorRothschildofMI5,throughwhomGuyLiddellrecruitedhimtothesecurityservice.Bluntwonimmediateplauditsasanintelligenceofficer,especiallyforhisdexterityinexamining

thecontentsofneutraldiplomaticbags.AnMI5secretaryofthetimelaterrecalled:‘MyGod,hewasacharmer!PoorAnthony!WewereallabitinlovewithAnthony,youknow…Heusedtowanderaroundwithhiscod-liveroilandmalt,saying“That’swhatTiggerslikeforbreakfast.”HeknewWinniethePoohverywell.HehadaLeslieHowardface–amatineeidol–aratherthinanddrawn-lookingfacebutitwasthefaceofLeslieHoward.EveryonewasinlovewithLeslieHowardatthattime.’OnseveraloccasionsBluntwassenttorepresentMI5atmeetingsoftheJointIntelligenceCommittee,andin1944hewassecondedtoSHAEFtoworkondeceptionplanning.InhisparallelNKVDroleherecruitedandranasasub-agentLeoLong,whoworkedinmilitaryintelligence.BluntprovidedastreamofMI5documentsandsomeUltradecrypts,includingsignalsrelatingtothe1943battleforKursk,thesubstanceofwhichhadbeenconveyedtoMoscowthroughBritishmilitarychannels.HealsobriefedtheRussiansabouttheactivitiesoftheTwentyCommittee,whichran‘turned’NaziagentsinitsmasterlywirelessgamewiththeAbwehr.Harold‘Kim’Philby,mostnotoriousoftheCambridgegroupbecausehegainedaccesstothemost

sensitivesecretsandhistreacheryultimatelycostmostlives,wasthesonoftheArabistscholarStJohnPhilby,anobsessivepersonalitywhototteredontheedgeofinsanity.Theelderlysagedeclared,

forinstance,thatHitlerwas‘averyfineman’,andin1940becameconvincedoftheinevitabilityofBritishdefeat,whichcausedhimtobebrieflyinternedinIndia.AfterWestminsterandCambridge,theNKVDgavePhilbycareercounselling:getintonewspapers,saidArnoldDeutsch,whichwouldprovideanidealplatformforhisMoscowwork.Duringthelater1930sPhilbybecameawell-regardedjournalist,servinginSpainduringitscivilwarasacorrespondentforTheTimesaswellasanagentoftheNKVD,whodoubledhisnewspaperincome.Philby’spersonalextravagancemadeRussia’scashasimportanttohimasthepleasureofassuaginghisclosetcontemptforBritainbyservingitsenemies.Peopleofpowerandinfluencelovedhimasthemostcongenialofcompanions:hewassponsoredformembershipofLondon’saugustAthenaeumClubbythemilitarytheoristBasilLiddellHart.AjokethatpleasedPhilbymightilywasthatFrancothefascistawardedhimSpain’sRedCrossofMilitaryMerit,thoughin1937theRussiansbriefedhimtogatherintelligencetofacilitateFranco’sassassination.Thereafter,however,duringthePurgesandtheperiodoftheNazi–SovietPacthefoundhimself

droppedasabruptlyasweremanyotherNKVDinformants.Hisoffersofnewmaterial,forwardedtoMoscowthroughDonaldMaclean,werespurned.HewasobligedinsteadtobusyhimselfasaTimeswarcorrespondentwiththeBritishExpeditionaryForceinFrance.PhilbywasappointedtoMI6in1940,afterexpressinganinterestinanintelligencecareertooneoftheservice’stalent-spotters,HarrietMarsden-Smedley.ValentineVivianwasafriendofStJohnPhilby,andcheerfullyacceptedtheoldman’sassurancethathissonhadforsworndalliancewiththeleft.KimstartedhiscareerwithBritishintelligencebylecturingontechniquesofsubversivepropagandatoforeignexilesrecruitedtoSOE.Heoftenopenedhisflamboyanttalksbyurginghisaudiences,manyofwhomrecognisedStalinandHitlerasmatchingmonsters:‘Gentlemen,IhavenowishtopreventyoublowinguptheRussians,butIwouldbegyou,forthesakeoftheAlliedwareffort,toblowuptheGermansfirst.’PhilbywontheaffectionaswellasthewarmapprovalofBroadwaycolleaguesandchiefs,andinOctober1941waspromotedtoheadtheIberiansectionofMI6.TheRussianshadrenewedcontactwithhimninemonthsearlier,buthisinitialreportsaboutlifeat

Broadwayearnedtheirscorn.HeassertedthattheSovietUnionstoodonlytenthonMI6’spenetrationtargetlist,anincrediblepropositiontoCentre,whichwasconvincedthattheexistentialpurposeoftheBritishsecretservicewastoachievethedestructionoftheSovietUnion.Russia’sleadersinhabitedasocietyinwhichnobilityofconductwasalien,indeeddangeroustothestate.Theywerethusunabletocreditthefactthatforthewar ’sdurationeventhemostimpassionedanti-communists,includingChurchill,hadsetasidetheirhostilitytothroweverythingintothestruggleagainsttheAxis.Thiswasemphasisedin1940whenWalterKrivitsky,theformerNKVDresidentinHolland,defectedtotheAmericans.On23January,MI5debriefedhimatLondon’sLanghamhotel.KrivitskydescribedalmostahundredSovietagentsinEurope,sixtyofthemworkingagainstBritishinterests,includingsixteenwhowereBritishsubjects.YetMI5,overwhelminglypreoccupiedwiththeNazimenace,felt

abletocommitonlyasingleofficertoinvestigateSovietpenetration,anditisthusunsurprisingthathefailedtoidentifyanunnamedBritishjournalist,mentionedbyKrivitskyashavinghelpedtheNKVDinSpaintoplanFranco’sassassination,asKimPhilby.Moscow’sinterestwasreawakenedbyPhilby’sappointmenttoheadtheIberiansection.Thereafter

heprovidedCentrewithalmostathousandwartimesecretdocuments,channelledthroughAnatolyGorsky,nowreappointedasNKVDresidentattheSoviets’Londonembassy.Shortandfat,GorskywasacaricatureStalinistwhosemercilesschillrousedtherepugnanceoftheCambridgespies,thoughinsufficientlysotoputthemofftheirwork.Atthisstage,Philby’smostsignificantcontributionwastofuelSovietparanoiaabouttheprospectthatBritainwouldmakeacompromisepeacewithHitler,throughtheagencyofDeputyFührerRudolfHess.Thiswaspuremischief-making,presumablydesignedtoraiseitsagent’sstandingwithCentre.Inthesamespirit,PhilbyreportedthathisMI6mastershadabandonedaplantokillAdmiralCanarisononeofhisfrequentvisitstoSpain,allegedlybecausetheBritishanticipatedthathemightbecometheintermediaryinbilateralnegotiations.InsideBroadwayBuildings,Philbyaffectedanold1914–18armytunicofhisfather ’s.Withhis

stammer,shabbyclothesanddiffidentmannerheseemed,inRobertCecil’swords‘likeoneofGrahamGreene’sseedyanti-heroes’.YetMalcolmMuggeridgewarmedtoanapparentfellow-freespirit:‘Hisromanticvenerationforbuccaneersandbuccaneering,whatevertheideologicalbasis–ifany–mightbe.Boozers,womanisers,violenceinallitsmanifestations,recklessnesshoweverdirectedhefoundirresistible.’PhilbyoncetoldMuggeridge,inafamiliarhalf-self-mockingkey,thatGöbbelswasamanhefelthecouldhaveworkedwith.Philby’squalitiescommandedanextravagantpremiuminsideBroadway:HughTrevor-Roper

foundhim‘anagreeableandeffectiveperson…intelligent,sophisticatedandevenreal’.Thehistorianwashatedbymanyofhiscareercolleaguesbecauseheneverconcealedhiscontemptforthem,butPhilbyflatteredandcaressedthem.TheconsequencewasthatTrevor-Roperthepatriotwasmistrusted–repeatedlythreatenedwithdismissalandoncewithaprosecutionfortreason,forconveyingdetailsofBroadway’sfailingstoLordCherwell–whilePhilbythebetrayersecuredhismasters’absoluteconfidence.CommontoalltheCambridgeFivewasadisdainforloyaltynotmerelytocountry,butalsoto

familyandfriends.In1935Philbyrifledhisownfather ’spapersonNKVDorders.HemademuchofhisrelationshipwithanoldWestminsterschoolfriend,TomWylie,inhopesofexploitingWylie’sroleasaWarOfficeofficial.GoronwyReesbrokecontactwithCentrefollowingtheNazi–SovietPact,anideologicalbridgetoofarforhim.DonaldMacleanspatatRees:‘Youusedtobeoneofus,butyouratted!’Thewriterpromisedtheothertraitorsthattheirsecretremainedsafewithhim,andkepthisword,anunedifyingmoralcompromise.Burgess,however,remainedfearfulofRees’sknowledge.Inthespringof1943heurgedhisSoviethandlerthathisfriendshouldbemurdered.

WhenMoscowdismissedthissuggestionasaclumsyBritishprovocation,atameetingwithGorskyon20JulyBurgessofferedtokillReeshimself,whichwasalsothoughtsuperfluous.CentreoftensoughttopressmoneyonitsBritishagents.Mostprofessedscruples,declaring

themselvesenthusiastsforanidealratherthanmercenaries.AnthonyBluntoncesurprisedhishandlerbydemanding,andreceiving,£200forsomeundisclosedpersonalpurpose.HesignedareceiptforthecashwhichthereafterreposedintheNKVD’sfiles,muchtothesatisfactionofCentre:thelong,lean,boundlesslydeviousarthistorianwasthuschainedtoitsoar.Meanwhile,Philby’slifestylecouldonlybesustainedbyanincomefromMotherRussiaaswellasfromMI6.Asisoftenthecasewithdoubleagents,bothsideshadmomentsofdoubtabouthisloyalty.In

November1942StuartHampshire,oneoftheRadioIntelligenceBureau’sOxforddons,producedanimportantreportonthepowerstruggletakingplaceinGermanybetweenHimmlerandCanaris.Philbysecuredabanonitscirculation,withoutgivingareason.ThiscausedHampshiretosaythoughtfully,‘There’ssomethingwrongwithPhilby,’thoughneitherhenorhiscolleaguescouldfigureoutwhat.Longafterwards,theyconcludedthatKimwasprobablyunderordersfromMoscowtostifleanyinformationthatmightencouragetheBritishtotalktoGermanoppositiongroups.Atthetime,HughTrevor-RoperwassoannoyedbyPhilby’sbehaviourthathegaveacopyofHampshire’sdocumenttoLordCherwell,whichearnedhimyetanotherformalreprimandfromMenziesandValentineVivian.Hewasorderedtowriteaformalapologyforcommunicatingwiththeprimeminister ’sadviser,ratherinthespiritofaschoolmasterpunishinganerrantchildbyimposing‘lines’.MeanwhileinMoscow,atexactlythesametimeElenaModrzhinskaya,oneoftheNKVD’smost

respectedanalystsandanobsessiveconspiracytheorist,urgedthatalltheCambridgeFivewerepartofaBritishplot,‘aninsultinglycrudecapitalistprovocation’.Thisseemedthemorecrediblesincethreeofthegroup’searlyhandlers–Deutsch,TheodoreMalyandAlexanderOrlov–hadalreadybeenbrandedastraitors.ModrzhinskayacomplainedthatthecontentofthecopiesofMI6’ssignalstotheBritishembassyinMoscow,passedtoCentrebyPhilby,werefartoobanaltobeauthentic.TheRussiansneverabandonedtheirconvictionthattheirowncountryteemedwithBritishspies.AnNKVDreportof30October1945stated:‘TheEnglishintelligenceorganstookadvantageofimprovedopportunitiesduringthewarandintensifiedtheespionageagainsttheSovietUnion.Atotalofaround200BritishagentsworkedintheUSSRduringthewar,ofwhich110wereinMoscow,30inMurmanskandover20amongvariousdelegations.’Thiswasanexquisitefantasy.MI6hadlackedanyMoscowstationsince1936,andtheBritishambassadorvetoedaproposaltoestablishone.Bycontrast,inthecourseof1941theNKVD’sLondonstationforwardedtoMoscow7,867British

classifieddocuments,715onmilitarymatters,fifty-oneonintelligence,127oneconomics,andtherestonpoliticalorothertopics.Asimilartrafficflowwassustainedthroughthelaterwaryears.Topreservethesecurityblanketoversources,insideCentrealmostalloriginalmaterialwasdestroyedafterbeingtranslatedandparaphrasedbydeskstaff.Suchwasthebulk,however,andsoseverethe

shortageofEnglishlinguists,thatthousandsofpagesweredispatchedtotheincineratorsunexamined.YuriModin,oneofsevenMoscowdeskstaffchargedwithhandlingthismountainofmaterial,laterreflectedsardonically:‘Whatwould[thespies]havethoughtiftheyhadknownthattheirtelegramsandreportshadbarelya50percentchanceofbeingread?’WhenPhilbyprovidedanaddressbookofBritishagentsinfar-flungplaces,theNKVDbrusheditaside:itschiefswantedonlymaterialaboutMI6activityincountrieswhereMoscowhadexplicitinterests.ButsomeoftheBritishspies’reports,trueandfalse,foundtheirwayintotheKremlin.Atypical

missivefromCentretotheUSSR’sStateDefenceCommitteewasdated21April1942:‘Thisistopassontoyoutheinformationfromanagent,whichNKVDoftheUSSRhasreceivedfromLondonasaresultofconversationsbetweenthesourcesandanofficialfromtheAmericanembassy(“Gilbert”)andanumberofMPs.1.OnTheSecondFront.Ithasbecomeclearthat…apartfromactiveopponentsofChurchillwhothinkheissabotagingtheopeningoftheSecondFrontfromhishostilitytowardstheUSSR,thedelayisbeingviewedfromtwoangles:Politicalaspect:thereisdisagreementamongmembersofthegovernmentastowhenoffensiveoperations[aninvasionoftheContinent]shouldstart…ManyofthosewhoknowChurchill,includingLloydGeorge,saythatheremainshauntedbythefailureoftheDardanellescampaign[in1915]whenhewasblamedfortheGallipolidisaster…Accordingto“Gilbert”…only4Britishdivisionshavehadspecialisedamphibioustraining.’Thisreport,whichcontinuesatlength,isnotmuchdifferentinstyle,accuracyandusefulnessfromroutinediplomaticandforthatmatternewspaperreporting.AsimilarNKVDreportfromLondon,dated28July1942,wasbroadlysoundinsubstance,but

quotedsomerisiblesources:‘OurfixedagentinLondonsentthefollowinginformation,obtainedbyanagent.MostofficialshaverecentlybeenassertingthattheSecondFrontwillnotbeopenedthisyear.SuchpeopleasLadyColefax–theagent-informantoftheConservativeParty’sexecutivecommittee…arenowdeclaringwithalmostcompleteassurancethattheSecondFrontwillnothappen.’SibylColefaxwas,inreality,ameresocialalpinistandconspicuouslyfoolishwoman,ofwhomacontemporaryjokesuggestedthatshescrawledononeofherluncheoninvitations‘tomeetthemotheroftheUnknownSoldier ’.MeanwhileDonaldMacleantoldMoscowthatPoland’sGeneralWładysławSikorskidismissedtalk

thattheKatynmassacresofPolishofficerswereNaziwork,sayinghewasconfidentthattheyhadbeencarriedoutbytheNKVD,asofcoursetheywere.AnthonyBluntwarnedthatthePolishgovernmentinLondonwouldneveraccepttheproposedredrawingofitscountry’sborders.ThiswasoneoftheBritishmessagesthatappearstohavehadsomeinfluenceontheKremlin,confirmingStalininhisdeterminationtospurnthe‘LondonPoles’andcreatehisownpuppetregime.TheMI5officeralsoprovidedMoscowwithausefullistofBritishsourcesrecruitedamongthepersonnelofexileEuropeangovernmentsinLondon.TheRussiansreceivedmuchinformationthatwasplainwrong,andreflectedonlytheirobsession

withsupposedconspiraciesagainstthemselves.Forinstance,on12May1942‘areliablesource’reportedtoMoscowthatanofficialfromtheGermanembassyinStockholmhadarrivedinLondonaboardaSwedishaircraftbearingpeaceproposalswhereby:‘Englandwillstayintactasanempire.TheGermanswillwithdrawtroopsfromCzechoslovakiaandrestoreitsoldborders.AllEasternEuropewillberestoredtoitspreviousborders.TheBalticstateswillalsoremainindependent.AfterEnglandacceptstheseconditionsGermanywillreachanagreementwiththeUSSR.’TheRussiansassumedtheworstaboutadmittedlymuddledAnglo-AmericanpolicyinYugoslavia.On28March1943anNKVDsourceinAlgiers–possiblyanOSSinformant–messagedalmosthysterically:‘IncollaborationwiththeAmericanstheEnglishhaveinstructed[General]Mihailovićnottojoinanyactiveoperations[againsttheGermans],butinsteadtobuildstrengthandmaterielandmakehisarmyascapableaspossible[foroperationsagainstTitoandhiscommunistpartisans].TheEnglishandAmericansarehelpingMihailovićdespitebeingwellawareofhislinkswiththeGermans…InparallelwiththistheEnglishhavedecidedtoexploitallopportunitiestocompromiseMarshalTito.AmongotherthingstheyareusingtheneutralSwissmediaforthispurpose.’MoscownursedarunninggrievanceabouttheBritishrefusaltoforwardtothemrawUltra

recrypts.ThemodernRussianintelligenceofficialwebsiteassertsasfactin2015:‘AlthoughtheBritishintelligenceservicewasgettingreliableinformationoftheplansofGermanarmyleadershipattheEasternFront,theEnglishpreferredtokeepthisinformationsecretfromtheirSovietally.ItwasthroughagentsamongtheBritishsecretservicethattheSovietforeignintelligenceservicedidacquirethisinformation.’YetYuriModinadmittedthatLondonhadreasononitsside.TheRussianswerethemselveshauntedbyfearsofNaziagentsinsideSovietheadquarters–includingtheNKVD–whichwereprobablyunjustified,butcosttwosuspectgeneralstheirlives.InMay1943,MI6createdanewSectionIX,taskedtostudycommunismandSovietespionage,

thoughitsstaffwasauthorisedtoworkonlywithsuchmaterialascouldbegatheredoutsidetheSovietUnion.InaccordancewithChurchill’ssterndiktat,nopenetrationactivitieswerecarriedout–notthatthesecouldhaveachievedmuchanyway.WhenanEstoniannamedRichardMaasingwasdebriefedbyMI6,Philbydisplayedakeeninterest,unsurprisingtoposterity:hewantedtodiscoverwhowereMaasing’scontactsinterritoriesclaimedbytheSovietUnion.EarlyinJuly1944,MI6’sLisbonstationreceivedsomewarningoftheHitlerbombplotfromOttoJohnoftheAbwehr.Philbywasinsistentthatthisreporthadnosignificanceandshouldbe‘spiked’–almostcertainlyforthefamiliarreasonthathisMoscowordersobligedhimtodoeverythingpossibletofrustrateAlliedintercoursewiththeGermanResistance.AftertheAbwehrofficerPaulVehmehren’s1944defectioninIstanbulandsubsequentdebriefing,PhilbypassedtotheRussiansVehmehren’slonglistofCatholicconservativecontactsinGermany:allthoseintheEastwereliquidatedbytheRussiansin1945–46,asactualorpotentialanti-communists.Moscow’ssuspicionsofPhilbynonethelesspersisted,intensifiedbyanepisodeintheautumnof

1943.HesuppliedtohishandlersacopyofasupremelysensitiveUltradecryptofasignaltoTokyofromtheJapaneseembassyinBerlin,detailingBaronŌshima’s4OctoberconversationswithHitlerandRibbentrop.TheversionwirelessedtoMoscowomittedtheconcludingparagraph,becauseBletchleyhadonlyacorruptedtext.WhentheNKVDsecuredfromanothersourceacopyofthesamesignal,butincludingthemissingsectionwhichdiscussedapossibleseparatepeace,Fitin,thechiefoftheFirstDirectorate,assumedthatPhilbyhaddeliberatelyomitteditfromhisdeliveryonBroadway’sorders.Moreover,alltheCambridgeFiveweredamnedbytheircontinuingfailuretoprovidedetailsofthenon-existentBritishspyringsintheSovietUnion.On25October1943CentretolditsLondonresidencythatitwasplainPhilbyandhisfriendsweredoubleagents.ItdispatchedeightmentoLondonwithanexplicitbrieftosecureconfirmationofthis,byshadowingtheirmovements.SincenoneofthenewcomersspokeEnglish,the‘tailing’operationagainsttheNKVD’sownsourceswaslessthansuccessful.OnlyinAugust1944wasthereachangeofheartinMoscow,arenewalofbeliefthatthe

CambridgespieswereservingSovietratherthanBritishinterests.CentrewrotetoitsLondonstationthatnewevidenceaboutPhilby‘obligesustoreviewourattitudetowardshimandtheentiregroup’,whowere‘ofgreatvalue’.InMoscowandLondonalike,rivalemployersnowclamouredforhisservices.HisoldnewspaperTheTimesstrovetopersuadehimtoreturntojournalism;oneofitsseniorexecutivescharacterisedhimas‘steady,experiencedandwise’.Philbydidindeedconsidersuchacareerchange,butinsteadcontinuedonhispathofsecretdevastationatBroadway,facilitatedbythedisastrousdecisionofStewartMenziestoappointhimtoheadMI6’santi-communistespionagesection.‘C’s’protégérewardedhiminhisowninimitablefashion,byspendingmanyhoursatMI6’sStAlbansout-station,photographingthefilesofitsagentsforMoscow’sedification.Longafterwards,followingtheexposureofPhilby,BurgessandMaclean,andamidatidalwaveof

recriminationsagainsttheintelligencecommunityforadmittingsuchmentotheircouncils,HughTrevor-RoperreflecteduponboththeirrecruitmentanditscosttoBritishinterests:‘If[Philby]hadbeenturneddownasanex-communist,andneverafterwardsexposed,ourfashionableleft-wingerswouldhavedenouncedhisexclusion,justastheynowdenouncehisappointment,asaninfamousexampleofsocialandintellectualdiscrimination…Until1944IdonotbelievethatPhilbyhadmuchopportunity,ormuchneed,todoharm.HisworkwasagainsttheGermans,inSpain,whereRussiawaspowerlessand,bynow,uninterested.Hehadnoaccesstopoliticalsecrets.AnywaytheinterestoftheRussianswas,atthattime,thesameasours:thedefeatofGermany.’PhilbythenwrotefromhisMoscowrefuge,commentingonTrevor-Roper ’sremarks,andbitter

stricturesagainsthim:‘Inotethatyouabhortreason.SodoI.Butwhatistreason?WecouldspendmanydaysmotoringaroundIraqanddiscussingthiswithoutgettingmuchneareragreement.’Trevor-Roperresponded,‘“Whatistreason?”Yougailyask,and,likejestingPilate,donotwaitforanswer…Toserveaforeignpower,eventospyforaforeignpower,doesnotseemtome

necessarilytreason.Itdependsontheforeignpower,andtheconditionsofservice…Buttoserveunconditionally,toequatetruthwiththereasonofstateofanypower,thattomeistreasonofthemind;andtomakethissurrendertoaformofpowerthatiscynical,inhuman,murderous,thattomeistreasonoftheheartalso.’SomeofMoscowCentre’sofficersretaineddoubtstothebitterendabouttheloyaltiesofthe

Cambridgespies.ElenaModrzhinskayaattendedPhilby’s1988funeral,inordertoviewhisopencasket.ShewashauntedbysuspicionsthatevenindeaththeBritishtraitormightsomehowhaveachievedalastdeceit.WhateverthedefiantclaimsofPhilbyandhiskintohavetakenprideinservingMoscow,thealcoholismandprematuredecaywhichovertookallsaveBluntsuggestthattheyfoundlittlecontentmentintreason.OnPhilby’sarrivalinMoscowhewascrestfallentodiscoverthathelackedanyNKVDrank–nomereforeigninformantwasgrantedone.Trevor-RopersaidhebelievedthatPhilbyhadenjoyedhissupposedtriumphoverbourgeoiscapitalismlessthanhepretended:‘DidJudasenjoytheLastSupper?Idoubtit.’SirDickWhite,laterheadofbothMI5andMI6,wrotetoafriendaftertheCambridgespieswere

exposed:‘Onbalanceitwasnotsuchabadbettofightthewaronaunitedfront.ThecostwastohavehadBluntin[MI]5,Philbyin[MI]6andB[urgess]andM[aclean]intheF.O.OntheothersideoftheequationamassiveintakeofbrainandabilitiesfromtheUniversitieswhichsetentirelynewstandardsofintellectualachievement.’Thiswasanextremepost-factorationalisationofadisasterforthereputationofBritain’ssecretservices.YetWhitewasthusfarright:thatBritain’swareffort,nottomentionitsstandingasabastionoffreedom,wouldhavebeenmuchthepoorerhadeveryofficerwithaleft-winghistorybeenexcludedfromitsinnercouncils.HowmuchdamagedidthetraitorsdotoBritishinterests?Untilthelatewartimeyears,thelikely

answeris:notmuch.ForlongperiodsMoscowrefusedtobelievethattheBritishweresostupidastoallowavowedcommunists–albeitsupposedapostates–accesstotheirdeepestsecrets.ProbablythemostsignificantcontributionoftheCambridgeFive,andexplicitlyofDonaldMaclean,wastokeepStalininformedaboutBritishpoliticalanddiplomaticintentions;animmensevolumeofcabletrafficconcerning–forinstance–Anglo-AmericanweaponsandsupplydeliveriestotheUSSRwasalsopassedtoMoscow.TheRussians’defaultdiplomaticposturetowardstheWesternAlliesofstone-facedindignationsuccessfullyconcealedfromWashingtonandLondonthefactthat,atsummitmeetings,theSovietdelegationwasfullyinformedinadvanceofintendedBritishandAmericanpositions.Churchillespecially,whooftenawaitedapprehensivelyStalin’sresponsetounwelcomesurprises,especiallyaboutdelaystoD-Day,mighthavesparedhimselfdiscomfort.The‘surprises’werenothingofthesort:theSovietdictatormerelybrilliantlysimulatedamazement,thenunleashedangertoorder.ItwasimpossibleforChurchillandRoosevelttoplaypokerwiththeKremlin,becauseStalinknewtheirhands.Meanwhile,itisknownthatAnthonyBluntatMI5handledmanyJapanesePurpledecrypts,anditislikelythathegavesometotheRussians,evenifIzumiKozo’smaterialdid

notenablethemtobreakthecipherontheirownaccount.ApologistsfortheCambridgespiescitesomeoftheaboveindefenceoftheirmen.Philbyandthe

rest,theyargue,gaveaidnottoBritain’senemies,buttoitsforemostallyinthestruggleagainstNazism.Wasitnotshameful–acauseforrighteousangertopeopleofconscience,todayasinthe1940s–thatBritaindidsolittletoaidRussiainitsdesperatehour,andevendeniedMoscowaccesstoUltra,theforemostweaponinChurchill’shands?ThefirstanswertosuchadefenceisthatthetraitorsprovidedinformationtoMoscowlongbeforeRussiabecameanally,indeedwhiletheSovietUnionwascoupledtoNaziGermany,fromAugust1939toJune1941,aperiodthatembracedsuchtriumphsforMoscowCentreastheKatynmassacres.Evenafter‘Barbarossa’,whenBritain,RussiaandlatertheUSwerejoinedinthestruggleagainstHitler,StalinneverwaveredinhisperceptionoftheWesternAlliesasultimatefoes.ThetreacheryofPhilbyandhisfriendslatercostthelivesofmanygoodmenandwomen,executedforthemerecrimeofresistingtyranny.Meanwhile,BletchleyParkwasthemostsecretorganofBritishwar-making.Thedangerwas

enormousthatonceitsdoingswereknowninMoscow,aleak–perhapsthroughacompromisedRussiancode–wouldalerttheGermanstoEnigma’svulnerability.ThefactthatthisdidnothappeninnowayexcusestheconductofthosewhorevealedtheUltrasecrettotheKremlin.TheRussianswerecareless,orworse,withthesecretsofothers;itshouldberememberedthat,whileStalinwasstillHitler ’sfriend,theSovietambassadorinWashingtontoldhisGermancounterpartthattheJapanesePurplecipherwasbroken.ThemostthatcanbesaidaboutPhilbyandhiskinisthatitwasfortunateallofBritain’ssignificantwartimetraitorsgavetheirallegiancetotheSovietUnion,theloomingmenacetofreedomanddemocracy,ratherthantoNaziGermany,itspresentdanger.

2 AMERICANTRAITORS

TheUnitedStatesisatempleoffreedom,andthusalsoofindiscretion.EvenafterPearlHarbor,Americansfoundithardtoadjusttotheimperativesofsecurity,toshakeoffhabitsacquiredovercenturies.Operationalpilotsgossipedovervoicelinks;politiciansandserviceofficersdiscussedplansovercocktails;newspapermenandbroadcasterschafedagainstcensorship,andpublishedinformationofvaluetotheenemy–mostnotoriouslytheChicagoTribune’s1942revelation,reprisedbyWalterWinchell,thatUStriumphatMidwayhadbeengainedbybreakingJapanesecodes–whenevertheythoughttheycouldgetawaywithit.Theeasternseaboard’sblazingilluminations,whichpersistedforweeksafterthe‘DayofInfamy’,muchtotheadvantageofU-boatcaptainswhosankscoresofmerchantmensilhouettedagainsttheirglare,weresymbolicofmuchelsethatmightbemagnificent,butwasalsoperilous,inanationatwar.FortunatelyfortheAlliedstruggleagainsttheAxis,GermanspieswholandedonUSsoilwere

roundedupwithlittledifficultybypoliceandtheFBI.TheJapaneseenjoyedaslittlesuccess

intelligence-gatheringinAmericaastheydidnearerhome.TheSovietUnion,however,exploitedtheopensocietytosponsorespionageinsidetheUnitedStatesonascaleunmatchedbyanyothernation.The1950sallegationsofSenatorJosephMcCarthy,whopromotedawitch-huntinaclimateofhysteriaandparanoia,wereunfoundedagainstmanyindividuals,buthadsubstanceinthegenerality.HundredsofAmericansofleft-wingsympathies,andasmallernumberwhoworkedforcash,systematicallybetrayedtheircountry’ssecretstoMoscow.Theatomictraitors,tobediscussedlater,havebeenthefocusofmuchhistoricalattention,whiletheRussians’hostofotherwartimeinformantshavereceivedlessnoticethantheydeserve.NKVDandGRUsourcesinWashingtonwereprivytosomeofthenation’smostsensitivepolicydebates.Untilthepost-warera,theFBIhadnegligiblesuccessinidentifyingAmericantraitors,andtheguilt

orinnocenceofsomehigh-profilesuspectsremainsunproventothisday.Asearlyas15July1941aStateDepartmentofficialwrote:‘AmpleevidenceexiststhatAmericancommunistsaretakingadvantageofthepresentsituationtoattempttoingratiatethemselvesinhighgovernmentcirclesasadvocatesofdemocracyundertheguiseofadvocatingall-outaidtotheSovietUnion.’FBIattention,however,focusedmorecloselyontheUSCommunistPartythanonSovietagent-runners.TherearesheavesofreportsintheWashingtonarchivesconcerningAmericancommunistsympathisers,butuntilthelater1940stheFBI’ssurveillancetargetswerealmostallpeopleatthelowerendofsociety–dockworkers,tradesunionactivistsandsuchlike.TheFBIbreathedheavilyuponsuchbodiesastheNationalCouncilofSoviet–AmericanFriendshipandEastEuropeanexpatriateandnationalistgroups.ItheldabulgingfileontheNationalMaritimeUnion’sallegedsubversiveactivities.IthadonesuccessagainsttheSovietUnioninApril1941,whenitsecuredtherecalloftheNKVD’sNewYorkstationchiefafterFBIagentsarrestedhimatameetingwithaninformant,butthiswasthetipofahugeiceberg,invisibletoJ.EdgarHoover.ThewartimeFBIclaimedknowledgeofjustfiveAmericancitizensspyingforRussia,while

subsequentrevelationsandconfessionsidentifiedatleastanothereighty.The1948VenonadecryptsprovidedcodenamesfortwohundredRussiansourcesintheUS,ofwhomhalfremainunidentifiedinthetwenty-firstcentury.SincetheVenonamaterialcoveredonlyapartofMoscow’soperations,itisreasonabletoassumethatinthe1930sand1940sthereweremanymoreAmericantraitors,aviewsupportedbythememoirsofcontemporaryNKVDandGRUofficerswhoservedintheUS.IntheFBI’sdefence,Hoovercouldpleadthatthenation’sdeclaredenemies–Germany,Italyand

Japan–enjoyednosignificantespionagesuccesswithinthecontinentalUnitedStates.AfterJune1941theRussianswereAmerica’sprofessedalliesratherthanfoes,andPresidentRoosevelthimselftreatedthemwithtrustandrespect.ApologistsfortheBureau’sfailureagainsttheNKVDmightsaythatthismerelyreflectedawidernaïveté,extendingtothesummitofUSgovernment,aboutthescaleofthemenaceposedbytheSovietUnion.TheFBIalsofacedsomeofthesameproblemsasdidAbwehrandGestapomenhuntingtheRedOrchestra:mostofthesignificantplayersinhabitedupper-

middle-classsocialandprofessionalcircles,wherelawenforcementagencieswereunaccustomedtotread.Aselsewhereintheworld,theNKVD’sAmericanoperationsbecamealmostmoribundbetween

1939and1941,andmostofitsUSsourcesbecameperforcesleepers.ThefirstattempttoreactivatenetworksfailedwhenArnoldDeutsch,rehabilitatedanddispatchedtobecomeUSstationchief,appearstohavedrownedwhenhisshipwassunkinmid-Atlantic.InDecember1941,ItzhakAkhmerovwasappointedinhisstead.HehadservedintheUSsincearrivingtherein1934undercoverasastudent,andashetoldanaudienceofKGBtraineestwentyyearslater,‘switchingfromthestatusofaforeignstudenttothestatusofanAmericaninsuchalargecityasNewYorkwasnotdifficult’.AfteratimehemovedtoBaltimore,whichwashandierformanaginghisWashingtonsources.HeandanotherNKVDofficersettleddowntorunafurrier ’sshop,whichprovedsuccessfulinitsownright,turningagoodprofitaswellasprovidingcover;buthehadindifferentsuccessrecruitingnewinformants,arolethatothersfilledbetter.TheNKVD’sthreeacknowledgedstations–attheSoviets’AMTORGtradeorganisationinNew

York,theWashingtonembassyandtheSanFranciscoconsulate–wereeachmannedbythirteenintelligenceofficers,supportedbyothersatsub-stationsinLosAngeles,Portland,Seattleandelsewhere.ScoresmoreagentsworkedundercoverofSovietfrontorganisations–theTASSnewsagency,Sovfilmexport,theRussianRedCrossandsuchlike;someAmericanmaterialwasalsochannelledthroughtheNKVD’sMexicoCitystation.ItmightbesupposedthatSovietspies,arrivingfromthemostrepressiveandausteresocietyonearthattheirusualfirstportofcall,NewYorkCity’sTafthotel,wouldbedazzledbyAmericanwealth,glitz,glamour,inexhaustibleenergy.Yetremarkablyfew‘wentprivate’–defected–andeventhosewhowrotememoirslongaftertheTerrorendedsaylittleornothinginpraiseoftheUS.MostseemtohavelivedandworkedinagreycocoonofRussiannessandsocialistrectitude.Sovietespionagewasoftenafamilybusiness.WhenAlexanderFeklisovleftMoscowforanNKVD

postinginNewYork,hehadthecustomaryfarewellmeetingwithforeignministerMolotov,whoexpresseddismaythathewasabachelor:‘Wedon’tsendsinglemenabroad,especiallytotheUSA.Theywillimmediatelyfoistabeautifulblondeorbrunetteonyou,andahoneytrapwillbeready.’Feklisov’sbossreassuredMolotovthatthereweresomegoodRussiangirlsservingatSovietinstitutionsinNewYork,andabridecouldbefoundamongthemforthenoviceagent.In1944thedutifulFeklisovindeedmarriedaRussianstudentsenttostudyatColumbia.ItzhakAkhmerovdidwedanAmerican–butshewasHelenLowry,nieceofUSCommunistParty

leaderEarlBrowder.WhenVasilyZarubin,freshfromparticipationintheKatynmassacresof25,000Poles,leftMoscowtobecomeWashingtonstationchiefinDecember1941,hetookwithhimhiswifeElizabeth,herselfanNKVDcaptain,whoplayedanimportantroleasrecruiterforherhusband’snetwork,andwhooftentravelledtoCaliforniatomeetRobertOppenheimerandotherusefulcontacts.

Shepassedeasilyasasophisticated,cosmopolitanEuropeanwoman,equallyfluentinEnglish,German,FrenchandHebrew.Shecamefromafamilyofrevolutionaries,andwasoneofCentre’smostruthlessoperatives.HavingcutherteethworkingasacaseofficerfortheterribleFelixDzerzhinskyaftertheRevolution,shewaspostedtoTurkey.ThereshegaveimpressiveproofofloyaltytoBolshevismbybetrayingherthenhusband,YakovBlumkin,anotherSovietagent.HehadbeenentrustedwiththesaleofMoscow’sHasidicLibrary,andrashlygavesomeoftheproceedstoTrotsky,whowasthenexiledinTurkey.AlmostbeforetheechooftheshotsfromBlumkin’sfiringsquadhaddiedaway,hiswidowmarriedZarubin.ForthirteenyearsthereafterthetwotravelledandspiedtogetheracrossEurope.InAmerica,ElizabethplayedherrolesoskilfullythattheFBIidentifiedherasacareerintelligenceofficeronlyin1946,afterherreturntoMoscow.SheandherhusbandmeanwhileplayedapivotalroleinCentre’sglobalespionageprogramme.BeforeOctober1941,StalinhadtakenlittlepersonalinterestintheUS–thoughalwayseagertostealitstechnology–becausetherewasnodirectclashbetweenSovietandAmericaninterests.Now,however,itspoliciesbecameatoppriority:StalinmetpersonallywithZarubinbeforehedepartedforhisAmericanposting,tourgeitsimportance.ThenewNKVDresidentwasforty-sevenwhenhearrivedinNewYork.HissubordinateAlexander

Feklisov,whoidolisedZarubinasagiantamongSovietspies,describedhimthus:‘Hewasofmediumheight,slightlyoverweight,withthinfairhairwhichhebrushedback.Heworeglassesinawhitemetalframe,andhiseyeswereforeverinflamedfromoverwork.Hewasimmenselystrong,verygoodattennis,fulloflifeandanobviousleaderinanycompany.Helovedsingingandplayedseveralmusicalinstruments…Hespokequicklyandhisvoicewassomehowtrumpet-like,thoughhewasalsoagoodlistener,easyandfriendlywithsubordinates.Hedemandedtheyshouldshowinitiative,boldness,evenrecklessness.Hederivedhisstrengthfromhisimmenseexperienceandprofessionalism,thoughhecouldsometimesbeindiscreet.Hehadallkindofconnectionsamongforeigners,andwasagreatrecruiter.Hehandledourmostimportantagentspersonally.’FeklisovomittedtomentionthatZarubin,asecretservantoftheSovietstatesince1925,wasalsoaruthlesskiller,thoughthisdidnotsparehimfromhimselfoncefeelingthewarmthoftheexecutioner ’sbreath.AtameetingBeriainvitedhimtostand,thensaid,‘TellusaboutyourlinkstotheFascistintelligenceservices.’Zarubinsternlyrejectedtheslander–andsufferednoconsequences.Butthosewhowitnessedthescenelefttheroomtrembling.ZarubindominatedSovietespionageintheUnitedStatesuntilhisexpulsionin1944.IntheUSasinBritain,theCominternprovidedafigleaftospareinformantsfromthediscomfort

ofacknowledgingthattheyweregivingsecretstoaforeignpower.Thoseinvolved,saidtheIowan-bornMarxistwriterJosephineHerbst,‘tookgreatprideintheirsenseofconspiracy’.AmongearlyrecruitswasHaroldWare,aradicalNewDealerintheAgricultureDepartment,killedina1935carcrash.AttheStateDepartmenttheGRUsecuredtheservicesofAlgerHiss,whiletheNKVDfromthe

mid-1930sreceivedasteadystreamofinformationfromNoelFieldandLaurenceDuggan.Thelatterwasapoliticalromantic,muchinfluencedbyhisformidablewifeHelenBoyd,whomaRussiandescribedas‘anextraordinarilybeautifulwoman:atypicalAmerican,tall,blonde,reserved,well-read,goesinforsports,independent’.HeddaGumpertz,aGermanexileandpassionateanti-NaziworkingfortheNKVD,hadcultivatedDugganasafriendofField.DugganwasoncehandedabirthdaypresentbyhisSoviethandler:amonogrammedcrocodiletoiletriescase.HerejecteditinthesamespiritthatsomeoftheBritishtraitorsdeclinedmoney,‘statingthathewasworkingforourcommonideasandmakingitunderstoodthathewasnothelpingusforanymaterialinterest’.TheRussiansprofitedfromthinkinglong.SincetheSovietUnionsawitselfinahistoric

adversarialrelationshiptotheWesternPowers,itsrulerswerecontentforagentstospendyearsintrainingandorientationfortheirroles.SemyonSemyonov,forinstance,wasashort,stockyfigurewithaducknoseandbigeyes,whorubbedalongeasilywithpeopleandcouldpassforamiddle-rankcorporateexecutive.InJanuary1938,agedtwenty-six,hewassentatMoscow’sexpensetodoadvancedstudiesattheMassachusettsInstituteofTechnology–theNKVDintendedhimtobecomeascientific-technologicalintelligenceofficer.AtMITtherewerecomplaintsthatSemyonovwaslazyandconceited,butheprovedanadeptwhenhestartedhiscareerasanagent.By1943hewasrunningtwenty-eightAmericansources,elevenofwhomprovidedmaterialonchemistryandbacteriology,sixonradio,fiveonaviation.Amongthemorenotablewasthirty-three-year-oldHarryGold,borninSwitzerlandtoRussianrefugeeparents.GoldcametoAmericaasaninfant,andstartedspyingfortheSovietsinhisfirstjob,wherehestoleadry-iceprocessthatstoppedicecreammelting.In1942heabandonedhisdayjobasachemisttomanagehisownagent-runningoperation,meetingSemyonovonceaweektoarrangeassignments.CentrewasuneasythatsomanyofitskeyWashingtonsourceskneweachother,mostlythrough

linkstoleft-winggroups,butcoulddolittleaboutit.OnemanwhomighthaveexposedtheextentofitspenetrationintheUSwasIgnatzReiss,anNKVDofficerwhoquitandfledforhislifeduringthePurges.Hisemployerscaughtupwithhim,however,inaLausannerestauranton4September1937.Hewasshotnearby,hisbodydumpedbytheroadside.Thisprovedausefulexecution,forotherspieswhoconsideredwithdrawingtheirservicestendedtodroptheideawhentheyrememberedReiss’swell-publicisedfate.MaybetheyalsoknewaboutJulietPoyntz,anAmericaninformantwhodecidedtoleavetheSoviets’employ,butinsteadvanishedfromtheNewYorkWomen’sClubon3June1937andalsoappearstohavebeenliquidated.ThoughsomeAmericanleftists’faithinthesocialistdreamwasshakenbytheNazi–SovietPact,it

wasrenewedinfullmeasureby‘Barbarossa’,whichthrewuponRussiathechiefburdenofdefeatingHitler.WhenAlfredSlack,aninformantworkingatEastmanKodak,wasoffereda$150bonusforanunusuallyusefulpieceofinformation,hetoldhishandlertosendthemoneytoMoscowforthe‘JosephStalintankcolumn’,apopularfundofthetime.SemyonSemyonov,theagentinquestion,

solemnlygaveSlackareceipt,tokeepalivetheflameofhisillusions.Others,however,shamelesslysoldsecretsforthemoney.Semyonovlikedtotellthestoryofan

AmericanchemistatDuPontwhopassedtheRussiansmaterialonnylonandexplosives,withoutanypretenceofideologicalmotive.‘Democrats,Republicans,fascists,communists,theyareallthesametome,’themansaid.‘ImeetyoubecauseIneedcash.Ineedtobuildahouse,educatemydaughter,dresshernicelyandmakesureshemarrieswell.’AteveryrendezvoustherewasprotractedhagglingbetweentheRussianandtheAmericanaboutthevalueofhiswares,whichcustomarilystartedwiththesellerdemanding$1,000,thentakinghometwoorthreehundred,togetherwithaburningindignation.SemyonovtoldhiscolleagueAlexanderFeklisovthathealwaysfeltexhaustedaftermeeting‘Hustler ’,astheDuPontmanwascodenamed.IttooktheRussianhourstorecoverhissangfroid,ashedebatedwhethertheangryAmericanwouldseehimagain.Feklisovasked,‘Whynotpaytheguymore?’Semyonovanswered,‘Becauseifhebuyshishouseandsavesenoughmoney,hewillstopworkingforus.’Asitwas,theirexchangescontinuedforyears.BycontrastLaurenceDugganoftheStateDepartment,whowashandledbyItzhakAkhmerov,did

thebusinessforlove.InOctober1939,State’ssecurityofficerswarnedhimthathisloyaltywasbeingquestioned,buttheyhadnoinklingofthemagnitudeofhistreachery,andafteracursoryinvestigationhewasallowedtokeephisjob,becomingapersonaladviseronLatinAmericatoCordellHull.InJuly1944DugganresignedfromStateandjoinedtheUNreliefagencyUNRRA.Fouryearslater,afterbeingquestionedbytheFBIhejumpedfromthesixteenthfloorofhisofficebuilding,buteventhentheauthoritieswereobliviousoftheimportanceofhisNKVDrole,revealedonlybythe1990openingofaMoscowarchive.ArthurSchlesinger,whoknewandlikedDuggan,wrotelongafter:‘OnewonderswhatimpulsesofidealismmayhaveinextricablyentangledthisdecentmanwiththeharshmachinationsofStalinisttyranny.’SomeofthosewhospiedforMoscowremainedunidentified.‘C-11’,awomansourceintheNavyDepartment,ceasedprovidinginformationinthesummerof1940,whenthreatenedwithexposure.AnotherAmericanwoman,codenamed‘Zero’,whoworkedforaSenatecommitteeandpassedonreportsfromtheUScommercialattachéinBerlin,soughtworkintheStateDepartmentbutwasrejected,partlybecauseitwasreluctanttoemployJews.ShenonethelesssecuredtranscriptsofCordellHull’sconversationswithforeignambassadors.TheSovietsalsohadplentyofdudsontheirpayroll.MarthaDodd,daughterofAmerica’s1933–38

Berlinambassador,wasrecruitedbytheNKVD’sBorisVinogradov,withwhomshefelldesperatelyinlove.EvenbySovietstandards,Centre’smanipulationoftheirrelationshiptouchedextremes:hoursbeforehisexecutionduringthePurges,VinogradovwaspersuadedtowritealettertoDodd,urginghertokeepspyinginexpectationofbeingreunitedwithhim.Hisdeathwasconcealedfromher,andshesustainedcontactwithherhandlersthroughthewaryears.AnNKVDreportassertedcontemptuously:‘SheconsidersherselfaCommunistandclaimstoaccepttheParty’sprogram.In

reality,however,“Liza”isatypicalrepresentativeofAmericanBohemia,asexuallydecayedwomanreadytosleepwithanyhandsomeman.’MoscowwasinexceptionallycredulousmoodwhenitgaveDodd’sbrotherWilliam$3,000tohelphimbuyasmallnewspaper,theBlueRidgeHerald.By1945hewasworkingintheNewYorkofficeoftheTASSnewsagency,runbytheNKVDstationchief,andwasunderunsurprisinglycloseFBIsurveillance.MoscowgainednothingfromtheDoddsaftertheirfatherlefttheBerlinembassy.MichaelStraightwasanotherRussianfailure,arichyoungAmericanrecruitedbytheNKVD’s

LondonstationchiefTheodoreMaly,supposedlyactingfortheComintern.Hissubsequenthandler,ArnoldDeutsch,dismissedStraightasadilettantewithmoremoneythansense,whooncewroteachequefor£500tohelpfundthecommunistnewspapertheDailyWorker.Ontheyoungidealist’sreturntotheUS,hesecuredajobwiththeStateDepartment.WhentheNKVD’sWashingtonstationexpressedscepticismabouthisvalue,MoscowCentrecautionedsternly:‘Straightisprospectivelyabigagent,andburninghim…isnotourintention.’TheNazi–SovietPactcausedStraighttoresignfromtheStateDepartment–andfromtheNKVD.Henever,however,revealedtheknowledgehehadacquiredinLondonaboutthetreacheryofBluntandBurgess.TheRussians,cynicallyandperhapscorrectly,believedthatthiswasnotoutofloyaltytotherenegades,butbecausethefateofIgnatzReissshowedwhathappenedtothosewhobetrayedCentreoritsagents.SincetheUnitedStatesisanationofimmigrants,itwasimpossibletomonitorahostofsuch

citizensasBorisMorros,borninStPetersburgin1891,whobecameaminor-leagueHollywooddirector-producer.TheNKVDrecruitedhimin1934,chieflytoprovidecoverforotheragentsratherthanasasourceofinformation.MorroshadthreebrothersstillintheSovietUnion:onewasexecutedafterincurringthedispleasureoftheParty,buthisownNKVDroleenabledhimtosavethelivesoftheothertwo.In1944VasilyZarubindroveMorrostomeetMarthaDoddandherrichhusbandAlfredStern,whomhepersuadedtoinvest$130,000intheproducer ’smusicpublishingbusiness.ThisnotonlyprovedapoorinvestmentforStern,butalsoawasteofeffortfortheNKVD,whogotlittleornothingofvaluefromMorrosbeforehewasbelatedly‘turned’bytheFBIin1945.Likewise‘Leo’,afreelancejournalist,provedaconmanwhoinventedintelligenceforcash,asdidNewYorkcongressmanSamuelDickstein,bornaLithuanianandcontemptuouslycodenamed‘Crook’,whononethelessreceived$12,000ofSovietfundsbeforeMoscowdecidedhewasnotworthanymoremoney.TheonlysignificantserviceDicksteinperformedwastosecureaUSpassportforanAustrianNKVDagent.Hediedin1954,agedseventy,ajusticeoftheNewYorkSupremeCourtwhoseworkfortheSovietswasunrevealed.Moscowwasasvulnerabletosuchunrewardingsourcesaseveryotherintelligenceservice,butit

couldalsoboastsuperbones.AlgerHissoftheStateDepartment,recruitedbytheGRUin1935,wasbornin1904intoaprominentBaltimorefamily.Hesufferedachildhoodtragedywhenhisfathercommittedsuicide,butbecameabrilliantstudentatJohnsHopkinsandHarvardLawSchool.His

wife,NewYorkwriterPriscillaFansler,wasaneageraccompliceinhisespionageactivities.InAugust1939HisswasdenouncedtoassistantsecretaryofstateAdolphBerlebyWhittakerChambers,aformerfellow-comrade.Thespynonethelesskepthisnerve,andhisjob.TheComintern’sresidenthitmanOttoKatzexploredthemeritsofkillingChambers,andwasdeflectedonlybytheintendedvictim’swarningthathehadconcealeddocumentswhichwouldcriticallydamageSovietinterestsintheUSifanythinghappenedtohim.In1941,bothHiss’sfriendDeanAchesonandhismentorFelixFrankfurterassuredtheyoungmantheyhadcompletefaithinhim.SuchwasthereluctancetobelieveillofthisbrilliantdiplomatthatheroseonwardandupwardintheStateDepartment,servingwiththeUSdelegationatthe1945Yaltaconference.BeforeeverymajorAlliedsummitofthewar,theNKVDbriefedtheSovietpolitburoaboutthe

membersoftheAmericanandBritishdelegationsand–inPavelSudoplatov’ssmugwords–‘indicatedwhethertheywereunderourcontrolasagents’.Thiswasagrossimplicitexaggeration:onlythreeorfourseniorAmericanandBritishdiplomatswereSovietsources.Butitwasindisputablytruethat,thankstoStalin’swellwishersinWashingtonandLondon,heenteredeverysummitcomprehensivelyinformedaboutthepolicypositionsofhisfellow-warlords.IfthishelpedlittletowardsachievingvictoryovertheAxis,itcontributedsignificantlytosecuringRussia’sobjectivesinthepost-warsettlement.SudoplatovbelievedthatwhenHissbriefedtheRussians,hewasactingatthebehestofRoosevelt’s

aideHarryHopkins.HopkinscertainlyprovidedimportantinformationtoMoscow.HewarnedtheSovietembassythattheFBIhadbuggedameetingatwhichanNKVDofficerpassedcashtoanAmericancommunist.HealmostcertainlybriefedCentre’sagentsaboutthesubstanceoftheRoosevelt–Churchillbilateralsummits,andprobablyaboutmuchmore.Thisshouldnotimply,however,thattheprominentNewDealerwasconsciouslybetrayingAmerica’ssecretstoanenemy;rather,hewascommittedtoseekingaworkingcollaborationbetweentheUSandtheSovietUnion.Hethought,asdidhismasterFranklinRoosevelt,thataparadeoftrustwasanimportanttooltowardsachievingthis.Hopkinssaidwithoutembarrassment:‘SinceRussiaisthedecisivefactorinthewarshemustbegiveneveryassistanceandeveryeffortmustbemadetoobtainherfriendship.’TherelativelyconfidingattitudeofhimselfandsomeotherprominentadministrationfigurestowardstheRussianshelpedtomakesubordinatesfeeljustifiedingoingmuchfurther,betrayingundoubtedsecrets.Russian-bornWilliamWeisband,aknownpost-warSovietsource,servedinwartimeUSArmy

signalsintelligence,latterlyatArlingtonHall,andisbelievedtohavepassedinformationfromanearlystage.TheOSSwasawashwithMoscowinformants.KarlMarzaniworkedinthegraphicsdepartment,JuliusJosephintheFarEastsection.OtherstaffersservingtwomastersincludedBellaJoseph,DonaldWheeler,JaneZlatowsky,HorstBerensprung,HelenTennei,GeorgeWuchinich,LeonardMintz.TheNKVD’sOSSinformantsprovidedfarmorematerialthanCentre’sfive-manUS

deskcouldtranslate.TheLatinAmericandivisionwasheadedbyaformerUniversityofOklahomaprofessornamedMauriceHalperin,whokeptacopyoftheDailyWorkerconspicuouslyonhisdesk,submittedreportsinstrictaccordancewiththeParty’sline,andworkedtirelesslytopromoteitsinterestsinthecountrieswithinhissphere.Hewaslesssuccessful,however,inwinningplauditsfromCentre,whothoughtlittleofhismaterial.FranzNeumann,aneconomistintheGermansection,receivedhighermarksforpassingonavoluminousAmericanstudyoftheSovieteconomy.NoelField,whoprovidedsomeassistancetoAllenDullesinBernwhileEuropewasoccupied,in1945soughttopromoteaPartyagendathroughOSS.ArthurSchlesingerwrote:‘FieldwasaQuakerCommunist,filledwithidealism,smugnessandsacrifice.Whatstruckmemostwashisself-righteousevasiveness…HesoughtnothingmorethanalifeofpiousdevotionontheothersideoftheIronCurtain.’JuliusJosephandhiswifeBellabecameprimeMoscowsourcesonUSpolicytowardsChina,

JapanandKorea.Evenfollowingthecouple’sacrimoniousdivorce,sostrongwasherloyaltytotheSovietsthatshedidnotexposeJulius.DonaldWheeler ’sNKVDhandlerwrotethat‘hetreatshisOSScolleaguesverycritically,andconsidersallempty-headed’.Wheelertookprideinhisowncontemptfortheriskofexposure,saying,‘Itmakesnosensetobeafraid:amandiesonlyonce.’HepassedtotheSovietsallOSSanalyticalmaterialonGermany,and–farmoredangerously–identifiedDonovan’sagentsinEurope,includingsomewhowereoperatingundercover.AftertheGermandefeat,WheelerfingeredaUSAirborneofficerwhowasengagedonasecretmissionintheSovietZoneofoccupation,toreportontheRussians’removalsofindustrialplant.ArthurSchlesingersaid:‘DonovanknewaboutsomeOSScommunistsbutnotperhapsabout

others.’Thegeneralshrugged:‘I’dputStalinontheOSSpayroll,ifIthoughtitwouldhelpusdefeatHitler.’ItisnonethelesshardtobelievehewasawarethathisownpersonalassistantwasaSovietinformant.DuncanLeeprovidedastreamofstrategicinsights,thoughtheUSgovernmentwouldhavegivensomeofthesetotheRussiansthroughopenchannels,forexampleLee’sMarch1944warningthatD-DayhadbeendelayeduntilJune.HedidbetterserviceforCentrebywarningitsagentsaboutsecurityprobes,includingoneonDonaldWheeler.Latein1944Leestartedaloveaffairwithhisex-NKVDcourierMaryWolfePrice,secretarytothegreatjournalistWalterLippmannandthusherselfaconduitformanyprivilegedconfidences.ThisthoroughlyannoyedCentre,becauseitshiftedhispriorities.On3February1945theNKVD’sJosephKatzreportedtoMoscow:‘SawLeelastnight.Afterbeatinghischestaboutwhatacowardheis,howsorryhefeelsaboutit,etc.,hetoldmehemuststicktohisdecisiontoquit…Inmyopinionthereisnosenseinusinghim.Heistotallyfrightenedanddepressed.Hesuffersfromnightmareswhereheseeshisnameonlists.’KatzhadtwomoremeetingswithLee,whosenervesweresoshreddedthathishandsshook.TheywouldhaveshakenevenmorehadheknownthathisSovietvisitor–nottobeconfusedwithhisnamesakeOtto,alsoakiller–hadpersonallyliquidatedseveralinformantswhoseloyaltywassuspect.Lee,however,

wasallowedtosurvive.InApril1945theNKVDsimplybrokeoffcontactwithhim.

On25November1943,afifty-four-year-oldRussianJewnamedJacobGolosdiedofaheartattackinhisNewYorkapartment.Thiscausedpassionategrieftohisloveroffiveyears’standing,ElizabethBentley–andtoMoscowCentre,whoseforemostAmericannetwork-runnerhethenwas.GoloshadfledhishomelandasaBolshevikbackin1910,joinedtheUSCommunistParty,thengonehometosharetheheadyjoysofRevolution.Later,however,heabandonedawifeandsonintheSovietUniontoreturntoAmericaasanintelligenceofficer.HebecameaUScitizen,andin1938tookupwithBentley,astrappingthirty-year-oldex-Vassargirlwithaweaknessforleft-wingcausesandunusualforeignmen.Goloswasbusytrainingherintheartsofintelligenceworkwhenhehimselfwasarrestedasaspy–hardlysurprising,sincehewasaclosefriendofPartyleaderEarlBrowder.Butheescapedwithashortsentence,and–amazingly–feltabletoresumehisactivities.GolosrecruitedhisfriendNathanSilvermaster,aveterancommunistwhobecameMoscow’smost

importantAmericanconnection,andinturnsecuredtheservicesofHarryDexterWhite–‘Lawyer ’–andotherkeyWashingtonsources.JuliusRosenberg,muchlatersenttotheelectricchair,firstgaveinformationtoGolos.CedricBelfrage,aBritishjournalistworkingforSirWilliamStephensoninNewYork,wasanotherusefulcontact.JosephGregg,anofficialwhomovedtotheStateDepartmentin1944,providedinformationabouttheUSArmyandNavy,andalsoforwardedFBIreportsoncommunistactivityinCentralandSouthAmerica.Asignificantnumberofthenetwork’sinformantshaveneverbeenidentified.In1943acommunistcodenamed‘Buck’andworkinginUNRRA,whoreportedfirsttoGolosthentoSilvermaster,passedonasixty-five-pagereportontheUSmachineryindustry,theninlateJune1945providedanagendaforUSpositionsatPotsdam.‘Arena’hadaccesstoinformationfromthePentagon’smilitaryintelligencedepartment,wherehiswifeworked.From1940onwards,GoloswasobligedtosubjecthimselftotheForeignAgentsRegistrationAct,

andsoonthereaftertoFBIsurveillance.NoneofthisinhibitedhiminsustaininghisNKVDcareer,usingElizabethBentley–‘Umnitsa’–tomakehiscontacts.Hisemployerswerehighlynervousabouthim,however,andmaderepeatedattemptstopersuadehimtoreturnhome,verylikelyforexecution.Golosnotmerelyrefusedthesedemands,shruggingthathecouldnotgetapassport,butmadesureCentreknewthathehadtakenout,orratherhidden,alifeinsurancepolicy:asealedenvelopecontainingdetailsofMoscow’soperationsintheUS.TheSovietswereequallyunsuccessfulinpersuadinghimtoturnoverhissourcestootherUSNKVDstations.GolostoldBentleythatnootherRussianintheUSunderstoodAmericansashedid.ThenheheardthatbackhomehissonhadjoinedtheRedArmy,andtalkedofwantingtojoinhim.HetooktheconsiderableriskoftravellingtoWashingtontomeetVasilyZarubin,towhomhecomplainedbitterlyaboutbeingaskedtotransferhissources.Then,suddenly,hewasdead.Amidsthergrief,ElizabethBentleyremainedcoolenoughtodestroy

thesealedenvelopeinasafedeposit,whichcontainedthesecretswithwhichGoloshadshieldedhimselfagainstavisitfromMoscow’sexecutioners.ItzhakAkhmerovassumedresponsibilityforhandlingher,andassuredCentrethatBentley,whomheliked,was‘onehundredpercentourwoman’.ButMoscowremaineduneasy,especiallyasheralcoholconsumptionrose.Sheshowedgrowingsignsofstrain,andwailedthatsheneededamaninherlife.Eventually,underpressurefromAkhmerov,sheturnedovertohimNathanSilvermasterandthushisgroup.SilvermasterwasborninOdessain1898,emigratedtotheWestCoastin1914,andwasforyears

anactiveUSCommunistPartymemberbeforetakingajobattheUSTreasury.There,inMoscow’sinterestsheforgedlinkswithastringoffellow-sympathisers,someofwhombecameblack-comicallymuddledabouttheirallegiances.FrankCoe,forinstance,complainedthathisworkloadasaSovietagentwashamperinghiscareerattheTreasury.Silvermaster ’ssourcesproducedmaterialfromalloverWashington.Therewasdataonmilitary-equipmentprocurementprogrammesandtheviewsofpolicy-makers,whichprobablycamefromHarryDexterWhite,asenioreconomistattheTreasury.June1941broughtreportsontheWehrmachtfromtheofficeoftheUSmilitaryattachéinLondon.Moscowlearnedon5Augustthatata31JulyWashingtonlunch,navysecretaryFrankKnoxbetagainstMorgenthauoftheTreasurythatHitlerwouldhaveMoscowandLeningradinsideamonth.HarryHopkins’sreporttotheWhiteHouseonhissummer1941visittoMoscowwasalsopassedtoCentre,togetherwithanoteontheUScabinet’sdiscussionofAverellHarriman’smissiontotheSovietUnion.Intriguingthoughallthisgossipwas–andStalinhimselfreadsomeoftheSilvermastermaterial–

theNKVDwantedmore.In1942theWashingtonstationwastoldtobriefitsmantodiscoverwhethertheUSwasfulfillingitsLend-Leasepromises,andifnottoidentifythosemembersoftheadministrationwhoblockedprogress.WhatwereAmericanintentionsaboutopeningasecondfront?Whatweretheadministration’sviewsaboutpost-warfrontiers,especiallythoseoftheSovietUnion?Wasthereanyevidenceoffifth-columnsabotageintheUS?Centrealsosoughtmoredetailonpolicydiscussions.ItshighestprioritywastopenetratetheWhiteHouseandtosecureinformationfromHopkinsandMorgenthau,becauseoftheirintimacywiththepresident.Meanwhile,CentrewasreceivinggovernmentmaterialfromRobertMiller,CharlesFlato,Harold

Glasser,VictorPerlo,CharlesKramer,JohnAbt.HarryMagdoff,astatisticianattheDepartmentofWarProduction,deliveredastreamofdataonweaponsoutput.ItissurprisingthatMoscowdidnotrunoutofcodenamesforitsAmericansources;thereweresomanythatitbecamenotunusualforthemtorunintoeachotherinthecourseoftheirofficialduties,sometimeswithknowledgeofshareddisloyalties.Field,DugganandStraightcrossedpaths.AccrediteddiplomatandcovertNKVDhandlerAnatolyGorskyfoundhimselfintheUSTreasuryDepartmentonedayinDecember1944,toreceiveatrivialbriefingaboutGermanpostagestamps.HewasdirectedfirsttotheofficeofHarryDexterWhite,andthen–inWhite’sabsence–tothatofHaroldGlasser.BothmenwereSovietagents:White

protectedGlasserfromasecurityinquiryabouthiscommunistlinks,thoughthetwomen’spersonalrelationshipbecamestrainedwhentheirwivesquarrelled.GlasserconsidereditprudenttorejectanofferedpostonthetopdeckoftheStateDepartment,becausehewouldbeunlikelytosurvivethesecuritycheckstheappointmentrequired.HewasnonethelessabletoprovideMoscowwithimportantcablesaboutUSpost-warpolicyplanning,includingdetailsofWashington’sviewsonfinancialaidtoRussia.Inanambitiousmoment,VasilyZarubinsoughttotargetErnestHemingwayasaninformant,thoughhesuspectedhimofbeingaTrotskyiteratherthanaStalinist.Inanyevent,thewaywardwritershowednoenthusiasm.JustasathomeinRussia,withintheextendedSovietsecretfamilyinAmericadenunciationswerea

wayoflife,andofdeath.InAugust1944theNKVD’snewresidentinSanFrancisco,GrigoriKasparov,signalledtoMoscowablisteringcritiqueofhiscounterpartinMexicoCity.KasparovaccusedhimofbunglingeffortstoliberateTrotsky’sassassin,RamónMercader,andofadoptinga‘grandlifestyle’,whichincludedbreedingpoultryandparrots.Similarly,theNewYorkdeputychiefclaimedthathisownboss,twenty-eight-year-oldStepanApresyan,was‘utterlywithouttheknackofdealingwithpeople,frequentlyshowinghimselfexcessivelyabruptandinclinedtonag…Aworkerwhohasnoexperienceofworkabroadandcannotcopeonhisown.’ApresyanwasdemotedtotheSanFranciscoresidenceinMarch1945.TheZarubinswereundonenotbytheartificeoftheFBI,butbyadisgruntledsubordinatecolonel

namedVasiliiMironov.Mironov’sfirstshotathischiefwastowritetoStalin,assertingthatZarubinwasdoublingfortheAxis.Whenthisgothimnowhere,hedispatchedananonymouslettertoJ.EdgarHoover ’soffice,fingeringZarubinasaSovietspy,andalsonamingtenotheragents,includingHollywoodproducerBorisMorros.DuringthewaryearstheBritishweretoofearfulofstrainingtheirdifficultrelationshipwiththeSovietstoexpelevenidentifiedSoviet‘illegals’,butin1944theAmericansinsistedontheZarubins’departure;boththeyandtheiraccuserwenthome.Thehusband-and-wifeteamreceivedaheroes’welcomeinMoscow;hewasloadedwithmedals,andendedhiscareerasdeputychiefofforeignintelligence.MeanwhileMironov,surprisingly,wasallowedtolive–foratime.BackinMoscow,hewasdiagnosedasschizophrenicanddispatchedtoanasylum.WhilesuchSovietinstitutionswerescarcelyhavensofcompassion,giventhedamagetheerrantcolonelhadinflicted,itisastonishinghewasnotshot.Hewaslessfortunatein1945,however,whenheattemptedtoinformtheUSembassyaboutSovietmassacresinPoland;thistimehewassilencedbyafiringsquad.Inthespringof1942,asaknowncommunistNathanSilvermasterwasinvestigatedbytheHouse

Un-AmericanActivitiesCommittee.Thisprovednothingagainsthim,thoughinJunetheUSNavy’sintelligencedepartmentinsistedonhisdismissalfromtheTreasury.Furtherinquiriesintohispoliticalactivitieswerequashed–itisthoughtthatHarryDexterWhiteandanotherfriend,LauchlinCurrie,aCanadian-bornsenioreconomicadvisertotheWhiteHouse,intervenedonhisbehalf.

AlthoughnothingwaseverprovedagainstCurrie,itseemsalmostcertainthathetoowasaSovietinformant.SilvermasterstayedinWashington,withanewjobintheFarmSecurityAdministration.Thoughthishadnoaccesstosensitivedefenceinformation,hepromptlybecameamemberoftheWarProductionBoard,whichdid.Moscow’sAmericansourceswerenothighlytrainedintelligenceprofessionals,butinstead

enthusiasticamateurs.OverhalfofthehundredsofUSgovernmentdocumentsphotographedbyWilliamUllmannin1944,forinstance,provedunreadablewhenCentre’smenporedoverhisfilms,forwardedbyElizabethBentley.Whatcouldbedecipheredwasimpressive,however;UllmannwasaformerTreasurymandraftedtothePentagon,whosuppliedamassoftechnicaldataonUScombataircraftandindustrialproduction.InMarch1945theimportantnuclearspyTedHallpassedinformationoutofSantaFeonthedesignofAmerica’satomicbombwhichhehadcopiedontoanewspaper,usingmilkasink.TheRussiansfumedatsuchhamfistedness.MuchmaterialreachedMoscowoutofrealtime.AnexasperatedmemofromFitintoMerkulovin

July1944complainedthatdocumentssuchasacopyofanAnglo-AmericanLend-Leaseagreementarrivedmonthslate,asdidaforty-one-pageTreasurymemorandumonpost-wartraderelationsbetweenWashingtonandMoscow,andadraftbyHarryDexterWhiteofanewUS-USSRLend-Leasedeal.FitinsoughtauthoritytoshiftamanfromLosAngelestoNewYorktohandlethegroaningcaseload.TheSovietswereevenmoreexasperatedbyemotionalcomplications:WilliamUllmannstartedanaffairwithNathanSilvermaster ’swife.AkhmerovcomplainedtoMoscow:‘Surelytheseunhealthyrelationsbetweenthemcannothelpbutinfluencetheirbehaviourandworkforusnegatively.’HealsoreportedthatSilvermasterbulliedhissources.VladimirPravdin,nowtheNKVD’sNewYorkstationchief,urgedAkhmerovtoreininthewaywardspy.Akhmerovrespondedbluntly:‘Themainthingistogetresults.Fortwenty-fiveyears,wecouldn’tgetinformationaboutthepoliticsofthiscountry.Now[Silvermaster]isdoingatremendousjobandgivingourgovernmentacompletepictureof[US]politicsonallquestions.’InAugust1944,FitinatCentrerecordedthatsinceJanuarytheWashingtonnetworkhadhandedover386importantUSgovernmentdocuments.HewassufficientlyimpressedbytheSilvermasters’worktocontributea$6,000down-paymentonafarmthecouplewantedtobuy.NathanwasawardedaSovietdecoration,whichhewaspermittedtoglimpsebeforehishandlerreturnedittosecretsafekeeping.ThevolumeofinformationpassedtoMoscowbyallitsAmericannetworksrosespectacularlyinthecourseofthewar,fromfifty-ninereelsofmicrofilmin1942,to211in1943,sixhundredin1944and1,896in1945,withtheSilvermastersamongthemajorcontributors.HowdidtheRussiansgetawaywithsomuchforsolong?Mostcitizensofdemocraciesacceptthat

partofthetariffimposedforfreedomisthattheirdefencesagainstsubversionandtreacheryarelesscomprehensiveandeffectivethanthoseofatotalitarianstate,andsuchapriceusuallyseemsworthpaying.YettheFBI’sincompetencewasastonishing.ItsagentschargedwithmonitoringSoviet

activitiesshowedthemselveslessthanastute.AlexanderFeklisovwroteinhismemoirs:‘Thereweremanygreenyoungmeninthe[FBI’s]footsurveillanceteams…andourofficersexposedthembyusingsimpletricks.Tailswereprobablyselectedfromyoungmenrearedinsmalltowns,whowouldstartworkingagainstusaftertwoorthreemonths’training.Onecouldseestraightawaythattheywereprovincials–bytheirclothes,theguilty,larcenouslookintheireyes;theirclumsiness.Theyfeltlostwhentheyrealisedthattheyhadbeenspotted,anddidn’tknowwhattodo.Theywouldturnaway,orwalkquicklyintothefirstbuildingtheysaw.’Feklisovsometimeswalkedstraighttowardshistail,forthefunofseeingthemanfleebeforehim

inembarrassment.Surveillanceishighlylabour-intensive,requiringback-upcarsincaseasuspectgrabsabusortaxi.‘Ioftenspottedfollowerswhengettingintothesubwayorstandingontheplatform.TheyweresoscaredtheywouldlosemewhenIboardedatrainthattheyalmostrandownthestairs.Onceontheplatform,Inormallychoseaspotwhereitwashardtoseeme:behindapillar,bythewall,inthecrowd.Therewereoccasionswhentheonlypeopleinaquietsubwaystationweremyselfandthetail.InsuchcasesInormallytriedtothinkaboutsomethingnice,smiledandhummedapopularAmericantunewhilepacingalongtheplatformwithacarefreelook,toshowthatIpaidnoattentiontothesurveillance.Thetailsdressedmodestly,mostlyindarkdullsuitsandovercoats.Insummertheymostlyworetheirshirtshangingout,withnotie.OnoneoccasionIwaswatchedbyateamoffour.Oneofthemworearmyuniformforhalftheday.Isawhimontheescalatorinthemetro,thenhefollowedmeintotheCunardWhiteStarofficewhereIbookedsteamshipticketsforSovietcitizenstravellingtoLondon.Isawthis“soldier”yetagainwhenlunchingatacafeteria.’Hoovercouldfireonlyonecounter-chargeagainsthismoreskilfulandsubtleBritishcounterparts:hisownBureauwasneverinfiltratedbyaSovietagent,aswasMI5.TheRooseveltadministrationapparentlyagreedabouttheFBI’slimitations.InJuly1941the

Soviets’Washingtonambassador,KonstantinUmansky,reportedtoMoscowanemotionalappealbyHenryMorgenthau.Thetreasurysecretarysaidthathewasasking‘notonbehalfoftheAmericangovernment,butonmypersonalbehalf’thatiftheRussiansknewtheidentitiesofkeyGermanagentsintheUS,theyshouldprovidethemtohimselfandthepresident,‘sincetheFBIworkspoorlytoday…leavingthecoreofNazileadersfreeandstillcarryingontheirunderminingwork’.AMoscowCentrehandscrawledexclamationandquestionmarksonthiscable.MorgenthaurepeatedthesamedemandtoUmansky’ssuccessor,MaximLitvinov.EarlyinMarch1942Moscoworderedtheambassadortorejectanyrequestsforintelligencecooperation:‘TheNKVDoftheUSSRisnotinterestedinestablishingthisliaison.’Inthesummerof1944,andpartlyinresponsetoconcernaboutthesecurityoftheManhattanProject,theFBIplantedwiretapsinallknownSovietheadquartersbuildings,throughwhichtheylearnedagoodmanycodenames,togetherwithindisputableevidenceofItzhakAkhmerov’sintelligencerole.Hewasdeclaredpersonanongrata,andwenthometoreceiveahero’swelcomeinMoscow.HewaspresentedwiththeOrderoftheRedBanner,andhiswifeHelen

withtheRedStar.BytheendofthewarCentrewasconvincedthatElizabethBentleywaschronicallyunstableanda

menacetotheirUSoperations,especiallyaftersheformedafriendshipwithamanwhowasplainlyanagentofeither‘theHut’–theFBI–or‘theArsenal’–theUSWarDepartment;inreality,itwastheformer.CentredecideduponherkidnappingandextractiontoMoscowforliquidation.Itwastoolate:shewasalreadysingingalongariatoHoover ’smen,newsthatwasconveyedtoheremployersbyKimPhilby.Inapost-mortemontheGolos–Bentleysaga,CentreconcludedthatitwasaseriousmistaketohavealloweditsagenttoforgelinkswithmembersoftheAmericanCommunistParty,andtobecome‘themainpillarofourintelligenceworkintheUS’.Itwasextraordinarythataspysocarelessastomeetinformantsintheirownapartments–asdidBentley–escapedexposureforsolong.

ThesameargumentsareadvancedtoexcuseAmerica’scommunisttraitorsastheirBritishcounterparts:thatitisscarcelysurprisingsomanyliberalssoughttoassisttheSovietUnion,whentheinstitutionalbarbarityofStalin’sregimewasinadequatelyunderstood,andRussiansboretheoverwhelmingburdenofthestruggletodefeatfascism.AstheEastGermanspychiefMarkusWolflaterputit,Moscow’sinformantsconsideredthemselvesmembersofanelitesecretclub,fightingforanobleideal.PierreCot,aformerministerinseveralFrenchgovernmentslivinginexileintheUS,undertookalong1944missiontoMoscowfordeGaulle.Heconcludedhissubsequentreport:‘Libertydeclinesunceasinglyundercapitalismandrisesunceasinglyundersocialism.’AremarkablenumberofAmericanandBritishintellectualslikewiseembracedthisidiotjudgement.From1941to1945,RussianswerethealliesoftheUnitedStatesinthegreatestconflictinhistory.Inresponse,however,itmaybearguedthatfewinformedpeople–whichincludedalmostallthe

Americanspies–couldhavefailedtobeawareofthehorrorsoftheSovietsystem,hadtheychosentomakethemselvesso.Apologistsalsoarguethatthetraitors’actionshadnoadverseimpactupontheAlliedcauseintheSecondWorldWar.Thatisonlynarrowlytrue:recalltheSovietleaktotheGermansabouttheAmericanpenetrationofPurple.ThosewerestillthedaysoftheNazi–SovietPact:Hitler ’semissarypassedonthismomentouswarningtotheJapanese.BaronŌshimamessagedJapan’sforeignministerfromBerlinon3May1941–adispatchsubsequentlybrokenbytheAmericans–sayingthat‘itisquitereliablyestablished[bytheGermans]thattheU.S.governmentisreadingAmbassadorNomura’scodemessages[fromWashington]…drasticstepsshouldbetakenregardingthismatter ’.ThefactthatTokyowasfoolishenoughtotakenoheeddoesnotalterthegravityofthethreattoUSinterests.ItisalsovirtuallycertainthattheRussiansacquiredthisvitalsecretfromoneoftheirAmericaninformantsintheupperreachesoftheadministration.ThismanmayhavesupposedthatbybriefingMoscowhewasmerelyaidingtheinternationalsocialistcause.Itwasonlybyamiracle,however,thathisactiondidnotcausetheUStoloseitsaccesstoPurple.

ArthurSchlesingerwroteinhismemoirs:‘ThereisnoevidencethattheinformationOSSmolesgavetheKremlindidmuchdamagetotheUnitedStates.ThediscoverythatOSSwasnotplanningsubversiveoperationsagainsttheSovietUnionmaywellhavesoothedStalinandreducedanychanceofhismakingaseparatepeacewithHitler.’Here,thehistorianmakesavalidpoint:SovietpenetrationoftheorganisationwouldhaveinflictedseriousdamageatthetimeonlyifMoscow’sagentshadbeenpassingintelligencethatshowedtheUnitedStatesdouble-crossingitssupposedally–whichwasnotthecase.YetatnotimeduringtheSecondWorldWardidStalinentertainanynotionofsustainingpeacefulco-existencewiththeWesternPowersonceitwasended.TheAmericanandBritishtraitorsdidsubstantialharmtotheirownnations’interests,byensuringthatWashingtonbargainedwithMoscow–forinstanceatYaltaandattheUnitedNations’foundingconferenceinSanFrancisco–ataseriousdisadvantage:SovietdelegationsknewpreciselywhereAmericanandBritishfinalpositionslay.TheAmericanswhogavetechnologicalandscientificdatatotheSoviets,ofwhommorebelow,

didgreaterharmtotheirownnation’sintereststhanthosewhomerelypeddledpolitical,diplomaticandstrategicinformationduringthewaryears.MostoftheRussians’immenseinvestmentinespionageintheUSachievedlittle.ThebestthatcanbesaidoftheAmericanswhoservedtheircauseisthattheyweremonumentallynaïve–theRussianscertainlythoughtso.TheUSinformantswhoworkedsoenthusiasticallywithVasilyandElizabethZarubinmighthavesuppedlesseagerlyhadtheyseenthebloodstainedfootprintsthatmarkedeverystepoftheirpathsfromMoscowtoWashingtonDC.

15

TheKnowledgeFactories

1 AGENTS

Britain’sintelligenceservicesemployedhundredsofimpressivelydeterminedandcourageousyoungfieldagents,ofwhomtheNorwegianOlufReed-Olsenmaystandasanexemplar.InSeptember1940,agedtwenty-two,heescapedtoBritainfromhisownoccupiedcountrybycrossingtheNorthSeainaneighteen-footboat,survivingextraordinaryhazardsandtempestsduringthetwo-weekpassage.ThereafterhespenttwoyearsasapilottraineeinCanada,andflewseveraloperationsforRAFCoastalCommandbeforeacceptingatransfertoagenttraining,inthecourseofwhichhebrokebothlegsparachuting.InApril1943theplanecarryinghimtoNorwaytwiceturnedback,becausewindspeedsweredeemedtoohighforajump.Thethirdtime,heinsistedonmakingthedescent,landedinatreetopandbadlydislocatedhisknee.ThiscausedhimtospendamonthinaNorwegianhospital,constantlyexposedtobetrayal,havingfluiddrainedfromtheinjury.Onbelatedlystartingintelligencework,hebrusheddisasterateveryturn.CarelessnesspromptedhimtouseEnglishphrasesinpublicplaces.HisBritishbriefershadknownnothingaboutnewregulationswhichrequiredhimtocarryatravelpermit.Hefoundithardtocreateanetworkfromscratch:‘Mostofthepeoplewhoatthattimewerecapableofdoingajobefficientlywerealreadyuptotheirnecksinillegalactivityelsewhere…Iwouldnotletanymanworkformeandinotherorganizationsatthesametime.Thiswasamistaketowhichfartoomanyfellvictims.’Hewastedamonthbivouackedinawildernesswithtwocompanions,wirelessinghisAKYcallsign

intonothingness,beforehissignalstoWhaddonHallreceivedanacknowledgement:‘PBO…PBO.’Hethenspentthirtyminutestransmittingasituationreport:‘Thedifferenceitmadetoourspirits–afterourweeksoftoilandincreasingsetbacks–cannotbedescribed.Itwaslikeabreezeofencouragementblowingthroughalltheblackness.’Olsenandhiscompanionslivedforsometimeonsemi-starvationrations–threeboiledpotatoesadaywithalittlebread,mackerelorherring.Poordietgoesfartoexplainhowinjuredmeninthefieldoftenprovedvulnerabletosepticaemia.OnlyaftermanymonthsdidOlsen’steamreceivetheirfirstparachutedrop,ofwhichthemostvaluedingredientswerenotweaponsorexplosives,but270poundsofchocolate,5,000cigarettes,driedplums,apricots,apples.AlthoughtemporarilydrivenfromtheareabyaGermansweep,theywere

fortunateenoughtoreturnlatertofindthesupplycacheundisturbed,inacaveamidthickwoodland.Secretwarriorsspentmuchoftheirtimepreoccupiedwithhumdrumsubsistenceactivities,rather

thanwithcollectingintelligenceorblowingupbridges.Reed-Olsensometimesfoundhimselftoilingacrossamountainsidecarryinganeighty-poundload–anMI6transmitterweighedalmosthalfofthat,withitsbatteries.Foragentsobligedtoliveinruralareas,ithelpedtobecountrywise:theyoungNorwegianwasoftenalertedtointerlopersbythecrosscallofastonechatorblackbird.HismainjobwastomonitorandreportshippingmovementsandGermantroopdeployments.InOctober1943,afterweeksofplayingcatch-as-catch-canwithAbwehrdirector-findersmonitoringhiswirelesstransmissions,hewasobligedtofleetoneighbouringSweden.FlowntoLondoninJanuary1944,hetooktwomonths’leaveinCanadatogetmarried,beforebeingparachutedbackintoNorwayinMay.Thereafterhetransmittedlocalweatherreportsseveraltimesaday,andansweredsuchquestionnairesasthislateJulyexamplefromBroadway:

1.IsthereadivisionalstaffinArendal?Givenumber,HQandnameofCO.2.IsthereaGrenadierregiment’sHQinKristiansandSouthand/orLyngdal?Givenumber,locationofHQandnameofCO.3.ArethearmytroopsinMandalsubordinatedtoLyngdalorKristiansand?

Thiscontinuedthroughsixmorequestionswithmultiplesub-headings.InthelastmonthsofthewarReed-OlsenwasabletorecruittwoGermandeserters,abandoningthe

sinkingReich,toassistinaddressingsuchrequestsfromLondon.HewaslatterlysuccessfulinevadingGermanDFunits,thoughtheseoftentauntedhimacrosstheethertorepeatcodegroups,andfinallysent‘HEILHITLER!’inplainlanguage.Reed-Olsen,likehundredsofhiscomradesaroundtheworld,livedforyearsinperilofcapture

andaghastlydeath.AttritionwasespeciallyhighintheLowCountries,wheretheterrainwasill-suitedtocovertactivity,informersweremanyandtheAbwehr ’scounter-intelligencebranchnotablyefficient.Ofeighty-nineMI6agentsdispatchedtooccupiedBelgiumandHollandduringthewaryears,thirty-ninewerecaptured,ofwhomjustelevensurvivedthewar.By1945,onlythirteenMI6wirelessesremainedoperationalintheregion.MeanwhileinthemountainsofGreece,byJuly1944NigelClivewasusingtworadio-operatorsto

processaconstantflowofmilitary,politicalandeconomicmaterial:‘Thegoodintelligencewewerereceivingwasareflectionoftheskillanddeterminationofouragents.Theyhadtheadvantage,however,thatalmosteveryonebelievedthattheGermanswouldsoonbegone.Inthesecircumstancesopenopportunitieswereofferedtoouragentstoapproachthosewhowishedtohedgetheirbets.’Clivewasconsciousofthetrivialityofmuchoftheinformation:‘IwouldbetoldthatAndreashadjustbeenconscriptedbytheGermansintoalabourforceforbuildinganairstrip;thatEvangeloshadacousinwhosebrother-in-lawwasnowservingin[thecommunist]ELASagainsthiswillandwantedtodefecttoZervas;thatMacros’suncleinIoanninahadheardthattheGermanswoulddefinitelybe

outofGreecebeforethesummer;thatLeftherishadheardfromhissisterinArtathatEDESwasplanninganattackonthetowninthefollowingweek…IalwayslistenedpatientlytoeverythingthatwastoldmeandnaturallyassuredCostakisandotherswhoapproachedmedirectlythateveryscrapofinformationwasofgreatvalue.ThiswastheonlydeceptionIpractisedandithelpedmetobeacceptedasamemberoftheircommunity.’AftertheGermansquit,Clivesufferedasuccessionofunwelcomerevelations.First,hislabourson

theenemy’sorderofbattlehadservednousefulpurpose.TheWehrmachtevacuatedGreeceofitsownvolition,withoutfightingabattleforwhichhisjigsaw-buildingmighthavebecomerelevant.HealsodiscoveredthatGermanknowledgemirroredhisown:thelocalenemycommanderLt.Gen.HubertLanz‘knewaboutuswhatweknewabouthim’,frominformersandinterception.ItwasevenmorebewilderingfortheBritishagenttolearnthatZervas,theguerrillaleadertowhosegrouphewasattached,hadbeenconductingparleyswiththeGermans,aimedatachievingacommonfrontagainstthecommunists.AsignalfromLanztohigherheadquarters,dated7August1944andeventuallypassedtoClive,spokeofZervas’s‘uptonowloyalattitude’–towardstheoccupiers.Finally,thespyfoundthathehadbeenthevictimofcynicism,incompetenceortreacheryhigherup

theintelligencefoodchain:theheadofMI6’spoliticalsectiontoldhiminJanuary1945thatnotoneofhislongandoftenperceptivepoliticalreportshadreachedBroadway.ItwillneverbeknownwhethertheseweresuppressedforideologicalreasonsbycommunistsympathisersinsidetheService,especiallyinCairo,or–equallyplausible–lostamidthemorassofunreadpapergeneratedbytensofthousandsofintelligenceofficersofallnations,atriskoftheirlives.Thatisnottosaythatfieldagentactivitywaswasted:DonaldMcLachlanofNIDpaidgeneroustributetothevalueofthereportsofNorwegianship-watcherssuchasReed-Olsen,whowarnedofsomeenemymovementsandespeciallyU-boatsailingsthatescapedUltra’snet,althoughitwasanothermattertoputtheinformationtopracticaluse:throughoutthewartheRoyalNavyandtheFleetAirArmhadlittlesuccessininterdictingScandinaviancoastaltraffic.AsforGermantroopdeployments,whetherinNorway,GreeceorelsewhereinoccupiedEurope,whileUltraprovidedagoodpicture,thiswasnevercomprehensive,anditwaseverywhereusefulforitscoveragetobesupplementedbymenontheground.BritishintelligenceneverachievedsignificanthumintpenetrationinsidetheReich.Plentyofanti-

NaziGermanswereeagertoescapetoAlliedterritory,butnotmanywereinterestedinreturningtoHitler ’sempirethereafterasspiesorsaboteurs.JohnBruceLockhartofMI6–nephewoftheoldspyRobert–wroteruefullyin1944thattherewere‘plentyofratsthatleavethesinkingship,andweshallgetmore,butpreciousfewarepreparedtogobacktognawanotherholeinherbottom’.InItaly,BroadwayabandonedattemptstorecruitagentsfromamongItalianPoWs,becausethehumanmaterialavailableprovedsopoor.OnlywhentheAlliesbegantofightinsidethecountry,andpartisangroupsprovidedrelativelysaferustichavensbehindenemylines,didBritishandAmerican

officersoperatethereinnumbers.Moreover,notallMI6agentsoverseaswereasconscientiousasReed-OlsenandClive:thenovelistGrahamGreenetreatedespionage,andindeedthewholewar,asanabsurdity.HesignalledBroadwayfromFreetown,SierraLeone,in1942,proposingthattheserviceshouldopenabrothelforVichyFrenchsailorsfromtheRichelieuonaPortugueseislandoffthebattleship’sbaseatDakar.FollowinghisrecalltoBritain,GreenejoinedMI6’ssub-sectionatStAlbans,runbyKimPhilby.ThoughthenovelistpersonallydislikedPhilbywhileheworkedwithhim,hetreatedhimwithindulgencewhenhewasrevealedasatraitor,asmerelyanothertraderinaridiculoussecretsbazaar.

