South African Capital in Regional Agrarian Economies, The Case of ZambiaBRICS Initiative in Critical Agrarian Studies. Working Paper Series

Toby Leon Moorsom

This paper explores the degree to which South African capital has penetrated the Zambian agricultural sector and assesses its impact. I seek to establish whether it is generative, insofar as it promotes indigenous capital accumulation, new investment, or alternately forms of dispossession and capital flight. I also seek to determine the degree to which investment arrangements from outside South Africa are able to use the country as a gateway to surrounding markets.

The paper is structured in four sections. The first briefly discusses relevant literatures on ‘land-grabbing’ and dispossession while also historically contextualizing Zambia in contemporary Southern Africa. Instead of looking solely at the high-profile, large tract investments, I follow the advice of Akram-Lohdi (2013) by considering the entirety of land-based social relations engendered by the land-use changes that are being driven by agro-food capital. Large-tract investments are, in fact, not as common as the Zambian government and its Development Agency would like. That being said, it is impossible to disaggregate South African agricultural capital in the region without examining the specificities of whiteness and its embodiment and re-assertion in paternalistic plantation models of production.

Secondly, the paper examines available trade data from the Zambian and South African governments and intergovernmental organizations to highlight changes in trade visible within those statistics. In privileging formal sector activity we no doubt miss a variety of forms of informal and illicit transactions, and figures are no-doubt skewed by accounting techniques that obscure transfer payments within corporations. Nevertheless, the data offers valuable insights into various dimensions of the agricultural economy. It shows a clear correlation between the implementation of Southern African Development Community Free Trade Area that came into effect in 2008 and the expansion of markets for South African capital. It also suggests there has been some displacement of Zambian produce in the local economy. Yet, more importantly, agribusiness growth seems to be occurring in commodities that support mechanization and technological change within the sector.

Third, I provide brief profiles of agricultural companies and South African investment in the sector in all areas other than direct farm ownership. Here we see clear inroads into the sector as far as market share and market expansion is concerned. We also, however, see a clear pattern in which these investments are benefiting from various forms of state subsidization within the industry.

In the fourth section I discuss the implications of the data in light of recent theoretical interventions insofar as labour conditions and development indicators are concerned. In many respects, South African and monopoly capital seems to have gained closer relationships with various additional states in the process of its expansion

(Zambian, South African, French, US, Netherlands and others). South African capital in this sector is far from independent, but is in fact more internationalized. South African Capital is not necessarily dominant, but coincides with investments structured through a variety of companies. It also exacts significant support from the World Bank/IFC, and promotes research and representative bodies that rely on aid institutions, corporations and government in