TheRussiansprovidedtheWesternAllieswithscarcelyanyinformationabouttheirownoperations,farlessthoseoftheAxis.Foratimetheygrudginglysuppliedcopiesofdecryptsoflow-levelWehrmachtcodestheyhadbroken,buton1December1942thisservicestoppedabruptly,andwasneverresumed.Inthespringof1944aRoyalNavymineandsabotageexpert,Lt.Shirley,wassenttotheBlackSeatosurveyGermandemolitionsinrecapturedRussianportsbeforetheAlliesfacedtheproblemofclearingcapturedFrenchharboursafterD-Day.When6Junecame,however,ShirleywasstillkickinghisheelsinSevastopol,vainlyawaitingRussianconsenttobeallowedtoinspectharbourinstallations.TheneedtosustainasemblanceofcollaborationcreatedotherdilemmasinLondon.Backin

December1941,whenBritishhopesofanintelligencepartnershipwiththeSovietsranmuchhigherthantheystoodeighteenmonthslater,theNKVDdispatchedfourAustrianstoBritain,whomtheRAFweresupposedtodropbackintotheirnativeland.Thespiesarrivedonlyafterlongdelaysandadventures–oneman’sshipwassunkenroute,withthelossofhiswireless.Allcomplainedbitterlyaboutthepoorqualityoftheirforgedidentitydocuments,andasecondsetsentfromMoscowprovednobetter.TheNKVD’sagentsflatlyrefusedtoundertaketheirmissionwithsuchpapers,andalsorejectedreturntoRussiaonthenotunreasonablegroundsthattheywouldbeexecuted.TheAustrians,whowereplainlyeagertosecurepermanentbilletsinBritain,toldtheirhoststhattheirmissionhadlittletodowithdefeatingHitler:theywerebriefedinsteadtoformaComintern‘sleeper ’cell,topromotepost-warcommunistinterests.Whetherornotthiswastrue,theBritishfeltunabletofrogmarchthemenaboardanRAFaircraftboundforenemyterritory.Yettheyalsoflinchedfromthediplomaticstormthatmustfollow,ifthespiesweregrantedasylum.InApril1943,MI5’singeniousandhumanesolutionwastodispatchthembacktoRussiaviaPanama,wheretheywereallowedtojumpshipanddisappear.

Broadway’sactivitiesandstaffingexpandeddramaticallyinthecourseofthewar,withdepartmentsspillingoverintoanetworkofout-stations.SectionV,forinstance,grewfromastrengthofeightin1940to250fiveyearslater.MI6’sseniorofficers,however,remainedlittlechanged,andHugh

Trevor-Roperthoughtnobetterofthem:‘Acolonyofcootsinanunventilatedbackwaterofbureaucracy…Abunchofdependentbumsuckersheldtogetherbyneglect,likeaclusterofbatsinanunsweptbarn…Thehighpriestsofaneffetereligionmumblingtheirmeaninglessritualstoavertafamineorstayacataclysm.’AnofficerwhoservedinMI6notedthatitstopbrass,whoregardedthemselveswithunflaggingseriousness,neverarrivedontimeforameeting:theyexcusedtheirunpunctualitybyimplyingthattheyhadbeenheldupattendingacabinetcommittee.AnintelligentandnotunsympatheticobservertoldoneofMI6’sofficersthatinrecruitingpersonnel,‘wearetooreadytobesatisfiedwithgoodsecond-raters’.Evenattheheightofaworldwar,theForeignOfficetreatedtheServiceas‘poorandratherdisreputablerelations’.Adiplomatcomplainedaboutthe‘lowsocialstatus’ofMI6’srepresentativesonhispatch,thoughthisreflectedmoreuponForeignOfficesnobberythanontheagentsconcerned.Wastewasprodigious:BroadwaypurchasedanaircrafttoscourthecoastofArgentinaforGermanshipping,animpossibletaskgiventhedistancesinvolved,andanywaydirectedagainstanon-existentthreat.AnobsessionwithsecuringadvantageinWhitehall’swarspersistedatBroadway,asinTirpitzüfer

andMoscowCentre.MI6’sofficialhistorianwritesofClaudeDansey’sattitude,manifestedinhisrolesupervisingtheescapeorganisationMI9:‘HefrequentlygavetheimpressionthathisengagementwasasmuchtodenyanyothergovernmentdepartmenttheopportunitytomeddleontheContinentasitwastorescueBritishpersonnel.’OnedayDanseystrodeintotheofficeofPatrickReilly,thebrilliantyoungdiplomatwhoservedforatimeasStewartMenzies’personalassistant.‘Greatnews,’hesaid.‘Greatnews.’HisexultationwascausedbythecollapseofamajorFrenchagentnetworkrunbySOE,whomDanseyhatedevenmorethantheAmericans.Reillywrote:‘Misery,tortureanddeathformanybravemenandwomen,BritishandFrench:andDanseygloated.’Reillyrecordedthathehimselffeltsick.Menzies’personalsanctumwasguardedbytwovenerableladieswhoaddressedeachother,even

afteryearsofsharedservice,as‘MissJones’and‘MissPettigrew’.Theformerwasthemilderandbetter-looking,whilethelatterwaslargeandformidable.BothweredrawnfromthesameextensivestableoffemaleservantsofBroadway–genteel,loyal,discreet,tireless.MalcolmMuggeridgeobserved,surelyrightly,thatacommoncharacteristicofpeoplewhoserveintelligenceservicesisadelightinopacityforitsownsake,aconceitderivedfromaccesstoknowledgedeniedtoothers:‘Thissenseofimportance,ofcherishingsecretsbeyondthekenofordinarymortals,wascharacteristicofSISpersonnelatalllevels,particularlythefemales,who,howevercarelesstheymightbeabouttheirchastity,guardedtheirsecuritywithimplacableresolution.’In1943,RobertCecilsucceededReillyasMenzies’personalassistant,andthereafterbecamea

sturdydefenderofhischief.‘C’s’mostimportantcontribution,hearguedyearslater,wastoensurethattheUltrasecretwaspreserved.TheSpecialLiaisonUnitswhichservedwithcommandersinthefield,createdbyBroadway’sFredWinterbotham,wereabrilliantsecuritydevice,saidCecil.Every

Alliedcommander-in-chiefhadhispersonalSLU,livingapartfromtherestoftheheadquarters,andchargedwithfilteringdecryptssecurelyintotheintelligenceprocess.‘C’alsoretainedaclearsenseofthepurposeofhisorganisation’sexistence.Inamemorandumtohisstaffon10November1942,heexpresseditsrationale:‘allIntelligenceabouttheenemy,whethercollectedbysecretmeans,orbyopenfieldIntelligence,shouldbebasedontheolddictumthat“IntelligenceisthemainspringofAction”…SIS’sprimefunctionistoobtaininformationbysecretmeanswhichmayadmitoforpromoteaction…Informationonwhichnoactioncanbetakenmaybeofinterest,itmaybeusefulforrecordsorforthefuture,butitisofsecondaryimportance.’LifeatMI6’sheadquarterswasnomorefreefromhazardthaninthatofanyothercentralLondon

office:onSunday,18June1944CecilandMenzieswereworkinginBroadwayBuildingwhenaV-1flyingbombdescended,onewingtouchingQueenAnne’sMansionsnextdoorbeforetheprojectileslewedintotheGuardsChapelandexplodedduringaservice,killing120ofthecongregation.Cecilarguedthatawartime‘C’neededtobeamanof‘coolcourageandhighintegrity,seekingonlyhowbesttoapplytheingenuityofothersinthecommoncause.Menzieswastherightmanintherightplaceattherighttime.’Cecil’scaseforthedefencedeservesnotice.IthasbeenasourceofexasperationtoBritishintelligenceofficerssince1945thattheirservice’sbest-knownchroniclersofitswartimeexperiencewereHughTrevor-Roper,GrahamGreeneandMalcolmMuggeridge,allnotoriouslyerraticpersonalities.Ofthethree,onlyTrevor-Roperdistinguishedhimselfasanintelligenceofficer,andevenheseemedtorecogniseinhispost-warwritingthatblanderqualitiesthanhisownwereneededinthemanagersofasecretservice:‘Apparentlymiraculousachievementsaretheresultsnotofmiraculousorganisations,butofefficientroutines.Theheadofanintelligenceserviceisnotasuperspybutabureaucrat.’BillBentinckoftheJICwasoncecanvassedasacandidatetosupplantMenzies,buttherewasnoappetitetochangejockeysrelativelylateintherace,whenBletchley’sachievementwasbeingcelebratedthroughoutthecouncilsoftheAlliedwarlords.Inallthebelligerentcampstherewasfiercedebateaboutthemeritsofcentralisationversus

dispersalofintelligenceeffort.Empire-buildingandrivalrybyBritain’sMI5,MI6andSOE,especially,causedduplicationandwastedresources.Butthisalsoenableddisparategroupsofmenandwomen,someofthehighestintellect,topursuetheirownideasandcourses,totheadvantageoftheAlliedcause:athousandseedsweresown.Thoughmanyprovedsterile,someproducedwondrousblooms,theRadioSecurityServiceandRadioAnalysisBureaunotableamongthem.Ifintelligence-gatheringandsabotagehadbeencentralisedunderMI6’scontrol,theweaknessesofBroadwaywouldmerelyhavebecomemoredeeplyembedded.AndeventhenotoriousfeudsbetweenMI6andSOEdidlessinjurytotheAlliedwareffortthandidtheglacialrelationshipbetweentheUSArmyandUSNavy.ThemostplausibledefenceofBroadway’swartimerecordistoposethequestion:whichother

nation’ssecretserviceperformedbetter?StewartMenzieswasalimitedman,butheshowedhimselfa

stablerpersonalitythanDonovan,Canaris,Schellenberg,Fitin–hiscounterpartsintheotherwarringcapitals.Onthedebitside,MI6creatednothingcomparablewithOSS’sResearch&Analysisdivision.Itneverforgedlinkswithanti-HitlerGermans,especiallyinthearmy,asdidtheRussiansandlatterlytheAmericans.Buttherewasaconstrainthere:theprimeministerhadimposeddraconianrestrictionsuponanycontactswithGermanywhichmightfeedStalin’smorbidfearsthattheWesternAllieswantedaseparatepeace.ItwasthisthatcausedtheForeignOfficerepeatedlytospurnapproachesfromanglophilemembersoftheGermanResistancesuchasHelmuthvonMoltkeandAdamvonTrott.Onlyontechnologicalissues,suchastheV-weaponsdiscussedbelow,canitbearguedthatwell-placedhumintsourcesinGermanycouldhaveexercisedimportantinfluence.Ultraprovidedsuchpeerlessinsightsintotheenemy’scampthatitishardtoimaginewhatspiesmighthavedonebetter.

2 THEJEWELOFSOURCES

ThetriumphoftheUSSignalsIntelligenceServiceinsecuringaccesstotheJapanesePurplediplomaticciphercontributedlittletowinningthewar,becauseitwasnotamilitarychannel,butnotableamongitsachievementswasrecruitmentoftheJapaneseambassadorinBerlinasasource.ItwasadrolleryofthetimethatthestrivingsandsacrificesofAlliedsecretagentssecurednohumintasinterestingasthatunconsciouslycontributedbyBaronHiroshiŌshima.Hisdispatches,decryptedbyArlingtonHallandBletchleyPark,providedawindowontheNazihighcommand,andoccasionallyonHitler ’sintentions.Ōshimawasnotacleverman–indeed,hismilitaryandpoliticaljudgementwasterrible.Untiltheendof1942heremainedanunswervingbelieverinHitler ’simpendingtriumph,andimpatientforJapantosharethespoils.From1939onwards,herepeatedlyurgedhiscountrymen:‘Don’tmissthebus!’Hisshort,chunkyfigurewasoftenphotographedgazingadmiringlyupattheFührer.In1942Göbbelswroteinhisdiary:‘OshimareallyisoneofthemosteffectivechampionsofAxispolicies.Amonumentoughtinduecoursetobeerectedinhishonour.’Thissentimentwouldhavebeenechoed,fordifferentreasons,inWashingtonandLondon,becausetheNazileadershipconfidedmorefreelyintheJapaneseambassadorthaninanyotherforeigner,andtheAlliesbecameprivytoeverythinghelearned.HesenttoTokyoseventy-fivedispatchesin1941,ahundredin1942,fourhundredin1943,sixhundredin1944andthreehundredinthelastmonthsofthewar,someofthemvoluminous,andallreadbytheAllieswithinaweekorsooftheirtransmission.Ōshimawasbornin1886,sonofapoliticianwhoservedaswarministerintwo1916–18Tokyo

cabinets.HeknewGermanyintimately,havingbeenfirstpostedthereasmilitaryattachéin1934,andbecameapopularfigureontheBerlindiplomaticcircuit,amusic-loverandkeenparty-goerwhosometimesconsumedanentirebottleofkirschwithoutvisibleill-effects.In1938hewaselevatedto

ambassadorandlieutenant-general.ThoughrecalledtoTokyointheautumnof1939,hewasreappointedinDecember1940,bywhichtimeWashingtonwasreadingPurple,andsoonprovidedtheBritishwiththemeanstodolikewise.Thereafteruntiltheendofthewarsome2,000ofŌshima’sdispatchesandmessagesweredecrypted,translatedandcirculatedtoRoosevelt,Marshall,ChurchillandseniorintelligenceofficersonbothsidesoftheAtlantic.Ifhisassessmentsandpredictionswereoftenpoor,hisaccountsofconversationswithtopNazisappeartohavebeenaccurate,andhewasanintermediaryforimportantexchangesbetweenTokyoandBerlin.Forinstance,on10May1941foreignministerYōsukeMatsuokasentalettertotheambassadorfor

onwardpassagetoRibbentrop,urgingrestraintintheGermangovernment’spublicremarksabouttheUnitedStates:‘OurmutualloyaltymakesmedeeplyanxioustocausetheAmericanPresidenttoreflectandcheckhisrecklessplans,and…Ihavebeenworkingnightanddaytothisend.BypreventingthestagingofArmageddonandtheconsequentdownfallofmoderncivilization(ifanactofmancanmakethatpossible)IshalltherebydischargemydualresponsibilitytoGodandman.’On24MayŌshimareportedaconversationwithCiano,Mussolini’sforeignminister,inwhichthelattersaid:‘DoyounotthinkthatoutbreakofwarbetweenGermanyandSovietUnionisvirtuallyinevitable?’On4June1941ŌshimareportedtoTokyo,andthustoWashingtonandLondon,theviewsofHitler

andRibbentropthat‘ineveryprobabilitywarwithRussiacannotbeavoided’.AfewdayslaterheexpressedtheviewthatGermanywouldsecurevictorytooquicklyfortheAmericansandBritishtobeabletoofferStalinusefulhelp;itwasthedecryptofthisdispatchthatbelatedlyconvincedtheJointIntelligenceCommitteeinLondonthatHitlerwasindeeddeterminedonwar.AttheendofJulyŌshimatoldTokyoofhisconvictionthattheUSwouldsooncomeintothewar;theonlydoubtinhismindwashowfartheAmericanswouldbeabletogivemeaningfulassistancetoBritain.Tokyo,however,toldhimnothingaboutitshardeningcommitmenttostrikingfirst.Throughout1941theAlliesremaineduncertainaboutJapaneseintentionstowardstheSovietUnion–aswasBerlin.TheTokyogovernmentasserteditsintentiontojointheGermansinattackingtheRussians,butrefusedtospecifyatimescale.Ōshimasenthomefullandfrequentdispatchesabouttheprogressof‘Barbarossa’,whichreinforcedAmericanandBritishperceptionsthattheRussianswereontheropes.WhenŌshimareportedon25AugustthattheRedArmywasestimatedtohavesufferedbetweenfiveandsixmillioncasualties–nogreatexaggeration–howcouldWesterngovernmentsfailtobeimpressed?BylateNovember,however,TokyowastellingthebaronthatitwouldwelcomeapeacedealbetweenHitlerandStalin.From1942onwardsŌshimareportedthesailingstoJapanofblockade-runningvessels,andlater

submarines.ThecombinationofinterceptsfromhisBerlinembassyandKriegsmarinesignalssnaredbyBletchleyandOp-20-GenabledtheAlliestowreakhavocwithattemptsbytheJapanesetobreaktheAlliedblockadeandcarryeithercommoditiestoEuropeortechnologicalprizeshomeward.Once

surfaceblockade-runnershadbeendisposedof,andtheAxiswasreducedtounderwatercommunication,from1942onwardsfifty-sixload-carryingsubmarinesweredispatched,ofwhichtwenty-nineweresunk,threeabandonedtheirmissionsandonewasinterned.Oftwenty-threewhichcompletedaone-waypassage,onlyfivesucceededinreturninghomeintact,survivorsofdevastationbysigint.Churchillwaspromptedtolaunchapre-emptiveBritishinvasionofFrenchMadagascarbya17

MarchdispatchfromtheambassadorassertingthatJapanwouldreceiveGermany’sfullsupportinattemptingtosecuretheislandforitself.On27JulyTokyotoldthebaronthatallhisurgingshadbeeninvain:therewouldbenoJapaneseattackontheSovietUnion–on5AugustFranklinRooseveltforwardedthesetidingstoStalininapersonalmessage.TheSovietwarlordmayhaveremainedscepticalnonetheless,sinceonlysixweeksearliertheUSpresidenthadgivenhimacontrarywarning.On21September1942,ŌshimareportedtheseriousdepletionofGermanoilstocks,whichcould

onlyberemediedbythecaptureoftheCaucasus–thendeemedimminent–‘afterwhichthesituationwillnotbeasdiscouragingasitnowlooks’.TheambassadorurgedRibbentropthattheWehrmachtshouldusepoisongastoensurethesuccessfulinvasionofEngland,whichtheJapanesestillconsideredshouldbeapriorityobjectivelongafterHitlerhadabandonedit.On23SeptemberŌshimarenewedhispleastoTokyothatJapanshouldattackRussia:‘LetusjoinforceswiththeGermansandbeinonthekill.’On28November,Japan’sforeignministerwrotetoŌshimadismissinghisoptimisticforecastsand

highlightingGermanweakness,especiallyinoil,alongwithfailuretotakeStalingrad:‘YousaythatGermanyhasweakenedRussia.Well,whataboutRussiaweakeningGermany?…IthinkyouwouldbeverywrongifyousupposedthatitisimpossiblefortheSovietstocomebackwithaswiftblow,andthatrightsoon.IthinkyouhadbetterwaitawhilebeforejudgingSovietforcestobesoweak…Howeveryouviewit,GermanycannoteasilygetintotheMiddleandNearEast.NowwhatwewantisforGermanytoreadyitselfforalongwar.’ŌshimapassedbackexplicitassurancesfromHitlerandRibbentropthatGermanywouldmakenoseparatepeacewithRussia,thoughinWashingtonandLondondoubtspersistedthattheNazismightchangetheirminds,asthestrategictideturnedagainstthem.InDecember1942RibbentropconfidedBerlin’sseriousalarmabouttheNorthAfricansituationfollowingtheAllied‘Torch’landings.Slowlybutsurely,Anglo-Americanintelligenceanalysts,whohadbeeninitiallywaryaboutthe

authorityofŌshima’scommunications,realisedhowmuchtrusthecommandedamongthetopNazis.Neverinhistoryhadbelligerentsbeenempoweredtoeavesdropontheconversationoftheirenemies’policy-makers,asnowtheywere.On15December1942theambassadorreportedRibbentropacknowledgingthat‘thewarwithRussiaisnotprogressingasexpected’.AfterspendingtwohourswithHitleron21January1943,Ōshimaquotedhimassaying:‘Idon’twantyoutothinkthatIamweakeninginmyconvictionthatweshallwin,but…itisclearthatif,inordertodestroythestriking

powerofRussia,youJapanesewould,fromtheEast,takeahandandhelpusout,itwouldbeveryadvantageousingettingthisjoboffourhands.’On2FebruarytheJapanesediplomatreportedwithstartlingbluntnessthatthedefeatsufferedbytheGermanarmyatStalingradwas‘thegreatestdisastertohaveovertakenitsinceNapoleoncrushedthePrussiansatJena[in1806]’.AtatimewhentheSovietsweretellingWashingtonandLondonalmostnothingcredibleaboutthecourseofthewar,herewasauthoritativeintelligenceaboutthetransformationoftheEasternFront.Ōshimacontinued:‘SinceGermanyhasbeenfightingRussia,Hitlerandthegeneralshavebeenat

oddsovertheconductofthewar,andnowisthetimefor[him]tostopandthink…ThemilitarysaythatitisnotthattheywanttoquarrelwithHitler,butthatwinningthewaristhefirstconsideration.[He]understandsthisandwill,inallprobability,willinglygivein.ItisrumouredthatanumberofthegeneralswhohavebeenindisgracewillsoonbebroughtontothestaffagainandthatField-MarshalKeitelwillbemoved[fromhispositionaschiefofthehighcommand];however,sofarthereseemsnocertaintyastothesematters.’InMay1943anotherJapanesegeneral,KiyotomiOkamoto,wasamemberofalargedelegation

thattravelledbyrailacrosstheSovietUnion,withwhichhiscountrywasnotyetatwar.Thevisitorscompiledexhaustivenotesoneverythingtheysawfromtheirtrain,countingboxcars,oiltankers,aircraftonairfields,forafatdossiertheyproudlypresentedtoHitler,andwhichwasafterwardsreadbyTokyo,ArlingtonHallandBletchley.Alltheseaudiencesmayhavequestionedthevalueofsuchnuggetsas‘2ndfield(about4kilometresnorthofAlmaAtastation).OneDouglaspassengerplaneandabout40single-seater,slowtrainingplanesofuncertaintype,awirelessstationandthreetwo-storeybarracks.Oneplanetakingoff,landingandtakingoffagain.’Therewerepagesofsuchstuff,characteristicofintelligenceflannelofallnationalities.InjusticetotheJapanese,however,theiroverallestimateoftheSovietUnion’scombatpower,

compiledinTokyo,wasbothhonestandreasonablysound,giventhatitwasdraftedforapartlyNazireadership:‘TheStalinregime,throughablemanagementandcarefulmobilization,hasralliedallresourcesofthestatetocombatGermany.ThearmyandpeoplearefirmlybehindStalinandwarconsciousnessisrunninghigh.’Theforeignminister,nowMamoruShigemitsu,wrotetoŌshimaonthesamedate–28April1943–sayingthattheTokyogovernmentfearedthat‘Germanymayloseallherself-relianceandthatinthemeantimeAmericaandEnglandwillbeleftfreetostrengthentheirstrikingpowerandfinallytolaunchagreatoffensive.’ŌshimawasurgedtoexerthisinfluenceandpassontotheNazisJapan’sstrategicassessments,toencourageGermanytopursueaseparatepeacewiththeSoviets.ItwasthreemonthsbeforetheambassadorhadanotherpersonalmeetingwithHitler,buton30

July,followingthedisasteratKursk,theJapanesedidindeedurgepeace.Germany’sFührerdismissedthisfantasy,saying,‘Don’tyouknowthatifIdid[theSoviets]wouldbeyondanyperadventureofdoubtreachout,clasphandswiththeUnitedStates,andsqueezeyouJapanesetodeath

betweenthem!’HitlerlamentedItaly’scollapse,saying,‘Whatanally!IfwehadonlyhadyouJapaneseinthe[geographical]positionofItalywewouldassuredlyalreadyhavewonthisstruggle.’FollowingafurthermeetingattheWolf’sLairon9October1943,ŌshimatoldTokyothatHitlerhadtoldhimthathewas‘inclinedtobelieve’theAllieswouldlandintheBalkansinsteadofmovingnorthinItaly.OnRussia,Hitlersaid,‘wearemakingourstand…but,dependingonwhetherornottheSovietforcesresumetheoffensive,wemayfallbacktothelinewhichwehavepreparedontheDnieper.Inthenorth,iftheworstcomestotheworst,wecanretiretoaseconddefencelinewhichwehavepreparedacrossthenarrowstripoflandadjoiningLakePeipus…IthinkitthebestpolicyfirsttostrikeattheAmericanandBritishforcesassoonaswegetthechance,andthentoturnontheSoviets.’InNovember1943Ōshimawirelessedasixteen-pagereporttoTokyo,describingatourhehadjust

madeoftheAtlanticWall,anddetailingthelocationsofsixteenGermancoastaldefencedivisions.Heemphasisedtheabilityofstrongpointstofightindependently,andmadeplaintheGermanexpectationthattheAllieswouldlandinthePasdeCalais.AnAmericancodebreakerborewitnesstothethrillthatranthroughhimasheworkedonreadingtheJapanesedispatch,andunderstooditsmomentoussignificance:‘Withinafewhoursthemagnitudeofwhatwasathandwasapparent…Iwastooelectrifiedtosleep.’ŌshimasuggestedtoRibbentropthattheBritishandAmericansmightmakeapreliminarydescent

onNormandyorBrittany.On23January1944HitlertoldhisJapanesefriend,‘beyondanydoubtthemosteffectivearea[forthemainlanding]wouldbethe[PasdeCalais]’.Theambassador ’sFebruary,AprilandearlyMayreportsontheinvasionprospectsignoredNormandy,anditwasobviousthatŌshima’sconfusionofmindreflectedthatoftheentireAxishighcommand.On19MayhetoldTokyothatanAlliedlandingmightbestagedinDalmatia,NorwayorsouthernFrance.Thefollowingday,hesuggestedthatitcouldtakeplaceinSweden,‘howeverJodl[operationschiefofOKW]toldmethathedoesnotthinkasIdo’.AsecondAlliedsourcewithintheJapaneseembassyalsodeservesmention.Itcameonstreamin

March1944whenOp-20-G,withassistancefromHughAlexander ’steamatBletchley,brokethe‘Coral’navalattachécipher.Vice-AdmiralKatsuoAbe,chiefofthenavalmissiontoGermany,wasamoreintelligentandcertainlymuchmorescepticalobserverthanhisambassador–Op-20-Greferredtohimgratefullyas‘HonestAbe’.HetoosentcopiousreportstoTokyo,especiallyinformativeaboutDönitz’snewTypeXXIandTypeXXIIIU-boats,bothwithveryhighunderwaterspeeds,andfittedwithSchnorkelbreathingdevices.Abegavedetailedtechnicalspecificationsforthesubmarinesandreportedregularlyontheirproductionschedules,especiallyafterpersonalbriefingsbyDönitzandhisconstructorsinAprilandAugust1944.Bythatstageofthewar,Abe–unlikeŌshima–wasinnodoubtoftheinevitabilityofGermandefeat,assertingon21August:‘IregrettosaythatitishardtoseewhattheGermanscandothatwillsufficetobridgetheyawninggapbetweenthematerialand

militarystrengthofthemselvesandtheiropponents.’HereportedontheseriousimpactofAmericanbombingonGermanoilproduction–acrisisaboutwhichAlbertSpeeralsobriefedŌshimaon18August.Alliedcommandershadbynowbecomeaseagerastheambassadorhimselfforhismeetingswith

Nazileaders,whichwereasusefulasholdingsuchconversationsontheirownaccount.GeorgeMarshallacknowledgedlaterthattheJapaneseenvoyhadbecome‘ourmainbasisofinformationregardingHitler ’sintentionsinEurope’.On27MayŌshimareportedonhislatestsessionwiththeFührerattheBurghof:‘Judgingfromrelativelyominousportents,IthinkthatdiversionaryactionswilltakeplaceagainstNorway,Denmark,thesouthernpartofwesternFrance,andthecoastsoftheFrenchMediterranean–variousplaces.Afterthat,whentheyhaveestablishedbeachheadsontheNormanandBrittanyPeninsulasand[have]seenhowtheprospectsappear,theywillcomeforwardwiththeestablishmentofanall-outSecondFrontintheareaoftheStraitsofDover.’Eisenhowerreadthismessageon30May.Here,fortheAlliedhighcommand,wasthemost

authoritativepossibleconfirmationofGermanconfusionofmind,intensifiedbyAllieddeceptions.Andthegusherofpricelessinsights,ofpreciousreassurance,continuedtopourforthafterD-Day.On8JuneŌshimareportedtheGermanssayingthattheNormandyinvasionstillleftthemuncertainwhethertheAllies‘willlaterattemptalandingintheCalais–Dunkirkarea’.NextdayheaddedthattheGermans‘arenowontheirguardagainstlandingsintheCalaisandSaintMalodirections’.On6JulyhemessagedTokyo:‘GermanyisstillwaitingforPatton’s[army]grouptoengageinasecondlandingoperationintheChannelarea’;amonthafterD-Day,the‘Fortitude’deceptionwasstillworkingitsspell.On20July,withinsevenhoursofthebombexplosioninHitler ’sheadquartersŌshimawasoneof

thefirsttoconfirmtheFührer ’ssurvival.Onthe23rd,afteralongtalkwithRibbentrophetoldTokyo:‘TheattemptonHitler ’slifeisthemostseriousoccurrenceforGermanysincetheoutbreakofthewar.’Itwasalwaysknownthattherewereanti-NazisamongtheoldPrussiangeneralstaff,hesaid,buttheyhadremainedmuteaslongasthewarwasgoingwell.However,‘morerecently,thewarsituationhasdeterioratedtothepointofproducingsuchaneventasthatwhichhasjusttakenplace.Judgingfromtheinformationwhichhas…sofarbeenmadeavailable,thegroupofrebelswasnotverylarge…However,inmyopinionitwillalmostinevitablyhaveunpleasantdomesticandforeignrepercussions…AlthoughGermanyhasreceivedhardblowsbothwithinandwithout,thefightingspiritoftheGermanleadersishigh,andtheycontinuetoexerttheirbesteffortstobringthepresentwartoanendwithaclear-cutvictory.’Inthespringof1945ŌshimasentdetailedreportsonlivingconditionsinBerlin,becausetherewas

nothingmoreusefultobesaidaboutstrategy.InMarch,RibbentropinformedthebaronoftheoutcomeoftheYaltaconference,givingdetailsderivedfromanOKW/ChidecryptofamessagefromthePolishgovernmentinexile.ŌshimaconductedalastphoneconversationwiththeNazi

foreignministerbeforehimselfleavingthecapitalforsouthernGermanyon14April,tellingTokyothat‘itwasplannedtotransferthehighcommandandgovernmenttothesouthaftertheyhavewatcheddevelopmentsalittlelonger ’.ThoughEisenhower ’sheadquartershadneglectedŌshima’swarningsbefore‘AutumnMist’–theDecember1944Ardennesoffensive–theyreadilysuccumbedtohistalkofaNazifortressinthesouth,whichskewedAnglo-Americanstrategyintheclosingdaysofthewar.ŌshimaprovidedtheAllieswiththeirmostimportantinsiderglimpsesofattitudeswithinHitler ’s

circle.Ifhisreportswereoftenmistaken–becauseNazileaderstoldhimfalsehoods,someofwhichtheybelievedthemselves,especiallyabouttheirownmilitaryprospects–theyprovidedeverythingthatcouldbeaskedofanyinformant:thetruthasitseemedatthetimetoaprivilegedspectator.HewasmoreusefultoWashingtonandLondonthanwouldhavebeenanyNaziorJapaneserenegade,betterplacedthantheRedOrchestraor‘Lucy’Ring.Hewasthespywhoneverknewthathespied,theunknowingbetrayer.

3 PRODUCTIONLINES

PeterCalvocoressi,oneofBletchley’scodebreakersandlaterchroniclers,wrotethatfromlate1942onwards,iftheglobehadbeencombedtoidentifythepeoplewhoknewmostabout–forinstance–everyoperationalandorganisationalaspectoftheLuftwaffe,thesewouldhavebeenfoundnotinGermany,butinBritainandAmerica.ThesamewastrueoftheAbwehr,andindeedofeveryotherbranchoftheenemy’sarmedforcesandinstitutions–thoughemphaticallynotoftheGermaneconomy.SignalsintelligencebecamesocentraltotheAlliedwareffortthatfrom1944onwardstheAmericansbecamereluctanttobombidentifiedJapanesewirelesscommunicationscentres,becausetheiroutputseemedmoreusefultoAlliedmilitaryoperationsthantothoseofNippon.Between1942and1945theUnitedStatesspenthalfabilliondollarsayearonsigint,andthishasbeenjustlydescribedasitsmostcost-effectiveinvestmentoftheconflict.AfterPearlHarbor,HenryStimsonrecognisedthatbeyondthetinyteamofSIScryptanalystswho

hadbrokenPurple,itswirelessintelligenceapparatuswasweak:onlyfourofficerswereworkingonJapanesearmytraffic,andtheSignalCorpsleasedjustthirteentabulatingmachines–IBMwouldneversellthem–againstfourhundredin1945.On19January1942StimsonappointedasaspecialassistantBrooklyn-bornlawyerAlfredMcCormack,withabrieftoexaminethewholefieldofsigint.Thereaftereventsmovedswiftly.TheSignalsIntelligenceServicemovedfromWashington’sMunitionsBuildingtoaformergirls’school,ArlingtonHall–‘thesaltmines’–thereafterthehubofmilitarydecryptactivities,whichsoonoccupiedseveraldozenbrickandwood-framebuildingsinthegrounds,andeventuallyemployed7,000people,manyofthemciviliansandwomen.ASectionhandleddiplomaticandclandestinematerial.BSectionstudiedtheJapanesearmy;itscardindex

eventuallyidentified46,000enemyofficers.C–‘BunkerHill’–addressedGermanmaterialforwardedfromBletchleyPark.ThearmyalsoassumedsoleresponsibilityforhandlingJapanesediplomatictraffic.Despiterepeatedprotests,however,untilJune1944ArlingtonHallhadnocontroloverinterception,whichremainedthejealouslyguardedbailiwickoftheSignalCorps,whoseinterceptarmandcryptographicschooltookoverVintHillFarmsatWarrenton,Virginia.Theneedtocreateanetworkofinterceptionstationsalmostfromscratchwasaserioushandicapforthearmycryptanalystsuntilthelaststageofthewar.Col.CarterClarkewasappointedtodirectanewandhighlysecret‘SpecialBranch’basedatthe

Pentagon,withMcCormackashisassistant,toanalyseUltramaterialfrombothArlingtonHallandBletchleyPark.McCormackrecognisedthearmy’sdireshortageoftrainedintelligenceofficers.Someseniorgenerals,includingGeorgeMarshall,wereslowtocorrectaweaknesstheysharedwithmanyprofessionalsoldiersofallnationalities–theythoughttoomuchaboutwhattheythemselvesmightdo,notenoughabouttheenemy’scapabilitiesandintentions.ColonelMcCormack,ashebecame,hiredandputintouniformhundredsoflawyers,whomhebelievedhadtheappropriatetrainingandskillstoanalysecomplexdata.HevisitedBletchleyinApril1943withLt.Col.TelfordTaylorandWilliamFriedman,andthereafteradoptedmanyBritishproceduresforhandlingUltramaterialandensuringitssecurity–thoughneverBritishratesofpay.AwomangraduateservingatBletchleystartedon£2aweek,whileherAmericancounterpartearnedfivetimesasmuch.SpecialBranchgrewtoaneventualstrengthoffourhundred,withTaylorheadingitsmostimportantout-stationatGC&CS;thishadadirectteleprinterlinktothePentagon,andeventuallyaclusterofBritish-builtbombesunderitsowncontrol.MostoftheAmericancontingentprovedtobeexceptionallyablepeople,whomadeanotablecontribution.StuartMilner-Barrysaidthattheircomingwas‘oneoftheluckiestthingsthathappenedtoHut6’.Inthespringof1943anagreementwassignedwhichbecameknownasBRUSA,andwasjustly

describedastheclosestintelligence-sharingpactinhistorybetweenanytwonations.Thoughnotalwaysimmaculatelyobservedoneitherside,itssuccesswasastonishing.Inmid-AugustascramblerwasinstalledontheWashington–Londonphoneline,enablingintelligenceofficersofthetwonationstoconversewhenanissuewasimportantenough.Aseriesofmajorconferenceswasheld,atwhichBritishandAmericanofficersexchangedinformationandtechniques.Cryptanalysiswasaworldofitsown,usingalanguageincomprehensibletothoseoutsideit,but

AmericanandBritishpractitionerscametounderstandintimatelyeachother ’sdoingsanddifficulties.InOctober1943,forinstance,theJICinLondonnotedthatUSforcessignalledsomeweatherreportsinplainlanguage,whiletheBritishencryptedthesameinformation.Thisposedadangerthatenemycodebreakerscouldexploitthematch,andtheAmericansdulystartedtoencryptallmeteorologicalinformation.LikewiseamemorandumfromtheBritishSLUinWashingtontoBletchleyParkon16February1945offeredpracticaladviceofakindwhichflewtoandfrodailyacrosstheAtlanticinthe

latterpartofthewar:‘notedrefJN-11Ransuuban.Forrecoveryofstripdigitsastraightadditiveattackhasprovedtobesuperior;withparticularemphasisontheheavyuseofHatsuandrelatedgroupsinthefirstposition.Speedofrecoveryisdependentupontheconditionofthecodeoncethestripsareidentifiedandcompleted,recoveryofthedailykeyonacompleteday’strafficproceedsrapidlybystripping.’ItwasagreedatanearlystagethattheAmericansshouldmajoronJapanesetraffic,whileBletchley

ParkmaintainedtheleadroleonGermanmaterial,andtrawledneutralstates’messages.AnOSSofficerwhourgedburglingsafesinVichytosecureitscodeswaspolitelyinformedthatthiswasunnecessary–theyhadlongsincebeengiventotheAlliesbysympatheticFrenchintelligenceofficers.Londonalsogaveadustyanswerin1943whenArlingtonHallrequestedhelpwithitsdiscreetmonitoringofsomeSoviettraffic:thiswouldhavebreachedChurchill’sprohibitiononespionageagainstanally.TheBritishwerealwayscautious,perhapsextravagantlyso,aboutadoptinganycourseofmilitaryornavalactionthatmightbetraytheUltrasecret,whileUSforcesweremorewillingtotakethesecurityriskinvolvedinexploitingprospectivetargetinginformation.Forthemostpart,however,theUSdisplayedconsiderablesophisticationinprotectingUltra.When

aJapanesePurplesignalwasbrokenon28December1942,requestingSpanishdiplomatsinWashingtontoretrieveontheirbehalfhalfamilliondollarsincashleftintheirabandonedembassysafe,theAmericansmadenoattempttoseizethemoney,incasethesignalwasacoat-trailingrusetodiscoverwhetherTokyo’strafficwasbeingmonitored.On18April1943,afterUSfightersshotdowntheaircraftcarryingAdmiralIsorokuYamamoto,theofficialAmericanbulletinmerelyroutinelyreportedthedestructionoffourJapaneseplanesintheNorthSolomons.Nohintwasgiventhattheattackersknewthesupremeimportanceofonepassenger,anactofforbearancethatproveddecisiveinlullingJapanesesuspicionsofacommunicationsbreach.ItwaslefttoTokyotoannounceYamamoto’sdeath.Inthespringof1944theAmericanswentevenfurthertoreassuretheJapaneseabouttheirown

security.On1April,twoImperialJapaneseNavyflying-boatsweredamagedinatropicalstorm,enroutefromPalautoDavao.OneofthemcarriedAdmiralMineichiKoga,commander-in-chiefoftheCombinedFleet.InthesecondwasVice-AdmiralShigeruFukudome.WhenthisplaneditchedoffCebuisland,Fukudomeflounderedashorewithouthisattachécase,containingJapanesecodesandimportantstrategydocumentsinplainlanguage.GuerrillasonCebualertedtheAmericans,whogottotheplane.AUSsubmarinerushedtheattachécasetotheAustralianArmy’sintelligencedepartment,whereFukodome’scodesanddocumentswerephotographed.ThenthecasewashastenedbacktothecrashareaforlocalpeopletohandovertotheJapanese,claimingthattheyhadchanceduponit.Fukudomehimselfeventuallygothome,tobeforgivenandpromoted.TheJapanesenavyneversuspectedthatitshaulofsecretshadpassedthroughAmericanhands.Therewasa1945debatebetweenBletchleyandArlingtonaboutwhethertocommitAlliedbombers

inEuropetoattackkeyGermanlandlinetelephoneexchanges,whoselocationsandimportanceUltrahadidentified.Aneventualdecisionwasmadetogoahead,butsubjecttoconsultationbetweenthetargetingofficersandBletchley’sHut6–withacut-outthroughSHAEFintelligence–beforeeachsuchattackwaslaunched.ThesecuritysystemwithinthearmedforcesprotectingUltraworkedremarkablywell:themostsignificantthreatstoitprovedtobenotAxisintelligenceofficers,butinsteadrecklesslyindiscreetAmericanjournalists.

ItwouldbewrongentirelytoidealisetheconductofthevastAlliedinterceptionandcodebreakingstaffs,mostofthemveryyoungmenandwomenperformingmonotonousandrepetitivetasks.In1944–45theBritishteleprinterinterceptcentreatKnockholtinKentsufferedsevereproblemsfromstaffdiscontent:itssixhundredstaffersresentedtheirlowpayandpoorworkingconditions;absenteeismrosesharplyatweekends,andnomanagerbotheredtoexplaintothegirlswhytheirworkmattered.MeanwhileLt.EdParksofthedisseminationunitatArlingtonHallscrawledanearnestlittlenoteon16October1944:‘Inthelastfewdaysourworkhastailedoffconsiderably…Weturnedoutatotalof15,739messagesinthe15days…Butnowthattheworkisnottoopressing,weshouldmakeaspecialefforttokeepallthemessagesgoingthroughpromptly.Inoticedlastweekatendencytoleaveearly,andtoplayaroundwhenthereweremessageswaitingtobetyped.Ithinktheimpressiongivenisbad…Itseemstomeessentialtorememberthattheworkwearedoingisofvitalimportancetotheconductofthewar…[and]deservesourbestefforts.’Fromlate1942onwards,theBritishandAmericanswereprocessingenemydecryptsinindustrial

quantities,thoughinter-servicerivalriesandjealousiescontinuedtohamperUSactivity.TheambitiousandexpensivebombesdesignedandbuiltfortheUSArmywereafailure,butthenavymodelsattainedhighertechnicalstandardsthantheBritishones,andwereproducedinnumbersunimaginableinChurchill’sstraitenedisland:foraperiodNationalCashRegisterofDayton,Ohio,wascompletingthreeorfoureachday.Op-20-Gbombes,twicethesizeoftheirBritishcounterparts,begantoachieveoperationaleffectivenessonlyinAugust1943,butbyAprilthefollowingyeareighty-sevenwereinservice,whichprovedsubjecttofewertechnicalfailuresthantheirBletchleycounterparts.Thus,theytookoverfromHut8anincreasingshareoftheburdenofreadingKriegsmarinetraffic.BletchleyPark’sstaffheldOp-20-Ganditscryptanalystsinthehighestrespect.Until17September1941,whenGC&CSmadeitsfirstsignificantbreaksintoWehrmachttraffic,

mostUltrainformationcamefromthearmy-Luftwaffekeys,andfromreadingtrafficdispatchedthroughtheItalians’Hagelin-C38mmachines.BetweenDecember1941andMay1942,somethirtytofortyUltramessagesadayweretransmittedtooverseascommandsbyHut3.Thereafter,however,therewasarapidincrease–toeightyadaybetweenJuneandOctober,thentoahundredbyApril1943,alevelwhichitsustainedthereafter,toachieveacumulativewartimetotalof100,000decryptscirculatedtooperationalheadquarters.This,inturn,wasonlythesmallproportiondeemedusefulor

relevanttocommanders,among90,000decryptsamonthprocessedatBletchleyin1944–45.Thephysicalandmentalstrainonthecodebreakersnevereased.Whilemachinesaidedtheir

labours,theforemostweaponsinthebattleswagedbyBletchley,Op-20-GandArlingtonHallwerealwayshumanbrains.Readingenemysignalsseldombecameaneasyorroutinetask–duringthelasttwoyearsofthewar,StuartMilner-BarrysaiditwasimpossibletoaspiretoreadmorethanhalfofallincomingGermanintercepts,evenunderthemostfavourablecircumstances.‘Therewasaperpetualexcitementabouteachday’sbreaks,atwhatevertimeofdayornighttheymightcome.Tothechess-player ’–hehimselfhadrepresentedEnglandbeforethewar–‘itwasratherlikealong-runningtournamentwithseveralroundsbeingplayedeachday,andneveranycertaintythattheluckwouldcontinuetohold.’EffortstoreadtheItaliannavy’shighertraffic,encryptedthroughbookcodes,wereabandonedasa

failure,adecisioninfluencedinpartbythefactthatItalianwarshipshadceasedtobeathreattoAlliedoperations.Manyofthoseengagedincodebreakingwereobligedtotakesickleaveatintervalstoobtainarespite.InJuly1943JohnTiltmanofBletchleyandWilliamFriedmanofArlingtonHallexchangedletters,inwhichbeyonddiscussingthedifficultiesofbreakingJapanesearmytraffic,bothacknowledgedthestressesoftheirrole.TherewereneverenoughqualifiedstaffavailableoneithersideoftheAtlantic.FriedmanmentionedthatCommanderJosephWenger,nowchiefofOp-20-G,hadmissedascheduledmeetingwithhimbecause‘hewasoutattheNavalhospital.Isuspectthathewillhavetotakearestforseveralweeks.Asamatteroffact,Ihadbeenwonderinghowlonghewouldbeabletostandupunderthestrain…foranumberofmonthsnowIhavewatchedhimgodownnoticeably.’Nevershoulditbethoughtthatfreedomfromphysicaldangerprovidedthecodebreakerswithapassporttoa‘cushy’war.Asfortheimpactofthishugeeffortonthebattlefield,untilthesummerof1942theBritishEighth

Army’scommanders-in-chiefandtheirstaffsinNorthAfricaweresceptical,evencontemptuous,aboutintelligence.Theycouldassertinself-justificationhowpatchywastheservicetheyreceived–forinstance,BletchleywarnedthatRommelwouldlaunchanattackinMay,butdidnotgiveanycluewhere.BoththeParkandseniorofficersintheMiddleEastwereslowtograspthescaleoftheAfrikaKorps’logisticalproblems.TheappointmentofGen.SirBernardMontgomeryasC-in-CinJunecoincidedwithanimportantincreaseintheUltraflow.ALuftwaffesignal,forinstance,statedthatAxisday-bombingofMaltawastobeabandoned.Thetheatreairintelligencechief,Group-CaptainHarryHumphreys,immediatelyrecognisedthismeanttheGermanswouldtransfertheirMesserschmittBf109fightersfromescortdutiestoNorthAfrica,andthusfeltabletogetSpitfiresshiftedfromdefendingMaltatosecuringairsupremacyoverEgyptandLibya.BreaksinItaliantrafficempoweredtheRoyalNavyandtheRAFtodevastatetheGermans’Mediterraneansupplyline,sinkingforty-sevenshipstotalling169,000tonsbetweenJulyandOctober,whileGermanmessagesfamouslywarnedtheBritishoftheimpendingAxisthrustatAlamHalfainAugust.Thiswasamong

themostimportantintelligencebreakthroughsofthewar,andenabledMontgomerytoachievehisfirstvictory.BeforetheBritishlaunchedtheirownAlameinoffensiveon23October1942,onthe7thGen.

GeorgStumme,Rommel’sdeputy,toldhisofficersthatthemainaxisoftheforthcomingBritishattackwouldbebetweenRuweisatandHimeimat,confirmedon20Octoberas‘thenorthernpartofoursouthernsector ’,togetherwithanadvancealongthecoastroad.ThisviewwasstronglyinfluencedbyelaborateBritishdeceptionoperationsinthesouth,andMontgomery’sofficersthereaftercongratulatedthemselvesontheclevernessoftheirschemeinvolvingdummytanksandpipelines;butitdeservesnoticethattheGermanswereabletoswitch21stPanzerDivisiontothenorththreedayslater,beforetheBritishachievedtheirbreakthrough.Deceptionswereonlyserviceableuntilanattackershowedhisrealhand.AfterMontgomery’svictoryhiscritics–prominentlyincludingRalphBennettofBletchley’sHut3

–arguedthatthesluggishBritishpursuitwasinexcusablewhendecryptsflaggedinrealtimealmosteverymovementtheretreatingGermansmade.Bennettwroteof‘thefierceindignationanddismayfeltthroughouttheHutatMontgomery’spainfullyslowadvancefromAlameintoTripoli,incomprehensibleinthelightofthemassofUltraintelligenceshowingthatthroughouthisretreatRommelwastooweaktowithstandseriouspressure…[Montgomery’s]delayseemedtocastdoubtonthewholepointofourwork.’Fromthebeginningof1943onwards,mattersgotbetter:EighthArmy’scommanderandhisstaffdevelopedcompleteconfidenceinUltra,andbecamemoreproficientaboutexploitingitonthebattlefield.FormonthsaftertheAmericansarrivedinNorthAfricainNovember1942,theymadethesame

mistakesthattheBritishhaddoneayearortwoearlier.OneofRommel’sintelligenceofficerspaidtributetothevalueofGermanvoice-monitoringofUSArmychannels:‘theywerestillhappy-go-luckyandcarelessoftheirsignalsprocedure’.AsforUltra,ayoungBritishintelligenceofficerwhovisitedAlliedheadquartersinAlgierslamentedthatEisenhower ’sstaff‘didnotknowwhattheyoughttobedoingandhadlearnedawholelotofwrongthingstheyoughtnottohavebeendoing’.Bletchley’sinputwasscrappyintheearlypartoftheTunisiancampaign,butmoreskilledandexperiencedintelligenceofficersinAlgierscouldhaveanticipatedRommel’spunishingFebruary1943assaultontheKasserinePass.ThesackingofBrigadierEricMockler-Ferryman,Eisenhower ’sBritishintelligencechief,wasajustpenaltyforhisfailure.ThereafterinNorthAfrica,SicilyandItaly,theAlliesusuallyhadanextensiveknowledgeoftheGermans’strengthsanddeployments.

BletchleyParkbecamemarginallylessuncomfortablein1942,whenfoursteelandconcreteblocks,designated‘A’to‘D’,replacedsomeofthewoodenhutments.ApneumatictubesystemusedinLondondepartmentstoreswasintroducedforshiftingmessagesbetweensections,replacingtheearliertray-and-pulleyoperation–thiswasabrainchildofHughAlexander,whoinhisearlierlife

hadbeenheadofresearchfortheJohnLewisstorechain.AlexandersupplantedTuringasheadofHut8,notbecausethelatterwasthevictimofanypersecutionorpalacecoup,butbecausehewastoodisorganisedahumanbeingtoadministeranything.Itwasrecognisedthathisastoundingintellectwasbestlefttoroamfree.RalphBennetthaspaintedavividportraitofthedailyroutineoftheteaminHut3,whichkeptits

nameevenwhenmovedintoabrickbuilding.Itwasitsinmates’functiontotranslateandrendercoherentbrokenorpart-brokensignals,withincreasinginputfromofficersoftheUSSpecialBranchwhowerenowattachedtoseveralBletchleysections.ThecodebreakersknewalmostnothingaboutAlliedoperations–thecontextofcampaigns–andthussawthewarthroughapeculiarlynarrow,enemyprism.‘WeknewmuchmoreaboutmostGermandivisionsandsomeGermangenerals,’wroteBennett,‘thanwedidaboutanyonourownside…[Rommel’s]90thLightDivisionbecamesodailyanacquaintanceduringtheAfricancampaignthattherewasevenasortoftemptationtorejoicewhenitscoredasuccess.’HealsoemphasisedanimportantconstraintonUltra’spracticalutility:‘Nomessagehadmoreauthoritythanthatoftheofficerwhosentit,normorereliabilityasaguidetohissuperiors’intentionsthantheextentoftheknowledgetheyallowedhimtohave.’Againandagain–forinstancewhendecryptscausedtheAlliestoexpectaGermanevacuationofsouthernItalyinSeptember1943,wheninsteadKesselringstoodandfought–regularaccesstoenemytrafficendedinamisreadingofHitler ’sintentions,oftenbecausehechangedhismind.Inthesecondhalfofthewar,however,theAlliescouldplanmostoftheiroperationswith

remarkableconfidencethattheenemyhadnounpleasantsurprisesinstore.OverthreehundredAlliedshipspassedthroughtheStraitsofGibraltarinthethirty-threehoursbeforethe‘Torch’landings,knowingthattheyweremostunlikelytofaceenemyairinterference.TheJanuary1944AnziolandingswerelaunchedwiththeassurancethatKesselringhadnohintofthem,andUltraalsoflaggedhisbigFebruarycounterattackagainstthebeachhead,whichbelatedlyconvincedtheUSArmy’sGen.MarkClarkthatUltrawasareliablesourceofintelligence.TheAlliesknewbeforetheAugust1944‘Anvil’invasionofthesouthofFrancethatHitleranywayintendedtoevacuatetheregion,whichcausedGen.SirHaroldAlexander,commandinginItaly,tourgethatitwouldmakemoresensetoleavetheinvasionforcefightingwithhisownarmy.OncetheAmericanswereashoreinsouthernFrance,theycouldpursuetheretreatingGermanswithunusualexuberance,becausetheyknewtheyneedfearnocounterattack.BletchleywasbreakingasubstantialportionoftraffictransmittedinsomefiftydifferentWehrmachtandLuftwaffeEnigmakeys,andwasforwardingthefruitstofortysubscribersinAlliedheadquarterseverywherethattheGermanswerebeingfought.Ultranevertoldall,however.ApopularmoderndelusionholdsswaythatGC&CS,throughthe

agencyofTuring’sbombesandthoseoftheUSNavy,madetheAlliesprivytotheenemy’scommunicationsthroughoutthewar,andthatallGermanmessagesofsignificanceweretransmittedbyEnigma.Noneofthisisso.TheWehrmacht’sEnigmatrafficposedongoingdifficulties,anduntil

alatestageofthewarBletchleyremainedvulnerabletodelaysandblackoutsinitsdecryption.InSeptember1944,Hut6solvedonly15percentofarmymessages;inOctober18percent;inNovember24percent.Bycontrast,inSeptember64percentofLuftwaffeinterceptswereread,and77percentinOctoberandNovember.Manydecodesofallkindswereachievedtooslowlytoinfluenceeventsonthebattlefield.Moreover,from1941onwardstheGermanhighcommandtransmittedanever-growing

proportionofitsmostsensitivetrafficbyteleprinter,ofwhichtherewereseveralmodels.ThemostwidelyusedweretheLorenzSchlüsselzusatzSZ40/42‘Tunny’,inBletchleyparlance,andtheSiemens&HalskeGeheimschreiberT-52–‘Sturgeon’.Thesesystemsworkedon-line,incontrasttoEnigma’soff-lineoperation,andemployedtheso-calledVernamcipher,anon-Morselanguage.WhenBritishinterceptorsrecordeditsincomprehensiblestutteracrosstheether,inAugust1941aBletchleyteamledbyCol.JohnTiltmanbegantoprobeitssignificance.TheymanagedtobreakasinglemessagefromAthenstoViennaforwhichanobligingGermansignallerrepeatedacorrupttext,butthistookthemlittlenearertoreadingthetraffic.Tiltman,adecoratedFirstWorldWarsoldier,wasacryptographicveteranwhoshowedthatnotallthePark’swizardswerecivilianeggheads.Hewasanunusualcolonel:whenanewlyarrivedprivatesoldierrecruitedtoTiltman’ssectionstampedtoattentionbeforehimandsaluted,theofficersetthetonefortheirsubsequentassociationbyhispainedresponse:‘Isay,oldboy,mustyouwearthosedamnedboots?’Thereaftertheyoungmanadoptedplimsolls.Piecebypiece,thoughpainfullyslowly,thecodebreakersatBletchleygropedtowardsasolutionto

ariddleevenmoredensethanthatofEnigma,partlybecausetheylackedaphysicalexampleofthetransmittingmachine.Intheearlymonthsof1942,bysheerintellectualendeavourthePark’sresearchsectioncreatedatheoreticalmodeloftheLorenzSZ40/42.MostcreditforthiswenttoachemistrystudentturnedmathematiciannamedBillTutte,whodeservestobealmostaswell-knownasTuringandWelchman.Hewasbornin1917,thesonofagardenerandacook-housekeeperataNewmarketracingstable.HewonascholarshiptotheCambridgeandCountyDaySchool,thenprogressedtoTrinityCollege.InOctober1941hewasassignedtostudytheTunnytraffic,andspentthemonthsthatfollowedperformingtheextraordinarycerebralfeatofdeducingwhatkindofmachinetheGermansmustbeemployingtoproducethenoisesrecordedbytheinterceptors.Tutteestablishedthattheteleprinterwouldhavetwosetsoffivewheels,oneofthese‘stepping’irregularly,with501settablepinsandafurthertwomotorwheels,betweenthemcreatingarangeofcombinationsmuchgreaterthanthatproducedbyEnigma.Hisastoundingfeat,atriumphofintellectualeffortunassistedbytechnology,causedhisseniorcolleaguestosupporthislatersuccessfulapplicationforaprizefellowshipatTrinity,basedentirelyonhisdoingsatBletchley,thoughtheirnaturewasnotdisclosedtothecollege.NigeldeGreyhailedhiscontributionas‘oneoftheoutstandingsuccessesofthewar ’,andsoitwas.

Establishingthecharacterofthemachinewasanimportantbeginning,butonethatbroughttheBritishonlyalittleclosertoreadingitstraffic.EdwardTravis,BP’schief,observedthattheGermanteleprinter ’soutputwas‘asanalogoustotheothermachineciphersasaMaoriandanEskimo’.InMay1942,Tiltmanacknowledgedthat‘theGeheimschreiber[Siemensteleprinter]isagreatworrytous’.AyoungOxfordmathematician,MichaelCrum,modelledtheT-52,andhisfindingsledthecodebreakerstoconcludethatitpresentedtoogreatachallengetobepursued.Instead,theymustconcentrateallpossibleresourcesontheLorenz–andquickly.ThemoretheGermansusedtheirfast-expandingWANDA-NetzContinentalteleprintersystemfortopsecretcommunications,thelesstheywoulduseEnigmatoencryptthem.ItisremarkablethatBerlin’senthusiasmfortheteleprinterwassogreat,becauseitsvulnerabilityhadalreadybeenexposed–backin1940,bytheSwedishcodebreakerArneBeurling,whotappedintotheStockholmexchangelinkconnectingBerlintoitsforcesinNorway,andbrokeT-52messagesbyamethodologyneverdisclosed.TheSwedishcompanyEricssonbuiltamachineitcalled‘theApp’,toassistBeurling’soperations,andhereadconsiderabletrafficuntilMay1943,whentheGermans,warnedbytheFinnsofwhatwashappening,introducednewkeysandsecuritymeasures.Berlindidnot,however,questiontheintegrityofthewholesystem,andtheBritishknewnothingofBeurling’sactivities.BetweenJulyandOctober1942,byendeavourswhichowedlittletomechanicalassistance,agroup

workingwithinMajorRalphTester ’snewsection,‘theTestery’,readsomeLorenzSZ40traffic,usingahighermathematicalmethodknownatBletchleyas‘Turingery’,afteritsinventor.Thoseresponsibleincludedeighteen-year-oldDonaldMichie,wholatertaughttheBaudotcode,throughwhichmessagesweretransmittedafterVernamencryption,tothefuturestatesmanRoyJenkins;PeterHilton,atwenty-one-year-oldOxfordmathematician;andPeterBerenson,whomuchlaterfoundedAmnestyInternational.IncreasinglydisciplinedGermanproceduresmadetheflowofdecryptsirregular:differentkeyswereallocatednamesoffishandmarinecreatures–‘Bream’,‘Grilse’,‘Octopus’andsoon;‘Jellyfish’laterprovedtoincludesomeofthemostmomentousGermanhighcommandmessages.Humanbrainpowerremainedthemainengineoftheteleprintercodebreakersuntilthemiddleof

1943.InJunetheParkbroke114Lorenzsignalsoutof575dispatchedtoBerlinbytheGermanhighcommandinItaly.BletchleyreportedinAugust:‘thequalityoftheintelligencederivedfromFishisofthehighestorder ’.ThoughLorenztrafficwasneverbrokeninanythinglikethesamevolumeasEnigma,itwasofexceptionalimportance,becauseitaddressedtheenemy’smostsensitiveexchanges.Moreover,Bletchley’sdifficultiesanddelaysinbreakingGermanarmyEnigmapersisteduntiltheendofthewar,andTunnyofferedapricelessalternativerouteintomilitarytraffic.Thetransformativedevelopmentforthecodebreakerscame,inevitably,fromtheenlistmentof

machines.ThesewereevenmoreinnovativethanTuring’sbombes,andwerecreatedbyothermindsandhands.MaxNewmanwasbornin1897.HisfatherwasaGermannamedNeumann,andlikethe

Saxe-CoburgshissonchangedhisnameduringtheFirstWorldWar,inwhichheservedbrieflyandreluctantlyasaBritishArmypaymaster.BetweenthewarsNewmangainedaformidablereputationasamathematicianatCambridge,wherehecametoknowTuring.ProfessorPatBlackettdrewhimtoBletchley’sattention,describinghimasafinechess-playerandmusician.NewmanwasinitiallyunwillingtojointhePark,becausehefearedthattheworkwouldbeinsufficientlyinteresting.Whenhegrudginglyacceptedanappointmentattheendof1942,hedidsoonconditionthatheretainedanoptiontoleaveafterayearifhebecameunhappy.Fewmen,howeverdistinguished,daredtomakesuchastipulationinthemidstofaworldwar–andevenfewerfounditaccepted.Newman’sfirstmonthsatBletchleyprovedsofrustratingthatitlookedasifhewouldindeedquit;

hewasnotasuccessasacodebreaker.ButheinitiatedacriticalbreakthroughbystudyingTutte’sanalysisoftheteleprinter ’sworkings,andurgedthatamachinecouldandshouldbeconstructedtotestthe1.6x1,019possiblestartpositionsforitswheelsettings.AlanTuring,newlyreturnedfromalongtriptotheUS,wasnowexploringthescienceofelectroniccircuitry,aswasCharlesWynn-Williams,acircuitspecialisttransferredtoBletchleyfromradarresearchatMalvern.TuringurgedNewmantodiscusshisprojectwithTommyFlowers,aseniorengineeratthePostOffice’sDollisHillresearchstationinnorth-westLondon,whohadplayedamodestroleinthecreationofthebombes.Newmanwasagiftedorganiserofconsiderablediplomaticaswellasintellectualskills.An

AmericanwhoservedatBletchley,SgtGeorgeVergine,describedhimas‘amarvellousfellow’,alwaysopentonewideas:‘Weusedtohaveteapartieswhichweremathematicaldiscussionsofproblems,developments,techniques…atopicwouldbewrittenontheblackboardandalloftheanalysts,includingNewman,wouldcometeainhandandchewitaround,andseewhetheritwouldbeusefulincrackingcodes.’HeassumeddirectionofanewBletchleysection,dubbed‘theNewmanry’,chargedwithidentifyingmoreadvancedmechanicalandelectronicaidstocodebreaking.HecouldclaimcreditforrecognisingthepracticabilityofamachinetoassistinbreakingFishmessages,andforsecuringapprovalandresourcesforthefirstrelativelyprimitivesuchdevicetobebuilt.Thisversion,dubbed‘theRobinson’,wasinspiredbythedesignofWynn-Williams,andbuiltatDollisHillunderthedirectionofengineerFrancisMorell.ThecollaborationofNewmanandWynn-Williams–assistedbyothersofalmostequalgiftssuchasmathematicianJackGood,whohadworkedwithTuringonthebombes–producedasuccessionoftechnologicalmarvelswhichoutclassedanyothercodebreakingaidcreatedoneithersideoftheAtlanticinthecourseofthewar.ThefirstRobinsonwasdeliveredtoBletchleyinJune1943,followedbyadozenstablematesbytheendoftheyear,andmorethereafter.TheRobinsonoperatedasasuper-fastbombe,attackingtheoutputoftheGermanteleprintersbyexploringpunchedtapesphoto-electricallyatthethenfantasticspeedofathousandcharactersasecond.ItenabledtheParktoreadsomeLorenzmessagesintheautumnof1943,andhundredsbythefollowingspring.Itslimitationwasmechanical–thedifficultyofsynchronisingtwo

tapeswhichhadtorunsimultaneously;preventingbreaks;dealingwithrepeatedvalvefailures.TommyFlowerswasimpatientwiththeRobinsonanditsweaknesses.Thisseniortelephone

engineernursedafarmoreambitious,all-electronicvision.Hewasabuilder ’ssonfromtheEastEndofLondon,bornin1905,whowonascholarshiptoatechnicalcollegewherehedisplayedaprecocioustalentformechanicsandscience.HavingjoinedthePostOffice,hespentadecadeworkingontheevolutionofautomatedtelephonesystems.Formuchofthewar,thoughheheldatitleasheadofthetelephoneswitchingdepartment,heplayedaleadingroleinmanufacturingtechnologyforBletchley.ButwhileheforgedacloseworkingrelationshipwithTuring,whooftenvisitedDollisHill,theformidableandinfluentialGordonWelchmantookagainsttheengineer,whowascertainlyno‘gentleman’intheparlanceofthosedays.Welchmantreatedhimwithdisdain,asamereartisanwithideasabovehisstation.FlowersisnonethelessconsideredtohavemadeabrilliantcontributiontorealisingandimprovingupontheconceptsofNewmanandWynn-Williams,bycreatingthenewwonderof‘Colossus’,whichmaybeconsideredthefirstcomputerintheworld.ItisameasureofBletchley’sdifficultieswiththeGermanteleprintersthatwhiletheoutputof‘Fish’

messagesfromtheenemy’shighcommanddoubledinthecourseof1943,thevolumeofdecryptsfell,from330inJanuaryto244inDecember,albeitmanyofhighvaluetoAlliedintelligenceofficers.Flowersgraspedtheimprovementinreliabilitythatcouldbeachievedifhardvalveswereusedinplaceofgas-filledones,andwereneverswitchedoff.HeinitiatedproductionofthefirstColossuswithoutanexplicitdirectivefromtheBletchleyauthorities,whourgedfocusingondeliveryofRobinsons,whichrequiredonlyahundredrelativelyscarcevalves,whileColossusused1,500,andamoreadvanced1945version2,500.MaxNewmanwasalwayssupportiveofFlowers,butotherswerelessso.Theengineer,inhisownfieldanobsessivelikesomanyofthoseinvolvedwithBletchley,wasobligedtousesomeofhisownmoneytopurchasescarcecomponents.WithintenmonthsDollisHill,usingfifteenofitsownengineersandfortytechniciansataPostOfficefactoryinBirmingham,hadbroughtintobeingahugemachinewhichprocesseddataatfivetimesthespeedoftheRobinson.Itwasfirsttestedon25November1943,andenteredserviceatBletchleyinJanuary1944.Flowersafterthewarreceivedanex-gratiapaymentof£1,000,togetherwithanMBE,ashamefullycondescendingrecognitionofhisroleasbegetterofColossus.MostBletchleyhandstestifythathewasthepracticalbrainwhoplayedapivotalroleintranslatingtheconceptsofTuring,NewmanandWynn-Williamsintoreality,andindeedforadvancingthemtoanewlevelofsophistication.ThemostadvancedcodebreakingtechnologyofthewarwasdevisedatBletchley,thoughwhentheAmericansbuilttheirownvariantstheyoftenimprovedupontheoriginals,aswiththeUSNavy’sbombes.ArlingtonHall’s‘autoscritchers’performedsomeofthesamefunctionsasColossus,thoughtheyoperatedagainstEnigmatraffic,andeachcostasmuchasafighter.AnunnamedBletchleystafferpennedadescriptionofhisownfascinationwiththespectacleof

Colossusatwork,amachineofacomplexityandenergysuchasnopreviousgenerationhadever

seen:‘thefantasticspeedofthinpapertaperoundtheglitteringpulleys;thechildishpleasureofnot-not,span,printmainheadingsandothergadgets;thewizardryofpurelymechanicaldecodingletterbyletter(onenovicethoughtshewasbeinghoaxed);theuncannyactionofthetypewriterinprintingscoreswithoutandbeyondhumanaid…periodsofeagerexpectationculminatinginthesuddenappearanceofthelonged-forscore…thefranticchatterofamotorrun,eventheludicrousfrenzyofhostsofbogusscores’.By1945sixhundredstaffwereworkingaroundtheclockattheKnockholtinterceptionstationto

recordGermany’steleprintertraffic.BletchleyParkexpandedfrom3,800personnelin1943to5,600in1944,thento9,000in1945.ThoughEnigmaremainedbyfarthemostproductivesourceofintelligencebyvolume,theteleprinterdecryptsconveyedthemostimportantmessages.TheNewmanryaloneemployedtwenty-sixcryptanalysts,twenty-eightengineersand273WrenstoservicetenColossi,threeRobinsonsandscoresoflessermachines.DollisHillwasbuildingonenewColossusamonth.Atotalof476TunnyteleprinterdecryptswererecordedinMay1944,339inJuly,404inAugust,thenafloodinthelastmonthsofthewar,foragrandtotalof13,500Tunnydecryptsoutof168,000GermantransmissionsinterceptedsinceNovember1942.ThecryptographichistorianRalphErskinehasdescribedthebreakingoftheteleprintertrafficas‘thegreatestcode-breakingfeatofthewar…findingTunny’swheelpatternsandsettingsrequiredthehighestcryptanalyticskillsandinvolvedadvancedstatisticaltechniquesandsomeofthemostcomplexelectronicequipmentofthewar ’.AlthoughitisrighttomarvelatBletchley’sachievement,itisalsoessentialtorecogniseits

limitations,eveninthelasteighteenmonthsofthewar.InFebruary1944,just17percentoftheGermanarmy’strafficwasbeingbroken.AroundhalftheUSNavy’shigh-poweredbombesatMountVernonwerehandlingKriegsmarinetrafficforHut6,becauseBletchley’sresourcescouldnotalonebearthestrain,andsometimesAmericanaidwasalsoneededtoaddressGermanarmy-Luftwaffematerial.AsignificantportionofEnigmatrafficwasbeingreadwithintentotwentyhours,butteleprintedFishmessagesoftentookaweektoread.EachRobinsonwasabletoprocessanaverageofonesignaladay,Colossusfifteen.TheLorenzTunnywasthegoldmineinqualityterms,providingastreamofintelligenceaboutGermanhighcommandthinking,mostimportantlyinadvanceofD-Day.ConsumersatAlliedmilitaryheadquartersreceivedallsuchmaterialwithoutdistinctionas‘Ultra’.

OnlythoseservingattheParkwereawareoftheinfinitevariationsandnuancesinitscryptographicoperations.EvenwithintheEnigmatraffic,therewasneverenoughbombecapacitytoattemptthebreakingofalltheenemy’smessages,andthusdailychoiceshadtobemadeaboutallocationofresources.InthelastyearofthewarAmericanandBritishairintelligenceofficersgrewprogressivelylessinterestedinLuftwaffedecrypts,becausewhattheenemywasdoinghadlittleinfluenceontheiroperationaldecisions.Atsea,UltrahadplayeditscriticalpartinsecuringAllieddominancebothinthePacificandintheWest,andby1944thishadbeenachieved.Bletchleyonce

againlostmuchoftheU-boattrafficinNovemberthatyear,whentheGermansintroduced‘oneboat’ciphers–uniqueencryptionofamessageforasinglerecipient.Moreover,asignificantnumberofKriegsmarineEnigmakeys,suchas‘Pike’,wereneverbroken.By1944–45,however,theAlliesweresostrong,andDönitz’sforcesoweak,thatthisnolonger

mattered.Moreover,theUSNavy’sOp-20-GhadassumedtheleadroleinhandlingU-boatintercepts,becauseofitsgreaterresources.Onland,Ultra’scontributionwasfarmoreoftenstrategicthantactical,becausesomuchmaterialreachedcommandersoutofrealtime:RalphBennettofHut3wroteof‘thefrequentlyrecalcitrantarmykeys’.Evenmorefundamental,whileknowledgeoftheenemy’sstrengthanddeploymentswasimmenselyreassuringtocommanders,itprovidednoassuredpassporttovictory.Fromthelatesummerof1943onwards,forinstance,UltrathoroughlyinformedtheAlliesabouttheopinionsandintentionsofKesselring,commandingHitler ’sconsiderablyinferiorforcesinItaly.ButittoldthemnothingthatenabledBritishandAmericantroopstodefeatKesselring’sarmyuntiltheverylastweeksofthewar.

4 INFERNALMACHINES

IntelligenceaboutenemyweaponssystemsoftenyieldedmorepracticalvaluetotheAlliedwareffortthaninsightsintoHitler ’sthinking.Thefive-yeargrappleintheskybetweentheAlliesandtheLuftwaffe–thechallengebeingtoovercomeGermany’sinvisibleelectronicdefencesaswellasitsfighters–persisteduntil1945,andpromptedendeavoursalmostasdramaticastheBrunevalraid.Athirty-year-oldBelgiandoctornamedAndréMatheof‘ServiceMarc’wasoneofseveralResistanceworkerswhotookextraordinaryriskstoexplorelocalGermannight-fighterdirectionstations.Inthesummerof1942hedispatchedamovingmessagetoLondonpleadingformoreeffectivesupport,andbetterguidanceaboutwhattheBritishwouldliketoknow.Mathe–whoserealidentitywasthenunknowntoMI6–suggestedthattheseriousnesswithwhichtheGermansguardedcertaininstallationsinhisareaimpliedtheirimportance.Heandhiscomradeshadseveraltimesbeenfireduponbysentrieswhilereconnoitringthem,‘fortunatelywithmorezealthanaccuracy…Asfarasourworkisconcerned,itwouldbehelpfulifweknewtowhatextentyouandtheBritishservicesareinterested.WehavebeenworkingsolonginthedarkthatanyreactionfromLondonaboutourworkwouldbewelcometosuchobscureworkersasourselves.Wehopethiswillnotberesentedsince,whatevermayhappenyoucanrelyonourentiredevotionandonthesacrificeofourlives.’OneofMathe’snetwork,alocaljewellernamedWilliBadart,madedetailedsketchesofaSeeburgbomber-plottingtable,afterbribingaBelgianSSguardtogivehimaccesstothefighterdirectiontowerwhileitsLuftwaffecontrollerswereoff-duty,whichgaveusefulaidtoRegJonesandhiscolleaguesattheAirMinistry.Matheprovedthattherewasnothingvacuouslyhistrionicabouthismessagepointingouttherisksofsuchmen’seffortsfortheAlliedcause:hehimselfwasarrestedon31March1943and

executedinthefollowingyear.Somesuchintelligencecouldonlybeassembledbymenandwomenwhocouldphysicallyexamine

relevantGermanequipment.Otherinformation,however,hadtobegatheredbyprobingtheenemy’sdefencesintheair,atmortalperil.Oneofthemostheroicflyingmissionsofthewartookplaceonthenightof2–3December1943.TheBritishestablishedthekeyroleoftheGermans’Lichtensteinairborneradaringuidingtheirnight-fighters.Forsometimethereafter,effortsweremadetoprovokeanencounterwithanight-fighterbysendingloneFerretaircrafttoroamthenightskiesoverFrance,BelgiumandHolland–comparativelyclosetohomefortheRAF–buttheenemyignoredthese.Itbecameplainthatdatacouldonlybeobtainedbydispatchinganinvestigatorymissiondeepintoenemyairspace.Thus,thedecisionwasmadetosendatwin-enginedWellingtonofBomberCommand’s1473WirelessInvestigationFlighttojointhe‘stream’onanightraidoverGermany.TheplanewaspilotedbyTedPaulton,aformercarworkerfromOntario,whosetforthwiththe

almostsuicidalpurposeofinvitingfighterattack,inorderthatelectronicspecialistHaroldJordan–theonlyEnglishmanamongacrewofCanadians–couldmonitoraradarfrequencyof490megacyclesandrecordwhathappened–foraslongashelived.At4.30a.m.,justwestofMainz,‘Lichtenstein’emissionswereindeeddetected.Throughthetenminutesthatfollowed,minutesofappallingtensionandapprehensionfortheWellingtoncrew,JordanmonitoredthestrengtheningsignalsastheGermanfighteredgedcloser,closer,closer.FltSgtBigoray,thewireless-operator,transmittedabriefcodedmessagedraftedbytheradarexpert,reportingwhatwashappening.Then,asGermanradarsignalsswampedhisownheadphones,theEnglishmanshouteddowntheintercomthattheywouldbeattackedatanysecond.Almostinstantlyastreamof20mmcannonshellshammeredintothebomber,whichPaultonflungintoadivingturnastherear-gunneridentifiedaJu-88ontheirtail.Jordan,thoughhitintheshoulder,scribbledanothermessageforEnglandwhiletherear-gunnerkeptfiringattheGermanuntilanincomingburstwoundedhimanddisabledtheturret.Attackscameagainandagain,inflictingfurtherfragmentwoundsonJordan’sjawandeye.Then,suddenly,theywerealone.Thefighterhadvanished,leavingfouroftheWellington’screw

seriouslywounded,theplanecrippled,itsfuselageriddled.Inthecockpit,forthenextthreeandahalfhoursPaultonnursedhisairbornewrecktowardshome.Theportenginethrottlewasshotaway,whileitsstarboardcounterpartwasjammedatfullpower;anaileronandmostoftheinstrumentswerewrecked;thehydraulicswereunserviceable.OnlytheWellington’sgeodeticconstruction,basedonaweaveofmutuallysupportingduraluminstrips–abrainchildofBarnesWallis–enabledittostayintheair.JordanandBigorayfeltasenseofdespair,becauseafterenduringtheirordealandrepeatedlysignallingdetailsoftheGermanfighter ’selectronicemissions,noacknowledgementwastransmittedfrombaseuntil4.55a.m.,andbythattimetheWellington’sreceiverwasdead.At6.45a.m.theycrossedtheFrenchcoastnearDunkirk,andthirtyminuteslatermadeanEnglish

landfall.Paultondecidedthattheaircraftwastoobadlydamagedtoriskanairfieldlanding:theymust

ditchinthesea.Bigoray,hislegsbleedingfrommultiplefragmentwounds,wasobviouslyincapableofmakinganescapefromasinkinghulk,soinsteadbuckledonhisparachuteanddraggedhimselftotherearescapehatch.OverRamsgate,thepilotgavehimthewordtojump.Thewireless-operatordescendedsafely,carryingacopyofJordan’sreport.ThenPaultonbouncedthedoomedWellingtonontotheseatwohundredyardsoffDeal.Itploughedtoawaterloggedstandstill,andthecrewstruggledoutthroughthehatches.Totheirdismay,theyfoundtheirdinghyshottoribbons,andinsteadhadtoclingtothesinkingwreckageuntilrescuedbylocalboatmen.Thiswasararecaseinwhichheroismanddevotiontodutyweresuitablyrecognised:Jordan,wholostaneye,receivedaDSO,PaultonaDFCandBigoraytheDFM.TheWellington’smissionprovidedRAFscientificintelligencewithonemoreamongathousandpiecesforitsjigsawofinformationaboutGermany’sairdefences,securedbyairmenwhoacceptedanencounteragainstoddssuchasfewsecretagentswouldhavecaredtoface.

Yettheoutcomesofothertechnologicalintelligencecampaignsweremoreequivocal,includingoneofthehighestimportance.On15May1942FltLt.DonaldSteventon,amongtheRAF’smostskilledreconnaissancepilots,wasonhiswaytophotographtheGermanBalticportofSwinemündewhenhespottedunusualconstructionactivitybelowhim,ataGermanairfieldonUsedomisland.Hebankedhistwin-enginedMosquitoandmadeashortrunoverPeenemünde,thenanameofnospecialsignificancetotheAllies.WhenSteventon’simageswereexaminedunderthemagnifiersoftheRAFMedmenhamphotographicinterpretationcentre,theycouldmakenothingofthreelargecircularembankments:thePeenemündephotographswerefiled.Itwasonlyelevenmonthslater,attheendofApril1943,afterthreemorereconnaissancesortieshadbeenflownoverthesite,thatacommitteecodenamed‘Bodyline’,appointedbyChurchilltostudyasuspectedGermanrocketprogramme,concludedthatPeenemündewasthehubandheartofwhateverdiabolicprojecttheNaziswerefomenting.TheV-weaponsagaremainsoneofthemostfascinatingintelligencestudiesofthewar.German

scientificingenuitycommandedwell-deservedBritishrespect.Assoonasitbecameplain,andwasreflectedinNazipublicrhetoric,thatBerlinwasdevelopinglong-rangeweaponswithwhichtoexactretributionfortheAnglo-Americanbomberoffensive,immenseeffortsbeganinLondontoidentifythenatureofthethreat.By1943thetideofwarhadswungdecisivelytowardstheAllies,whowerenowvastlystrong,especiallyintheair.BletchleyParkwasreadingasubstantialproportionoftheenemy’ssecretwirelesstraffic.Yetdespitetheseadvantages,untiltheGermansbegantofireV-1sandV-2satBritain,Churchill’sintelligencemachineremainedconfusedanduncertainabouttheexactnatureofHitler ’s‘revengeweapon’programme.ThestoryoffersapowerfulcorrectiveforthosewhosupposethatUltralaidbarealltheenemy’ssecrets:herewasanimportantone,whichlargelydefiedpenetration.

TheWehrmachthadbeenexperimentingforyearswithrockets,andtheLuftwaffewithpilotlessplanes.The1939‘OsloReport’toMI6mentionedthesignificanceofPeenemündeasateststation.OnlyinJuly1943,however,didHitler,exasperatedbytheLuftwaffe’sinabilitytoretaliateforRAFandUSAAFattacksonGermany,decidetocommitmassiveresourcestomanufacturingnewweapons,thenstillattheexperimentalstage,thatmightachievewhathismannedaircraftcouldnotbywreakinghavoconBritain.AtthatstagetheBritishhadalreadybeendebatingforsomemonthsthesignificanceofcluesthatreachedthemaboutGermanrocketry.R.V.JonesreadofaconversationbetweenGermanscientists,overheardinaBerlinrestaurantbytheDanishchemicalengineercodenamed‘Elgar ’,mentionedabove,whoreportedregularlytoBroadway.On22March1943,eavesdroppersatthecelebrityPoWcampatTrentParkheardtwocapturedAfrikaKorpsgenerals,CruwellandvonThoma,discussprospectsfortherocketprogramme.Aweeklater,BroadwayreceivedamessagefromaLuxembourgResistancegroup,providingscruffysketchesandfragmentsofinformationsuppliedbyitsownpeopleservingasforcedlabourersatPeenemünde.ThiswasforwardedviaBernbyjuniorofficers,intheabsenceoftheheadofstation,‘Fanny’vandenHeuvel.Hereturnedtotheofficetorebukehisstaffforwastingciphergroupsonsuchnonsense–thenreceivedasignalfromLondonsayingthattheinformationwasoftheutmostvalue,andurgingeveryefforttosecuremoreofthesame.On12ApriltheBritishvice-chiefsofstaffreportedthegistofallthistotheprimeminister,whodecidedtotakethethreatseriously.Heappointedhisownson-in-lawDuncanSandys,ajuniorsupplyminister,toheadanongoinginvestigation.Itsinitialreport,on17May,statedthat‘suchscantevidenceasexistssuggeststhat[aGermanrocketprogramme]maybefaradvanced’.Sandyswaswidelydisliked–AlanBrookepromisedthathewouldresignif,aswaswidelyfeared

thoughitdidnotcometopassinthewaryears,theambitiousyoungupstartwasmadesecretaryforwar.Sandys’appointmenttransferredmanagementoftheBodylineinvestigationfromthehandsoftheprofessionalintelligenceanalystsintothoseofapolitician,andthiswasnoaccident:fromstarttofinish,V-weaponswereviewedinDowningStreetasintenselypolitical.NothingtheNaziscontrivedatthislatestagecouldaltertheoutcomeofthewar,andthusthemilitarythreatfrom‘secretweapons’mustbelimited,giventhatGermanatomicresearchseemedtohavemadelittleprogress.Butitseemedalarminglyplausiblethatarevolutionaryformofconventionalattackcoulddamage‘Overlord’–theloominginvasionoftheContinent–andinflictpainandmiseryonthewearyBritishpeopleofakindthatmightsourthesweetnessofvictory.AnestimatebytheMinistryofHomeSecurity,directedbytheLabourpoliticianHerbertMorrison,suggestedthateachrocketwhichexplodedonLondonmightkillsixhundredpeopleandseriouslyinjureafurther1,200,andthattheGermansmightbeabletolaunchonesuchweaponanhour.Herewascrystal-gazingofafeveredkindthatsustainedalarminWhitehallthroughmanymonthsof1943and1944.TheerrorthatdoggedBritishintelligenceactivityforoverayearwasthattheBodylinegroup

supposedtheGermanstobeworkingonasinglesecretweapon,whereasinrealitytheyweretestingseveraldifferenttechnologies,includingagiantgun.APolishintelligencegroupbasedinParisreportedinAprilonplansfora‘bombwithwings’thatwasevolvingatPeenemünde.InAugustaDanishnavalofficerprovideddetailsofacrashedV-1thathehadinspected,whichappearedtohavenoengine;thispromptedspeculationinLondonthatitmightbeanewvariantofthegliderbombstheGermanswereknowntobebuilding,forstand-offreleasefromLuftwaffemannedaircraft.ThereweresomeharshexchangesbetweenMedmenham’sphotographicinterpretersandR.V.Jones,whoforallhisbrilliancewasnotuniversallybeloved.Heoftenmadesnapjudgementsthatwereinspiredbutalsodisputed,anddeliveredwitharudenessHughTrevor-Roperwouldhaverespected.Today,whenballisticmissileshavebeenetchedontheworld’sconsciousnessforseventyyears,theaerialimagesofwhatwastakingshapeatPeenemündewouldberecognisedbyachild.Butin1943,interpreterspeeringthroughtheirfinelensesacknowledgedthemonlyas‘objects’,or‘verticalcolumns’.Andwhocanblamethem?Againandagainthatsummerandthroughthemonthsthatfollowed,theBodylinegroup–

rechristened‘Crossbow’on15November–stumbledinitsanalysis,becauseoftheirreconcilabilityofthereportedcharacteristicsoftheartefactsseenatPeenemündeandothersitesinPolandandFrance.On29June1943,MI6reportedthattheGermanswerebuildingagiantgunwitharangeof230miles.Therewasalsospeculationaboutarocketthatmightdeliveraten-tonwarhead,adevastatingpunch.TheBritishwerebaffledbysuggestionsthatsuchamissilemightbeliquid-fuelled,becausetheirownscientistsdoubtedthefeasibilityofsuchtechnology.LondonaskedtheAmericansandRussianstocontributewhateverinformationtheyhad,anddrewblank.Washingtonsaidithadnothingtotell.MoscowCentrecouldhavepassedonsomecluescollectedbythe‘Lucy’Ring,butwasnotmuchinterestedinassistingtheBritishwiththeirpunywareffort–asStalinviewedit.AllenDullestransmittedseveral1943OSSreportsaboutPeenemündeandtheGermansecretweaponsprogramme,whichatleastprovidedindependentconfirmationofBritishspeculations,butR.V.Jones’slengthynarrativemakesnomentionofeithertheBernstationchieforOSS,anditmaybethattheAmericancableswereneverpassedtotheBritish.

Inthelatesummerof1943,theonlycommongroundamongtheinterestedpartiesinLondonwasthatPeenemündewasthefocusofhighlydangerousGermanactivities.Thus,onthenightof17Augustitsairfieldcomplex,factoriesandworkshopsweredevastatedby596Lancasters,HalifaxesandStirlingsoftheRAF’sBomberCommand.Asacoastaltarget,theislandwaseasilypinpointed.Theraidwashighlysuccessful,savethatGermannight-fighterswereabletodestroyfortyofthebombers,6.7percentofthosecommitted,whichwereoperatingatextremerangefromtheirhomeairfields.Ontheground,manyinstallationswerewreckedand180Germanscientistsandengineers,aswellasmorethanfivehundredmostlyPolishslavelabourers,werekilled.WernervonBraun,theV-2programme’schiefscientist,hadhopedtoinitiateattacksonBritainbyNovember1943.Thisdeadlinewouldanywayprobablynothavebeenmet,butBomberCommand’sassaultretardeditbyseveralmonths.On27AugustanewreportsignedbyDuncanSandysatlastrecognisedthattheGermanswere

developingtwodifferentweapons,butfierceargumentpersistedabouttheweightofexplosiveeithermightdeliver.DrJoneswasamongthosewhopointedoutthatanycredibleprojectionshowedthattheenemycouldcreateonlyasmallfractionofthedevastationtheRAFandUSAAFwerewreakingdailyinGermany.TherenonethelessseemedsomethingprofoundlysinisteraboutthenotionthattheNazis,byemployinginfernalmachines,mightslaughtertensofthousandsofBritishpeoplewithoutriskingthelivesoftheirownaircrew;suchanassaultappearedspitefulandunfair,whentheoutcomeofthewarwasdecided.Americanbomberswerecommittedtotwoattacksagainstnewsecretweaponbunkersidentifiedat

Watten,inFrance.ThesecausedthesitetobeabandonedbytheGermans,althoughResistancereportsshowedother,apparentlyrelated,constructionactivityelsewhereinthenorthofthecountry.AnMI6informantnamedMichelHollard,atravellingsalesmanforthegazogèneenginesthatpoweredmostFrenchcarsofthetime,collectedextensiveinformationabouttheV-1sitesthroughhis‘Agir ’network.Hollardinspectedonesitehimself,disguisedasalabourer;inthecourseofthewarhecrossedtheSwissfrontierninety-eighttimestodeliverhismaterialforBroadwaybeforebeingbetrayedandcaptured,thoughmercifullyhesurvived.ThePeenemünderaidalsopromptedtheNazistoshiftsecretweaponproductiontounderground

sitesalmostimpervioustoAlliedairattack.Someintelligencereportsaboutthisdevelopment,compiledatenormousriskbyAlliedinformantsinenemyterritory,failedtocompletethetortuouspassagetoLondon:inDecember1943aformerofficeroftheFrenchDeuxièmeBureauacquireddetailsofthedesignofV-2rocketsbeingbuiltattheRAXworksnearWiener-Neustadt.HedispatchedamessageviaMadrid,butthisneverreachedBritishscientificinvestigators,towhomatthattimeitwouldhavebeeninvaluable.On7OctoberanUltradecryptofoneofBaronŌshima’sreportstoTokyo,dispatchedaweek

earlier,describedGermanplanstostartfiringlong-rangeguns,accurateupto250miles,asearlyas

mid-December.ButwhiletheGermanhighcommandtoldŌshimamuchthatwastrue,itwasalsofeedinghimsomefancifulinformation,merelytosustainTokyo’sstomachforthefight.DoubtspersistedwithintheSandysgroupabouthowfarboththeNazis’publicthreatstotheworldandtheirprivatepromisestoalliesweremerepropaganda.TheJointIntelligenceCommitteeinLondonremainedsceptical,asdidLordCherwell,Churchill’sinfluentialscientificadviser.Intheweeksthatfollowed,Ultrapickeduponlytworelevantmilitarysignals,whichconcernedtheflakdefencesatvarioussecretweaponsites.AlmostallGermanexchangesaboutthetechnicalaspectsofV-weaponswereconductedonpaperorbylandline,andthusremainedimpenetrablebyBletchleyPark.Duringthewinterof1943debateinLondonaboutV-weaponsbecamefierceandanxious,because

thereweresofewcertainties.On24OctoberDuncanSandyssuggestedthattheGermansmightsoonbeabletostartfiringrocketsatBritaininlargenumbers,deliveringbyChristmasapossibletotalofanythingupto10,000tonsofexplosives.Thiswasnonsense,nevercreditedbythelikesofRegJones,butitnonethelessalarmedtheprimeminister.BletchleyParkwasorderedtomaintainaspecialwatchonthesignalsofthe14thand15thCompaniesoftheLuftwaffe’sSignalsExperimentalRegiment,whichwereknowntobeinvolvedinthepilotlessaircraftprogramme.AttheendofNovember,newdecryptssuggestedthatwhatlaterbecameknowntoBritishpeopleasthe‘doodlebug’couldflyatbetween200and300mph,for120miles.On4December,theCrossbowcommitteeagreedthatscoresofmysterious‘skisites’whichthe

GermanshadbeenbuildinginthePasdeCalaisandotherpartsofnorthernFrance–Hollard’sAgirnetworkidentifiedahundred–weredesignedforlaunchingthepilotlessaircraft.Itwasagreedthatskisites,socalledfortheirresemblancetoski-jumplaunchingramps,shouldbecomeprioritytargetsfortheRAF’sandUSAAF’sbombers,thoughtheyprovedresistanttoeffectiveairattack.UrgentstudiesalsobeganonadefensiveresponsetotheV-1,basedontheuseoffighters,balloonbarragesandflakguns.InMarch1944anewUltrafragmentshowedthattheGermanshadimprovedtheweapon’saccuracy.Twomonthslater,theBritishnavalattachéinStockholmwasabletostudywreckagefromtwoV-1swhichcrashedinSweden.Ataboutthesametime,aWehrmachtchemicalwarfarespecialistcapturedbytheBritishinItalytoldhisinterrogatorshehadattendedarocketcourseatPeenemünde,andgavedetails–someaccurate,othersfanciful–ofwhathehadlearnedabouttheV-2.InMay1944also,BletchleybrokeanobscureWehrmachtcipherbeingusedtocommunicatebetweenPeenemündeandtheV-2testsiteatBliznainPoland.TheParkwasinstructedasatopprioritytomonitortransmissionsinthiskey,evenatthecostofdivertingstaffandbombesfromotherimportantwork.On13June1944,aweekafterD-Day,thefirstV-1flyingbombs,primitiveCruisemissiles,began

tolandonBritain.Untilthedayoftheirarrival,asbothR.V.Jonesandtheofficialintelligencehistoryreadilyconcede,theBritishhadscantideaeitheroftheprecisenatureoftheweapon,orofhowseriousaperilitrepresented.Thelastpre-attackestimatebytheAirMinistry–on12June–

suggestedthattheGermansmightbeabletodropfourhundredtonsofexplosiveinthefirsttenhours,awildexaggeration.ItcameasarelieftotheBritishandAmericansthattheoffensiveopenedtoolatetodisrupt‘Overlord’,theNormandyinvasion,ashadbeenfeared.Anditsoonbecameapparentthatballoons,fightersandtheinherentlimitationsoftheV-1couldcontaintheassault,deeplyunwelcomethough‘doodlebugs’weretothebatteredBritishpeople.Britain’srulers,particularlythehomesecretaryHerbertMorrison,remaineddeeplyconcerned

aboutthethreatposedbytheGermans’asyetuncommittedrocket,theV-2.ItwasMorrisonwhoattemptedtofrustrateoneofR.V.Jones’sinspiredstrokes–usingDoubleCrossAbwehragentstoinformtheGermansthattheV-1swereovershootingLondon,sothattheyshiftedtheiraimingpointsouthwards:thehomesecretaryobjected,absurdlyandfortunatelyinvain,thatthiswouldrepresentamaligninterferenceintheworkingsofProvidence.InJuly,athisbehestthewarcabinetconsideredaproposalforevacuatingtwomillionLondonersandremovingthegovernmentfromthecapitalifabombardmentprovedsufficientlydevastating.TherewasstillspeculationthattheV-2’swarheadmightbeasheavyastentons.AJulyestimatefromAirMinistryexperts,whotravelledtoSwedentoinspectprototypecrashwreckage,suggestedfivetons.Onthatbasis,theGermanscouldraineighthundredtonsofexplosivesamonthonBritain,thoughthiswouldstillbeonlyafractionofthevolumedescendinguponGermany.RegJonesconcededon16JulythattheGermanshadbroughtatechnicallyimpressivemissiletoastagewhereitcouldprobablymount‘atleastadesultorybombardmentofLondon’,buthethoughtthewarheadunlikelytoweighmuchmorethanaton–asindeeditdidnot.Onthenightof25July1944anunarmedRAFC-47,pilotedbyayoungNewZealander,FltLt.Guy

Culliford,undertookanextraordinarylong-haulflightfromItalytotheremotenessesofNazi-occupiedPoland,accompaniedbyaPolishnavigator,F/OSzrajer.Indeepdarkness,CulliforddescendednearthevillageofZaborow,twelvemilesnorth-westofTarnow.FourhundredGermanswerebivouackedamileaway,andtheairstriponwhichtheDakotalandedwasusedbytheLuftwaffeduringthedaylighthours.Atnight,however,itwassometimesexploitedbythePoles:CullifordwasguidedinbyUHFS-Phone,andsafelymetbyareceptioncommitteeofpartisansarrangedbySOE.TheymanhandledthroughtheaircraftdoorsnineteensuitcasescontainingwreckagefromaV-2whichhadlandedbesidetheriverBug,togetherwithscoresofphotographsanddrawings,andfivemembersofthePolishResistance.Afterjustfiveminutesontheground,Cullifordrevvedhisenginesfortake-off.Andstuck.TheDakota’sbrakesjammed,anditswheelssankintothesoftearth.Onlyafteranhouroffrenzieddiggingbythegroundparty,andbycuttingtheplane’shydraulic

lines,didCullifordmanagetostaggerintotheairathisfourthattempt.TheDakotadronedawaysouthwardswithagonisingsluggishness,slowedbyitsundercarriage,whichremainedpartiallyextended.Asdawnwascomingup,theplaneanditsexhaustedcrewandpassengersmadeaclumsylandingatBrindisi;theV-2partswereflowntoLondon,reachingR.V.Jonesandhiscolleaguestwo

dayslater.CullifordreceivedtheVirtutiMilitari,Poland’shighestairdecoration,whichwasassuredlyrichlydeserved.ItwouldbesatisfyingtorecordthatthisremarkableepisodesolvedtheriddleoftheGermanrocket.Itdidnot,however.TheBritishremainedaspuzzledaseveraboutthetechnicalspecificationsoftheV-2.Inthecourseofthesummerandautumn,justover10,000flyingbombswerelaunchedagainst

England,ofwhich7,488crossedthecoast;butonly2,419reachedLondon,andmostofthebalancewereshotdown.Theyinflicted6,184deaths,causeforgriefenough,butnothinglikethedevastatingcampaignHitlerhadintendedandtheBritishfeared.Theconsequencewasasurgeofprematureeuphoria.EarlyinSeptemberthevice-chiefsofstaffdeliveredaremarkablyrecklessreport:‘AllthoseareasfromwhichtheflyingbombortherocketmightbelaunchedagainstLondonhavebeen,orareabouttobe,occupiedbyAlliedtroops.Thereshouldthusshortlybenofurtherdangertothiscountryfromeitherofthesecauses.’Atapressconferenceon7September,Sandysstatedpublicly:‘Exceptpossiblyforafewlastshots,theBattleofLondonisover.’YettheverynextdaythefirstV-2rockets,firedfromHolland,landedonParisandChiswick,andsoonthreeorfouradaywereexplodingaroundtheBritishcapital.Thescaleofattackroseuntilanaverageoffourteenadaywerelanding–albeitwithwildimprecision–onHollandandsouth-eastEngland.TheofficialhistoriansofwartimeintelligencenotefranklythatBritishinformationabouttheV-2

hadbeensketchyformanymonths,and‘itwaslongtoremaininsufficientforallpracticalpurposes’.R.V.Jonesmadeaprettygoodestimateoftheweapon’ssizeandwarheadweightontheeveofitsfirstfiringinanger,butonlyinDecember1944diditbecomeunderstoodinLondonthattheweaponwasnotradio-controlled,andthuscouldnotbejammed.TheCrossbowcommitteeandtheJIClackedanysignificantknowledgeaboutthelocationoftheV-2’sfactories,depotsorfuelplantsinGermany.NodefenceagainsttherocketwaspracticablesavetooverrunitslaunchsitesinHolland,whichdidnothappenuntiltheendofthewar.ItisameasureoftheextravagantalarmprovokedbytheV-2campaignthatHerbertMorrisoncalledforall-outAlliedbomberattacksonitslaunchersaroundTheHague,heedlessofthecosttoDutchcivilians.Theairchiefsinvokedhumanitarianconsiderationstoresistsaturationattacks,butAlliedbombingofskisitesandotherV-weaponinstallationsinFrance,andofV-2sitesinHolland,nonethelesskilledmoreFrenchandDutchpeoplethanHitler ’ssecretweaponskilledBritishcivilians.Between8September1944and27March1945,1,054rocketsfellonEnglandand2,700Londonersperished.Sincethesummerof1943,LordCherwellhadbeenaconsistentscepticabouttheplausibilityof

Hitler ’srocketprogramme.Lateinthatyearhesaid:‘Attheendofthewar,whenweknowthefullstory,weshallfindthattherocketwasamare’snest.’Hehasbeenmockedeversinceformakingthatstatement,anditiscertainlytruethatCherwelloverstatedhiscase,asheoftendid.ButhewasfundamentallycorrectthattheNazisin1944–45createdtwoweaponsthatwereremarkablewithinthelimitsofthetechnologyofthattime,butquiteincapableofchangingthestrategicbalanceofthewar.

AftertheV-weaponsbegantoexplodeonBritain,Cherwellreiteratedhisscorn:‘Themountainhathgroanedandbroughtforthamouse.’HewasrightthatHitlermadeoneofhismanyhugeerrors,bydivertingtoV-weaponsmanpowerandrawmaterialsthathecouldhaveusedmuchmoreprofitablyelsewhere–toincreasetankproduction,ortohastenandexpandtheMe-262jetfighterprogramme.SevenGermanfighterscouldhavebeenbuiltwiththeresourcesexpendedoneachV-2.TheNazileadershipfailedtoseethattheonlyissuethatmatteredwasnottheinnovatorybrilliance

ofagyro-stabilisedballisticmissile,northatoftheflyingbomb,butmerelywhatweightofexplosiveseitherwascapableofdeliveringtoBritain.AwarheadofratherlessthanatoninthecaseoftheV-1,andsomewhatmoreinthatoftheV-2,wassmallerthanthebombloadofaHeinkelorJu-88bomber.ThemoralimpactofV-weaponsontheBritishwasconsiderable:itwasaterrifyingexperiencetogoaboutone’sdailybusinessbeneaththe‘doodlebugs’,whosebuzzingmotorscutsecondsbeforetheyplungedinmurderoussilencetoearth,ortheV-2s,whichdelivereddevastationwithawesomeabruptness.Butevenhadtheprogrammecreatedmoreweaponssooner,theywerecapableonlyofdistressingHitler ’senemies,notofseriouslyinjuringtheirwareffort.ItwouldhavebeenmorerelevanttodirectthemagainstEisenhower ’sforcesinFrance,thoughneithersystemwassufficientlyaccuratetoinflictseriousdamageuponarmiesinthefield.Itisnomoreusefultospeculate,asdosomehistorianstothisday,aboutthepossibleeffecthadtheGermansbuiltandlaunchedtensofthousandsofV-weaponsagainstBritain,thantotrytocomputetheimpactonthewarofadramaticallylargerLuftwaffeorU-boatfleet.Both,asCherwellandR.V.Jonescorrectlysurmised,werebeyondHitler ’smeans.TheV-weaponsintelligencefailurewascertainlynotabsolute.TheBritishdiscoveredthatthere

wasathreat.TheydelayedtheGermanprogrammebymonthsthroughbombingPeenemündeandtheFrenchskisites,whichtheycorrectlyidentifiedasimportantelementsintheV-weaponproject.TheCrossbowgrouplearnedenoughabouttheV-1topreparesomemoderatelyeffectivecountermeasuresbeforeitbegan;andnoAlliedweaponssystemexistedthatcouldhavedestroyedV-2sinflight.Itwasnonethelessremarkablethat,inthelastmonthsofthewar,HitlercouldlaunchacampaignagainsttheAllieswhichtheycouldnomorepreciselydefinethantheycouldmonitortheGermanatomicbombprogramme,suchasitwas.Thereweregoodreasonsforthis.TheRAF’sphotographicinterpreterswerehighlyskilled,butcouldnonethelessbebaffledbytheunfamiliar–artefactssuchastheyhadneverseenbefore.ResistancegroupsinPolandandWesternEurope,whichprovidedreports,sketchesandcrashfragments,displayedextraordinarybraveryanddetermination,buttheireffortsyieldedinsufficientevidencetoenablescientistsandagentsinLondontoreachfirmconclusions.Finallyandmostimportant,theBritishintelligencemachinewassoUltra-weightedthatitstruggledwhenconfrontedwithanissueaboutwhichBletchleyParkcouldreveallittle:theGermanswerenotsoobligingastodispatchwirelesssignalsdescribingtheexactnatureoftheirFührer ’srevengeweapons.

Inthegrandschemeofthewar,noneofthismatteredmuch.AsLordCherwellsaid,theNazimountainproducedamouse.Butitremainsstrikingthat,foralltheUltra-driventriumphsofAlliedintelligenceinthelatteryearsofthewar,therewasaremarkableamountthehighcommandyearnedtoknow,yetfailedtodiscover.

16

‘Blunderhead’:TheEnglishPatient

Manyspiesofallnationalitiesadoptedmuddledormultipleloyalties,asthebehaviourofahostofcharactersinthisbookillustrates.YetfewEnglishmenwhoservedinthewarexperiencedsuchanodysseyasthatofRonaldSeth,whoisscarcelyknowntoposterity,oreventomosthistoriansofthesecretwar.Hisdoingsdidnotinfluencethestruggleinthesmallestdegree,buttheynonethelessabsorbedcountlessman-hoursamongtheseniorofficersofSOE,MI5,MI6andMI9–andoftheAbwehrandRSHA.WhatmakesSethevenmoreunusualisthatthedocumentsabouthiscasesurvivealmostintheirentiretyinBritain’sNationalArchives.Itisthuspossibletorecountindetailthestoryofoneofthefewwartimeagents‘turned’bytheGermans,amanwhobaffledbothsides’secretservicesinafashionthatrelegatesEddieChapman–‘ZigZag’–toamateurstatus.SethwasbornineasternEnglandin1911,ametalmerchant’ssonwhoattendedKing’sSchool,Ely,

andreadEnglishatCambridgebeforeembarkingonacareerasateacher.Havingconsidered,andfinallyrejected,ordinationasapriest,in1936heacceptedapostattheEnglishCollegeinTallin,Estonia,andfromtheregraduatedtobecomeassistantprofessorofEnglishatthelocaluniversity.HewrotealittlebookonEstoniaentitledBalticCorner,whichwaspublishedinBritainin1938.AttheoutbreakofwarhereturnedhomeandspentayearasanannouncerfortheBBC’sEstonianServicebeforefallingoutwiththeCorporationandbeingcalledupforserviceintheRAF,becominganadministrativeofficeratanairfieldinWiltshire.AlthoughSethwasmarriedwithtwosmallchildren,hehankeredforamoredramaticpersonal

roleintheconflict.On26October1941hewrotealonglettertotheAirMinistry,suggestingthathewasjustthemantoraisethestandardofrevoltagainstNazismintheBalticstates:‘BecauseofmyactivitiesIbecamewell-knowntotheordinaryEstonianman-in-the-streetand,ifImaysayso,heldinhighesteemandadmirationthroughoutthecountry.ItcannotbedeniedthatIamthebest-knownEnglishmaninEstonia.InadditiontothisImadefriendswithaverylargecircleofprominentandinfluentialEstonianswhoincludedthepresident[and]mostmembersofthegovernment.AlltheEstonianseverwanted,andIampositivestillwant,ispoliticalindependence…Iwishtoplacebeforeyouthefollowingproposal:thatIshouldbepermittedtogotoEstoniaandattempttoorganisea[Resistance]movement…Irealisethedifficultiesandtherisks.IrealisethatifIamcaughtIshallbe“agonner”.IfIsucceedIshallhavedoneafairspotofwork…Inanyevents,Ishouldbehappier

attemptingitthanIamnow,inmoreorlessenforcedinactivity…atanOperationalTrainingUnit.’Manysuchwartimeappealsfromboredorunfulfilledmenandwomenwithromanticambitions

weredismissedunheeded.However,Seth’sremarkableletterwaspassedtoSOE,whichrespondedenthusiastically.Russia’ssurvivalhungbyathread;theBritishwereeagertodoeverythingintheirlimitedpowertoprovideaid.TheGermanswereextractinghundredsoftonsofshaleoilfromEstonia,whichwerefuellingWehrmachtformationsbesiegingLeningrad.BakerStreetputthequestiontoRonaldSeth:howwouldheliketobeparachutedintothecountry,blowuptheoilplantsandstartalocalResistancemovementbehindtheEasternFront?TheaspiringheroembracedtheschemeandcompletedSOE’sapplicationform,answeringaquestionabouthispoliticalviewsbywriting‘vaguelysocialist’.Hestatedthathehadwritten‘twonovelsofnoconsequence’andwasunabletodriveacar.Noneofthiswasheldagainsthim,norwasacomplaintfromhisformerRAFstationthatachequeheleftbehindinsettlementofhisfinalofficers’messbillhadbounced.Hespentmostof1942attendingtheusualschoolsinsabotage,tradecraft,unarmedcombatandwirelesstransmission.Sethperformedreasonablywellasanembryosecretagent.Hewasuncomfortablewithweapon

training,andweakwristsmadehimapoorshot,butheimprovedaftersomefitnessclasses.FollowinganexerciseinNewcastle,hisexaminerreported:‘Thisstudent’sworkwasofanunusuallyhighquality.Heisexceptionallykeenandcompetent…Underarigorousinterrogationonhisidentity,hislife,hispastandpresentactivities,hispresenceinNewcastleandhisfutureplans,thestudentwassuperblyself-confident.Hewascompletelyunperturbable,hisstorywasconvincing.’TheparachuteschoolatRingway,wherehejumpedinhisspectacles,describedhimas‘atalkativebutpleasanttypewhoseemedsincereanddetermined…anervoustypeofofficer.Likeable.’Hisfinishingreportsaid:‘intelligent,butanerratictypeofbrain.Mentallyimmature.Heisintenselyenthusiastic,borderingonthefanatic.Heappearstopossessabundantself-confidence…Hehasacharmingpersonalityandisagoodmixerbuthisgreatweaknessisthatheisinclinedtodramatisenearlyeverythinghedoes.Herequiresafargreaterdegreeofsecurity-mindednessandself-disciplineifheistosucceed.Itishisdeterminationratherthanhischaracterwhichinspiresadegreeofconfidence.’ThefinalverdictonSeth,inSeptember1942,wasthat‘althoughhissublimeself-confidenceis…possiblysomewhatexcessive,itisatthesametimeoneofhisstrongestweapons’.Heprovidedacluetohisowneccentricity,ifnotmentalinstability,bysuggestingtoSOEthat

beforehejumpedintoEstoniaheshouldbesubjectedtosomebodilymutilation,suchaswouldrenderhimunfitforforcedlabourinGermany.Hishandlersrejectedthisproposal,onthesomewhatcynicalgroundsthatiftheyfulfilledhisproposaltheBritishgovernmentwouldbecomeliableforpayinghimadisabilitypensionafterthewar.OnesensitiveplannerinBakerStreetwastroubledattheprospectofdispatchinganagentonamissionwhich,thepoliticalrunesalreadyindicated,wouldraisehopesamonglocalpeoplethatmustgounfulfilled:‘IfEstoniaistobehandedovertoRussiaat

theendofthewar,’wroteanunnamedofficeron1May1942,‘andtheEstoniansgettoknowBritain’sacquiescence,IdonotseehowR[onald]caningoodfaithgettheEstonianstorallyroundhiminsabotagingtheirwaytoanon-existentfreedom!’Doubtsmighthavealsohavebeenraisedabouttheplausibilityofsendingsuchanimmediately

noticeablefigureasSeth–sixfeettwoinchestall–toblendintoBalticsocietyasaspy.ButallscrupleswerebrushedasidebySOE’schieftains,andinOctoberthedecisionwastakentodispatchhimonthefirstsuitablenightanRAFaircraftwasavailable.Therewasonesmallhitch:anEstonianseamannamedArnoldTedrekinhadbeenselectedtodropwithhim,butSethbaulkedatundertakingthemissionwithacomradewho,hepointedout,seldomdrewasoberbreath.ItwasagreedthattheEnglishmanshouldjumpalone.TheSOEoperationalordernotedbleaklyifungrammatically:‘thereislittlehopeofwithdrawingthispersonnel’.WinstonChurchilldeliveredasterninjunctiontohisservicechiefs,warningthemagainst

allocatingfrivolouscodenames.Itwasintolerable,saidtheprimeminister,thatawifeormothershouldbeobligedtolearnthatherhusbandorsonhadperishedtofulfilamissionwithsuchacodenameas‘Bunnyhug’or‘Ballyhoo’.SOEbreachedthisinjunctioninthecaseofRonaldSeth,bydubbingtheagentandhisBalticmission‘Blunderhead’.Itsstartwasinauspicious,becausethetake-offwasthreetimesscheduledandcancelledbecauseofbadweather.Seth’smoraleunderstandablyplummeted,accordingtotheRAFofficerresponsiblefortheSpecialDutiesSquadron.Butshortlybefore6o’clockontheeveningofSaturday,24October1942,aPolish-pilotedHalifaxbombertookofffromLinton-on-OuseinYorkshireforthesix-hourflighttoEstonia.Itcarriedthenewlymintedagent,dressedinacamouflagedjumpsuit,togetherwithawirelessset,somerationsandexplosives.

Sethwouldbedropping‘blind’,withnoreceptioncommitteetomeethim,becausetherewasnoknownlocalResistance.Hehadoptedtolandnearacoastalfarmhousewhoseowner,MartinSaarne,heknewandtrusted,havingtaughthissonEnglish.Thepilotafterwardsdescribedhowhispassengercameandstoodbesidehiminthecockpit,peeringdownthroughtheclearnightattheBalticcoastlineuntilhewassuretheywereintherightplace,aboveaclearinginforestsatthewesternbaseoftheKolgapeninsula.Sethvanishedintothedarknesswithremarkablegoodcheer,followedonasecondcircuitbythreecontainersthatborehisequipment.Heflashedatorchfromthegroundtoconfirmasafedescent,thenthebigbomberbankedandturnedforhome,landingsafelyat7o’clocknextmorningafterthirteenhoursintheair.ThepilotreportedSeth’sdelivery:‘Agentjumpedwithouthesitationafterselectingthepointwiththecaptainoftheaircraft.’Thereafter,however,adeafeningsilencedescendedupon‘Blunderhead’.Weekspassed,then

months.AreportreachedSOEthatasourceinTallinhadheardofaBritishparachutistansweringitsman’sdescription,whohadbeencapturedbytheGermans,thencommittedsuicide.Theagent’shandler,MajorRonaldHazell,aformershipbrokerwhowasheadofSOE’sPolishSection,wasaskedif‘Blunderhead’hadbeenprovidedwithpoison.Yes,ofcourse:allagentswereissuedwithan‘L’forlethalpotassiumcyanidepillforoptionaluseintheeventoftheircapture,thoughmostpromptlyflusheditdownthenearesttoilet.HazellfeltobligedtowritetoJosephineSeth,reportingthatherhusbandwasmissing,andthatitmightbenecessarytoassumetheworst.Sherespondedwithamovingletter,inwhichsheexplainedthatsuccessivepostingstodifferentRAFstationsmeantshesawherchildrenatschoolsintheWestCountryonlyeverythreemonths,soshewasexperiencingadifficulttime.SheacknowledgedSOE’sinterpretationofherhusband’ssilence,butsaid,‘IshallalwaysgoonbelievingthatRonnieisalive’–aphraseusedbymany,manywartimewiveswhowereeventuallyobligedtoadmitthemselveswidows.Thenextdevelopmentinthissagaderivedfromafluke.InApril1943twoLuftwaffeaircraft

forced-landedinneutralSwitzerland.TheyprovedtocontainlargequantitiesofGermandocuments,whichwereimpoundedbytheSwiss.ThelocalMI6stationgainedaccesstophotographthem,andwhenthehaulwasexaminedinLondon,on30AprilanSOEofficerreportedgloomilytocolleagues,‘thefollowing,Iamafraid,concernsus’.ThefiletowhichhereferredwasatranslationofaLuftwaffereportontheinterrogationofaBritishspy,RonaldSeth,atDulagLuft,Oberursel,on6February.BakerStreet’sman,itappeared,fellintoGermanhandswithindaysoflandinginEstonia.HehadsincetoldhiscaptorseverythingabouthisSOEexperiences–withaprotectivegloss.HeclaimedthathehadbeenforcedtoaccepthisespionagemissionbyaJewattheAirMinistrywhohadthreatenedhimwitharevolver.SOEcommentedafterstudyingtheAbwehrinterrogation:‘Thisreportisfactuallycorrectsofaras

theindividual,histrainingwithusandhisdeliveryinEstoniaareconcerned.Itisdifficulttocredit,however,thestatementthatSETHmakesinregardtoapistolheldtohisheadbyaWING-

COMMANDERintheAIRMINISTRY…Thereissomepossibilityofhisbeingalive…Itmaybe,however,thatintheprocessoftimeweshallhearmoreastothefurthertreatmentmetedouttohim.Untilthen,itisimpossibletosaywhetherhehasremainedaprisonerinenemyhands,orhasbeenexecuted.’AnotherSOEofficertookaharsherview:‘Iamsorrytohavetodoso,butIfeelthatIcanputnootherconstructiononthisunfortunateoperationthanthatSETHgotcoldfeetonhisarrival.Inevermethim,sofarasIknow,butallthereportsIhaveheardofhimpointedtohisbeingsomewhatnervyandlikelytobreakdownunderanystrainoflonelinessoropposition.’On5May1943SOE’sSignalsOfficewasinstructedtoabandonitslisteningwatchforwireless

transmissionsfrom‘Blunderhead’.Amonthlater,amemorandumreportedthatSeth’shandler,MajorHazell,‘hasseenMrsBlunderheadwhosaysshewouldbeverygladtohavesomeapprovedstorytotellherfriends–forexample,thatherhusbandismissing.[Hazell]hasnottoldheranythingaboutourinformationastoBlunderhead,andsaysthathiswifewillbereconciledtowaitinguntiltheendofthewarfornews…InallthecircumstancesIwouldsuggestthatthePersonneldepartmentoftheAirMinistryshould…sendthewifealettersayingthatBlunderheadismissingfromoperations.’JosephineSethwasdelicatelyinformedthatalthoughherhusbandwasnotdead,hiscircumstanceswereextremelyprecarious.Thestrainonthepoorwomanmusthavebeenappalling.Thereafter,formorethanayearnotanotherwordwasheardofSeth.Itwasreasonabletoassume

that,likealmostallcapturedAlliedagents,hewasbeingheldinaconcentrationcampor–morelikely–wasdead.AfewweeksafterD-Day,on29July1944SOEminuted:‘InformationhasnowbeenreceivedthatFlight-LieutenantRonaldSethmustnowbereclassified“Killedonactiveservice24.10.42”…MrsSethhasalreadybeeninformedunofficiallyofherhusband’sdeath.’Lessthanamonthlater,however,theliberationofParisproducedanewandsensationaltwistintheSethstory,whichthereafterengagedtheseriousattentionofMI5,MI6andMI9.AmanwhocalledhimselfÉmileRivièreapproachedanRAFofficerintheFrenchcapitalandhandedhimanenvelopeaddressedtotheWarOfficeinLondon.Thiswasdulyforwardedtoitsdestination.Onexaminationitprovedtocontainadensely-pencilledseventy-six-pagenarrativeheaded‘Paris,August7th,1944’,andaddressedto‘theGOCS[pecial]T[raining]S[ervices]HQ,Room98HorseGuards.FromBLUNDERHEAD.InTheField.’Acoveringletterbegan,‘DearSir,Ihopeyouwillforgivemyaskingthisverygreatfavour,butif

myoperationhassofarbeensuccessfulinyouropinion,pleasecouldyoupossiblyapplyformypromotiontotherankof:ACTINGGROUP-CAPTAIN(unpaid),withseniorityretrospectivetwelvemonthsfromthedateofthisletter?Iaskforthisfavour,Sir,becauseshouldanythinghappentomeinthemonthsthataretocome,mywifeandchildrenwouldatleasthaveasuitablepensiononwhichtolive.Thishasworriedmeconsiderablythroughoutthewholeofmyoperation,althoughMajorHazelassuredmethathethoughtthatintheeventofmydeaththeOrganisation[SOE]wouldprovide£1000formychildren.But£1000willnotprovidetheeducationformysonanddaughterthatIcouldgive

themwereItheretoprovideforthem.Andeducationisgoingtocountmorethaneverinpost-warEngland,Iamsure.’Ifthiswasasomewhathumdrumopeninggambit,therestofSeth’sreporttoSOEwaspage-turning

stuff:alurid,highlycolourednarrativeinwhichitisnoeasiertodaytodistinguishtruthfrominventionthatitwasforBritain’ssecretservicestodosoin1944.Theonlyincontrovertiblefactwasthat,inthecourseofalmosttwoyearsinoccupiedEurope,inthehandsofaruthlessenemy,SOE’smanhadknownexperiencesfantasticevenbythestandardsofworldwar.HeclaimedthathehadmadehisoriginalparachutelandingontopofagroupofGermans,fromwhomhemanagedtoflee,atthecostofabandoninghisarmsandequipment,thensufferedadventureswhichincludedbeingfireduponbyEstonianmilitiamen:‘oneshotwhizzedthroughtheundergrowthinwhichIwashiding,narrowlymissingmyhead’.HedescribedhowhehadblownupseveralGermanaircraftandanartilleryposition,buthadbeenobligedtospenddayslivinginthewildernesswithoutfood,sustainedonlybyopiumtabletsandaflaskhehadbroughtfromEngland:‘Icouldfindnochickens.Forshootingdeer,evenifIcouldstalkthemsuccessfullyIhadonlymyColt.32andthirtyrounds.Theoutlookwasbleak,asmywhiskeywasgettinglow.Havingsampledthetemperofthenatives,IdecidedtoadheretomyplantomakenocontactsuntilIhadseen[hisoldfriend]Saarne.’Sethmetthefarmeratlaston5November,andduringatense,bleakconversationwastoldthathis

missionwashopeless:‘ThoseolderpeopleremainingaftertheRussianoccupationof1939–40werelethargic,theyoungEstonianswerewhole-heartedlywiththeGermans,whohadverycleverlyexploitedthedisgustingRussianexcessesduringtheRedoccupation.’SethsaidhethereupondecidedtogotoTallin,andwaswalkingthroughthenearbyvillagewhenhewasarrestedbymilitia,whohandedhimovertotheGermans.HewaspromptlyincarceratedinCell13ofTallinCentralprison,andinterrogatedbyaMajorVogl.AskedifhewouldmakewirelesstransmissionstoEngland,thisagentweakenedbyhungerandprivationtearfullyagreedtodoso.Hewasquestionedforeightdays,andinventedthetaleofaJewattheAirMinistrynamedGoldmannwhohadforcedhimtoaccepttheSOEassignment.HelengthilydescribedtohisLondonreadershipexperiencesoffirstbeingtortured,theninformedthaton21Decemberthathewouldbepubliclyhanged.Hesaidthatontheappointeddayhewasindeedledoutontoagallows,andplacedbeforethetrap:‘IrefusedahandkerchiefformyeyeswithasheroicashakeofmyheadthatIcouldmanage.’Afteralongandcircumstantialaccountofthisordeal,heclaimedhewastoldthathisexecutionwouldbepostponeduntilaftertheChristmasholiday.HetoldtheGermansthathewouldbehappytoworkforthemagainsttheRussians.ThispersuadedtheminJanuary1943toputhimonatrainfromRigatoBerlin,thencetoFrankfurtamMain.Sethspunhisjailersaseriesoffantasticyarns,describinghimselfasagroup-captainwitha

knighthoodandcloseconnectionswiththeroyalfamily.HetoldSOEhehadinformedtheGermansthatin1941hewasinitiatedintoasecretsocietycalledtheWindsorLeague,seekingtherestoration

ofKingEdwardVIII,andhadattendedmeetingsatwhichSirStaffordCrippsandseveralotherMPshadbeenpresent.HeurgedtheGestapo–whoheldhimforatime–thathisexperienceasaBBCannouncercouldbeimmenselyhelpfultothem.HewaseventuallytoldthathewasbeingtransferredtothecustodyoftheAbwehr,whoproposedtotrainhimtocarryoutanespionagemissioninBritain.InNovember1943hewastakenbyhisAbwehrhandlerMajorEmileKliemanntoParis,wherehe

waslodgedwithaFrenchfamilyofwell-knownGermancollaboratorsnamedDelidaise,andgrantedlibertytomovefreelyaroundthecitycarryinganAusweis–officialpass–inthenameofSvenPassikiwi,aFinn.HerehisnarrativeforSOEassumedBaronMunchhausenproportions:heclaimedtohaveshotdeadtwoGermansoldiersintheMetro.HeconfessedthathehadformedaneasyrelationshipwithRichardDelidaiseandhisfamily,andespeciallywithLiliane,hishost’ssister-inlaw.HetoldSOE:‘Iwasknownbyeverybodyas“M.Ronnie”…Itwasinevitable,Iamafraid,Sir,thatMlle.Lilianewouldbecomemymistress.Thepresentreportisnoplacetoenterintopathologicalorpsychologicaldetails,butIfeelImustjustifythissomewhatunagentlikebehaviouronmypart,bysayingthatforme“practicallove”isaPHYSICALNECESSITY;butalso,atthistime,Iwasmentallydesperatelyinneedofsomemundanecontacttomakemyworldseemreal…Iaskyouifyouwill,Sir,toimagineyourselfinmyplace.Iwasplayingarole,notliketheordinaryactor,fortwoorthreehoursaday,butfortwenty-four.’ForsixmonthsheunderwentAbwehrtrainingasanagent,includinginstructioninwireless

techniqueandcoding,aboutwhichheprovidedSOEwithcopiousdetail,includingchartsandnumericalexpositions.HeappearssometimestohavewornaLuftwaffeuniformonthestreetsofParis.ShortlyafterD-Day,hewastoldthatwithinafortnighthewouldbedispatchedtoEngland.On20June,however,hewasabruptlyinformedthathisnewemployershadlostconfidenceinhim;Berlinnowrefusedtoapprovehismission.HewasremovedfromhiscomfortablequartersandfromhisloverandlodgedintheCherche-Midiprison,whereheenduredsufferingsthathedescribedextensively,includingfindinglice‘asbigasafingernail’anddevelopingscabies.HisAbwehrhandler‘Kilburg’–MajorKliemann–visitedhimtoreportthatadebatewastakingplaceaboutwhethertosendhimbacktoBerlin.Aftersixweeksinacell,hewassuddenlyinformedthatithadbeendecidedtousehimasastool-pigeoninBritishPoWcamps.HewasthereuponreleasedfromtheCherche-Midi,restoredtosemi-liberty,and–inthosedays

whenitwasobviousthattheAllieswouldsoonbeinParis–occupiedhimselfincomposinghisvoluminousreport,whichheentrustedtoRichardDelidaise–whoalsousedthenameÉmileRivière.TheFrenchmanmusthavebelieved,notwrongly,thatbyassistingSethtomakecontactwiththeBritishhecouldsavehisownunattractiveneck,togetherwiththoseofhisrelations.SethincludedinallhissubsequentmessagestoLondonpassionatepleastoprotectDelidaise–and,ofcourse,hisbelovedLiliane.HeassuredSOEthatalthoughtheymightthinkhewasnowworkingfortheGermans,inrealityhewasstillaloyalBritishagent.Inthevaledictionofhisreportaddressedtothe

WarOffice,hewrotehistrionically:‘IdonotyetknowwhetherIshallgotocampsinGermanyorFrance,orindeedifIshallyetcomeoutalive.Butifyoudonotreceivereportsofmydeathwhenthearmisticeissigned,pleasewillyoulookformeinP.O.W.camps,andifIamnotthere,inGermancivilprisonsandconcentrationcamps…Ibegtoremain,Sir,yourobedientservantBLUNDERHEADAugust7th1944.’WhenthisastonishingdocumentreachedLondonitpromptedanewsurgeofmemorandaand

commentaries,thickeningfilesonSethinBroadway,BakerStreetandatMI5thatalreadyrantohundredsofpages.Adozenoverworkedseniorintelligenceofficers,fromStewartMenziesandFelixCowgillatMI6toLt.Col.‘Tar ’RobertsonofMI5andLt.Col.JamesLangleyofMI9,foundthemselvesattendingmeetingstodiscussthepastdoingsandfutureprospectsof‘Blunderhead’.SOE,reasonablyenough,soughttomakethebestpossiblecaseforitsman,butwasobligedtoadmitthathisnarrativewasimpossibletoswallow:‘Sethisextremelyprolificonpaper,ofahighly-strungtemperament,veryvainglorious,butpossessesinitiative,imaginationandquicknessofmind…Itwouldappearthat,inthespirit,SETHisverymuchunderthedominationoftheGermans…hewouldhavehadmanyopportunitiestoescapeinPARISwhichhedidnotembrace.IftheGermansdecidethattheyhavenofurtheruseforSETH,itislikelyhemaybeexecuted.Hehas,however,shownhimselfveryastutebyputtingtheGermansoffwithpromisesandhemaysucceedincontinuingtodoso…Itwouldappeartobethecasethatheisgenuineinhisassertionsthatheintendstodouble-crosstheGermans,andifheweresentbacktoENGLAND,wouldcertainlynotcarryoutanymissionforthem.’On25SeptemberCommanderJohnSenterofSOEwroteto‘Tar ’Robertson,emphasisingBaker

Street’s‘responsibilityinthismatter,firstofalltoSethwhoundertookamissioncallingforgreatpersonalcourage…Iunderstandthatyouareinfullagreementthatheshouldnotbetreatedonhisreturntothiscountryasafelon,butasaBritishofficerwhomustbeinvitedtoexplainwhathappened.’RAFadministratorsjoinedtheSethpaperchase,expressingconcernthatsomemonthsearliertheyhadpaidagratuitytohiswifeontheassumptionofherhusband’sdeath,andwereevennowpayingherapension.Ithadnowbecomeplainthatshewasnotentitledtoeither.Shouldshebemadetopaybackthemoney?On5Octoberaninitialreportfromcounter-intelligenceinParisexpressedbewildermentthat

Seth’sdocumentaddressedtoSOEhadbeenhandedovertoanRAFofficerbyRichardDelidaise–underhisaliasasRivière–aknowncreatureoftheAbwehr.TheCIteamhadinterviewedthefamily,andemergedwithscantenthusiasmforanyofthem.Theydescribed‘Liliane’,Seth’sacknowledgedmistress–fullnameLucieBeucherieof3,RueLincoln,Paris8–as‘awomanofloosemorals,oneloversucceedinganother ’,someofthemGerman.Shewasuptoherneckintheblackmarket,andSethwasmerelyoneamongamultitudeofhermen.HehadspentsomeofhistimeinParisunderanassumedGermanidentityas‘Lt.Haid’,butshetoldherinterrogatorthat‘Blunderhead’hadconfessed

toherthathewasonlypretendingtoworkfortheGermansinthehopeoffacilitatinghisescape.TheauthorofthePariscounter-intelligencereportconcludedwithalistof‘questionstowhichIshouldliketheanswers’,whichstartedwiththatof‘WhenandwheredidSETHfindtimetowritehis76-pagereport?’On10OctobertherewasanotherflurryofexcitementinLondonfollowingreceiptofanew

emotionaloutburst,scribbledbySethinBelgiumandgiventoalocalmanwhopasseditontoanAmericanofficerwhentheliberatorsarrivedaweeklater.Thisletter,dated2September,explainedthathehadleftPariswiththeretreatingGermanson17August,havingagreedtoworkfortheSDinPoWcamps.‘Havingfoundoutwhattheywantedmetodo,IdecidedthatthisworkwouldbesoimportantfromtheBritishsideandalthoughIhavehadmanychancestoescapeinthelasttwoweeksIamcarryingthrough.IhavegotsomuchimportantpoliticalinformationthatitisabsolutelyessentialIshouldbereleasedimmediatelywarisover.IshallbeintheOflagatLimburgunderthenameofCAPTAINJOHNDEWITT.’AnMI5officerwrotetoJohnSenterofSOE,sayingthatthelatestmessagefromSeth‘onlydeepensthemysteryofhiscase,andImustsayIfinditdifficulttounderstandhisargumentthat,havingashesayssomuchimportantpoliticalinformationforthiscountry,heshouldconsideritevenmoreimportantnottoescapebuttostaybehindandworkfortheSicherheitspolitzeiinP/Wcamps’.TheBritishPoW‘CaptainJohndeWitt’madehisdebutinaletterfromtheofficers’campat

Limburg,dated15September1944.Hewrotetoasupposedsister–infacthiswifeJosephine–sayingamongmuchelse:‘Thereisonethingworryingme.WillyougetintouchwithHazel?HeknowsIhavebeennursingtheElyconstituency,andIamafraidthatafterthisisallover,theremaybesomedelayingettingreleased,andImaymisstheGeneralElection.AskHazeltopulleverystringhecan–seeAnthony[presumablyEden,theforeignsecretary]ifnecessary–andgetmeoutofhereimmediatelypeaceissigned.Imustgethomeatonce,otherwiseallmyworkwillhavebeenwasted.’Incasethisletterfailedtogetthrough,Sethpersuadedafellow-officerwritinghometoincludesomeremarkswhichreachedSOEandMI5:‘bythewayRonnieishere,asblunderheadedasusual.It’sgoodtohavehim.’ThecopyinSOE’sfileismarked‘originalwithMI9’.OtherBritishprisonersinthecampsentcodedmessagestoLondon,demandingtoknowwhatthey

shouldmakeof‘CaptaindeWitt’,whoseemedtospendmuchofhistimetalkingtoGermansoutsidethecompoundonthepretextofarrangingmusicalentertainments,andwhooccasionallyconfidedthathewasreallySOEagentRonaldSeth.TheseniorofficeratLimburglatertestifiedthatthenewcomerhad‘startedbehavinginamostpeculiarmanner.Hedrewattentiontohimselfinnouncertainfashionbytellingallandsundryincredibleanddivergingstories.’AnotherbulletinreachedMI9inanofficer ’sletterdated10OctoberfromOflag79.Itsaid:‘DEWITTclaimsjoinedRAFbomber1940promotedGroup-CaptainandmadeKCB.SecondedSOEdroppedEsthonia24October1942.’MI5discussedthe‘deWitt’letterswithSOE.Obviouslythe‘Hazel’towhomthewriterreferredwashis

ownformerhandler,nowalieutenant-colonelworkinginFrance,wherehewasdispatchingagentsintoGermany.ButtheMI5officercommentedwearily:‘ImustsayIcannotfindanysatisfactoryhypothesistoexplainwhySETHshouldbegivenafalsenameandthenpermittedtowritetohiswifeunderthefalsenameasifhewasherbrother.’AndwhatwasallthisstuffabouttheElyconstituency?DidSethhavepoliticalambitions?After

moremessagesfromGermanyreferredtoElyandtheprospectofapost-warelection,on5December1944SOEwrotetoFelixCowgillofMI6,saying,‘AsSethcontinuestoharpontheElytopic,wearestillrackingourbrainsforsomeexplanation.’ThemostpatheticvictimofthisfarragowasJosephineSeth,stillservingatanRAFstationinthenorthofEngland,andutterlybewilderedaboutthecorrespondencefromherhusband.SheappealedrepeatedlytoSOEforguidanceonhowtohandleRonald’smessages,especiallyoneaskinghertoopenabankaccountwith£150.SOEminuted:‘MrsSETHstatesthatinfactshehasnotthenecessarymoneytoopenanaccountfor£150.’Sethpersuadedinmatestosendmoresecretmessagesonhisbehalfintheirlettershome,for

instance:‘5thOctober.FromTHUNDERHEAD[sic]FORSTS98HORSEGUARDS.FAILEDTOBLOWESTONIANMINE.8thOctoberVONKLUGERSHOTHIMSELF.HUNSHAVEGOTTHEFULLDETAILSOFOURROCKETBOMBTRIALSINAFRICA.9thOctoberRUSSIANSINFILTRATINGMANYFIFTHCOLUMNISTSINTONORWAY.’On15December,inanotherlongmemorandum,BakerStreetsuggestedtoMI5:‘wecannothelpwonderingwhetherhisreasonhasnotbeentosomeextentaffected’.MI9eventuallydispatchedageneralcodedwarningtoallBritishPoWcamps,instructingtheirinmatestohavenothingtodowithanybodycallinghimselfeitherdeWittorSeth,whowas‘gravelysuspect…[hisactions]haverenderedhimsuspectofcollaborationwiththeenemy’.HespenthislastmonthsinLimburgin‘protectivecustody’byhisfellow-prisoners–unabletomoveinthecompoundunlessescortedbyaBritishofficer–untilhewas‘arrested’bytheGermansandvanishedon11March1945.Withhindsightatleast,itisnotdifficulttounderstandthatSethwasplayingtheaccustomedrolesof

everydoubleagent,strivingtokeeptwoemployershappy.Despitethecomicaspectsofhisstory,hewasatthemercyoftheNazis,whowouldshoothimthemomenthisusefulnessseemedtohaveexpired,orhisloyaltytothemwasindoubt:capturedBritish,AmericanandSovietagentscontinuedtobeexecutedbyGermanfiringsquadsuntilthelastdayofthewar.Seth’sonlychanceofsurvivalwastoconvincetheAbwehrandRSHAthathewasanimportantperson,henceallthereferencestohisfictitioushighrank,knighthoodandparliamentaryprospects.Hedisplayedamazingingenuityandthespianskillinsustainingthisdelusion.Therewasnothingnoble,heroicoradmirableabouthisbehaviour.Butwhoistosaywhatamanmaydotosavehisskinundersuchcircumstances?Sethsavedhisbesttrickforlast:on16April1945,threeweeksbeforethewarinEuropeended,he

presentedhimselfatthedooroftheBritishlegationinBern,anddemandedtoseetheminister.Usheredintotheaugustpresence,hesaidthathemustbeflowntoLondonimmediately,toreportto

WinstonChurchillonamatteroftheutmostgravity:hewascarryingpeaceproposalsfromHimmler,whomhehadmetpersonallyonlydaysbefore,whilestayinginMunichasaguestoftheSS,underaDutchaliasas‘JandeFries’.MI6’sBernstationsignalledthisnewstoLondon,whereitprecipitatedanewferment.WhatwastobedonewithSeth?Broadway’sBernofficerssaidthatheappearedtobesane.HewasplainlyactingwiththecomplicityoftheNazihierarchy,orsomepartofit,otherwisehecouldneverhavesecuredapassagetotheSwissfrontier,andlicencetocrossit.NopossiblemessagefromHimmlercouldholdanyinterestfortheAlliedgovernmentsatthisstage,andindeedurgentinstructionsweresignalledtoBern,toensurethatSethwasunabletodiscusshis‘peaceproposals’withanybody,norbequestionedaboutthem;buteventheworld-weary,orratherwar-weary,seniorintelligenceofficersinLondonfeltanurgentcuriositytointerrogateSeth.Hewasflownhomeon20AprilinhispersonaasCaptainJohndeWitt,andpermittedtoseehis

wifeandchildren.Heclaimedtohaveexpectedtobereceivedasareturninghero,havingsurvivedthemostharrowingexperiences.Hemaintainedapersistent,manicclamouraboutSOE’sfailuretoproduceasuitcasecontainingcivilianclothesthatheclaimedtohaveleftinitscharge.Heshoweddismay,evendisgust,whenhishandlersmadeplainthatunlesshecouldproducesomeplausibleanswerstotheirquestions,therewaseveryprospectthathewouldfaceatrialforhightreason,suchaswouldsoondispatchWilliamJoyceandJohnAmerytothegallows.GuyLiddellofMI5feltthatheandhiscolleaguesmustagreeapositionaboutSethbeforepeople

inhighplaceslearnedanythingofhisactivities,whichcouldinflictgrievousembarrassment–‘disastrousresults’–uponthesecretcommunity.Howcouldsuchamanhavebeenrecruitedanddeployedasaspy?On22April1945‘Blunderhead’reportedforhisfirstsessionofquestioningbythesecurityservicebearingamedicalcertificatestatingthathewassubjecttoparanoiactendencies.Liddellcommentedacidlyinhisdiary:‘fromthesensationalnatureofhisstorythisindeedseemslikely’.SethtoldMI5thattheGermanswerestillholdingbacksometerrifyingsecretweaponsfortheirlast-ditchresistance,includinggermwarfare.Duringthemonthsthatfollowed,hewasquestionedbysomeofthemostskilledofficersofMI5,

including‘Tar ’Robertson.Theyemergedfromtheprocessemotionallyexhausted,innodoubtthatSethwasafantasistwhoseemedincapableofdistinguishingtruthfromfalsehood.On16May1945CaptainE.MiltonofMI5producedatwenty-five-pagereport,halfofwhichwastakenupwithcataloguingtheobviousinconsistenciesandfalsehoodsinthespy’saccountofhimself.MiltonbelievedSethhadsurrenderedtotheGermansalmostimmediatelyafterlanding;hadneverfulfilledanyactsofsabotage;andhadneverbeensubjectedtotortureoramockexecution:‘IthinkthisinformationwasinventedbySETHasanexcuseformanyofhissubsequentactionswithwhichwemightreproachhimandalsoperhapstojustifytohisownenormousvanitywhyhehumiliatedhimselfbyofferingtoworkfortheGermans…IfeelpersonallythatSethwasbadlyfrightenedandwillingtoworkfortheGermans,eventotheprejudiceofthiscountry…Sethwasnotmaltreatedby

theGermans,becausehetoldthemalltheyasked.’HehadlatterlybeencontrolledbyanofficernamedGrafChristophervonDönhoff,whohadlivedinKenyafortenyears,butwhonowmadeawisecareerdecisiontorelocatehimselftoZürich.ThereportconcludedthatSethwas‘undoubtedlysufferingfrommegalomaniaandwouldseemtobeoflong-terminteresttothesecurityservices’.Uncertaintypersisted,however,aboutwhetherheshouldbebrandedafull-bloodedtraitor,andindictedfortreason.Troublewasneverfarfrom‘Blunderhead’.HewaspermittedtotraveltothenorthofEnglandto

seehiswifeattheRAFstationwhereshewasserving.ThiscompassionateoutingpromptedabaffledlettertoMI5fromthechiefconstableofLancashire,whowrotetosaythatwhileinhiscounty,Sethhadgivenallandsundryawildlyfancifulaccountofhisadventuresabroad,whichseemedtoconstituteanindustrial-scalebreachofnationalsecurity.Meanwhile,apassionateletteraddressedbySethtoLilianeandwritteninFrenchwasinterceptedandconfiscated;itseemedundesirablefortheSOEmantohaveanyfurthercontactwithhislover,especiallywhenherbrother-in-lawRichardwasinthesecurityservice’scustodyasacollaborator,andwasunderinterrogation–notleastaboutSeth.MI5’sfinalconclusionaboutSOE’swould-beResistancechiefinEstoniawasthat,whiletherewasnodoubthehadgiventheGermansfarmoreactiveassistancethanhewouldadmit,therewasinsufficientevidencetosendhimfortrial.ItiseasytodeducethatnoneofthesecretserviceswantedthissampleoftheirdirtylaundryexposedinpublicatatimewhentheBritishpeoplesimplysoughttocelebratethetriumphofBritishvirtueoverNazievil.InAugust1945SethwasdischargedfromtheRAF,inwhichhehadheldthenominalrankofflight-lieutenantduringhisservicewithSOE.Eveninthesurrealworldofintelligence,Seth’sdoingswereremarkable.Hemusthaveembarked

onhisEstonianadventureingoodfaith–whyelsewouldamanofthirty-one,withayoungfamily,havevolunteeredtobecomeasaboteurparachutedintoenemy-heldterritory?MostofhisownaccountofhisexperiencesinGermanhandsseemsasabsurdasMI5judgedittobe.Itismostlikelythat,havingsetforthfromBritainwithhighambitionstomakehimselfahero,onceonthegroundinEstoniaacollisionwithterrifyingrealitydispelledsuchillusions,andfocusedhisattentionsexclusivelyupondissuadingtheGermansfromkillinghim.Theshockmusthavebeendevastating,ofmeetingEstonianswhomheexpectedtogreethimastheharbingeroftheirfreedom,asymboloftheirfuturedeliverance,andfindinginsteadthattheymerelywishedhimtogoaway.ThemostpersistentenigmaiswhySethwentbacktoGermanyfromPariswithhisAbwehrhostsinAugust1944,insteadofmakingabreakfortheAlliedlines,ashehimselfadmittedthatheeasilycouldhavedone.Thelikelyansweristhat,bythatstage,hewaspainfullyconsciousthatiftheGermansdidnotshoothim,hisowncountrymenmightdoso.ItseemstothecreditofBritain’sintelligenceservicesthattheytreatedSeth,onhisreturn,withanunderstandingnotfarshortofcompassion.Itwas,afterall,SOEwhichhaddispatchedhimintoaplaceofutmostdanger,asitdispatchedsomanyothers.

17

EclipseoftheAbwehr

1 HITLER’SBLETCHLEYS

ItremainsoneofthemostfascinatingpuzzlesoftheSecondWorldWar,howasocietyasadvancedasGermanyfailedtomatchtheAlliesascodemakersandbreakers.ItshubsofcivilandmilitarypoweremployedatleastasmanypeopleastheBritishonsignalsintelligence–some30,000,workinginsixseparateandrivalorganisations.AfterVE-Day,interrogatorsquizzedtheircapturedpersonnelexhaustively.AdramaticmomentcameatFlensburg,whenoneofthemostseniorofficersofthehighcommand’sChiffrierabteilung–OKW/Chi,asitwasknown–wasaskedtoidentifyhisservice’smostimportantachievement.Therewasaprotractedsilence.TheAlliedquestionerwrote:‘ItbecameapparentthatOKW/Chihadnotachievedanoutstandingsuccess.’Theytried,however.Theytried.NaziGermanyhadclevermenwhostrovemightilytomatchthe

prowessofTuringandWelchman,FriedmanandRowlett,ofwhichmercifullytheyknewnothing.ThosewhoknowonlythehistoryofBletchleysupposethatAlliedsigintsuccessandAxisfailurewereabsolutes.Thistheycertainlywerenot.TheB-DienstachievedimportantpenetrationofBritishnavalcodesduringtheBattleoftheAtlantic,describedearlier.TheLuftwaffe’seavesdroppersacquiredanimmenseamountofinformationaboutRAFandUSAAFoperationsoverEuropebymonitoringvoicetraffic–aircrewtalkingtoeachotheramidthestressofcombatoperationswerenotoriouslyinsecure–throughelectronicobservationandPoWinterrogation.OntheEasternFront,theGermansacquiredmuchusefulorder-of-battledatathroughtrafficanalysisandbreakingfieldcodes–thearmyradiointelligenceservicedeployedsixregimentsinRussia.AslateasMarch1943,aBletchleyreportonGerman‘YService’operationsontheEasternFrontrevealedthemreadingmostRedAirForcetrafficfromtheirstationW40atWildpark,Potsdam,partlybecausetheRussiansseldomtroubledtochangecallsigns.TheLuftwaffeaccessedtheirtwo-,three-andfour-figureciphermessages.AnAmericanpencommented:‘What,ifanything,theBritishhavedonetojackuptheRussians,Idon’tknow.’TheGermansalsoclaimedtohavemadeoccasionalbreaksintohigherciphers,becauseofSovietwireless-operators’shortageof,andthuscarelessreuseof,one-timepads.InNorthAfrica,untilJuly1942theAfrikaKorpsexploitedsigintmoreeffectivelythandidtheBritish.BeyondtheGermans’accesstotheWarOffice’sWCode,capturedinNorwayin1940,which

thereafterrenderedsomelow-levelBritishArmytrafficaccessible,theyalsohadtheUSMilitaryAttachés’codeuntilJune1942,andlaterclaimedtohavebrokenintoUSArmyM-209fieldciphers.BothWesternAlliedarmiesusedradiovoicecommunicationcarelessly,totheadvantageoftheirenemies’excellentinterceptstations.Never,however,didtheGermansremotelymatchtheachievementofBletchley,ArlingtonHalland

Op-20-Ginregularlyreadinghigherciphersinrealtime.ItwastheirmisfortunethattheAmericanSigabawasacriticalstepsmarterthanEnigma.ExpertsbelievetrafficfromtheBritishType-XmachinemighthavebeenbrokenhadtheGermanslaidhandsontheappropriaterotors,buttheyneverdid.Berlin’seffortsalsosufferedseverelyfromthedivisionofitscryptographiceffortsbetweenrivalarmedforcesandNaziempires.ThesmallestestablishmentwasthatofRibbentrop’sForeignMinistry,PersZS,whichhaditsowninterceptstationatLandhaus,aswellasreceivingsomemessagesfromOKW/Chi.ItsleadingpersonalitiesincludedDrAdolfPashke,aRussianandItalianlinguistwhohadworkedfortheForeignMinistrysince1919andby1945hadbecomePersZS’sdefactochief.DrWernerKunze,anotherveteransinceWorldWarI,wastheseniormathematicalcryptanalyst,whoranthedepartment’sIBMmachinery.DrUrsulaHagenwasoneofthefewwomenworkinginherfield,supervisingagroupoftwelvecryptanalystsstudyingEngland,IrelandandSpain.Thepost-warAmericanreportonthedepartmentsuggestsagroupofreasonablyproficientbutrelativelyelderlyspecialistswho‘seemedoverlypreoccupiedwithcryptanalysisasascience,andapparentlynot…asaprimesourceofintelligence’.PersZS’sgreatesttriumphwastoreadtheJapanese‘Red’diplomaticcipheruntilFebruary1939,whenitwasreplacedbyPurple.DuringthewaritscodebreakersbrokesomeAlliedandneutralmedium-gradediplomatictraffic,butthereisnoevidencethatitscontentwasmuchheededbypolicymakers,orevensubjectedtoseriousanalysis.Germanmilitarysigintorganisationchangedsomuchandsofrequentlyinthecourseofthewar

thatitismeaninglesstodetailthevariations,savetosaythattheydidnothingtohelpcodebreaking.AttheoutsetWilhelmFennerofOKW/Chi,whichwaschargedwithcreatingGermany’sowndiplomaticciphersaswellasbreakingtheenemy’s,washiscountry’smostinfluentialcryptanalyst.ThoughFennerwasexperiencedandcompetent,hisdepartmentsufferedfromhisowndelusionthathewasbrilliant.Hewasbornin1891inStPetersburg,wherehisfatherranalittlenewspaperfortheGermancommunity,andhehimselfbecamefluentinRussianandEnglish.Afterworkingforsometimeasanengineer,andthenasawartimearmyinterpreter,in1921hejoinedthearmycryptographicbureau,andscoredanearlysuccessbybreakingtheRussianmilitaryattachés’code.Heintroducedintothedepartmentanexoticfigurewhomheconsideredhismentor,aWhiteRussianex-navalcaptainnamedProfessorPeterNovopasakenny.ThetwoweresoonreadingmostFrenchandPolishcodes,whichperhapspersuadedthemthatcryptanalysiswasnottoodifficult.Fennerlatercomplainedstifflyabouttheproblemsof‘Haltung’–‘attitude’–thatwerecreatedbytheNazis’ascenttopower:‘Therestlesstimeswerenotfavourableforscientificcryptanalysis.’Loyaltywasesteemedfarmorehighlythan

intellectualintegrity.ThetipsofChi’ssiginttentacleslayinitsreceivingstationsatTreuenbrietzen,south-westof

Berlin,andatLauf,southofBaden-Baden.Theformerwascomposedoftwosingle-storeystonebuildingssurroundedbywireandsentries,thecompounddominatedbyaforestofsixty-footaerials.Inside,banksofoperatorsmannedsixtyreceiversinsix-hourshiftsaroundtheclock,assistedbyMorse-recordingmachines.TheWehrmachtemployedsomeblindoperators,recruitedfortheacutenessoftheirhearing,ofwhomFennernotedapprovingly,‘theprecisionoftheirworkwashighlyesteemed’.Mostoftheincomingmaterialwascomposedinfive-letteror-numbercodegroups,andagoodoperatorhandled3,000to4,000inashift,maybetwohundredmessagesaday.ThesameroutineswereobservedatLauf,andthereweresubsidiaryinterceptstationsatBreslau,

Munster,Königsberg,SofiaandMadrid:intheSpanishcapitaloperatorsoccupiedtheextensivepremisesoftheformerFloridanightclubinthenorth-easternsuburbofCastellana.In1941Chiestablishedafurtherout-stationstaffedbysomefiftymenonaGerman-ownedcattleranchnorthofSeville.Thisranuntil1944,whentheSpanishauthoritiesbelatedlyacknowledgedthetiltofthewarandenforceditsclosure.Furtherafield,aformerLuftwafferadio-operatorservicedaone-manoperationintheCanaries.AllthesestationsteleprintedGeheimeKommandosache–TopSecret–materialtoBerlin,whereitwassortedaccordingtosource,fordiscardorattackbythecodebreakers.AsatBletchleyandArlington,onlyaproportionofinterceptscouldbeaddressed,andsomebrokenforeignsignalshadtobeleftuntranslated.Duringthepre-waryearstheGermansreadmuchofFrance’sdiplomatictraffic.ASeptember1939

decryptprovidedOKWwiththecriticalinformationthattheFrencharmy’sincursionintotheSaarlandwasonlyagesturewhichrequirednotransferofGermanforcesfromthePolishfront.Formuchoftherestofthewar,ChiaccessedthetrafficfromLondonoftheFreeFrenchandthePolishexilegovernment,togetherwithsomeSwissEnigma,andallegedlysomeSovietmessages,thoughthereisnoevidenceofanythingimportant.TheGermanattackonthetrafficoftheAlliedarmieswascomplicatedandweakenedbythedivisionbetweenOKW/Chi’sroleandthatofthearmy’sradiointelligencebranch,whicheventuallybecameOKH/GdNA,orInspectorate7/VI,towhichasteadystreamofChispecialistswereseconded.Thisultimatelydeployed12,000personnelincludingitsfieldregimentsonthebattlefields,thoughEasternFrontactivitieswereseparatelymanaged,underanorganisationnamedHLS/Ost.UntilAlliedbombingofBerlinachieveddevastatingproportionsinthewinterof1943,boththe

army’scryptographicheadquartersandOKW/Chi’svarious‘nation’departmentswerelocatedinthesamedistrictofthecapitalasCanaris’soffices,withtheAmericanReferatandChi’smainHQsituatedonMatthaeikirchplatz,theBalkanandEnglishReferatenat9Schellingstrasse,andsoon.Some320crypto-linguistswereemployed,togetherwithseveralhundredclericalandadministrativestaff,manyofthemwomen.TheevaluationdepartmentwashousedonBendlerstrasse,whereofficerscreatedthe

samesortofcardindexesofenemyofficers,callsigns,unitsandwarshipsasBletchley’s.Chi’scodebreakersworkedbehindlockedofficedoors,andnoneofthefemaleclericalstaffhadaccesstosafekeys.OngoingrivalrywithGöring’sForschungsamt,chieflyaNaziPartyinstrumentdismissedbyWalterSchellenbergastheminister ’s‘privateplaything’,wasahandicap.Thelatter ’s2,000codebreakingpersonnelmighthaveachievedmoreunderacommonroofwithChiandOKH/GdNA.ChiusedthesamestaffselectionmethodsastheBritishandAmericans–testingrecruitswith

crosswordpuzzlesandmathematicalproblems.Successfulcandidateswereassignedtoafour-weekinductioncourse,learningthesubstitutionandtranspositionmethods,andsuchlike.TheywerealsourgedtoreadaFrenchhistoryofcryptanalysis,andHerbertYardley’saccountoftheold‘BlackChamber ’.InChi’s1941heydayitemployedaround3,000people,butthereafterthisstrengthfell,asrear-areaorganisationswerecombedforpersonnelwhomightbecomeFrontsoldaten,orshiftedtoOKH/GdNA.WhereasBletchley’ssuccesssecuredevermoreresources,Chi’slackofitearnedevermorescepticism.Moreover,fromJuly1944itbecameafocusofhostilescrutiny,followingtheexecutionofitstwomostseniorofficers,signalscorpsgenerals,asplottersagainstHitler.Fenner,Chi’sveterancryptanalyst,foundhimselfunderinvestigation,accusedbyanSDofficerofplottingtosabotagetheWehrmacht’scommunicationsbyrecommendinganinferiorciphersystem.Fennersaidlater,‘thewholecryptographicservicecameunderpoliticalsuspicion’.Thoughhewaseventuallycleared,inNazieyesthedepartment’sreputationwasirretrievablytarnished.Britain’sTuringandWelchman,America’sFriedmanandRowlett,hadnoequalsintheenemy’s

camp.RecruitmentwasnotassistedbythefactthatmanyofGermany’smostbrilliantbrainswereexiled,imprisonedorslaughtered,becausetheywereJews.ItbearsnoticethatthreeofthefourmembersofFriedman’soriginalUSArmycodebreakingteamwereJewish,togetherwithsomeofthehighestintellectsatBletchley.ThenamesofHitler ’scodebreakersarealmostunknowntoposterity,evenintheirowncountry,whiletheirBritishandAmericancounterpartshavebelatedlybecomefamous.Nonetheless,someofChi’smenweretalentedbyanystandardsavethatofitsenemies.AmongtheforemostwasDrErichHüttenhain,bornin1905inWestphalia,abrilliantstudentwhoprofessedapassionforMayanchronology.Heleftuniversityin1932ladenwithlaurelsinastronomy,mathematicsandphysics.ThereafterheservedforfiveyearsasanastronomicalresearchassistantinMunsterbeforebeingrecruitedasacryptanalyst.Hewasquicklyappointedtoheadadivision,andsetaboutrecruitingthebestbrainshecouldidentify,andensuringthattheywerekeptawayfromthefrontwhenwarcame.Hisassistant,WaltherFricke,producedadoctorateonthedynamicsofthestellarsystem,andin1939hadbeenduetotakeuparesearchpostatEdinburghUniversity.FrickejoinedChiin1941knowingnothingofcryptanalysis,butprovedanadept.Lt.SchubertbecameanexpertonRussiantraffic,assistedbyacodebookcapturedbytheFinnsduringtheir1939–40warwiththeSovietUnion;hewaslatertransferredtoOKH/GdNA,wherehereadsomeRedArmyfour-figurecodematerial.FenneralsothoughthighlyofBernert,aViennesewho

workedonBritishmessages,andDöring,whowas‘alwayscalledinfordifficultjobs’.Therewasanengineerwhobuilt‘phasedecoders’–WilliJensen,thenearesttheorganisationhadtoTommyFlowersatDollisHill.OthernotablepersonalitiesincludedWolfgangFranz,ErnstWitt,KarlSteinandGisbert

Hasenjaeger,thelasttheyoungestintheteam,agedtwenty-four.Hüttenhainrecruitedfiveprofessorsofmathematics,includingGeorgAumann,WernerWeberandJohannSchultze–togetherwithaphysicianofmathematicalleanings.WhiletheBritishallowedmostofBletchley’scodebreakerstoretaintheircivilianstatus,theGermansinductedtheirsintotheWehrmachtasGefreiters–privatesfirstclass–alossofstatuswhichtheserelativelydistinguishedacademicsresented.ErichHüttenhainhadhisfirstsignificantsuccesscrackingFrenchfieldcodesin1938;theGermanscontinuedtoreadthesethrough1940andindeedthereafter,eventhoughmonthlychangesweremade.DuringtheBlitzkrieginFrance,armysigintdecryptedrelativelyfewimportantBritishsignals,butwasnonethelessabletoprovideGermancommanderswithafullpictureoftheirorderofbattle;totracktheiradvanceintoBelgium;toreadtheordertotheirCalaisgarrisontoholdouttothelast.InaprominentpositioninChi’sTirpitzüferheadquartersstoodaBritishType-Xciphermachine

capturedatDunkirk,albeitwithoutitsrotors.Hüttenhaintoldinterrogatorsin1945that‘sinceEnigmawassimilartoType-X,andwebelievethattheEnigmacannotbebroken,nogreateffortwasmadetobreakType-X…EnigmamightbebrokenifavastHollerithcomplex[tabulator]wasused,butthisisscarcelyfeasible.’TheGermanscreatedarangeofintermediatetechnologytoassisttheirlabours,includingaRoellchengerät,a10x10cylinderdevicebuiltbytheForeignMinistry’scipherdepartment,whichperformedaprimitivecalculatingfunction.Chialsohadanelectrictypewriterthatcouldhandlesimplelettersubstitution.Fennercomplainedafterthewar:‘Mechanicalscanningofperforatedtapes[byBigramdevices]wasalwaysmuchtooslow.Thefuturebelongstophoto-electricscanning.’TheBritish,however,hadachievedmiracleswithintermediatetechnology,andincomparisonwiththebombesandColossusworkingtheirmarvelsatBletchley,themachineryemployedbyChiandOKH/GdNAresembleda1914biplanealongsidea1945jetfighter.TheGermansreliedoverwhelminglyonhumaningenuitytoaccesslowerAlliedsystems.Groups

ofmenwereassignedtoworktogetheronagivensignal,cross-fertilisingideasjustasatBletchleyandArlingtonHall.Fennertestifiedthatduringtheearlywaryears,whentheGermanswerereadingAmerica’sstrip-ciphermilitaryattachécode,80percentofthebreakswereachievedthroughusererrors,especiallywhenidenticalmessageswererepeatedindifferentcodes–thefamiliarvulnerabilitythatassistedtheAllies.FennersaidthatSovietciphersweresecureifproperlyemployed,‘butifthecryptanalystsinMoscowcouldonlyseehowtheywereused,theywouldbeveryunhappy’.Thissmuglittleobservationshouldbejudged,however,inthecontextofthefactthatBerlinseemstohavelearnedlittleofanysignificancetoitswareffortfromwhateverbreaksitachieved.

In1941theGermanstransferredfromFrancetoNorthAfricawirelesseavesdropperswithexperienceofmonitoringBritishtraffic,andreapedhandsomedividends.On26June,alongreportfromBletchleydrewWarOfficeattentiontoBritishoperationalsignalsdecryptedbytheGermansduringtheCretandébâcle,someofthemdetailingaircraftandwarshipmovements.TheAfrikaKorpsconsideredEighthArmy’swirelessdisciplineveryslack,andattributedmanyofRommel’s1941–42successestohisforeknowledgeofBritishdeployments.Someoftheinterceptorswerehighlyqualifiedlinguists.One,anNCOnamedSchwartze,wasthetwenty-six-year-oldsonofanEnglishmotherandahalf-JewishGermanfather.HehadbeeneducatedatCheltenhamCollegeandMertonCollege,Oxford,wherehereadlaw,thoughdebarredlaterfrompractisinginGermanybecauseofhisancestry.HeworkedinNorthAfricaalongsideafriendnamedGraupe,aBerlinerafewyearsolder,whohadstudiedinLouisianaandworkedinaUSfactoryuntiltheauthoritiesdeclinedtorenewhisvisa.Afterthewar,Lt.Gen.AlbertPraundescribedhowspasmsofAnglo-Americancarelessness

enabledhisofficerstopiecetogetherenemyordersofbattle,justastheAlliesdid.Thesigintout-stationinAthens,forinstance,readamessagefromaBritishpaymasterinPalestine,instructingadivisionbeingtransferredtoEgypttoleavebehinditsfilingcabinets–whichenabledabigredpintobeshiftedonthemapofBritishdeploymentsintheMiddleEast.Later,theGermansdiscoveredthattheUS82ndAirborneDivisionhadmovedfromtheMediterraneantoBritainbecausetheybrokeanadministrativemessageaboutoneoftheformation’sparatrooperswhowasfacingapaternitysuit.TheyreceivedwarningofanimpendingattackinItalybydecryptingasignalaboutanissueofrumtotheassaultunits.ItaliancodebreakingofBritishtrafficplayedanimportantroleinempoweringAxisintelligence.Hans-OttoBehrendt,oneofRommel’sofficers,wrotegleefullythatin1941–42hischief‘oftenhad

aclearerpictureofwhattheBritishC-in-CplannedthansomeoftheBritishsubordinateformationcommanders’.TheGermangeneralcalled621RadioInterceptionCompanyhis‘circus’.UntilElAlamein,heboastedthatnomajorBritishformationenteredabattlewithouthavingbeenpreviouslyidentifiedbyhissigintteam.Theoverrunningof621CompanybyNewZealandtroopson10July1942,withthelossofalmostallitspersonnelbydeathorcapture,wasdeemedamajordisasterfortheAfrikaKorps.WhenBletchleydecryptedtrafficthatrevealedtheGermanbreakintotheUSmilitaryattachétraffic,itachievedanimportantsuccessbypersuadingWashingtontochangeciphers.Thus,on29June1942Rommellostaccesstothetraffic,whichhehimselfhaddescribedaffectionatelyashis‘littleFellers’–thenameoftheUSattachéinEgypt.AGermanstaffofficerdescribedthisdevelopmentas‘acatastrophe’.ThetraumafeltbythecodebreakersofChiandarmyradiointelligenceinBerlinwasasgreatasthatimposedonBletchleybyDönitz’sintroductionofthefourthrotortoU-boatEnigma.GC&CShadwarnedtheAmericansaboutthelethalthreatposedbytheCairotrafficearlyinMay,butbureaucraticbunglingcausedmoreFellerssignalstobesent,including

highlysensitivematerialaboutdefenceoftheNileDelta,foralmostanothertwomonthsbeforethebreachwasfinallyclosed.ColonelMcCormackwrotetoWashingtonfromBletchley,wherehewasvisiting:‘Themishaps…haveproducedinahighquarterhere(andyoumustadmitwithsomejustification)asomewhatunfortunateimpressionofourownsecurityprocedures.’Untilthesummerof1942,theGermansandtheAllieswereinaboutthesameplaceinthestruggle

forintelligenceintheMediterranean:RommelandhisBritishcounterpartsknewapproximatelythesameamountabouteachother.Moreover,innorthernFrancethedisasterthatbefelltheAugustDiepperaidwaspartlyattributabletothefactthatthedefenderswereonhighalert,thankstoplentifulGermansigintandhumintaboutBritishpreparations.Thereafter,however,theWehrmachtlaggedincreasinglyfarbehind.ItbecametheturnoftheGermanstosufferfromthedeficiencythathaddoggedBritishoperationsforthepastthreeyears:lackofhardpowertoexploitinformation.By1943,oneofRommel’sintelligenceofficersnotedthatwhiletheywerestillacquiringsomegoodmaterialfromtheYServiceandPoWinterrogation,theycoulddolittleusefulwithit:‘tacticalintelligencewasnotofmuchuse.Wewerejusttooweak.’TheGermansneversecuredanotherAlliedmilitarysourceasgoodasBonnerFellers.Operation‘Torch’,theNovember1942NorthAfricaninvasion,cameasacompletesurprisetoBerlinbecauseAlliedwirelessdisciplinewasstrict,specialnewnavalciphertableshadbeenintroduced,andtheAbwehrsupposedthe‘Torch’convoys,thoughreportedbyitswatchersinSpain,tobedestinedforMalta,orelseforlandingsfurthereast.In1943theyweresometimesalertedtoimpendingMediterraneanlandingsbyreferencesinBritishorAmericanfield-cipheredsignalsorvoicetraffictocolours–beachesdesignated‘Green’,‘Blue’,‘White’andsuchlike.InthefirsthoursofOperation‘Husky’inJuly,however,theywereslowtorespondpartlybecauseafortnightearlierradiointelligencehadrungfalsealarmbellsaboutjustsuchanAlliedinvasionofSicily.InvestigationshowedthatGermaneavesdroppershadpickeduptransmissionsfromalandingexerciseinNorthAfrica,whichhappenedtotakeplaceonthesamecompassbearingasSicilyfromoneoftheirdirection-finders,butahundredmilesfurthersouth.AsfortheEasternFront’sHLS/Ost,inFebruary1943theintelligenceofficerofXXXthPanzer

Corpspaidlavishtributetothe‘outstanding’sigintservicebeingmaintainedonhisformation’sfront.ButaboutthattimetheRussianscapturedaGermaninterceptioncompanyatStalingrad,andbelatedlyawoketothesophisticationofitsactivities:thereafter,Sovietofficersoftenbrokeoffavoiceconversationiftheirotherpartiesviolatedsecurity.AfterStalingrad,saidAlbertPraun,theRedArmymaintainedthebestradiodisciplineofanyofHitler ’sadversaries,‘andposedagreaterproblemtoGermandirection-findersthandidtheirWesternAllies’,whobecameevermorecareless.Intheyearbeginning1May1943,ArmyGroupNorth,forinstance,intercepted46,342Russiansignals,butreadonly13,312–allatlowlevelandmanyoutofrealtime.Gen.KurtvonTippelskirchsaidafterthewar:‘Astimewenton[theeavesdroppers]hadmoreandmoredifficultycopingwithRussiandeceptionmeasures,consistingofconstantsimulatedtroopmovements.’TheWehrmacht’sspirits

werenotimprovedbybreakinganenemysignalinwhichaRedArmyintelligenceofficerurgedunitsthatkilledGermanprisonerstospareatleastoneforquestioning.ThisappearstohavepromptedanotherSovietmessage:‘20Fritzescaptured,onesentbackforinterrogation,remaindershot.’Praunwrotedisdainfullyafterthewarthatthisgave‘atrulyshockingpictureoftheAsiaticcombatmethodsusedbytheRussians’–hehadevidentlyforgottenthathisownarmykilledorallowedtostarvetodeathtwomillionSovietprisonersin1941–42,andplentymorethereafter.

Intheearlysummerof1944,beforetheRedArmylaunched‘Bagration’,greatestoffensiveofthewar,PavelSudoplatovwassummonedtotheKremlinwithhisbossMerkulov,AbakumovofSMERShandtheGRU’schieftodiscussanewtwisttothelong-runningdeceptionoperation‘Monastery’.ReinhardGehlenandtheAbwehrwerestillenthusingaboutthesteadyflowofinformationtheyreceivedfromAgent‘Max’.TheGermans’EasternFrontintelligencechiefwasrashenoughtotellhisownhighcommandthatitmightexpect‘acalmsummer’.TheStavkainMoscowthusdecidedthatthetimewasripetouseAlexanderDemyanovandhisnetworktobuildanewedificeofdisinformationtosupport‘Bagration’.TheintelligencechiefsenteredStalin’ssuiteincockymood,inspiredbythetideofsuccess

attendingRussianarms–SudoplatovhadrecentlyreceivedtheOrderofSuvarovforhisownrole.Stalin,however,withcharacteristicperversity,receivedthevisitorscoldly.Traditionaldeceptionideaswereplayedout,hesaid;hewantedtotrysomethingnew,ofimmediateassistancetotheRedArmy.Sudoplatov,ataloss,keptcautiouslysilent.Abakumovsimplyurgedplacing‘Monastery’underhisowncontrol.Stalinthencalledinthedeputychiefofthegeneralstaff,Gen.SergeyShtemenko,whoreadanorderalreadydrafted.The‘Monastery’teamwastopassintelligencetoOKHtopersuadetheGermansthatoneoftheirbrigadesinBelorussiawascutoff,butstillfighting.TheobjectivewastogoadtheGermansintolaunchinganoperationtobreakthroughtorelieveit.Sudoplatovwasexcitedbytheboldnessandoriginalityoftheplan.InJuly1944hisdeputyLeonid

Eitingon,alongwith‘Fisher ’theradiospecialistandanNKVDteam,weredispatchedtoBelorussiatoimplementit.AlexanderDemyanov–‘Max’–informedtheGermansthathehadbeentransferredtoanewassignment,inthecommunicationsdepartmentoftheRedArmyontheBelorussianfront.On19AugustGehleninformedhiscommanders,ontheauthorityof‘Max’,thataWehrmachtbrigadeof2,500mencommandedbyLt.Col.HeinrichScherhorn,withsomegunsandafewtanks,wasstrugglingdesperatelyinanencirclementneartheBerezinariver.ThesizeofthebaitwasfinelycraftedbytheRussians:smallenoughtobecredible,largeenoughtobeworthanefforttosave.Inreality,ofcourse,Scherhornand1,500survivorsofhisshatteredcommandhadbeendisarmedandwereinthehandsoftheRedArmy;theirwireless-operatorswerenowtransmittingwithEitingonandhiscomradesholdingpistolstotheirheads,figurativelyandperhapsliterally.Amazingly,thisdeceptionwassuccessfullysustainedfrom19August1944to5May1945.

AlthoughtheWehrmacht’scircumstancesweretoodesperatetolaunchaground-forceoperationtorelieveScherhorn,duringthosemonthsaprocessionoftransportplanesparachutedtothecolonelsupplies,ammunition,radioequipment,cashandPolishguidestaskedtoleadthebrigadeacrosscountrytowardstheGermanlines.Allthismaterialwasrecovered,includingthirteenwirelessesandtenmillionroubles,togetherwithtwenty-fiveAbwehrpersonnel.SomeoftheGermanaircraftcarryingoutthedropswereallowedtoflysafelyhome,tosustainthedeception.TothespecialdelightoftheNKVD,on28March1945ScherhornreceivedapersonalsignalfromGen.HeinzGuderian,announcinghispromotiontofullcolonelandtheawardoftheKnight’sCross.AlthoughtheScherhorndeceptionwassuperblyingenious,fromtheKremlin’sviewpointtheresultsweremodest,notremotelymatchingthecontributionof‘Monastery’totheStalingradenvelopment.

AmidtheWehrmacht’sdireshortageofsources,itsintelligenceofficersdevotedincreasingefforttodeterminingwheretheRedArmywasmassingartillery,butthisbecameproblematicasevermoregunsprovedtobedummies.Gen.vonTippelskirschsaid,‘PoWinterrogationwasthemostprofitablesource[ofinformation],withtheYservicesecond.’TheGermanshaddespairedofcrackinghigh-levelAlliedcodes,andnowfocusedexclusivelyonhumblertraffic.Moreover,itwasalwaysnecessaryforknowledgetobematchedbycapability.InthelatterwaryearsontheEasternFront,AlbertPraunnotedgloomilythatitbecamefruitlesstolocateSovietconcentrations,becausetheWehrmachtandLuftwaffecouldactonsuchintelligenceonly‘inasmuchastheGermanshadthemeansforappropriatecounter-measuresinthistheatre’.Whichwasnotoften.In1944–45,aftertheGermanslostthecapabilitytocarryoutsignificantairreconnaissance,the

Nachrichtenarmaufklärungvoice-interceptionservicebecameevermoreimportant.Itsstationsabandonedinterceptionoflow-prioritytrafficinsuchplacesasIrelandandSpain,toconcentrateontheAlliedarmies.TheytrackedmanyUSformationsthroughthemovementsoftheirAPOs–ArmyPostOfficenumbers.TheGermaninterceptionstationatBergeninNorwayhad150receivers,andmonitoredawealthoftrafficasfarafieldasthecontinentalUnitedStates.AlbertPraunpraisedBritishradiodiscipline,butexpressedbafflementthatitsunitscustomarilytransmittedcallsignsandsignaturesinplainlanguage.VoicechatterduringAlliedexercisesprovedafertilesourceofintelligence.ErichHüttenhainofChiregardedcipher-makingandcipher-breakingasprocessesthatshould

fertiliseeachother,andwasexasperatedthattheWehrmachtignoredhiswarningsaboutthevulnerabilityofsomeofitscodes,andofitsteleprinterlinks–thoughnot,untilalatestage,oftheEnigmamachine.EvenafteraspecialChiciphersecuritydepartmentheadedbyKarlSteinwascreatedin1942,OKW’shubrispersisted.WilhelmFennersaidsourlyafterthewar:‘Thehighcommand’sviewwasthat“Germanyhadwonallherbattlessofarbyusingthesystem[ithadgot],andtherewasnoneedtooverloadthetroopswithnewmethods.”’InAugust1944,whenStein’steam

belatedlyurgedabandonmentofEnigma,thearmy’sresistancepersisted.Fenneragain:‘Therewasastormofprotestwheneverthearmywasaskedtochangeasystem.’CompareandcontrasttheattitudeoftheUSArmy,whichlostaciphermachineinFrance,andacceptedtheimmenselogisticalburdenofrewiringeveryotherSigabainthetheatre,justincasetheGermanshadcapturedthelostexample–whichitwaseventuallyfoundthattheyhadnot.InNovember,Hüttenhainlecturedtoamilitarysignalssymposium,highlightingthevulnerabilitiesofWehrmachtcommunications,butnothingwasdonetoassuagehisfears.Chi’scryptanalystshadnohardevidenceofBritishsuccessinbreakingEnigma,andinitsabsencewereforcedtomaketheircasesimplybydemonstratingitstheoreticalvulnerability.ThiswasnotenoughforGermany’sgenerals.Meanwhile,manufacturersdalliedforyearswiththedevelopmentofanewandmoreadvancedEnigmarotor,theLuckenfüllerwalze,butthisbecamefitforintroductiontoserviceonlyon1May1945.TheGermansneverconcentratedtheircodebreakingtalentsandresourcesinthefashionthatwas

essentialiftheyweretoaccomplishbigthings.AnAmericananalystobservedafterinterrogatingthechiefGermancodebreakersin1945:‘NeithertheAbwehrnortheheadofOKW/Chiseemstohavehadanadequateideaofthedifficultiesfacedbythecryptanalysts…Directionsalwayscametoolate.’TheBritishgeniuslayincreatingapartnershipbetweenthefreespiritsofthecivilianacademiccodebreakersandahighlydisciplinedsystemofanalysisanddissemination.Germany,amongthemostorganisedsocietiesonearth,failedfirstinmakingbestuseofitscleverestminds,andsecondindevisinginnovativetechnologytoprovidethesupportindispensabletobreakingmachineciphersinrealtime.Wehrmachtintelligenceofficersassertedthattheirmostusefulsourcesinthesecondhalfofthewar,whenaerialreconnaissanceceasedtobefeasibleinthefaceofAlliedairsuperiority,were–indescendingorder–captureddocuments;humanobservationonthebattlefield;siginttrafficanalysis;andmaterialderivedfromopensources–readingAlliednewspapersandlisteningtotheBBC.AtBletchley,Britain’scodebreakershadtoperformtaskswhichcalledforsupremeconcentration

inconditionsofrelativediscomfort,especiallywintercold.TheplightofChi’speopleandtheGermanarmy’scryptographicheadquarterswasmuchworse,however.InNovember1943BritishbombingdestroyedorseverelydamagedmostoftheTirpitzüferhousesinwhichtheyworked,andtheB-Dienstlostalargepartofitsfilingsystem.Itwashardtofocusoncomplexmathematicalproblemswhileshiveringindust-shroudedofficesthatlackedwindowsanddoors.Moreover,almostnightlyattacksdeprivedstaffofmuchchanceofsleep.Fennerreckonedthatthecodebreakers’output–thenumberofsignalstheybroke–diminishedbytwo-thirdsinthewinterof1943–44,andneverrecoveredthereafter,amidrepeatedevacuationsandtransferstotemporaryquarters.HehimselfwasmarriedtoaPrussianarmyofficer ’sdaughter,Elise,andthecouple’sspiritwascrushedbythedeathoftheironlysonontheRussianFront.From1944totheendofthewar,ChibecamealmostentirelypreoccupiedwithGermanciphersecurity–aroleinwhich,ofcourse,italsofailed.Thestruggleto

crackhigherAlliedwirelesstrafficwasalmostabandoned.Itwaslefttothetacticaleavesdroppersofarmyradiointelligenceinthefieldtodowhattheycouldwithlowercodesandtrafficanalysis.EachmonthbetweenJanuaryandJune1944,Chilogged3,000decryptedmessages–‘VNs’,asthey

weretagged,‘VerlässlicheNachrichten’,reliablereports–theGermanequivalentoftheBritish‘mostsecretsources’.Thevastmajority,however,addressedAlliedhousekeepingissues,ortheaffairsofsuchneutralsastheTurks.Fennerandhiscomradesreadahundreddiplomaticsignalsadaydispatchedbytwenty-ninesecondarypowers,whichgeneratedhectaresofpaperandhelpedtoconveytothemselves,andinsomedegreealsototheirsuperiors,anillusionofusefulactivity.Theywastedmucheffortcrackingmessagesoutof‘realtime’:anextremeexamplewasareportfromJapan’sMoscowambassadorabouttheeconomicandmilitaryconditionoftheSovietUnion,dispatchedtoTokyoon10December1943.Thiswasfinallybrokenon11October1944;acopyfellintoAmericanhandsafterthewar,annotatedbyaChiclerk‘solvedafterdelay’.Germany’sfinestcryptanalystsalsocrackeda23August1944ArgentinemessagefromBeunos

AirestoLondonwhichread:‘TheEconomicOfficeforSugarandAlcoholapprovestheextensionoftheintermediateagreementfor2yearsanddeemsitsuitabletoaskforanincreaseofthequota.’Ifthisseemsbanal,in1945theAlliescapturedthousandsofpainstakinglyfiled‘VNs’thatmadeevenlessexcitingreading.Until1943theGermanscouldclaimsomeuseful,thoughneverdecisive,codebreakingsuccesses.Fortherestofthewar,however,Chiilluminatedlittlemorethansugarquotas.Bletchley,ArlingtonHallandOp-20-Gminedplentyofdross,butinitsmidstwereseamsofgold.Berlincouldboastnosuchassayingtriumph.

2 ‘CICERO’

Itisascenefromsome1920sHollywoodespionagedrama:inasumptuousdiplomaticdrawing-room,amustachioedaristocratwithanamethatdefiesparodyplaysBeethovenonagrandpiano,whileupstairsavillainouslittleBalkanservantphotographshissecretpapersforsaletotheenemy.TheBritishtakejustprideintheirintelligencetriumphsinWorldWarII,butthestaffproblemsofSirHugheKnatchbull-Hugessen,ambassadortoTurkey,representasorrieraspectoftherecord.ItwasoneoftheGermansecretservice’slastsuccesses,ifitcanbedignifiedassuch,foritdidscantservicetoHitler ’scause.Knatchbull-HugessenhadservedinAnkarasince1938,livingwithhiswifeMaryattheBritish

residencebesidetheembassyinthehillsofCancaya,abovethecapital.Itiswellknowntohistorythatin1943–44heemployedavaletwhosoldhissecretstotheGermans.Itislessfamiliar,andalmostdefiescredibility,thatasearlyas1941theAbwehrwasreceivingmaterialfromhissafe,liftedbyotherhands.InOctoberandNovemberofthatyearDrViktorFriede,Canaris’slocalstationchief,boastedthathehadaccessedHugessen’spapers.Moreover,inasecondJanuary1943incident,the

ambassador ’sthenvaletAndreaMarovictelephonedtheGermanembassytoreporthismaster ’sdepartureforAdanatomeetWinstonChurchill.WhentheForeignOfficeinLondongotwindofthisandinstructedHugessentodismissMarovic,heprevaricated.Hesaidthathecouldscarcelybeexpectedtofulfilhisdutieswithoutavalet,andwoulddonothinguntilasubstitutewasrecruited.TheForeignOfficescoldedHugessen,sayingthematterwas‘aseriousonewhichadmitsofnodelay’.Marovicwasbelatedlydismissedon15May,andtemporarilyreplacedbyafootman.Twomonthslater,HugessenhiredElyesaBaznatofilltherole,despitebeingwarnedagainstthemanbytheTurkishauthorities.Baznawasaself-confessedrogue,greedyandalwaysintrouble.ThesonofaMuslimreligious

teacher,borninsouthernYugoslaviawhenitwasstillpartoftheOttomanEmpire,hedriftedthroughaseriesofchauffeuringjobsfromwhichhewassackedforincompetence,andonceservedasentenceinaFrenchpenalcampwhereheacquiredsomelockpickingskill.Onhisrelease,inhisownwords,‘Ibecamewhateverybodybecomeswhohasneverlearnedajobandhasnothingbehindhimbuthiswits–akavass.’AsadomesticservantandchauffeurheworkedsuccessivelyforAmerican,Yugoslav,GermanandfinallyBritishemployers.Fancyinghisownvoice,inoff-dutyhourshetrainedtobecomeaprofessionalsinger.By1943,however,thiscockylittlemanfoundhimselfdepressedbyhisowncondition:hewasthirty-eight,andaself-avowedfailure.WhileworkingattheGermanembassyheidlyphotographedafewletters,whichpromptedaninspiration:‘Iwasapersonofnoconsequence…Whynotsetupasaspy?’HesecuredadomesticpostwiththefirstsecretaryattheBritishembassyinAnkara,andbegan

readinghisemployer ’sprivatepapersbetweenleisurelybathsintheresidencebathroom.Healsoembarkedonanaffairwiththesecretary’steenagenannyMara:‘herarmswereentwinedaroundmyneckmoreoftenthanmyfourteenties’.TheirrelationshipcontinuedwhenBaznabecametheambassador ’svalet,andshewasawide-eyedwitnesstohistransitionfromcasualvillaintocommittedspy.Afterhisluncheon,theambassadorinvariablyplayedthepianointhedrawing-room,leavinghiskeyswithinreachofBazna,whomadeawaximpressionofthosewhichopenedthedispatchboxandsafe.Hugessenalwaystookthemostimportantpapersintohisbedroom,offeringthevaletandhiscamerafurtheropportunities.‘Iamdoingallthisformycountry,’BaznatoldMarasolemnlyashesetforthforthemarketplace–orrather,fortheGermanembassy.HesaidthathewasworkingtokeepTurkeyoutofthewar,whiletheBritishandAmericanswereconspiringtodragherintoit.ThewifeofGermancounsellorAlbertJenke–whochancedtobeRibbentrop’sbrother-in-law–

gaveBaznaafrostyreceptionwhenhearrivedwithhisfirstwareslateonthenightof26October1943:hehadoncebeenherownleastfavouriteservant.Baznaannouncedthathehadfifty-sixphotographeddocumentstosellfor£20,000.Jenkeviewedthecallerashemighthaveexaminedabeetleinthebath,butdutycompelledhimtopassBaznaontoacaseofficer,anAustrianSDman

namedLudwigMoyzichwhoservedSchellenberg’sDepartmentVIoftheRSHA,undercoverascommercialattaché.Moyzichthoughtthevalet‘lookedlikeaclownwithouthismake-up’.Hewasinitiallydisbelieving

aboutboththematerialandthemeansbywhichithadbeenacquired,whichreekedofcheapmelodrama–or,moreplausibly,ofanenemydeception.Baznaclaimedthathewasmotivatedbyhisownfather ’skillingbytheBritish,butitwasobviousthathewasameremercenary.Berlindulypaidup,andBaznasetaboutphotographinghisemployer ’spapersdayafterday,thenweekafterweek.OnestolenmemorandumsummarisedquantitiesofwarmaterialbeingdeliveredtoRussiabytheWesternAllies;therewasmuchcorrespondenceaboutBritain’seffortstodragTurkeyintothewar;mostappetisingofall,inGermaneyes,wasasummaryofexchangesbetweenChurchill,RooseveltandStalinattheirNovember1943summitmeetinginTehran.ProperlyanalysedinBerlin,thelattermaterialcouldhavetoldtheGermansagooddealabouttheAllies’mostcloselyguardedsecret,Operation‘Overlord’,theplannedinvasionofFrance.Butthisdocument,likeothersfromthesamesource,neverreceivedthesortofimaginativescrutinyitdeserved.WithinafewmonthsBazna–whomtheGermanscodenamed‘Cicero’–hadsecretedafortune,£300,000insterling.Itwasenough.Hewasrich,andhewaslosinghisnerve.InJanuary1944,RooseveltinformedChurchillofanOSSreportthataGermanagenthadsecured

detailsofdiplomaticnegotiationsbetweenBritainandTurkey.TheBritishassumedaleakfromTurkishsources,butthiswasofcoursetheworkofBazna.FritzKolbeoftheGermanForeignMinistryhadtippedoffAllenDullesinSwitzerland,whointurninformedWashington.Amonthlater,withBritishintelligenceincreasinglyconvincedthattheleakcamefromtheambassador ’sstaff,BillCavendish-Bentinckprepareddeceptiondocuments–supposedwarcabinetpapersrelatingtopeacefeelersfromBulgariatotheAllies–whichwereplacedinKnatchbull-Hugessen’sbriefcase.Nobodytouchedthebait.Baznahaddownedtoolsasbothaspyandavalet.Abandoningbothhis

BritishandhisGermanemployers,inApril1944hesetoffonariotousspendingspree,andindulgedthisforsomeweeksbeforebothheandthehotelshepatroniseddiscoveredthattheGermanshadpaidhiminforgedBritishbanknotes.Heshouldhaveguessedasmuchwhentheysoreadilysurrenderedsuchhugesums.Despiteaspasmofdubiousfamewhenhisstorybecamepublicafterthewar,hediedbrokein1970,hisvaingloriousdreamsshattered.GiventhegameBaznaplayed,however,hemightconsiderhimselffortunatetohavepreservedhislifeandfreedom.WhentheForeignOfficelearnedofthe‘Cicero’affair,Knatchbull-Hugessenmerelymumbledthat

hehadfoundBazna‘agoodservant’.Incredibly,althoughrecalledfromAnkara,hewasgivenanotherpostinginBrussels.WhencapturedGermanfilesrevealedthefullfactsin1945,thepermanentunder-secretarySirAlexanderCadoganwroteinhisdiary:‘“Snatch”,ofcourse,oughttobecourt-martialled,butImustthinkoverthis.’Cadogan’seventualdecisionwaspredictable:theforemostimperativemustbetoprotecttheForeignOffice’sreputation,whichmeantshieldingthis

boobytowhomanambassadorshiphadbeenentrusted.ThoughKnatchbull-Hugessenreceiveda‘severe’formalreprimandinAugust1945,hewasallowedtoretireonfullpensiontwoyearslater,andpublishedacomplacentmemoirofhisdiplomaticcareerbeforetheAnkaradébâclebecamepublicknowledge.StewartMenziesfulminatedoverthe‘Cicero’case,callingit‘anappallingnationaldisaster ’.Itwas

certainlytruethatitreflecteddeplorablyupontheForeignOffice.Thoughitbecamethemostnotoriousexampleofdiplomaticinsecurity,itwasbynomeanstheonlyone.WhenthestorywasrevealedtotheworldbyBaznahimselfinthe1950s,manypeopleexpressedamazementthat,withsuchfiguresasKnatchbull-Hugesseninpositionsofinfluence,theAllieshadwonthewar.ItdefiedimaginationthataBritishambassadorinasensitiveneutralcapitalshouldhaveexposedhispersonalpaperstotheattentionsofanewlyemployedYugoslavvalet–tothreesuccessiveones,hadthefullfactsbeenknown.Thecover-upaftertheevent,protectingfromdisgraceanOldEtonianschoolfriendofAnthonyEden,reflectedtheworsttraditionsoftheBritishEstablishment.Howmuch,however,didthecoupprofittheNaziwareffort?HughTrevor-Roper,inhisMay1945

assessmentofGermanintelligence,musedaboutBerlin’sfailuretoexploittheHugessenpapers.BroadwayknewthatWalterSchellenberg’sexaggeratedrespectforMI6causedhimtoassumethat‘Cicero’wasaBritishplant.Trevor-Roperwrote:‘Thusthemostsuccessfulscoopof[theRSHA’s]AmtVI,beingthecaptureofgenuinedocumentsfromwhichthenatureandincidenceof“Overlord”mighthavebeeninferred,wasneveractedupon.’Formonthsafter‘Cicero’s’materialstartedtoreachBerlin,itwasdismissedasanAllieddeception.Whenitwasbelatedlyacknowledgedasauthenticinthespringof1944,OKWdidmakethesignificantdeductionthattheAllieswouldlaunchnomajoroperationintheMediterraneanwhiletheyaddressedtheliberationofFrance,whichwasobviouslyimminent.ButHitlerdissented.Theonlydecision-makerwhomatteredcontinuedtobelievethatsomeBalkaninitiativebytheAllieswasstillplausible.Asforthespyhimself,whenBaznaquitthereisnoevidencethatanybodyinBerlincared.Bythatstageofthewar,theglimpsesheprovidedofAlliedmotionsseemedoflittlepracticalvaluetotheNazicause,evenhadtheybeencredited.Anoverridinghandicaptoexploitationofthe‘Cicero’documents,likeallotherGerman

intelligenceproduct,wasthatbythewinterof1943–44theinitiativeinthewarhadpassedirretrievablytotheAllies.Intelligencemustinformaction,andtherewasnownocourseavailabletoGermanytocounterAnglo-Americaninitiatives,evengrantedsecretknowledgeofthem.InAugust1944TurkeybrokeoffdiplomaticrelationswithGermany,thoughwiselydecliningtobecomeafullbelligerent.WithorwithouttheinsightsonBritishdiplomacyprovidedby‘Cicero’,nothingcouldchangetheoverarchingreality,plaintotheAnkaragovernment,thattheGermanswerelosers.

3 THEFANTASISTS

AdmiralWilhelmCanarisinsistedtotheendofhislifethattheAbwehrproducedsoundinformation,whichGermany’shighcommandfailedtouse.Thiswasnonsense.TheWehrmachtacquiredsomegoodoperationalintelligencethroughcodebreaking,directobservation,eavesdropping,staffanalysisandairreconnaissancewhiletheLuftwaffewasabletofly,buttheAbwehrcouldscarcelyblameonHitler ’sinterferencethefactthatitsforeigninformantswerecontemptible,mostmuchlessimpressivethan‘Cicero’.CountessFredaDouglas,forinstance,wasthewifeofawell-knownGermanagent,AlbrechtArchibaldDouglas.SheleftRomaniain1940followinganarrestonespionagecharges,thenafterfallingoutwithherhusbandtravelledtoAmerica,whereshewasarrestedbytheFBIafterAllieddecryptsfromChilementioneda‘CountessD’.ShetoldherinterrogatorsthatshehadagreedtoprovideinformationafterbeingthreatenedbytheNazis’Santiagoembassy.In1942PrinceCharlesdeLignewasarrestedbytheAbwehrandsentencedtodeathafter

confessingtoaidingtheBelgianResistance.Hewasreprieved,however,after‘givinghiswordofhonourasanofficerandaprince’thathewouldswitchsidesandworkloyallyforGermany.HewasthereaftersenttoSpain,butpromptlyabandonedhisemployersandmadehiswaytoBritain.MajorBrede,hishandler,latertoldAlliedinterrogatorsthathehadalwaysdoubtedthesincerityofdeLigne’schangeofallegiance,but‘rantheriskbecausetheAbwehrwasatthattimeveryshortofusefulcontacts’.WernerWaltemath,borninGermanyin1909,emigratedtoBrazilin1930.Adecadelaterhe

returnedtovisithissickmother,wasconscriptedintotheWehrmachtandtrainedasawireless-operator.InJuly1941theAbwehrsenthimbacktoBrazil,wherehebuilthisownradiotransmitter.AssoonashetappedouthisMNTcallsign,however,thiswaspinpointedbyUSdirection-finders.Similarly,BrazilianpolicealertedbytheAmericansinterceptedsecretlettershedispatchedtoMadrid,containingmicrodotsandreportswritteninphenolinvisibleink.On1June1943Waltemath’shousewasraidedbypolice,whofoundhisradio,microfilmandotherparaphernaliaconcealedinacavityundertheliving-roomfloor.Hereceivedatwenty-five-yearjailsentence,whileafellow-expatriatewhomhehadrecruitedtohisnetwork,Hans-ChristianvonKitze,becameadoubleagentfortheBritish.ThreebarelyliterateMoroccans,strandedinFrance,weretrainedattheAbwehrspyschoolin

Angers,thendispatchedtoreportbackfromtheirowncountry.TheonlycommunicationtheGermansreceivedthereafterwasaletter,writteninAsproinvisibleink,thankingthemfortheirkindlytreatment,andfortheinvaluableassistanceingettinghome.AFrenchAbwehrspynamedduChaffault,twenty-sixyearsoldandfromTours,recruitedin1942,proposedhimselfforapostingtoMontevideo,whichhemayhaveconsideredasafedistancefromthewar.HewastrainedforamissiontotheUnitedStates,andlackingwirelessskillswasprovidedwithinvisibleinks.InJuly1943,OKWsanctionedhismovetoAmerica.TotravelfirstintoSpain,hewasprovidedwitha

GermanpassportinthenameofWenzel,severalhundreddollarsandsomepesetas,withthepromiseofmoreifheproducedresults.HereachedBilbao,whereheacquiredalocalgirlfriend.Whenheleftthecity,hetoldherthathewouldbesendingherlettersfromAmericaforonwardtransmissiontotheAbwehr.Thereafter,theGermansandtheSpanishgirlalikelosttrackofhim.Mostlikely,andincommonwiththerestoftheabove,hevanishedintothemassofhumanflotsamclingingtoafugitiveexistenceineverycommunityinEurope.ACanadian-bornsource,thirty-four-year-oldGraceBuchanan-Dineen,wastrainedinsecret

writingbeforeleavingEuropefortheUSlatein1941,providedwith$2,500togetherwithBudapestandStockholmmaildrops.Shewasbriefedthatifsheranintotrouble,sheshouldcabletheAbwehr ’sLisbonstation‘Ill.RequireOperation’–butthisprovednohelpwhentheFBIarrestedherinDecember1942,followingaBritishtip-offderivedfromadecrypt.SheappearstohavejoinedtheNazipayrollforthemoney–shewaspromised$500amonth.AfteraspellasasomewhatunconvincingFBIdouble,Buchanan-Dineenservedalmostfouryearsofatwelve-yearjailsentencebeforebeingparoledin1948.TheGermanslearnednothingofvaluefromher.Twenty-four-year-oldRobertRousseau,‘Rodolphe’,fromNantes,desertedfromtheFrenchtothe

GermansinNorthAfrica.InAugust1943hewassentforwirelesstraining,thenpostedtoSaint-Brieuc,withcoverasheadofalocalrecruitingofficefortheTodtOrganisation.LateinOctoberRousseautoldhishandlerhehadjoinedtheResistanceinordertoacquireinformation.Afewweekslater,however,somecapturedGaullistsunderinterrogationtoldthelocalSDthatRousseauhadofferedtosellthemhiswirelessandcodes.HewaspromptlyarrestedanddispatchedtoGermany–presumablytoaconcentrationcamp.SeveralFrenchmenatVichy’sWashingtonembassysoughttoservetheAbwehr,notablyLt.Col.Bertrand-Vigne,theassistantmilitaryattaché,andCharlesEmmanuelBrousse,thepressattaché.Anotherdiplomat,JeanMusa,actedasacourierandasaconduittosympatheticNewYorkers.XavierGuichardofVichy’smilicecontactedanumberofFrenchmenlivingintheUSandinvitedthemtoprovideintelligence,onpainofunpleasantconsequencesfortheirfamiliesstillinFranceshouldtheyrefuse.GuichardwaseventuallyexposedandobligedtoleaveAmerica.Therewerelargeexpansesoftheglobewherespying,orevenapretenceofit,seemedan

unproductiveactivitybecausetheywerestrategicallyirrelevant.WhenaquestionwasraisedinLondonaboutrunningsomedoubleagentsoutofCanada,theresponsibleMI5officer–CyrilMills,ofthewell-knownBritishcircus-owningfamily–demurred.EventheAbwehr,hesaid,couldseethatnothingofmuchimportancehappenedinCanada.Canarisdisagreed.On9November1942aU-boatlandedhismanWernerJanowskyontheGaspepeninsula.FollowinghissubsequentarresthewasfoundtobecarryingaQuebecdrivinglicencetakenfromaCanadianPoWcapturedatDieppe,butwithanOntariopersonalidentificationandaddress.Mostofthe$5,000inCanadiancurrencywithwhichJanowskywassuppliedwastime-expired–amistakewhichpromptedhiscaptureafterheused

ittopayaNewCarlislehotelbill.Hehadalreadyrousedtheproprietor ’ssuspicionsbysmokingGermancigarettesandtakingabathatmid-morning.AmongthepossessionsappropriatedbytheCanadianpolicewereaWehrmachttravelproformaanddiary,a.25automaticpistol,radio,knuckle-duster,fiveUS$20goldpieces,amicrofilmcopyofcodinginstructionsandacopyofMaryPoppinsasacodecrib.Janowskywasathirty-eight-year-oldformerFrenchForeignLegionnairewhohadawifelivinginCanada,andknewthecountry.ButnoAlliedsecretservice,evenonabadday,wouldhavedispatchedanagentintothefield–atthecostofasubstantialinvestmentofNaziresources,includingtheU-boat–soabsurdlyill-equipped.JanowskywasfortunatetosurvivethewarinBritishcaptivity.SomeAbwehrrecruitswereamazinglycredulousaboutacceptingpost-datedcheques,for

encashmentfollowingaNazivictory.One,namedFranzStigler,waspromisedanestateinSouthAfrica.JorgeMosquera,aChileanwhohadbuiltupasubstantialfortuneinGermany,wastoldthatifhedidsomespyingforBerlinintheUS,hisReichsmarkholdingswouldbereleased.ItisequallypuzzlinghowtheGermanssupposedthatanuntrainedcivilianinformantsuchasMosquera,livingontheUSEastCoast,couldsecureanswerstoquestionspostedbyBerlinsuchas:‘SincewhenhasCurtissdeliveredtypesP40andP46insteadofP36A?HavetherealreadybeendeliveriesofB-17s?’Thepersonalitiesmentionedabove,farfrombeingunusual,weretypicalofthosethroughwhom

theAbwehrprofessedtogatherforeignintelligenceforOKW.Theconsequencewasthatitsoverseasstationsfeltobligedtoinventmaterialtocompensateforlackoftherealthing.AstrikingexampleofthecircularityofespionagewasprovidedbyDrKarl-HeinzKramer,aflamboyantAbwehrofficerbasedinStockholmandtaskedwithrunningpenetrationagentsintoBritainandtheUS.MI5becamealarmedwhenbothUltraandOSSinSwitzerlandrevealedKramertransmittingmaterialfromBritishsources.InApril1943,MI6assignedPeterFalkofitsStockholmstationtomonitortheAbwehrofficerandidentifyhisinformants–theGermanrepeatedlycitedaBritishagentcodenamed‘Josephine’.Whocouldthisbe?Onceonthetrail,FalkdiscoveredthatKramersharedRichardSorge’smanicappetiteforfastliving–itwashardtokeeppacewitheitherhissportscarorhispartying.Moreover,theGermanwasconstantlyimportunedforcashbytheJapanesemilitaryattaché,Col.Onodera,whoseremittancesfromTokyofailedtoarrive:Kramerloanedhisally$20,000ofHitler ’smoney.InDecember,MI6gotabreak.Ananti-NaziAustrianwomaninStockholmofferedherservicesto

theBritishlegation,alongwiththoseofafriendwhowasworkingasKramer ’smaid.Throughout1944sheprovidedmaterialliftedfromKramer ’swastepaperbasketanddesk–thelatteropenedwithakeycopiedbyimpressingitinabutterdish.BritishalarmgrewwheninspectionoftheAbwehrman’soldpassportshowedthathehadvisitedEnglandbeforethewar.Herewasahintthathemighthaveestablishedarealnetwork,andMI6receiveditduringthetenseweeksbeforeD-Day.CouldKramersecureintelligencefromBritainthatdiscreditedthe‘Fortitude’deceptionplan,blewopenthe

DoubleCrossoperation?PeterFalkgatheredincreasingevidencethatKramerwaslivingwaybeyondhismeans,presumably

bypocketingBerlin’sexpensesmoney.MightnotMI6–theintelligenceofficernowsuggested–blackmailand‘turn’theGerman,puttinghimontheirownpayroll?ButD-Daywasbythenhistory:themomentofmaximumdangerfortheAlliedcausewaspast.Thus,Broadwaysternlyrejectedsuchasordidproposal:‘Wecannotdobusinesswithwarcriminalstosavetheirnecks.Thereissurelynothingveryimportantthatthispeculiarlyunpleasantratcouldgiveusifhewasallowedtoleavethesinkingship.’Onlyafterthewar ’senddidAlliedinterrogationsrevealthetruth:KramerhadmadefoolsoftheBritishaswellastheAbwehr.His‘agentnetwork’wasthefigmentofafertileimagination;hisreportstoBerlinwerefoundedinfantasy.MI6’scounterattack,themaid’slittlemelodramawiththedeskkeyinthebutterdish,hadbeenpointless.AlltheplayerssaveKramerhimself,whoenjoyedanunusuallysafeandcomfortablewartimeexistence,accomplishednomorethancagedhamstersscramblinguptheirwheels.TheAbwehrcherishedasgolddustallreportsfromitsagentsthatseemedauthoritative–which

meantthoseprovidedbytheBritishTwentyCommittee,controlling120doubleagents,ofwhomthirty-ninewereusedmoreorlessseriouslytotransmitfalseinformation,muchofitdrafted,oratleastmonitored,byBentinckoftheJIC.OversightofthesystembyCol.JohnnyBevan,thepeacetimestockbrokerwhorantheLondonControllingSectioninchargeofAllieddeceptions,requirednicecalculationtoachieveatemptingblendoffactandfiction.WhentheGermansinFebruary1943asked‘Garbo’tosendthemsomecurrentBritishrailwaytimetables,GuyLiddellofMI5wasconsulted.Handthemover,hesaid–theycoulddolittleharmwhenthereweresomanytrains,mostofwhichranlate.ContrarilyPeterLoxley,SirAlexanderCadogan’sprivatesecretary,oncerangLiddelltoreportthattheGermanshadcondemnedtodeathfivePolishagents.Wasthereachancethatanexchangecouldbeoffered,forNaziagentsinBritishhands?Absolutelynot,respondedtheMI5officer:everysurvivingAbwehrmanknewfartoomuchaboutDoubleCross.In1943–44Germany’sintelligenceserviceatrophiedtothepointofnear-impotence.MI6reportsin

MayandJune1943adoptedatoneofcondescensiontowardstheenemy:‘wehaveevidencefromoursignalsofthedisappointmentfeltinBerlinaboutthefailuretopredicttheNorthAfricancampaignortheCasablancaconference…Fromthebeginningof1943theAbwehrhasbeenbriskly,ifamateurishly,wieldingtheweaponofdeception.TheDeceptionofficehassponsoredtheissueofaconsiderablenumberofstrategicliesorhalf-truthsforultimateconsumptionbyus…TheAbwehrreliesonaverysmallnumberofpipestocarrythelie-streamtousandourRussian,Americanand,recently,Frenchallies.Butthoughthetechniqueiselementary,theintentionisobvious–tostrengthentheirguardontheBalkanflankbytrickingusintoover-estimatingitsstrength.’TheBritishtookforgrantedtheirmasteryofAbwehrpostingsandoverseasintelligenceoperations:‘SincethefallofTunis,’reportedtheRadioAnalysisBureau,‘severalmembersofAbwehrGroupAfricahavebeen

transferredafteronlyaveryshortspellofleavetotheBalkans.Obst.Lt.Seubert,atonetime[chief]oftheAbwehrgroup,hasbeenvisitingSofia.Obst.Lt.Strojil,whohasconductedoperationsinGreece,theCrimeaandTunisia,hasbeenmadeLeiterIIatSalonika,etc.’Naziself-deceptionhadbecomeinstitutionalised.Inthesummerof1943,HimmlerandGöbbels

agreedthatHitlershouldnolongerbeshowntheSD’smonthlyreportsontheGermanpublic’smood,moraleandresponsestopressandradiobroadcasts.Thereafter,thesewentnofurtherthantheirowndesks.Meanwhilemanyneutralstates,seeingAlliedvictorylooming,adoptedharsherpoliciestowardsNaziresidentsandvisitors.UnderpressurefromtheBritish,in1943thegovernmentinMadridinsistedonclosureoftheUnternehmenBodden–theAbwehr ’simportantship-watchingservice–andinthefollowingyearCanarishimselfwasdeniedadmissiontoSpain.ThebestsourcesbynowavailabletotheGermanmilitaryattachéinChile,MajorvonBohlen,wereAmericanaviationmagazines,whosecontentswereprizedinBerlinbecausehardtoprocureelsewhere.Therewasnolongeranyrationalintelligence-handlingprocessinsideGermany,only–asHughTrevor-Roperputit–‘avortexofpersonalambitions’.Fromthesummerof1943onwards,Trevor-RoperattendedthemonthlymeetingsoftheLondon

ControllingSectioninthewarcabinetoffices.HetolditschiefsthattheatmospherewithinGermanintelligencehadbecomesoparanoidthatitsofficersnolongerdaredtofilterandanalysematerial;instead,theymerelypassedontothehighcommandamassofundigestedandunassessedreports,mostofthemfancifulorcomposedbyBritishhands.AttheendofApril1943,sostraitenedwerethecircumstancesoftheAbwehr ’sSarajevostationthatitbeggedViennaforadeliveryof250kilosofbirdseedtofeedits150carrierpigeons,whilebothZagrebandSarajevoweredemandingmoremanpowertomanagethebirds’lofts.TherewerealsorepeatedbizarrerequestsfromlocalAbwehrofficersinYugoslaviaforsuppliesofshoeleather,whichcausedTrevor-RopertosuggestcausticallythatwhentheAlliesenteredthecountrytheyshouldbewaryofwell-shodmen.On5June1943,BerlinaskeditsTangierandMadridstationstosecureAlliedorder-of-battle

informationfromNorthAfrica.Thisrequestreceivedawhimperingresponse:‘Theassignmentcannotbecarriedout,astherearenoagentsinAfrica.’On4AugustTrevor-RoperreportedonthechaosofAbwehroperations.Inthethreeweekspreceding‘Husky’,theAlliedinvasionofSicily,henotedthatreportswereforwardedtoBerlinmakingforecastsofAlliedattacksasenumerated:Norway3,Channelcoast4,Azores1,SpanishMorocco1,SouthernFrance6,Italy8,Corsica7,Sardinia4,Sicily6,Dalmatia9,Greece7,Crete8,Dodecanese8,Cyclades1,Romania2:‘EvaluationatAbwehrHQdoubtlessreducedthisvariety,butitcanhardlyhavesuppliedanyvaluablepositiveconclusions.’Trevor-RoperobservedthattheonlyexceptiontothepervasivevaguenessofAbwehranalysisconcernedthematerialsubmittedbytheBritishthroughthe‘Mincemeat’deception–thestrandingontheSpanishcoastofthecorpseofa‘RoyalMarineofficer ’carryingtopsecretpapersaboutBritishplans–whichwasconsideredentirelyreliable.

Canarishimselfwasinastateofchronicbewilderment.Whenhisagent‘Melilla’,hithertolittleregarded,senta9AugustmessagereportingAlliedconvoysenrouteforSicily(afterthelandingstherehadstarted),theadmiralsignalledbackpersonally,enquiringplaintivelywhatthemanthoughtwouldhappennext.‘Melilla’,aBritish-controlleddouble,toldBerlinthathebelieved100,000menwouldlandinsouth-westFrance.HefollowedupbyreportingAlliedforcesheadingforCorsicaandSardinia.Trevor-RoperexpressedbafflementthattheAbwehrforwardedamassofrawmaterialtoOKW

‘withoutdistinguishingbetweenthevaluablelocaltacticalinformationandthemassofgeneralandparticularstrategictripe’.HisconclusionwasthattheAbwehrwas‘confessedlyunabletoevaluateitsownreports…Berlinhasnoknowledgeorsolidopinionaboutthestrategicfutureandthereforehastoletthelocalgeneralsandadmiralsmakeuptheirownmindsbygivingthempromptaccesstoallthereportsthatcomein.Itdarenotwinnow,lestthegeneralsshouldcomplainlaterthattheyhadnotbeenallowedtoseethestrawswhichinfactshowedwhichwaythewindwasblowing.’AdmiralvonderMarwitz,theGermannavalattachéinIstanbul,agreed:hewasaprominentcriticofAbwehrreports,inlanguageechoingthatofTrevor-Roper,astheMI6officernotedwithgleewhenhereadthenavalofficer ’sdecryptedcommentary.Perversely,theweaknessofGermanintelligencesometimesmadeitmoredifficultfortheAlliesto

conductdeceptionsaheadoftheirownbigoperations:itishardtocatchtroutifbasketsofcrumbsarebeingemptiedintotheriveraroundafisherman’sfly.‘Thecarefullyorchestrated“signals”thatthedeceptionauthoritieswerefeedingintotheenemyintelligencesystemswereusuallyswamped,’inthewordsofofficialhistorianSirMichaelHoward,‘bythe“noise”generatedbythemassofrumours,gossip,diplomaticindiscretionsandgarbledreportsthattheAbwehrcollectedandforwarded,largelyunfiltered,totheirheadoffices…TheoverworkedofficersatFHW[GermanhighcommandintelligenceintheWest]learnedtopaylittleattentiontoanythingemanatingfromthatsourceunlessitwasbackedbymoresolidevidencesuchasairreconnaissanceorSigint.’Allieddeceptionsbecamemoresuccessfulfrom1943onwards,whenairreconnaissancebecameimpossibleandsomeGermanofficers,atleast,feltobligedtotakedoubleagents’reportsreasonablyseriously,forlackofinformationfromanybodyelse.Nevertheless,theGermansneverbecamewhollygullibleabouteverything,allthetime:large

AllieddeceptionoperationswerestagedinAugust1943offtheFrenchcoast,involvingthemovementofscoresofshipsandhundredsofaircraft,designedtodeflectattentionfromtheimpendinglandingsinItaly.VonRundstedt,commandingintheWest,unhesitatinglyrejectedanynotionthattheseChanneloperationswereserious,sayingtherewasnodoubtthatanythingbigtheAlliesintendedin1943wouldtakeplaceintheMediterranean.OKWaccordinglyreducedGermanstrengthinFrancefromforty-fivedivisionstothirty-five,andonlybegantoincreaseitagaininOctober,whenitwasobviousthatanAnglo-AmericanlandinginFrancewasbecomingapracticableprospect.

ThefallofCanarisasHitler ’sintelligencechiefwasprecipitatedbyaBroadwaycoup:inJanuary1944,MI6officerNicholasElliottstage-managedthedefectionoftheAbwehr ’sdeputystationchiefinIstanbul,DrErichVermehren,togetherwithhiswifeElizabethandlatertwoofhissubordinates.VermehrengavetheBritishavividpersonalaccountofconditionsintheGermanintelligencecommunity.TheGermanwailedthattheSD’sinfluencedominated,becauseitsreportswentstraighttoHitlerviaHimmler.‘TheAbwehristheCinderellaoftheOKW,’hesaid,‘andhastoacceptofficerswhohavenoexperienceofforeigncountries…TheAbwehrinTurkeyisludicrouslyunderstaffed,andcannothopetocompeteeffectivelywiththeBritishandAmericanI.S.,whosemembersoutnumbertheAbwehrbynearly10–1.OfficersatAbwehrHQdonotunderstandandarenotinterestedinpoliticalorsemi-politicalreports,preferringminutiaeaboutdivisionalsignsandnumbers.’VermehrendescribedCol.GeorgHansen,fromMarch1943chiefofCanaris’sintelligencebranch,as‘agreatman’,themostefficientofficerintheorganisation,honest,cultivated,intelligent,energeticanddeterminedtogetresults.Nonetheless,saidVermehren,‘therewasnocentralisedgradingofficeresponsibleforassessingthebona-fidesoracumenofagents’.Justso,Trevor-Roperwouldhavesaid.On16February1944,AllenDullescommentedsomewhatpriggishlytoWashingtononthe

sensationalVermehrendefectionsinTurkey,sayingthathehimselfhadneverencouragedsuchopenswitchesofallegiance,becausesuchpeopleweremoreusefulinplace.Hewasassuredlymistakeninthiscase,becausetheTurkishaffaircompletedthedestructionoftheAbwehr ’sreputationintheeyesoftheNazileadership,andplungeditsstationsintoaconditionofchaosanddemoralisationfromwhichtheyneverrecovered.ABroadwaymemorandumdated24March1944,andmarked‘TOPSECRET’,borethepencilledannotation‘sourceisMI6’smaninStockholm’.FivepagesthereafterdetailedthetroublesoftheAbwehr ’schieftain:‘InthemiddleofFebruaryAdmiralCanariswassummonedtotheFührer ’sHQinBavaria…Hewaswarnedthathisstaytherewouldprobablylastnotlessthan8dayssothatitwouldbeadvisableforhimtonominatesomebodytoreplacehimduringhisabsence…[Hechose]Col.Bentevigni,thechiefofSectionIII.OnarrivalattheFührer ’sHQhegotaverysourreceptionandwasinformedby[Field-]MarshalKEITELthattheFührerhadseenallthematerialincriminatinghimandhaddecidedthatunderthecircumstancesitwasimpossiblefortheAdmiraltoremaininoffice.CANARISwasorderedtotakethreemonthsleave…ThefutureorganisationoftheAbwehrwasthentobedecidedinagreementwiththechiefoftheSD(KALTEN-BRUNNER)andthechiefoftheForeignIntelligenceService(SCHELLENBERG).’Thiswasabroadlyaccurateversionofevents:WalterSchellenbergservedfortherestofthewaras

Hitler ’sforeignintelligencechief,andtheRSHAprogressivelyabsorbedtheAbwehr.FollowingtheJuly1944plotagainstHitler,someofitsmostseniorofficersandex-officerswereimprisonedandsoonerorlaterexecuted,includingCanaris,Oster,Hansen,FreytagvonLoringhoven–theformerheadofsabotagesection,whokilledhimself–andGrafMarogna-Redwitz,theableheadofthe

Viennastation.WilhelmKuebartwasarrestedandtried,butmiraculouslyescapedthehangman.

4 THE‘GOOD’NAZI

WalterSchellenbergwasanotablyhandsomemanwithsensitivefeatureswhopresentedhimselftotheoutsideworld,withsomesuccess,astheacceptablefaceoftheSS:mild-mannered,courteous,renderedvulnerablebychroniclivertrouble.Unlikethethugsaroundhim,theRSHA’sforeignintelligencechiefcouldtalksensitivelyaboutmusicandthearts.Hewassuccessfulinconvincingsomeofthosewithwhomhetrafficked,notablytheSwedeCountBernadotte,thathewas‘adecentandhumaneperson’.Posterityshouldnotdoubt,however,thatSchellenbergwasacommittedNazi,fullycomplicitintheregime’scrimes;hewasmerelyintelligentenoughtodiscernfromanearlystagethatHitlercouldlosethewar,andthereaftertohedgehisbetswithserpentineintent,ifnotsuccess.Hewasabuilder ’ssonfromSaarbrucken,bornin1910.Aftersomelegaltraininghejoinedthe

NationalSocialistPartyinApril1933.Lessthanayearlater,seizedbytheglamouroftheblackuniform,hebecameamemberoftheSS.Schellenbergshowedhimselfaningenioussecretpoliceman,whowonthespecialapprovalofhissuperiorsafterthe1939occupationofPoland:riflingWarsaw’sintelligencerecords,heidentified430GermanswhowereactingasPolishinformants,convenientlyindexedforremovalbytheSDtothegallowsorconcentrationcamps.HebecameaprotégéofHeydrichandHimmler,thoughhisrelationshipwiththeformerwasdamagedforsometimebyrumoursthathewashavinganaffairwithLena,FrauHeydrich.InOctober1940,followingadivorceofhisown,SchellenbergmarriedIreneGrosse-Schönepauck.Heseemstohavehadfew,ifany,friendshipsoutsidehiswork.Anambitiousandboundlesslydeviousloner,hewaslesscleverthanhesupposedhimself.AnAmericananalystofGermanintelligencewroteafterthewar:‘Hetendstoconfusehismagnificentschemeswithactualaccomplishments.’Therewereplentyofschemes.In1940SchellenbergwasdispatchedtoLisbonwithHitler ’s

personalmandatetosnatchtheDukeofWindsor,theformerKingEdwardVIII.Hedeclinedtoexecuteacrudekidnapping,preferringinsteadtoattemptaseduction,andbeforethiscouldtakeplacehewasobligedtowatchfromtheGermanembassybalconyinAugust,asthedukeandhiswifesailedawaytowardsthegovernorshipoftheBritishBahamas.Thereafter,hespentsometimecompilinga‘WantedG.B.’rosterofhigh-profilefigurestobedetainedfollowingaGermanoccupationofBritain.ThoughSchellenbergoftenexpressedarespectforChurchill’snation,hislistrevealedanepicignoranceandnaïvetéaboutwhowaswhoamongitselite.HewassentbacktoLisbonwithorderstopoisonaGermanémigré,OttoStrasse,usingasubstanceprovidedbyaMunichbacteriologist.StrassesurvivedbecausehefailedtoturnupasscheduledinthePortuguesecapital.SchellenbergwasnextappointedbyHimmlertoheadSectionVI,theRSHA’sforeignintelligencebranch,despite

havingapoorrelationshipwithErnstKaltenbrunner,theReichsecuritychief.Heexploitedthisroletoindulgemoreforeigntravelthanmostmen,evenspies,contrivedinthemidstofaworldwar.SchellenbergcultivatedtheSwedishministerinBerlin,ArvidRichert,securinghisgoodwillbyarrangingthereleaseofsomeNordicprisonersinwhomSwedenhadaninterest–DanishpolicemenandNorwegianstudents.In1941theRSHAofficerflewtoStockholmforameetingwithMartinLindquist,chiefofthe

Swedishsecuritypolice;thetwomengotonwell,partlybecausetheysharedadeephostilitytocommunism.Thefriendshipbecameimportantinthefollowingyear,whentheGestapochargedwithespionagefivetopmanagersofthePolisharmofabigSwedishcompany.Twowereacquitted,butonewassentencedtolifeimprisonmentandfourwerecondemnedtodeath.Schellenbergintervened,firsttosecurebetterconditionsforthecaptives,andeventuallytosecuretheirrelease,thelastbeforeChristmas1944.HeconductedpersonalnegotiationsaboutthecasewithSwedishbusinessleadersAxelBrandin,JacobWallenbergandAlvarMoeller.Schellenberg’sascenttohighofficewasfoundeduponhisskillsasanintriguerathomeand

abroad,ratherthanuponanyconspicuousskillsasanintelligenceofficer.HewasperceptiveenoughtounderstandthedamagebeingdonebyrivalrybetweentheNaziempires,buthimselfbecameaprominentpartofit.AfewmonthsbeforeReinhardHeydrich’skillinginJune1942,Hitler ’sCzechproconsulinvitedCanarisandSchellenbergtoagrandshootingparty.Thetwomenarguedsoheatedlyabouttheresponsibilitiesandboundariesoftheirrespectiveservicesthattheyfailedtonoticethepheasantsstreamingunscathedovertheirheads.TheSSofficerusedSwitzerlandinthesamefashionasdidtheAllies–partlyasabattlefieldon

whichtoduelagainstenemyintelligenceservices,andpartlyasarendezvousformakingcontactsthatwouldbetreasonableinsideGermany.HimmlersaiddismissivelyaboutSectionVI’sSwissdalliances:‘Well,Idon’twishtoknowallthedetails–that’syourresponsibility.’Fromanearlystage,itislikelythatSchellenbergwaslookingaheadtoSwitzerlandasaprospectiverefugeforhimselfiftheNazicausefoundered,andhischiefmayhavesharedhisaspirations.NeverthetypetorelishparticipationinaBerlinGötterdämmerung,SchellenbergopenedlinesofcommunicationthatmightenablehimtosurviveadayofreckoningfortheThirdReich.Hewasthusanaturalintermediarywhen,intheautumnof1942,SwissintelligencechiefRoger

MassonbecameapprehensivethattheNaziswereconsideringaninvasionofhiscountry.AfteranegotiationconductedbyOttoKocher,theGermanministerinBern,thetwomenmeton8SeptembernearWaldshut,justinsideHitler ’sterritory.SSSturmbannführerHansEggenescortedthecoloneltothefrontier,thenwatchedhimcrosstheRhinebridgealoneandonfoot.Massonwasdesperatelynervous,aswellhemightbe,aboutbothhispersonalsafetyandthatofhiscountry.HeandSchellenbergmetatanearbyhotel,thenwalkedandtalkedbytheRhine,wheretheyfeltsafefromeavesdroppers.

MassonsoughttowheedlebackfromtheSectionVIchiefdocumentsthatrevealedSwissintelligence’spre-warcollaborationwiththeCzechs,whichHitlermightexploittojustifyaninvasion.ThecolonelalsoaskedforthereleaseofErnstMorgeli,oneoftheSwissconsulate’sStuttgartstaff,sentencedtodeathforespionage.HerequestedSchellenbergtocurbtheactivitiesofaViennapressagencyrunbytwoSwissNazis,whosustainedapropagandabombardmentagainsttheirowncountry,andespeciallyitsarmycommander-in-chief,Gen.HenriGuisan.TheNazispychiefagreedtoalltheserequests,butneedledMassonbyshowinghimacopyofa1940cablefromtheUSmilitaryattachéinBern,whohadreportedtoWashingtonthathisSwisssourcessaidthattwenty-fiveGermandivisionswerepoisedtoinvadeSwitzerland.Surely,theSSmanenquiredmildly,thisprovedthattheSwisswereworkingwiththeAllies?AsMassonimmediatelyrealised,italsoshowedoffthereachofGermanintelligence,whichinthosedayswasreadingsuchAmericanciphertraffic.SchellenbergandMassonachievedabetterunderstandingatasecondmeeting,heldon16October

1942insideSwitzerland,attheLakeConstanceestateofbusinessmanWolfsbergMeyer-Schertenbach.Thetwomenworecivilianclothes,andSchellenberggossipedfreelyabouthisownlifeandearlycareer,extollingthejoysofmarriage.HespokewarmlyofSwitzerland,andexpressedsympathywithitsdifficultiesanddilemmas,isolatedamidawarringEurope.MassonbrieflyponderedwhetherSchellenbergwasprobingforthepossibilityofSwissmediationinopeningnegotiationswiththeAllies.ThentheGermanrevealedthatBerlinhaddecryptedtwoofthe‘Lucy’Ring’sDecember1941messagestoMoscow:SchellenbergwasconvincedthattherewasaseriousleakinsideOKW.ThiscausedMassontodecidethathisvisitorwasnotapeaceenvoy,butsimplyanintelligencechiefseekingcluestoassistinidentifyingtraitors.ThetwospentthreedaystogetherbeforetheSSmandepartedforGermanyundercoverofdarkness.WhatdidSchellenberggetoutofthemeetings?HemadesignificantconcessionstoSwissinterests,

anditisimpossibletobelievethathedidsowithoutgettingareturn–bothofficersweretraders.MassonneverrevealedwhathehimselftoldtheSDchief,butitislikelythathefedhimtitbitsaboutAlliedintelligenceactivitiesinSwitzerland.ThecolonelsoughttoshowsufficientfriendlinesstowardsGermanytodeteraninvasion.SchellenbergwassurelyreconnoitringalineofretreatforhimselfifhisFührer ’svisioncollapsed.Moreover,hewasabletocoverhisbackinBerlinbyreportingthathisexchangeswiththecolonelprovidedimportantintelligencematerial.On6January1943hepassedanotetoHitlerwarning–ontheauthorityofhisSwisssources–thattheRAFwasplanningabombingcampaigntoclosetheBrennerPasslinkingAustriaandItaly.HealsosaidthattheSwisswereconsideringanewmobilisationoftheirarmy,promptedbynervousnessaboutNaziintentions.On30January1943theSwiss‘Viking’intelligenceline,controlledfromLucernebyMajorMax

Waibel,reportedtoMassonthatHitlerandhishighcommandhadheldameetingthepreviousOctobertodiscussaninvasionofSwitzerland.ThecoloneldecidedthathemustmeetSchellenberg

again,thistimeaccompaniedbytheSwissarmy’sC-in-C.On3MarchtheSDchiefflewbyLufthansatoZürich,accompaniedbytwosecuritymen.HansEggenmetthemattheairport.TheywereinitiallybookedintotheBellevuehotel,butSchellenbergpreferredtostayattheSchweizerhof,beforedrivingtoBiglen,twelvemilesfromBern,forhismeetingwithMassonandGen.GuisanattheBaranhotel.Himmlerhadgivenhismanexplicitinstructions:hewastopresstheSwisspubliclytoemphasisetheircommitmenttostrictneutrality.On4MarchastatementdeclaringSwitzerland’sdeterminationtoresistanyincursionbyanyforeignarmywasdrawnuponSwissarmynotepaper,andsignedbythecommander-in-chief.TheBaran’sproprietor,muchexcitedbyhisexaltedvisitors,persuadedthemalltosignthehotel’svisitors’book,butaSwissRSHAcontactafterwardsprudentlytoreoutthepage.AlthoughGuisanleftatthisstage,Schellenbergstayedforafurtherweek,andheldseveralmore

meetingswithMasson.HepressedtheintelligenceofficerfordetailsoftheGermantraitorswhowerefeedingthe‘Lucy’Ring,butMassonwassincereinpleadingignorance.TheSwiss,inhisturn,askedthevisitortosecurethereleaseofthefamilyofGen.HenriGiraud,whohadbeenseizedbytheGestapofollowingtheFrenchofficer ’sescapefromfortresscaptivity.Schellenbergassented–andagainfulfilledhispromise.MassontoldtheGermanhewasmuchconcernedthatHitlerstillappearedtobeconsideringaninvasionofhiscountry.Thiswastacticallyinept,becauseitalertedSchellenbergtothefactthatBern,too,hadsecretsourceswithintheNazihighcommand.Buton27MarchtheVikingLine’ssourceschangedtackcompletely,andsaidtherewasnolongeranydangeratallofaninvasionofSwitzerland.ThewholeexercisebytheGermans,orchestratedbySchellenberg,hadbeendesignedtointimidatetheSwiss,togalvanisethemtotakeharshercountermeasuresagainstAlliedintelligenceagentsintheircountry,especiallytheSovietnetworks–whichMassoneventuallydid,roundingupmuchofthe‘Lucy’Ring.Meanwhile,theheadoftheSwissgovernment’smilitaryaffairsdepartmentexplodedinfuryatthedisclosureofGen.Guisan’sunauthorisednegotiationswiththeNazis.WhenAllenDullestoldWashington–manymonthslater–aboutthecontactsbetweenSchellenberg

andMasson,hecommentedthathehimselfremainedconfidentthattheSwissgovernmentfavouredanAlliedvictory.However,someofthecountry’smilitarymenweresomorbidlyfearfulofSovietcommunismthattheyhopedforacompromisepeace,whichwouldleavesomebastionbetweenStalin’sempireandtheWest.Itwasthisthreat,Dullessuggested,thatinducedthemtotrafficwiththelikesofSchellenberg,andhewasprobablyright.ThereisnoevidenceaboutwhichunnamedSwissintelligenceofficertippedofftheAbwehrinAugust1943–allegedlyonthebasisofinformationreceivedfromaSwiss-Americansource–thattheAllieshadbrokenGermanU-boatcodes.ButitisnotimpossiblethatitcouldhavebeenMasson,asagambitinhiscontinuinghorse-tradingwiththeNazis.Schellenberg’sotherforeignplotswereingenious,fanciful,andnomoresuccessfulthanthoseof

Canaris.In1941hewastedthousandsofReichsmarksontwocommunists,worknamed‘Georgeand

JoannaWilmer ’,whowereturnedinPlötzenseejail,thendispatchedtoSwitzerlandtotrytobreakintothe‘Lucy’Ring.TheyspenttheRSHA’scashenthusiastically,butAlexanderFooterejectedtheiradvanceswithcontempt.DuringaJuly1942visittoPortugalandSpain,SchellenbergconductednegotiationswithaBrazilianexile,PlínioSalgado,whopromisedgreatthingsfortheGermancause,butdeliverednothing.ThespychiefalsotraffickedwithDrFelixKersten,aGermanmasseurwithFinnishnationality,oneofthelegionofcharlatanswhoextractedlargesumsofcashfromHimmler,whomheintroducedtotheprominentSwedishlawyerDrCarlLangbehn.Langbehnwasoneofmanyneutralseagertoexploitthewarforhispersonalenrichment:hedemanded80,000kronorfromtheStockholmgovernmentasafeeforhelpingtonegotiatethereleaseofseveralSwedishcitizensheldbytheGermansinPoland.DrWilhelmBitter,apsychoanalystataBerlinhospital,wassentabroadbytheRSHAwithamissiontofindachannelthroughwhichGermanymightnegotiatewiththeAllies.HavinggothimselfasafedistancefromGermany,Bittersentjustonehystericalmessagehome,sayingthattheonlyanswerwastooverthrowHitler,thenvanishedforever.WiththeencouragementofHimmler,SchellenberggavethewifeofRibbentrop’sformerforeign

presschief‘Putzi’HanfstaenglawadofcashtostartanartshopinParis,withtheimplausiblepurposeofopeningalinetotheBritishprimeminister ’ssonRandolph,whomshehadknowninLondon.Achronicallyoverwroughtwoman,shedulyvisitedParisinJulyandSeptemberandspentthemoney,butmadenocontactwithanyChurchill.InApril1944oneofAlbertSpeer ’sofficialssuggestedthatSchellenbergcontactCocoChanel,whohesaidwasviolentlyanti-Soviet,andonsufficientlyfriendlytermswithChurchilltomakeheracredibleintermediaryforpeacenegotiations.Chanel,thensixtyandlivingattheParisRitzwithherAbwehrfriendHans-GunthervonDincklage,wasdulybroughttoBerlin.ThecouturiertoldtheGermansshehadjusttherightfriendtomakeaconnectionwiththeBritish–VeraBate,anEnglishwomanmarriedtoanItaliannamedLombardi,currentlyinternedbecauseofherlinkstotheBadogliogovernment.Schellenbergaccededatonce:SignoraLombardiwasreleased,andjustaweeklaterwassentbyairtoMadrid,carryingaletteraddressedtoChurchillforpresentationattheBritishembassy;Dincklagewasappointedashergo-between,toconveytheBritishresponsetoSchellenberg.OncearrivedinMadrid,however,theungratefulSignoraLombarditoldall,denouncingChanelastheNazistoogeshewas.SchellenbergheardnomorefromVeraBate,yethewasadeptatevadingblameforsuchfailures.

InNovember1942,whenHitlerandGöbbelsragedatCanarisandtheAbwehrfortheirfailuretopredicttheAnglo-American‘Torch’landingsinNorthAfrica,thechiefoftheRSHA’sDepartmentVImerelyshruggedthatmilitaryintelligencewasnothisresponsibility.Twomonthslater,heinvitedadelegationoftopTurkishpoliceandintelligenceofficerstotourGermany,forwhatwasintendedtobeadisplayoftheReich’smight.SchellenbergstrovetowooPepyli,thepolicepresident,astaunchanti-communistwhowasindeedresponsive,andgavealavishpartyontheGoldenHornwhentheSSofficervisitedTurkeylaterintheyear–theTurksharedtheNazis’loathingofcommunistsand

Russians.Butforallhishosts’elaboratecourtesy,Schellenberggotnowhereinsecuringgreaterlatitudeforhisofficersintheircountry.TheAnkaragovernment,consciousofthewaythewarwasgoing,wassodismayedbythehospitalityPepyliextendedtotheNaziforeignintelligencechiefthatitsackedhimfromthepolicepresidency.InMay1943SchellenbergandRibbentropagreedthataNazipropagandateamshouldbe

dispatchedtotheUStoinfluencethe1944presidentialelectionagainstRoosevelt.Theyweredulytrainedanddispatched,buttheU-boatcarryingthemvanishedwithouttrace,presumedsunk.TwoothermenwhodidgetashorenorthofNewYorkinJulyweresoonarrestedbytheAmericans,whoassumedthemtobesaboteurs.Intruth,theyhadbeensentonanabsurdpoliticalintelligencemission.Meanwhile,whentheAlliesinvadedItalySchellenbergwenttoelaboratelengthstorescuetheexiledgrandmuftiofJerusalem.Hewassuccessfulintransportingthisviolentlyanti-British,anti-SemiticMuslimleaderfromRometoBerlin,butquicklytiredofthemufti’scompanyanddespairedofhisusefulness.HerecruitedfortheSDIrna,BaronessvonRothkirch,aformersingerandthewidowofan

industrialist,nowinherfortiesandservingasmistresstothePortugueseambassadorinBerlin.AfterastintgatheringgossipontheGermancapital’sdiplomaticcircuit,shewasdispatchedtoLisbononafishingexpedition.SheranupsomeimpressivebillstherebeforesecuringatransfertoSwitzerland,wherehersonwasattendingschool.HeretooshesquanderedtheSD’smoneyuntilSchellenbergrecognisedherworthlessness,commontomost‘socialspies’.InOctober1943hepaidapersonalvisittoStockholm,supposedlyinpursuitofmedicaladviceabouthisownlivertroubles,butchieflytoputoutacautiousfeelertotheAllies.TheSwedishmoodhadshifteddramaticallynowthatAlliedvictoryloomed:BritishandAmericanintelligenceofficersoperatedwithafreedomdeniedtothemearlierinthewar,whileNazivisitorshadbecomemuchlesspopulardiningcompanions.SchellenbergcalledonthehotelofanotablerichAmericanguest,oneAbramStevensHewitt,whoheldsomevaguestatusasa‘Europeanobserver ’forPresidentRoosevelt.TheSDchiefadvancedaproposalastoundinglycrassandnaïve:thattheGermansshouldnegotiateacompromisepeacewiththeWesternAllies,whilecontinuingthewarontheEasternFront.AtasecondmeetingHewittagreedthatifthisproposalfoundfavourinWashingtonhewouldinsertapersonaladvertisementintheSvenskaDagbladet:‘Forsale,valuablegoldfishaquariumfor1,524Kr.’HewittreturnedtotheUSandappearstohavepassedonSchellenberg’smessage,butunsurprisinglytheaquariumremainedunadvertised.InNovember1943theSwedishgovernmentwasemboldenedtobreakoffeconomicrelationswithGermany:theNaziswererunningoutofneutralfriends.

InFebruary1944thiswould-be‘goodNazi’inheritedfromCanariscontroloftheAbwehr,inaconditionofdecaywhichitwastoolatetoreverse.Germanyhadlostthepowertoattractforeigninformantsbecauseitwasplainlydestinedtolosethewar,andalsolackedthemilitaryandnaval

capabilitytoexploitgoodstrategicintelligenceevenifitsecuredthis.ThusSchellenbergspentevermoretimeindallianceswithforeignintermediaries,ofakindthatwouldhavecausedhimtobeshothadhenotenjoyedthebackingofHeinrichHimmler.RSHAchiefErnstKaltenbrunner,whodislikedSchellenberg,wieldedmorepower,butthelatterretainedtheearoftheSSoverlord,whileplayingaperilousgameamidthecrumblingThirdReich.Schellenbergwasskilledinprovidingreassurance–hissoothingbedsidemannersustainedHimmler ’strustinhim.InAugust1944,followingtheHitlerbombplot,theRSHAofficerwascommissionedtodriveto

thehouseintheBetazielestrasseatZehlendorfwhereWilhelmCanarislivedinenforcedretirement.Hefoundtheadmiralentertainingtwovisitors,towhomhebadefarewellbeforeaccompanyingSchellenbergtomeethisjailersattheSiposchoolinFürstenberg.Canarisseemeduntroubled,perhapssincerelyso,sincehelackedthecourageofhisconvictions,andhadnotparticipatedinthefailedcoup.BeforehewashandedovertotheSShemerelyaskedSchellenbergtoarrangeaninterviewwithHimmlerforhim.TheReichsführer-SSinitiallypromisedtohelpwiththeadmiral’scase,butasubsequentdiscussionwithKaltenbrunnerpersuadedhimtoletinjusticetakeitscourse:CanarisremainedimprisoneduntilhewashangedatFlossenburgconcentrationcampinApril1945.Schellenbergdidintervene,however,tosavethelifeofanotherplotter,CountGottfriedvonBismarck,whohadonceurgedhimtoassassinateGöring.Inthelastmonthsofthewar,underSchellenberg’sdirectiontheGermanintelligence-gathering

machineadoptedevermoredesperateexpedients.ItsofficersrecruitedhundredsofRussianPoWsasexpendableline-crossers,tobeherdedintoSoviet-heldterritorytodiscoverwhatevertheycouldbeforetheirinevitablecapture–thiswasdesignatedasOperation‘Zeppelin’.Rough-and-ready,indeedbarbaric,methodswereemployedtoinsureagainsttheirdefection:manywerephotographedbytheGermansexecutingfellow-countrymen.Schellenberg’sofficersalsorecruitedprostitutes.TheRSHA’sSectionV,responsibleforlicensingthegirls,issuedadirectivetoitsregionaloffices:‘Iaskthatyoulookaroundinyourareas…forsuitablewomen…verygood-looking…whohaveflawlessmanners,intelligence,andtactandifpossibleknowledgeofforeignlanguages…Reportthem…toDepartmentVI.’Theproject’soutcomeisunrecorded,butitseemsunlikelythatmanysuchdazzlinglyqualifiedwomenweretobefoundinbrothels.InSeptember1944,amongthemassoffancifulintelligencematerialthatcrossedSchellenberg’s

deskcameawarningviaSwedenthattheAlliesplannedanairbornelandinginHolland,toseizeaRhinebridge.Hetooknoaction,perhapsbecausehemistrustedthesource.ThemessagecamefromasupposedBritishinformant,butwasintruthaninspiredguessbyDrKramer,theAbwehr ’sresidentfantasistinStockholm.SchellenbergwasanywaynowdevotingalmostallhisenergiestointriguesthatmightservehimselforhismasterinthewakeofaGermandefeat.InOctober,heintroducedtoHimmlerJean-MarieMusy,anelderlySwissCatholicconservative,todiscussanexchangeoftrucksforJews.TheupshotofthesenegotiationswasthatinFebruary1945Schellenbergpersonallyhandled

thedepartureof1,200JewsforSwitzerland;asecondexodusof1,800wasagreed,butnevertookplace.WhenHimmlerwasgivenanarmycommandontheEasternFrontinFebruary1945,SchellenbergurgedhimtothrowallthemilitaryresourceslefttoGermanyintoholdingbacktheRussians,andeffectivelytoopentheWesternFronttotheAnglo-Americans.HesustainedafriendlydialoguewiththeSwiss,whoathisbehestagreedtodestroyanMe-110

whichforced-landedatoneoftheirairfields,thuspre-emptingOttoSkorzeny,whowaseagertoleadacommandoraidtorecaptureit.Schellenberg’sadjutantFranzGöringplayedaroleincountermandinganorderfortheliquidationofRavensbrück’sprisonersinthelastweeksofthewar–10,000ofitsinmateswereinsteadshippedtoDenmark.On20April1945SchellenberghadbreakfastwithNorbertMasur,arepresentativeoftheWorldJewishCongress,anactionforwhichHitlerwouldalmostcertainlyhavehadhimshot,hadhebecomeawareofit.TheRHSAofficer ’sbelatedgooddeedstowardsJewsmighthavemeritedrespecthadtheybeencarriedoutin1942or1943;asitwas,theyseemtorepresentmeregesturesinsupportofhisclaimsuponAlliedclemency.On1MayKaltenbrunnersackedSchellenberg,butnowhisSwedishconnectionspaidoff:CountFolkeBernadotte,whomhehadfirstmetatGottfriedBismarck’shome,assistedtheAbwehrbosstoflytoSwedenonaRedCrossplane.

ThestoryoftheAbwehr,ofCanarisandSchellenberg,maybeviewedasameremarginalscribbleonthevastcanvasofworldwar,asinconsiderabledegreeitwas.EvenifHitler ’sstrategicintelligencehadbeenbetter,andifhehadbeenwillingtoheedit,itisunlikelythathecouldhavealteredthecourseofhistory–forinstance,byrepellingthevastRussianandAnglo-Americanoffensivesof1943–45–thoughhecouldhavemadetheirvictoriesmuchmorecostly.ThefundamentallessonoftheAbwehrexperiencewasthatthedemocracieshandledintelligencebetterthanthedictatorships–includingthatofStalin–becausetheyunderstoodthemeritoftruth,objectiveassessmentofevidence,notasavirtue,butasaweaponofwar.Moreover,fewprospectiveAbwehragentsofanynationalitywereattractedtoHitler ’sservicebyideologicalenthusiasm:intheearlywaryearstheyservedbecausetheysupposedGermanylikelytowin.Oncethisbelieffaded,asitdidfrom1942onwards,itbecameimplausiblethatanyintelligentmanorwomanwithachoicewouldespousetheNazicause.Onlyhumandrosswasavailableforrecruitment.NotforamomentshouldposteritybedeludedintothinkingWalterSchellenberga‘good’Nazi,far

lessacompetentintelligenceofficer,becauseheboastedsomemannersandacharmlackinginmostofthegangsterswhomanagedHitler ’sGermany.Hewasmerelyonewhoweighedtheoddsmorecarefullyandcynicallythanmost.NotforSchellenberg,attheend,acyanidecapsuleorabulletfromhisowngun;givenhisrelativeyouth,hemighthavebecomeoneoftheraresurvivorsfromHitler ’shighpriesthood,hadnothisliverbetrayedhim.HisconceitwouldhavebeenprickedbytheverdictofAlliedinterrogatorsonHitler ’slastintelligencechief,afterhereturnedfromSwedenin1945toface

captivity:theyreportedthathedidnotseemveryintelligent.

18

Battlefields

1 WIELDINGTHEULTRAWAND

InadvanceofD-DayinNormandyon6June1944,somerationalGermancommandersbelievedthattheAlliedinvasionoftheContinentofferedthemafinalopportunitytoavoidlosingthewar,byrepellingtheAnglo-AmericaninvadersthencommittingtheentirestrengthoftheWehrmachtagainsttheRedArmy.ForecastingthetimeandplaceoftheAnglo-Americanlandingsthusrepresentedthesupremechallengefortheirintelligenceofficers.Everycasualreaderoftheworld’spressin1944knewthataninvasionoftheContinentwasalmostcertaintocomeduringthesummer.Butwhen,exactly?ThecodebreakersofOKH/GdNAsaid4June.Col.AlexisvonRönne,whoheadedthethirtyofficersand110otherranksofFremdeHeerWest,orFHW,theintelligencedepartmentofvonRundstedt’sarmiesmanningtheAtlanticWall,wastheonlyimportantsoldierwhotookthispredictionseriously.MostGermancommandersinthetheatre,includingRommel,theirjudgementheavilyinfluencedbylackofAtlanticweatherstations,choseinsteadtobelievethatnolandingwaslikelybefore10June.Theywerethusabsentfromtheirheadquarterswhentheinvasionstarted.Yetforecastingthedatewasfarlessusefultothedefendersthanguessingwheretheinvaderswould

strike.TheAllies’deceptionoperation‘Fortitude’madeanimportantcontributiontocreatingandsustainingenemyconfusion.Thisshouldbesetincontext,however.Thedefenders’uncertaintybeforeD-Daywashardlyauniquewartimephenomenon.Throughoutthesummerandautumnof1940theBritishwereinastateofchronicbewildermentaboutwhenorwhetherHitlermightinvadethem;duringtheMediterraneancampaignstheywereoftensurprised.TheRussianswerewrongfootednotmerelyby‘Barbarossa’,butrepeatedlythereafter,likewisetheAmericansandBritishintheFarEast.‘Fortitude’,likeother1943–44deceptions,couldonlyworkitsspellbecausetheWesternAlliesownedthehardpower–absolutecommandofseaandair–toprovidethemwithagenuinevarietyofinvasionoptionsalonghundredsofmilesofcoastline.GiventheerraticinfluenceofHitler,ifanAbwehrintelligenceofficerhadannouncedaweek

beforeD-DaythathewasassuredbyagentsthatNormandywasthetarget,itisunlikelythattheGermanswouldhavealteredtheirdeployments.ByJune1944trustintheAbwehr,OKW/ChiandOKH/GdNAwaslow,atleastasfarastheWesternwarwasconcerned.Germany’sfieldcommanders

wereincreasinglywillingtoacceptonlywhattheyandtheirstaffscouldseebeforetheireyesintheirownoperationalareas;tobelieveonlyinwhattheirtroopsandtankscouldachievebytheexpenditureofbloodandiron.HitlerwasfarfromtheonlyonewhothoughtthePasdeCalaistheobviousplacetoattack:there

hadbeenforcefuladvocatesintheAlliedcampformakingthelandingsthereratherthaninNormandy.ItwasnotmerelyinBerlinthatsomestrategistsbelievedtheBritishandAmericanscouldalsomakeasecondthrust,perhapsinBrittany:untilthelastmomentChurchillwasurgingRoosevelttodojustthat.FarfromtheGermansdisplayingbullet-headedstupiditybyquestioningwhethertheAllieswouldattacksolelyoratallinNormandy,theywouldhavebeenfoolishnottoacknowledgeseveralalternatives.ItwasasnecessaryfortheWehrmachtin1944tofortifyanddefendagreatswatheofnorthernFranceasithadbeenfortheBritishin1940tobuildpillboxesbehindtheirownbeachesfromDevontoNorfolk.Noneofthisistosaythat‘Fortitude’wasunsuccessful.SomepeopleintheGermancamp–though

certainlynotall–tookseriouslythesignalsof‘Garbo’andotherdoubleagentscontrolledbytheBritishTwentyCommittee.Allieddeceptionfedanenemyuncertaintythatwasanywayinevitable.ItismerelynecessaryyetagaintociteChurchill’sdictum:‘Allthingsarealwaysonthemovesimultaneously.’WhatwasofdecisiveimportancetothesuccessofD-DaywasnotthattheGermansbelievedtheAlliesmightlandinthePasdeCalais,butthatBerlinwasdeniedassuredknowledgethattheywoulddosoinNormandy.ProtectionofthesecrecyofOperation‘Overlord’matteredmorethanpromotionofOperation‘Fortitude’–atleastuntiltheAllieshadgotashore.Britain’sislandstatus,thepeerlessmoatprovidedbytheChannel,wasthemostimportantfactorhere.Alliedradiodeception,whichwasbrilliantlysophisticated,probablyplayedalargerrolein

deceivingtheGermansaboutAlliedplansbeforeandafterD-Daythandiddoubleagents,becauseGermany’sgeneralshadmorefaithinitsreliability.On16May1944,afterstudyingthelatestUltra,‘Tar ’RobertsonofMI5toldGuyLiddellthattheGermansseemedtohaveexploitedwirelesstrafficanalysistobuildupareasonableassessmentofthedispositionofAlliedformationsinBritain,someofthemfictional:‘thewholepictureisbuiltupfromanumberofdetails.Agents’reportsdonotappeartoplayaverybigpart.’Liddellcommented:‘Icannothelpfeelingthattheenemy,asisthecaseofourselves,aremorelikelytodependonYinformationandwirelessintelligencethanonanythingtheymayreceivefromothersources,whenformulatingtheirplans.Allthatagentscanreallydoistofillinthepicture.’Thiswasso.TheAlliedwirelessdeceptionelementof‘Fortitude’,itssimulationofthefictitiousFirstUSArmyGroupinsouth-eastEngland,almostcertainlyinfluencedtheGermans’thinking,theirmassiveoverestimateofAlliedstrength,morethandidmaterialtransmittedbytheAbwehr ’sinformantscontrolledbyMI5,thoughthelatterexcitemoretwenty-first-centuryimaginations.Exceptionally,inJune1944Hut8placedatemporaryinterceptionstationinsideBletchleyPark,to

hastentheflowofdecryptstooperationalcommanders.Throughthosevitaldays,thecodebreakersprovidedadrasticallyacceleratedintelligencefeedtocommanders:decryptedKriegsmarinetrafficreachedtheAdmiraltywithinanaverageofthirtyminutesofinterception–therecordforonesignalwasnineteenminutesforreception,registration,deciphering,translationandteleprintdispatchtotheRoyalNavy.Ontheotherside,theWehrmacht’sAlbertPraunlaterpaidruefultributetotheexcellenceofAlliedsignalsdiscipline:‘Theradiopicturedidnotchangenoticeablyuntilthelastdaybeforetheinvasion…Noradiodeceptionwasrecognised.Nokindofradioalertwasobservedbeforethelanding.’TheGermanintelligenceapparatusneverswallowedAllieddeceptionplanssuggestinganimpendingdescentonNorway–butHitlerwasmorbidlyprotectiveofhisnorthernfastness,whichwaswhatmatteredindeterminingdeployments.Praunassertedthatafter6JunehisownorganisationwasscepticalaboutthenotionofasecondAlliedlandinginthePasdeCalaisbecausemostoftheavailableAlliedforcesseemedcommittedtoNormandy,butheacknowledgedthatOKWremainedforweekssoldonthesecondlandingscenario,especiallyafterchancewashedashoreanAlliedlanding-craftatBoulogne.Ultrainthelatterpartofthewarfortifiedtheconfidence–latterlyover-confidence–oftheAllies’

groundcommanders.Theybelievedthattheycouldlaunchtheirownoperationswithoutfearthattheenemywasabouttounleashsomefearsomesurpriseofhisown.WhiletensionintheAlliedcampbeforeD-Daywasacute,becausethestakesweresohigh,alltheoddswereontheinvaders’side.NeverbeforeinhistoryhadarmiesgoneintobattleaswellbriefedaswerethoseofBritainandtheUnitedStatesbefore6June.BeyondbulgingfilespreparedbytheWarOffice’sMI14ontheGermanunitsidentifiedintheinvasionarea,amongtonsofintelligencematerialdistributedtotheinvaderswasabreakdownofallknownGermanfacilitiesacrossthewholeofnorthernFrance.InAmiens,forinstance,werelisted‘HôtelduCommerce,RueduJacobins–foodstore;164,RueJeanned’Arc–Germanpolice;219,RueJulesBarni–hospital.’Similarinventories,partlycompiledfromagentreports,partlyfromUltra,coveredscoresofmajortownsandcities.MI6informantsinBelgiumandnorthernFrancemadeasignificantcontributionbymapping,photographinganddrawing,atmortalrisk,hundredsofinstallationsalongtheAtlanticWall,thoughsuchhumintwasweakestaboutpositionsontheimmediateNormandyinvasionfront.BletchleysuppliedtoAlliedcommandersareasonablycomprehensiveGermanorderofbattle.The

invadersknewmostabouttheparatroopformations,becausethesesignalledintheever-vulnerableLuftwaffeciphers.Therosterwasincomplete:littlewasknownaboutthearmy’s352ndDivision,whichwreakedsomehavocamongtheAmericanslandingonOmahabeach,noraboutthe711thand716thdivisionsfurthereast,butitisabsurdtomakemuchofthis,ashaveafewhistorians:noarmycanexpecttoknoweverythingaboutitsfoe.WhatmatteredwasthatallHitler ’s‘heavy’formationswereaccuratelypinpointed,andtheirmovementstowardsthebeachheadcouldbetracked.OncetheAllieswereashore,Ultrawasabletogivereal-timewarningof–forinstance–the12JuneGerman

counterattackonCarentan,andofmostimpendingLuftwafferaids.Nonetheless,itdeservesnoticethaton10JuneBletchleylostFishteleprinterdecryptsforsomedays,whentheGermanstweakedtheirencryptionsystem;itwasfortunateforAlliedpeaceofmindthatnosuchblackouthadoccurredaweekortwoearlier.Ontheothersideofthehill,eventhoughGermanintelligencegotthebigthingswronginJune

1944,oncebattlewasjoinedlocalcommandersandstaffsinNormandydisplayedtheirusualcompetenceinexploitinginformationgainedfrompatrolling,prisonerinterrogation,interceptionofradiovoicetraffic.TheWehrmacht’sAlbertPraunthoughtthatoverweeningconfidenceintheirownstrengthmadetheAmericansandBritishlazyaboutpreservingwirelesssilencebeforetheylaunchedoperations:‘Thiscarelessnesswaspossiblyduetoafeelingofabsolutesuperiority…[that]offeredtheweakerdefendersmuchinformationwhichcosttheattackerslosseswhichcouldhavebeenavoided…Manyattacksofdivisionstrengthandgreatercouldbepredictedonetofivedaysinadvance.’SomeAmericanmessagessentbytheM-209fieldciphermachinewerebroken,saidtheGerman,

andtheRAF‘continuedtobecareless’initsvoicechatter,especiallyitsairliaisonofficersattachedtogroundunits.Alliedreconnaissanceaircraftoftenreportedsightingsinplainlanguage,includingmapreferences,sometimesintimefortheGermanstobolt,andespeciallytomoveoutartillerybatteries.Patton’sarmyhadtheworstradiodiscipline,saidPraun,Gen.AlexanderPatch’sthebest.Frenchcommunicationscontinuedtobeeasilyread,astheyhadbeensince1940–theGermansfollowedGen.Leclerc’sadvanceonPariskilometrebykilometre.MeanwhiletheWehrmachtbecamemorbidlysensitivetoAlliedmonitoringofitsowncommunications:‘AradiopsychosisdevelopedamongGermantroops,’saidPraun.‘Theybecamemostreluctanttosignal’–toavoidprecipitatingastormofbombsandshells.Moreover,afundamentalproblemnowbesettheGermans,whichwoulddogthemfortherestofthewar:itwasfruitlesstogarnerenemysecretsifmilitarystrengthwaslackingtoexploitthem.On7JuneinNormandyGermantroopscapturedadetailedAmericanoperationalorder,butwerequiteunabletodoanythingwithit,becausealltheiravailableforceswerefightingdesperatelytostaveoffanAlliedbreakthrough.LikewisesigintoperatorsidentifiedChicksandsasakeyRAFtransmissionandinterceptionstation,buttheLuftwaffewasincapableofbombingit.TheAlliedintelligencemosaicbecameevermoredominatedbyEnigmaandTunnydecrypts.For

BritishandAmericangeneralsinthelaterstagesofthewarUltrabecameanaddictivedrug,requiringatwice-orthrice-daily‘fix’beforeanyoperationaldecisionwastaken.IncamouflagedtrucksandtentshighonwindsweptItalianmountainsordeepinmuddyFrenchfields,bespectacledyoungstaffofficersinBritishbattledressorUSArmycombatfatigueshuddledoverthelatestsignalsfromBletchley.TheAlliedhighcommandfacedaconstantdilemmaabouthowmuchUltramaterialtodisclosetothosewhomustfighttheGermansatthesharpend.Ifitwasclaimedthatagivenpieceof

intelligencecamefromagentreportsor–lessconvincingstill–fromline-crossers,nobodymuchcreditedit.Butiftheyknewthatitboretheauthorityoftheenemy’sownwords,theycouldhardlyfailtodoso.BillWilliams,Montgomery’sintelligencechief,saidthatofficerswhohadbeenindoctrinated

aboutcodebreakingbecamepathologicallydiscreet:‘Whatanagentsaysbecomesgossip.ToexplainthenatureofUltrawastoslamthedooronthisapproach…Thevastnumberofitsrecipientsweresofrightenedoflosingwhat…wasobviouslyanimmensestrategicassetthatwegotawaywithoutitsloss.’TheUSArmyinItalyhadahalf-solemn,half-mockingphraseforitsUltra-indoctrinatedofficers,whoweresaidtobe‘steepedinthebloodofthelamb’.Ultraproductwasknownas‘BlackMarket’.RumouramongheadquartersofficersnotprivytothesecretsuggestedthatitwasachannelthroughwhichAlliedcommandersconductedargumentsorissuedreprimandsunfitfortheeyesofjuniorpersonnel.KnowledgeofthewizardryofBletchleywasrestrictedtointelligenceofficersatarmyleveland

above.Noonewhomightfallintoenemyhandsshouldbecapableofbetrayingitsstory;thus,pastserviceattheParkformedapermanentbartoacombatrole,evenifafewmenaspiredtoone–KeithBateyaloneachievedit.CorpsanddivisionalcommanderswhowerenotUltra-indoctrinatedweresimplyinformedofacleardistinctionbetweenwhatArmyHQstatedasfactaboutGermandeploymentsorintentions,andwhatitmerelysuspected.MuchlightersecurityattendedtheactivitiesoftheYService–eavesdroppersonenemyvoicetraffic–becausetheGermanswereobviouslyawareofitsexistence,andthemselvesplayedthesamegame.‘Y’oftenprovidedacloakforintelligencesecuredthroughdecrypts.BillWilliamsbelievedthateventhehighestcommandersshouldmerelyreceivebriefsbasedonsigint,ratherthanbeingallowedtoseedecryptsastheycamein:‘NoseniorofficershouldeverreadnakedUltraunlessheistrainedinIntelligence…Theyaregivenaweaponoftentoobigfortheirhand.’IntheviewofBritain’schiefsofstaffthisappliedespeciallytotheirprimeminister,whooftenusedadecryptedreportfromanenemycommanderasaclubwithwhichtobelabourhisowngeneralsabouttheirallegedpusillanimity.

SpecialoperationsandResistancecontributedsomething,thoughlessthanromanticswishtobelieve,toeventualAlliedtriumphinNormandy.InthefirstdaysaftertheAlliedlandings,partiesoftheBritishSpecialAirService,togetherwithSOEandOSSteams,weredroppedalloverFrancetofomenttroublefortheGermansbyanymeanstohand.On10JuneapartyoflocalResistancefightersvisitedthecampofaBritishSpecialAirServicegroupintheforestofVerrièresintheVienne,bearingimportantnews.TheSAS,fiftystrong,hadbeenparachutedintoFranceon7Juneforanoperationcodenamed‘Bulbasket’,intendedtopromotesabotageattacksfarbehindtheGermanfrontincollaborationwithResisters.NowthevisitorsurgedtheEnglishtoaddressanimportantrailjunctionatChâtelleraultsomethirty-fivemilesnorthwards,whereGermanpetrolstockswerebeing

held.TheSASteam’scommandingofficer,CaptainJohnTonkin,deputedLt.TwmStephenstoaccompanytwoFrenchmenonacycleridetoreconnoitrethejunction.Stephens,amustachioedlittleWelshmanwholookedplausiblyFrench,donnedanill-fittingciviliansuitandberetandsetforthonwhatwasahighlydangerousjourney–inthewakeofD-DaytheregionteemedwithalertandfearfulGermans.HeandhiscompanionsnonethelessreachedChâtellerault,wheretheBritishofficerfoundthatthelocalshadnotexaggerated.Inthemarshallingyardsstoodlineuponlineoftankerwagons,envelopedinheavycamouflagenetting,andthusfarunscathedbyAlliedairattack.StephensandtheothersrodebacktothecampatVerrières,whichtheyreachedthefollowingnight,

afteranabsenceofthirty-sixhours.Tonkin’swireless-operatorsignalledtotheSASBrigade’sBritishbasethemapreferenceofelevenpetroltrainshaltedinsidingsathousandyardseastofthejunction.AnUltrainterceptthesamedayshowedthattheGermansintendedthefuelfortheDasReich2ndSSArmouredDivision,incongruouslydesignatedintheBritishdecrypt‘2SugarSugarPanzer ’,whichwasenroutetoNormandy.Withinthreehours,twenty-fourtwin-enginedMosquitoesoftheRAF’s487,646and107squadronsstrafedandbombedthejunction,destroyingthetrainsandtheirpreciousfuel.2ndSSPanzerreachedNormandyintheend,butitsarrivalonthebattlefieldwassignificantlydelayedbytheairattack,promptedbytheSAS’ssignalfromFrance.Herewasatextbookexampleofcoordinationbetweenintelligence,specialforces,Resistanceand

airpowertoachieveanoutcomewhich–asUltrarevealed–materiallyassistedtheAlliedbattleforNormandy.FewsuchoperationsendedassuccessfullyasLt.Stephens’sreconnaissance–forwhichhepaidwithhislifewhenheandmostofhiscomradeswerecapturedandexecutedfollowingaGermanassaultontheirforestbaseafewdaysafterthebicycleridetoChâtellerault.Butthesummerof1944witnessedadramaticandbloodyfulfilmentofChurchill’svisionforResistanceandspecialforcesbackinJuly1940,whenheenthusedaboutsettingEuropeablaze.

InthefirstthreeweeksofJuly,Bletchleybrokeremarkablyfewarmymessages–theWehrmacht’sEnigmakeywasgoingthroughoneofitsintractableperiods–andtheAllieswereobligedmerelytofightanddieasbesttheycould,withnosignificantUltraassistance.Inanyevent,thiswouldhavebeenunlikelytoprovidedetailsofpracticalvalueaboutenemydeploymentstomeettheBritishassaultsonCaen,whichcausedthemmuchgriefandsuccessivefailuresbeforeachievingbelatedsuccess.ForBletchley,muchthemostimportantmomentoftheNormandycampaigncameontheeveningof6August,whenabrokensignal–oncemorefromLuftwaffetraffic–revealedtheGermanintentiontostrikeinforcewestwards,withalmostalltheirremainingpanzers,towardstheseaatAvranches.Thusforewarned,anoverwhelmingconcentrationofAlliedairpowerandartillery,togetherwithagallantstandbytheUS30thDivision,wreckedtheso-calledMortaincounterattack.UltraalsoflaggedHitler ’sdeterminationtoperseverewiththisassault,evenasAmericantroops

burstoutoftheirperimeterandsurgedsouthandeast,bypassingthestrugglingpanzers.Alliedforces

couldadvancetoclosethe‘FalaiseGap’,knowingthatmuchoftheGermans’survivingstrengthwastrappedtothewestofit,stillbatteringvainlyattheAmericanholdingforcebetweenthemselvesandAvranches.ThisrepresentedUltra’slastinterventioninthenorth-westEuropecampaignwhichsignificantlyinfluencedbattlefieldevents,asdistinctfrommerelykeepingAlliedcommandersinformedoftheirenemies’condition.StuartMilner-BarryofHut6neverforgotbreaking‘thedesperatemessagefromtheGermancommanderinNormandy,whichheraldedthecollapseoftheGermanresistance…Thiskindofmessage,showntousmaybeinthemiddleofthenight,gaveoneanextraordinarysensationoflivingwithhistory.’Since1939thecodebreakershadbeentoldpatheticallylittleabouttheimpactoftheirherculean

laboursuponthecourseofthewar.Onlyinthefinalmonths,withthetiderunningirresistiblyinfavouroftheAllies,didfieldcommandersbelatedlyrecognisethatmoraleatBletchleymightbeboostedbyalittlefeedback.Montgomery’sintelligencestaffbegantodispatchdailybriefsfrom21stArmyGroupheadquarters.‘Onefeltonewastalkingtofriends,’wroteBillWilliams,‘andfromthatfeelingofgratitudewhichwehopedwasreflectedinthewordssenttotheParkemergedabeliefthatbecauseofthem[we]weregettingabetterservice.’OnlyafewscoreBritishandAmericanofficersinthefieldknewhowgreatwasthearmies’debtto

GC&CS.ThecodebreakersdidnotprovideAlliedsoldiers,sailorsandairmenwithakeytovictory;onlyhardfightingcouldachievethat.Buttheywavedamagicwandwhichsweptasidetheshroudofsecrecybehindwhichtheenemymovedandhadhisbeing.Thiswasaboonneverbeforeconferredonanynationatwarinhistory.ItwasnofaultofBP’sthatgeneralsonthebattlefieldsometimesignored,misinterpretedorfailedtotakeadvantageofitsbounty–astheydidinnorth-westEuropeintheclosingmonthsofthewar.

2 SUICIDESPIES

Themostruthlessandcynicaloperationsrunbyallintelligenceserviceswerethoseinvolvingshort-rangespies–locallyrecruitedciviliansdispatchedtoreportwhattheycouldseebehindtheenemy’sfrontline.Theirprospectsofsuccessorevensurvivalwereslight,butthisdidnotdetereithertheAxisortheAlliesfromthrustingasmallarmyofthemintothefray.InthemonthsbeforeD-Day,theGermansrecruitedthreehundredFrench‘stay-behind’agentsfordeploymentwhentheAllieshadgainedabeachhead.TheyweretrainedattheAbwehr ’sspyschoolatAngersontheLoire,runbyafifty-three-year-oldlanguagesprofessorfromHamm,HauptmannClören,aNaziPartymemberwithaSwisswife.Hisstudents,hetoldAlliedinterrogatorslater,were‘ofaverypoorstandard…unemployedmenwhoacceptedthework“forthesakeofearningsomemoney”’.ThehabitualgloomofoneofClören’spupils,dark,bespectacledtwenty-three-year-old‘Bardou’,

mayhavebeenexplainedbyhisdayjobasassistanttoRouen’smunicipalundertaker.TheGermans

paidhim3,000francsamonth,andgotnothingfortheirmoney.‘Beccassino’,ayoungNorman,waswantedbySaint-Malopolicefortheft,andprovedsoconspicuouslyincompetentasanagentthattheAbwehremployedhimasitsstationcookinAngerstojustifyhis2,000francsamonth.AfterD-DayhewasdispatchedthroughtheAlliedlinesandneverheardfromagain.Thesamesilencedescendedupon‘Berthelot’,aformerParisartstudentgiven20,000francstoreportfromAmerican-occupiedCherbourg.‘Beru’,anotheryoungParisian,allegedlysentsomeusefulmessagesfromAlliedterritorybeforeannouncinginAugustthathewasill,andbeingallowedtogohome.AftertheAlliedlandingsthirty-five-year-oldBigaultdeCasanove–‘Calvert’–wasleftinwestern

France,fromwhichhesenttwowirelessmessagesinOctober.Thefirstsaidthat250ResistancemenplannedtoattacktheGermangarrisonofSaint-Nazaire.Thesecondread:‘Ihavenomoneyleftandneedneworders.Pleasesendmoneyandorders.’Mostoftheagentscommittedinthesummerof1944werepaid500–800francsamonthandissuedwithhalfadozencarrierpigeonsandasupplyoffeed.InadvanceofD-DaytheAbwehrkeptahundredbirdsatitsAngersstation,whichweretruckedoutintothecountrysideonceamonthtopractiseflyinghome.AGermanintelligenceofficertoldAlliedinterrogatorssourly:‘Nomessageswereeverreceivedfromagentswithpigeons.’OtherAbwehrstay-behindsincludedtwenty-three-year-oldParisianGenevièveMouquet,‘Girot’,

anidealistwhoprofessedtobelievethatVichyandtheNazisrepresenteda‘NewEurope’.Farfrombeingtheglamorouswomanspyoffiction,shewasdecidedlystout,butaftertrainingasawireless-operator,inJune1944shewassenttoAmerican-occupiedSaint-Lô.SeveraltimesshereturnedtoherbaseatAngers,sayingthatAlliedbombingmadeittoodifficulttogetacrosstheViretoherobjective.ShewasinsteaddeployedtotheestateofaracehorsetrainernamedDevoy,westofVilledieuinNormandy,whohadingratiatedhimselfwiththeGermansbykeepingpigeonsforthemduringtheOccupation.Mouquetlastedamonthwithhimbeforefleeingeast,havingabandonedherwireless,sayingthattheplacehadbecometoodangerous.TheGermanseventuallyallowedhertodecamptoWürttemberg,recordinginherfilethatshewas‘unfitforanyfurtherintelligencework’.Shehadbackedlosers,andbyAugust1944musthaveknownit.

TheAlliesfarednobetterthantheAxisinrecruitingstay-behinds.IntheworstdaysoftheArdennesbattleinDecember1944,theAmericansbecamesufficientlyalarmedthattheymadetheirownfranticeffortstoidentifysomelocalagentsinBelgium,incasethepanzersthrustonwardsbeyondtheMeuse.AUSNinthArmyofficerreportedgloomily:‘Theproblemisnotasimpleone;radio-operators,atoncewillingandable,mustbediscreetlyconcealedinplaceswheretheyhavesomechanceofremainingeveniftheenemymovesinandevacuatesmostofthepopulaceandsearchesthehouses.Theneighborscannotbeletinonthesecret.Theagentmustbekeptinareasonablygoodframeofmindduringadullandnervouswaitingperiod.’ItwasfortunatetheBulgestay-behindswereneverneeded.

InthosedaystheGermanslaunchedanewsurgeoftheirownline-crossers.AmongenemyagentsdetainedbytheUSNinthArmyduringtheBulgebattlewereBernardPiolot,whowasallegedlycaughtcuttinganAmericanfieldtelephoneline;BetsyCoenegrachts,néeStratemans,ofVroenhoven,Belgium,‘aprovensmugglerandinformantoftheGestapowhowasresponsibleforthearrestoftwoBelgianundergroundespionageagentsduringtheoccupation’;PhilipStaab,whoallegedlyadmittedhavingworkedfortheGestapo;JosephBernard,ofKerkrade,Holland,whoconfessedtobeinganSDagent.InallinJanuary1945NinthArmy–whoseG-2recordsalonesurvive–arrested156peoplesuspectedofbeingenemyagents,ofwhomtwenty-oneweresoldiersincivilianclothes,afurtherelevenwerehandedovertotheBelgianauthorities,twenty-eightweredetained,fifty-sixheldforfurtherinterrogationandjusttwelvereleased.Itisnomorepossibletoguesswhethersuchpeoplewereguiltyorinnocent,giventhehysteriaofthosedays,thanitistodiscovertheireventualfate.AstheWehrmachtretreated,inthelastmonthsofthewarhundredsofline-crossersrecruitedbythe

AllieswerethrustforwardintoGermany.Almostallvanished,andwerepresumeddead.OnedayinMarch1945,forinstance,anSOEofficerherdedabatchofPolesuparoadtowardstheGermanlines,withorderstopushforwardasfarastheycouldinpursuitofinformation.Hewroteafterwatchingonemango:‘IcannotsayIwasaltogetherhopefulabouthischances.’TheotherPolesdisplayedlast-minutereluctance,buteventuallydisappearedtowardsOsnabrück,‘threeratherforlorn-lookingfiguresdisappearingintotheblue’.Nothingisknownoftheirlaterstories.TheAmericansenlistedtheservicesoftheBelgianSûretétoidentifylocalmenwillingtorisktheir

livesbyplungingintothemaelstromofacollapsingReich.Areportonanoperationlaunchedon1March1945byanOSSofficernamedJosendaledescribedafarcicalattempttoparachuteagent‘Peter ’behindtheGermanfront.Duringtheflighttothedroppingzone‘theoperationwasbroughttoanunfortunateendwhentheagentshothimselfintheleg…Hadthisincidentnotoccurred,themissionwouldhavefailedinanyeventastheplanewasrecalled,duetoquiteheavyenemyactiononthegroundandintheairinthevicinityoftheproposedpinpointdrop.’Othersuchoperationsfarednobetter:‘Agent“Bert”becamedifficulttomanageanddevelopedintoatroublemaker…Agents“George”and“Hank”losttheirvalueastheareawithwhichtheywerefamiliarandinwhichtheywereduetooperatewasoverrun.’‘Hansreturnedon23MarchafterswimmingacrosstheRhine,butJosephwascapturedandhisfateisaforegoneconclusion.Onthenightof23Marchmissions“Peter”and“Mac”weremounted.Thiswasanairdropoperation.Agent“Peter”refusedtogothroughwiththemissionatthelastmomentandagent“Fred”wassubstitutedinhisplace.Forsecurityreasonsagent“Peter”hasbeenplacedincustodyforthedurationofthewar.Agent“Fred”wasdroppedintheHammareaandonetestingW/Tcontactwasmadewithhimon24March,sincethennocontacthasbeenestablishedwithhim.’Sovietline-crosserssufferedequallydevastatingattrition.InJuly1944Stalindecreedthecreation

ofnetworksuptothreehundredmilesbeyondthefront,inGerman,Hungarian,Romanian,Czechand

Polishterritory,forthepromotionofsabotageandintelligence-gathering,withthesamepurposesforwhichSOEandOSSdroppedhundredsofagentsintoFranceafterD-Day.AnofficernamedNikolsky,whoransuchSovietgroupsfromBrestandKobrin,franklyadmittedtheirfailure:‘Welearnedevenbeforetheendofthewarthatalmostallofourintelligenceandsabotagegroupshadbeeneliminatedbytheenemysoonaftertheylanded.’AnAbwehrofficerinNorway,HauptmannPardon,pickeduponeGRUteamandthereafterpersuadeditscontrollersinMurmansktoparachuteseveralsupplydropsintoGermanhands.FewGRUagentsevenspokealocallanguage,andmostweredroppedblind.EveryGermanwithin

milesclosedinonthesiteofareportedparachutelanding,tobegina‘Hasenjagdt’–aharehunt–whichwasusuallysuccessful.Nikolskyreportedthatonlyadozenof120trainedintelligenceofficersthathehimselfdispatchedsurvived,‘byamiracle’,untiltheywereoverrunbytheRedArmy.OneofthosewhoperishedwasaveteranofundergroundoperationsinGerman-occupiedterritorynamedAnnaMorozova.Atrainedwireless-operator,shewaseventuallytrappedandwoundedon11November1944whileservingwithaPolishpartisangroupinEastPrussia,andblewherselfupwithoneofherowngrenades.EventheRussiansbecamedismayedbythelossesoftheirownnationalsinsuchoperations,andin

thewinterof1944adoptedanewpolicy–dispatchingGermandeserters,ordoubleagents,tofulfilStalin’sdemands.TheGRUinfiltrated‘turned’PoWsattherateofuptothirtyaweek,thoughmostpromptlysurrenderedtotheWehrmachtonarrival.ScarcelyanyoftheeighteenteamsNikolskydroppedbehindtheGermanlinesbetweenAugust1944andMarch1945wereheardfromagain,includingonedeliberatelyparachutedintothemidstofabattle.SuchagentsasdidtransmitlaterprovedtohavebeenunderGermancontrol.Nikolskycommenteddryly,‘Theresultswerefarfromencouraging.’Itispossibletodetailthefortunesofonesuchmission,becauseasurvivorlaterfellintothehands

ofBritishinterrogators.Whatfollowsseemsfantasticevenbythestandardsofwartimespecialoperations,buttheremustbesignificantportionsoftruthinit.WaldemarBartschwasborninUkrainetoGermanparents,andwasstudyinginOdessawhentheWehrmachtoccupiedthecityin1942.TheBritishreportdescribeshimas‘intelligent,hasagoodmemoryandisanopportunist.Heappearstohavenonationalloyalty,’averdictjustifiedbyhischequeredexperiences.BartschworkedasaninterpreterwiththeLuftwaffeuntilMarch1944,whentheRussiansoverrantheareaanddispatchedhimtobecomeaforcedlabourerwithanengineerbattalion.AcounterattackrestoredhimtothecustodyoftheGermans,whochargedhimwithdesertion.HewashandedovertotheAbwehr,whodecidedtousehimashandlerforadoubleagent,MihailKotschesche,afellow-Ukrainianbornin1919.KotscheschehadservedwiththeHungarianarmyuntilcapturedbytheRussiansnearKharkovin

1942.Aftersomemonthsasaprisoner,hewasoneofagroupoftwenty-sevenchosenfortrainingas

aSovietagentanddispatchedtoaspyschoolatDjetsojeSelo,twenty-fivemileseastofMoscow.ThereheunderwentfifteenmonthsoftrainingintheRussianlanguage,photography,wireless-operationandpoliticalindoctrination.HethenspentafurtherthreemonthsinMoscowbeforebeingdispatchedonamission,withthecodename‘Dodi’.On24May1944hewasflowntoKursk,andbriefedforadropinHungary.HewasprovidedwiththeuniformofaHungariansergeant,alargesumofcash,anAmericanTensorwirelesssetwithaten-metrewireaerial,andatableoffrequenciestowhichhewastoldtoadd3,000kconevendays,andsubtract2,000onoddones.HealsoreceivedaHungarianprayerbook,notforspiritualsolacebutasacodingkey.KotscheschewasdroppedfromaUS-builtBostonbomber,anditwasscarcelysurprisingthathe

twistedhisankleonlanding,sincehehadreceivednoparachutetraining.Hemanagedtohobbletoarailwaystation,fromwhichhetravelledtohismother ’shomenearSvalava.Hespenttwoweeksthere,andhidhismoney,beforeobeyingtheinstructionsofhisRussianhandlers:tosurrenderhimselftothepolice,admittingthathehadbeensentbyMoscow,andthereafterplayadoubleradiogameintheenemy’shands.TheHungariansspentthreehoursdebatinghisfate,thengavehimtotheGermans,whoallocatedhimanAbwehrcodenameas‘Adam’,andWaldemarBartschashishandler.KotscheschedulybeganmessagingMoscow,firstfromDebrecenandthen,astheRedArmyadvanced,fromBudapest.HeallegedlysentsomematerialatthebehestoftheGermans,someonhisowninitiativetohisSovietcustomers.HisMoscowordersrequiredhimtotransmitonlyonceaweek.Hesignalledinformationontroopandvehiclemovements,butwasreprimandedbyCentrewhenhementionedAmericanbombing:‘Americanbombingofnointerest.Sticktoyourinstructions.Whereareyouliving?’On22AugusttheGRUdemandedtoknowwhathehaddonewiththemoneyhehadbeengiven.

Kotscheschereplied:‘Havespent2,000pengooncarhire.2,000leftwithmothertobuyahorse.’On2SeptemberhetoldMoscow:‘ThepoorarewaitingfortheRedArmy,therichmakeforthewestinahurry.IsawinarestaurantthreeHungarianandsixGermangenerals.’On19Octoberhemessaged:‘IhavenoclearpictureyetofBudapest.Thereisunrestincity.ArrowCross[fascistmovement]supportedbyGermanshaveseizedpower.’ThisbroughtafuriousresponsefromhisRussianmasters:‘Stopsendingunclearmessagesoryouwillbeheldresponsible.Observethepoliticalsituation…Donotlistentorumours.Theyarefascistlies.’ItseemsremarkablethattheGermans,atsuchalatestageofthewar,persistedwithintelligence

activitiesthatcouldnotbeofthesmallestpracticalusetotheircause,butallinstitutions,includingintelligenceservices,retainazombiemomentumeveninthefaceofcatastrophe:atthesameperiodtheAbwehrwasstillparachutingline-crossersbehindtheRussianfront.BartschlatertoldtheBritishthatheneverdoubtedthatKotscheschewasworkingforMoscow,butthoughthisowninterestsbestservedbykeepinghismouthshutandappearingtocollaboratewiththeGermans.Kotscheschefrequentlymockedhisfellow-UkrainianthathewouldnotdaretelltheGermansabouthistreachery,

andboastedthathehimselfwouldbeabigmanwhentheRedArmyarrived.InDecember1944,bothmenfledfromBudapesttoVienna,wherenervouslocalpolicemen

arrestedKotschescheasasuspiciousperson–which,heavensknows,hewas–andBartschhadsomedifficultysecuringhisrelease.AttheendofJanuary1945theymovedontoGraz,wherethespyresumedtransmissionstoMoscow.Healsoacquiredatwenty-year-oldblondelovernamedIlseKiller,andpassedthelastmonthsofthewarinrelativetranquillity.TheRedArmyarrivedinGraztofindKotscheschestruttingasaself-appointedcommissar,interrogatingAustriancivilians.TheungratefulspydenouncedIlse,hisgirlfriend,asaGermanstool-pigeon,andsheswiftlyvanished,presumablyintothemawofSMERSh.Bartschescapedwestwards,whileKotschesche’sultimatefateisunknown.Whatconclusionscanbedrawnfromhistortuousstory,astoldtotheBritish?Themostobviousis

thatitwouldbeunwisetoacceptawordofitatfacevalue,thoughmuchofthenarrativeseemstoocircumstantialandfancifultobeuntrue.BothBartschandKotscheschedisplayedremarkabletalentsasintriguers,matchingthoseofRonaldSeth,merelybydissuadingtwoofthemostruthlessregimesinhistoryfromshootingthem.ItseemsunlikelythatthedoingsofthetwoUkrainians,whichabsorbedsubstantialRussianandGermanresources,yieldedthesmallestadvantagetoeitherside.Theywereflotsam,sweptintotheintelligencegameforaseason,whoplayedafewhandsbeforebeingsweptawayonthetideofwar.

3 TARNISHEDTRIUMPH

InthelastmonthsofthewarinEurope,theAlliedmarchtovictorywassulliedbyrepeatedintelligencefailuresthatcostmanylives,wastedopportunitiesandgrantedtheGermansentirelygratuitoussuccesses,albeitafterwardsreversed.RalphBennettofBletchley’sHut3believedthatafterachievingvictoryintheNormandycampaignattheFalaiseGapinAugust,euphoriadistortedthejudgementofAlliedcommanders,blindingthemtobothintelligenceandprudence.Intheearlyautumnof1944thecodebreakersreadastreamofdesperatesignalsfromGermancommandersintheWest,describingtheirownforcesasatthelastgasp.ForsomedaysEisenhowerandhissubordinates,aswellastheBritishJIC–thoughemphaticallynotWinstonChurchill–wereconvincedthatthewarwasasgoodaswon.BennettnotesthatUltraflaggedHitler ’sacuteconcernaboutthevulnerabilityoftheMoselle–Saarsectorofthefront,whichEisenhowerignoredinfavourofsupportingMontgomery’snorthernthrust.Itremainshighlydoubtful,however,whetherPatton–whocommandedinthesouth–couldhavemadeadecisivebreakthrough,evenhadhebeengivenlogisticsupport.UnfavourableterraintoldheavilyagainstattackerswhotookthatroadintoGermany.Bennettissurelyright,however,toemphasiseMontgomery’sculpabilityforfailuretosecurethe

ScheldtapproachestoAntwerpatthebeginningofSeptember,whentheystoodopenforthetaking.

UltrarepeatedlyemphasisedGermandeterminationtodefendtheestuaryandthusdenyuseofthevitalporttotheAllies,togetherwithdetailsofshipmentsofGermantroopsandgunstofortifypositionsontheeastbank.Incomprehensibly,theBritishfailedtointerdicttheGermancrossings,evenafterAdmiralSirBertramRamsaywarnedMontgomeryofthisdanger.InthefaceoftheGermanstandontheScheldt,Antwerpremainedunusableforalmostthreemonthsafteritsintactcapture,withcripplingconsequencesforAlliedlogistics.ThelittleBritishfield-marshal’sneglectofcrystal-clearintelligence,andofanimportantstrategicopportunity,becameamajorcauseoftheWesternAlliedfailuretobreakintotheheartofGermanyin1944.Thesameoverconfidencewasresponsibleforthelaunchofthedoomedairborneassaultin

Hollandon17September,despiteUltra’sflaggingofthepresencenearthedropzoneof9thand10thSSPanzerDivisions,togetherwithField-MarshalWalterModel’sheadquartersatOosterbeek.Had‘victoryfever ’notblindedAlliedcommanders,commonsensedictatedthatevendrasticallydepletedSSpanzersposedamortalthreattolightlyarmedandmostlyinexperiencedBritishairborneunits.Ultraon14–15SeptemberalsoshowedtheGermansalerttothedangerofanairbornelandinginHolland.ItwasobviousthatitwouldbeveryhardtodrivetheBritishreliefforceeightymilesupasingleDutchroad,withthesurroundingcountrysideimpassableforarmour,unlesstheGermansfailedtoofferresistance.ThedecisiontolaunchOperation‘MarketGarden’againstthisbackgroundwasrecklesslyirresponsible,anditsdefeatremainsadeservedblotonMontgomery’sreputation.ThegreatestAlliedintelligencedisasterofthecampaignwas,ofcourse,failuretoanticipate

Hitler ’s16December1944Operation‘AutumnMist’,whentwoGermanarmiessmashedintotheweakestsectoroftheUSFirstArmy’sfrontintheArdennes.Aftertheevent,everyseniorAmericanandBritishintelligenceofficergazedruefullyuponthestackofUltradecryptsthatshouldhavealertedEisenhowerandhisgenerals.On4SeptembertheJapaneseambassador,BaronŌshima,hadmetHitlerinEastPrussia.TheFührerassertedthatassoonashisnewreinforcementarmywasready,heintended‘totaketheoffensiveintheWestonalargescale’,exploitingpoorseasonalweathertomaskredeploymentofhisforcesfromtheAlliedairforces;theattackwouldcome‘afterthebeginningofNovember ’.YetalthoughBritishandAmericanintelligenceofficersreadŌshima’sreportofthatconversation,on11NovembertheBritishJointIntelligenceCommitteewrote:‘TheGermansmaybeplanningalimitedspoilingattackdesignedtoupsetAlliedpreparationsandthuspostponethemajorAlliedoffensive,possiblyevenuntilthespringof1945…WedonotthinkthattheevidencewarrantstheconclusionthattheGermansareplanningaspoilingoffensive.’Theofficialhistoriansofintelligencesay:‘Itisnotamisuseofhindsighttohazardthejudgement

thattheBritishchiefsofstaffandtheJICmadeafundamentalmistake’infailingtotakethiswarning,togetherwithotherUltraabouttheformationofSixthPanzerArmyandredeploymentwestwardsofsubstantialLuftwaffeelements,withtheseriousnesstheymerited.ŌshimarepeatedlyrestatedhisforecastofanoffensiveintheWest,mentioningtheprospecttwenty-eighttimesindispatchesbetween

16Augustand15December1944.Hismessages,matchedbyothercluesaboutGermanredeploymentsandconcentrations,andthedisappearanceofpanzerformationsfromtheEasternFront,shouldhaverungbellsatAlliedheadquarters.RalphBennettofHut3notedlatertheotherunheededcluesabouttheloomingonslaughtthatBletchleyprovided:massivetrainmovementsflaggedindecryptsofmessagesintheGermanStateRailwayscode;forwardconcentrationsofLuftwaffeaircraftonascaleunseenforyears;requestsforintensiveairreconnaissanceofkeysectorsoftheAmericanfront–‘ItwasextraordinarythatUltradidnotarousemoreforebodings.’TheBritishboremuchoftheresponsibilityforthefailureofanalysis,becausetheyledtheAllied

intelligenceeffortagainsttheGermans,andSHAEF’sintelligencechiefwastheirownMaj.Gen.KennethStrong.TheBritishofficerhadbeenflowntoreinforceEisenhower ’steaminNorthAfricafollowingtheFebruary1943KasserinePassfiasco,andhadbeenwiththeSupremeCommandereversince.Henowdirectedastaffathousandstrong,andthusasbloatedaseveryotherelementofthatAnglo-Americanheadquarters.Heassertedina16SeptemberSHAEFstrategicassessmentoftheGermancondition:‘NoforcecanbebuiltupintheWestsufficientforacounter-offensiveorevenasuccessivedefensive,’andheneverwaveredfromthatviewduringthethreemonthsthatfollowed.Alifelongbachelor,Strongwasanodd-lookingfigure,withbulbouscheeksandprotrudingears.

BillWilliams,Montgomery’sintelligencechief,includedamonghisownmultiplechargesagainstIke’sG-2theaccusationthathe‘wouldn’tgonearthefrontifhecouldhelpit’.TheOxforddondismissedthecareersoldierinthetopintelligencejobasa‘headlesshorrorandafacelesswonder…Strongworriedabouteverything.’ItshouldalsobenotedthatintensiveactivitybyOSS,MI6andSOEindispatchingline-crossingagentsintoGermanyfailedtoproduceasinglereportaboutpreparationsfor‘AutumnMist’.EnemywirelesssilencepreventedtheYServicefromdetectinganythingamiss,andsomeimportantcluesfromPoWinterrogationsinthedaysbefore16Decemberwentunnoticed.TheSHAEFintelligencechiefwasneitherclevernorimaginative,andwasindeedunfittoholdthetoppostonEisenhower ’sstaff.ButWilliamsat21stArmyGroupdidnobetterthanhissuperiorinanticipating‘AutumnMist’.TheUSArmywasalwaysscepticalaboutBritishwillingnesstoallowamateursoldierssuchasthisthirty-two-year-oldacademictorisetothehighestranksinintelligencedepartments.Gen.OmarBradleywroteofWilliamsafterthewar:‘Heisbrilliantbutinclinedtobeerraticlikemostbrilliantmen…frequentlywrongbecausehelacksthemilitarybackgroundthatwedemand.’BradleycitedatypicalWilliamsremark:‘Mydigestionisbadthismorning–I’vebeeneatingmywordsforaweek.’PresumablythiswassaidinthewakeoftheBattleoftheBulge.InDecember1944bothStrongandWilliamswereguiltyofthesameblunderastheJIC:they

dismissedascenariobecauseitdidnotconformtotheirownlogic.Strongwroteinhisownpost-warapologiafortheArdennesfailure:‘MembersoftheIntelligencestaffs…wereconsideredtobedefeatistsiftheypredictedanythingbutcontinuedAlliedsuccess;iftheyexpresseddoubtsaboutthefuturetheywereaccusedofbeingoutoftouchwiththerealitiesofthewar.’HesaidthattheUSFirst

Army’sseniorintelligenceofficeremergedfromthebattlewithmostcredit,havingwarnedthathebelievedtheGermanswereuptosomething.‘OfalltheofficersconcernedwithOrderofBattleintelligence,’saidStrong,‘itwasCol.“Monk”DicksonwhocamenearesttogettingthecorrectanswertotheriddleaboutthewhereaboutsofunlocatedGermandivisions.’TheUSArmythroughoutthewarremainedshortoftrainedintelligenceofficers,butDicksonwas

oneofitsbetterpractitioners–othersincludedJohnPetito,RichardCollinsandJamesO.Curtis.Strongadmitted,however,thattheAmerican’spre-Ardennescredibilitywasweakenedbythefactthathehadacquiredareputationforpessimism,indeedalarmism,‘andwehadthereforedevelopedahabitofdiscountingsomeofthethingshereported’.ItshouldalsobenoticedthatDicksondepartedonleaveforParisontheeveoftheArdennesoffensive.ThehistorianPeterCaddick-AdamsobservesthatifthecolonelhadbeensuretheGermanswereabouttoattack,hewouldcertainlynothavequitFirstArmy’sheadquartersatsuchamoment,eventhoughhewasencouragedtotakeabreak.MI6’sreportontheArdennessurprisewascirculatedon28December1944.‘Itcanbestatedat

once,’thissaid,‘thatSource[Ultra]gaveclearwarningthatacounter-offensivewascoming.Healsogavewarning,thoughatrathershortnotice,ofwhenitwascoming.Hedidnotgivebyanymeansunmistakableindicationsofwhereitwascoming,nor…ofitsfullscale.ThiswaslargelyduetonewandelaboratedeceptionsstagedbyGermansecurity.Germanplanning…musthavebeengreatlyhelpedbytheinsecurityofcertainAlliedsignals…ItisalittlestartlingtofindthattheGermanshadabetterknowledgeofUSOrderofBattlefromtheirSignalsIntelligencethanwehadofGermanorderofbattlefrom[Ultra].‘TheredoesexistinIntelligence,ofwhichthepresentisaseriousexample,thetendencytobecome

tooweddedtooneviewofenemyintentions.IthadgrowntobegenerallybelievedthattheGermanswouldcounter-attack,headon,whenwehadpushedthemhardenough,probablyintheRoersectorwithitsdams.Thisideadiedhard…UnlessIntelligenceisperpetuallyreadytoentertainallthealternatives,itseemsonlytheevidencethatfavoursthechosenview…Thereisariskofrelyingtoomuchon[Ultra].Hisverysuccessesinthepastconstituteadanger,iftheyleadtowaitingforfurtherinformationbecause“Sourcewilltellusthat”,ortodoubtingthelikelihoodofsomethinghappeningbecause“Sourcewouldhavetoldusthat”…TheGermanshavethistimepreventedusfromknowingenoughaboutthem;butwehavenotpreventedthemfromknowingfartoomuchaboutus.’Thiswasanimpressivelycandiddocument–atributetotheobjectivitywithwhichtheAllied

intelligencecommunityandhighcommanddidmostoftheirbusiness.Itishardtoimproveonitsjudgementsseventyyearslater,thoughitwouldhavebeengracefulifBroadwayhadacknowledgedthat,intheabsenceofanyusefulmaterialfromagentsofitsown,theAlliedarmies’commandershadlittlechoicesavetorelyuponUltrafortheirassessments.BillWilliamswroteafewmonthsaftertheArdennes,acknowledgingthathesharedwithStrongandtheJICresponsibilityforanegregiouslapse:‘Therecordisnotimpressive…OntheArdennesoffensivewewerewrong…Wegavealead,

butthewronglead…TheerrordidnotliewiththePark[Bletchley],butratherinourattitudetothePark.’YetiftheBattleoftheBulgegavetheAlliesadevastatingshock,whatmatteredintheendwasthat

theGermanslostit.Duringthemonthsthatfollowed,WehrmachtintelligenceatrophiedinstepwitheverythingelseinHitler ’sarmies.Col.AlexisvonRönneofFHWhadbeenarrestedandexecutedforhisroleinthefailedJulybombplotagainstHitler.HewassucceededasGermanintelligencechiefintheWestbyCol.WilliBurklein.Intheabsenceofhigh-leveldecrypts,captureddocumentsbecamethemostprizedGermansources,ofwhichtheSeptember‘MarketGarden’plan,takenfromadeadUSofficeronaDutchlandingzoneinthefirsthoursoftheoperation,wasthemostnotable,andexercisedanimportantinfluenceinmakingpossiblethatGermanvictory.Thiswasararesuccess,however.FHWbecamesostarvedofresources,aswellasofintelligence,thatwhentonsofAmericandocumentsfellintoBurklein’shandsduringtheBulgebattle,mostofthemneverevengottranslated.GermanintelligencecontinuedwildlytooverestimateAnglo-Americanstrength,asithadbeen

doingforatleasttwoyears.InOctober1944,FHWestimatedthatfourteendivisionsoftheBritishArmywerestillpoisedathome,awaitingcommitmenttotheEuropeancampaign.Intruththerewerenone;existingBritishformationswerebeingcannibalisedtomaintaintheshrinkingstrengthsofMontgomery’sunits.ButtheGermanswerehauntedbyabeliefinChurchill’shiddenreserve,whichcausedthemtofearanamphibiouslandingbehindtheirflank,perhapsinHeligolandBight–evidenceof‘Fortitude’s’lingeringinfluence.Finally,ofcourse,theGermanswerecrippledbybattlefieldweakness.DuringtheArdennesbattle,AlbertPraun’seavesdroppersbrokeintotheUSMilitaryPolicenet.Theyknewthatthewhitehelmetswerestationedatimportantroadjunctions–idealtargetsforLuftwaffeassault.Yettheairmenshruggedthatnotaplanecouldbesparedforsuchmissions.TheGermanslackedmeanstoact,evenwhentheydiscoveredthings.InthelastmonthsofthestruggleagainstHitler,Ultradeliveredanunprecedentedvolumeof

decryptstoAlliedcommanders–25,000weredispatchedfromBletchleytoBritishandAmericanSpecialLiaisonUnitsbetweenJanuary1944andMay1945,manyoftheseduringthefinalstagesofthecampaign.Copiousstrengthandcasualtyreports,documentsrecordingfuelstatesandtankserviceabilitywereintercepted,butfewmademuchimpactonthebattlefieldwhenGermancapacitytotaketheinitiativewasspent.ThechallengeforEisenhower ’sarmieswasmerelytodrivesmallforcesofwearybutstubbornenemysoldiersoutoffixedpositions.Moreover,inthemoodofhubrisprevailingasvictoryloomed,Alliedcommanderslostinterestinstudyingtheenemy’smotions,andinattemptingtodeceivehimabouttheirown.‘Deceptionduringtheseclosingmonthsseemstohavebeenanunsatisfactoryandlargelyunsuccessfulaffair,’wrotetheBritishofficialhistorian,MichaelHoward.‘Fewofthecommandersofthehugenewforcescommittedtobattlefullyunderstoodwhattheirdeceptionstaffscouldbeexpectedtodo…Mostimportantofall,Alliedstrategyitselfwassoopportunistic…thatnoseriouscoverplanscouldbemade…TheAlliesweresostrongthatthey

effectivelydispensedwithstrategyaltogetherandsimplyattackedallalongtheline,muchastheyhaddoneintheclosingmonthsof1918.’Bletchleysufferedonelastalarmcall:inthecourseof1944theLuftwaffe,whosetraffichadbeen

theeasiesttobreaksince1940,introducedanewrewirablereflectoronitsEnigma–UmkehrwalzeD,christened‘UncleDick’byBletchley–whichthreatenedtorenderthebombesincapableofreadingitswheelsettingsuntilthechangedwiringswereidentifiedandapplied.TheflurryofalarmthisdevelopmentprovokedamongthecodebreakerscausedtheAmericanstoembarkonacrashefforttoproducetechnologytoovercomeit,butthewarendedbeforeitbecamenecessary.TheLuftwaffeinnovationemphasisedthattheGermansmightatanystagehavemademodestchangestotheEnigmaanditsmannerofusewhichwouldhaverendereditssignalsimpervioustoAlliedpenetration.Itwasamiraclethattheyhadnotdoneso.ThefinalsignificantintelligenceissueofthewarintheWestwasachimera:Eisenhower ’s

headquartersweredisturbedforweeksbythepossibilitythattheNaziswouldstagealast-ditchstandinan‘Alpineredoubt’.ItwasameasureoftheAllies’profoundrespectforthefightingpowerofHitler ’slegionsthat,evenastheirsurvivorsbledtodeathamidtheashesoftheThirdReich,theycouldstillinspirefearintheirconquerors.

19

BlackWidows,FewWhiteKnights

1 FIGHTINGJAPAN

ThewarinAsiaandthePacificembracedfourvasttheatres,whereintheonlycommonfactorwastheparticipationoftheJapanese.InthecentralPacific,Nimitz’spatch,duringtheyearfollowingJoeRochefort’striumphatMidway,codebreakingplayedonlyamarginalrole,becausetheJapanesenavy’shigherciphersmostlydefiedpenetrationinrealtime.WhileUltrainEuropebecamefrom1943onwardsplentiful,ifnevercomprehensive,progresswithbreakingJapan’scodeswasslowerandmoreerratic,partlybecausesomemanually-encryptedenemyarmytrafficprovedlessvulnerablethanEnigma.IthasbeensuggestedthatArlingtonHallmadeastrategicmistakebyfocusingtoomanyresourcesonreadingPurpletraffic,whichhadbeenbrokenandofferedlittleintelligencedirectlyrelevanttothebattlefield,andinsufficientskilledmanpoweronthehugeproblemofJapanesemilitarycommunications.Sigintcontributedtosome1942–43navalbattles,butachievedmaturityonlyin1944–45,andeven

thenneverinfluencedasingleactionasdramaticallyasithaddoneatMidway.DuringtheSolomonsandNewHebridescampaigns,forinstance,coast-watchersplayedamoreimportantrolethanHypoatPearlHarbor:theheroicAustralianPaulMason,aplantationmanageronBougainville,providedwirelesswarningofincomingJapaneseairattacksduringthelongstruggleforGuadalcanal.TheAlliednavaldisasteratSavoinAugust1942reflectedcontinuingAmericandifficultieswiththeenemy’sJN-25cipher.BetterinformationbecameavailablelaterthatmonthfortheBattleoftheEastSolomons,butallthroughthesavage,costlynavalactionstherestofthatyearandinto1943,Nimitz’ssquadronsoftengropedfortheirenemies.NomajorUSstrategicdecisioninthePacificduring1943wassignificantlyinfluencedbyUltra.BletchleyParkhadasmallJapanesesection,aCinderellawhosestaffwerefrequentlyfrustratedto

discoverthattheyhadspenthoursordaysbreakingsignalsalreadyreadinWashington–GC&CS’scommunicationsandinterceptfacilitiesweremuchinferiortothoseoftheUSNavy.BP’sbranchesoutsideDelhi,andattheColomboheadquartersofSouth-EastAsiaCommand,addressedthemselvesalmostentirelytostudyingJapanesetrafficinBritishoperationalareas.InMarch1943,ArlingtonHallmadethefirstbreakintoahigherJapanesearmysystem–theso-calledWaterTransportCode,

whichsoonyieldedfiftytoahundreddecryptsaday.TheBritishinDelhiachievedtheirownentrytoitataboutthesametime,butthereafter–notwithoutconsiderablehand-wringing–theyrelinquishedtheleadonJapanesematerialtotheAmericans.JohnHurt,oneofSIS’sveteranJapaneselinguistsatArlingtonHall,assertedafterthewarthatevenaslateas1944andearly1945codebreakingwas‘performedratherinefficiently’.ItisafundamentalrealityofthePacificandAsianwarthattheAlliesneverenjoyedanythinglikethestrengthofsigintcoveragetheyachievedinEurope.From1942onwardstheUSNavy’scryptographicoperationsexpandedonasimilarscaletothose

oftheUSArmy,andlikewiseshiftedoutofWashington–toMountVernonAcademyinVirginia.Aneleven-monthcrashJapaneselanguagecoursewasestablishedatBoulder,Colorado,whichby1945hadprocessedathousandstudents.MuchcodebreakingactivitytookplaceintheUSratherthanabroad,becauseMountVernon,likeArlingtonHall,possessedbatteriesofmachines–inadditiontobombes,ithadtwohundredIBMtabulatorsby1945,upfromsixteeninDecember1941–thatwereunavailableinsuchquantityinoverseastheatres.IncreasingnumbersofwomenWAVESwererecruitedtooperatethemachines,aftersolemninauguralbriefingsintheNavyChapel,warningthemthatiftheyspokeoftheirworkoutsidetheAnnex,theywereliabletobeshot.TheegregiousCaptainJosephRedmancontinuedasdirectorofnavalcommunications,withafewmonths’breakin1942,whilehisbrotherJohnfilledaninfluentialroleintheofficeofthechiefofnavaloperations;bothcontributedunhelpfullytotheAlliedwareffort.NimitzranhisownintelligenceoperationatPearlHarborasanalmostindependentfiefdom,much

expandedfromRochefort’soriginalHypo,renamedFRUPAC–FleetRadioUnitPacific–supposedlyworkingwithCommanderRudolphFabian’sCaststationatMelbourne,thoughcollaborationwasneverFabian’sforte.InApril1943FRUPAC’sstaffweretransferredfromtheDungeontoanewbuilding,sunnierandhealthier,withanair-conditionedmachineroom,closetotherimoftheMakalapaCrater,andalsotoNimitz’sheadquarters.Thelaboursofthecodebreakersandtranslatorsremainedasrelentlessasever,entrustedexclusivelytoservicepersonnel,albeitoftenciviliansinuniform.ShortagesofqualifiedstaffbedevilledallAlliedsigintactivities,andJasperHolmesfeltthatthePearloperationsufferedfromtheC-in-C’sbanonwomen.Nimitzconsideredtheirpresenceabreachofnavalcustomanddiscipline,evenashore,yetwhenwomenbelatedlyjoinedFRUPACinthelastweeksofthewartheymadeasignificantcontribution.ThechallengeposedbythesuccessivevariationsoftheJapanesenavy’smaincode,JN-25,was

enormous.FromAugust1942onwards,theadditivebooksformostofthecipherscontained100,000entries,changedeverysixtydays.Inallthereweretencodebooksandatleastseventy-sevenciphers.Untilthecryptanalystshadseenasignificantvolumeofmessagesatthebeginningofeachnewperiod,showingthemostusedadditives,itwasimpossibletomakemuchofastartonreadingtraffic.ItislesssurprisingthatittooksolongtoachieveongoingpenetrationofJapanesecommunicationsthanthatthishappenedatall.SomeearlyfruitswereseeninJanuary1944,whenalmostallof

Nimitz’ssubordinatecommandersexpectedandadvocatedprogressiveassaultsontheouterislandsoftheMarshallgroup.Instead,theadmiraldecreedthathisforceswoulddriveheadlongforthekeyatollofKwajalein,becauseheknewfromUltrathattheJapanesewereweakeningitsgarrisontostrengthentheouterislands.Thesubsequent30Januaryinvasionwasabrilliantsuccess.Thereafter,Nimitzwasgenerallyawareofhisenemies’deployments,exceptwhenwirelesssilencewasimposedontheirwarshipsailings.MoreJapaneselanguagespecialistsslowlybecameavailable–eighty-fourweredeployedinthe

fieldwiththeOkinawainvasionforceinApril1945,andFRUPACproduced127tonsofintelligencematerialabouteveryknowntopographicalfeatureanddefensivepositionontheisland,fordistributionafloatandashore.Noquantityofsuchinformation,however,couldsparetheAmericansfromdesperatefightinginthe1944–45campaigns.TheUSArmyandMarineCorpsfoundthemselvesbatteringatJapanesedefensivepositions,thelocationsandsubtletiesofwhichtheywereignorant,becausethesewereneithervisibletoreconnaissanceaircraftandphotographicinterpreters,norrevealedbyenemysignaltraffic.ThemostimportantachievementofUltrainthePacificin1943–44wastoempowerNimitz’s

submarineflotillastolaunchthemostdevastatingassaultinmaritimehistoryagainstJapan’soverseascommerce,lifebloodofitshomeindustries.The‘Maru’cipher,bywhichthemerchantservicecommunicated,wasbrokenin1943,andevermorewarshiptrafficwasread.AdirecttelephonelinkfromFRUPACtothesubmarineoperationalheadquartersenabledthecodebreakersinstantlytoforwardintelligenceonJapaneseconvoymovements–andtoreceivenewsofconsequentsinkings,whichhelpedtheintelligencestafftofeelintouchwiththeoutcomesoftheirtravails.FRUPACmadepossiblesuchasignalasthatdispatchedat8a.m.on9June1943tothesubmarinesTriggerandSalmonpatrollingtheJapaneseInlandSea:

ANOTHERHOTULTRACOMSUBPACSERIAL27LARGESTANDNEWESTNIPCARRIERWITHTWODESTROYERSDEPARTSYOKOSUKAAT5HOURSGMT10JUNEANDCRUISESAT22KNOTSONCOURSE155DEGREESUNTILREACHING33.55NORTH140EASTWHERETHEYREDUCESPEEDTO18KNOTSANDCHANGECOURSETO230DEGREESXSALMONANDTRIGGERINTERCEPTIFPOSSIBLEANDWATCHINGFOREACHOTHER.WEHAVEADDITIONALDOPEONTHISCARRIERFORTHEBOYSNEARTRUKWHICHWEHOPEWEWONTNEEDSOLETUSKNOWIFYOUGETHIM.

TheBritishwouldhaveconsideredsuchasignalarecklessbreachofUltrasecurity,becauseitwassenttolow-levelpersonnelinanoperationalarea,buttheAmericansgotawaywiththisone,andmanymorelikeit.CommanderJohnCromwellrefusedthechanceofescapefromhisowndoomedboatSculpin,tojoinhiscrewinJapanesecaptivity,becauseashesaidlaconically,‘Ican’tgowithyou.Iknowtoomuch.’AboutUltrawaswhathemeant,ofcourse.Triggerindeedattackedonthenightof10Juneatpoint-blankrange,badlydamagingtheJapanesecarrierHiyo,buttorpedofailures,theblightoftheUSNavyin1943,preventeditssinking.Onlywhenthisdeficiencywasbelatedly

madegooddiditbecomepossibleforNimitz’ssubmarinestostrangleenemysupplylines,aswellassinkmanywarships.In1942theJapaneselostamilliontonsofmerchantshippingtoallcauses.By1945tentimesthattonnagewasgone.BetweenJanuaryandApril1944,USsubmarinessenttothebottom179shipstotalling799,000tons,andbytheendofAugustafurther219vessels.WhentheJapanesesoughttodispatchtwoarmydivisionsfromShanghaitoNewGuineainApril,theso-called‘Bamboo1’convoycarryingthetroopswasalmostwipedoutatsea,andeventuallyabandonedtheattempttoreinforceNewGuinea.EvenbeforetheUSAAFlauncheditsintensivesea-miningcampaigninthelastmonthsofthewar,theJapanesemerchantfleethadbeenlargelydestroyedbysubmarineattack.Itwasoftendifficulttojudgehow,orwhetheratall,toexploitsensitiveinformation.InApril1944,

FRUPAClearnedthatthetrawlerTajinaMaru,avesseldeliberatelychosenbytheenemyforitsinsignificance,wascarryingtheJapanesenavy’snewcodestoWakeIsland.TwoUSsubmarinesweredispatchedtocaptureTajinaMaru–butinsteadblewittopieces.JasperHolmesandhiscolleaguesfumed,regrettingthatanintelligenceofficerhadnotbeenputaboardoneofthesubmarinestosupervisetheoperationandensurethetrawler ’sseizureintact.AnAmericanintelligenceofficer,CommanderKennethKnowles,saidafterthewar,‘TheBritishweremorecleverinuse[ofUltra],wemoredaring.’JasperHolmeswrote:‘Intelligence,likemoney,maybesecurewhenitisunusedandlockedupinasafe,butityieldsnodividendsuntilitisinvested.’ItwasthisconvictionthatledtheAmericanstooverrideBritishsecurityscruplesandlaunchaferociousassaultonU-boatrefuellingrendezvousinthesummerof1943,whichinflicteddramaticlossesonDönitz’sfleet.LikewiseinthePacific,oneofthemoredramaticUSNavycoupswaspromptedbyaMay1944decryptforwardedfromFRUPAC,allocatingnewpatrolpositionstoallJapanesesubmarinesofftheSolomons.Armedwiththisinformation,adestroyerescortgroupledbytheUSSEnglandsanksixenemyvesselsintwelvedays.KennethKnowleswasgraciousenoughtoaddtohispost-warremarksaboutBritishcautioninexploitingUltra:‘Buttheyhadmoretolose.’Whichwastrue.

Nimitzwasawiseman,MacArthurwasnot.ThishelpstoexplainwhyUltraexercisedonlymarginalinfluenceonAmerica’sSouth-WestPacificcampaignagainstJapan.ThegeneralrejectedtheWarDepartment’sintelligencesystemandinsteadestablishedhisown‘CentralBureau’,firstinMelbourne,lateratHollandiaandLeyte.MacArthurbannedallOSSpersonnelfromhistheatre,thoughhebackedguerrillaactivityinthePhilippines,provokingpredictablybrutalJapanesereprisals.HisintelligencechiefMaj.Gen.CharlesWilloughby,whosepompositycausedhimtobeknowntosubordinatesas‘SirCharles’,wasnoclevererthanthesupremo’sothercourtiers,andheldsigintinsomecontempt.InsteadoftheSpecialLiaisonUnitstheUSArmyadoptedintheEuropeantheatreforhandlingandprotectingUltra,MacArthurinsteadallowedhisstafftohandledecryptswithacasualnessthatwouldhaveappalledAlliedofficersanywhereelseintheworld.Documents,

personnelandevenofficefurniturewereopenlyaddressedto‘TheUltraSection’,andofficersfreelydiscussedcodebreaking.SigintinfluencedthreeimportanteventsintheSouth-WestPacificcampaign:the1943Kokoda

TrailbattlesinPapua-NewGuinea;theMarch1944decisiontoleapfrogsixhundredmilesforwardtoHollandia;andtheJulydefeatoftheJapaneseassaultdowntheDriniumorriver,whichcosttheenemy9,000dead.IneachoftheseactionsUltra–in1944assistedby9thAustralianDivision’scaptureofapileoftheJapanese20thDivision’sburiedcodebooksinNewGuinea–flaggedtheenemy’sintentionsandvulnerabilities,thoughMacArthur,inthesamefashionasMontgomery,afterwardsattributedtheAlliedvictoriestohisownclairvoyance.HisUSAAFofficersadoptedamoreenlightenedview.Maj.Gen.GeorgeKenney,whocommanded5thAirForce,wasanexceptionallyableairmanwhousedsiginttogoodeffect,especiallyforattackingJapanesereinforcementconvoys,andmostnotablyintheMarch1943BattleoftheBismarckSea.Familiarinter-servicefeudingcausedtheUSNavytorefusetoprovideUltramaterialtoGen.ClaireChennault,commandingtheUSAAF’s14thAirForceinChina.TheBritisheventuallyforwardedsuchmaterialtohimviaSEACheadquartersinColombo,whichimprovedairtargetingofJapaneseshippinginthelastphaseofthewar.TheBurmacampaignwasofmarginalrelevancetothedefeatofJapan,butmatteredimmenselyto

theself-esteemoftheBritish,andespeciallytothestruggletoregainpossessionoftheirSouth-EastAsianempire.Britain’sgeneralsinthetheatrecomplainedloudlyandoftenabouttheweaknessofbattlefieldintelligence,bothhumintandsigint.BeyondthemanyAnglo–Americantensionsanddisputes,theofficersofSOEandMI6werebarelyonspeakingtermswitheachother,andintelligence-gatheringwaspoor.Inthesummerof1943Lt.Col.GeraldWilkinson,MI6’sliaisonofficeronMacArthur ’sstaff,wroteinhisdiary:‘FarEastintelligencefrom[Britain’ssecretservice]hasnowdwindledtoatricklefromafewChinesecoolies.’AdmiralLordLouisMountbatten,theSupremeCommander,urgedMI6toabandonitsfumblingeffortstosecureintelligenceabouttheJapanese,andinsteadconcentrateonstudyingthevariousregionalnationalistmovements,whichwouldobviouslyplayacriticalroleindeterminingpost-waroutcomes.LatterlySOEhad1,250personnelinAsiaandMI6175,butfewofthemcommandedmuch

confidence.ThelocalMI6chief,asoldiernamedLt.Col.LeoSteveni,wasatypicalBroadwayplaceman,whobecamealaughingstockatSEACmeetingsandranhisoperationsoutofDelhibecauseheknewthatMountbatteninColombohadnotimeforhim.SteveniwasfinallysackedinJuly1944,buthisreplacementwasnoimprovement–a16thLancersofficernamedBrigadier‘Bogey’Bowden-Smith,whotookthejobafterachancemeetinginBoodle’sClub,wherehementionedthathewasoutofajobbecausehewasthoughttoooldtocommandtroopsinthefield.Mountbatten’sintelligencecoordinator,aRoyalNavycaptain,deploredthechaosthatstemmedfromlackofunifiedcontrol:‘TwocharacteristicsarealwayspresentinpersonnelofClandestineServices.Thefirstis

jealousyandthesecondiswhatIwoulddescribeasscoop-mindedness.’Operationalcommandersfeltseverelyhamperedbyshortageofintelligence,andaboveallsigint.

EslerDening,Mountbatten’sinfluentialpoliticaladviser,wrotetotheJICinLondonon29September1944:‘Doweknow,oramIjustnotbeingtold,whattheJapaneseintentionsareinBurma,bearinginmindthattheyupsetthewholeofouroffensive-defensiveplansearlierthisyearandthatagooddealoftheirmovementpassedunnoticed?’–DeningherereferredtotheferociousJapanesethrustsagainstKohimaandImphal.‘Ifwedonotknow,thenifIweretheArmyGroupcommanderIshouldbeveryunhappytogointobattlewithanenemydisposedIknownothow,andofwhosefullintentionsIamequallyignorant.NodoubtthereisalimittowhattheJapanesecandotodaywiththelandforcesavailabletotheminBurma,butpastexperiencehasshownthatitisbothinconvenientanddecidedlyunpleasantwhentheydotheunexpected.YouwillremembermysayingtheotherdaythatitwasneverwisetoassumethattheJapanesewillnotdoathingbecauseitseemsstupidtous.’Maj.Gen.Lamplough,Mountbatten’sdirectorofintelligence,summarisedhisownviewinasignal

totheJICinLondonon1October1944:‘Whatweknowandwhatwedon’tknow:WeknowthetotalstrengthoftheJapaneseArmy,AirForceandNavyinSEAC.Wealsoknowthecompositionoftheseforcesinsufficientdetail.WealsoknowthelocationofthemoreimportantH.Q.’s…WecanusuallytellifandwhenreinforcementsarelikelytocomeintoSEAC.AlltheaboveisfromSIGINT.WedonotknowJapaneseintentions.’BillSlim,commandingFourteenthArmy,complainedabouttheshortageofbattlefieldinformationattheendof1943,andrenewedhisprotestsinNovember1944.HesaidthatOSSseemedtobedoingabetterjobthanMI6insecuringinformationabouttheenemy.Heurgedendingtheinterminablewranglingamongclandestineorganisationsbymergingthem–aproposalthatpromptedaclosingofranksamongthemall,forrejection.Gen.SirOliverLeesedeliveredasimilarbroadsideamonthlater,messagingMountbatten’sheadquarters:‘AsyouknowIammostdisturbedbythelackofintelligence.’Hetoldhisownseniorintelligenceofficerthathewas‘exceedinglydissatisfiedwith[Intelligence]…verydissatisfiedwiththeSigintside,whichcomparesmostunfavourablywiththesituationinEurope’.Healsocomplainedthatthevariousintelligenceorganisationsrefusedtoacceptbriefsfromthearmyaboutwhatitneededtoknow.SomeoftheproblemsderivedfromthefactthattheJapaneseusedwirelessmuchlessthanthe

Germans;theirforwardelementscommunicatedsparinglywithrearheadquarters.Moreover,eveninEuropetheGermansdidnotalwaysobligeBletchleyParkbytellingtheAlliesthroughEnigmaorTunnywhattheyintendedtodonext.Beyondthis,theAmericansledthecodebreakingcampaignagainsttheJapanese,andthusthePacificwasinevitablythefocusoftheirinterest,whiletheBritishstruggledtoreadrelevantSouth-EastAsiantraffic.TheBritishandAmericanseachrananindustrial-scaleinterceptstationoutsideDelhi,andtheRoyalNavyhadaColombofacility,HMSAnderson,wherebyMarch19441,300staffhandledtwohundredenemymessagesaday.TheJapaneseWaterTransportCodeyieldedasteadyflowoforder-of-battleintelligence.ButtheBritishcodebreakers’

labourswerehamperedbyachronicshortageoflanguagespecialists,andRoyalNavyintelligenceofficerssufferedthesameproblemastheirAmericancounterparts:cryptanalysiswasacareerdead-end.ColomboreceivedonlygrudgingcooperationfromtheUSNavy’sCmdrRudyFabianinMelbourne,andneverreallyrecovereditsbalanceaftersuccessive1942evacuationsfirstfromSingaporetoCeylon,thenbrieflytoEastAfrica,andbacktoCeylonagain.Leese’sdenunciationoftheshortageofsigintpromptedaresponsefromBletchleyParkon22

December1944whichfranklyacknowledgedthedifficultiestheBritishfacedinreadingJapanesewirelesstraffic.EdwardTravis,GC&CS’schief,saidthatnothinglikethesamenumberofstaff,andespeciallylinguists,wereavailabletoaddressJapanesesignalsasGermanones.WhileBritainwaswellendowedwithfluentGerman-speakers,therewerepreciousfewfamiliarwithJapanese.AlthoughcooperationwiththeAmericanswasexcellent,‘thereisnoquestionthatitisnotsorapidandeffectivetodealwithproblemsbetweenparties3,000milesapart,withafrontwhichstretcheshalfacrosstheglobe,asithasbeenwiththecompactEuropeantheatre,whichhasbeenanall-Britisheffort,atleastinthevitalearlystages’.Travisthenaddressedthetechnicalproblems,which,hesaid,wereentirelydifferentfromthose

posedbytheGermansystems:‘TheJapanesedonotatpresentusemachinesforcipheringmilitaryorairforcesignals.Theyusecodebooksandthenextremelytoughencipheringmethodstoconcealthecodedtext…TheupshotisthattheworkofproducingaJapanesetextislongandlaborious,thatonlyapercentageofmessageseverbecomereadable.’Headmittedthatonlyfragmentsofasmallproportionoftrafficbecameavailableinrealtime:‘EventheirdivisionalsystemsareverydifficultandsuchascanneverbehandledinthefieldaswehavehandledGermanfieldciphers.OntheArmysidenothingisinterceptedbelowdivisionfornothingisaudible[bytheYService],eventounitspushedrightupintotheline.’Finally,andsignificantly,hesaidthatthetaciturnJapanesewerenothinglikeasaccommodatingastheGermans,whofrequentlytransmittedcomprehensivesituationreports:‘TheJapanesedonotasarulepasshigh-levelappreciationsandfutureintentionsbysignal.Theirintentionsstrategicallyhavetobeassessedthereforefromindirectevidence.’HerewasanauthoritativestatementoftheweaknessofAlliedsigintoperationsagainsttheJapanese.TheBritishwerereceivingevenlessUltrathantheAmericansofakindwhichprovideddirectassistancetotheirtroopsonthebattlefield.BothAlliedarmieswereusuallywell-informedaboutoverallJapanesestrengths.But–giventhatprisonerinterrogationwasusuallyanunprofitableactivity–bycomparisonwiththeEuropeantheatrecommandersdependedformuchoftheirintelligenceonpre-sigintmethods:patrolling,airreconnaissance,andpainfulexperienceincontactwiththeenemy.TheBritishinBurma,whentheirFourteenthArmybeganits1944–45campaigntorecapturethe

colony,expendedconsiderableeffortsondeception,runbyCol.PeterFleming,brotherofjournalistIanandhimselfatthattimemuchmorefamous,asapre-waradventurerandtravelwriter,andhusbandofthehugelypopularactressCeliaJohnson.Flemingwrotegleefullyon9October1944,

reflectingontheexaggeratednotionsofJapanesearmyheadquartersinBurmaaboutAlliedstrengths:‘Theirmarginoferror,untilrecentlyslightlyinexcessof100percent,islikelytoincreaseduringthecomingmonths.’HereportedthathisownteamhadalargeimaginaryBritisharmy,readyfordeployment:‘Experiencehasshownthatthemereexistenceoftheseforcesinourbackareashaslittleinfluenceon[theJapanese].’Hesuggestedmovingthesefictionalforcesontothebattlefield,tointimidatetheenemyintoabeliefthattheyfacedoverwhelmingodds.Suchgamesasthesegavepleasuretotheofficersinvolved,butthereislittleevidencethatthey

influencedthebattlefield,saveatoneimportantmomentwhenSlimsuccessfullydeceivedtheJapaneseabouthisFebruary1945crossingoftheIrrawaddy,feintinginthenorthwhilemakinghisbigmoveinthesouth.Itwasalmostimpossibletorunusefuldeceptionsagainstanenemyhighcommandwhichconductedmilitaryoperationswithalmostnoheedforitsownintelligencedepartment,andwhichdeemeditanaffronttotheJapanesewarriorcodetoallowitsownstrategicdecisionstobeinfluencedbywhattheAlliesmightormightnotbedoing.

2 FIGHTINGEACHOTHER

ThroughouttheAsianwar,aparallelinternecinestruggletookplacebetweenofficersoftherivalsecretservicesofBritainandAmerica.MuchBritishintelligencematerialwasmarked‘Guard’–nottobeshowntoAmericans–andmanyUSdocumentswerestamped‘Control’–tobehiddenfromBritisheyes.EslerDening,Mountbatten’spoliticaladviser,wroteinJune1944:‘ItisamelancholyanddisquietingfactthatthebrotherhoodinarmsoftheUnitedStatesandourselvesintheFarEasternwarhasbeenaccompaniedbyasteadydeteriorationin…collaboration…whichisadverselyaffectingtheprosecutionofthewar.’InFebruary1945Lt.Gen.Frederick‘Boy’Browning,Mountbatten’schiefofstaff,wrotesavagely:‘Ihaveyettomeettheseniorofficerwhocanbearwithequanimitythetrialsandtribulationsinflictedonasufferingworldbytheclandestineorganisations.’UnpalatablelocalrealitiesmadeSOE’staskalmostimpossiblydifficult.Whereasinthecountries

ofoccupiedEuropeAlliedagentscouldexpectassistancefromatleastenthusiasticminoritiesamonglocalpopulations,thiswasnotthecaseinSouth-EastAsia.Britishdefeatsin1941–42hadshatteredimperialprestige,acenturies-oldmythofWesterninvincibility.AttemptstoconductcovertoperationsinJapanese-occupiedBurmaandMalayalaidbarethecolonialrulers’unpopularity:manyinhabitantsbetrayedtheBritishagentsandspecialoperationsteamsthrustintotheirmidst.Thoughtfulofficersunderstoodthatitwasamockerytotalkof‘liberating’South-EastAsiawhenitspeoplesmighthavelearnedtohateandfeartheJapanesefortheirbrutality,yetwantednoresumptionofBritish,FrenchorDutchrule.FreddySpencerChapmanofSOE,whosurvivedforthreeyearsinoccupiedMalaya,vividlydescribedtheembarrassmentoflivingamong,andrelyingforhissurvivalupon,peoplewhohadlostallconfidenceinBritain.

SOE’sheadquartersinthesubcontinentwaslocatedinaramblingclusterofbungalowsoutsideColomboknownasMountLavinia,guardedbyNewZealandMaoris.Areportontheprospectsforstay-behindoperationsinIndia,compiledinthedarkdaysofMarch1942whenenemyinvasionseemedimminent,assertedgloomily:‘TheeffectofJapanesesuccesseshasbeenenormousinthiscountry.AnyoperationscarriedoutbytheArmy,orbyourselves[SOE]inthegreatbulkofBengal,willbecarriedoutinanessentiallyhostilecountry…ThereisnoconvictionsostronglyfixedintheOrientalmindasthathemustchoosethewinningside,andifhecanchooseitslightlyearlierthanhisfellow-man,somuchthebetterforhim.’Gen.SirArchibaldWavell,ascommander-in-chief,tookableakviewofSOE.HesaidthathehadthoughtlittleofitsperformanceintheMiddleEast,andwasevenlessimpressedinAsia:‘InsofarasSOEisknownouthere,itsreputationdoesnotstandhigh.Itisconsideredtohavebeenanexpensiveandsubstantialfailure.’MatterslookednomorepromisinginAugust,whenBakerStreet’sformidablelocalchieftainColin

Mackenzie,whocommandedusefulbackingthroughhisfriendshipwiththeviceroyLordLinlithgow,setabouttraining150Indiancommuniststudentsasstay-behindagents.Thepoliceinsistedthattheloyaltyoftheseyoungmenshouldbetested,bybriefingthemonthewhereaboutsofsecretBritisharmsdumps,withinstructionsnottogoneartheseunlessoruntiltheJapanesewereathand.Thestudentsrespondedbystaginganimmediaterushfortheweapons,whichcausedtheprogrammetobeshutdown.Thiswasonlythebeginning,however.ThehistorianRichardAldrichhaswritten:‘TheambitionsofMackenzieandSOEintheFarEastwerewithoutlimit.’OncetheBritishandAmericansecretservicesrealisedthattheycouldcontributelittletothedefeatofJapan,bothfocusedtheirenergiesontheadvancementofrivalpost-warcommercial,politicalandstrategicinterests.Aldrichsuggests,ongoodevidence,thatSOE’smensawthemselvesas‘shocktroopsforreassertingcontroloftheempire’.SodidOSS.ItsResearch&AnalysisdivisioncontainedaBritishEmpiresectionwhichwas

virulentlyanti-colonialist.WilliamDonovanwrotescathinglyon27October1944thatBritain’sstrategywastorecoverSouth-EastAsia‘makingthefullestpossibleuseofAmericanresources,butforeclosingtheAmericansfromanyvoiceinpolicymatters’.ManyofDonovan’smen,togetherwithsomeseniorofficersoftheUSArmy,strovetopreventtheBritish,FrenchorDutchfromregainingcontroloftheirAsianempires.Lessmoralistically,andastheBritishwerekeenlyaware,theAmericanssoughttousetheirresourcesandclouttocarveoutpost-warcommercialadvantagefortheUS,andwhereverpossibletodiminishthatofBritain.Thetwoalliesincessantlyliedtoeachother.ColonelJohnCoughlin,Donovan’schieftainfirstin

IndiathenatSEAC,toldhisbossthatitsoperationswere‘notonlyimportantindefeatingtheJapsbutmayalsobeconsideredinpartascoverforanopportunitytoserveasalisteningpostforAmericaninterestsinAsia’–andtomonitortheactivitiesofBritishsecretorganisations,whichCoughlindidwithawill.MeanwhiletheBritishambassadorinChinablandlyassuredhisUScounterpartthat

BritainhadnointerestinthefutureofThailand,whenofcourseitdid–withanespeciallykeenappetiteforappropriatingtheKraisthmus.DonovansoughttousehisownofficerstosecureanopeninginThailandforUSpost-warcommercialpenetration.ThesupposedlyneutralThaisarrestedbothOSSandSOEofficersindiscriminatelyandcollectedtheminjailsuntilJune1944,whenBangkokdeemeditpolitictoallowthemtomakecontactwiththeirrespectiveheadquarters.WithfourteenBritishandAmericanclandestineorganisationsrepresentedinSouth-EastAsia,

competitiontorecruitagentsinJapanese-occupiedterritoryresultedinwhatoneofficerdeploredfastidiouslyas‘anundignifiedscrambleforindigenouspersonnel’.IntheDutchEastIndiestherewereallegationsthatsomelocalshadbeenenlistedatgunpoint.AftertheJapaneseoccupiedMalaya,during1942theyroundedupandexecutedseveralthousandrealorsupposedBritishstay-behindagentsandsympathisers.ThereafterAlliedcovertoperationsinthecountrybecameoverwhelminglydependentonChinesecommunists,includingLaiTek,theirpre-warpartysecretarygeneral,whowasalmostcertainlyadoubleagentservingTokyo.LocalsupportforBritishactivitiesinoccupiedterritorydidnotmuchincreaseevenwhenAllied

fortunesimproved.AnSOEpartyparachutedintotheKokangareaofBurmainDecember1943,andreinforcedinJune1944,succeededinstayingaliveandpatrollingwestoftheSalweenriver,butfailedabsolutelytorousethelocalpopulationtoparticipateinaresistancemovement.Itsreportconcluded:‘Localoppositionrestrictedthepartyincarryingouttheoriginaltasksofarmingandtrainingguerrillas,’anditwasevacuatedinOctober1944.TwoBritishofficersdroppedintoKarenterritoryinOctober1943werekilled,whereuponMajorHughSeagrim,analmostsaintlyfigurewhohadstayedbehindintheareasincethe1942retreat,gavehimselfuptotheJapaneseinanattempttosparethelocalpeoplefromreprisals.Thetowering,beardedSeagrim,sixfeetfourinchestallanddressedintheragsoftheKarencostumehehadwornforsolong,stooderectasheaddressedaJapanesecourt-martialatInsein,northofRangoon.‘Iobeytheordersofmycountry,asaBritishofficer,’hesaid,‘andIhavemerelycarriedoutmyduty.Ihavenocomplaintsatbeingsentencedtodeath.Butthemenwithmemerelycarriedoutmyorders,andIaskyoutodeclarethemnotguilty.’Hispleafailed.Whenhewasshoton2September1944,hissevenKarencompanionswerealsoexecuted.EvenaslateinthewarasJanuary1945,whenyetanotherteam–‘GroupBurglar ’–parachutedinto

BurmaeastofPyminama,‘thepartywashamperedbythehostilityofthelocalpopulationandhadcontinuallytokeeponthemove’.ThecommanderofSOE’sForce136minutedwithauthenticimperialcondescensionon2April1945:‘Thelocalinhabitanthasneitherthepatrioticmotivenorinmostcasestheeducationandintelligencetomakehimanadequatesecretagent…EuropeanscannotminglewiththelocalpopulationinthesamewayasinfiltratedsecretagentsinEurope.Amuchlargerlocalproportionofthepopulationhasbeenneutralorevenhostile,sothatchanceofsurvivalofsecretagentsistherebymademoredifficult.’MI6reportedatthesameperiodthatinMalayalocals

wouldprovidenohelpwithintelligence-gathering,norassistanyorganisationtheycouldnotthemselvescontrol.Apost-warreportonSOEoperationsintheDutchEastIndiesnoted:‘NocontactwithresistancemovementsinSumatrawasmadebyForce136…IntelligenceindicatedthatthepopulationwascollaboratingwiththeJapaneseandtheprospectofsuccessfulclandestineoperationswassmall.’ThedominantrealityofBritishcovertoperationsacrosstheareasofSouth-EastAsiaoccupiedbytheJapanesewasthatfewlocalpeoplewerewillingtoriskghastlyreprisalstoaidrepresentativesofdiscredited,dislikedandapparentlydefeatedimperialpowers,andthischangedlittleeveninthelastmonthsofthewar.SOEachieveditsonlyimportantsuccessesinparamilitaryoperationsagainsttheJapaneseinthewildtribalregionsofnorthernBurma,whoseinhabitantswerechronicallyalienatedfromtheirfellow-countrymenoftheplains.EvenasSOEstrovetojustifyitsexistenceinBritain’sJapanese-occupiedcolonies,itsofficers

sustainedtheirwiderstrugglewiththeAmericans.InJune1942,OSSandSOEhadapportionedtheglobeintoregionsacknowledgedrespectivelyaspredominantlyBritishorAmericanforthepurposeofspecialoperations,withequalrightsforbothinSpain,PortugalandSwitzerland.ChinawasdefinedaschieflyAmerican,andDonovan’smenfoughtliketigerstomakeitexclusivelyso.SOEandOSSwagedacontinuousturfwarthere,andneithercontributedmuchtothedefeatoftheJapanese,beyondrescuingsomedownedaircrewandescapedPoWs.InWashington,however,OSSexercisedmorepoliticalinfluenceonFarEastmattersthanonmostothers.Foraboutayearfromthespringof1944,Donovan’sofficersattachedtotheso-called‘DixieMission’inYenanprovincebecametheRooseveltadministration’sprincipalsourceofinformationaboutMaoZhedong’scommunists,thoughthereaftertheOSSChinagrouplostitscloutinhighplaces.AlliedintelligenceactivityintheNationalistregionswasnotassistedbytheneedforobsessivecautioninpreventingUltramaterial,andindeedanythingsensitive,fromreachingChongqing,becausetheJapanesereadalmostalltheChiangregime’sciphertraffic,despiterepeatedwarningsaboutitsinsecurity.BeforeD-Dayin1944theBritishfeltobligedtowithdrawthecipherprivilegesoftheChineseembassyinLondon,eventhoughChiangwassupposedlyaformalally,becauseitwaswellknownthatwhenevertheambassadorsawaBritishgeneralorpolitician,withindaysatranscriptoftheirconversationwasondesksinTokyoaswellasChongqing.FrenchIndochinawitnessedthemostintenseAnglo–Americanconflictofall.OSSofficerswere

determinedtopreventFrancefromregainingcontrolofitscherishedcolony,whiletheBritishstrovetoassisttheFrenchcause.Theclashplungedtoasymbolicnadironthenightof23January1945,whenP-61BlackWidownight-fightersoftheUS14thAirForceappeartohaveshotdowntwoRAFLiberatorscarryingFrenchagentsintoIndochina,withthelossofallonboard.TheAmericanshopedthattheepisodewouldproveasalutarywarning,deterringtheBritishfromprovidinganyfurtherhelptoFrance,butinthefirsttwomonthsof1945theRAFflewseventy-oneSpecialDutiessortiestoIndochina,someofthemcarryingFrenchofficersindefianceofanexplicitvetofromtheWhite

House.Churchill,probablywisely,decidedtoavoidadirectconfrontationwithFDRabouttheissue,andaBritishinvestigationintothelossoftheLiberatorswasabandoned.Inthelastmonthsofthewar,bothLondonandWashingtondespairedofimposingorderontheirnation’sclandestineoperationsinSouth-EastAsia,andlefttheofficersonthegroundtofightitout–whichtheydid,tonoconclusiveoutcome.By1945therewerefewdelusionsamongintelligencechiefsaboutthefailureofSOE’smissionin

theoldAsiancoloniesasstandard-bearersfortherestorationofBritishrule.ThedepthofthedividebetweentheEuropeanimperialpowersandtheAmericanswasalsoplain.On26AprilthePoliticalWarfareExecutivediscussedtheprospectsatameetinginLondon.Itrecommendedthatspokesmen‘shouldadmitfranklythelossofprestigeinempire:thisgravesituationmustberepairedbyimplantingtheconvictionintheorientalmindthatthepeopleoftheBritishCommonwealthofNationshaveinfactcontributeddecisivelytothedefeatofJapan…Unfortunatelythistaskisoneofconsiderabledifficulty,sinceourAmericanAlliesareplayingthemajorandthespectacularrole…Successfullyemancipatedcolonialsthemselves,Americansitchtofreeothersfromtheyokeunderwhich,theyfeel,theyoncegroaned…Wearethoughttobereturning[toliberatedcoloniesinSouth-EastAsia]undertheaegisofourAmericanAllieswhoareknowntoorientalstobefundamentallyopposedtoagreatdealforwhichwe,asanAsiaticpower,necessarilystand…Onlybyskilfulmanipulation…canwehopetoregainourlostprestige.’Inanothersimilarpaper,theauthorsurgedwithshamelesscynicismthatBritain’sliberatorsshouldbelessthanexplicitaboutacknowledgingtheircommitmenttorestoreimperialrule:‘weshouldmakeasmuchcapitalaspossibleoutofnotdefiningpreciselythedetailsofthefutureset-up’.Bythesummerof1945,theJapanesehadbecometheleastformidableofBritain’sfoesinSouth-EastAsia.

3 THEENEMY: GROPINGINTHEDARK

BizarrethoughitseemstoWesterners,formuchoftheSecondWorldWartheSovietUnionandChina–wheremostoftheJapanesearmywasdeployed–loomedlargerthantheUnitedStatesandBritaininthemindsofTokyo’sdecision-makers.Theysoughttoconductthewartheywanted,ratherthantheonetheyhadgot.ThearmyoriginallyplannedforthePacificstruggletoendinthespringof1942,withtheAmericansacceptingpeaceterms,whereuponJapanwouldfalluponthecarcassoftheSovietUnion.On14Januarythatyear,theOperationsDepartmentinTokyotoldtheKwantungarmyinManchuriatoexpecttoreceivemajorreinforcementsbyMarch,intimefortheintendedassaultonRussia.OnlyinOctober1944,aftersufferingcrushingnavaldefeatatLeyteGulf,didtheJapaneseformallyrecognisetheUS,ratherthantheSovietUnion,asitsforemostintelligencetarget.Theylefttheirgeneralstocollectwhateverinformationtheyneededintheirownoperationalareas,withwhatevermeansweretohand.Theyneverexploitedcleverciviliansinanythinglikethefashionthe

BritishandAmericansdid.Themilitary’shubriswasundiminishedbyearlysetbacks.Maj.Gen.KenryoSato,chiefoftheBureauofMilitaryAffairs,madeaspeechtotheDietinTokyoinMarch1943,afterJapansuffereddefeatatGuadalcanal,assertingthatAmericantroopswereundisciplinedandamateurish:‘Theyaregoodatshooting,buttheirfightingspiritandmoraleareverypoor…MostUSsoldiersdonotunderstandwhytheyarefighting.’TheJapanesewereslowtounderstandtheimportanceofattackingBritishandAmericancodes–

theeasewithwhichtheyreadChineseNationalistwirelesstraffichadperhapsmadethemslothful.Inanyevent,onlyin1943–44wereJapaneseofficersdispatchedtoGermany,HungaryandFinlandtostudycodebreaking.In1943,whenJapan’sdefeatwasalreadylooming,thearmycreatedtheTokushuJoho-bu–CentralSpecialIntelligenceSection–togathersigint,belatedlyacknowledgingthat‘codebreakingactivitiesagainsttheUnitedStatesandUnitedKingdomareextremelyinadequate,withfewqualifiedstaff’.Thisinitiallyemployedthreehundredpersonnel,whichswelledtooverathousandby1945.SeveralhundredadditionalintelligenceandcodebreakingstaffservedinManchuriawiththeKwantungarmy,theairforcesandfieldarmies.InMay1944itschiefstartedtorecruitgraduatesinmathsandlanguages,andacquiredafewIBMmachines.AMilitaryCryptographicalResearchAssociationwascreated,withsomehelpfromTokyo’sImperialUniversity.Yetallthiswasmuchtoolittle,fartoolate.Eventheemperorexpressedbewildermentthatthearmy

spentsomuchtimetalkingaboutaprospectivewaragainsttheRussians,whenitwasfightinganactualoneagainsttheAmericans.TheJapaneseclaimedforatimetohavebrokenintosomeUScodesinMacArthur ’stheatre,buttheseweresoonchanged.OneoftheSpecialIntelligenceSection’sofficersclaimedafterthewarthaton11August1945ithaddecryptedtheword‘nuclear ’inasignalsentbyanAmericanM-209ciphermachine.Evenifthiswastrue,however,itcontributedpreciouslittletotheJapanesecause,anymorethandidtheirintermittentbreaksintoSoviettraffic.TheImperialJapaneseNavy’sintelligencedepartmentloggedthestatisticsforitsincomingreports

fromdifferentsourcesbetween1October1944and19July1945,afairrepresentationofthebalancethroughoutthewar:393sigint,almostallbasedontrafficanalysis;102attachéreportsfromneutralforeignembassies;twenty-sevenfromPoWinformation;twocaptureddocuments;sevenforeign-agentreports;110open-sourceradiobroadcastitems;769newspaperitems.TheJapanesehadalwaysplacedmorefaithininformationacquiredthroughespionagethanfromsigint,yettheynevershowedmuchskillinrecruitingandrunningforeignagents.CommanderNobuikoImaiwrotesourly:‘InNewGuineawehirednativeChineseandAustralians,buttheyeventuallydouble-crossed[us].’TokyopaidsubstantialsumstoinformantsinMexico,ChileandArgentina,thoughitishardtoimaginehowthesecouldhavecontributedtoitswareffort.TheJapanesehadnogreaterluckrunningagentsinBritishIndia.Forty-five–thebulkofthecrop–werecapturedin1942,mostofwhomprovedtohavebeensecondedfromTokyo’sIndianNationalArmy,recruitedfromPoWsintheirhands.In1944

JapaneseintelligencestartingtakingakeeninterestinIslamasapotentialfocusforanti-Alliedactivities.AlargepartyofMuslimsaboteurswaslandedonthecoastofBaluchistanearlyin1945–butpromptlysurrenderedtotheBritish.Japan’sintelligenceservicetriedhardinthecontinentalUnitedStates.On3May1944,Tokyo’s

ministerinMadridsentamelodramaticreporttohisForeignMinistryaboutaSpanishagentwhohadsupposedlybeenservingJapaneseinterestsinAmerica,andhadnowreturnedtoSpaintoreport,sincehelackedwirelessoracourier:‘IhavesecretlywarnedhimthatsincehecamehomewiththewomanearlyinAprilnotonlytheBritishandAmericansbuttheSpanishalsohavebeenkeepinghimundercloseobservation.Heisthereforeactingoutwardlyasthoughhehadnoconnectionwithmeatall…Sinceitwouldbeasgoodassigninghisdeathwarrantifweweretomeetdirect,Ihaveinstructedhimtofurnishmewithawrittenreport…[He]isduetoreturntohisdutiesinAmericaon17thMayandheisgoingahead(asmattersstandatpresenttheAmericansseenoobjectiontohisre-entry).’Theattachedagent’sreportwaswritteninthemannerofaperiodthriller:‘Livinginanenemy

countryandcollectinginformationwhilefacingallmannerofdanger,itwasunavoidablethatIshouldhavetodependtoagreatextentonmymemory.ToensureaccuracyInaturallyusedspecialinkandsmallphotographsoneveryoccasionwhenmattersofimportancewereinvolved.’Sincewhatfollowedrepresentedasummaryoffourteenmonths’allegedobservation,itwasscarcelybeingdeliveredinrealtime.Thespyreported,amongmuchelse,thefabulousfictionthatfourUSbattleshipshadbeensunkintheNovember1942Solomonsbattles,anddevotedseveralhundredwordstolistingAmerica’sseniorcommandersandtheirposts,informationreadilyavailableintheWashingtonPost.Therewasafinaltwist:theJapaneseagent’sdispatchsurvivesonlybecauseitwasdecryptedbyArlingtonandBletchley,andhasreposedsinceMay1944inAmericanandBritishfiles.From1944onwardsJapanesecommandersshowedthemselveschronicallyreluctanttoconsider

evidence,preferringinsteaddecision-makingbyinstinct,withagrowingappetiteforfantasy.Thenavydevotedevenfewerresourcestocodebreakingthanthearmy,andfocusedmostofitssigintactivitiesondirection-findingandtrafficanalysis.AJapaneseadmiral,Rear-AdmiralYokoiTishiyuji,observeddespairinglyafterthewar:‘Ournavywasbeingdefeatedinthebattleoftheradiowaves.Ourcardswerebad,andtheenemycouldreadourhand.Nowonderwecouldnotwininthispokergame.’TheIJNnonethelesshadsomemodestcodebreakingsuccesses,bymonitoringlower-gradeAmericanlogisticscommunications.Intelligenceofficersreadabouthalfthe1944–45BAMStraffic–BroadcastForAlliedMerchantShipping–whichenabledthemtoforecastmajorUSamphibiousassaultsthroughtrackingthehugesupport‘tail’thataccompaniedeachone.TheyanticipatedtheJanuary1944Marshallsoperations,theMarianasinJuneandIwoJimainFebruary.Yetthehighcommandchoseinsteadtobelievethat,ratherthangofortheMarianas,theAmericanswouldtargetthePhilippines,northernNewGuineaandtheWestCarolines.AndevenwhenJapan’sadmirals

andgeneralscorrectlyanticipatedAmericanintentions,theywererepeatedlyanddecisivelyoutfoughtonland,atseaandintheair.Hardpowerwaslacking.Duringthesummerandautumnof1944,theclimateoffantasyatimperialheadquartersbecame

feverish.USdeceptionactivitiesconvincedthemthattheAmericanswerebuildingupforcesinAlaskawithaviewtoinvadingtheKuriles.Thus,inJuneJapaneseintelligenceestimatedthattheUShad400,000menandsevenhundredaircraftinAlaska,whereasthetruefigureswere64,000and373.TokyoincreaseditsownforcesintheKurilesfrom25,000menandthirty-eightaircraftinJanuaryto70,000and589inJune.Japan’sseniorofficerschosetobelievethatthe12–16OctoberairbattlesoffTaiwan,whichdevastatedtheirownairforce,hadcosttheUSnineteencarriersandfourbattleships.JapaneseradiomonitorscorrectlyreportedthattrafficanalysisshowedalltheelementsofHalsey’sThirdFleetstillafloat–buttheirviewsweredismissedasunacceptable.CaptainKaoruTakeuchioftheIntelligenceDepartmentraved:‘ThestaffoftheOperationsDepartmentareinexcusable…Theyareinsane!It’sunbelievablethatthemadofficershavetheirownway.’ItwasthesurgeofoptimismaboutAmericanlossesoffTaiwanthatpersuadedJapan’sadmiralstolaunchtheCombinedFleet’sOperation‘Ichi-Gō’,whichendedindisasteratLeyteGulf.YetLeytepromptedanevenmorefrenziedJapaneseflightfromreality.TheNavyIntelligence

Department’sbroadlyaccurateassessmentswereignored,whilewildlyinflatedclaimswereacceptedforthesuccessofkamikazeattacksonUSwarships.Onsixoccasionsthenavy’sOperationsDepartmentdeclaredthecarrierLexingtonsunk,andfourtimeswroteoffSaratoga.Theemperornoticedthesereports,andsuggestedthattheymightbeatriflefanciful.ThearmyhighcommandreliedincreasinglyforintelligenceaboutthePacifictheatreonits‘SpecialInformation’staffinHarbin,northChina,whichhadasourceintheSovietconsularoffice.Unfortunately,thiswascontrolledbytheNKVD.Whentheintelligencestaffrealisedthis,itsofficerswarnedthehighcommand,butthegeneralspreferredtobelievewhatMoscowwantedtotellthem,ratherthananyportionofunacceptabletruth.Thearmy’sintelligencechief,Gen.SeizoArisue,deploredtheOperationsDepartment’shubris,

sayingthatitsofficers‘dislikedevenlisteningtotheopinionsofothers’.HecitedtheMarch1944assaultonBritishandIndianforcesatImphal.Foronce,Arisuehadbeenconsultedinadvance,butassoonasheexpressedstrongoppositiontotheplanhewasexpelledfromimperialheadquarters’debateontheoperation.TheJapaneseasarace,accordingtothe2ndDepartment’sKiichiroHiguchi,preferasubjectiveapproachtoproblem-solvingtoobjectiveanalysisofevidence:‘Theaffairsofindividualsmaybedeterminedbysubjectivecriteria,butitismostdangeroustousethesetodeterminethefateofnations.’ThemostconspicuousexampleofthiscameinApril1945,whenintelligencewarnedofadramaticincreaseinSovietmilitarytraffictowardstheManchurianborderandconcluded:‘The2ndDepartmentconcludesthattheUSSRhasalreadystartedtoprepareforawaragainstJapan.’BecausethisrepresentedtheworstnightmareofJapan’sgenerals,theydismissedthe

reportsoutofhand,andcontinuedtodosountiltheRedArmylauncheditsoverwhelmingoffensiveinManchuriainAugust.AllJapanesemilitaryplanningin1945assumedanAmericaninvasionoftheirhomeland,uponwhichtheybelievedtheycouldinflictintolerablelosses.ItisafineironythattheWesternAlliescouldmostplausiblyhaveconfoundedtheirenemy’shighcommandbyannouncingpubliclythattheydidnotintendtoinvadeJapan,butinsteadtobombandstarveitintosubmission.WhateverdifficultiestheBritishandAmericansfacedinworkingwitheachother,thesewereas

nothingcomparedwiththelackoftrust,theculturalchasm,dividingtheGermansandJapanese.Thoughthetwonationshadanintelligence-sharingagreement,littlewasdonetoimplementit.SeniorWehrmachtintelligencespecialistsdespisedtheirJapanesecounterparts.OneGermanofficerdescribedthemas‘verypoor ’,notingthattheyoftenidentifiedanAmericandivisionasopposingtheminthePacificwhenBerlinknewthatitwasinFrance.Col.OhletzoftheRSHAsaidafterthewarthathisservicehad‘anuneasyandunprofitablepartnershipwiththeJapaneseI[ntelligence]S[ervice]’.Canaris,whileherantheAbwehr,maintainedtenuouslinkswithTokyo.AnofficernamedHauptmannPlagewasretainedasBerlin’ssupposedresidentexpertonJapan.TheGermanspassedontoTokyofragments–forinstance,areportsupposedlyfromaBritishsource(oneofMI5’sdoubleagents)–abouttheUSlandingsatLeyteGulfinSeptember1944.Asthewarsituationdeteriorated,sotoodidtherelationshipbetweenthetwoallies.Eachregarded

thecauseoftheotherasdoomed,buttheGermansstrovetokeeptheJapaneseinthefight.OKWurgedtheRSHA’schiefstotelltheirOrientalbrethrenanythingthatmightstiffentheirresolve–forinstance,aboutprospectsfortheDecember1944Ardennesoffensive.OnenightjustafterOperation‘AutumnMist’hadbeenlaunched,ErnstKaltenbrunnerandWalterSchellenberghostedabigJapanesepartyfordinnerinavillaontheWannsee.Thiswasnotasuccess.Col.OhletzgottheimpressionthattheJapanese‘wantednothingtodowiththeSD’.Kaltenbrunneremergedassertingcontemptuouslythat‘theJapanesehadbecomeso“soft”that,ifthe[Ardennes]offensivedidnotsucceed,theywouldprobably“rat”’.TheGermansnoddedcontemptuouslytoeachotherwhen,soonafterwards,theJapanesebegantoevacuatetheirBerlinembassyarchivestoSwitzerland,SwedenandSpain.Inthespringof1945MakotoOnodera,theStockholm-basedheadofJapaneseintelligencein

Europe,madeanoffertotakeovercontroloftheAbwehr ’sstationsinneutralcapitals.SeeingtheNazishipfoundering,heobservedthattheJapanesewantedtotakeoveritsintelligenceapparatusasagoingconcern.YetwhenJapanhadbeenunwillingorunabletouseintelligenceeffectivelysinceatleast1942,itishardtoimaginewhatservicetheNazis’scleroticEuropeanspynetworkscouldhavedoneforimperialheadquarters,asHirohito’scommandersgazedupontheruinoftheirownambitions,andoftheirempire.

20

‘Enormoz’

In1944,whentheyoungAmericanphysicistTedHall,workingontheatomicbombprojectatSantaFe’sCamp2,toldallthatheknewtoMoscowCentre,hejustifiedhimselfbysayingferventlytohisNKVDhandler,‘ThereisnocountryexceptfortheSovietUnionthatcouldbeentrustedwithsuchaterriblething.’PerhapsfiftyofthoseonbothsidesoftheAtlanticwhowereprivytotheatomicbombprogrammesurrenderedportionsofitssecretstotheSovietUnion.ThebetrayaloftheManhattanProjectbyBritishandAmericaninformantswasthemostimportantespionagestoryofthewar.IthadnoeffectontheoutcomeofthestruggleagainsttheNazis,ofcourse,butamajorinfluenceonwhathappenedthereafter:whenthefirstSovietbombwasexplodedin1949,itprovedtobeanexactcopyoftheJuly1945Alamogordotestdevice.ApologistsforMoscow’sinformantshaveeversincemadetwopoints:first,thatwithorwithoutthetraitors,theSovietUnionwouldhavebuiltitsownbombsoonenough,becausethatishowscienceandtechnologyevolvearoundtheworld;second,thattheNKVD’sinformantsperformedaservicetothecauseofpeace,becausetheyensuredthecreationofabalanceofterror,makingitimpossibleforAmerica’sright-wingfanaticscrediblytoadvocateanuclearfirststrikeagainsttheSovietUnion.Bothargumentsmeritconsideration.Allthatseemscertain,however,isthattheatomicspiesdramaticallystrengthenedStalin’sstrategichand,andprovidedtheNKVDwithoneofthebiggestcoupsinitshistory.In1940Sovietscientistsassertedthatthecreationofanatomicbombfromuraniumwasa

theoretical,butnotapractical,possibility.Moscowallocatednofundstoatomicespionage,thoughtheNKVD’sscientificdeskalertedallforeignstationstobewatchfulforindicationsofactivityinthisfield.InthefollowingyeartheRussiansreceivedaseriesofreportsfromBritishinformants,JohnCairncrossnotableamongthem,aboutworkonuranium-basedweapons,basedoncluesfrommeetingsoftheBritishchiefsofstaffandtheUraniumCommittee.AnNKVDofficerinLondon,VladimirBarkovsky,wasassignedtoaddresstheissue.On16September1940,DonaldMacleanforwardedasixty-pagereportontheprojecttheBritishhadcodenamed‘TubeAlloys’.ThissuggestedthatChurchill’sgovernmentwastakingseriouslythenuclearpossibilities,thoughanotherBritishsource,inthelaboratoriesofICI,contradictorilyassertedthatithaddecidedaBombwasimpracticable.MoscownextlearnedofadecisionbytheBritishchiefsofstafftoundertakeafeasibilitystudy.InAugust1941theGerman-bornphysicistKlausFuchs,apassionatecommunist,

wasrecruitedinBritainbytheGRU’sJurgenKuczynski–brotherofUrsulaHamburger.WhenhewenttoworkwithRudolfPierlssoonafterwards,FuchsbecameakeyMoscowsource,providingearlyinformationthatautumn.On24NovembertheNKVD’sNewYorkstationchiefreportedthatthreeAmericanscientistswereontheirwaytoBritaintodoworkon‘anexplosiveofenormouspower ’.TheLondonstationpromptlyquestionedCairncross,inLordHankey’soffice,aboutthetruthofthis.HerespondedthatitmustrelatetoUranium235.Cairncross’shandlerAnatolyGorskyremainedsceptical,however,becausehisotherinformantslearnednothingaboutthevisit,whichprovedmostinfluentialinpersuadingtheUnitedStatesthataBombmightbebuilt.ThencamePearlHarbor.SoonafterwardssecrettidingsreachedMoscowthattheBritishhad

abandonedtheirownnuclearaspirations,leavingtheUStopursueaBombthroughtheManhattanProject,naïvelyregardedinWhitehallasasharedAnglo-Americanventure.InMarch1942BeriasentStalinasummaryofSovietknowledgeofBritishatomicresearch,chieflybasedoninformationfromCairncross.AboutthesametimeoneoftheNKVDNewYorkstation’ssources,FranklinZelman,metanacquaintancenamedClarenceHiskey,aColumbiachemistryprofessorandfellow-communist,whotoldhimthathewasworkingonanAmericanradioactivebombproject;thatthiswasmakingprogress,butthattheGermanswerefarahead.Hiskeywasmistakenonbothcounts,buthisremarkscausedalarminMoscow.LeonidKvasnikov,ascientistontheNKVDpayroll,soughttoreassurehismasters:afterexaminingtheavailableinformationfromBritish,AmericanandGermansources,hesuggestedthatnobodyhadyetmademuchheadway.Nonetheless,heurgedintensivefurtherenquiries.GregoryKheifetz,Centre’sSanFranciscoresidentwhoworkedundercoverasSovietvice-consul,

metRobertOppenheimer,nowsecretlychargedwiththescientificdirectionofthe‘ManhattanProject’tobuildaBomb,atafundraisingreceptionforSpanishCivilWarrefugees,andlearnedthathewasengagedinalarge-scalenewresearchoperation.Kheifetzwasanespionageveteran:hehadpreviouslyservedasdeputyresidentinRome,wherehetargetedEnricoFermiandBrunoPontecorvoasprospectivesources.Evenearlier,heworkedasasecretarytoLenin’swidowNadezhdaKrupskaya,thenplayedamajorpartinestablishingtheCominternintheUnitedStates.Withsuchabackground,hecommandedbothinterestandrespectinSanFrancisco’sleft-wingsocialcircles.OppenheimerseemstohavegivenKheifetzsomeimportanthints,possiblyincludingmentionofthefearsofWashingtonandLondonthattheNazismightbebuildingaBomb.HealsorevealedEinstein’ssecret1939lettertoRoosevelt,draftedbyLeóSzilárd,urginghimtoexplorethepossibilitiesofharnessingnuclearenergy.OppenheimerwasassignedtheNKVDcodename‘Star ’.Someofhisclosestfriends,including

SteveNelson,borninCroatiaasStefanMesarosh,werecommunistsandactiveSovietinformants.Oppenheimer ’sformidableandsomewhatsinisterwifeKittyhadoncebeenmarriedtoacommunist.Attheendof1942,underordersfromtheSovietconsulateinSanFrancisco,acommunistBritishchemistinstructedtheliteraryacademicProfessorHaakonChevaliertoapproachhisoldfriend

RobertOppenheimerandinvitehimtosharetheManhattanProject’ssecretswiththeRussians.Thescientist,however,immediatelyreportedthisapproachtoGen.LeslieGroves,Manhattan’soverseer,andChevalierfoundhimselfconsignedtoouterdarkness.Inthefollowingyearasuccessionoffurtherapproachesweremade,oneofthembySolomonMikhoels,thefamousMoscowactorwiththeYiddishStateArtTheatre,whowasonaUStoursponsoredbytheJewishAnti-FascistCommittee,alongwithhiscomradetheYiddishpoetItzikFeffer.BeriahadpersonallybriefedthetwomentoassureOppenheimerthatanti-SemitismintheUSSRwasnowadeadletter.PavelSudoplatovassertsinhismemoirsthatOppenheimer,FermiandSzilárdknowinglyassisted

theNKVDtoplacemolesinManhattan’slaboratories.Evenmorestartling,hesuggeststhatOppenheimerrequestedtheservicesofKlausFuchs,knowingthathewasaSovietagent.Bothpropositionsseemwildlyimplausible–Oppenheimer ’smostrecentbiographerRayMonkcallsthenotion‘risible’.BecauseOppenheimerindisputablyliedtocongressionalhearingsin1954aboutsomeofhisoldcommunistassociations,therehasbeencontroversyabouthisloyaltyeversince.Yetthemostplausibleverdictisthat,notunlikeHarryHopkins,hewasguiltyofindiscretionstosomecommunistfriendsandcontacts,ratherthanofmakingaconsciouscommitmenttobetrayhisvastresponsibilityforthemostambitiousmilitaryprojectinhistory.MoscowwasimpressedandalarmedbytherevelationthattheAmericanshadbeguntocommit

hugeresourcestothecreationofaBomb.Inthismatterasinsomuchelse,StalinlookedfarbeyondmerevictoryoverHitler,towardsapost-warworldinwhichnoaspiringsuperpowerwithoutanatomicbombcouldhopetochallengeanotherwhichownedone.TheSovietwarlordseemstohavegraspedmuchearlierthanChurchillorRooseveltthegame-changingnatureofsuchaweapon.SudoplatovcitesOppenheimer,Fermi,SzilárdandSzilárd’ssecretaryasRussia’smostimportantAmericanatomicsources,butwhetherornothetoldthetruthabouttheseindividuals,itisundisputedthattherewereplentyofothers.LiseMeitnerwasaphysicistwhohadfledfromGermanytoSweden,whereshenowworkedatthePhysicalInstituteoftheAcademyofSciences.SovietagentsrunbyZoyaRybkinaapproachedandquizzedheraboutwhatshehadlearnedfromtheinternationalfraternityofscientistsaboutaBomb;itcouldbebuilt,shesaid.InMarch1942DonaldMacleansentanewreportfromLondon,emphasisingthehighprioritybeinggiventotheWesternAllies’atomicresearch.Onthe10th,BeriawrotetoStalinendorsingthisview,whichwasechoedbySovietphysicistProfessorGeorgeFlorev,whoinMaydeclaredtotheKremlinhisconvictionthataBombwasfeasible.TheNKVDprogressivelyintensifieditseffortstopenetratetheresearchplantsoftheManhattan

Project.SemyonSemyonov–‘Twain’–thelong-servingsciencespecialistinCentre’sUSoperation,wasassignedtorecruitsources.TheRussiansrecognisedthattheyhadlittleprospectofsecuringthehelpofthetopatomicscientiststhroughbriberyorcoercion;instead,theymustappealtotheirfinerinstincts,toasupposedcommunityofinterestandculturewiththeSoviets,America’salliesagainstHitler,whowerebearingthelion’sshareofthestruggleandofthesacrifice.Semyonovquickly

identifiedmostofthekeyManhattanscientists,buthadlimitedsuccessinrecruitingthem.HesupervisedtheNKVDveteranHarryGold,whoworkedwithFuchs,butfailedinthewooingofUkrainianexplosivesexpertGeorgeKistiakowsky.TheRussiansmeanwhilepuzzledendlesslyaboutwhatGermanywas,orwasnot,doingabout

atomicresearch.Theevidencewasthinandconfusing.Forinstance,ifheavywaterwasanimportantelementoftheprocess,whywasBerlinnottakingfarmoreseriousstepstoguarditsNorwegianproduction?TheBritishobviouslytookheavywaterseriously:theNKVD’sNorwegianagentstoldMoscowabouttheNovember1942SOEattempttodestroytheRjukanhydro-electricplant,whichfailedwiththelossoftheentireassaultpartyofglider-borneengineers.KimPhilbyalsoforwardedareportonthefiasco,whichwasfollowedbythesuccessfulFebruary1943operationconductedbysixSOE-trainedNorwegiansaboteurs.SovietparanoiaaboutAnglo-AmericandeceitfulnesswasintensifiedbythefactthattheAlliesneithersoughtRussianhelpinlaunchingtheraid,norinformedMoscowaboutitafterwards;this,thoughthehistoryofBritishattemptstocollaborateonsecretoperationswasoneofunyieldingSovietintransigence.BerianowcontrolledaSpecialCommitteeonAtomicEnergy,underthenominalchairmanshipof

twodeputyprimeministers,withSudoplatovattachedasdirectorofintelligence.ASovietacademician,V.I.Vernadsky,suggestedthatMoscowshouldformallyinvitetheWesternAlliestoexchangeknowledgeonnuclearresearch.Stalinrespondedcontemptuously:‘Youarepoliticallynaïveifyouthinkthattheywouldshareinformationabouttheweaponsthatwilldominatetheworldinthefuture.’HozyainagreedthatRussia’sintelligenceagenciesshouldintensifycoverteffortstopriseinformationoutofWesternscientists.TheygotnowherewithNielsBohr,thoughthegreatDanishphysicistdidurgeuponChurchillandRooseveltthattheyshouldvoluntarilyshareatomicsecretswiththeSovietUnion.InJanuary1943,SemyonovtookdeliveryofBrunoPontecorvo’sreportonthefirstnuclearchainreaction.PontecorvoalsodescribedFermi’s2December1942experimentinChicago,heraldingthiswithacrypticphonemessagetotheNKVDofficer:‘TheItaliansailorreachedthenewworld.’InFebruary1943,SudoplatovwasauthorisedtoshowSovietscientistsnuclearintelligencefrom

America,withoutdisclosingthesources.Suchring-fencingwasunsuccessful,however.ThephysicistI.K.KikointookonelookatatranslatedreportinSudoplatov’sofficeattheLubyankaandsaid,‘ThisisFermi’swork.Heistheonlyonecapableofproducingsuchamiracle.’SudoplatovdisplayedotherdocumentsinEnglish,withtheauthors’namesmasked.Thescientistsguessedmostoftheiridentities,andtoldhimnottobenaïve:thenatureofsuchsupremelysophisticatedresearchfindingsenabledthemalmostinstinctivelytodivinetheauthorship.ThereaftertheNKVDofficersecuredBeria’sauthoritytoshowtheSovietgroupmostincomingmaterialfromtheUS.ByJuly1943MoscowCentrehadreceived286USclassifieddocumentsonManhattan,andwiththeguidanceofRussianscientistsbegantobriefAmericanagentsaboutspecifictechnicalquestionsthatneededanswers.

TheimportanceofBombintelligencewasemphasisedinFebruary1944,whenBeriaaddedtoSudoplatov’sresponsibilitiesthedirectionofanew,autonomous‘DepartmentS’,tohandleatomicespionageanddisseminateitsfruitstoSovietscientists.TheRussiansgavetheirownpenetrationprogrammetheuncharacteristicallyappropriatecodename‘Enormoz’.Sudoplatovlaterclaimedthathehadnotwantedthejob,becausehepreferredtofocusonhismainresponsibility–providingsupportforpartisanoperationsbehindtheGermanlines.NoSovietofficial,however,refusedeitheranincreaseinhispoweroranorderfromBeria.SudoplatovwrotelaterthathederivedcomfortfromhisfaithinSemyonSemyonov,togetherwithhislongstandingfriendshipwithVasilyandElizabethZarubin.KlausFuchs,whohadbecomeacriticaltechnicalsource,wastransferredfromGRUhandlerstothecareofDepartmentS.ItsnewdirectorwasinstructedtoforgecloseworkingrelationshipswithRussia’stopscientists.

Thiswaseasiersaidthandone:likeallSovietcitizens,theylivedinterrorofanycontactwiththeNKVD.Thedinnerpartiesthatthespymasterinitiatedinthesitting-roombehindhisofficeintheLubyankamusthavebeenappallingordealsforthesewretchedmen.AtatimewhenmuchofRussia’spopulationsubsistedonthevergeofstarvation,intheLubyankasumptuousmealswereservedbymaids.Tensionscannothavebeeneasedbythefactthat,whiletheguestswereurgedtodrinkdeepofSudoplatov’sArmenianbrandy,hehimselfwasteetotal.HetoldthescientiststhathewasempoweredtoprovidefurtherinducementsforthemtogiveoftheirbestforStalin’sBombprogramme,throughaccesstoextrarationsandshopsaccessibleonlytotheParty’schosenfew.Hedidnotrecordwhatmatchingthreatswereoffered,incaseoffailure.In1943theRussianswerestilllearningmoreabouttheManhattanProjectfromtheirBritish

sourcesthantheirAmericanones.Fifty-sixyearslater,wheneighty-seven-year-oldMrsMelitaNorwoodwasexposedasaformerSovietagent,theBritishmediatreatedtherevelationascomic:‘thesuburbangrannywhospiedforMoscow’.Norwoodissuedanimpenitentstatement,justifyingheractions:‘IdidwhatIdidnottomakemoney,buttohelppreventthedefeatofanew[Soviet]systemwhichhad,atgreatcost,givenordinarypeoplefoodandfareswhichtheycouldafford,giventhemeducationandahealthservice.’Notonlywasshesparedfromcriminaltrialandpunishment,butherfellow-countrymentreatedherpasttreacherywithgood-naturedindulgence.YetotherthanKlausFuchs,MrsNorwood–‘Tina’–wasMoscow’smostimportantwartimeandpost-warsourceofnuclearintelligenceinBritain,throughherroleasasecretaryattheBritishNon-FerrousMetalsResearchAssociation.ThedaughterofaLatvianfatherandaBritishmother,shewasalifelongsecretcommunist,

recruitedbyCentrein1937.MI5failedtonoticeherinvolvementintheSoviets’WoolwichArsenalspyring,exposedin1938.Moscow’sfilescategorisedheras‘acommitted,reliableanddisciplinedagent,strivingtobeoftheutmostassistance’.SheprovidedamassofdataonAmericanandBritishnuclearactivitiesfromtheirbeginningsintothe1950s.Thesewereforwardedbyhercourier,none

otherthanUrsulaHamburger,onceakeyfigureinthe‘Lucy’Ring,whonowoperatedawirelesslinktoMoscowfromcottagesinasuccessionofidyllicallyruralOxfordshirevillagessuchasGreatRollright,GlymptonandKidlington.CentredescribedNorwood’sreportsas‘ofgreatinterestandavaluablecontributiontothedevelopmentofworkinthisfield’.SovietscientistssaidlaterthatthetechnicaldetailprovidedbyherselfandFuchscontributedmorethananyotherinformantstothecreationoftheirownfirstbomb.BeyondNorwoodandCairncross,anotherimportantBritishsourcewas‘Eric’,ayoungcommunist

physicistwhohasneverbeenidentified.ThismanassertedthattheAmericansweremakingbigstrides,andhisreportscausedMoscowtourgeitsNewYorkstationtostraineverysinewtofindoutmore.Fivetimesin1942KlausFuchssuppliedfurtherbatchesofmaterialabouthisteam’stheoreticalcalculationsonatomicfission.Fuchs’courierinBritainfromthatautumnonwardswasasupposedGermanJewishrefugeelivinginBritain,a‘MrsBrewer ’–onceagainUrsulaHamburger.ForhercontributionstoRussia’ssecretwarinSwitzerlandandBritain,shelaterbecamethefirstwomantobemadeanhonorarycolonelintheRedArmy.ThefirstsignificantAmericanbreakthroughcamefrom‘Mar ’,ascientistworkingforDuPont,

whoforwardedmaterialthroughhissister-in-law.InApril1943shedeliveredalettertotheSovietconsulateinNewYork,detailingtheplutoniumroutetowardsanuclearexplosion.‘Mar ’assertedthathismotivewastodefeatthe‘criminal’effortsoftheUSmilitarytoconcealtheconstructionofabomb.On1JulytheNKVDNewYorkstationreportedthatfivehundredpeoplewerenowworkingontheManhattanProject–anunderestimate:bythatdatesome200,000,includingconstructionworkers,wereengaged,atotalthatultimatelyreached600,000,ifsub-contractorsareincluded.Penetrationofitsmostsecretplantshadthusfarprovedimpossible.TheRussiansreviewedtheirstrategy.First,theymadethesensibledecisiontoendtheGRU–NKVDcontestfornuclearinformation,bytransferringalltheGRU’ssourcestoNKVDhandlers.PavelSudoplatovwasgivenoverallresponsibilityfordirectingEnormoz.Centrethenreviewedprominentnamesknowntobeassociatedwiththebombproject,withaviewtoidentifyingrecruitmenttargets.EnricoFermi?ClarenceHiskey?RobertOppenheimer?MoscowassertedthatOppenheimerwasasecretPartymember,butthiswasneverproved,andseemsunlikely.OneNKVDsource,aSenatestaffernamedCharlesKramer,mettheManhattandirectorseveraltimes,butreportedbackthathewasavisionary,ratherthanaprospectiveMoscowagent.InDecember‘Mar ’passeddocumentsontheconstructionofanuclearreactor;itscoolingsystem;

theextractionofplutoniumfromirradiateduranium;andradiationprotection.Anothersource,‘Kvant’,or‘Hustler ’,aboutwhosegreedSemyonSemyonovhadcomplained,asusualmerelywantedmoney.InJunehereceived$300forareportonuraniumisotopeseparationthroughgaseousdiffusion.Moscowenthused.ByChristmas1943itsscientistshadreceivedamassofrelevantBritishandAmericanmaterial,someofthelatterfroma‘progressiveprofessor ’intheradiationlaboratory

atBerkeley.Still,however,theNKVDhadfailedtosecuretheservicesofanyinformantinsidetheLosAlamosdevelopmentcentre.Inthewinterof1943KlausFuchswaspostedtotheUnitedStates,whereHarryGoldbecamehis

courier,thoughthetwomendislikedeachother.Throughtheearlymonthsof1944,onthefirstandthirdSaturdaysofeachmonthFuchspresentedhimselfat4p.m.attheentranceoftheHenryStreetsettlementonNewYorkCity’sLowerEastSide,initiallywithagreenbookandatennisballinhishands,meetingamanwearinggloveswhoaskeddirectionstoChinatown.Afterthefirstmeetingsthiselaborateperformancewassimplified,atMoscow’sinsistence.Later,GoldtravelledtotheCambridge,Mass.,homeofFuchs’sister,anAmericanPartymember.Thevisitorpresentedhiscredentialsbysaying,‘IbringyouregardsfromMax.’MsFuchsresponded,‘Oh,Iheardhehadtwins.’‘Yes,sevendaysago.’Allthepartieshadbeenreadingbadthrillers.Nonetheless,thematerialFuchsprovidedwaseminentlyserviceable,mostlyabouthisownworkontheseparationofisotopes.MoscowexpressedfrustrationthatGold’sreportsdidnottellthemenoughaboutFuchsasaman.Frommid-1944onwardstheNKVD’sAnatolyYatskovcontrolledhimthroughGold,becauseSemyonSemyonovhadbecomesocloselywatchedbytheFBIthathecouldnolongermeetagents,andindeedhadtoberecalledhome.Moreover,inOctoberFuchsreturnedabruptlytoBritain,causinganinterruptionofhisreporting.Atthebeginningof1944SanFranciscostationchiefGregoryKheifetzreturnedtoMoscow,ifnot

indisgraceforhisownfailuretobreakintoLosAlamos,atleastinhopesthatasuccessormightproveabletodoso.CentrethereafterfocusedextraordinaryeffortontheUSatomicprogramme–more,indeed,thanuponespionageinGermany.ThestruggleagainstHitlermightbethepresent,reasonedtheKremlin,buttheconfrontationwiththebourgeoiscapitalistdemocracieswouldbethefuture.Thechiefclearing-houseforinformationdispatchedfromthewesternUSAwasadrugstoreinSantaFe.MoscowmobilisedWestCoastsleepers,someoftheminactiveforadecade,includingaPolishJewishdentistcodenamed‘Chess-Player ’,whohadbeensubsidisedbytheoldOGPUtosecureaFrenchmedicaldegree,andwhosewifenowbefriendedtheOppenheimers.Sudoplatovclaimsthatbeyondorallydeliveredprogressreports,‘Chess-Player ’passedonfiveclassifieddocumentsacquiredfromOppenheimerandhisfriends.Itseemsrashtocredittheseassertionsunsceptically.ItispossibletoacknowledgethatmanyscientistswhoworkedontheManhattanProjectheldleft-wingconvictions,andwereespeciallysympathetictotheSovietUnioninthecircumstancesofitsdeathstruggleagainstHitler,withoutacceptingthattheywerecommittedNKVDsources.EveninsideAmerica,terrorcouldoccasionallyplayasusefularecruitmentroleasideology.

GeorgeGamowwasaRussian-bornphysicistwhohaddefectedtotheUSbackin1933.ElizabethZarubinapproachedGamow’swifeRho,alsoaphysicist,andwarnedherthatthesafetyoftheirrelativesstillintheSovietUniondependedonthecoupleprovidingassistancetoMoscow.Therewasacarrotaswellasaknout:spywell,saidMrsZarubinencouragingly,andyourfamilywilleatbetter;

refuse,andthereisthegulag.Gamowacceded,andwasabletoexploitawidenetworkofsourcesinthescientificcommunity.Tricklesofmaterialarrivedfromunexpectedpeople:inthesummerof1944anunknownstrangerdeliveredapackageoftopsecretmaterialtotheSovietconsulateinNewYork.ItstechnicalcontentfascinatedMoscow’sanalysts,makingthemallthemorefuriousthatthesupplierleftthebuildingwithoutrevealinghisidentity–andwasneverheardofagain.Meanwhile,ayoungUSCommunistPartymembernamedFogelwasworkingforKellogg

ConstructionontheManhattanProject,thoughtoMoscow’sfrustrationhedeclinedthecompany’sofferofatransfertoLosAlamosearlyin1945,andstoppedprovidinginformation.WhenTedHalldecidedthathewantedtotelleverythingheknewtotheRussians,hehadtroublefindinganappropriateconduit.IntheendajournalistforthepropagandanewspaperRussianVoice,SergeiKurnakov,whowasalsoonCentre’spayroll,becamehiscourier.KurnakovsentMoscowadescriptionofHall:‘rathertall,slender,brown-hairedandabitpimply-faced,dressedcarelessly,shoesappearnotcleanedforalongtime,fallen-downsocks…Heiswittyandsomewhatsarcastic…comesfromaJewishfamily,thoughdoesn’tlooklikeaJew.’HalllaterbecamethefirstAmericaninformanttorevealtheimplosionmethodofdetonation,backedupbyamoredetailedreportfromFuchson6April1945.Yetanotheratomicspy,DavidGreenglass,anarmysergeantworkingasamechanicatLosAlamos,wasabletopassoutinformationfromautumnof1944whenhereceivedvisitsfromhiswifeRuth.ShelatertoldJuliusRosenbergthat‘socialismwasthesolehopeoftheworldandtheSovietUnioncommandedherdeepestadmiration’.MoscowCentrewasdismissiveaboutthequalityofGreenglass’smaterial,buteverylittlehelped.LikeallSovietoperations,Enormozwasfortifiedbyanimpregnableself-righteousness.In1944the

RussiansprofessedtobeaffrontedwhenthemostprominentscientistsofBritainandAmericadeclinedenmasse–attheirgovernments’insistence–invitationstoattendaMoscowconferencetocelebratethe220thanniversaryoftheRussianAcademyofSciences.Yetthiswasplannedexplicitlyasafestivalofsecrets-gatheringandinformantrecruitment.TheSovietUnionwasnowconductingtechnologicalintelligenceoperationsintheUSonanindustrialscale.TheoutputoftheillegalresidencyinWashingtonincreasedfrom211rollsoffilmofclassifieddocumentsin1943tosixhundredinthefollowingyear,and1,896in1945.Theinformationrelatedtomuchelsebeyondnuclearresearch:stolenAmericansecretsmadealargecontributiontoadvancesinRussianradar,wirelesstechnology,jetpropulsionandsyntheticrubber.Therewerethosewhoarguedthatanallydeservednoless,butthiswasthesameallywhohaddeclinedtoadmittotheBritishin1941thattheRedArmyused57mmanti-tankguns,andwhorefusedtogiveLondonandWashingtontechnicaldetailsoftheKatyusharocket-launcher,amongitsfewrelativelysophisticatedweaponssystems.A.E.Ioffe,directoroftheSovietUnion’sAcademyofSciencesandPhysics,offeredwarmpraise

forthecontributionoftheatomicinformants:‘Theinformationalwaysturnsouttobeaccurateandforthemostpartverycomplete…Ihavenotencounteredasinglefalsefinding.’Yetsomerecipients

inMoscowweretroubledbytheveryeasewithwhichAmerica’smostsensitivesecretshadbeguntoflowontotheirdesks.Beriaquestionedtheauthenticityofthefloodofmaterialfromtheatomicspies.AnatolyIatskov,oneofhisaides,saidlaterthattheintelligencechiefthoughttheWesternAllies‘weretryingtodrawusintohugeexpenditureofresourcesandeffortonworkwhichhadnofuture’.BeriapersistedinthisbeliefevenaftertheSovietUnionhadstarteditsownatomicprogramme,andchangedhismindonlyafterthedestructionofHiroshima.Evenduringtheperiodofhisscepticism,however,hedidnotdaretoallowhisconspiracymaniatoshutoffthelong,richintelligencepipelinerunningtoMoscowfromtheUSandBritain.InNovember1944Department5learnedthatKlausFuchswasbackintheUS–betterstill,working

inNewMexico.CentreurgedNewYorktoidentifyawomancourierwhocouldtravelthereundercoverashislover,butthisideagotnowhere.Instead,inFebruary1945HarryGoldmetFuchsinCambridge,Mass.,andwasbriefedbyhimaboutthehugeexpansionofLosAlamos.Goldaskedthispricelesssourceifhewouldlikesomecash.No,saidFuchs;allhewantedwasthatwhentheRedArmyoccupiedKielandBerlin,theyshouldlocateanddestroythefilestheGestapoheldonhim.Bythespringof1945,fromboththeUSandBritainMoscowwasreceivingasteadyflowof

atomicintelligence,whichenabledSovietscientiststomonitortheprogressoftheManhattanProject.Slowlyandbelatedly,however,Americansecuritywasimproving;itbecamemoredifficultforNKVDhandlerstomeetagents.JuliusRosenbergwassackedfromtheplantwherehewasworkingonthenuclearprogrammebecauseofhisCommunistPartymembership,thoughhadtheUSArmyG-2branchthathandledinternalsecuritybutknownit,hewasamongthelessdangerousSovietagents.Hissub-sourcesweretransferredtootherhandlers.TheNKVD’sofficerswereacutelyconsciousoftheimportanceoftheatomicspiestotheirown

country.LevVasilevsky,Centre’sresidentinMexicoCity,becameuneasyaboutallegedlycarelesssecurityattheSovietembassyinWashington,andbeganhimselftowirelessNewMexicomaterialtoMoscow.ByAugust1944,MI5inLondonwasawareofcommunistpenetrationoftheManhattanProject.GuyLiddellnotedthat‘details…arealmostcertaintobeknowntotheRussians’.NeithertheBritishnortheAmericans,however,recognisedthescaleofSovietnuclearespionageuntilaftertheendofthewar.AnatoliYatkov,theRussians’scienceandtechnologyspecialistinNewYork,saidlaterthattheFBIuncovered‘perhapslessthanhalf’ofhisownnetwork.InJanuary1945,Moscowclaimedatriumph–theacquisitionofdetailsofthedesignofthefirst

atomicbomb.ButitsAmericanagentswerefarfromperfectlyinformed:theyreportedthat,whileatestexplosionwasexpectedwithinafewmonths,itwouldtakeatleastoneyearandpossiblyaslongasfivetoproduceausableweapon.InsidetheSovietUnion,afranticsearchbeganforsuppliesofuranium.Thatwhichwasavailablewithinitsownborderswasoflowquality,butinFebruarycapturedGermandocumentsrevealedthatthemineralwastobefoundatBukovo,intheRodopimountainsofBulgaria,fortymilesfromSofia.ThissitehadnowbeenoverrunbytheRedArmy,and

miningbeganthereimmediately.MeanwhiletherewasabigintelligencesweepofCzechoslovakiaforpossibleuraniumsources,thoughonlylow-gradematerialwasfound.Probablythemostimportantatomicsecrethadbeenthe1940establishmentoftheproposition

hithertodeemeduntenable:thataman-madenuclearexplosionwasfeasible.Oncethisgreatleapoffaithwasmade,Stalin’sscientistswerealmostassuredofsuccessinbuildingaBombwithinafewyears,thoughtheirAmericanandBritishinformantssignificantlyacceleratedtheprocess.TwelvedaysbeforethefirstatomicbombwasassembledatLosAlamos,theNKVDsecureddescriptionsoftheBombviaboththeirNewYorkandWashingtonstations,fromFuchsandPontecorvorespectively.FouryearsoffrenziedstrivinglayaheadbeforeStalin’sscientistsproducedtheirownweapon,buttheRussianshadtriumphedintheintelligencewar;notagainstthefascistenemy,whosedefeatwassupposedlythecommonobjectiveoftheSecondWorldWar,butagainsttheirsupposedally,theUnitedStates.Someofthetalestoldinthisbookaboutthesecretwarseemcomicorgrotesque.Herewasone,however,thatwasdeadlyearnest,andinwhichthestakeswereashighastheworldhaseverknown.

21

DecodingVictory

Whenthewarended,mostoftheWest’stemporaryintelligenceofficersabandonedsecretserviceandreturnedtotheircivilianlives,asdidmanyoftheirformerspies.SOE’sRonaldSethappliedforapassport,inordertotakeupaBritishCouncilpostinIstanbul.ThispromptedanexplosionatMI5,whichobservedthatalthoughtherehadbeeninsufficientevidencetotrySethfortreason,hecertainlycouldnotbeconsideredaloyalBritishsubject.IntheendtheForeignOfficeconcededapassporttotheex-agent,buttheBritishCounciljobfailedtomaterialise.Thelastdocumentin‘Blunderhead’s’securityservicefileisacopyofa1946applicationthathemade,apparentlyinearnestthoughwithoutsuccess,tobecomechiefconstableofWiltshire.Sethspenthislaterlifewritingbooks,amixtureofsexmanualsandespionagestories;heonceattemptedtopatentapenisenlarger.Hisown1950accountofhiswartimerolewasentitledASpyHasNoFriends,andbearslittlerelationshiptothefactsofthecaseasdeterminedbyMI5.Hediedin1985,asymboloftheceaselesstensionbetweencomedyandtragedy,absurdityanddeadlyearnest,whichcharacterisedthesecretwar.NigelCliveservedforafurtherdecadeasanMI6agentabroad,theninretirementpublishedavividreminiscenceofhisserviceinGreece.OlufReed-Olsenworkedasapilotforsomeyearsbeforeturningbusinessman.HismemoirTwoEggsonMyPlateisregardedasaminorclassic.Hediedin2002.SomeOSSofficersinthefieldcherishedinto1945delusionsaboutcommunistgoodwilltowards

theUnitedStates,andwerethusshockedwhen,forinstance,Tito’spartisansexpelledAmericansfromBelgradealongsidetheBritish,whiletheRedArmywaswelcomed.Inthewinterof1944,OSS’sFrankWisneractedasimpromptuUSambassadorinBucharest,wherehewasonceseenscurryingaroundadancefloorattemptingtopersuadeRomaniansocialitestodancewithRedArmyofficers;theungratefulRussiansdeportedhimanyway.‘WildBill’Donovan,nowamajor-general,stilldidnotdespairofaworkingpartnershipwithhisNKVDcompanionsinarms:on23July1945hemadeanoffertoturnovertoCentreanentireGermanintelligenceunitcommandedbythedeputyforeignchiefoftheGestapo,DrWilliamHöttl.HöttlhadvolunteeredhisservicestotheAmericans,butDonovansuggestedshare-and-share-alike.HisofficewrotetoPavelFitin:‘GeneralDonovannotonlyfeelsthatyoushouldhavethisinformationbutthatitwouldbemostdesirableforAmericanandSovietrepresentativesonthespot[inGermany]todiscusswaysandmeansofeliminatingHöttl’sentireorganization.’

MarshallandEisenhowerfumedwhentheyheardaboutthisunilateralgesture,havingthemselvesdespairedofcooperationwithMoscow.MeanwhileDonovan’smeninManchuriawereseizedbytheNKVDastheyphotographedRussianengineersdismantlingandremovingJapaneseindustrialplant.Intheautumnof1945thefirstrevelationsbecamepublicaboutSovietintelligencepenetrationoftheUnitedStates.Arrestsandtrialsfollowed,althoughyearselapsedbeforetheFBIandtheAmericanpeoplebecameawareofthescaleoftreasonwithintheirowncamp.In1943SirWilliamStephensonobservedtoLt.Col.GeraldWilkinson:‘MI6isoldandrather

obsoletecomparedwithSOE[which]…islikelytosurviveafterthewarbecauseofitsyoungerandablerorganisation;itmayinfactalternativelytakeoverMI6.’Followingvictory,however,inbothBritainandtheUStheoldguardprevailedinintelligencepowerstruggles.ThoughBillBentinck,chairmanoftheJointIntelligenceCommittee,wasacriticofMI6,hestronglyopposedacontinuingdivisionofresponsibilitiesforespionageandsabotage.Heconcludeda1945officialreportonBritain’swartimeintelligenceexperience:‘DespitetherealcontributionthatSOEhasmade,wecannotbelievethattheexperimentofrunningspecialoperationsasaseparatemilitaryfunctionoutsidethedirectcontrolofthechiefsofstaffandunderthedirectionofanon-Serviceminister,willberepeated.’In1946theForeignOffice,WarOfficeandBroadwaybetweenthemsecuredtheextinctionofSOE,thoughithadrecruitedablerpeople,andcouldidentifymoreachievementsinthefield.MI6’sinfluenceandprestigehadsoaredthroughitsfeudalsuzeraintyoverBletchleyPark,andtheupstartsabotageorganisationwaswoundup.Menzieskepthisjobas‘C’until1952,despitethebetrayaltoMoscowbyKimPhilbyofMI6’smostsensitiveearlyColdWaroperationsandinformants,withthelossofmanylives,andlivedinretirementuntilhisdeathin1968.IntheUS,J.EdgarHoover ’svoiceproveddecisiveinsecuringthedemiseofOSS,assistedbythe

factthatthearmedforceschiefsofstaffhadneverlikedDonovan,andthoughtnothingofhiscostlyoperation’scontributiontothewareffort.Latein1945Lt.Col.RichardParke,theUSArmyrepresentativeintheWhiteHousemaproom,compiledanunsolicitedindictmentofOSSforPresidentHarryTruman.Itistemptingtoconcludefromtheorganisation’sexcessesthatthecriticswereright–thatDonovanandhisorganisationmerelysquanderedanotinsignificantportionofAmerica’svastwealth.ButOSS’sexcesseswerenotmuchworsethanthoseofSOE,anditsResearch&Analysisdivisionwassuperiortoanyothersuchbodyintheworld.In1947therisingmenacefromtheSovietUnionpersuadedTrumantoauthorisethecreationoftheCentralIntelligenceAgency,employingmanyex-OSSpersonnelsuchasRichardHelms,WilliamColby,WilliamCaseyandFrankWisner,bythenanardentColdWarrior,ofwhomArthurSchlesingersaidwryly:‘HehadseentheCommunistfutureatfirsthandandnotlikeditatall.’In1944SterlingHaydenparachutedintoCroatiaonamissionforwhichhewasawardedtheSilver

Star,sawalittleshootingandendedhisservicesecondedtotheUSFirstArmyinnorth-westEurope.Heenjoyedhispartinthesecretwar,whichsuitedhischaracterandtalents,butcherishedasuspicion

thatthescepticalarmyintelligenceofficer ’sverdictcitedabove–thatOSShadcontributedlittletodefeatingGermany–heldmorethanagrainoftruth.MadeleineCarrollandHaydenweredivorced,andhebecamebrieflyacommunist.HereturnedreluctantlytoHollywoodforthemoney,butfinishedhiscareerwherehehadstartedit,sailingboatstothefarshoresoftheworld.TheNKVD’sPavelSudoplatovwrote:‘Theendofthewarisstillvividinmymemoryasa

gloriouseventthatwashedawayallmydoubtsaboutthewisdomofStalin’sleadership.Allheroicandtragicevents,lossesandevenpurges,seemedtobejustifiedbythetriumphoverHitler.’ChristopherAndrewhasobservedthatmanyoftheSovietsecretservicepersonneldecoratedbyMoscowfortheirwartimeservicesreceivedmedalsnotforvalour,butforcrimesagainsthumanity:atStalingrad,forinstance,theNKVDhadexecutedincoldbloodsome13,500allegeddesertersand‘defeatists’.ThemostconspicuousconsequenceofpeacewastounleashanewwaveofKremlinparanoia,whichextendedtotheintelligencecommunity.ManySovietagentswhoflewhomein1945wereshotorsentencedtolongtermsofimprisonment.By1953theroll-callofthosewhohadfacedfiringsquadsincludedLavrentiBeriaandVsevolodMerkulov,whileSudoplatovspentfifteenyearsbehindbarsasan‘enemyofthepeople’.Inembitteredoldage,theformerSpecialTaskschiefragedagainstthisinjusticeatthehandsofthe

SovietUnion,‘towhichIdevotedeveryfibreofmybeingandforwhichIwaswillingtodie;forwhichIavertedmyeyesfromeverybrutality,findingjustificationinitstransformationfromabackwardnationintoasuperpower ’.YetSudoplatov’sloyaltytoStalinandBeriacausedhimtobecometheinstrumentofmanydreadfuldeeds.HisonlydefencemighthavebeenthatsuchruthlessmenashimselfplayedalargerpartinthedestructionofNazismthandidthemoresqueamishWesternAllies.VladimirPutinassuredlyacknowledgessuchafigureasahero.UrsulaHamburgerretiredtoEastGermanyin1950,andspentherlateryearswritingmodestly

successfulstoriesforchildren,togetherwithsuitablysanitisedspybooks,someofthemaboutherself.Shewenttohergravein2000animpenitentStalinist.LeopoldTrepperinformedMoscowCentrethathisnetworkhadbeenbetrayedtotheGermansby‘MonsieurKent’,AnatoliGourevitch,butthisdidnotsavehimfromasubsequentdecadeofimprisonmentforhisowncollaborationwiththeNazis.GourevitchreachedParisfromGermanyinMay1945withatrainoffollowersthatincludedtheseniorofficerHeinzPannwitz,togetherwiththelatter ’ssecretary-mistressHenneKempe.On7JunetheyflewtogethertoMoscow,whereallwereimmediatelyshownintocells.PannwitzspentthenextnineyearsassistingCentrewithidentificationofGestapoinformants,realandimagined,beforebeingallowedtoleavefortheWestin1955.Hediedin1975,agedsixty-four.Gourevitchfacedtreasoncharges;hewasdamnedbySMERSh’sdiscoveryofadocumentdated1February1944,inwhichGestapochiefHeinrichMullertoldPannwitzthattheSovietagentmustbebroughttoGermanywithhiswifeandson,andlookedafter:‘ItgoeswithoutsayingthatIregarditasmydutytodefendandprotect“Kent”followingthefulfilmentofthetaskswhichhadbeenassignedto

him.’InJanuary1947theSpecialCounciloftheMinistryofStateSecuritysentenced‘Kent’tofifteenyears’imprisonment.‘Prisonsarethesameeverywhere,’Gourevitchwrotemorosely,afterexperiencingthoseofbothHitlerandStalin.Hewasreleasedonparolein1960,butsecuredformalrehabilitationandatinypensiononlyin1991,whenapost-SovietexaminationofwartimeGRUdocumentsshowedthathisfirst1943radiomessagestoMoscowincludedtheagreedwarningthathewastransmittingunderenemycontrol.Hediedin2009.

WhileGourevitchreposedinhisMoscowcell,inLondonanarmyofficer,BrigadierTristramLyon-Smith,appearedonemorninglatein1945atMI5’sStJames’sStreetheadquarterstocomplainthataGestapoofficerkeptwritingunwelcomeletterstohisdaughterfromGermany,claimingthatshehadpromisedtomarryhim.ThiswasofcourseToniaLyon-Smith,theEnglishgirllastseenatGestapoheadquartersinParis,whowassuspectedofgivinginformationtotheGermansaboutLeopoldTrepperandGeorgiedeWinter.ShehadreturnedtoEnglandfollowingtheFrenchliberation.AnMI5officerwhosawthebrigadieranddiscussedhisdaughter ’syear-longsojournasaguestoftheNazisonnotuncomfortabletermsreportedsardonically:‘Ididnotthinkitadvisableornecessarytoaskfordetailsoftheprecisequidproquo.’Asubsequentinterrogationofthegirlconcluded:‘Thestoryisalittlecomplicated,andsheherself

hasbeenfarfromcandid.ShecertainlybecameKarlGagl’smistressandalmostcertainlydisclosedtotheGermansallherknowledgeoftheSPAAK[FrenchResistance]organisation,whichIbelievetohavebeenconsiderablygreaterthansheadmits.’MI5nonethelessconcluded,withwhatseemscompassionategoodsense,thatalthoughshecouldprobablybeprosecutedfortreason,givenherageandherunhappystory–shehadbeenfourteenwhenmaroonedinFrancein1940,andwasstilljustnineteen–itseemedthatitwouldhavebeenmistakentotakethecasefurther.TheGestapoofficerwasnonethelesstoldtherewouldbenoweddingbells–in1946Lyon-Smithbrieflymarriedayoungnavalofficer–andthatheshouldabandonhispassionateletter-writing.Shediedin2010.AsforGourevitch,heneversawMargaretBarczaagain,andafterhisreleasemarriedaRussian

woman.Onlyin1992washereunitedwithhissonbyBarczaatSacha’shomeinSpain.TherewillneverbeaconclusiveanswertothequestionofwhogaveawaywhatinthematteroftheRedOrchestraandtheTreppernetwork;noneoftheprotagonists’accountsareremotelytrustworthy.ButifSMERShandtheGRU,instrumentsoftheleastmercifulregimeonearth,wereinsufficientlysureofGourevitch’sculpabilitytoshoothim,heseemstodeservethebenefitofdoubt.Hediedin2009,agedninety-five.AlexanderRadó,sensingthewaythewindwasblowing,madeabreakfromaSovietflightin

transittoMoscowduringaCairostopoverinSeptember1944.HisappealtotheBritishforasylumwasrejected,however,andinAugust1945hereachedMoscowunderguard.Heremainedimprisonedwithouttrialuntil1954,butwasthenrehabilitatedandallowedtoretiretoHungary.TheLausannewireless-operatorAlexanderFootespenttwoyearsinMoscowbeforedefectingbacktoBritainthroughBerlinin1947.ConspiracistscherishatheorythatFootewasalwaysanagentofMI6,atwhosebehesthesupposedlychannelledsomeBletchleymaterialabouttheEasternFronttoMoscow,underthepretencethatitderivedfromthe‘Lucy’Ring.SuchanarrativewildlyoverratesthesubtletyofBroadway.Moreover,itwouldassuredlyhavebeenknowntoKimPhilby,whowouldhavetippedofftheRussians.FootecouldscarcelyhaveriskedflyingtoMoscowin1945,norwouldtheGRUhaveallowedhimlatertoleavethecityalive,hadheservedBritainduringthewaryears.Itismost

plausiblethattheEnglishmanwaswhatheseemed–acommunistadventurerwhoenjoyedthegameforitsownsake.RachelDübendorferwasreleasedfromcompulsorytreatmentinaSovietprison’smentalhospital

onlyin1956,whenshewasallowedtoretiretoEastGermany.In1969sheandseveralmembersoftheanti-HitlerResistancewereawardedtheOrderoftheRedBanner.RudolfRösslerwasbailedfromhisSwisscellinSeptember1944,butremainedsubjecttoSwisspolicescrutiny.HemadeseveralfurthercourtappearancesforallegedforeignespionageactivitiesbeforehisdeathinLucernein1958,agedonlysixty-one.ThoughhehadreceivedlargesumsfromMoscow,Rösslerdiedbroke.NothingevercameofaproposalinsideCentrethatheshouldbedecoratedforhisservices,onthereasonablegroundsthatheservedthe‘Lucy’Ringasameremercenary,ratherthanasatruebeliever.MeanwhileAlexanderDemyanov,‘AgentMax’or‘Heine’,returnedtoworkasanelectricalengineer.TheNKVDinthe1950ssoughtoncemoretoexploithisWhiteRussianconnections,bydispatchinghimwithhiswifetopenetratetheémigrécommunityinParis.Butitsmembersrebuffedhim,andaftermonthsofinactivitythecouplewererecalledtoMoscow.Demyanovdiedofaheartattackin1975,agedsixty-four.InTokyoin1949,HanakoIshiipromptedtheexhumationofRichardSorge’sskeleton,stillclearly

identifiablebeneaththeyardoftheprisoninwhichhehadbeenhangedfiveyearsbefore.ShearrangedhiscremationandreintermentintheTamacemetery,preservingforherselfhisspectaclesandbelt.Patheticallyorgrotesquely,shehadthegoldbridgeworkfromhisteethresetasaringwhichsheworefortherestofherlife.Shecomposedanepitaphforhisgrave,whichwouldhavearousedmixedfeelingsamongotherswithwhomhelived–spies,friendsandloversalike:‘Hereliesaherowhosacrificedhislifefightingagainstwarandforworldpeace.’Shediedin2000.AnystudentofthewartimeerawhoexplorestheconductoftheSovietUnion,andespeciallyofits

intelligenceservices,islikelytoemergebewilderedthattheword‘ally’couldeverhavebeenusedtodescribeRussia’swartimestatusalongsidethedemocracies.StalinacceptedtheirassistancetosecurethedestructionofHitler,anassociationthatwasinescapableforembattledBritaininJune1941,andthereaftersavedcountlessBritishandAmericanlives,becausetheRedArmyacceptedmostofthehumansacrificenecessarytodefeatGermany.Itisdifficult,however,toperceivethesmallestmoralsuperiorityintheSovietsystemoverthatoftheNazis,thoughtheWesthasalwaysseemedwillingtoacceptinmitigationtheconsiderationsthatStalinconfinedhisprogrammeofmassmurdertohisownpeopleandthoseofSovietsatellitenations,anddidnotcommitaJewishgenocide.ThefailureofboththeBritishandAmericansecurityservicestocatchthemultitudeofSovietspies

andinformantsintheirmidstincurredcriticismandindeedscornintheColdWarera.AmidtheclimateofparanoiawhichovertookBritishintelligence,GuyLiddellofMI5wasdenouncedasapossibletraitor,partlybecauseofhisfriendshipswithGuyBurgessandAnthonyBlunt.Intruth,itiswildlyimplausiblethatLiddell,afirst-classintelligenceofficerwhobecamedeputydirectorofthe

securityservice,betrayedhiscountry;buthegavehisconfidencetosomemenwhowereundeservingofit.Hediedin1958.AlthoughtheWest’sintelligenceservicesappearedfoolishwhentheBritishandAmerican

betrayerswereexposed,thereisnonethelessapowerful,surelyoverridingargumentthatthepresumptionoftrustwhichwasandisthedefaultmindsetwithinWesterndemocracies,andwhichmadetreasonrelativelyeasyforthelikesofBluntandMaclean,HissandHarryDexterWhite,wasvastlypreferabletotheclimateofoppression,suspicion,denunciationandnear-madnesswhichprevailedintheSovietUnionthroughoutthecommunistera.TheRussiansweremoresuccessfulinidentifyingtheirowntraitors,withafewnotableexceptions,butatwhatcosttothehumanityoftheirsociety?AlthoughJosephMcCarthyhadapointwhenheassertedthescaleoftreacheryinhighplaces,the

senatorwentontoconductawitch-huntofsuchgrossextravagancethatintheeyesoftheworld,aswellasofhisownpeople,thereputationofAmericanjusticewasbesmirchedforageneration.ThemoralandhistoricstatureofBritainandtheUnitedStateswasbetterservedbyindulgingacertainnaïvetéabouttheirtraitorsthanitwouldhavebeenbyinstillingintotheFBIandMI5thethoughtprocessesofMoscowCentre.Thatassertionholdsgoodevenafteracknowledgingthatpost-warrevelationsoftreasoninsecretplacescreatedwithintheAnglo-AmericanintelligencecommunityadistrustofcolleagueswhichsometimesapproachedSovietparanoia,andpersistedforageneration.ThefinaltriumphofHughTrevor-RoperwastointerrogateWalterSchellenberg,whoreturned

fromSwedentofaceAlliedcaptivity.ThisexperienceenabledtheMI6officertodemonstratethatheknewfarmoreabouttheGermanintelligenceservicethandidtheNazihighfunctionary.Trevor-RoperassertedinhisApril1945valedictoryreportthatin1939–41,BritishknowledgeoftheAbwehrwas‘veryimperfect’,whilein1943itbecame‘adequatelyrepresentative’,andfromthenuntiltheendwas‘probablycomplete’.HeexaggeratedonlyalittleinassertingthatalltheAbwehr ’sagentsdeployedoverseaswereeitherfictional–suchasthosecreatedbyDrKramerinStockholm–orcontrolledbyLondon,aswere‘Garbo’andhiskin.InTrevor-Roper ’scontemptuouswords,‘ThoseofficersoftheGISwhowereintelligentenoughtoseethenecessityofcentralevaluationwerecorruptenoughtoseethenecessityofpreventingit.’HewasprobablyrighttosuggestthattheGermanssecuredbetterintelligenceabouttheAlliedwareffortbypurchasingitfromopensourcesthanbyrunningincompetentspies.Intheautumnof1945,attheinstigationoftheseniorMI6officerDickWhite,Trevor-Roperwas

commissionedtotraveltoBerlinandexplorethecircumstancesoftheFührer ’sdeath,whichenabledhimtotranslatehissubsequentreportintoabest-sellingbook,TheLastDaysofHitler.ThereafterheresumedhiscareerasanOxfordhistorian,unflagginglycontroversial,cantankerous,snobbishandbrilliant,hislastyearstarnishedbyafoolishendorsementoftheauthenticityofthe1983‘Hitlerdiaries’.Hediedin2003.DrR.V.Jonesalsoreturnedtoacademiclife,asprofessorofnatural

philosophyatAberdeenUniversity,havingbeendrivenoutoftheintelligencecommunitybyitstime-servers,whofoundhimtoocleverbyhalf.Jonesreceivedappropriaterecognitionofhiswartimecontributiononlyin1994,whenhewasmadeaCompanionofHonour.Hediedin1997.WalterSchellenbergservedaremarkablybrieftermofimprisonment,giventhathehadheldsenior

postsintheNazihierarchy:hewasreleasedoncompassionategroundsin1951,theyearbeforehisdeathatforty-twofromliverfailure,andspenthislastmonthsinSwitzerland,writingamemoirwiththeassistanceofhisfavouritesecretary,Marie-LuiseSchienke.WhenGermany’sintelligenceserviceswerewoundup,ReinhardGehlen’sself-promotionalskillsenabledhimtoachieveacoup.Longbeforetheendofthewar,inanticipationofGermany’sdefeathepreparedhismilitaryintelligenceapparatustoexploittheloomingnewstrugglebetweentheSovietUnionandtheWest.In1945heofferedtheAmericanshisservices,completewithpersonnelandfiles.Theyacceptedenthusiastically,andtheGehlenBureaulaterbecameanimportantarmoftheCIA’sactivitiesinEurope,provingtheonlybranchoftheWehrmachtgeneralstaffwhichsurvivedvirtuallyintactintotheColdWar.Gehlen’snewrolewaswarmlywelcomedbyhisoldadversariesoftheNKVDandGRU,since

almostallhissourcesintheEastwereeithercontrolledbyorknowntoCentre.ErichHüttenhain,principalbrainofOKW/Chi,joinedtheGehlenorganisationasitschiefcipherexpert,andlaterrantheGermangovernment’scodemakingandcodebreakingoperations,dedicatedtoimprovinguponitswartimeperformance.ArthurSchlesingerwasamongtheAllieswhorecoiledfromthespectacleoftheOSS’sFrankWisnerenlistingsuchmenasGehlenandHüttenhain:‘TherewassomethingaestheticallydispleasingaboutAmericansplottingwithNazis,whohadrecentlybeenkillingus,againstRussians,whosesacrificeshadmadetheAlliedvictorypossible.’On28June1945,theBritishchiefsofstaffdrovetoBletchleyPark,whereSirAlanBrooke

addressedfourhundredofitsstaff,thankingandcongratulatingthemfortheirextraordinarycontributiontotheAlliedwareffort.Thenewmoodofthetimewasillustratedbythefactthat,soonafterVE-Day,trafficanalystsattheParkwhohadbeenmonitoringGermantransmissionswereorderedtoswitchtoFrenchandRussianwavelengths;thiscausedsometodowntoolsinimpassionedprotest,andindeedtoresignfromGC&CS.Almostallthecodebreakerssoonreturnedtoacademiclife.MaxNewman,themathematicianwhohadjoinedBletchleyreluctantlybecausehefearedthattheworkwouldborehim,toldhissection:‘Oneofthepricesofpeacemustbethelosingofthemostinterestingjobwe’veeverhad.’Itwasfortunatethathehadderivedsuchsatisfactionfromhiswork,becauseagratefulnationofferedhimonlyalowlyOBE,whichherejectedwithscorn.GordonWelchmanacceptedhisownOBE.AlanTuringandJohnTiltmanbecameCBEs,atatimewhenscoresofindifferentlycompetentgenerals,admiralsandair-marshalswerebeingawardedknighthoods.BillTutte,whohadledthewaytowardsbreakingtheGermanteleprintertraffic,gotnothingatallsavehisprizefellowshipatTrinityCollege,Cambridge.HeemigratedtoCanadain1948,andspenttherestof

adistinguishedworkingcareerasamathematicianatWaterlooUniversity,Toronto,amongpeoplewhoknewnothingabouthisdazzlingwartimecontributionbutadmiredtheenergyofhimselfandhiswifeDorotheaasleisurehikers.Hediedin2002.ThemenandwomenofBletchleyleftbehindaformidabletechnologicallegacy,whichenabled

GC&CS’ssuccessor,theGovernmentCommunicationsHeadquartersorGCHQ,tobecomeBritain’sforemostcontributiontotheAtlanticalliancefrom1945tothepresentday,thenucleardeterrentnotexcluded.ItwasnotbychancethatGCHQbecameaninstitutionindependentofMI6:neveragainwouldBroadway’sbureaucratswaxfatontheachievementsofthecodebreakers.IntheUnitedStates,theNationalSecurityAgencyexercisesthecodebreakingresponsibilitiesoncefulfilledbyArlingtonHallandOp-20-G,whiletheCIAconductsUSintelligenceoperationsabroadonascalethatwouldgladdentheheartof‘WildBill’Donovan,whodiedin1959.AlthoughBletchleywassupremelyateamachievementbyoneofthemostremarkablegroupsof

humanbeingseverassembledwithinasingleorganisation,thereisnodoubtofAlanTuring’sprimacy.Intwenty-first-centuryBritainithasbecomeasourceofnationalshamethatTuringkilledhimselfin1954,agedonlyforty-one,followingacriminalconvictionforgrossindecency.The2014HollywoodfilmaboutTuring,TheImitationGame,offeredaversionofhisexperienceatBletchleyParkthatwasatravestyofthereality:farfromsufferingpersecution,hewastreatedtherewitharespectvergingonreverence,albeittingedwithbewildermentathiseccentricities.AlastairDenniston,inthemovieTuring’ssinisternemesis,wasinrealityanenlightenedadministratornotableforhiskindness.Itisnonethelessrightfulcauseforamazementthatwhenthegreatmathematicianandpioneerofcomputingfacedprosecutionandruinonlysevenyearsafterthewarended,nobodyinBritain’ssecretcommunity,knowingofTuring’spersonalcontributiontovictory,intervenedtosavehimfromchemicalcastration.MI6todaystilldeclinestoopenitsarchive,toestablishwhetherTuring’scaseattractedthenotice

orsympathyofitsseniorofficers–mostplausiblythatofStewartMenzies–in1952,butitseemsreasonabletoassumethatitdidnot.*TherearegroundsfordismayattheBritishgovernment’spopulist2013decisiontograntTuringaposthumouspardon,sincehisconvictionwasperfectlyproperbytheinhumanelegislationoftheday,whichimposedsimilarlyharshpunishmentsonthousandsofotherhomosexuals,nolessdeservingofrehabilitation,ifsuchgesturesaretobemade.ItseemsmuchmoresignificantthattheBritishpublictodaysalutesTuring’ssupremelylonelygenius.Itisironic,butalsorightandfitting,thatthismanknowntoscarcelyanyoneoutsideBPandtheRoyalSocietyduringthewaryearsandforhalfacenturythereafteristodaythemostcelebrated1939–45secretwarriorintheworld.

TheSecondWorldWarwitnessedahugeexpansionoftheintelligenceservicesofeverybelligerentnation,sothatinRichardAldrich’swords,‘secretservicebecamethestruggle’sgrowthindustry’.

Neverinthehistoryofconflicthadsuchvastresourcesbeendeployedbyallbelligerentstocompileandassesssomuchinformationabouttheirenemies.Theoverwhelmingbulkwaswasted,ofcourse.AslateasJanuary1943,intheheydayofBletchleyPark,LordBeaverbrookexpressedscepticismaboutintelligence,tellingBruceLockhartthatincabinetheheard‘verylittlesecretinformationwhichwasofrealvalue.SecretIntelligenceServicereportswereofdoubtfulquality,andtheirquantitymadeitdifficultforanyonetosiftthegoodfromthebad.’BeaverbrookevenexpressedcautionaboutUltraintercepts,sayingthat‘Theenemycouldputoutdeceptionmessagesinacodetheyknewwehadjustaseasilyaswecould.’Todayweknowthisdidnothappen,butitdeservesnoticethat,atsucharelativelyadvancedstageoftheconflict,agrandeeprivytotheaffairsoftheAlliedintelligencecommunity,albeitalsoaprofessionalcynic,couldspeakinsuchterms;contemporarywitnessesdidnotalwaysregardAlliedsecretwaroperationswiththereverenceconferredonthembyatwenty-first-centurygeneration.ThehistorianPaulKennedyarguesthatanobjectiveassessmentofwartimeintelligenceshould

highlightitspreponderanceoffailures:theRussians’underestimateofFinnishdefensivecapabilityin1939–40;BritishmisjudgementoftheNorwaycampaign;theconfoundingofFrenchexpectationsbytheGermanthrustthroughtheArdennesinMay1940;Stalin’srejectionofpredictionsoftheGermaninvasionofRussiainJune1941;AmericanblindnessaboutthethreattoPearlHarbor;GermanfailuretoanticipatetheRussianenvelopmentatStalingrad,thereversepincermovementatKursk,orthecentralthrustofOperation‘Bagration’in1944.TheWesternAlliesmisjudgedGermanresponsestotheirlandingsatSalernoin1943andAnzioin1944,andtotheArnhemairdrop.TheAmericansweresurprisedintheArdennesinDecember1944.TheJapanesebeganbygrosslyunderratingAmerica’smoralstrengthaswellasindustrialcapability,andwerethenblindsidedbyalmosteveryUSinitiativeofthelaterPacificwar.Kennedyconcludeshiscatalogueoffailures:‘evenifonecanreadilyconcedethattheAlliedrecordonintelligencewasfarbetterthanthatoftheAxis,itiseasiertodemonstratewheresmoothlogisticshelpedwinthewarthantoshowwhereintelligenceledtovictory’.Thereisascintillaoftruthinthis,buttheevidenceshowsthatknowledgeoftheenemy’smotions

madeamoreimportantcontributiontotheWesternAlliedwareffortthanKennedyallows,especiallyatsea,bothinthePacificandAtlantictheatres.Ironically,Hitler ’sspiesachievedmorefortheAlliedcausethandidthoseofMI6,OSS,theNKVDorGRU.TheAbwehragentsdispatchedtoBritainandRussiawhowere‘turned’didbetterservicethereaftertoAllieddeceptionoperationsthandidmostofthemenandwomenpaidbytheirsecretservicestooperateabroad.Muchoverseasintelligenceworkwasazero-sumgame:everybelligerentneededtoberepresentedbyitssecretserviceeveninsuchfar-flungplacesasLourençoMarquesandSantiago,buttheirforemostaspirationwasmerelytofrustratethemachinationsoftheotherside,whateverthosemightbe.TheinformationprovidedbytheSorgeringandtheRedOrchestramighthavebeeninvaluableto

Moscowinpreparingtomeet‘Barbarossa’,hadStalinbeenwillingtoheedit–buthewasnot.No

BritishhumintsourceremotelymatchedthequalityofintelligencesuppliedbytheBerlinnetworksofHarnack,Schulze-BoysenandtheSwiss‘Lucy’Ring.AllenDullesofOSSforwardedtoWashingtonusefulandreasonablyaccuratematerialaboutconditionsinGermanybetween1943and1945,butthereislittleevidencethatthisinfluencedUSpolicy-orstrategy-making.ThetoweringrealityaboutWesternAlliedintelligenceisthatitbecamedominatedbyUltra,which

boreaninherentauthoritynospy’sreportscouldmatch.HughTrevor-Ropernotedthatalltheimportantachievementsinhisfieldweretheproductofsigint,nothumint:‘OfthegreatintelligencetriumphsofthewarnotonewasdirectlyorexclusivelyduetotheSecretServiceproper…MI6wasmarginal,verymarginal.’NoelAnnansaid:‘Thecryptanalystsdidnotwinthewar,buttheystoppedBritainlosingit.’Thisistooglibaverdict,butthereissomethinginit:UltrawasacriticalforceinprotectingAlliedcommandersfrommakingegregiousblunders.EvenwhileacknowledgingthefailuresatArnhemandintheArdennes,inthesecondhalfofthewaritbecamemuchharderforthemtowalkblindlyintoGermanorJapanesetraps.ThepracticalmilitaryvalueofAlliedaccesstotheJapanesediplomaticcipherswaslimited,but

Gen.Ōshima’swirelesseddispatchestoTokyofromBerlinprovidedmoreusefulinsightsthandidanyAlliedagentintotheNazihierarchy’sthinking,justasAdmiralAbeprovidedsomesuperbinformationonGermannavaltechnology.ThepriceofhavinggainedsuchaccesswasthatitdistortedthewiderprocessofintelligenceassessmentinLondonandWashington,andinthefieldwiththearmies.IfathreatwasnotflaggedthroughUltra,itwasassumednottoexist.DonaldMcLachlanofnavalintelligencewrote:‘Experienceonbothsidesintwoworldwars…hasshownthatanintelligenceorganisationwhichlivedoncryptographicalexpectationsalonebecamespoiled.Itlosttheskillandapplicationtomakethefullestuseofothersourcessuchasairphotography,prisoner-of-warstatements,neutralobserversandevenpressandradioindiscretions.Onemightsaythateasyknowledgecorruptsandentireknowledgecorruptsabsolutely.’MajorLewisPowell,afutureUSSupremeCourtjustice,warnedinanearly1944armyreportonexploitationofsigintintheMediterranean:‘ThereseemstobeatendencytorelytooheavilyuponULTRAtotheexclusionofallelse.’InOctober1945,Montgomery’sintelligencechiefBrigadierBillWilliamspenned‘MOST

SECRET’reflectionsonthewartimeusesandabusesofUltra,inwhichheespousedthesameviewasMcLachlanandPowell.‘Thematerialwasdangerouslyvaluable,’hewrote,‘notonlybecausewemightloseit,butbecauseitseemedtheanswertoanintelligenceofficer ’sprayer…ItwasliabletosavetherecipientfromdoingIntelligence.Insteadofbeingthebest,ittendedtobecometheonlysource.Therewasatendencyatalltimestoawaitthenextmessageand,often,tobefascinatedbytheauthenticityoftheinformationintofailingtothinkwhetheritwassignificant…Probablyessentialwoodwasignored,becauseofthevarietyofinterestingtreesonoffer…Theinformationpurveyedwassoremarkablethatittended,particularlyifoneweretiredoroverbusy,toengulfnotonlyall

othersources,butthatverycommonsensewhichformsthebasisofintelligence.’Trevor-Roperagain:‘Secretintelligencemustalwaysberelevanttorealpoliticalormilitary

purposes;itmustalwaysbecontiguouswith“open”intelligence’–informationderivedfromdiplomatsandpublishedsources–‘anditmustalwaysbeverifiable,forifitisnotverifiableitis,inthestrictsenseoftheword,worthless;itcannotbebelievedorused.’ItisstrikingtonoticethattheUSStateDepartment’sregularbulletinsontheworldatwar,circulatedthroughouttheRooseveltadministrationandderivedchieflyfromopensources,wereasinformativeasandoftenmoresensiblethantheoutputoftheAllies’secretservices,andthesameendorsementmightbegiventosomeBritishambassadors’dispatchesfromoverseas.Itwasimportant,notedBillWilliams,forofficersconstantlytoremindthemselvesthat,thoughthe

Germancommanderdispatchingagivenmessagetoldthetruthashesawit,‘itwasnotnecessarilytrueinrelationtothesituationasawhole’.Thereweremanygaps,and–especiallyinthemiddlewaryears–muchmaterialreachedAlliedfieldcommandersoutofrealtime.WilliamstriedtotellhimselfthathewasnotdoinghisjobproperlyunlessheevaluatedthebattlefieldsituationcorrectlybeforetheUltrasignalscamein,butheadmittedthathewasnomoresuccessfulinthisthanmostofhisfellow-tradesmenintheAlliedcamp.Intelligenceofficersrecognisedby1945thatthewartimeworkofBritishandAmericancodebreakershadchangedtheverynatureoftheirbusiness.Henceforward‘theoldcloakanddagger ’,asGuyLiddellandaBletchleyfrienddescribedpre-warespionageinafitofnostalgia,wasnotquiteredundant:highlyplacedagentsintheenemy’scorridorsofpower,suchasCol.OlegPenkovsky,remainedimportantassetsduringtheColdWar.Asinfluencesuponstrategyandpolicy,however,theywererecognisedasentirelysecondarytosignalsintelligence.Since1945,historiansofsomeothernationshavemadelargeclaimsforwhattheirown

codebreakersallegedlyachieved–forinstance,RussianassertionsthattheyreadJapanesePurpletrafficorevenbrokeEnigma.GivenwhatwenowknowaboutIzumiKozo,theformerpropositionisnotincredible.Buttocreditsuchsuccesses,documentaryevidenceisnecessary,whichisstillalmostentirelyabsentinMoscow’scase.WhereRussianarchivesholdcopiesofdecryptsofhigherGermanandJapanesewartimemessages–itisundisputedthatCentrebrokepre-warcyphers–itismorelikelythesewerepassedtoMoscowbyBritishorAmericantraitorsthandecryptedbyitsowncodebreakers.EventhetriumphsoftheBritishandAmericansneedtobequalifiedbystudyingexactdatesonwhichdecryptsbecameavailabletocommanders–sometimeswellbeyond‘realtime’.Themostimportantissueaboutallintelligenceiswhetheritempoweredcommandersinthefieldandatseatotakeaction.Unlessthiscanbeproven,allclaimstocodebreakingprowessbecomesuspectormeaningless.ThisbookhassoughttoshowthattheradiointelligencewarbetweentheAlliesandGermanywas

notasone-sidedaspopularmythologysupposes.Hitler ’scodebreakers,especiallyinthefirsthalfof

thewar,couldclaimsomeimportantsuccesses.InNorthAfricauntilJune1942,RommelknewasmuchabouttheBritishEighthArmyashisenemiesknewabouttheAfrikaKorps,andthelatter ’scommanderusedhisinformationbetter.Dönitz’sB-DienstprovidedtheU-boatcommandwithanongoingstreamofintelligenceaboutBritishconvoyoperations.EvenwhenAlliedcipherscouldnotbebroken,trafficanalysisandvoiceinterceptiongaveBerlinongoinginformationaboutAlliedoperationsinbothEastandWest,onthegroundandintheair,throughouttheconflict.ButnotasmuchastheAlliespossessed.Manythingsaboutthe1939–45eraremaindisputable,but

fewinformedpeoplewouldquestionthepropositionthatBletchleywasoneofthemostremarkableinstitutionstheworldhaseverknown,andoneofthegreatestachievementsinBritain’shistory,toweringoveranynarrativeofthenation’spartintheconflict.Itdoesnotdiminishthecodebreakers’achievementtoemphasisehowextraordinaryitwasthattheGermansneverrecognisedthevulnerabilityofEnigmaandLorenz.Berlingarneredplentifulclues,andreceivedwarningsfromitsownexperts–yetcarriedonregardless.AmostunGermaniclazinessofmindpersisted.WhiletheThirdReichexecutedwholesalespies,traitorsandsaboteurswhothreateneditssecurity,itsfunctionariesremainedinsistentlyobliviousofthemostdeadlythreatofall–afewhundredtweedy,bespectacledyoungEnglishacademicslabouringindrabsuburbanBedfordshire.Theonlycredibleexplanationishubris:aninstitutionalunwillingnesstobelievethattheirAnglo-Saxonenemies,whomtheysooftenhumbledonthebattlefield,couldbesoclever.GrantedthebrillianceoftheAmericanachievementsinbreakingPurpleandforecastingthe

JapanesestrikeatMidway,themostinnovativecodebreakingtechnologyofthewarwasdevisedatBP.TheUnitedStatesbecameinsomedegreeaprisonerofitsearlysuccesswithJapan’sdiplomaticcipher:itmighthavebetterserveditsarmedforcesinthestrugglewithJapanhadArlingtonHallfocusedmoreintensivelyuponbreakingtheenemymilitarycodesitcouldnotread,ratherthanPurple,whichitcould.Itseffortswerealsohandicappedbydivisionofeffort–thecripplingarmy–navyrivalry.PainfulexperienceshowedthatitwasmoredifficulttobreakJapanesebookcodesthanmachine-generatedciphers.Op-20-GandArlingtonHallcouldboastremarkableachievements,andeventuallysucceededwheretheBritishhadfailedwithsomeJapanesecommunications,buttheyneverfullymasteredthem.Alliedintelligencemadeitsgreatestimpactonthewaratsea,bothintheAtlanticandthePacific.

Nimitz’sFRUPACatPearlHarborachievedmorethandidArlingtonHall,partlybecauseofthedifficultiesofreadingtheJapanesearmy’strafficinrealtime,andpartlybecausedecryptswereoflimitedvaluetolandcampaignsinwhichtheenemymanoeuvredlittle,butinsteadfoughtstubbornlyfromfixedpositions.Innavaloperations,bycontrast,theforemostchallengewasalwaystolocatetheenemy’swarshipsatseaandconcentrateforceagainstthem,forwhichUltraprovidedtheRoyalNavyandUSNavywithunprecedentedopportunities.IftheAllieshadnotbeenabletoexercisealmostunchallengedcontroloftheAtlanticsearouteinthespringof1944,theD-DayinvasionofNormandy

couldnothavetakenplace–andsuchdominanceowedmuchtoUltra.Nimitz’striumphsinthePacific,withbothhissurfacefleetsandsubmarineflotillas,wereimmenselyassistedbyUltra,andsometimesaltogethermadepossiblebyit.In1944–45theUSAAFusedeconomicintelligencemoreeffectivelyandimaginativelythandidthe

RAFtoinformitsbomberoperations.Nonetheless,noAlliednationachievedacompleteunderstandingofHitler ’sindustrialmachine,eventhoughsomeofthebestbrainsinBritainandtheUSengagedintheattempt.Onland,itwasofimmensevaluetotheAlliestopossessavividpictureofdeployments,butonlyonrareoccasions–themostconspicuousbeingatAlamHalfainAugust1942andatMortaininJuly1944–wasUltradirectlyresponsibleforenablingAlliedforcestofrustratemajorGermanattacks.ItisimpossibleandalmostirrelevanttojudgetherivalclaimsoftheRussiansandGermanstosigintsuperiorityontheEasternFront;whatisindisputableisthat,fromthesummerof1942onwards,theRedArmydecisivelywontheoverallintelligencecontest.

TherewasadebateatBletchleyParkinFebruary1945aboutwhatsteps,ifany,shouldbetakentocreateahistoricalrecordofitsachievement.EdwardTravis,itschief,minutedhisownviewthatunlessthiswasdoneimmediatelyafterthecessationofhostilities,nolaterhistorianwouldbeabletomakesenseofBP’srecordsandintercepts,intheabsenceoftechnicalknowledgeandcontextwhichhebelievedonlyacontemporarywitnesscouldhave.Meanwhile,sustainingsecrecywasdeemedparamountwhensomanynationsaroundtheworldcontinuedtoemployinthepost-wareracommunicationstechnologyvulnerabletoAnglo-Americanpenetration–theRedArmyenlistedinitsownservicemanycapturedLorenzteleprinters.Whenwarcrimestrialsbeganin1946,intelligenceofficersexpressedhorroratthenotionthatthey

mighthavetogiveevidence,whichwouldexposetheuseofstool-pigeons,electroniceavesdropping–andUltradecryption.Thesemethods,saidtheWarOffice,wouldbeindispensableinfuturewars,andmustonnoaccountbementionedinopencourt,norindeedanywhereelse.ItwasanotableironythatsometensofthousandsofAmericanandBritishmenandwomenwhosharedknowledgeoftheUltrasecretpreserveditthroughthesubsequentthreedecadeswithalmostreligiousfervour,whiletheSoviets–theonlyenemieswhomattered–wereprivytoitfromtheoutset,thankstoWesterntraitors.WhenBletchley’sstorybegantobepubliclyrevealedin1974,enoughveteranssurvivedtopendozensofauthoritativeaccountsoftheirownroles,whileProfessorHarryHinsleyledtheteamwhichproducedtheofficialhistoryofwartimeintelligence.IdeologicalenthusiasmforcommunismwastheprincipalforceinenablingtheSovietUnion’s

intelligenceservicestorecruitahostofinformantsinboththeAxisandAlliednationswithbetteraccesstosecretsthanthehumansourcesofMI6andOSSachieved.MuchtechnicalintelligencegeneratedfromtheUSandBritain,especiallyaboutaircraftdesignandaboveallabouttheBomb,wasofvaluetotheRussians.Thisborefruit,however,notduringthestruggleagainstHitler,butin

strengtheningMoscow’shandintheColdWarthatfollowed;itnotmerelyinfluencedthenucleararmsrace,butalsoempoweredtheSovietUniontobuildjetaircraftandmuchelsebeyonditsnativecompetence.TherecordoftheNKVDandGRU,workingunderthedeadhandofStalin,showsthattheirchiefswerenomoresensibleorskilled,andinfinitelymorebarbarous,thantheirWesterncounterparts.TheSovietsprofitedfromthehonourablepoliciesoftheWesternwarlords,whosoughttotreat

themasgenuineallies,anddeployedscarcelyanyintelligenceorcounter-intelligenceresourcesagainstthem.Stalin’sparanoiarenderedsterilethelaboursofhisadmirersinNaziGermany,whosacrificedsomuchtoinfluenceSovietactionssolittle.ThemasteroftheKremlinwasabletomakeformidableuseofmaterialsecuredfromAmericanandBritishtraitorstoarmhimselfagainstRooseveltandChurchillinthepoliticalstruggletoshapethepost-warworld.ButprobablythemostinfluentialwartimeelementsofSovietintelligenceactivitiesagainsttheAxisweretheirdeceptionoperations,theforemostbeingthatofAgent‘Max’through‘Monastery’,atthetimeofStalingrad.TheNKVDandGRUtieduptheAbwehrinasmanyknotsasdidMI5throughtheDoubleCross

system.TheGermanandJapaneseleadershipsmadetheirdecisionsshroudedinbewildermentandignoranceabouttheirenemies,partlybecauseofaninstitutionalisedresistancetotheobjectiveexaminationofevidence,emphasisedbyHitler ’srefusaltoexploretheeconomicpotentialoftheSovietUnionandtheUnitedStatesbeforehedeclaredwaronthem.From1942onwardstheAxisconducteditscampaignswithonlymeagre,orwildlymistaken,ideasofwhatwashappeningintheenemy’scamp.Inconsiderablemeasure,ofcourse,thiswasduetothemadnessofHitlerandthewilfulblindnessofJapan’sgenerals.InTrevor-Roper ’swords,writteninthelastdaysofthewar:‘Allstrategy,andindeedalldecisionsofpolicyandinterpretationsofacts,becameincreasinglydependentonthearbitrarywhimsofagroupofignorantmaniacs.’InlesserdegreeGermanbewildermentwasattributabletothefogofmisinformationgeneratedbyAlliedcounter-intelligenceanddeceptionstaffs.ByfarthemostimportantrealityabouttheimpactofintelligenceontheSecondWorldWar–onall

wars–isthatknowledgeoftheenemy’smotionsdoesnotalterordiminishtherequirementforsoldiers,sailorsandairmentodefeathimonthebattlefield.Thereweresomedelusionsin1918,wroteStewartMenziesina1942circulartohisofficers,thatGermanyhadbeendefeated‘bymeansofthespoken,writtenword,orsomeotherancillarywaractivity’.Notso,hesaid.‘GermanywasdefeatedbecausetheGermanArmieswerebeaten.’MI6wouldhavefailedinitsprimaryfunction,thespychiefwrote,ifitdidnotmateriallycontributetosuchanotheroutcomeinBritain’slatestconflictwithGermany.ABritishgeneraloncelecturedtoAlliedstudentsattheHaifastaffcollegeontheprinciplesofwar.

Whenhesatdownandinvitedcomments,aPolishofficersprangtohisfeetandsaid,‘Sir!Youhaveleftoutthemostimportant:Bestronger!’ThePolewasright.SirAlanBrooke,asheadoftheBritish

Army,complainedatachiefsofstaffmeetinginNovember1943thattheJointIntelligenceCommitteeconsistentlyunderestimatedtheenemy’smilitarycapabilitiesinalltheatres.Thiswasonlyhalf-true.BrookeshouldinsteadhaveacknowledgedthatthechronicproblemfortheAllieswasnotthattheirintelligencestaffsmisjudgedAxispaperstrengths,thoughtheysometimesdid,butthattheenemyconsistentlydisplayedsuperiorcombatskillstothoseoftheAnglo-Americanarmies,evenwhenthelatterhadmoretroops,overwhelmingairpower–andsometimesforeknowledgeconferredbyUltra.DecryptedsignalsprovidedtheAlliedwarlordswithaknowledgeoftheirenemies’strengthsand

deploymentsunparalleledinhistory.‘Fewarmies,’acknowledgedBillWilliams,‘everwenttobattlebetterinformedoftheirenemy.’ButUltraseldomtoldChurchill,RooseveltandtheirgeneralsmuchaboutGermanintentions,andespeciallyaboutHitler ’sintendedresponsetoagivenAlliedcourseofaction.TheachievementsofBletchleyPark,ArlingtonHallandtheUSNavy’sOp-20-Gwereverygreat.Theyelevatedintelligence,hithertoalittle-respectedbranchofstaffwork,toanunprecedentedimportanceinoperationalplanning.Theydidnot,however,provideAnglo-Americanforceswithmagickeystovictoryontheground,intheairandatsea.TheGermans,ItaliansandJapanesealwayshadtobefought.Itisunsurprisingthatgoodintelligenceseldomproveddecisiveinalteringbattlefieldoutcomesinthefirsthalfofthewar,whenAlliedforceswereweak.Especiallyinlandcampaigns,knowingwhereablowwastofalldidlittletoimprovetheprospectsofcounteringit,intheabsenceofcompetentcommandersandsufficientarmedstrength.InDecember1941,forinstance,theBritishhadextensiveforewarningaboutJapaneseintentionsintheFarEast,especiallytowardsMalaya,buttheirlocalforcesweretoofeebleandtooincompetentlyledtoprofitfromit.Ultracamefullyintoitsown,servinguptoAlliedwarlordsadailyfeastofsecretknowledge,only

betweenlate1942and1945,whentherecipientsknewthattheywereanywaycertaintowinthewar.Itisimpossiblecrediblytoquantifyitscontributiontofinalvictory,toforeshorteningtheconflict,becauseitwasaWesternAlliedtool,whiletheRedArmyboretheprincipalburdenofdestroyingNazism.Whatcanbesaid,however,isthatBletchleyParkanditsbrilliantcivilianbrains,togetherwiththeirAmericancounterparts,wentfartocompensatefordeficienciesinthefightingqualitiesoftheBritishandUSarmiesagainsttheWehrmachtandtheImperialJapaneseArmy.AsIassertedinAllHellLetLoose,forallthegeniusoftheGermansoldierandcourageoftheJapaneseoneonthebattlefield,theAlliesmadebetterwarthandidtheAxisnations.Thesuperiorityoftheirstrategic,ifnotalwaystactical,intelligenceapparatuswasakeyelementinthisachievement.DespitethecriticismsofWesternAlliedsecretservicesinthenarrativeabove,theyweremuchmoreeffectivethanthoseoftheirfoes,andoftheSovietUnion.WinstonChurchilldeservescreditforhispersonalengagementwiththesecretservicesingeneralandwithBletchleyParkinparticular,uponwhichheconferredabenignpatronageunmatchedbyanyotherwarleader.Theindispensableelementinmakingallintelligenceuseful,inpeaceorwar,isthatitshouldpassintothehandsofawiseand

effectiveleader;ifsuchapersonisabsent,whethergeneral,admiralorstatesman,theneventhemostprivilegedinformationisworthless.Itissometimesarguedthatcertainnationsdisplayageniusforintelligencewhichotherslack.

AlthoughtheJapaneseconductedmeticuloustacticalreconnaissanceofthetargetsfortheirinitial1941–42assaultsontheWesternPowers,thereaftertheirmindsetprovedill-suitedtothecollectionorobjectiveanalysisofintelligence.TheRussianssustainedtheirhistoricgiftforconspiracy,butmadelittleeffectiveuseofwhattheylearned.TheAmericans’wartimeintelligenceactivitiesweredominatedbysuccessesinbreakingJapanesecodes,thoughtheyalsodeveloped–throughtheResearch&AnalysisdivisionofOSS–amoreeffectivearmforeconomicandpoliticalassessmentthanMI6possessed,orevenrecognisedaneedfor.Ratherthandistinguishingrelativeintelligenceskillsbynationality,itseemsmoreappropriatetodosobyculture.ManyofthefinestintelligenceofficersofallnationswereJews.TheThirdReichpaidheavilyforexcludingthemfromitssecretservices,asalsodidtheSovietUnionwhenitpurgedthemintheearly1950s:SemyonSemyonov,Moscow’sbrilliantagent-runnerinAmerica,wasamongthosethendismissed.ThenationsthatgatheredandusedinformationbestintheSecondWorldWarwerethosecommittedtointellectualhonestyandthepursuitoftruth,whilethosethatfailedwerethedictatorshipstowhichtruthwasinherentlyalien,unacceptable,antipathetic–whichincludedtheSovietUnion.Whiledemocraciesdonotalwaystradeinfrankness,asthemodernexperienceofthe2003IraqWarvividlydemonstrates,atleastmostoftheircitizensarerearedtoregardtruthasavirtue,whilethoseofdictatorshipsarenot.AsfortheguerrillacampaignsconductedinAxis-occupiednations,onlyinYugoslaviaandRussia

between1943and1945didpartisansmakeasignificantcontributiontothefinaloutcome,andeventhereallthebigthingshadtobedonebytheRedArmy.IntheFarEast,SOEandOSScouldachievenothingthatmatteredinsocietiesoverwhelminglypreoccupiedwithriddingthemselvesoftheircolonialmasters,aswellasoftheJapanese.InWesternEurope,theAnglo-AmericansecretservicesperformedausefulfunctionbysustaininganAlliedpresence,andmarginalmilitaryactivity,inadvanceofD-Day,whentheprocessofliberationbeganinearnest.Theirforemostcontribution,however,whichjustifiedtheirexistence,wastoraisebannersthroughouttheoccupiedcountriesbeneathwhichfightersforfreedomcouldrally.TheAlliedagentswhowentforthintooccupiedEuropeofferedasymbolicsacrificewhichmanyoftheirinhabitants–thenon-communistones,atleast–neverforgot.Mostofthesupposedmilitaryachievementsofguerrillas,especiallyinconnectionwithD-Day,

werenegligible:forinstance,thestorythattheResistance‘liberated’partsofFranceinAugust1944isafairytale–theGermanarmyretiredbecauseithadsuffereddefeatinNormandy,withmobsofmaquisardssnappingatitsheels.‘Resistanceissmallbusiness,’saidashrewdOSSofficer,MacdonaldAustin,whoservedinoccupiedFrance.‘Anyattempttomakeitmorethanthatisboundtogowrong.’Yetthemoralcontributionofsecretwar,whichwouldhavebeenimpossiblewithoutthe

sponsorshipofSOEandOSS,wasbeyondprice.Itmadepossibletheresurrectionofself-respectinoccupiedsocietieswhichwouldotherwisehavebeenobligedtolookbackonthesuccessivechaptersoftheirexperienceoftheconflictthroughadarkprism:militaryhumiliation,followedbyenforcedcollaborationwiththeenemy,thenbybelateddeliveranceatthehandsofforeignarmies.Asitwas,andentirelythankstoResistance,allEuropeannationscouldcherishtheircadresofheroesandmartyrs,enablingthemassoftheircitizenswhodidnothing,orwhoservedtheenemy,tobepaintedoveronthegrandcanvascherishedintheperceptionoftheirdescendants.

Finally,ahindsightandaforesight.Thisbookhastraffickedlittleinromance,muchinharshrealities.Yetnoaccountofthesecretwarwouldbecompletewithoutacknowledgingthatformanyagentsservingtheircountriesabroad,especiallywhentheywerewinning,theexperiencewasirresistiblythrilling,evenwhentheirownliveswereimperilled.AwartimeSOEofficerpostedtotheLevantdescribedtheimpactonlocallistenerswhenheusedtheFrenchword‘intelligence’todescribehismission:‘ThesharpintakeofbreathbyArabswhohadreadtheirromanspoliciers,andknewtheomnipotence,omniscienceandruthlessnessoftheBritishSecretService,wasflatteringlyaudible.SomeinstantlyaskedmeifIwasalord.’Helovedit.So,too,didmanyotherspiesofmanynations.Whyelsewouldtheyhavetakenthework?Between1939and1945,secretwarwasstillinitsinfancy.Thevictoriesthatdecidedoutcomes

weresecuredbygreatarmies,fleets,airforces.Inthetwenty-firstcentury,however,itseemseverlessplausiblethatmassuniformedforcesoftheGreatPowers,numberedinmillions,willagainclashinarms.Bycontrasttheimportancetonationalsecurityofintelligence,eavesdropping,codebreakingandcounter-insurgencyhasneverbeengreater.Cyber-warfareisalogicalevolutionoftheprocessthatbeganinRoom40duringWorldWarI,andexpandedvastlyatBletchleyParkandOKH/GdNA,ArlingtonHallandOp-20-GduringWorldWarII.Itwouldbeextravaganttosuggestthatconventionalstrifehasbecomeredundant:inUkraine,VladimirPutinfindsmainbattletankshighlyserviceable.ButhealsoemploystacticsofsubversionbackedbyMoscow’ssecretsoldiersthatwouldcommandtheimmediatesympathyandapplauseofPavelSudoplatov.ElectronicsurveillanceofcommunicationshasbecometheforemostweaponofbothBritainand

theUnitedStatesinidentifyingandmonitoringterroristswithintheirownfrontiersandabroad,tothedismayofsomecivillibertarians.The2013–15revelationsofEdwardSnowden,theformerNSAemployeewhohasseenfittodisclosethescaleofWesterneavesdropping,fromtheawesomelyinappropriatesanctuaryofMoscow,hasdoneimportantdamagetoAmericanandBritishsecurity,andinvitesastabofreliefthathedidnotserveatwartimeBletchleyorArlingtonHall.Heinhabitsanewuniverse,inwhicholddefinitionsofconflict,andalsoofpatriotism,arenolongeruniversallyacknowledged.Thebalanceoftacticsandmethodologyinstrugglesbetweennationshaschanged,ischanging,andwillcontinuetochange.Secretwar,asitwaspractisedbythenationsthatfoughtthe

conflictof1939–45,maywellprovetobefuturewar.

*Theauthormadesucharequestforinformationtotoday’s‘C’inDecember2014,andwastold,albeitinthemostcourteousterms,thattherecanbenobreachoftheprinciplethatMI6’spost-1949archiveremainsclosed.

PictureSection

SoldiersofHitler’sWehrmachtuseanEnigmaciphermachinetoencryptsecretsignals.BreachofEnigmabythecodebreakersofBletchleyParkbecameoneofthegreatestBritishachievementsoftheSecondWorldWar.(©Scherl/SüddeutscheZeitungPhoto)

RUSSIANSPIESANDSPYMASTERS:ZoyaRybkina,pitilessasshewasbeautiful.(BaikalPress)

PavelSudoplatov,whosememoirsprovidesomeofthemostvividtestimonyaboutSovietespionageagainstbothenemiesandsupposedallies.(FromPavelSudoplatov,SpecialTasks)

Acharmingsnapshotofeviloutofhours–LavrentiBeria,Stalin’sforemostsecretpoliceman,holdsStalin’sdaughterSvetlana,whileinthebackgroundthemasteroftheKremlinrelaxeswithhispipe.BeriaprovedbetteratguardingStalinfromtheRussianpeoplethanfrom

hisforeignenemies.(Sovfoto/GettyImages)

VasilyandElizabethZarubin,twoofRussia’smostsuccessfulagent-runnersinEuropeandtheUnitedStates.(FromPavelSudoplatov,SpecialTasks)

RichardSorgeoftheGRU,greatestsecretagentofhistime,thoughhisinfluenceonKremlinpolicyismoredoubtful.(©

Ullsteinbild/TopFoto)

THECODEBREAKERS:AsceneinBletchleyPark’sHut3,probablyinthelatterhalfofthewar,becauseconditionslooklessprimitivethantheywereattheoutset.(BletchleyParkTrust/GettyImages)

Bombes,createdbyAlanTuringin1940,wererevolutionaryelectro-mechanicalaids,heretendedbyWrens.TheydidnotdecryptEnigmasignals,butprovidedvitalacceleratorsfordoingso.(BletchleyParkTrust)

KEYPLAYERSatGC&CS:Welchman,picturedinhisCambridgedays.(BypermissionoftheMasterandFellowsofSidneySussex

College,Cambridge)

Alexander,whoplayedchessforEngland.(FromHarryGolombek,Golombek’sEncyclopediaofChess)

Milner-Barry.(FromHarryGolombek,Golombek’sEncyclopediaofChess)

TuringinyouthfulincarnationasaCambridgeathleteaswellasmathematician.(King’sCollegeLibrary,AMT/K/7/41:AMT)

THEWARATSEAwasmoredramaticallyinfluencedbyUltraintelligencethanthelandstruggle.Aconvoyescortdepth-chargesaU-boat.(NationalArchives&RecordsAdministration,26-G-1517)

AGermansurvivorpleadsforrescue.(NationalArchives&RecordsAdministration,FDR-PHOCO195468)

AremarkablesequenceofpicturesoftheNovember1940GermanscuttlingoftheBritishmerchantmanSSAutomedon,afteritscapturebythecommerce-raiderAtlantiswhilecarryingcabinetdocumentsthatdetailedfortheJapaneseBritishmilitaryweaknessintheFarEast.

(Abt.Militärarchiv/Bundesarchiv)

SPYMASTERS:CanarisoftheAbwehratadinnerpartywithReinhardHeydrichoftheSS.(Scherl/SüddeutscheZeitungPhoto)

SchellenbergoftheRSHA,whotookovertheAbwehrin1944.(UnitedStatesHolocaustMemorialMuseum,courtesyoftheBerlinDocumentCenter)

FrantišekMoravec,whoranCzechintelligencefrom1937to1945.(MilitaryHistoryInstitutePrague)

‘C’,StewartMenzies,chiefofMI6.(EveningStandard/GettyImages)

ONEOFCANARIS’SMEN:HermannGörtz,whospiedfortheAbwehrwithheroicincompetence,hereenjoyingharmonicaaccompanimentfromMarianneEmig,whoaccompaniedhimona1935tourofEnglishairfieldswhichtookhimtoBrixtonprison.In

1940,heparachutedintoIrelandfromaHeinkelbomber.(IMAGNO/AustrianArchives(S)/SüddeutscheZeitungPhoto)

AMERICA’SCODEBREAKERS:TheRegistrationRoomoftheUSArmy’smonitoringunitatAvonTyrell,partoftheout-stationofArlingtonHallinBritain.(FromStephenBudiansky,BattleofWits)

JoeRochefortoftheUSNavy,themanwhomadepossibleAmericanvictoryatMidwayinJune1942,wagsafingeratfellowdomino-playersaboardthecruiserUSSIndianapolis,inafashionthathelpstoexplainseniorofficers’disdainforhim.(PhotobyCarl

Mydans/TheLIFEPictureCollection/GettyImages)

TommyDyer,mostbrilliantcryptanalystofRochefort’steamin‘theDungeon’atPearlHarbor.(FromElliotCarlson,JoeRochefort’sWar)

StarsoftheUSArmy’sSignalsIntelligenceService.Inthecentre,standing,isFrankRowlett,creditedas‘themanwhobrokePurple’,withAbrahamSinkovtohisleftandbelow,incivilianclothes,thepioneerWilliamFriedman.(FromStephenBudiansky,BattleofWits)

LEADERSOFTHEREDORCHESTRA:LibertasandHarroSchulze-Boysen.(CollectionMegele/SüddeutscheZeitungPhoto)

ArvidandMildredHarnack.AllfoursuffereddreadfuldeathsinNazihands.(GedenkstätteDeutscherWiderstand/Bundesarchiv,Plak009-009A-020)

SOVIETSPIESINEUROPE:AlexanderFoote.(JayRobertNashCollection/CRIAImages)

AlexanderRadó.(TheNationalArchives,KV2/1647)

AnatoliGourevitch.(FromAnatoliGourevitch,UncertainmonsieurKent)

RudolfRössler.(dpa/SüddeutscheZeitungPhoto)

UrsulaHamburger.(JayRobertNashCollection/CRIAImages)

LeopoldTrepper.(TheNationalArchives,KV2-20741)

SECRETWARRIORS:ItalianSOEagentPaoladelDininparachutekit,animagethatcapturestheterrificemotionalchargemanyagentsgainedfromtheirroles.(FromMarcusBinney,TheWomenWhoLivedforDanger)

OlufReed-Olsenstandsontherightinaphotographoftwocarbine-wieldingNorwegians.(FromOlufReed-Olsen,TwoEggsonMyPlate)

Frenchagent-runner‘ColonelRémy’.(RuedesArchives/Tallandier/SüddeutscheZeitungPhoto)

‘Cicero’relaxes.(FromElyesaBazna,IWasCicero)

NigelCliveofMI6.(FromNigelClive,AGreekExperience)

RonaldSethofSOE,‘Blunderhead’,picturedwhileinGermanhands.(FromRonaldSeth,ASpyHasNoFriends)

SterlingHaydenofOSS.(©JohnSpringerCollection/CORBIS)

HughTrevor-RoperofMI6,whoby1945knewfarmoreabouttheopeionsoftheAbwehrthananyGerman.(TheLiteraryEstateofLordDacreofGlanton)

BillBentinck,chairmanofBritain’sJointIntelligenceCommittee.(PhotobyTonyLinck/TheLIFEPictureCollection/GettyImages)

AwardrobespecialistatOSS’sLondonstationdressesanAmericanagentforamissioninthelatestContinentalfashion.(JosephE.PersicoPapers,EnvelopeA,HooverInstitutionArchives:CourtesyofHooverInstitutionLibrary&Archives,StanfordUniversity)

TRAITORS:TheyoungAnthonyBlunt,beforehebecameanofficerofMI5andaninformantoftheNKVD.(PhotobyLyttonStrachey/FrancesPartridge/GettyImages)

ARussianstampcelebratingKimPhilby’scontributiontotheRevolution.(PhotobyTerryAshe/TheLIFEPictureCollection/GettyImages)

DonaldandMelindaMacleanwiththeirchildrenonatransatlanticliner.(PhotobyKeystone-France/Gamma-Keystone/GettyImages)

AlgerHisssuccessfullybluffingouthisevidencetotheHouseCommitteeonUn-AmericanActivitiesin1948–hewaslongdeadbeforehistreasonwasconfirmed.(PhotobyThomasD.Mcavoy/TheLIFEPictureCollection/GettyImages)

JohnMaynardKeynesinamicableconversewithHarryDexterWhite,oneofMoscow’smostimportantUSsecretsources.(PhotobyThomasD.Mcavoy/TheLIFEPictureCollection/GettyImages)

GERMANS:Hitler,theAllies’bestfriendinfrustratingintelligenceanalysis,withcourtiersincludingKeitel,GöringandRibbentrop.(Ullsteinbild/GettyImages)

AgeneralstaffofficerextendshimselftoexploreSovietdeployments.(CourtesyoftheNationalCryptologicMuseum)

TheV-2,whichalarmedtheAlliesandsetthemoneofthemostintractableintelligencepuzzlesofthewar.(FromR.V.Jones,MostSecretWar)

RESISTANCE:Oneoftheseminalimagesofthesecretwar–FrenchmenuseabrengunsuppliedbytheBritishtoharassGermansfleeingFranceinAugust1944.(©Bettmann/CORBIS)

AnSOEtraineesetschargesonarailwayline.(ImperialWarMuseum,HU056936)

AnSOEtraineewiresLondon.(NationalArchives,HS5/121)

ThreeSASofficersofthe‘Bulbasket’missiontoFrance,June1944.Lt.TwmStephenswearstheciviliandisguiseinwhichherodeabicycletoChâtelleraulttoreconnoitrepetroltrains,intendedtofueltheDasReich2ndSSArmouredDivision,forattackbyRAF

Mosquitoes.OnlyJohnTonkin,ontheleftwiththepipe,survivedtheoperation.(FromMaxHastings,DasReich)

BaronŌshima,picturedherewithNaziforeignministerRibbentrop,Japan’sambassadorinBerlin,andthroughPurpledecryptstheAllies’bestsecretagentofthewar.(NationalArchives&RecordsAdministration,111-SC-285496)

ONSLAUGHTINTHEARDENNES:Hitler’slastthrowinDecember1944,whichranksasoneoftheAllies’greatintelligencefailuresofthewar.(©Bettmann/CORBIS)

SPIESANDCOUNTERSPIES:‘WildBill’Donovanin1941doingwhathelikedbest,talkingtoreporters.(PhotobyMPI/GettyImages)

Donovan’sOSSstationchiefinBern,AllenDulles.(©Bettmann/CORBIS)

FBIdirectorJ.EdgarHoover.(PhotobyGeorgeSkadding/TheLIFEPictureCollection/GettyImages)

ApriestgivessolacetoahaplessGerman‘line-crosser’beforeheisshotbyanAmericanfiringsquadinNovember1944.(CriticalPast)

IlyaTolstoy(centre)andcompanionsontheirfantasticOSSmissiontoTibet.(PhotobyCapt.BrookeDolan,fromNationalGeographicMagazine,August1946,Vol.XC,No.2)

THEEASTERNFRONT:AlexanderDemyanov,keyfigurein‘Monastery’,themostastoundingRussiandeceptionoperationofthewar,photographedin1943.(FromPavelSudoplatov,SpecialTasks)

Col.ReinhardGehlen,attheextremerightofthephoto,theGermanintelligencechiefwhobecameadupeoftheNKVD.(©Ullsteinbild/TopFoto)

TheoccupiedpeoplesofRussiawereequallyliabletobeshotbyeitherside.Peasantsleadoutasupposedtraitorforexecution.(FromDavidMountfield,ThePartisans)

GermanspreparetoinflictNazijusticeonapeasant.(FromDavidMountfield,ThePartisans)

BLETCHLEY’SFINESTHOUR:Colossus,theworld’sfirstcomputer,createdbyCambridgemathematicianMaxNewmanandPostOfficeengineerTommyFlowers.TheircreationenabledGC&CStoreadsometopsecrettrafficoftheGermanLorenzteleprinter,which

employedanentirelydifferentencryptionsystemfromEnigma.(BletchleyParkTrust/GettyImages)

MaxNewman.(BypermissionoftheMasterandFellowsofStJohn’sCollege,Cambridge)

TommyFlowers.(CourtesyofKennethFlowers)

TheGermanLorenzteleprinter.(CourtesyofSteveMontanaPhotography)

TheyoungmathematicianBillTutte,whobysheerbrainpoweridentifiedthecharacteristicsoftheLorenz,anddeservestobealmostascelebratedasAlanTuring.(TrinityCollege,Cambridge)

R.V.Jones,thegreatBritishscientificintelligenceofficer,withhisfamilyata1945BuckinghamPalaceinvestiture.(FromR.V.Jones,MostSecretWar)

AcknowledgementsBecausethisismyfirstbookexplicitlyaboutintelligence,myforemostdebtsaretohistorianswithspecialistknowledge,whohavebeenkindenoughtogivemeassistanceatvariousstages.ProfessorSirMichaelHowardOMCHMC,theofficialhistorianofBritishwartimedeception,readandcommenteduponmydraftmanuscript,ashehasdonesooftenandimportantlyforotherbooksofmineinthepast.IalsoreceivedvaluableguidancefrommyoldfriendAntonyBeevor,whocopiedformeAlbertPraun’simportantGermansigintreport,areallabourofloveforafellowhistorian;RichardAldrich,DavidKahn,AlanPetty,ChristopherAndrew,ChrisBellamyandtwoofthesecretworld’sarchivists,whoinkeepingwithtraditionwishtoremainanonymous.None,ofcourse,bearstheslightestresponsibilityformyjudgementsanderrors.MyobligationisimmensetoRalphErskine,afountofinformationabouteveryaspectofwartimecryptanalysis,whichisbothamazeandaminefieldfortheuninitiated.Hecorrectedahostofmistakesinmyoriginaldraft,someofthemegregious,andprovidedmewithmanysourcereferencesandpointers;mytextisimmeasurablyimprovedbyhisattentions.WilliamSpencerattheBritishNationalArchivesandTimNenningerattheUSNationalArchiveswerewonderfullyhelpful,asever,aswasmydearfriendRickAtkinson,apeerlesshistorianoftheUSArmy.Likealmosteveryauthorintheland,IgivedailythanksfortheLondonLibraryanditspeerlessstaff.ImustreprisemygratitudetoDrLyubaVinogradovnaforresearchingandtranslatingamassofRussianmaterial,andtoSusanneSchmidtfordoinglikewisewithGermandocuments,notablyfromtheFreiburgArchive.MyoldfriendandcolleagueDonBerryreadthemanuscriptasanexperteditorwhobroughtanon-specialist’seyetomytext.Virtuallyallthewartimegenerationofintelligenceofficersarenowgone,butindecadesgonebyI

wasfortunateenoughtointerviewmanymenandwomenwhoservedwithSOE,OSSandMI6,togetherwithsomeoftheirContinentalagentsandinformants.Thoseencountersweresignificant,Ithink,inhelpingmetounderstandthenatureofthesecretwar,theextraordinarychallengesfacedbythosewhowagedit,togetherwiththesacrificesmadebythosewhobecameitscasualties.IneverceasetothankmystarsforthesupportofMichaelSissonsandPeterMatson,myagentsin

LondonandNewYorkrespectively.MyrelationshipwithHarperCollinsinBritain,andespeciallywithArabellaPike,RobertLaceyandHelenEllis,hasbeenunfailinglyhappy.ItisanewdelighttoworkwithJonathanJaoofHarperCollinsintheUS.MysecretaryRachelLawrencehasenduredmyfrailtiesandsavedmefrommyfolliesforalmostthirtyyearsnow.MywifePennyhasservednearlyaslongasentenceinmycompany;Iamfearfulthatshewillsoondemandparole,asajustrewardforsaintlybehaviour.

NotesandSourcesItdeservesrenewedemphasisthatscepticismisessentialaboutallaccountsrelatedtointelligenceineverynation,andthustothememoirsofagents,officialreports,publishedhistoriesandevencontemporarydocuments.Almosteveryonewhoparticipatedinthesecretwarlied,andsometimesitwastheirjobtodoso.Thisbookrepresentsanattempttodescribeandexplainwhathappened,butitwouldbeabsurdtopretendtovouchforitsauthenticity.ThememoirsofPavelSudoplatov,forinstance,makefascinatingreading,andconstitutealmosttheonlyavailabletestimonyaboutsomeRussianaspectsofthewartimestory.Partsofhisnarrativeareundoubtedlytrue,butitisimpossibletobesurewhich.Thesameappliestoaccountsgivenbymanyotherformerintelligenceofficers,Russian,German,British,AmericanandJapanesealike.AmassofdocumentarymaterialisavailablenotonlyintheUSNationalArchivesinMaryland,butnowalsoonline:thepost-warAmericanTICOMstudiesoftheradiointelligencestruggleareespeciallyrelevantanduseful.AlargebodyofmaterialrelatingtoBritishintelligenceisaccessibleintheNationalArchivesat

Kew.ThisincludessomeMI6papers,buttheservice’sownfileshaveneverbeenopenedtoanyhistoriansaveitsofficialchronicler,KeithJeffery,adecadeago,andhewasdebarredfromnaminginformants,evenlong-deadones,inhispublishednarrative.BecausetheavailablematerialsuggeststhatMI6–otherthanitssubordinatebranch,GC&CS–playedamarginalroleinwartimeintelligence,defendersoftheservicemakethepointthatonlyalimitedproportionofitsowncontemporaryarchivehassurvivedforscrutiny,byKeithJefferyoranyoneelse.Thus,loyalsecretservantsargue,itisplausiblethatdetailsofmanygooddeedsperformedbyBroadway’smenhavebeenlost.Thisispossible,butdoubtful.MyownscepticismaboutMI6’sperformanceisinfluencedbythenumberofinformedcontemporarywitnesseswhothoughtpoorlyofStewartMenziesandhisseniorofficers,notallofthemasjaundicedasHughTrevor-RoperorMalcolmMuggeridge.ThelikesofBillBentinck,AlexanderCadoganandNigelClivehadnoaxestogrind.Anestimated13percentofSOE’sfilessurvive,andhavebeenavailableforsomeyearsto

historiansandstudentsintheNationalArchives.ChristopherAndrew’sauthorisedhistoryofMI5containsmuchfascinatinginformation,andquotessomeimportantinternaldocuments.TheSovietintelligencearchiveshaveneverbeenopenedtoresearchers,butsubstantialquantitiesofmaterialderivedfromthemhavebeenpublishedincollectionsoverthepasttwodecades.Wemayassumethatmostofthesepapersareauthentic,andtheyarecertainlyfascinatingtohistorians.Butthereisanimportantcaveat:Moscowhasreleaseddocumentsonahighlyselectivebasis,designedtoshowitswartimeintelligenceservicesinthebestpossiblelight.Thus,itisnomorepossibletoachievearoundedassessmentoftheGRU’sandNKVD’sactivitiesfromwhatmodernRussiachoosestoreveal

thanbystudyingalistofaracingtipster ’swinnerswithoutreferencetothealso-rans.Moscowmakessomeambitiousclaimsfortheachievementsofitswartimecodebreakers,buthasthusfarproducedlittledocumentaryevidencetosupportthem,beyondsomedecryptsofwhichtheoriginsareunspecified;untilitdoesso,itseemsreasonabletoattributetonationalisticexuberanceitsprofessionstohavematchedBletchleyandArlingtonHall.MeanwhileasubstantialbodyofAbwehrandGermanarmystaffintelligenceassessmentsisheldbytheMilitaryArchiveinFreiburg,where–forinstance–itispossibletoreadalmosttheentireoutputof‘AgentMax’,composedbyMoscowCentreforthedelectationofReinhardGehlen.Inthenotesbelow,theBritishNationalArchivesaredesignatedasUKNA;theirUScounterpartas

USNA;Germany’smilitaryarchiveisgivenasFreiburg.

Introduction

AllaspectsofPaunMSp.15Friedmanonlinearchive,seeBibliographyforaccessdetails

Histransportationexpenses’Kahn,DavidHitler’sSpiesHodder&Stoughton1978p.198

‘Therehasneverbeen’Jones,DrR.V.MostSecretWarHeinemann1978p.7

Chapter1–BeforetheDeluge

‘TheAbwehrsomehow’Jones,DrR.V.ReflectionsonIntelligenceLondon1984pp.69–70

‘[MI6]valuesinformation’StewartHampshireinTrevor-Roper,HughTheWartimeJournalsed.RichardDavenport-HinesI.B.Tauris2012p.149Apr1943

‘Underoursystem’Liddell,GuyTheGuyLiddellDiariesed.NigelWesttwovolsRoutledge2005vol.Ip.86

‘Practicallyeveryofficer’Usborne,RichardClublandHeroesConstable1953p.1

‘Foreignintelligenceservicesenvied’Sisman,AdamHughTrevor-RoperWeidenfeld&Nicolson2010p.90

‘TheAirMinistrycomplained’Jeffery,KeithMI6:TheHistoryoftheSecretIntelligenceServiceBloomsbury2010p.287

‘On25July,aBritishdelegation…’ThisaccountisbaseduponthatgiveninRalphErskine’s‘ThePolesRevealtheirSecrets:AlastairDenniston’sAccountoftheJuly1939MeetingatPyry’Cryptologia22.11.2006

‘Weweredailyinundated’Cadogan,AlexanderTheDiariesofSirAlexanderCadogan1938–45ed.DavidDilksCassell1971p.158

‘Instead,however,Sinclair’s’UKNAFO1093/127

‘Iacceptedthebrutality’Sudoplatov,PavelSpecialTasksLittle,Brown1994p.62

‘atanironmonger’sshop’Foote,AlexanderAHandbookforSpiesMuseumPress1949p.22

‘Ithinkthatfromthattime’ibid.p.38

Chapter2–TheStormBreaks

‘insteadofstarting’JonesIntelligencep.274

‘casualsourcesshouldnot’ibid.p.275

‘TheVenloincident’UKNAFO1093/200-202

‘Ithinkthey[theGerman’Cadoganp.226

‘Althoughinthefollowing’Moravec,FrantišekMasterofSpiesBodleyHead1975p.52

‘thepermanentunder-secretaryordered’Cadoganp.23110.11.39

‘therealniggerinthewoodpile’Liddellvol.Ip.51

‘wehadacontinuousstream’Strong,KennethIntelligenceattheTopGiniger1968p.55

‘RegJonescited’JonesIntelligencep.216

‘cantosomeextentbe’Liddellvol.Ip.32

‘Perfectintelligenceinwar’BillWilliamsinUSNARG457Entry9002SRH037

‘AGermanaeroplanecamedown’Liddellp.57

‘completeplanofGermaninvasion’Cadoganp.24513.1.40

‘SooftenIhave’Strongp.61

‘buthe’srathermercurial’Cadoganp.248

‘Col.Handeeming’PraunMSp.53;Friedmanonlinearchive,seeBibliographyforaccessdetails

‘brilliantineveryrespect’Behrendt,Hans-OttoRommel’sIntelligenceintheDesertCampaignKimber1980p.59

‘carryingimportantlists’ibid.p.219

‘Guidelinesfortheinterrogation’FreiburgArchiveR6060551/2&2/2

‘Theofficers(andmostofthemen)’Lockhart,BruceDiariesp.4716.1.40

‘LikeallSouthAfricans’FreiburgarchiveRW4/320-84June1941

‘MI6’sMajorMontyChidson’Jefferyp.386

‘MI5spurnedtorture’Liddellp.98

‘NavalIntelligenceDivisioninterrogators’McLachlan,DonaldRoom39:NavalIntelligenceinAction1939–45Weidenfeld&Nicolson1968p.176

‘theWarOffice’sdirector’Strongp.69

‘our“intelligence”givesnothing’Cadoganp.318

‘Littleornoreliance’Aldrich,RichardIntelligenceandtheWarAgainstJapanCambridge2000p.376.1.41

‘Inothercircumstances’Sukulov-Gourevitch,AnatoliUnCertainMonsieurKentGrasset1995p.117

‘wascomposedalmostentirely’ibid.p.129

‘Writersofthrillers’Muggeridge,MalcolmTheInfernalGroveCollins1973p.117

‘followingtheinterrogations’Strongp.94

‘Iamforeverdiscovering’Trevor-RoperJournalsp.33

‘mindofamountedspectator’Sismanp.107

‘Intheworldofneurotic’ibid.p.88

‘irreverentthoughts’ibid.p.89

‘ateamofabrilliance’ibid.p.96

‘Withthefinestfeel’KahnSpiesp.228

‘ThewriterCyrilConnolly’Langhorne,Richarded.DiplomacyandIntelligenceDuringtheSecondWorldWar:EssaysinHonourofF.H.HinsleyCambridge1985Andrewessayp.31

‘HereturnedsafelytoEurope’UKNAWO208/5542SIR1595,1598

‘wesoonbecameawarethat’Sismanp.119

‘on28March1941hetoldSzymanska’Jefferypp.381–2

‘thiscannotbe’KahnSpiesp.187

‘Himmlerin1944declared’ibid.p.270

‘Leadersinademocraticsystem’Handel,Michaeled.StrategicandOperationalDeceptionintheSecondWorldWarFrankCass1987p.119

‘TheYServicewasthebest’Behrendtp.49

‘thisincomparablesource’ibid.p.167

‘amirrorimageof[MI6]’Sismanp.117

Chapter3–MiraclesTakeaLittleLonger:Bletchley

‘StewartMenzies,knowing’Jefferyp.332

‘whetherornotCryptanalysis’ibid.p.335

‘WithinaweekIwas’Annan,NoelOurAgeWeidenfeld&Nicolson1990p.223

‘Itisthelawyer’McLachlanp.343

‘Itmustbemade’UKNAWO208/3575

‘Aneutraltraveller’UKNAWO169/18

‘Itispiteoustofindourselves’Jefferyp.401

‘Myimpressionis’Howarth,PatrickIntelligenceChiefExtraordinaryBodleyHead1986p.144

‘Wenolongerdepend’Strongp.98

‘TheachievementsofGerman’PraunMSp.129

‘gaveGermancommanders’ibid.p.3

‘Ifheistostay’Hodges,AndrewAlanTuring:TheEnigmaofIntelligenceAllen&Unwin1983p.26

‘Ilikedhissly’Annanp.237

‘Doyouhavereligious’Hinsley,F.H.&Stripp,AlanCodebreakers:TheInsideStoryofBletchleyParkOUP1993HughDenhamp.264

‘You’vetravelledabit’quotedAndrewessayinLanghornep.31

‘Onasnowy’Lucas,F.L.inEnigma:TheBattlefortheCodeWeidenfeld&Nicolson1980p.36

‘ByJove’Jones,R.V.IntelligenceandNationalSecurity91994p.2

‘It’samazinghow’Budiansky,StephenBattleofWitsPenguin2000p.114

‘almosttotalinability’Budianskyp.159

‘Theidealcryptanalyst’ibid.p.135

‘patience,accuracy,stamina’ChristopherMorrisinHinsley&Strippp.243

‘Whenanewword’Skillen,HughEnigmaanditsAchillesHeelPinner1992p.48

‘Iwasabouttoreturn’Baring,SarahTheRoadtoStationXWilton652000p.93

‘WilliamMillwardrecalled’MillwardinHinsley&Strippp.28

‘Ifnotsatisfied’Calvocoressi,PeterTopSecretUltraCassell1980

‘DOCNOTE,IDISSENT’JackGoodinHinsley&Strippp.160

‘entirelydependentonHerivel’Welchman,GordonTheHutSixStoryMcGraw-Hill1982p.101

‘someEasterngoddess’Winterbotham,F.W.TheUltraSecretFutura1975p.33

‘BuiltbytheBritishTabulatingMachine’Welchmanp.140

‘Itwaslikealotofknitting’McKay,SinclairTheSecretLifeofBletchleyParkAurum2010p.106

‘probabledateofendingpreparations’UKNAHW1/3

‘thegreatestdisappointment’StuartMilner-BarryinHinsley&Strippp.98

‘CAS[ChiefofAirStaff]Howmanyhours’ibid.

‘Manyofthecryptanalysts’Annanp.236

‘Cryptanalystshavetobehandled’UKNAHW14/13

‘Itisaseriouscharge’RalphErskinetotheauthor27.4.15

‘Despitethehightension’ThomasinHinsley&Strippp.45

‘Itsfilesrecorddetails’UKNAHW14/4315.7.42

‘Therewasmuchsnapping’UKNAHW14/11Jan1941

‘Althoughanexcellentlinguist’UKNAHW14/13

‘WrenKenwickisinaccurate’McKayp.151

‘nineteenyear-oldmathematician’Smith,MichaelandErskine,RalphedsActionThisDayp.104

‘Itwasacknowledgedthat’Grey,ChristopherIntelligenceandNationalSecurity28no.6Dec2013pp.705–807

‘Ihadleftasoneof’BennettessayinHinsley&Strippp.38

‘devotedtothetask’Taunt,DerekinActionThisDayp.82

‘exemplaryleadership’ibid.p.207

‘Mytouchinessisprobably’UKNAHW14/37

‘MI5boughtupandpulped’Liddellvol.Ip.33

‘highlycommendable’McKayp.104

‘Newfacesarebeing’UKNAHW14/13

‘Therehavebeenrecent’UKNAHW14/3711.5.42

‘Awonderfulsetofprofessors’Brooke,AlanWarDiaries1939–45ed.AlexDanchevandDanielTodmanWeidenfeld&Nicolson2001p.250

‘thewholeEnigmaisgarbage!’KahnKahnOnCodesp.113

‘InMarch1943,twosuch’Budianskyp.241

‘runningamistress’Liddellvol.Ip.264

‘Donovan…isextremelyfriendly’Kennedy,SirJohnMS,King’sCollegeLondon,LiddellHartArchive7.3.41

‘Whatwilltheythink’Jefferyp.44

‘averygoodfellow’Liddellvol.Ip.11611.12.40

‘mightwinthewar’USNARG65Box124

‘InJanuary1941,whenanAmerican’ThisaccountisbasedonRalphErskine‘WhatdidtheSinkovMissionReceivefromBletchleyPark?’Cryptologia22.9.2007

‘thatforBritainUltra’BudianskyinActionThisDayp.222

‘thegeneralpolicyistobe’UKNAWO193/306

‘stillrevealinstancesofgross’UKNACAB120/768

Chapter4–TheDogsthatBarked

‘AsearlyasJuly1940’Sotskov,L.F.ed.Aggressiya.RassekrechennyedokumentysluzhbyrazvedkiRF,1939–41(Aggression:DeclassifiedDocumentsoftheForeignIntelligenceServiceoftheRussianFederation)Moscow2001p.222

‘TheGermanshaveraised’Gorodetsky,GabrielGrandDelusion:StalinandtheGermanInvasionofRussiaYale1999p.58

‘Pressurewastobeexerted’ibid.p.57

‘VsevolodMerkulov,Beria’sdeputy’ibid.p.114

‘remainedthedecisivefocus’ibid.p.122

‘Wehavecompletelyaltered’ibid.p.133

‘themajorityoftheintelligence’ibid.p.135

‘Whatnewsfrom“thevillage”?’Gourevitchp.87

‘Iamlonely’Prange,GordonTargetTokyo:TheStoryoftheSorgeSpyRingMcGraw-Hill1984p.342

‘Berlinhasinformed’Sorgedispatchesp.277,document150TsAMORFf.23,op.24127,d.2,l.422

‘Ithinkthatonecannever’Gorodetskyp.53

‘Nospecialassignments’Peshchersky,VladimirKrasnayaKapella:SovetskayarazvedkaprotivabveraiGestapo(RoteKapelle:TheSovietIntelligenceServiceAgainsttheAbwehrandGestapo)Moscow2000p.70

‘Mostsignificantly,hetold’Sotskovp.141

‘TheNKVDFifthDepartment’s’ibid.p.234

‘on7February1941’ibid.p.256

‘Nextdaycameanother’ibid.p.258

‘Thiswasfollowedby’ibid.p.262etseq.

‘“Breitenbach”reportedthattheBritish’ibid.p.27119.3.41

‘Kuckhoffstrikesone’ibid.pp.165–6

‘rumoursaboutGermany’sattack’ibid.p.391

‘Wecanpumpwhateverinformation’Gorodetskyp.53

‘Behrenswasanyway’ibid.p.176

‘Moreover,on20June’Sotskovp.490

‘anti-Sovietelements’Gorodetskyp.301

‘AvisitingAmerican’JohnDeaneinWaller,DouglasWildBillDonovanSimon&Schuster2012p.223

‘anervousFitinscribbled’Sotskovp.461

‘theusualcontradictoryrumours’UKNAFO371/29479N1390/78

‘Germanplanisasfollows’UKNAFO371/26518C2919/19/18

‘InearlyApriltheJIC’s’UKNAFO371/29479N1364/78/38and29465N1713/3/38

‘Aslateas23May’UKNAWO208/1761jic41/218

‘CrippstoldtheAmericanambassador’USStateDepartment740.0011EW/39/89197.3.41

‘TheNKVDalsosuggested’Gorodetskyp.185

‘TheyrespondedthatBerlin’ibid.p.187

‘On24May,when’ibid.p.222

‘Buthealsostated’Sudoplatovp.123

‘Theonlycertainthing’Gorodetskyp.306

‘Misinformation!Youmaygo’ibid.p.206

Chapter5–DivineWinds

‘Thesagavividlyillustrates’ThisaccountisprincipallybaseduponSekiEiji’sMrsFerguson’sTeaSet:JapanandtheSecondWorldWarGlobalOriental2000

‘likesearchingforveryfine’Kotani,KenJapaneseIntelligenceinWorldWarIIOsprey2009p.32

‘The[US]ArmyandNavy’ibid.p.83

‘characteristicimpertinence’Liddellvol.Ip.161

‘InJapanwearein’Kotanip.20

‘ItisexpectedthattheGermans’ibid.p.101

‘Ibecameawareof’ibid.p.71

‘HewasrecruitedbyTokyo’seeElphick&SmithOddManOutHodder&Stoughton1993

‘Hereportedthreetimes’JohnHurtMSinFriedmanPapersBox212‘TheJapaneseProblemintheSignalsIntelligenceService’1930–45p.28

‘Rochefortwasborn’TheprincipalsourceforthebiographicalinformationthatfollowsisElliotCarlson’sJoeRochefort’sWarNavalInstitutePressAnnapolis2011

‘makesyoufeel’ibid.p.35

‘Thefewpersonswho’ibid.p.39

‘theresultstheyachieved’ibid.p.21

‘forgetPearlHarbor’Holmes,W.J.Double-EdgedSecrets:USNavalIntelligenceOperationsinthePacificDuringWorldWarIINavalInstitutePress1979p.43

‘Now,theregoes’ibid.p.96

‘Inthedefensivestages’USNARG457Box78SRH264

‘theenemyhadgrasped’Kotanip.87

Chapter6–MuddlingandGroping:TheRussiansatWar

‘Areyousure’Sudoplatovp.127

‘Thenewlyliberatedofficers’ibid.p.128

‘Itishardtosuppose’Andrew,Christopher&Mirokhin,VasiliTheMitrokhinArchiveAllenLane1999p.106

‘Since1939Sudoplatov’Sudoplatovp.112

‘Hewasamanwho’ibid.p.113

‘Peoplelikeyou’ibid.p.114

‘Wedidnotgohome’Voskresenskaya,ZoyaTeperyamoguskazatpravdu(NowICanTelltheTruth)Moscow1993

‘Heappearedtome’Sudoplatovp.150

‘AmodernRussian’VelikayaOtechestvennayaVoina1941–1945godov(TheGreatPatrioticWarof1941–1945)vol.VI(IntelligenceandCounterIntelligenceDuringtheGreatPatrioticWar)Moscow2013p.196

‘Itisamistake’Masterman,J.C.TheDouble-CrossSystemGranada1979p.32

‘SergeiTolstoy’L.A.Kuzmin,inanessayentitled‘Nezabyvatsvoikhgeroev’(WeMustNotForgetOurHeroes),claimsthatTolstoy’steambroketheJapaneseOrange,RedandPurpleciphers

‘Allthatseemscertain’VelikayaOtechestvennayaVoina1941–1945godov(TheGreatPatrioticWarof1941–1945)vol.VIp.196

‘Westerncryptographicexperts’RalphErskinemadethispointtotheauthor5.4.2015

‘Hewasanunusuallygifted’ThisnarrativeisbasedontheaccountinDegtyarev,Klim&Kolpakidi,AleksandrVneshnyayaRazvedkaSSSR(SovietForeignIntelligence)Moscow2009p.130etseq.

‘Almosteveryoffensive’FranzHalderina1967interviewwithDerSpiegel

‘Radórevealedafterthewar’Byendorsingapublishedversionofhisstory,Moscow’sEyebyGermanjournalistBerndRuland

‘Bythismeansthespy’Peshcherskyp.235

‘abig,imposinghouse’Gourevitchp.159etseq.

‘I’mthrilledtoseeyou’ibid.p.164

‘Icouldnotridmyself’ibid.p.165

‘ArmyGroupB,saidtheRoteKapelle’KorovinV.V.SovetskayarazvedkaIkontrrazvedkavgodyVelikoiOtechestvennoivoiny(SovietIntelligenceandCounter-IntelligenceDuringtheGreatPatrioticWar)Moscow2003p.48

‘ThissummertheGermans’ibid.p.49

‘Germany’scounter-intelligenceagencies’EchterkampfSecondWorldWarvol.IX/1p.821etseq.

Chapter7–Britain’sSecretWarMachine

‘theresultsofwhich’ThereisanexemplaryaccountofthisandrelatedMediterraneannavalactionsinRichardWoodman’sMaltaConvoysJohnMurray2000p.244etseq.

‘AdmiralCiliax’ssquadron’ThisaccountischieflybasedonHinsleyetal.BritishIntelligencevol.IIpp.179–88

‘atacticalvictory’Roskill,S.W.TheWaratSeaHMSO1956vol.IIp.159

‘Thebestarrangement’Cradock,PercyKnowYourEnemy:HowtheJICSawtheWorldJohnMurray2002

‘ItwaslikeaFrenchfarce’Howarthp.113

‘veryimpressive…Hehadatemperament’ibid.p.171

‘AnadvancebytheAxis’UKNACAB81/103

‘leadingmychoir’Howarthp.143

‘ratherasanarmycommander’JonesIntelligencep.91

‘theBritisharmiesandthenew’Howarthp.171

‘tousetheSoviet[front]’UKNACAB81/103

‘Assumingthatthecampaign’UKNACAB81/103

‘Wethinkherinclination’UKNACAB81/103

‘aGermanintouchwith’UKNACAB81/103

‘IfElizabethhadtaken’Trevelyan,G.M.AShortHistoryofEnglandPelican1959p.256

‘Ithink,Captain’McLachlanp.264

‘spokeillofmany’Dalton,HughTheWarDiariesofHughDaltoned.BenPimlottJonathanCape1986p.58

‘DesperateDesmond’Lockhartp.23015.3.43

‘acuriouscreature’Howarthp.144

‘Althoughheknew’BennettManofMysteryp.250

‘WhenIlookedcoolly’Sismanp.90

‘Idonotthinkheever’Trevor-RoperSecretWorldp.103

‘Isitnecessarytoargue’Sismanp.107

‘Trevor-Roperfoundhimself’ibid.pp.109–10

‘Ifgoodworkresultsin’JonesIntelligencep.158

‘OnlyBletchleykept’Howarthp.115

‘Intelligenceisonly’Schlesinger,ArthurM.ALifeintheTwentiethCenturyMariner2000p.328

‘It’shopelessconducting’Cadoganp.4056.9.41

‘Theyaretoberegarded’UKNAHW14/13

‘TheBritishservice’seeHastings,MaxBomberCommandMichaelJoseph1979p.98

‘Thescienceofdestroying’UKNACAB163/6

‘Itisstriking’Bonsall,A.AnUphillStruggle:TheProvisionofTacticalSigintSupporttotheAlliedAirForcesinEuropeinWWIIandStubbington,JohnKeptintheDarkp.205

‘Likethedriver’McLachlanp.2

‘ifnotthewisest’ibid.p.2

‘On11March1942C-in-C’UKNAADM205/23

‘Soreliablewas’McLachlanp.38

‘entertainingattheRitz’ibid.p.174

‘Theenemypossessed’TICOMfilesonline,GermanNavalCommunicationsIntelligenceSRH-024,p.21

‘Themostcompletesingle’ibid.p.25

‘Theconvoysthenatsea’ibid.p.22

‘themoreimportantciphers’ErskineActionThisDaypp.374–5

‘whetherandtowhat’DönitzMemoirs:TenYearsandTwentyDaysp.143

‘AfterthewarDonaldMcLachlan’McLachlanp.340

Chapter8–‘Mars’:TheBloodiestDeception

‘Inthewinterof1941’PraunMSp.98

‘TheBritishwerealarmed’UKNAHW14/62Dec.1942,HW14/33,HW14/60,HW14/19,HW14/17.ThereisfurtherdetailonUKmonitoringofGermaninterceptsoftheEasternFrontinHW14/27,HW14/29,HW14/62,HW14/28andHW14/33.Thereareusefulinsightsintothe‘Mars’deceptionintheInformationBulletinoftheRussianAssociationofSecondWorldWarHistoriansno.6200p.16etseq.

‘theGermanscanread’UKNAHW14/19

‘FHO’schiefoffered’FreiburgArchivesRH2/1981,sheet46–51ForeignArmiesEast

‘Earlyin1942,during’Damaskin,IgorStalinirazvedka(StalinandtheIntelligenceService)Moscow2004p.284etseq.

‘ThechaosintheGRU’ibid.p.285

‘Evenaslateas19June’Damaskinp.287

‘The6Novemberreportshould’FreiburgArchiveRH2/1957,sheets180,183

‘veryhighlyvalued’UKNACAB154/105

‘Heandhissectionpuzzled’UKNAHW19/347

‘MAXmustberegarded’Liddellvol.IIp.99

‘PavelSudoplatovistoo’seeDavidGlanzwritinginHandeletal.p.188

‘BishopVasilyRatmirov’Sudoplatovp.160

‘Thebishopaskedfor’Rybkinap.321

Chapter9–TheOrchestra’sLastConcert

‘Centrekeptsending’ZoyaRybkinamemoirsp.239

‘Ididnotknowthathe’Gourevitchp.213

‘shemendedclothes’UKNAWO208/5556;seeAntoniaHuntLittleResistanceLeoCooper1982forLyon-Smith’sversionofevents.

‘Afterthebreak-up’PraunMSp.185

‘itgavememoral’Footep.119

‘Forthefirsttime’ibid.p.143

‘amotherlyoldsoul’ibid.p.110

Chapter10–Guerrilla

‘setEuropeablaze’Daltondiaryp.6222.7.40

‘Youshouldneverbe’ibid.p.521.7.40

‘Thetimeisnot’Howarthp.138

‘tendedtogiveChurchill’Beevorp.15

‘RobertBruceLockhart’Lockhartp.168–9

‘Sometimestheywould’Hastings,MaxDasReich:The2ndSSPanzerDivision’sMarchtoNormandyJune1944MichaelJoseph1981p.137

‘Youcouldnevermake’Totheauthor10.3.80

‘Theonlygoodpoint’BennettChurchill’sManofMysteryRoutledge2009p.261

‘severalofitstrainingschools’Jefferyp.629

‘Themanwhois’Sweet-Escott,BickhamBakerStreetIrregularMethuen1965p.24

‘nothingmorethanawicked’ibid.p.12

‘TheAbwehrwasbemused’seeUKNACAB301/51Hanbury-William/PlayfairJune1942reportonshortcomingsofSOE

‘AJanuary1942BakerStreet’UKNAHI5/20321.1.42

‘Hetellsmethat’UKNAHI5/203December1942

‘actionforaction’ssake’Sweet-Escottp.60

‘Thesacrificemight’ibid.p.197

‘Whatmattersmost’Clive,NigelAGreekExperience1943–48MichaelRussell1985p.85

‘theGermanswereinfuriated’PraunMSp.121

‘Couldnothingbedone’Lockhartp.222

‘Theyneverachieved’SeeUKNAFO1093/155forattemptsbyMI6tostifleSOE

‘Lackofunity’Liddellvol.IIp.61

‘TheGreekAlphabet’Jefferyp.355

‘Thosewereexceptions’UKNAWO208/3629Weigelinterrogation

‘WHENEVERYOUWILLCOME’ThisaccountistakenfromFoot,M.R.D.TheSpecialOperationsExecutive1940–46BBC1984pp.130–4

‘displayedanenthusiasm’TimesLiterarySupplement18.3.53

‘goodpeople,verygood’Howarthp.175

‘Therewerealotof’ibid.p.174

‘tofrontalassault’ibid.

‘Onewasmostafraid’Reed-Olsen,OlufTwoEggsonMyPlateAllen&Unwin1952p.234

‘liketryingtolive’Jefferyp.434

‘CarltonGardenswasindifferent’Liddellp.206

‘itwasnotexclusively’Reed-Olsenp.45

‘Escapersandevaders’Foot,M.R.D&Langley,J.M.MI9:EscapeandEvasion1939–45BodleyHead1979p.65

‘JamesLangley’Langley,JamesFightAnotherDayMagnum1974p.242

‘Yourtrouble,Jimmy’ibid.p.193

‘onecoloneltried’Sweet-Escottp.73

‘allhisenergies’Clivep.45

‘Politicalratherthan’ibid.p.123

‘ofcarryingouttwo’Haukelid,KnutSkisAgainsttheAtomNorthAmericanHeritage1989p.13

‘thereweremanymore’Sweet-Escottp.154

‘OureffortinGreece’Clivep.128

‘Wallacewasquitewrong’UnpublishedHillerMS,seeHastingsDasReichp.48

‘Ienjoyedoneof’Clivep.134

‘20percentforLiberation’HarrisSmith,R.OSS:TheHistoryofAmerica’sFirstCentralIntelligenceAgencyUniversityofCaliforniaPress1972p.112

‘forinstance,the2ndSS’seeHastingsDasReichpassim

‘Itwasonlyjustworthit’ibid.p.218

Chapter11–Hoover’sG-Men,Donovan’sWildMen

‘Gentlemen,Iam’Hayden,SterlingTheWandererSheridanHouse2000p.330

‘AnSOEmanvisiting’Sweet-Escottp.126

‘Reader’sDigest,TwentiethCentury-Fox’USNARG65Box125FBINarrative

‘Whathedidwhen’ibid.

‘inabilitytofitinto’USNARG65Box122

‘TheBritishMI6displayed’ibid.

‘OnMarch17’USNARG65Box125

‘Considerationisbeing’USNARG65Box126

‘“skulduggery”andintelligence-gathering’Howarthp.148

‘calculatinglyreckless’HarrisSmithp.35

‘Everyonewasworkingup’Haydenp.310

‘WhenArthurSchlesingerjoined’Schlesingerp.296

‘Thechiefsofthevarious’Haydenp.310

‘MajorWilliamHolohan’Smithp.111

‘Thecolonelhasaged’Lockhartp.17517.6.42

‘ThetrainingIhave’USNARG59Box151103.91802

‘Hefeelsverystrongly’RG59Box150103.91802July1944

‘TheUSambassadorinChonqing’USNARG59Box148103.91802/1414.10.43

‘TheUSconsulinTangier’ibid.Box149103.91802/1921Apr1944

‘Gollys,youngfeller’Haydenp.236

‘Mydutywasto’Stafford,DavidRooseveltandChurchillp.213

‘inintelligence,theBritish’Tompkins,PeterItalyBetrayedSimon&Schuster1966p.253

‘thesecallow,touchy’Trevor-RoperJournalsJanuary1943p.128

‘Britishimperialism’Sweet-Escottp.150

‘“greatvalue”,andauthorised’USNARG59Box151103.91802November1944

‘SOEandMI6agreed’UKNAHIS/210

‘Weareshortlycomingto’UKNAHS1/103

‘Theoverlandjourneytook’Smithp.254

‘werenotinterestedin’ibid.p.128

‘Here,Iwas’Seitz,AlbertMilhailovitchColumbus1953p.49

‘Weestablisheda’Hayden1951TestimonytotheHouseUSCommitteepp.152–3

‘foundhimselfcommitted’Haydenp.314

‘Itoldyouinearlier’ibid.p.315

‘unusualmethodsofinterrogation’Katz,BarryM.ForeignIntelligence:ResearchandAnalysisintheOfficeofStrategicServices1942–45Harvard1989p.185

‘Pleaseturnoverto’USNARG59Box144103.91810-214423.10.44

‘If[Robert]Murphy’Smithp.43

‘WelearnthatKing’USNARG59Box144103.91810-344

‘aswellbunch’Smithp.246

‘Woetotheofficer’BrucewritingintheNewYorkTimes15.2.59

‘TheUSambassadortoSpain’SeeUKNACAB301/91forBritishembassycorrespondenceonbribingSpaniardstostayoutofthewar

‘Inthesummerof1943’Wallerpp.201–2

‘Inthatkindofgame’NewYorkTimes31.8.48

‘Wewereverymuch’WedermeyerReportsNewYork1958p.107

‘moreorlesslike’Katzp.9

‘Therecord[ofResistance]’ibid.p.40

‘Theanalystssuggested’ibid.p.41

‘Don’tknow,butIcan’ibid.p.115

‘atbestalimited’ibid.p.29

‘Themainprincipleof’Weinstein,Allen&Vassiliev,AlexanderTheHauntedWood:SovietEspionageinAmerica–TheStalinEraRandomHouse1999p.245

‘Donovanwasinhis’Schlesingerp.305

‘[OSS’s]bitterestdetractors’Sweet-Escottp.126

‘heorderedWalterSchellenberg’Doerries,ReinhardR.Hitler’sLastChiefofForeignIntelligence:AlliedInterrogationsofWalterSchellenbergFrankCass2003p.102

‘Hewasnotjusta’Petersen,NealFromHitler’sDoorstepPennStateUniversityPress1996p.20

‘Iamoftheimpression’ibid.p.33

‘offensivepreparations’Dullessignal4.3.43

‘testflightsoffleets’Dullessignal10.4.43

‘Americanseverywhere’Jefferyp.509

‘howclosewereHitler’s’Dullesreport24.3.44

‘Ononeoccasionhe’Dullessignal17.2.44

‘Theirreactiontothe’Dullessignal15.3.44

‘theAmericansarenot’Korovinp.617

‘OneofMoscow’smen’ibid.p.593

‘Oneishard-pressed’Petersenp.16

Chapter12–Russia’sPartisans:TerrorisingBothSides

‘TheNKVD,thisstated’seeKrasnyepartizanyUkrainy(RedPartisansoftheUkraine)Gogun,KentiyedsKiev,2006

‘TheNKVD’sKartashev’ThisaccountistakenfromGlebovV.Voinabezpravil.Predannyiresident(AWarWithNoRules.TheAgentWhoWasBetrayed)Moscow2005с.54–6

‘Wemayassume’No3272/SVTsDAGOUkragniF.1Op.22Spr.62Ark.40–1quotedGogun

‘Mostofthem’24.11.41.No3292/sp.TsDAGOUkragniF.1Op.22.Spr.62.Ark.45–6quotedGogun

‘Measureshavebeen’No3290/SVTsDAGOUkragniF.1Op.22Spr.62.Ark.49–50quotedGogun

‘Theyfoundthebones’ReportcompiledbyChiefofRomanianSpecialIntelligence,DirectorGeneralEujenKristescu.DAOO(DerzhavniyarkhivOdeskoioblasti)F.492(st.)Op.1(st.)Spr.13(st.)Ark.20–4(st.)quotedGogun&Kentiy

‘Duringthesummerof1942’Potsdamhistoryvol.VIp.1010

‘MyGod!MyGod’Kovpakdiaryp.30quotedGogun

‘Thiswasagooddecision’N.Popudrenkodiaryp.1651.2.42quotedGogun

‘Hewascapturedinthevillage’G.V.Balitskydiaryp.5223.8.43quotedGogun

‘WeattackedaHungarian’N.Popudrenkodiarypp.175,179

‘Theoccupyingpowerwas’PotsdamGermanyandtheSecondWorldWarvol.VIp.1020

‘Formerlyemployedby’UKNAWO208/5543serial1675

‘Anenemytrainwas’G.V.Balitskydiaryp.543

‘Bornin1911’Sudoplatovp.131

‘unmaskedasspies’AndrewMitrokhinArchivep.xxx

‘Idiscoveredby’TsDAGOUkragniF.130Op.1Spr.231Ark.5–39.P.111–11449.FromthereportofPartisanDetachmentKopenkinontheRaidinthePoltavaOblastinOct–Dec194126.2.42

Chapter13–IslandsintheStorm

‘theBritishagreed’MuchofthisaccountisbasedonthenarrativesbyRobertFiskInTimeofWarAndréDeutsch1983andEnnoStephanSpiesinIrelandLondon1963

‘anattemptatrevolution’Liddellvol.Ip.29

‘ThenIcametoDublin’Stephanp.119

‘Nothingmorethan’ibid.p.195

‘InDecember,theIrish’Fiskp.217

‘InIstanbul,anArmenian’UKNAHW19/333

‘theItaliansareHitler’s’ibid.

‘Lisbon,withallitslights’Muggeridgep.135

‘Theadmiraldismissed’UKNAWO208/5545Bredeinterrogation

‘prominentamongthem’Jefferypp.393–4

‘Idonotwantyouto’BennettChurchill’sManofMysteryp.220

‘butwhereapolicy’SeeUKNAFO1093/138forForeignOfficeattemptscontrolMI6sabotageschemes

‘areundoubtedlyonceagain’USNARG65Box122FBIrecord

‘BillBentinckagreed’Jefferyp.539–40

‘thetypeofbrightidea’UKNAFO1093/292

‘PaulClairewasa’UKNA1093/225

‘howeverrepugnant’Jefferypp.404–6

‘Underthesecircumstances’UKNAWO208/3612serial1446

‘Russianémigréwho’Jefferyp.513

‘Assumethismaterial’UKNAKV2/757

‘Likewise,whenMalcolm’Muggeridgep.167

‘FrantišekMoravecheldMasson’Moravecp.57

‘Weneverknew’Footep.42

‘Probablyagooddeal’Liddellvol.IIp.22andpassim

Chapter14–ALittleHelpfromTheirFriends

‘Unfortunatelythelaw’Liddellvol.IIp.77

‘Penetrationoftheservices’ibid.p.11729.9.43

‘Ittranspiredthat’Jones,Intelligencepp.70–1

‘Theintelligenceserviceswere’Annanp.233

‘Inthefirstweeks’UKNAHW1/14

‘Thereisnodoubt’Liddellvol.IIp.24

‘Lookingaroundus’Toynbee,PhilipFriendsApartSidgwick&Jackson1980p.71

‘Wesimplyknew’Boyle,AndrewClimateofTreasonp.52

‘merelythemostradical’Trevor-RoperSecretWorldp.80

‘Manyofourfriends’ibid.

‘amarvellousman’Bororvik,GenrikhThePhilbyFilesed.PhilipKnightleyLondon1994p.29

‘Onedoesnot’ibid.p.28

‘It‘slikebeing’Cecil,RobertADividedLifeBodleyHead1988p.77

‘wasbasedondoubtful’AndrewMitrokhinp.109

‘andanythingelse’Annanp.226

‘smarty-pants’Howarthp.163

‘Heissixfoottall’Cecilp.60

‘MyGod,hewas’Andrew,ChristopherTheDefenceoftheRealm:TheAuthorizedHistoryofMI5AllenLane2009p.270

‘Gentlemen,Ihave’Harrison,E.TheYoungKimPhilbyExeterUniversityPress2012p.96

‘YetMI5,overwhelmingly’AndrewTheDefenceoftheRealmpp.263–8

‘Philbyreportedthat’Modin,YuriMyFiveCambridgeFriendsHeadline1994p.63

‘likeoneofGrahamGreene’s’Andrew,Christopher&Dilks,DavidedsTheMissingDimension:GovernmentsandIntelligenceCommunitiesintheTwentiethCenturyMacmillan1984p.173

‘Hisromanticveneration’Muggeridgep.126

‘anagreeableandeffective’Sismanp.93

‘There’ssomethingwrong’ibid.p.113

‘aninsultinglycrude’Harrisonp.156

‘Thisistopasson’Korovinp.566

‘LondonPoles’Modinp.92

‘Englandwillstay’Korovinp.566

‘Incollaborationwith’ibid.p.599

‘TheRussianswerethemselves’Modinp.113

‘InaccordancewithChurchill’s’Jefferyp.486

‘hewantedtodiscover’ibid.p.554

‘obligesustoreview’AndrewMitrokhinp.165

‘Whatistreason?’Sismanp.396

‘DidJudasenjoy’ibid.p.397

‘Onbalanceitwasnot’WhitetoTrevor-Roper10.2.80

‘Ampleevidenceexists’USNARG59Box347181100B/7–1541

‘switchingfromthestatus’Weinsteinp.36

‘Wedon’tsend’Feklisovmemoirp.41

‘Hewasofmediumheight’ibid.p.57

‘tookgreatpridein’Weinsteinp.39

‘anextraordinarilybeautiful’ibid.p.4

‘statingthathewas’ibid.p.12

‘Whynotpay’Feklisovmemoirp.137

‘Onewonderswhat’Schlesingerp.304

‘Sheconsidersherself’Weinsteinp.62

‘Straightisabigagent’ibid.p.81

‘indicatedwhetherthey’Sudoplatovp.227

‘Sudoplatovbelievedthat’ibid.p.227

‘hetreatsallhis’Weinsteinp.252

‘Donovanknewabout’Schlesingerp.305

‘SawLeelastnight’Weinsteinp.260

‘Itshighestpriority’ibid.p.160

‘Surelytheseunhealthy’ibid.p.164

‘Thereweremanygreen’Feklisovp.121

‘notonbehalfof’Weinsteinpp.238–9

‘themainpillar’ibid.p.94

‘itisquitereliably’https://www.nsa.gov/public_info/declass/friedman_documents/

‘Thereisnoevidence’Schlesingerp.305

Chapter15–TheKnowledgeFactories

‘Mostofthepeople’Reed-Olsenp.126

‘Thedifferenceitmade’ibid.p.136

‘1.Isthereadivisionalstaff’ibid.p.254

‘Thegoodintelligence’Clivep.73

‘Iwouldbetoldthat’ibid.p.69

‘TheWehrmachtevacuated’ibid.p.136

‘knewaboutuswhat’ibid.p.133

‘TheheadofMI6’spoliticalsection’ibid.p.146

https://www.nsa.gov/public_info/declass/friedman_documents/

‘plentyofrats’Jefferyp.501

‘Broadwayabandonedattempts’ibid.p.425

‘Thoughthenovelist’PrivateinformationtotheauthorfromAlanJudd2.3.2015

‘When6Junecame’McLachlanp.321

‘Theneedtosustain’Liddellvol.IIpp.66–8

‘InApril1943,MI5’singenious’ibid.p.70etseq.

‘Acolonyofcoots’Trevor-RoperJournalsp.63Mar1942

‘Anofficerwhoserved’Sweet-Escottp.19

‘wearetooready’Jefferyp.419

‘Broadwaypurchased’ibid.p.457

‘Hefrequentlygave’ibid.p.410

‘Misery,tortureanddeath’Harrisonp.109

‘Thissenseofimportance’Muggeridgep.128

‘allIntelligenceabout’Jefferyp.369

‘Cecil’scasefor’Cecil,Robert‘C’sWar’IntelligenceandNationalSecurityMay1986pp.171–83

‘Hisdispatches,decrypted’Exceptwhereotherwisespecified,thequotationsbelowaretakenfromCarlBoyd’sHitler’sJapaneseConfidantKansasUniversityPress1993

‘Ōshimareallyis’Goebbels,JosephTheGoebbelsDiariesed.LouisLochnerDoubleday1948p.181

‘Ourmutualloyalty’UKNAHW12/264serial090774

‘Doyounotthink’UKNAHW12/264serial091401

‘Iregrettosay’HinsleyBritishIntelligencevol.IIIpt.iip.366

‘Hereportedon’ibid.p.511

‘ourmainbasis’Marshall27.9.44quotedKahnCodebreakersp.606

‘PeterCalvocoressi,oneof’Howarthp.173

‘oneoftheluckiest’ActionThisDayp.78

‘notedrefJN-11Ransuuban’UKNAHW14/122

‘Therewasa1945debate’UKNAHW14/12228.2.45

‘Inthelastfewdays’USNARG457P11201G23-0108-6

‘Therewasaperpetual’Milner-BarryinHinsley&Strippp.97

‘InJuly1943JohnTiltman’JT25.7.43,WF18.9.43;seeFriedmanPapersinNSAonlinearchiveACC35865/41775129081420.pdf

‘Thetheatreairintelligencechief’USNARG457SRH-037

‘BreaksinItalian’Behrendtpp.61,198andHoward,MichaelBritishIntelligenceintheSecondWorldWarvol.VDeceptionp.66

‘thefierceindignation’Hinsley&Strippp.37

‘theywerestillhappy-go-lucky’Behrendtp.173

‘didnotknowwhat’Hunt,DavidADonatWarKimber1966p.147

‘RalphBennetthaspainted’Bennett,RalphUltraandMediterraneanStrategy1941–45HamishHamilton1989p.408etseq.

‘Weknewmuchmore’ibid.p.410

‘Nomessagehadmore’ibid.p.412

‘Isay,oldboy’Smith,MichaelStationX:TheCodebreakersofBletchleyParkPan2004p.77

‘oneoftheoutstanding’UKNAHW25/4&5‘GeneralreportonTunnywithemphasisonstatisticalmethods’byJackGood,DonaldMichie&GeoffreyTimms

‘asanalogousto’UKNAHW14/6718.2.43

‘BetweenJulyandOctober1942’UKNAHW25/5p.313sects43Aand43B

‘Thereisunconfirmed’Gannon,PaulColossus:BletchleyPark’sGreatestSecretAtlantic2006p.182

‘thequalityoftheintelligence’UKNAHW13/5316.8.43

‘Weusedtohaveteaparties’VergineinterviewVirtualJewishLibrary

‘AnunnamedBletchleystaffer’Gannonp.340

‘thegreatestcode-breakingfeat’ErskineinTheTimesHigherEducationalSupplement6.10.2006pp.24–5

‘thefrequentlyrecalcitrant’BennettNormandyp.16

‘Inthesummerof1942’JonesIntelligencepp.217–18

‘TheWellington’smissionprovided’UKNA1473FlightrecordbookinAIR29/870,materialontheLuftwafferadarsysteminAVIA6/9380&14420,AVIA26/540

‘On15May1942FltLt.Donald’Williams,AllanOperationCrossbowPreface2013p.113

‘Itsinitialreport’MuchoftheaccountthatfollowsistakenfromHinsleyetal.BritishIntelligencevol.IIIpt.ipp.357–455

‘inthecourseofthewar’Jefferyp.534

‘Hedispatchedamessage’JonesIntelligencep.223

‘Onthenightof25July’ThisaccountistakenfromAllanWilliamsOperationCrossbowpp.274–6

‘Exceptpossiblyfor’Hinsleyetal.BritishIntelligencevol.IIIpt.iip.464

Chapter16–‘Blunderhead’:TheEnglishPatient

‘YetfewEnglishmen’Seth’sstory,asrecountedhere,derivesfromUKNAfilesHS9/1344,HS9/1345,KV2/377,KV2/378,KV2/379,KV2/380,HS4/240andSeth’saccountofhimselfinASpyHasNoFriendsHeadlineReview2008

‘Itsstartwasinauspicious’W/Cdr.JohnCorby,privateinformationtotheauthor

‘GuyLiddellofMI5felt’Liddellvol.IIp.285

Chapter17–EclipseoftheAbwehr

‘Itbecameapparent’FreiburgarchivecopyofUSArmySecurityAgencyS-3873Doc.D3422796

‘AslateasMarch’USNARG457TaylorreportinGAFY

‘Itsleadingpersonalities’TICOMonlinearchive/II/TheForeignOffice

‘seemedoverlypreoccupied’TICOM/IIp.1

‘theprecisionof’TICOMFennerinterrogation

‘Mostoftheincoming’UKNAWO208/3612serial1446

‘Chiusedthesame’UKNAWO208/3609

‘thewholecryptographic’TICOMFennerinterrogation

‘Mechanicalscanning’FreiburgcopyofASCS-3873doc.D3422796

‘On26June,along’UKNAHW13/52

‘TheAfrikaKorpsconsidered’UKNAWO208/5544serial1704

‘Later,theGermans’PraunMSp.73

‘oftenhadaclearer’Behrendtp.165

‘acatastrophe’ibid.p.169

‘tacticalintelligencewasnot’Behrendtp.203

‘Investigationshowedthat’PraunMSp.65

‘theRedArmymaintained’ibid.MSp.83

‘intercepted46,342’KahnSpiesp.206

‘Astimewenton’UKNAWO208/4178

‘20Fritzescaptured’UKNAWO208/4178

‘atrulyshocking’PraunMS.p.109

‘acalmsummer’KahnSpiesp.440

‘thatitbecamefruitless’PraunMSp.109

‘AlbertPraunpraised’ibid.MSp.19

‘NeithertheAbwehr’ibid.

‘Hesaidthathecould’Baxter,ChristopherForgeriesandSpies:TheForeignOfficeandthe‘Cicero’CaseIntelligenceandNationalSecurityDec.2008p.811

‘Ibecamewhateverybody’Bazna,ElyesaIWasCiceroAndreDeutsch1962p.13

‘Iwasapersonof’ibid.p.17

‘herarmswere’ibid.p.34

‘Thusthemostsuccessful’UKNACAB154/105

‘rantheriskbecause’UKNAWO208/5545Bredeinterrogation

‘Theonlycommunication’UKNAWO208/35618

‘Mostlikely,andincommon’ibid.

‘Hewaspromptly’ibid.

‘EventheAbwehr’UKNAWO203/367

‘JorgeMosquera,aChilean’USNARG65Box123FBInarrative

‘Havetherealreadybeen’USNARG65Box123FBInarrative

‘Wecannotdobusiness’Jefferyp.515

‘theycoulddolittleharm’Liddell10.3.43

‘everysurvivingAbwehr’ibid.Jan1943

‘wehaveevidencefrom’UKNAHW19/347

‘SincethefallofTunis’ibid.

‘Thereafter,thesewent’UKNAWO208/5544SSGrup.Ohlendorfinterrogation

‘Americanaviationmagazines’UKNAWO208/5545Bredeinterrogation

‘avortexofpersonal’Trevor-RoperSecretWorldp.28

‘whentheAlliesentered’UKNAHW19/347

‘Theassignmentcannotbe’ibid.

‘Hefollowedupby’ibid.

‘withoutdistinguishingbetween’ibid.

‘Thecarefullyorchestrated’HowardDeceptionp.50

‘OKWaccordinglyreduced’ibid.p.79

‘adecentandhumane’KorovinquotingMalletp.648

‘Hebecameaprotégé’Gerwath,RobertHitler’sHangmanYale2011p.113

‘Hetendstoconfuse’FreiburgarchivecopyofUSArmySecurityAgencyS-3873Doc.D3422796

‘WhenAllenDullestold’Dulles1.3.44

‘Heretooshesquandered’KahnSpiesp.335

‘Forsale,valuable’Doerriesp.132

‘Iaskthatyou’KahnSpiesp.274BAR58/117:24

Chapter18–Battlefields

‘“Tar”RobertsonofMI5told’Liddellvol.IIp.196

‘therecordforone’Alexander,HughCryptographicHistoryofWorkontheGermanNavalEnigma

‘Theradiopicturedidnot’PraunMSp.74

‘hisownorganisation’ibid.p.76

‘Similarinventories,partly’UKNAWO208/4312

‘Thiscarelessnesswas’PraunMSp.72

‘Whatanagent’UKNAWO208/3575

‘BlackMarket’USNARG457SRH-031

‘Fewsuchoperations’ForafulleraccountofthisextraordinaryepisodeseeHastingsDasReichpp.187–209

‘Onefeltonewas’UKNAWO208/3575

‘thedesperatemessage’Milner-BarryinHinsley&Strippp.98

‘Theyweretrainedat’ThepersonalstoriesbelowderivefromUKNAWO208/35618

‘Shehadbacked’Thisaccountofthestay-behindsistakenfromUKNAWO208/35618Clöreninterrogationreport

‘Theproblemisnot’USNARG407–Entry427Box2410NinthArmyreports

‘Itisnomorepossible’ibid.

‘Icannotsay’UKNAHS6/704

‘theoperationwasbrought’USNARG407Box2411109.31

‘Welearnedevenbefore’V.NikolskyAquarium2,quotedinDamaskinp.286etseq.

‘AnAbwehrofficerinNorway’UKNAWO208/3629

‘TheGRUinfiltrated’UKNAWO208/5543serial1675

‘Whatfollowsseems’UKNAWO208/5556

‘Whatconclusionscanbe’ibid.

‘Itisnotamisuse’Hinsleyetal.BritishIntelligencevol.IIIpt.iip.418

‘Itwasextraordinary’BennettNormandyp.185

‘headlesshorrorand’ForrestPogueTheArdennesCampaign:TheImpactofIntelligenceDec1980availableonlinethroughNSAwebsitepublic_info/_files/cryptologic_spectrum/Ardennes_campaign.pdf

‘Mydigestionis’USAMHICarlisleChesterB.HansenCollection,Diary,Box6

‘Ofalltheofficers’Strongp.178

‘PeterCaddick-Adams’Caddick-Adams,PeterSnowandSteel:TheBattleoftheBulge1944–45Preface2014p181

‘Itcanbestated’UKNAHW13/45

‘Therecordisnot’UKNAWO208/3575

‘existingBritishformations’HowardDeceptionp.199

‘DuringtheArdennesbattle’Praunp.85

‘Deceptionduringthese’HowardBritishIntelligenceinWWIIvol.Vp.197

Chapter19–BlackWidows,FewWhiteKnights

‘performedratherinefficiently’HurtMSFriedmanPaperspp.31–2

‘Ican’tgowithyou’Hastings,MaxNemesis:TheBattleforJapan1944–45HarperCollins2007p.297etseq.

‘TheBritishweremore’Budianskyp.294

‘Intelligence,likemoney’Holmesp.129

‘FarEastintelligencefrom’Aldrichp.233

‘Twocharacteristicsare’UKNAHIS/304CaptainGAGarron-Williams28.4.45

‘Doweknow’UKNAWO208/5606

‘Whatweknow’Aldrichp.254

‘Asyouknow’UKNAHS1/30414.12.44

‘exceedinglydissatisfied’ibid.17.11.44

‘Leese’sferocious’UKNAWO208/5075

‘Itisamelancholy’UKNAWO203/5606

‘Ihaveyettomeet’UKNAWO203/6451

‘FreddySpencerChapman’SpencerChapman,FrederickTheJungleisNeutralChatto&Windus1949passim.

‘InsofarasSOEis’UKNAHI5/20325.3.42

‘TheambitionsofMackenzie’Aldrichp.284

‘makingthefullest’ibid.p.176

‘anundignifiedscramble’ibid.p.185

‘Whenhewasshot’Allen,LouisTheLongestWar:Burma1941–45Dent1985pp.577–8

‘thepartywashampered’UKNAHIS/203

‘MI6reportedatthesame’UKNAH51/304

‘Nocontactwith’UKNAHI5/203

‘Theclashplunged’Aldrichp.xv

‘shouldadmitfrankly’UKNAHIS/210

‘In1943,whenJapan’s’Kotanip.17

‘InNewGuineawe’ibid.p.10

‘AlargepartyofMuslim’Aldrichp.164

‘Ihavesecretlywarned’UKNAHW12/300

‘Ournavywasbeing’FriedmanPapersinNSAonlinearchiveLectureV,PartII1/1/1958Folder023A3840041699909073923

‘Tokyoincreaseditsown’SeeKatherineHerbiginHandeletal.p.274

‘ThestaffoftheOperationsDepartment’Kotanip.106

‘dislikedevenlistening’ibid.p.101

‘Theaffairsofindividuals’ibid.p.104

‘Themostconspicuousexample’ibid.p.39

‘verypoor’UKNAWO208/5543serial1673

‘anuneasyandunprofitable’UKNAWO208/5545

‘SeeingtheNaziship’ibid.

Chapter20–‘Enormoz’

‘Thereisnocountry’Weinsteinp.196

‘Inthefollowingyear’Antonov,V.‘MoscowLookedForwardtotheInformationfromAgent“Dan”’inNezavisimoeVoennoeObozrenie17.10.2008

‘PavelSudoplatovasserts’Sudoplatovp.192

‘Oppenheimer’smostrecent’Monk,RayInsidetheCentre:TheLifeofJ.RobertOppenheimerCape2012p.336

‘SudoplatovcitesOppenheimer’Sudoplatovp.172

‘ofgreatinterest’AndrewMitrokhinp.168

‘On1JulytheNKVD’Weinsteinp.182

‘ElizabethZarubinapproached’Sudoplatovp.192

‘Theinformationalways’AndrewMitrokhinp.173

‘details…arealmostcertain’Liddellvol.IIp.222

‘perhapslessthanhalf’Sudoplatovp.188

Chapter21–DecodingVictory

‘MI6isold’Wilkinsondiary24.2.43ChurchillCollege,Cambridge

‘Despitetherealcontribution’UKNACAB163/6

‘HehadseentheCommunist’Schlesingerp.349

‘Theendofthewaris’Sudoplatovp.170

‘enemyofthepeople’ibid.p.431

‘Itgoeswithoutsaying’Gourevitchp.8

‘Prisonsarethesame’ibid.p.79

‘Thestoryisalittle’UKNAKV2/3552

‘veryimperfect’UKNACAB154/105

‘Therewassomething’Schlesingerp.350

‘thiscausedsome’Thirsk,JamesinActionThisDayp.277

‘Oneoftheprices’Gannonp.447

‘secretservicebecamethestruggle’s’Aldrichp.xv

‘verylittlesecretinformation’Lockhartp.219

‘PaulKennedy’Kennedy,PaulEngineersofVictoryAllenLane2012p.358

‘Thecryptanalystsdidnot’Annanp.237

‘Experienceonboth’McLachlanp.28

‘Thereseemstobeatendency’USNARG457SRH-031

‘Thematerialwasdangerously’UKNAWO208/3575

‘Itisstrikingtonotice’USNARG59Box3064

‘theoldcloakanddagger’Liddellvol.IIp.237

‘EdwardTravis’UKNAHW14/22

‘Thesemethods,said’UKNAWO311/632

‘bymeansofthespoken’Jefferyp.369

‘Sir!Youhave’AnecdotequotedtotheauthorbyGen.SirDavidRichardson22.4.81

‘Fewarmiesever’UKNAWO208/3575

‘Resistanceissmall’HastingsDasReichp.218

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Mure,DavidMasterofDeceptionKimber1980Newby,EricLoveandWarintheApenninesPicador1983Pahl,MagnusFremdeHeereOst.HitlersmilitärischeFeindaufklärung(ForeignArmiesEast:Hitler ’sMilitaryReconnaissance)Berlin2012

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IndexThepagenumbersinthisindexrelatetotheprintedversionofthisbook;theydonotmatchthepagesofyourebook.Youcanuseyourebookreader ’ssearchtooltofindaspecificwordorpassage.

NOTE:Ranksandtitlesaregenerallythehighestmentionedinthetext

Abakumov,Viktor,236–7,455–6Abe,Vice-AdmiralKatsuo,401,549Abel,Rudolf(‘WilliamFisher’),231Abramov(Sovietpartisan),320Abt,John,381Abwehr(Germansecurityagency):Canarisheads,6,60–2,482;inTurkey,42–3;andGermanplansforattackinwest,49–50;agentscaptured,interrogatedandturned,53,548;inadequacy,57,64–6,67,469–72,482;ciphersbroken,58–60;suppressesResistanceactivity,223;activitiesinIreland,331–8;inLisbon,341;agentsinSwitzerland,347;recruitsandinformants,464–8;informedofbreakingofU-boatcodes,477;Schellenbergdirects,480–2;employslocalspiesinFrance,491–2;Britishknowledgeof,544

Acheson,Dean,376Admiralty(British):headquartersbuilding,212–13;OperationalIntelligenceCentre,216;Room39,211;Room40,9,68Afghanistan,339AfrikaKorps:attackonAlamHalfaknown,94;sigintsuccesses,196,447;logisticalproblems,408;onBritishwirelessindiscipline,454;Britishknowledgeof,551

Agent479(British),3Agnew,CaptainWilliam,195AirMinistry(British):communistcellin,349Akhmerov,Itzhak,370–1,374,380,383,385Aktay,Haydar,106AlamHalfa,94,409Alamein,El,battleof(1942),409,454Alaska,521Alba,FitzJamesStewart,17thDukeof,348Aldington,Toby,69Aldrich,Richard,514,547Alexander,Gen.SirHarold,411Alexander,Hugh,73,82,90,401,410Almásy,CountLászló,63Alsop,Stewart,304Amery,John,444Amery,Julian,267AMTORG(SoviettradingorganisationinUSA),370Anderson,HMS(Colombofacility),511Anderson,SirJohn,348Andrew,Christopher,xxv,39,538Ankara,338,460–1Annan,Noel:recruitedintointelligence,69;onTuring,74;onstaffatBletchley,86;onCavendish-Bentinck,202;onsuperiorityof

Wehrmachtsoldiers,203;onBritishcommunistsympathisers,350;onvalueofcryptanalysis,548Anti-CominternPact(1936),19Antonescu,Ion,321Antwerp,497‘Anvil’invasion(southernFrance,August1944),411Anziolandings(January1944),411,547Apresyan,Stepan,381–2Ardennes:Germanattackthrough(1940),49–50,547;Germanoffensive(‘AutumnMist’,‘BattleoftheBulge’,December1944),402,492,498–501,523,547

Argentina:Germanagentsin,63;wartimeposition,342Arisue,Gen.Seizo,522Arita,Hachiro,148ArlingtonHall,Virginia:USSignalsIntelligenceUnitbasedat,396,403,406–7,448,450,452,460,521,551,559Arnhem,547Arnim,Ernstvon,118Arnold,Gen.HenryHarley(‘Hap’),211Aronsky,Boris,184Asia:warin,504;SOEin,509,514–17;Britishunpopularityin,513;colonialpowers’ambitionsin,514–15;clandestineorganisationsin,515;seealsoBurma;Malaya

Assarasson,Vilhelm,106AstierdelaVigerie,Emmanuel,275Atlantic,Battleofthe,83,88–9,218–21AtlanticWall,483Atlantis(Germanarmedmerchantcruiser),135–8,140atomicbomb:developmentandintelligenceon,524–35,553Auchinleck,Gen.SirClaude,196Auerbach,Richard,284Aumann,Georg,452Aurora,HMS,195Austin,Macdonald,263,557Austria:Dullessupports,313Automedon,SS,135–7,139–41‘AutumnMist’,OperationseeArdennesAvranche,Normandy,490Ayer,A.J.(‘Freddie’),97

B-Dienst(GermanKriegsmarine),56,66,94,196,218–21,447,458,551Bach-Zelewski,Erichvondem,322Bacon,Francis:HistoryoftheReignofHenryVII,8Badart,Willi,418Badoglio,Pietro,313‘Bagration’,Operation(1944),227,326,456BainbridgeIsland,PugetSound,164Bakách-Bessenyey,Baron,315Baldegg,Mayrvon(‘Luise’),109Baldwin,Stanley,13Balkans:Hitler’sthreatto,103–4;aspotentialareaofGerman–Sovietconflict,105Balticrepublics:anti-Sovietpurges,123Baluchistan,520

‘Bamboo1’convoy(Japanese),507‘Barbarossa’,Operation,85,103,109,116,120,132,151,204,351,483,548Barczafamily,54Barcza,Margaret,54–5,190,239–40,247–9,541Barcza,René,240Barcza,Sacha,249‘Bardou’(localspy),491Barkovsky,Vladimir,525‘Baron,the’(agent),11Barry,Col.Dick,281Bart,Robert,241,243Bartsch,Waldemar,495–7Bate,Vera(SignoraLombardi),478Batey,Keith,70,488Baxter,JamesFinney,299Bazna,Elyesa(‘Cicero’),xvi,309,460–4Beaufre,André,50Beaverbrook,WilliamMaxwellAitken,1stBaron,127,547‘Beccassino’(Frenchlocalspy),491Beck,Gen.Ludwig,312Bedrov,Vladimir,325Beevor,Jack,266Behrendt,Hans-Otto,66,453Behrens,Karl,121Belfrage,Cedric,379Belgium:Germanplanstoattack,48–9;Sovietagentsin,54–5,189–90;agentscaptured,390;localspies,492–3Belorussia:Germanreprisalsin,322Beneš,Edvard,41Bennett,Ralph,89,409–10,418,497,499Bentevegni,Col.Franzvon,62,472Bentinck,BillseeCavendish-Bentinck,VictorBentley,Elizabeth,379–80,382,385Berenson,Peter,413Berensprung,Horst,377Beresantsov,Tatiana,229Beria,Lavrenti:meetsSudoplatov,18,20;internalspying,21;disbelievesHitler’sintentiontoinvade,104,106,122,132;suspectsLehmann,115;sacksandreinstatesKorotkov,117;andKobulov’sdisgraceinBerlin,120;andFitin,123;oninternalsubversion,123;onreadinessofGermanforces,129;orderspurgeofNKVDofficers,132;andstartofGermaninvasion,133;agreestoreleaseofimprisonedintelligenceofficers,174;testsloyaltyofVolgaGermans,175;andRadziwiłł,176;onmissiontoCaucasus,178–9;SudoplatovrecommendsDemyanovto,230;warnsSudoplatovover‘Max’operation,231;purges,317;onNKVDarrestsofsuspects,327;suspectsCambridgeFive,355;tauntsZarubin,372;informsStalinofWesternatomicresearch,525,527;deniesanti-SemitisminUSSR,526;controlsSpecialCommitteeonAtomicEnergy,528–9;doubtsauthenticityofatomicmaterial,534;shot,538

Berle,Adolphe,292,376Berlin:bombed,450;seealso‘RedOrchestra’Berlings,Oreste(‘Lycéestudent’;‘Peter’),120Bern,204,338,347Bernadotte,CountFolke,473,482Bernard,Joseph,493Bernert(Viennesecryptanalyst),451

Bertrand,CapitaineGustave:expertise,8;negotiateswithPoles,12;Polishcryptanalystsworkwith,48;colleaguescapturedinFrance,95;contactwithLondon,341

Bertrand-VigneLt.Col.,466Best,CaptainSigismundPayne,44–6,116Beurling,Arne,413Bevan,Col.Johnny,232,468Bigoray,FltSgt,419–20Bingham,MajorSeymour,271–2Binney,George,266Birch,Frank,88Birley,Eric,69Bismarck(Germanbattleship),83,216Bismarck,CountGottfriedvon,481BismarckSea,Battleofthe(March1943),509Bissell,Clayton,283Bitter,Wilhelm,478‘BlackChamber’(USarmy’scodebreakingdepartment),5,158,451Blackett,Pat,414Blandy,Group-Captain,87BletchleyPark(GovernmentCodeandCipherSchool):asintelligencehub,xxi,xxvi;GC&CSmovesto,13;struggleswithEnigma,47;staffing,70–1,73–4,86–8,172–3;gradualbreakingofEnigma,72–3,75;characterandconditions,73–4,78–9,459;womenat,74,87,91;organisationandmanagement,75,88;behaviourandtemperamentat,77;procedurefordecrypting,77–8;recordkeeping,78;humanapplicationat,81,407;readsU-boatandnavalsignals,83;providesinformationonGermandeployments,84–6;readsItaliannavalsignals,84;informalitybetweengrades,86–7;internaldissentanddifferences,86,90–1;limitations,86;and‘Shark’submarinekey,88,90,101;bombeshortage,89;comradeshipandmorale,90–1;securityandsecrecy,91–3;USvisitorsat,100–1;valuesUSAAF’spartnership,212;Americansworkat,404,410;cooperationwithUSsigint,404–5;numberofdecrypts,407;stressandexhaustion,408;buildingimprovements,410;decodesGermanteleprintermessages,411–13;readsmultipleEnigmakeys,411;suppliesGermanorderofbattleinAlliedinvasion,486;breaksfewarmymessagesfollowinginvasion,490;informedofactionsbyMontgomery’sstaff,490;contributionoverlooked,491;alarmedbynewEnigmareflector(UmkehrwalzeD),503;branchesinAsia,505;Japanesesection,505,511;staffthankedbyBrooke,545;succeededbyGCHQ,546;achievements,551,555;considershistoricalrecord,552

Blizard,MajorChares,271Blumkin,Yakov,371‘Blunderhead’seeSeth,RonaldBlunt,Anthony,348,350–1,359–60,361,363,366–7,543Bock,Gen.Fedorvon,125Bogel,Claus,158Bohlen,Majorvon,469Bohme,Sergeant,325Bohr,Niels,9,528Bokii,GlebIvanovitch,19Bolli,Margrit,109,250bombes(key-findingmachines),75,80–1,89,407,413Bonatz,KapitänzurSeeHeinz,218–19Bondarenko,Sergeant,318Bonhöffer,Dietrich,114Bormann,Martin,188Bose,SubhasChandra,339Bosshard,Walter(‘Jakob’),347

Böttcher,Paul,109Bötticher,Gen.Frierichvon,4Boulder,Colorado,505Bowden-Smith,Brigadier‘Bogey’,510Boyd,Helen,372Boyle,AirCommodoreArchie,269Boyle,Cmdr,218Bracken,Brendan,125Braden,Thomas,304Bradley,Gen.Omar,500Brandin,Axel,474Bratton,Rufus,164Brauchitsch,Gen.Waltervon,314Braun,Wernervon,310,423Brede,Major(ofAbwehr),341,464‘Breitenbach’seeLehmann,WillyBrenker,FieldPoliceInspector,325Brest:Germanwarshipsbreakoutfrom,197–8Brewer,Len,25–6,108Bridges,SirEdward,101Brinton,Crane,291Britain:reputationforintelligence,8–9,18;lackspre-warjointstaffs,14;Germaninvasionthreat,53;socialclass,62;mobilisesbestbrainsinwar,68;intelligenceliaisonwithUSA,98–102;wartimerelationswithUSA,99;warnsSovietUnionofinvasionthreat,125;admitstoweaknessinAsia,139–40;useofintelligence,200–1;commandstructure,206;prospectiverelationswithUSSR,302;communistsympathisersandinformants,349–50,352–9;colonialambitionsinAsia,509,515–18;prestigesuffersinSEAsia,513;rivalryinAsiawithUSA,513;anddevelopmentofatomicbomb,525

Britain,Battleof(1940),105BritishSecurityCoordination(BSC),97BritishTabulatingMachineCompany,80Broadway(MI6HQ)seeMI6Brokdorf,CountessErikavon,242Brooke,Gen.SirAlan,91,93,201–2,422,545,554Brooke-Popham,Air-MarshalSirRobert,54,137Brotherhood,Lt.Francis,164Brousse,CharlesEmmanuel,466Browder,Earl,357,371,379Brown,Tommy,89Browning,Lt.Gen.Frederick(‘Boy’),513Bruce,David,297BrunevalseeSaint-Bruneval‘Bruno,Station’(ChâteaudeVignobles,France),47–8BRUSA(British-USintelligenceagreement),404Bryn,Wilma,211Brzezinski,Zbigniew,352Buccleuch,JohnScott,9thDukeof,17Buchan,John,9Buchanan-Dineen,Grace,465–6Budiansky,Stephen,xxv,77Bulge,BattleoftheseeArdennes

BureauCentraldeRenseignementsetd’Actionmilitaire(BCRA),274–5BurgessGuy,350–1,356,359,361,367,543‘Burglar,Group’,526Burklein,Col.Willi,501Burma:campaign,509–10,512;SOEin,515–16;uncooperativelocals,515–16BurmaRoad,112BuroHa(Switzerland),110Byalik(Sovietpartisan),321Bystroletov,Dmitri,175Bystroletova,Shelmatova,175

CabodeBuenaEsperanza(Spanishliner),339CabodeHornos(Spanishliner),339Caddick-Adams,Peter,500Cadogan,SirAlexander,16,45,49,54,209,264,356,463Caen,Normandy,490Cairncross,John,351,354–5,524,530Cairo:SOEin,278Calvocoressi,Peter,403CambridgeFive(spies),62,352,354–5,361–2,365–7Campini(ItalianinLourençoMarques),345Canaris,AdmiralWilhelm:headsAbwehr,6,61–2,65;bidsforMoravec’sservices,40;qualitiesandbackground,57,60–2,64–5,67;Trevor-Ropermonitorsandstudies,57–8,60,63–4,67,208;supposedoppositiontoNazism,63–4,223;fallfromgraceandexecution,67,471–3,479–80,482;Heydrichrebukes,116;recruitsNelidov,128;reportedlyrecruitsDewavrintoAxiscause,193;failureof‘Pastorius’,223;plantoassassinate,360;differenceswithHimmler,361;believesAbwehrproducinggoodinformation,464;seeksinformationinCanada,466;deniedadmissiontoSpain,469;rivalrywithSchellenberg,474;maintainslinkswithTokyo,523

Carpentier,Abbé,273Carr,Harry,11Carroll,Madeleine,290–1,538Carson,ThelmaStone,289Casanove,Bigaultde(‘Calvert’),491Casey,William,538Caucasus:campaignin,178,187,225–6Cavendish-Bentinck,Victor(‘Bill’):chairsJIC,53,200–1,232;onChurchillandintelligence,200;marriagebreakdown,202;onMorton,207;onMenzies,209;opposesrousingcivilianpopulationinEurope,261;praisesSOE,272;opposesassassination,342;declinessucceedingMenzies,394;andBaznainTurkey,462;anddoubleagents,468;criticisesMI6,537

Cecil,Robert,5,357,360,394Ceramic(liner),218Cetniks(Yugoslavia),268Chaffault,du(FrenchAbwewhragent),465Chamberlain,Neville:appeasementpolicy,15–16Chambers,Whittaker,376Chanel,Coco,478‘ChannelDash’,196–9,221Chapman,Eddie(‘AgentZigZag’),xviii–xix,231,431Chapman,FrederickSpencer,513Charteris,BrigadierJohn,17Chauveau,Charles,2523

Chekhova,Olga,176Chennault,Gen.Claire,509Cherwell,FrederickLindemann,Viscount,43,208,350,361–2,425,429–30‘Chess-Player’,532Chevalier,Haakon,526ChiangKai-shek:counter-intelligenceservice,5;andDolan-Tolstoymission,293;OSSrequestsshotgunsfor,297;Japanesereadciphertraffic,517

ChicagoTribune,368Chidson,MajorMonty,52Chiffrierabteilung(OKW/Chi;Germancode-breakingbody),6,93,447–52,458–60China:Sorgein,32–3;proposedpeacetreatywithJapan,111;warwithJapan,112,141;Japaneseintelligenceworkin,141;Donovanclaimsresponsibilityfor,517;Japanesepreoccupationwith,518

Churchill,Randolph,478Churchill,(Sir)Winston:angeratunwelcomeviews,xxi;discountssinglecontributionstovictory,xxvi;Mortonpassesinformationto,13;recommendsGodfreytosucceedSinclair,17;trustinR.V.Jones,43;opposesnegotiationswithGermany,45;scepticismoverGermaninvasion,54;valuesUltra,70,85;telephoneconversationswithRoosevelt,72;‘ActionThisDay’messagetoBletchley,86;broadcastonmurderofJews,93;aimstodrawUSAintowar,96;relationswithRoosevelt,99;allowsUSaccesstoBletchleyPark,100;antipathytoBolshevikrevolution,103,123;Stalinmistrusts,103–4,126–7;and‘Lucy’Ring,110;warnsStalinofGermaninvasionthreat,125,132,351;onstrategicpositioninAsia,137,139;memorandumtoJapaneseforeignministeronwarprospects,152–3;encouragesarmedrevoltinFrance,174;questionsAuchinleckoverUltramessages,196;useandmisuseofintelligence,200,209,555;onJICplanners,202;kinshipwithCharlesDrake,206–7;promotesraidsandResistance,260;andcreationofSOE,264;encouragesSOEandResistanceaction,267,279,305,489;supportsTito,295;andpost-warplans,299;supremeauthroityinBritain,304;on‘GrandAlliance’,349;preventsintelligenceoperationsagainstRussians,352,364,405;cautionoverSecondFront,363;andpassinginformationtoUSSR,367;readsŌshima’sdispatches,396;deploresfrivolouscodenames,433–5;informsRooseveltofTurkishagent,461;onpost-invasionstrategy,484;usesUltrainformationtowinarguments,488;warinessaboutendofwar,497;policyonIndochina,517;andeffectofatomicbomb,527;BohrurgestoshareatomicsecretswithRussia,528

Ciano,CountGaleazzo,195,397‘Cicero’seeBazna,ElyesaCiliax,ViceAdmiralOtto,197–200ciphers:useandbreaking,7–8,70;codesbrokenatBletchleyPark,70–1CityofBaghdad,SS,136Claire,Paul,342–3Clark,Gen.Mark,411Clarke,Col.Carter,404Clarke,Col.Dudley,xxiiClausen,Anna,37,111,183Clausen,Max,37,39,111–12,179,181–2Clegg,Hugh,100Clemens(inBerlin),28Cline,Walter,292–3Clissman,Helmut,336Clive,Nigel,268,272,278,280,390–1,536Clören,Hauptmann,491Cockburn,Claud,350Cocteau,Jean,262codesseeciphersCoe,Fran,380Coenegrachts,Betsy(néeStratemans),492Colby,William,538

Cole,SergeantHarold,273Colefax,Sibyl,Lady,363Colin,David,295Collins,Richard,500Colombo(Ceylon),505,511‘Colossus’(computer),415–16‘Colossus’,Operation,260Colpoys,CmdrGeoffrey,53Colville,SirJohn(‘Jock’),354COM14see‘Hypo,Station’Comintern,17–18,20,372communism:appeal,19–20,352–4,385,553ConfrérieNotre-Dame,274Connolly,Cyril,62Constantini,Francesco,5convoys:controlof,216–17;Germanknowledgeof,219;losses,220Coon,Carleton,291Coppi,Hans,243Coppi,Hilda,243,246–7CoralSea,Battleofthe(1942),167Cot,Pierre,385Cotton,Sidney,3Coughlin,Col.John,515Cowgill,Felix,60,207–8,440,442Cox,Flight-SergeantCharles,256,258–60Cox,James,149Cradock,Percy,200Crete:Germansinvade(May1941),84;Germangeneralkidnapped,267;BritishsignalsdecryptedbyGermans,453Cripps,SirStafford,106,125–6,129–30,439Cromwell,CmdrJohn,507Crossbowgroup(earlier‘Bodyline’committee),421–3,428,430Crow,Richard,284Crum,Michael,412Cruwell,Gen.Ludwig,421Culliford,FltLt.Guy,427–8Cunningham,AdmiralSirAndrew,84,195–6Currie,Lauchlin,382Curtis,JamesO.,500cyber-warfare,557Czechoslovakia:intelligenceservice,1–2;threatenedbyHitler,11,15;annexedbyGermany,40;agentsinLondon,50,55–6

D-Day(1944):deceptionplan,228,286,402,484–5;date,483;success,486;seealsoNormandyinvasionD-Dienst,219Dakar,203DalaiLama,293Dalton,Hugh,207,261Daly,Mrs(Irishgoverness),336Damaskin,Igor,228Dansey,Claude:headsMI6’sZSection,10;asMenzies’deputy,17;relationswithdraftedstaff,207;messagefromBoyleonSOE

codenames,269;declinestosavecapturedagents,277;anti-AmericanismandhostilitytoOSS,287;believesKolbeadoubleagent,309;narrowattitude,393

Darlan,AdmiralFrançois,291Davies,Tommy,52Davis,Elmer,287Deakin,MajorWilliam,97,278deceptiontechniquesandoperations:xxii–xxiii,193,483,502,553;seealso‘Fortitude’,Operation;‘Mincemeat’deception;‘Monastery’,Operation

Deery,Anthony,336–7deGrey,Nigel,86,90,208,412Dekanozov,Vladimir,105,132Delattre,Robert(‘Bob’),255Delhi,505,511Delidaisefamily(ofParis),439Delidaise,Liliane(LucieBeucherie),439–41,445Delidaise,Richard(ÉmileRivière),437,439–41Delius,DrWagner,2332Demyanov,Alexander(‘Max’;‘Heine’),xxiii,229–36,456,542,553Dening,Esler,510,513Denning,CmdrNorman,216Denniston,CmdrAlastair:inGreatWar,9;meetsPolishcodebreakers,12;acquaintancewithPolishcryptanalysts,48;andRSS’scrackingofAbwehrhand-cipher,59;movestoBletchleyPark,73;interviewsBletchleyParkstaff,74;complaintsfromKnox,76;pessimismoverbreakingEnigma,82;relegatedtoLondonrole,88;onimportanceofUltra,101;andTuring,546

Despres,Emile,301Deutsch,Arnold,354,359,362,370,375DeuxièmeBureau(France’sintelligenceservice),7deValera,Eamon,330,332,336Devonshire,HMS,140Dewavrin,André(‘Col.Passy’),193,264,274–5Dickey,Marvin,211Dickinson,Lee,144Dickinson,Velvalee,144Dickson,Col.‘Monk’,500Dickstein,Samuel,376Dieppe:raid(1942),260,454Dincklage,Hans-Gunthervon,478Dirksen,Herbertvon,33,33–4,38Dodd,Martha,374–5Dodd,William,375Doihara,Gen.Kenji,141Dolan,Brooke,293DollisHill,414–16Dönhoff,GrafChristophervon,445Dönitz,AdmiralKarl:onCanaris,61;introducesfourthrotorintoU-boats’Enigma,88,94,454;U-boatcampaign,93,213,218;suspectssignalsbeingmonitored,94,220–1;valuesintelligence,218;lacksU-boatnumbers,221;communicationsweaknesses,222;U-boattypes,401

Donovan,Maj.Gen.William(‘WildBill’):agreementwithNKVD,xvii;activities,xxiv,284,295–6;backgroundandcharacter,97–8,304,395;Stephenson’srelationswith,97–8;Godfreyon,157;directsOSS,283–4,287,293,303–4;advicefromCavendish-Bentinck,286;style,288,295,298;andResearch&Analysisdivision,299;onGermansupplydifficulties,301;knowsofOSS

communists,378;onBritishaimstorecoverS.E.Asia,514–15;claimsChinaasareaofresponsibility,517;offerstocooperatewithRussiansafterwar,537;unpopularity,538;death,546

Döring(code-breaker),452DoubleCrosssystem,271,286,553DoublePlayfair(filedciphersystem),7Douglas,AlbrechtArchibald,464Douglas,CountessFreda,464Downes,Donald,297Drake,Charles,206–7Driscoll,AgnesMeyer,158–9Dübendorfer,Rachel(‘Cissie),24,109,252,542Duchessad’Aosta(Italianliner),266–7Dufours(imrisonedFrenchman),275Duggan,Laurence,372,374,381Duke,Col.Florimond,294Dulles,Allen:receivesinformationfromBerlin,xxiv,114,202;disapprovesofVermehrendefectionsinTurkey,73;Frenaysellsintelligenceto,276;reputationasmasterspy,305–6,314–15;inSwitzerland,306–9,340,377,477;onprospectsofpost-warEurope,307;reports,307–13;meetsKolbe,309;onGermanoppositiontoHitler,311–13;gathersinternationalinformation,312;arrangessurrendertermswithWolffinItaly,315;onpartisansinRussia,325;onPeenemünde,423;informsWashingtonof‘Cicero’leak,462;effectofinformationinUSA,548

Dulles,Clover,306Dumont,Roger(‘Pol’),254–5Dunderdale,Wilfred(‘Biffy),47,341DutchEastIndies(Indonesia),515–16Dyer,Lt.CmdrThomas,160,164,166–7Dyson,Freeman,212Dzerzhinsky,Felix,371

Earhardt,Karl,344EastSolomons,Battleofthe,504Eddy,Col.WilliamA.,296Eden,Anthony,209,261Eggen,StürmbannführerHans,340,475–6Eichmann,Adolf,300Einstein,Albert,526Eisenhower,Gen.DwightD.,402,409,497,498–9,503,537Eitingon,Leonid,133,456electroniccircuitry,414electronicsurveillance,559Elliott,Nicholas,471Ellis,Dick,96Emig,Marianne,3England,USS,508EnglishPatient,The(film),63Enigma:Britishuseof,xxi;Polesaimtocrack,8,12–13;BletchleyParkstruggleswith,47;Polesfirstdecrypt,48;GermansunawareofAlliedprogresson,56;Germansbelieveimmunetodecipherment,72,93,551;gradualbreaking,72;naval,82;Japaneseneglect,145;Wehrmachttrafficpresentsdifficulties,411,413;decryptsfollowingAlliedinvasion,487;armyoperates,490;Luftwaffeintroducesnewreflector(UmkehrwalzeD;‘UncleDick’),503

‘Enormoz’(Russianatomicenergypenetrationprogramme),529,531,533

‘Eric’(Britishcommunistphysicist),530Ericsson(Swedishcompany),413Erskine,Ralph,83Esmond,Lt.CmdrEdward,VC,198Esperance,Cape,Battleof(October1942),95Estonia:welcomesGermaninvaders,317;Sethand,431–3,437,446Evan,FirstOfficerPeter,136Ewan,William,135–6

Fabian,CmdrRudy,511Fairburn,Captain,264FalaiseGap,490,497Falk,Peter,467–8Falkenhausen,Gen.AlexanderErnst,Freiherrvon,311Fansler,Priscilla,376FarEastCombinedBureau,216Fasson,Lt.Tony,89–90FederalBureauofInvestigation(USA):role,4,98,285;viewofBritish,100;wartimeexpansion,284;claimssuccesses,285–6,532;incompetenceagainstspying,383–4,534;neverinfiltrated,384

Feffer,Itzik,526Feklisov,Alexander,371–2,374,383–4Fellers,Bonner,454Fenner,Wilhelm,93,449,451–3,458–9Ferguson,Alan,137,140Ferguson,Violet,135,137,140Fermi,Enrico,526–8,531Field,Noel,372,377FifthColumns,260FighterCommand(RoyalAirForce),53Finland:warwithRussia(1939–40),186,547Finnegan,Joe,170Fischer,Franz,46Fishmessages(German),413–15,486Fish,MildredseeHarnack,MildredFitin,Lt.Gen.Pavel:andGermanplantoinvadeUSSR,116,119,123–4,128,131–2;headsforeignsectionofNKVD,116;background,123;disbelievesNelidov,128;Rybkinapresentsreportto,130;meetsStalin,131,134;signsrehabilitationdocumentsforSudoplatov,175;suspicionofPhilby,365;complainsoflatedeliveryofdocuments,382;character,395;andDonovan’swillingnesstocooperate,537

Flato,Charles,381FleetRadioUnitPacific(FRUPAC),173,505–7,551Fleming,CmdrIan,xxv,98,213,343Fleming,Col.Peter,xxiii,512Fletcher,AdmiralFrankJack,64Florev,George,527Flowers,Tommy,414–16Fogel(USCommunistPartymember),532Foot,M.R.D.,xxvi,727Foote,Alexander,24–6,107–9,187,251–2,348,478,542;seealso‘Lucy’RingForbes,AdmiraloftheFleetSirCharles,214

ForceK(RoyalNavy),195ForeignArmiesWestseeFremdeHeerWestForeignOffice(British):receivespre-warintelligence,16;declinesapproachesfromGermanResistance,395‘Fortitude’,Operation(Alliedinvasiondeception),xxiii,228,402,467,483–5,502Fourcade,Marie-Madeleine,262France:intelligencedepartments,6–7;falls(1940),52;collaborators,56;andJapaneseaimsinIndochina,153;Resistance,254,262–3,274,557;SOEoperationsin,272–3;Germanyreadspre-wardiplomatictraffic,450;Germansrecruitstay-behindagents,491;andcontrolofIndochina,517

Franco,Gen.Francisco,297–8,360Franken(rumouredGermanaircraftcarrier),42Frankfurter,Felix,376Franz,Wolfgang,451Fraser,Ingram,97‘Fred’(Germanagent),63FreeFrench,274–5Freeman,John,69FremdeHeerOst(FHO;ForeignArmiesEast),224–5,234FremdeHeerWest(FHW;ForeignArmiesWest),50,483,501–2Frenay,Henri,275‘Freya’(Germanradarsystem),256,2457Freyberg,Gen.Bernard,VC,84FreytagvonLoringhoven,Wessel,473Fricke,Walther,451Friede,Viktor,460Friedman,William,5,77,101,160,404,408,451;ElementsofCryptanalysis,158Frolov,Captain,321Fromme,Franz,331Frost,MajorJohn,256–9Frowein,Lt.Hans-Joachim,220FRUPACseeFleetRadioUnitPacificFuchs,Klaus,26,525–7,529–35Fukudome,Vice-AdmiralShigeru,406

Gabin,Jean,107Gaertner,Dieter,33Gaevernitz,Gerovon,306Gagel,Karl,249,541Gambier-Parry,Col.Richard:qualities,59–60;interceptGermansignals,77;Trevor-Ropercriticises,208Gamelin,Gen.Maurice,50,52Gamow,George,532Gamow,Rho,532Gamsakhurdia,Konstantin,178Garbers,Heinrich,62–3,346‘Garbo’(agent),285,468,484,544Gaulle,Gen.Charlesde,274–6,300,312,385GeheimeKommandosache,450GehlenBureau(ofCIA),545Gehlen,Lt.Col.Reinhard:activities,xxiv;claimsBormanninRössler’spay,188;backgroundandcareer,224–5;analysisofsituationinRussia,225–7;Demyanov(‘Max’)reportsto,231–2,234,456;awardsDemyanovIronCross,236;keepsjob,238;offersservices

toAmericans,544–5Gendin,MajorSimon,22,28Gerlach,Christiane,32Germany:securityagencies,6;pre-wareconomicweakness,13–14;rearms,15;pre-warintentions,16;agreementwithJapan,38;invasionthreattoBritain,53–4;planstoinvadesUSSR,56,85,103,105–6,118–20,122,126;beliefinimmunityofEnigma,72,93,551;breaksAlliedcodes,72;invasionandadvanceintoRussia,121,133,174,187,189,203–4,223,483;Sovietspeculationsonstrategy,128–9;militarystrengthanddeploymentatinvasionofRussia,130;economymisjudged,210–11,301–2;intelligenceorganisationsandweaknesses,223,447–51,457–8,468–72;loathedbyoccupiedpeoples,260;persecutionofJews,300;proposalstoprovokerevolutionin,300;lacksspecialoperationsunits,305;Dullesonpost-wartreatmentof,307,312;Dullesreportsonoppositionin,311–13;fearofUSSR,311;anti-partisanreprisalsinRussia,322–5;oilshortage,398;expectsAlliedlandinginPasdeCalais,402;usesteleprinters,411–16;rocketandV-weaponsdevelopment,421–6;closesselectedforeigninterceptionstations,457;militarydispositionsknowninAlliedinvasion,486;lacksresourcesforreactioninNormandyandNWEurope,487,502;possiblelast-ditch‘Alpineredoubt’stand,503;lackoftrustwithJapan,522–3;andatomicbombdevelopment,527;susceptibilitytodeception,554;seealsoBerlin;‘RedOrchestra’

Gestapo:andRSHA,61;suppressesResistanceactivity,223Gibson,Guy,58Gibson,MajorHarold,40Giering,Hans,247–9‘Gilbert’(agent),363Gill,Walter,58–9Giraud,Gen.Henri,477Gisevius,Hans-Berndt,64,110,308–9Giskes,Maj.Herman,269,271Glasser,Harold,381Glebov(Russianconspirator),229Glodjai,Heinz(‘Sharp’),252Glushenko(Sovietpartisan),320Gneisenau(Germanheavycruiser),196,199,257Göbbels,Joseph,360,396,469,478Godfrey,Rear-AdmiralJohn:ChurchillrecommendstosucceedSinclair,17;visitsUSA,98;reportsonUSintelligence,156–7;inJIC,202;personalstaff,212;replaced,213;andprotectionofUltrasecret,214

Godfrey,Margaret,74Godin,BaronMichelvon,24Goggins,CaptainWilliam,172Gold,Harry,373,527,531,534Goldberg,Arthur,297–8Golikov,Gen.Filip,106,128Golos,Jacob,379–80,385Good,Jack,415Gördeler,Karl:nationalistviews,46;andRössler,110;anti-Hitlergroup,118;JICconsidersascontact,204Gorgopotamosviaduct(Greece),267Göring,Franz,481Göring,Hermann:andGermaninvasionplansforRussia,131;givenJapanesesamuraisword,140;assassinationproposed,177,481;andexposureof‘RedOrchestra’,244;Forschungsamt,450

Gorsky,Anatoly,355,360,381,525Görtz,Hermann:pre-wartourinEngland,3;inIreland,333–7Gourevitch,AnatoliSukolov-(‘VincenteSierra’;‘MonsieurKent’):background,22–3;inSpain,22;inBelgiumwithTrepper,23,31,54–5,189–90,239;memoirs,30,247;training,30;personallife,54,190,239–40,249;movestoGeneva,107–8;setsupSimexco(tradingcompany),189–90,239;travelstoPragueandBerlin,191;encountersSchulze-Boysenand‘RedOrchestra’,192–3;moves

toParis,240;arrestedandinterrogated,241,247;Pannwitzreleases,249–50;post-wartrialandimprisonmentinRussia,539;death,539

GovernmentCodeandCipherSchool(GC&CS)seeBletchleyParkGovernmentCommunicationsHeadquarters(GCHQ),546Grand,Laurence,263GrandmuftiofJerusalemseeHusseini,MuhammedAminel-Graupe(GermaninNorthAfrica),453Gray,LAC,87Grazier,AbleSeamanColin,89–90Greece:Germanyinvades,103,105;SOEin,278,280;Germanswithdrawfrom(1944),280,390;OSSin,294;agentsin,390Greene,Graham,55,391,394Greene,Herbert(Midorikawa),144Greenglass,DavidandRuth,533Gregg,Joseph,379GreyPillars,Cairo,278Gribble,Col.Philip:DiaryofaStaffOfficer,91Grossvogel,Leon,31Groves,Gen.Leslie,526GRU(RedArmy’sintelligenceorganisation),18;purged,20–1,28;inBelgium,23;inSwitzerland,24–6;Germannetwork,28;informantsinLondon,105;attemptedcoupinYugoslaviathwarted,106;andprospectiveGermaninvasionofUSSR,121;predictsHitler’sOperation‘Blue’,228;identifiescollaborators,229;agentsinGermany,252;inUSA,369;sendsspiesforlocalwork,494;deceptionoperations,553

Guadalcanal,172,504,519GuardsChapel,London:destroyedbyflyingbomb,394Gubbins,Colin,264,272,279Guderian,Gen.Heinz,457Guerisse,CaptainAlbert,273guerrillacampaignsandpartisans,261,305,314–29,556–7Guichard,Xavier,466Guisan,Gen.Henri,475–7Gumassat,BhagatRam,339Gumpertz,Hedda,372

Haas-Heye,Libertas,29Hagen,Ursula,448Haig,Field-MarshalSirDouglas,17Halder,Col.Gen.Franz,118,130,188,204,318HalfayaPass,85Halifax,EdwardFrederickLindleyWood,1stEarlof:appeasementpolicy,15;character,261;Macleanand,359Hall,CmdrRichard,216Hall,Ted,383,524,533Hall,AdmiralSirWilliam(‘Blinker’),74Halperin,Maurice,377Halsey,AdmiralWilliam(‘Bull’),166,521Hambro,SirCharles,264Hambro,Olaf,74Hamburger,Ursula(‘Sonya’),25–6,107–8,525,530,539Hamel,Edmond,107,109,251Hamel,Olga,251

Hampshire,Stuart,361–2Handeeming,Col.,50Handel,Michael,65Hanfstaengl,Helene,478Hankey,MauricePascalAlers,1stBaron,351,355Hansell,Gen.Heywood,211Hansen,Col.Georg,473Harker,BrigadierOswald(‘Jasper’),207Harnack,Arvid:recruitedasRussianagentinBerlin,29–31,247;activitiesin‘RedOrchestra’,114,116–22,130,193–4,242,548;losescontactwithMoscow,189;Gourevitchcontacts,191;arrestedandhanged,246

Harnack,Mildred(néeFish),29,246–7Harriman,Averell,301,380Harris,Kitty,357Harrison,Leland,306Hart,BasilLiddell,359Hasenjaeger,Gisbert,452Hastings,CaptainEdward,101Hastings,Max:AllHellLetLoose,555Haulkelid,Knut,280Hausamann,CaptainHans,110,307Haushofer,Karl,33Havemann,Wolfgang,242Hawaii:Japanesecolonyon,155;seealsoPearlHarborHayashi,Lt.Col.Saburo,143,151Hayden,Sterling(‘Buzz’),290–2,294–5,538Hayes,Carlton,297Hayes,Stephen,336Hazell,Lt.Col.Ronald,435–7,442heavywater,279,528Heenan,CaptainPatrick,155Held,Stephen,333–4Helms,Richard,538Hemingway,Ernest,381Hempel,Eduard,334Henderson,SirNevile,11,16Henniger,Hans,29Hensler,Hermann,250Herbst,Josephine,372Herivel,John,79,81Hermes,R.A.seeRössler,RudolfHess,Rudolf,127,129,360Hessler,Albert,241–2Heuvel,Frederickvanden(‘Fanny’),306,421–2Hewitt,AbramStevens,480Heydrich,Lena,473Heydrich,Reinhard:andSchellenberg,6,473;Canarisworkswith,64;usesRSHAagainstinternalenemies,66;andMuller’sclaimtobeGestapomember,116;assassinated,250,342,474

Hignet,Gilbert,97Higuchi,Kiichiro,522

Hill,Tony,256Hiller,George,276Hillgarth,CaptainAlan,297,343Himmler,Heinrich:andLehmann,27;andVenloincident,45;runsdomesticsecurityservice(RSHA),61;onloyaltytoHitler,65;formspartisanunit,305;differenceswithCanaris,361;Sethclaimstohavemet,444;withholdsSD’sreportsfromHitler,469;andSchellenberg,473–6,480;demandsSwissneutrality,476;largesse,478;givenarmycommandonEasternFront,481

Hince,Clarence,100Hinsley,Harry,xxiv,xxvi,74,553Hirch,Frank,82Hiskey,Clarence,525,531Hiss,Alger:astraitor,xviii;worksforGRU,372;backgroundandcareer,376Hitler,Adolf:discountsobjectiveevidence,xx,555;diffusespower,6;respectforBritishintelligence,8;militarystrength,13–14;MI6analyses,15;intentions,16;andVenloincident,45;plansofattackinWest,48–9;launchesBlitzkrieginWest,50;planstoinvadeSovietUnion,56,85,103,105,118,120,397;controllingnature,65;useofintelligence,66–7;losesBattleofBritain,105;dissensionwithgenerals,126,129;rejectsSovietpeaceproposal,127;invadesRussia,174;Russianassassinationplanagainst,176–7;andrecallofOttfromTokyo,182;strategyinRussia,187–8,194,228;obstinacyandunpredictability,206,554;Jungon,308;andpersecutionofJews,310;strategyinItaly,310–11;oppositionto,311–13;ordersreprisalsinSovietUnion,322,324;pactwithStalin,354;Julybombplotagainst,365,402,472,480;meetingswithŌshima,399–401;onItaly’scollapse,400;changesmind,410;anddevelopmentofV-weapons,421,429;believesinAlliedBalkancampaign,463;SD’sreportswithheldfrom,469;denouncesCanaris,478;expectsAlliedinvasionatPasdeCalais,484;plansArdennesoffensive(1944),498;supposeddiaries,544

Hiyo(Japanesecarrier),507HoChiMinh,353Hoare,SirSamuel,297,343Hodges,Corporal,87Hogg,CmdrW.S.,285Holland,Elisabeth,115Holland,Col.John,264Hollard,Michel,262,425,426Hollerithpunch-cardmachines,160Holmes,Jasper,160–1,166–7,169–70,172,506,508Holohan,MajorWilliam,288Holtwick,Lt.CmdrJack,160–1,166Holzach,Paul,340Hönmanns,MajorErich,48Hoover,J.Edgar:headsFBI,4;Menziesseekslinkwith,96;passesinformationtoBritish,97;Godfreyvisits,98;conflictswithDonovan,284;uncooperativeness,285;vanity,286;unawareofanti-USactivities,369;Zarubinbetrayedto,382;andnon-penetrationofFBI,384;securesdemiseofOSS,538

Hopkins,Harry,377,380,526Horodyski,Count,17Horthy,AdmiralMiklós,24Hoskins,Col.Harold,291Höttl,William,537HouseUn-AmericanActivitiesCommittee(USA),382Howard,SirMichael,471,502Hoyningen-Huene,BaronOswaldvon,348Hozyain,228,528Hradecký,Václav(‘LittleWally’),315‘Huff-Duff’(High-FrequencyDirection-Finding),83,88,213Hull,Cordell,314,374

humint(humanintelligence):defined,xxiiin;Britishdependenceon,13;BritishshortageinsideGermany,391,395Humphreys,Group-CaptainHarry,xx,408Huntington,Ellery,298‘Husky’,Operation(Sicilyinvasion,July1943),455,470Husseini,MuhammedAminel-,GrandMuftiofJerusalem,479Hüttenhain,Erich,451–2,457–8,545Hydracipher,83‘Hypo,Station’,PearlHarbor(COM14),160–2,165–8,171–2,504–5

Iatskov,Anatoly,534Icardi,Lt.Aldo,288‘Ichi-Go’,Operation,522Ichijima,Kikuyasa,182–3Ilyin,Viktor,236–7Imai,CmdrNobuiko,519ImitationGame,The(film),xxvii,546Imphal,510,522ImportersandExportersServices(USA),284India:troopssubornedbyJapanese,154–5;Britishpolicyin,514–15;Japaneserunagentsin,520IndianNationalArmy,339,520Indochina:asJapaneseobjective,153–4;Anglo-Americanconflictin,517IndustrialIntelligenceCentre(British),13Ioffe,A.E.,533Ireland:positioninwar,330–1;Abwehractivitiesin,331–8IrishRepublicanArmy,330–4Irrawaddy,river(Burma),513Isbutski,Hermann(‘Bob’),248Ishii,Hanako(‘Agnes’),35,39,180,183,542Ismay,Gen.HastingsLionel(‘Pug’),17Istanbul,339Italy:pre-warintelligencegathering,5;navalcodesbroken,83–4;frogmen’ssuccesses,221;Hitlerintendstowithdrawfromsouth,310;partisansandagentsin,391;collapse,400;trafficintercepted,407–8;breaksBritishcodes,453;Alliesinvade,479

Ito,CaptainRisaburo,145Ivanov,Peter,341Ivanov,Vasily,237IwoJima,521Izaki,Kioya,141

Jacob,BrigadierIan,70;navalandmilitarycodes,145,164Janowsky,Werner,466Japan:pre-warspying,5;Sorgein,33–8;agreementwithGermany,38;deploymentsonSovietborder,38;Purpleciphermachinelost,95;AmericansbreakPurplecipher,99,145,160,162,165,386–7,395,551;USbringsmockPurplemachinetoBritain,100;US–Britishcollaborationon,100;proposedpeacetreatywithChina,111;restraintinenteringwar,111;shockatNazi–SovietPact,111;warwithChina,112,141;Sovietneutralitypactwith,126,151;readscaptureddocumentsonBritishpositioninAsia,138–9;collectsintelligenceinformationbeforePearlHarbor,141;intelligenceoperationsagainstSovietRussia,142–3;intelligenceoperationsinBritainandUSA,144;undervaluesintelligence-gathering,144–5,149–50,521;complacencyoversecurityofcodes,145;counter-espionageorganisations,145–9;lackofsuccessinnavalcodebreaking,145;assessmentofwarinEurope,150–2;conductswargame,150;overconfidenceofresultofwar,150–1;andGermaninvasionofRussia,151,179;Churchill’smemorandumto,152–3;militaryobjectives,153,555;informationonSoutheastAsiaandPacific,154–6;supportsAsiannationalistgroups,154;enterswar

(1941),156;Orangecode,162;plansattackonPearlHarbor,163–4;JN-25bFleetCode,166–7;introducesFleetCodeJN-25c,171;prospectivethreattoUSSR,179–81;changesdiplomaticcodesafter‘Barbarossa’,186;messagestoandfromŌshima,397;realisticestimateofSovietstrength,399;‘Coral’navalattachécodebroken,401;keptfromknowingAlliedintelligencesecrets,405–6;Germanyreads‘Red’diplomaticcipher,448;codesbrokenslowly,504;JN-25FleetCode,504,506;WaterTransportCode,505,511;‘Maru’cipherbroken,507;shippinglosses,507–8;Burmacampaign,510;useofcodebooks,512;preoccupationwithUSSRandChina,518–19;CentralSpecialIntelligenceSection(TokushuJoho-bu),519;slowdevelopmentofintelligenceoperations,519,556;agentsinUSA,520;overestimatesUSstrengthinAlaska,521;kamikazeattacks,522;lackoftrustwithGermany,522–3;underestimatesUSmoralstrength,548

JapaneseNavy:pre-PearlHarborcontradictions,150;intelligencedepartment,519;monitorsUStraffic,521Jebb,Gladwyn:defendsMI6,15;requestsGrand’sdismissal,263Jeffreys,John,73Jenke,Albert,461Jenkins,Roy,413Jensen,Willi,452Jews:Nazipersecutionof,300,310;joinSovietpartisans,324;Schellenbergexchangesfortrucks,481‘Jim’(Germanagent),63Jodl,Gen.Alfred,401John,Otto,365Johnson,Celia,512JohnstonIsland(Pacific),169JointintelligenceCommittee(JIC):onGermaninvasionthreat,53;onGermaninvasionofRussia,125,132,203–4,206;composition,201–2;honestreporting,201;efficacyandjudgements,203–6;reportsonenemystrengthsanddispositions,205;researchstaff,299;scepticismoverGermanV-weapons,425;misinterpretsArdennesoffensive,498–9,501;underestimatesenemy’smilitarycapabilities,554

JointIntelligenceStaff,202–3Jones,Eric,88Jones,ReginaldV.:onimportanceofradio,xix;andjammingofLuftwaffenavigationalbeams,xxii;Bohrconfidesin,9;backgroundandcareer,42–3;readsandbelieves‘OsloReport’,42–4;andDunderdale’sinformationonJu-88,47;passesUltradecrypttoNutting,75;onusingmixedinformation,203;onpresentationofsuccessfulresults,209;identifiesGermanradarsystem,256;andBrunevalraid,258–9;shownlistofsuspectscientists,350;knowledgeofLuftwaffebomber-plottingtable,418;onGermanV-weapons,422–4,426–8,430;deceivesGermansoverV-1targeting,427;post-warcareeranddeath,544

Jordan,Harold,419–20Josendale(OSSofficer),493Joseph,Bella,377–8Joseph,Julius,377–8Joyce,William(‘LordHawHaw’),444Juricka,Stephen,162Justice,CeciliaChapman,289

Kahn,David,xxvKaltenbrunner,Ernst,6,61,472,474,480,482,523Kamenz,Lt.Paul,138‘KammhuberLine’(Germanradarsystem),256,259Karens(Burma),516Kartashev,Mikhailov,318–19Kasparov,Grigori,381KasserinePass,Battleof(1943),50,410Katyn:massacreofPolishofficers,119,363,368,371Katz,Barry,303

Katz,Joseph,378Katz,Otto,376Kavinsky,Ivan,175Kawai,Taikichi,37Keitel,Field-MarshalWilhelm,xxi,128,399,472Keller,Professor(Swiss),347Kempe,Henne,539Kempeitai(Japan),148–9Kennan,George,292Kennedy,Maj.Gen.John,98Kennedy,Paul,547–8Kenney,Maj.Gen.George,509Kenny,John,337Kershaw,MarthaBelle,289Kersten,Felix,478Kesselring,Gen.Albert,21,311,410–11,418Ketel,Helmut,35KGr100(Germanpathfinderunit),81Kharkov,228Kheifetz,Gregory,525–6,532Khrushchev,NikitaS.,318–19Kiev,223Kikoin,I.K.,528Killer,Ilse,496Kimmel,AdmiralHusband,160King,CaptainJohn,5,350Kipling,Rudyard:Kim,9Kirinovic,CaptainJan,45Kistiakowsky,George,527Kitabayashi,Tomo,181Kitze,Hans-Christianvon,465Kliemann,MajorEmile,439Kluge,Field-MarshalGünthervon,193,310Klugmann,James,353–4Knatchbull-Hugessen,SirHughe,460–3Knockholt,Kent,406,416Knowles,CmdrKenneth,508Knox,Dillwyn:inGreatWar,9;meetsPolishcodebreakers,12;breaksintoAbwehrciphermachine,60;employedatBletchleyPark,73,87;deathfromcancer,76–7;difficultrelationswithWelchman,76–7;onoperatorerror,79–80;supportstalentedwomen,83–4

Knox,Frank,380Kobulov,Amayak(‘Zakhar’),116–17,118,120–1Kobulov,Bogdan,117Kocher,Otto,475Koga,AdmiralMineichi,406Kohima,510KokodaTrailbattles(Papua-NewGuinea),509Kolbe,Fritz,308–9,311,462Kondo,ViceAdmiralNobutake,138–9Konoye,PrinceFumimaro,179,181

Kopkow,HauptsturmführerHorst,242Koppi,Hans,121Korotkov,Alexander,115–17,119–21,241Kotschesche,Mihail,495–7Koutrik,Folkertvan,11,45–6Kozo,Izumi,184–7,367,550Kraisthmus,Thailand,515Kramer,CmdrAlwin,164Kramer,Charles,381,531Kramer,Karl-Heinz,467–8,481Kranzbühler,Major,190–1Krebs(Germantrawler),82Kreiger,Leonard,300Kreipe,Gen.Heinrich,268‘Kremlin,The’(Germandeceptionplan),193Kriegsmarine(Germannavy):Enigmamachines,82;signalsintelligence,219Krivitsky,Walter,360Kroner,Brigadier-Gen.Hayer,162Krug,Peter,285Kruger,Karl,10–11Krupskaya,Nadezhda,526Kuckchoff,Adam(‘OldMan’),120Kuczynski,Jurgen,525Kudo,CaptainKatsuhiko,141Kuebart,Wilhelm,473Kulikov,Ivan,237Kunze,Werner,448Kur,Ernst,26Kurmin,Col.(ofRussian12thArmy),224Kurnakov,Sergei,533Kursk,188,227,400,547Kuznetsov,Col.Gen.Fedor,232Kuznetsov,Lt.,320‘Kvant’(or‘Hustler’),531Kvasnikov,Leonid,525Kwajaleinatoll,506

Lahousen,Col.Erwin,62LaiTek,515Lamplaugh,Maj.Gen.,510Langbehn,Carl,478Langer,Col.Gwido,12Langley,Lt.Col.James,277,440Lanz,Lt.Gen.Hubert,390Larsen,Svend,301Lasswell,Red,170Latvia:welcomesGermaninvaders,317Lauenberg(Germanship),82Lauwers,Hubertus,269–70

Lawrence,Costa,269Layton,Edwin,159,162,165–6,168–9Leclerc,Gen.Jacques-Philippe,487Lee,Duncan,378Leese,Gen.SirOliver,511Lehmann,Willy(‘Breitenbach’),27–9,114–15,122,189,241,243Leibbrandt,SydneyRobey,346Lemichik,Captain,321Lemoine,Rodolophe(bornRudolfStallman),8Lempe,Julius,83Lend-Lease,380,383Lenin,VladimirI.,24Leningrad,225–6Lestraint,Gen.Charlesde,276Lever,Mavis,83,87Lexington(UScarrier),522LeyteGulf,518,522–3Liberatoraircraft,221Lichtensteinairborneradar(German),419Liddell,Guy:onCanaris,6;onBest,46;onPolishcryptanalystsseekingasyluminBritain,47;scepticalofdownedGermanplaneinBelgium,49;deplorestorturemethods,53;onunsuitableagentsinNewYork,97;onvisitingFBIagents,100;denouncesJapaneserequestfordetailsofnationalgrid,144;qualities,207;Trevor-Roperrespects,208;onagent‘Max’,235;onlackofcooperationwithSOE,268;onDukeofAlba,348;oncommunistpenetrationofservices,349,352;onRussiansuperiorityinespionage,351–2;onRonaldSeth,444;authorisespassingBritishrailwaytimetablestoGermans,468;andGermanknowledgeofAlliedinvasionplans,485;oncommunistpenetrationofManhattanProject,534;denouncedaspossibletraitor,543;onpre-warespionage,550

Lidice,Czechoslovakia,250Lier-Hansen,Knut,280Ligne,PrinceCharlesde,464Lindquist,Martin,474Linlithgow,VictorAlexanderJohnHope,2ndMarquessof,514Lintz,Leonard,377Lippmann,Walter,378Lisbon:Japaneseconsulateraided,296;aswartimeintelligencecentre,338,341Liss,Lt.Col.Ulrich,50Lithuania:welcomesGermaninvaders,317Litvinov,Maxim,384Liveley,HMS,196Liverskaya,Florentina,27LloydCommitteeonGermanoilresources,210LloydGeorge,David,363Locarde,Professor(ofLyons),7Lockhart,JohnBruce,391Lockhart,RobertBruce,207,262–3,268,288,547Lofotenislands,82Long,Breckinridge,297Long,Leo,359LorenzSchlusselzusatzSZ40/42(teleprinter;‘Tunny’),xxi–xxii,411–13,415Lourenço,Agothino,338–9LourençoMarques,54,338,345–6

LowCountries:Germanplanstoattackthrough,49Lowry,Helen(MrsAkhmerova),371,385Loxley,Peter,468Lubyanka,133‘Lucy’Ring:establishedinSwitzerland,24,26,31;originofname,109;KremlinbelievesaninstrumentofChurchill,110;increasesactivities,187,194;Russiansundervalue,189;andGourevitch,190,239;informants,239,244;asRussians’mainaccesstoGermanhighplaces,250;Footeand,251,542;windsdown,252;harassed,309;Germansdecryptmessages,476;Germantraitorsinform,477–8;importance,548

Luftwaffe:pre-warcapabilities,14;usesWotannavigationalbeam,43;personnelengagedonsignalsduties,76;Bletchleydeciphersmessages,81,84;aircampaignagainstBritain,100;technicalsecretsuncovered,255–6;Enigmatrafficinterceptedandread,411;electronicdefencesuncovered,418–20;intelligencesuccesses,447;introducesnewreflectoronEnigma,503

Lund,Col.Rosher,344Lusey,Alghan,297Lyon-Smith,Tonia,249–50,541Lyon-Smith,BrigadierTristram,541Lyushov,Gen.Genrikh,142Lywood,Wing-CmdrO.C.,71n

M-109field-cipheringmachine(US),72Maasing,Richard,364‘Mac’(agent),44MacArthur,Gen.Douglas,172,206,300,508–9McCarthy,Joseph,xvi,369,543McCormack,Col.Alfred,100,403–4,454McCormick,CaptainLynde,168Machivariani,Georgi,179Mackenzie,Colin,514Maclean,Donald,314,351,354,356–9,359,361,363,367,525,527,543Maclean,Fitzroy,278Maclean,Melinda(néeMarling),357MacNeill,Gen.Hugo,336Madrid:aswartimeintelligencecentre,338;Germanship-watchingserviceclosed,469Maffey,SirJohn,334Magdoff,Harry,381‘Magic’(USdecryptmaterial),xxiiMaisky,Ivan,105,125–6,127,129Makarov,Mikhail(‘CarlosAlamo’;‘Chemnitz’),54,239,242,248Malaya:Britishweaknessin,139,555;inJapanesestrategy,154;Britishunpopularityin,513–14;JapaneseexecuteBritishstay-behindagents,515;localuncooperativeness,516

Mallet,SirVictor,125,314–15,341Maly,Theodore,21,362,375Manchuria,518,522,537ManhattanProject,385,524–5,527–30,532,534Manstein,Gen.FritzErichvon,310MaoZhedong,141,317,517‘Mar’(USscientist),530–1March-Phillips,Gus,266–7Marcuse,Herbert,299Marianas,521

Maritza(Germanfreighter),196‘MarketGarden’,Operation,498,501,547Marogna-Redwitz,Graf,473Marovic,Andrea,460‘Mars’,Operation,227,232–3,236Marsden-Smedley,Harriet,359Marshall,Gen.GeorgeC.,160,164–5,396,401,404,537Marshallislands,506,521Marwitz,Admiralvonder,470Marzani,Karl,377Maskirovka,238Mason,Paul,504Mason-MacFarlane,Col.Noel,3–4,351Masson,Lt.Col.Roger,307,309,347–8,475–7Masterman,J.C.,58,180Masur,Norbert,482Matapan,Cape,84Mathe,André,418–19Matsuoka,Yosuke,126,151,386,396‘Max’(Sovietagent)seeDemyanov,AlexanderMaximova,Yekaterina(‘Katcha’),33,35May,Sergeant(Germancipherexpert),269Mayer,HansFerdinand,43–4Mayers,Lt.CmdrCollin,143McKittrick(friendofMalcolmMoss),211McLachlan,Donald:onintelligence,xx,300;advocatesusingciviliansinuniformforintelligence,69;onGodfrey,213;onnavy’slapsesandmistakes,221;praisesNorwegianagents,391;onrangeofintelligencesources,549

McNeela,Jack,336Meckel,KapitänzurSeeHans,218Medhurst,Air-ChiefMarshalCharles,91Meisinger,Joseph,112,182Meitner,Lise,527Melland,MajorBrian,208,235Mellon,Paul,27Menzies,Stewart(‘C’):andPolishmimickedEnigmamachine,12;succeedsSinclair,17;Trevor-Roperdisparages,17,67,208;expectsGermanattack(January1940),49;sedentaryactivities,63;promisessuccessinbreakingcodes,68;prestigefromcodebreakingsuccesses,75;dissuadesChurchillfromsendingUltramaterialdirecttofieldcommanders,85;criticisedforremoteness,86;anddissentatBletchley,86;dislikesDenniston,88;seekslinktoFBI,96;appointsStephensonPassportControlOfficerinNewYork,97;andliaisonwithUSA,101;andCavendish-Bentinck,202;maintainsposition,208–9;reprimandsTrevor-Roper,208;criticisesSOE,268;toldofMI6andSOElossesoncontinent,273;anddeathofClaire,343;cautionoverinformingRussiaofUltra,351;appointsPhilbyheadofanti-communistespionagesection,365;assistants,393–4;qualities,395;andRonaldSeth(‘Blunderhead’),440;on‘Cicero’affair,463;remainsasMI6headuntil1952,537;attitudetoTuring,546;ondefeatofGermanyin1918,554

Mercador,Ramón,381Merkulov,Vsevolod,105,119,123,131–3,175,178,383,455,538–9Meyer,Herbert,xxMeyer-Schertenberg,Wolfsberg,475Meyer-Schwertenbach,Paul,340MI5:interrogatescapturedagents,53;out-stationinNewYork,97;directors,207;andSovietpenetration,360;feudswithSOE,395;rivalrywithotherservices,395

MI6:pre-warintelligenceonLuftwaffe,3;overvaluessecretinformation,4;codebreaking,8,75;reputation,8–9,15;staffing,9–10,392–3;ZSection,10;andNazithreat,13–14;andVenloincident,45–6,68;exaggeratesinformation,47;andfallofFrance,52;unreliability,54;employsexilegovernmentsinLondon,55–6;RadioSecurityService(RSS;earlierMI5),58–9,395;RadioAnalysisBureau,60,395;criticisedbyofficials,68,70;relationswithFBI,96,285;SpecialLiaisonUnits,210;SectionD,263;onrelationswithFreeFrench,275;dislikesDulles,309;reportonIreland,331;SectionIX,364;SectionV,392;empire-building,395;onArdennesoffensive(1944),500;inAsia,509–10;differenceswithSOE,509;continuesafterwar,537;declinestoopenarchives,546

MI9,393Michael,KingofRomania,296Michie,Donald,413Midway,167–70;Battleof(1942),157,171–2,504,551Mihailović,DragoljubDraa,178,268,295,364Mikhoels,Solomon,526Miklashevsky,Igor,176–7Mikler,Adam,23Miller,Robert,381Mills,Cyril,466Millward,William,79Milne,Ray,349Milner-Barry,Stuart,73,84,90,404,407,490Milshtein,Gen.Solomon,106Milton,CaptainE.,445‘Mincemeat’deception,470Mironov,Vasilii,382Mitchell,Charles,213Miyaki,Yotoku,34,181Mockler-Ferryman,BrigadierEric,410Model,Field-MarshalWalter,498Modin,Yuri,362,364Modrzhinskaya,Elena,362,366Moeller,Alvar,474Mohr,Anita,37Mohr,Lt.Ulrich,136–7Molodstov,CaptainVladimir,320Moloney,Adele,92Molotov,VyacheslavMikhailovitch:visittoBerlin,104;onmistrustingintelligence,113;onpostingspiestoUSA,371Moltke,Helmuthvon,204,395‘Monastery’,Operation,228–32,235,455,456–7,553Monk,Ray,526Montagu,Ewen,208Montagu,Ivor,350Montgomery,Gen.SirBernardLaw:opentoothers’views,xxi;andincreasedUltrainformation,408;achievesfirstvictory,409;slowadvance,409;innorth-westEurope,497–8

Moran,Spike,269Moravec,Col.František:paysforknowninformation,xviii;aschiefofCzechIntelligenceService,1–2;onFrenchintelligence,7;Sovietsrequestespionagetraining,19;movestoBritain,40–1;CzechagentsinLondon,49,55–6;onbrutishnessofBerlinNKVDagents,116;respectforMasson,347

Mordinov,Col.Georgy,177Morell,Francis,414Morgan,Charles,213

Morgeli,Ernst,475Morgenthau,Henry,300,380,384Morozova,Anna,494Morris,Christopher,78Morrison,Herbert,422,427–8Morros,Boris,375,382Morse,Chandler,291Mortaincounterattack(Normandy,1944),490Morton,MajorDesmond,13,96,207–8,288Morton,Joe,294Mosquera,Jorge,467Moss,Malcolm,211Moulin,Jean,276Mounsey,SirGeorge,14–15MountLavinia,Ceylon,514MountVernonAcademy,Virginia,505Mountbatten,AdmiralLordLouis,509–11Mountbatten,Lt.Philip,331Mouquet,Geneviève(‘Girot’),492Moyzich,Ludwig,461Mozambique,345–6Mueller,Anna,251Muggeridge,Malcolm,xvii–xviii,55,287,341,345–6,360,393–4Müller,Gen.Friedrich,268Muller,Heinrich,248,539Muller,Siegfried,115München(Germanship),82Munichcrisis(1938),15,40Murphy,Robert,291,296Musa,Jean,466Musashi(Japanesebattleship),148Muslims:Japaneseattempttosuborn,520Mussolini,Benito,8Musy,Jean-Marie,481

Nachrichtenarmaufklärung(voiceinterceptionservice),457NaganoSchool(Japaneseintelligencetrainingcentre),148Nagato(Japanesebattleship),148Nagel,Maj.-Gen.,323Nagumo,ViceAdmiralChuichi,171Nakajima,Lt.CmdrMinato,155Nakazawa,CaptainTasuku,150Nankin(Australianfreighter),94NationalCashRegister(company),407NationalCouncilofSoviet–AmericanFriendship(USA),369NationalMaritimeUnion(USA),369NationalSecurityAgency(USA),546Nazi–SovietPact(1939),xvii,11,26,103–4,111,114,118,354,373,386Nelidov,CaptainAleksandr,127–8,133–4

Nelson,SirFrank,264Nelson,Steve(bornStefanMesarosh),526Netherlands:andVenloincident,44,46;Germanplanstoattack,49;SOEagentscaptured(1942),269–72;agentscaptured,390;Alliedairbornelanding(September1944),498

Neumann,Franz,299–300,377neutralcountries:secretoperationsin,338,341;seealsoPortugal;Spain;Sweden;Switzerland;TurkeyNewGuinea,508,519NewHebridesislands,504NewYork:asMI6’sout-station,97Newill,Lt.CmdrJoseph,10Newman,Max,413–14,416,545Nikolsky(Sovietintelligenceofficer),494Nimitz,AdmiralChester,165–8,170–1,173,504–6,508,551–2Nissen,Christian,336NKVD(Sovietintelligenceorganisation):Beriacontrols,18;FourthDepartment,19,117;penetratesFrenchForeignOffice,20;purged,20–1;pre-waroperationsinGermany,28–9;reportspotentialGermaninvasionofUSSR,103,121;informantsinLondon,104–5,362–3;communicationsweaknesses,121;‘AdministrationforSpecialTasks’,174;organisesstay-behindespionagegroupsduringGermanadvance,177–8;identifiescollaborators,229;agentsinGermany,252;briefedbyOSSstaff,296;attachedtopartisangroups,317,319,326,328;recruitsBritishsympathisers,354;inUSA,369–78,380,383;deniescooperationwithUSA,384–5;inHarbin,522;learnsatomicbombsecrets,524–5,527–8,530–1;scientistsfear,529;seizesOSSmeninManchuria,537;executionsatStalingrad,538;deceptionoperations,553;seealso‘RedOrchestra’

Nomonhan(Russo–Japaneseclashes),110,142Nomura,Kichisaburō,386–7Nordenbombsight,4Norman,Montagu,74Normandyinvasion(1944):unaffectedbyV-1attacks,426;locationanddate,483–4;specialoperationsandResistancecontributions,488

NorthAfrica:Britishcampaignin,55;Germanintelligencegains,66,550;BritisheavesdroppingonItalians,82;Britishintelligencein,85,408–10;Germansuccessesin,126;Germanintelligencedecline,454–5;seealsoTorchlandings

‘NorthPole’,Operation,271Norton,Sarah,78Norway:Germansinvade,50;Resistancein,273,276;Reed-Olsenin,388–9;campaign,547Norwood,Melita,352,529–30Noskwith,Rolf,90Novopasakenny,Peter,449Nutting,AirCommodoreCharlesWilliam,75

Obed,Henry,335Odessa,320–2O’Donovan,Jim,331–3O’Duffy,Eoin,331,336OfficeofStrategicServices(OSS):politicalinterference,192–4,298;created,260;inItaly,281;criticised,283,298;established,283–4;role,286;extravaganceandbehaviour,287–90,295–7;numbersemployed,287;recruitmentandstaffing,288–9;operations,291–3,298;mistrustofBritishcounterparts,292;memberscapturedandkilled,293–4;NKVDagenton,303;reportscirculated,303;assessed,304–5;inSwitzerland,306;passesinformationtoUSSR,386;agentsdroppedtoassistNormandyinvasion,488;inAsia,514;dividesglobewithSOE,516;influenceinWashington,517;demise,538;effectiveness,557;seealsoResearch&Analysisdivision

Ohletz,Col.(ofRSHA),523Oka,Lt.CmdrArata,143–4

Okada,Lt.Col.Yoshimasa,139Okamoto,Gen.Kiyotomi,399OKH/GdNA(Germanradiointelligence),6,559Okinawa,506Oksana(Ukrainiangirl),178OKW/ChiseeChiffrierabteilungOleJacob(ship),138Olenhorst(Gestapomember),243OmahaBeach,Normandy,486‘one-timepad’,7Onodera,Col.Makoto,341,467,523Op-20-GseeUnitedStatesNavyOppenheim,E.Phillips:suicide,5Oppenheimer,Kitty,526Oppenheimer,Robert,371,525–7,531–2Oprecht,Emil,307Oradour-sur-Glane(France),322O’Reilly,JohnFrancis,337–8Orlov,Alexander,362Ōshima,BaronHiroshi,151,184,365,386,396–403,425,498–9,549‘OsloReport’,42–4,421Oster,Col.Hans,48,110,473Ott,Lt.Col.Eugen,33–5,38,111,113,179–81Ott,Helma,33‘Overlord’,Operation,426,462,463,484;seealsoNormandyinvasionOzaki,Hotsumi,32,34,38,111,179–82

Pakenham,FrancisAungier,208Palembang,154Pannwitz,Heinz,249–50,539Panyushkin,A.S.,120PaoHsienChu(‘Polo’),24Papen,Franzvon,342Pardon,Hauptmann,494Parke,Lt.Col.Richard,538Parks,Lt.Ed,406partisansseeguerrillacampaignsandpartisansPasdeCalais:GermansexpectsAlliedlandingsin,400–2,484–5Pashke,Adolf,448‘Pastrius’,Operation(1942),223Pataki,Ferenz(‘Ian’),252Patch,Gen.Alexander,487Patti,CaptainArchimedes,293Patton,Gen.GeorgeS.:masqueradesascommanderoffictitiousforce,xxi;army’spoorradiodiscipline,487;innorth-westEurope,497Paul,CrownPrinceofYugoslavia,106Paulton,Ted,419–20Paulus,Gen.Friedrich,228,238,301Peacocke,Lt.,RN,149PearlHarbor:attacked,155–6,164–5,547;intelligenceoperations,505–6

Peck,George,295Peenemünde,420–4,426,430Penelope,HMS,195Penkovsky,Col.Oleg,550Pepyli(Turkishpolicepresident),479Perlo,Victor,381Perskaya,Elena(laterKozo),184–6Perskaya,Elizaveta,184–5‘Peter’(agent),493Peter,Hans(‘Romeo’),250PeterII,KingofYugoslavia,106Petersen,Neal,307,315Petito,John,500Petrie,SirDavid,207,273Pfaus,Oscar,331,333Philby,Harold(’Kim’):astraitor,xviii,245,358–61,364,367,538;employedbyMI6,55,351,367;characterandqualities,183,360–1;forwardsJapanesemessagetoMoscow,184;sendsmaterialtoMuggeridge,345;onDeutsch,354;backgroundandcareer,359;andMaasing,364–5;appointedheadofMI6’santi-communistespionagesection,365–6;Russianssuspect,365;deathandfuneral,366;respondstoTrevor-Roper,366;reportsonElizabethBentley,385;onfailedSOEattackonRjukan,528;andAlexanderFoote,542

Philby,StJohn,359Phillips,AdmiralTom,216Phillips,William,291Pieck,Wilhelm,131Pieckenbrock,Col.Hans,62Pierls,Rudolf,525‘Pike’(unbrokenEnigmakey),416Pillenwerfer(U-boatbubble-ejectiontechnique),215Piolot,Bernard,492Pipe,Harry,247Plage,Hauptmann,523Platt,George,298Plomer,William,213Poland:aimstocrackEnigma,8,12–13;threatenedbyHitler,11;FrenchandBritishguaranteeto,12;Germaninvasion,41;exilegovernmentinLondon,55;V-2rocketpartsretrievedfrom,427–8

Pölchau,PastorHarald,247Poles:breakcodesatFrance’sStationBruno,75PoliticalWarfareExecutive(British),260Pontecorvo,Bruno,526,535Pope-Hennessy,John,208PortMoresby,Papua-NewGuinea,167–8,172Portal,AirChiefMarshalSirCharles,xxvi,85,201,210Portugal:neutralstatus,341‘Postmaster’,Operation,267Pound,AdmiralSirDudley,197,205Powell,Enoch,69Powell,MajorLewis,549Poyntz,Juliet,373PQ17(Arcticconvoy),205,214,216

Prague:Gourevitchvisits,191Praun,Lt.Gen.Albert,xv,xx,72,453,455,457,486,502Pravdin,Vladimir,383Preetz,Willy,335Price,MaryWolfe,378PrinceofWales,HMS(battleship),197,216PrinsAlbert(assaultship),257,259PrinzEugen(Germancruiser),197prisonersofwar:interrogatedforinformation,50–2Procida(Germanfreighter),196Pryce-Jones,Alan,69Prytz,Bjorn,126Punter,Otto,24Putin,Vladimir,539,559Putlitz,WolfgangGanzEdlerzu,11

Quebec:Churchill–Rooseveltmeeting(1943),311Quigley,Clothilde,201

Rabaul,166radio:technologicaldevelopment,7Radó,Alexander(‘Dora’),24,107–9,116,187–9,250–1,306,541Radziwiłł,PrinceJanusz,176Raeder,Erich,61Ramsay,AdmiralSirBertram,497Ratmirov,BishopVasily,237–8Ravensbrück:prisonersspared,481RedArmy:effectivenessinFarEast,110,142;knowledgebeforeBarbarossa,128–9,130;purged,174;losescontactwithMoscow,189;codes,224;strength,224;offensiveandadvance,227,455;radiodiscipline,455;attacksManchuria,522;intelligencesuccesses,552

‘RedOrchestra’(RoteKapelle;SovietagentsinGermany):composition,xxiv,21,26–7,114,193,235,252;achievements,62,548;warnsofGermaninvasionofUSSR,114,116,117–20;Germanspickupsignals,193;passesinformationtoRussia,193–4;escapesdetection,223;Germansbreak,241–7

Redman,John,505Redman,CmdrJoseph,165,169,505Reed-Olsen,Oluf,273,276–7,388–90,536;TwoEggsonMyPlate,536Rees,Goronwy,361Reichssicherheitshauptamt(RSHA;Germansecuritymachine),6,61,244Reilly,Patrick,60,393–4Reinberger(Belgianofficer),48Reiss,Ignatz,373,375Rejewski,Marian,12‘Rémy,Col.’seeRenault,Gilbert,254Renault,Gilbert(‘Col.Rémy’),159,254,257,274Repulse,HMS,197,216Research&AnalysisDivision(R&A;USA),299–303,395,514,538Resistance:inFrance,254,262–3,274;effects,260–1;development,262–3;lackofarms,263;post-wareffects,272;dangers,276–7;contributiontoNormandyinvasion,488–9

Revoi,Andrew,356

Ribbentrop,Joachimvon:rewardsSorge’sworkinTokyo,38;onOresteBerlings,120;messagefromMatsuoka,396;andinvasionofRussia,397;relationswithŌshima,398–400,402;cryptographicservice(PersZS),448;advocatessendingpropagandateamtoUSA,479

Richert,Arvid,474Ridderhof(Dutchinformer),269Rivet,Col.Louis,48Rivière,ÉmileseeDelidaise,RichardRjukanheavywaterplant,Norway,279,528Robertson,Lt.Col.Tom(‘Tar’),207,440,444,485Robilant,Edmonddi,340Robinson,Geroid,302Robinson(machine),414–15Rochefort,Joseph,157–70,172–3,504–5rockets:Germansdevelop,421–3Rogge,Bernhard,136–8,140Romania:Germanyinvades,103,118;andSovietpartisans,321–2Rome:USembassycodebookpenetrated,66Rommel,Gen.Erwin:andBritishPOWs’givinginformation,50;campaigninNorthAfrica,64,85;givenJapanesesamuraisword,140;supplylinesattacked,214;assassinationplotfails,292;Bletchleywarnsofattack,408;atKasserinePass,410;knowledgeofBritishdeployments,453,550;losesaccesstoenemysignalstraffic,454;militaryweakness,454;mistimesAlliedinvasion,483

Rönne,Col.Alexisvon,483,501Roosevelt,FranklinDelano:telephoneconversationswithChurchill,72;relationswithDonovan,98;relationswithChurchill,99;detachmentfromoperationalmatters,206;Donovan’spromisetoonOSSactivities,287;respectforRussianallies,370;trustinUSSR,377;readsŌshima’sdispatches,396;messagetoStalinreportingnoJapaneseattackonUSSR,398;informedofTurkishagent,462;andpost-invasionstrategy,484;letterfromEinsteinonnuclearenergy,526;andeffectofatomicbomb,527;BohrurgestoshareatomicsecretswithRussia,528

Ropp,BaronWilliamde,10Rorie,Tex,160Rosenberg,Julius,379,533–4Rössler,Rudolf(‘Lucy’;‘Lutzi’;R.A.Hermes),109–10,187–9,252,306,542Rosso,Augusto,104Rostow,Walt,291Rothkirch,Baronessvon,479Rothschildfamily,74Rothschild,Victor,359Rousseau,Robert(‘Rodolphe’),466Rowlett,Frank:helpsbreakJapanesecode,5,156,165RoyalAirForce,210–12RoyalNavy:ciphersfoundbyGermans,66;capturesEnigmamaterial,82;NavalIntelligenceDivision,212–13,215,222;useofintelligence,215–16;changesciphers,221;lapsesanderrors,221–2

RSHAseeReichssicherheitshauptamtRSSseeMI6:RadioSecurityService‘Rubble’,Operation,266Ruben(NKVDillegalinBerlin),28Rudchenko(Sovietpartisancommander),320Rundstedt,Gen.Gerdvon,471Russell,Sean,333,335Rutland,CmdrFred,143Ruzek,Col.,93

Ryan,Frank,335Rybkin,‘Kin’,241,344–5Rybkina,Zoya,22,128,130–4,177,186,237,241,344,527Ryle,Gilbert,60

Saarne,Martin,435,438Safford,Lt.Laurance,99,158–60,165,285Saint-Brunéval,Normandy,254–9Saito,Harutsugu,111Sakimura(JapaneseinMadrid),344Salazar,AntóniodeOliveira,292,348Salerno,547Salgado,Plínio,478Salinger,Hermann(‘Dozen’),252Salmon(USsubmarine),507Samejima,CmdrMonotono,154Sandys,Duncan,422,424–5,428SantaCruz,Battleof(November1942),95Saratoga,USS(carrier),522Sas,MajorGijsbert,48Sato,Maj.Gen.Kenryo,519Saunders,Hilary,213Savo,Battleof(1942),504Schacht,Hjalmar,64Schaefer,Max,305Scharnhorst(Germanheavycruiser),196–7,199,221,257Scheldtestuary,497Schellenberg,Irene(néeGrosse-Schönepauck),473Schellenberg,Walter:intelligenceactivities,8;inVenloincident,44–6;checksonSorge,112;reprimandedbyHimmler,182;formspartisanunit,305;andDulles,307;qualities,395,473,480,482;dismissesGöring’sForschungsamt,450;andfallofCanaris,472;career,473–4,477–9;rivalrywithCanaris,474;inSwitzerland,474–7,481;negotiateswithMasson,475–6;advocatessendingpropagandateamtoUSA,479;proposesGermanynegotiatepeacewithWesternAllies,479;succeedsCanarisasheadofAbwehr,480–1;fliestoSweden,482;hostsJapaneseparty,523;Trevor-Roperinterrogates,544

Scherhorn,Lt.Col.Heinrich,456–7Schienke,Marie-Luise,544Schlesinger,Arthur,209,287,304,374,377–8,386,538,545Schmeling,Max,177Schmidt,Hans-Thilo(‘Asché’),8,275–6Schneider,DrChristian(‘Taylor’),188Schnorkel(U-boatbreathingdevice),401Schol,Lt.Col.(GermanmilitaryattachéinBangkock),113Schoonmaker,Frank,297Schotmüller,Oda,242Schröder,George,93Schubert,Lt.,451Schulenberg,Friedrichvonder,104,126,130Schultze,Johann,452Schulze,Kurt,191–2Schulze-Boysen,Harro(‘Corporal’):character,29;asRussianagentinBerlin,29,31,114,119,247,548;activitiesin‘RedOrchestra’,

114,116,119,121,189,242;warnsRussiaofimpendingGermanattack,122;GourevitchcontactsinBerlin,191–3,248–9;exposed,194,244;Rybkinasendsmessageto,241;hanged,246

Schulze-Boysen,Libertas,191–2,246Schumacher,Kurt,121,242Schütz,SgtGunther,337Schwartze(GermanNCOinNorthAfrica),453SchwartzeKapelle,Die(theBlackOrchestra),193Schwarze,Alois,270Scotland,Col.Alexander,53Sculpin(USsbmarine),507Seagrim,MajorHugh,516Seal(Britishsubmarine),66Sealion(Britishsubmarine),198‘Sealion’,Operation:postponement,80,151,334SecondFront:Sovietviewof,363Sedlacek,CapainKarel,56Seeburgbomber-plottingtable,418Seekt,Gen.Hansvon,128Sempill,Rear-AdmiralWilliamFrancisForbes-Sempill,19thBaron,144Semyonov,Semyon(‘Twain’),373–4,527–9,531,556Senter,CmdrJohn,440,441Sergienko,Vasily,317Seth,Josephine,435–6,441–3,445Seth,Ronald(‘Blunderhead’),xix,431–46,497,536Seubert,Obst.Lt.,469Seydlitz-Kurzback,Heratvon,224SezionePrelevamento(Italy),66Sforza,CountCarlo,307Shamli(Turkishinformer),339‘Shark’submarinekey,88–90,101,221Shelia,Rudolf,23Sherman,John,35Shigemitsu,Mamoru,400Shijnotsuka,Rorao,37Shirley,Lt.(ofRoyalNavy),392SHON(Sovietintelligencetrainingschool),123Shornyakov,Nikolai,115Short,Gen.Walter,164Shtemenko,Gen.Sergey,456Sicherheitsdienst(SD;Germancounter-intelligence),6Sicily:Alliedinvasion(1943),206,455,470Siemens&HalskeT-52(teleprinter;‘Sturgeon’),411,413‘Sierra,Vincente’seeGourevitch,AnatoliSukolov-Sigabaciphermachine(US),71sigint(signalsintelligence):defined,xxiiin;limitations,214;andwaratsea,216;importancetoAllies,403,548;inPacificandAsia,504,510–12,519;inMediterranean,549

SignalCorps(USA),403–4Sikorski,Gen.Władysław,363Silvermaster,Nathan,379–80,382–3

Simexco(company),189–90,239–40Simon,Walter,334–5Sinclair,AdmiralSirHugh(‘C’),16,73Sissman,Kathleen,207Skillen,Hugh,78Skorzeny,Otto,305,481Slack,Alfred,373Slim,Gen.William(‘Bill’),510,513Smedley,Agnes,32;China’sRedArmyMarches,142SMERSh,236,238Smith,Ernest,71nSmith,R.Harris,272Smith,MajorTruman,4Smuts,JanChristian,346Snow,C.P.,86Snowden,Edward,xviii,559Sokol,HerschandMyra,240Solborg,Col.(ofOSS),297Soldatenko,Aleksandr,321–2Soldatenko,Elena,322Solomonislands,504Sorge,Richard(‘Ika’):xvi,xxiv;careerandachievements,31–9,302,351,548;inJapan,33–8;andGermanthreattoUSSR,110;onJapaneseintentions,111–12;Nazisuspicionof,112;andproposedclosureofBurmaRoad,112;onprospectiveGerman–Sovietwar,113,130;meetsStennes,122;andGermaninvasionofUSSR,179;andprospectiveJapanesewaragainstUSSR,179–81,187;arrestedandconfesses,181–2;triedandexecuted,182–3;skeletonexhumedandreinterred,542

Sorlie,Rolf,280Sosnowski,Col.Stanislas,176SouthAfrica:Nazisympathisers,346–7SouthAmerica:OSSin,184–5,297SouthShanxi,Battleof(1941),141SovietUnion:sourcesinGermany,xxiv,21,32,62;intelligenceorganisations,18–19,39;Japanesethreattoborder,38;misusespre-warintelligence,39;exploitssecretsourcesinoccupiedEurope,54–5;Germanyplansinvasion,56,85,103,105,118–19,120,122,126;Germaninvasionandadvancein,121,133,174,187,189,203–4,223,483;fearofinternalsubversion,123;neutralitypactwithJapan,126,151;speculationsonGermanstrategy,128–9;Japaneseintelligenceoperationson,142–3;releasespoliticalsuspectsforintelligencework,174–5;prospectiveJapanesewaron,179,181;limitationsintechnologyandcode-breaking,184;transfersforcesfromFarEasttoWesternFront,184;warwithFinland(1939–40),186;Germaninadequateintelligenceon,224;Gehlen’sanalysisofsituation,225–7;deceptionoperations,228–38,455–7,553;secrecytowardsAllies,300;prospectiveWesternrelationsmisjudged,302;partisansandguerrillas,305,314–29,556;fearWesternAlliesmakingsecretpeacewithGermany,314;Germanreprisalsin,322–4;informationwithheldfrom,351;BritishandUSinformants,352–3;suspicionofBritishsympathies,360;supposedBritishagentsin,362;receivesinformationfromLondoninformants,363–4;deniedaccesstoUltra,364,367;andJapanesePurpledecrypts,367;sponsorsespionageinUSA,369;receivesUSscientificandtechnologicaldata,386;provideslittleinformationtoWesternAllies,392;Japaneseestimateofstrength,399;capturesGermaninterceptionunit,455;Wehrmachtstrugglesin,456–7;POWsrecruitedasinformantsbyAbwehr,481;plantsagentsforlocalspying,494–5;Japanesepreoccupationwith,518–19;explodesatomicbomb,524,535;gathersinformationonUSatomicprogramme,525–35;technologicalintelligenceoperationsinUSA,533;agentsshotandimprisonedafterwar,538;questionablealliancewithWest,543;claimstohavebrokenJapaneseandGermancodes,550;benefitsfromloyalallies,553;giftforconspiracy,556;seealsoStalin,Josef;Stalingrad

‘Spaak’Resistancegroup,249–50Spain:Canarisvisits,63,65;Germanespionageoperationsin,339;Germanintelligencerestricted,469SpanishCivilWar:informationonaircraftuse,11;Sovietprestigein,353

SpecialAirService(SAS),488–9SpecialLiaisonUnits(BritishandUS),394,502,508SpecialOperationsExecutive(SOE):created,55,260,264;coupinYugoslavia,106;trainingandfieldservice,261,264–8,272–3;criticised,268–9;inter-servicerivalries,269,395;capturedagentsinterrogated,270–2;assessed,272,279–82,305;betrayals,273;inMediterranean,278;agentsdetectedbyGermaninterceptors,279;lacksstrategicdirective,279;supportedbyairsorties,279;empire-building,395;agentsdroppedtoassistNormandyinvasion,488;inAsia,509,514–17;differenceswithMI6,509;dividesglobewithOSS,516;dissolved,537;effectiveness,557;seealsoSeth,Ronald

Speer,Albert,401spies:local,line-crossersand‘stay-behind’,491–7Springhall,Douglas,349Staab,Philip,493,527Stalin,Josef:onspies,xviii;diffusespower,6;respectforBritishintelligence,8;aims,18;criticisesintelligenceservices,20;ruthlessness,20–1;feared,39–40,237;useofintelligence,39;controllingnature,65;disbelieveswarningsofGermaninvasion,103,105–6,110,121,126,131–2,547–8;andpactwithNazis,103–4,354;suspicionofChurchill,103–4,126–7,206;andagreementwithYugoslavia,106;onSorge,113;andFitin,123;believesimpendingAnglo-Germanpeace,127;earlystrategicpreparations,129;MerkulovandFitinmeet,131;andassassinationplanagainstHitler,176–7;andprospectiveJapanesethreat,179;personalcontrolofmilitaryoperations,228;andsupposedbetrayalof‘Mars’,232;acceptsloyaltyofOrthodoxChurch,238;politicalaims,299,349,386;appealtoSovietpeople(July1941),316;andSovietguerrillas,327;indifferencetocasualties,329;demandsdeathsofenemies,342;agentsspyonAllies,349;andassassinationofTrotsky,355;hostilityto‘LondonPoles’,363;awareofUS-Britishplans,367;seesWesternAlliesasultimateenemy,368;developsinterestinUSA,371;demandsnewdeceptionplan,456;createsterritorialnetworkforpromotingsabotageandintelligence-gathering,494;acceptsassistanceofWesternAllies,543;paranoia,553

Stalingrad,225–8,232–3,399,455,538,547Stauffenberg,ClausSchenckvon,313Stein,Gunther,37Stein,Karl,452,458Stennes,CaptainWalterMaria,122Stephens,Lt.Twm,489Stephenson,SirWilliam(‘LittleBill’):liaisonfunction,xxv,96–7;buildsuporganisationinUSA,97;relationswithDonovan,97–9;onageingMI6,306,537;Belfrageworksfor,379

Steptoe,Harry,10Stern,Alfred,375–6Stettinius,Edward,296Steveni,Lt.Col.Leo,509Stevens,MajorRichard,44–5,117Steventon,FltLt.Donald,420Stewart,SecondOfficerDonald,136–7Stewart,Group-CaptainPeter,203Stigler,Franz,467Stimson,Henry,4,403Stöbe,Ilse,23,191,248Stockholm:aswartimeintelligencecentre,338,341–2,344–5,479Stokes,Hamilton,343Straight,Michael,375,381Strojil,Obst.Lt.,469Strong,Maj.Gen.GeorgeV.,283Strong,Kenneth:receivesrequestsforinformation,47;questionsgenuinenessofcapturedintelligence,49;onGermanineptnessinlandingagents,57;onnewintelligencemethods,70;character,499;headsAlliedintelligenceorganisation,499;andArdennesoffensive(1944),500–1

Stuart,Charles,60

Stuart,Iseult,333–4Stülpnagel,Gen.Carl-Heinrich,313Stumme,Gen.Georg,409SubmarineTrackingRoom(British),69,216–17Sudoplatov,Pavel:assassinatesUkrainianinRotterdam,18;backgroundandcareer,20–1;onBeria,20;endorsesKorotkovorder,117;andproposedsecretRusso–Germanpeace,127;informedofGermaninvasion,133;headsNKVD’s‘AdministrationforSpecialTasks’,174,177;organisesTrotsky’sasassination,174;caution,175;onmissiontoCaucasus,178–9;promoted,178;anduseofeliteunits,178;onbetrayalof‘Mars’,232;onRussianradiodeception,238;andOperation‘Monastery’,279–80,455–6;recruitsDemyanov,279–80;onimportanceofconfidentialcontacts,314;organisesstay-behindoperatorsandguerrillagroups,316,326;onAlliedsummits,376;onHiss,377;meetsStalin,456;gathersinformationonUSatomicprogramme,526,528–9,531;onfinalvictory,538;imprisonedas‘enemyofthepeople’,539;andsubversion,559

Sudoplatova,Emma,20–1,133,237–8Sukolov-Gourevitch,AnatoliseeGourevitch,AnatoliSukolov-Suss,Louis(‘Salter’),24,109Sweden:breaksoffeconomicrelationswithGermany,480;seealsoStockholmSweet-Escott,Bickham,264,266–7,279,292,299,304Sweezy,Paul,299,302Swinemünde,420Swinton,PhilipCunliffe-Lister,1stEarlof,208Switzerland:Sovietagentsin,24–6,107–10,251;Dullesin,306–9;wartimeprofiteering,309;asintelligencecentre,340,347–8,476–7;fearofGermanoccupation,347–8;Schellenbergin,474–5,481;Germaninvasionthreat,476–7;‘Viking’intelligenceline,476–7;seealso‘Lucy’Ring

Sykes,Caprain,264Szilárd,Leó,526–7Szrajer,F/O,427Szymańska,Halina,17,64

Tachibananetwork(California),144Taconis,Thys,269TaiLi,297Taiwan,521TajinaMaru(Japanesetrawler),508Takayama,Col.Shinobu,149Tamura,Col.Hiroshi,153–4Tanabe,Kazuo,145Tangier(USseaplanetender),170Taunt,Derek,90Taylor,Lt.Col.Telford,404Tedrekin,Arnold,433‘Teffi’(Ankaraagent),118TelecommunicationsResearchEstablishment(British),256teleprinters:usedbyGermanhighcommand,411–16Tennei,Helen,377Teplinsky,Maj.Gen.Boris,236–7Tester,MajorRalph,413Tew,AC1,87Thailand:Japaneseintelligence-gatheringin,153–4;BritishandUSagentsarrested,515Thoma,Gen.Wilhelm,Rittervon,421Thomas,Edward,86

Thomas,Gen.Georg,xx–xxiThompson,Harry,143Thomsen,Henning,336Thor(Germanmerchantcruiser),94–5Thummel,Paul(agentA–54),1,40–1,48,56,109Tiltman,Col.John,74,80,86,408,411–12,545Times,The,365Timoshenko,MarshalSemyonKonstantinovitch,127Tinchebray,Captain,270Tippelskirch,Gen.Kurtvon,455,457Tirpitz,AdmiralAlfredvon,29Tirpitz(Germanbattleship),199,214,312Tishiyuji,Rear-AdmiralYokoi,521Tito,JosipBroz,272,278,295,364,536Tizard,SirHenryThomas:missiontoUSA,99TodtOrganisation,190Tojo,Gen.Hideki,150–1,181Tokko(Japanesesecuritypolice),181–2Tokyo:Sorgein,33–5,37–8Tolstoy,Ilya,293Tolstoy,CaptainSergei,183–4Tonkin,CaptainJohn,389Tooze,Adam,13‘Torch’landings(NorthAfrica,November1942),206,411,454–5,479torpedoes:USfailures,507Toscanini,CountessWally,306Toynbee,Philip,352,357Tranow,Wilhelm,218,220Travis,Edward,88–9,91,412,511–12,552Trepper,Leopold:background,23;withGourevitchinBrussels,30–1,239;movestoParis(1940),54;intelligencenetwork,55,244,541;orderedtocontactBerlinagents,189;receivesprofitsfromSimexco,190;Berlinnetworksusetransmitter,193;knowsidentitiesof‘RedOrchestra’,239;returnstoPariswithGourevitch,240;inGestapohands,248–50;wirelessoperatorseized,248;imprisonedinRussia,539

Trevelyan,G.M.,206Trevor-Roper,Hugh:servesinintelligence,xxiv,59;criticisesMI6officers,9,392–3;disparagesMenzies,17,67,208;shadowsandstudiesCanaris,57–8,60,63–4,67,208;readsAbwehrtraffic,58–9,63;onGambier-Parry,59–60,208;backgroundandqualities,60–1;headsMI6’sRadioAnalysisBureau’sintelligencesection,60;onGermaninformationbureaux,61;stressedatBletchleyPark,77;high-handedbehaviour,207–8;relationswithMI6colleagues,207–8;on‘Max’(agent),234–5;onGermanskillincounteringResistance,271;disdainforAmericancolleagues,292;onvalueofstudyingpublicsources,302–3;under-estimatescommunistthreat,353;onPhilby,361–2,366;definestreason,366;aschroniclerofservice,394;oneffectof‘Cicero’leaks,463;onGermanintelligencedisorder,469–70,472;interrogatesSchellenberg,544;latercareeranddeath,544;onachievementsofsigint,548;onverifiableintelligence,549;TheLastDaysofHitler,545

Trevor-Roper,Richard,58Tributh,Herbt,335Trigger(USsubmarine),507Trompke,Paul,346Trotsky,Leon:assassination,18,174,355,381;Blumkingivesmoneyto,371Trott,Adamvon,395Truman,HarryS.,538

Tsuchihashi,Major-Gen.Yuichi,149‘TubeAlloys’,525Tucker,Robert,301Tuckerman,LauraWolcott,289Tukhachevsky,MarshalMikhailNikolayevich,2Tunney,Gene,96Tunnydecrypts,487Turing,Alan:roleatBletchleyPark,xxi,xxiv,73,547;backgroundandcharacter,73–4,77;plans‘bombe’machine,75,80,411,413;Knoxdisparages,77;brilliance,79;interestinGermannavaltraffic,82;pleatoChurchillformorestaff,86;visitsUSA,101;replacedasheadofHut8,410;studieselectroniccircuitry,414;Flowersworkswith,415;anddevelopmentof‘Colossus’,416;awardedCBE,545;death,546;reputation,546–7

Turkey:neutralstatus,339–40;breaksoffdiplomaticrelationswithGermany,464;Abwehrin,471–2;anti-communism,479;seealsoAnkara

Turner,Cobden,43–4Tutte,Bill,xxii,412,414,545Tutte,Dorothea,546TwentyCommittee(British),58,359,468,484Type-Xciphermachine(British),71,81,448,452

U-67(Germansubmarine),220U-110(Germansubmarine),83U-111(Germansubmarine),220U-559(Germansubmarine),89–90U-boats:Ultralocates,xxii;successes,82;signalsreadatBletchley,83,90;campaign,213;Britishlacktechnicalknowledgeof,215;crewsresistinterrogation,215;located,217;informedofconvoymovements,218,551;inadequatenumbers,221;sunkonpassagetoandfromJapan,397;typesandequipment,401;refuellingpointsattacked,508

Ukraine:partisans,317;welcomesGermanliberators,317;rebellionin,559Ullmann,William,382–3Ultra:asterm,xxii;importance,69–70,207,209;andGermaninvasionofUSSR,85;keptsecretfromUSA,99–100,351;successes,196;distributionofinformation,209–10;secrecyprotected,213–14,394,405–6,488,553;informationpassedtoRussians,253;USSRdeniedaccessto,364,367;interceptsGermantraffic,407;inNorthAfrica,408–9;strategicvalue,418;andAlliedinvasionplans,485–7;inItaliancampaign,488;finalinterventioninnorth-westEuropecampaign,490;andArdennesoffensive(1944),499–501;inPacificcampaign,504,506,508–9,512;dominance,548–9

Umansky,Konstantin,384UnitedNations:foundingconference(SanFrancisco),386UnitedStatesofAmerica:lackspre-warintelligenceservice,4;Soviet-sponsoredespionagein,31,369–83,537;Germanagentssentto,48;Romeembassypenetrated,66;Churchillaimstodrawintowar,96;intelligenceliaisonwithBritain,96–102,404–5;OfficeofWarInformation,99,260;wartimerelationswithBritain,99;attackedatPearlHarbor,156;intelligenceachievementsandweaknesses,156–7,551–2,556;commandweaknesses,206;lackssupremeauthorityfigure,304;loosesecurity,368;communismin,369,385;valueofinformationpassedtoRussia,387;SignalsIntelligenceService,395,403;emphasisessigint,403–4;inter-servicerivalries,407,551;carelesssignalsproceduresinNorthAfrica,409;Sigaba(encryptingmachine),448,458;losesciphermachineinFrance,458;messagesbrokenoninvasionofNormandy,486–7;rivalryinAsiawithBritain,513,516–18;Japaneseagentsin,520;seealsoArlingtonHall

UnitedStatesArmy:shortageoftrainedintelligenceofficers,500UnitedStatesArmyAirForce(USAAF):resistancetointelligence,211;bombingcampaign,212;useofeconomicintelligence,552UnitedStatesNavy:Op-20-Gcodebreakingteam,100,102,159,162,166,407,417,555,559;cryptographicoperations,505UnternehmenBodden(GermanserviceinSpain),65uranium,535‘Uranus’,Operation,227,232

Uren,CaptainDesmond,349Ustinov,Klop,11

V-1flyingbombs:sites,425–6;attackBritain,426–8V-2rockets,425,427–9V-Mann(Vertrauensmänner;informer),269V-weapons:intelligenceon,31;developed,421–6;effect,429Vasilevsky,Lev,534Veesenmayer,Edmund,333Vehmehren,Paul,365Venloincident(1939),44–6,68Vennier,Paul,255Venonadecrypts,369Vergine,SgtGeorge,414Vermehren,ErichandElizabeth,471–2Vernadsky,V.I.,528Vernamcipher,411Vernon,Lt.Denis,256,258Vichy:codesknowntoAllies,405Vickers,SirGeoffrey,VC,202,205,210Vinogradov,Boris,375Vinogradova,Lyuba,xxivVirginia(film),290VittorioVeneto(Italianbattleship),84Vivian,Valentine,17,207–8,359,362Vogl,Major,438Voukelitch,Brankode,34,111,181,182Voumas,George,294

Waibel,MajorMax,307,476Wallace,David,280Wallenbergfamily,344Wallenberg,Jacob,474Wallis,Barnes,350,420Walsingham,SirFrancis,9,206Waltemath,Werner,465‘Walter’(Germanagent),63WANDA-Netzteleprintersystem,413Wanvig,Col.Harry,290warcrimestrials,552WarOffice(British):WCodecaptured,448Ware,Harold,372Warsawrising(1944),322Washington,DC:inwartime,286Watten(France),425Wavell,Gen.SirArchibald,84,514Weber,Werner,452Weber-Drohl,Ernst,332Wedermeyer,Gen.Albert,298

Wehrmacht:voice-monitoringunits,66;Enigmatrafficpresentsdifficulties,411,413;intelligenceorganisation,449;strugglesinRussia,456–7

Weigel,Corporal,270Weisband,William,377Welchman,Gordon,73,75–6,78–9,88–90,415,545Wendt,Bruno,33,35Wenger,CmdrJoseph,408Wenneker,CaptainPaul,33,138,140,179Wenzel,Johann,242Werz,Leopold,345WhaddonHall,77Wheeler,Donald,377–8White,SirDick,366–7,544White,HarryDexter(‘Lawyer’),379–83,543WhiteRosegroup(Munich),114Wigginton(ofSOECairo),278Wilkinson,Lt.Col.Gerald,509,537Wilkinson,Peter,52Williams,BrigadierEdgar(‘Bill’):opennesswithMontgomery,xxi,491;positionsunderMontgomery,69;onexcessivediscretion,488;onKennethStrong,499;discountsArdennesoffensive,500–1;onuseofUltra,549;oncredibilityofinformation,550;onavailabilityofinformation,554

Williamson,Harry(‘Tate’),53Willoughby,Maj.Gen.Charles,508Willson,Rear-AdmiralRussell,172Wilson,Angus,77Winchell,Walter,368‘Window’(counter-radarsystem),249Windsor,Edward,Dukeof,473WindsorLeague,439Winn,CmdrRodger,69,216–19Winter,Georgiede,240,249–50,541Winterbotham,FredW.,3,43,80,394;TheUltraSecret,xxviwirelessseeradioWisner,Frank,536,538,545Witt,Ernst,452Wolf,Markus,385Wolff,Lt.Gen.Karl,315women:atBletchleyPark,74,80,87,91;inOSS,289;inUScryptographicservice,505–6;bannedbyNimitz,506WorldJewishCongress,482Wright,Fred,278Wright,Lt.Ham,160,166–7,170WRNS(WomenRoyalNavalService):operatebombes,81;employedatBletchleyPark,87Wuchinich,George,377Wunsch,SgtEdward,52‘Würzburg’(Germanradarsystem),256,258–9Wylie,Tom,361Wynn-Williams,Charles,414–16

‘YService’(British),47,53,66,488,499,512

Yalta,386,402Yamamoto,AdmiralIsoroku,150,156,163,168–71,173,405–6Yamasaki,Yoshiko(Voukelitch’swife),111,236Yardley,Herbert,158,451Yatkov,Anatoli,531,534Yenanprovince,China,517Yoshikawa,EnsignTakeo,155Young,Lt.Peter,258Yugoslavia:officerssubornedbyGermans,65;Germanyoccupies,106;wirelesssetsunused,262;SOEoperationsin,272,278;OSSin,294–5;Alliedpolicyon,364;AmericansandBritishexpelledafterwar,536;guerrillacampaign,556

Zaborow,Poland,427Zacharias,CaptainEllis,143,158–9Zarubin,Elizabeth,371,382,387,529,532Zarubin,Vasily,27–9,122,134,371–2,375,380–2,387,529Zavatarri,Lt.Col.Stefano,339Zeitzler,Kurt,65Zelman,Franklin,525‘Zeppelin’,Operation,xxii,481Zhukov,Georgi:inFarEast,38,110;summonedtoKremlin,127;keptinignoranceofforeignintelligence,128;onGermanstrategy,129;onfailureof‘Mars’,232

Zhuravlev,Boris,115,122,131–2,133Ziegler,Madame(capturedagent),270ZimmermannTelegram(1917),9Zlatowsky,Jane,377Zubov,Pyotr,175–6

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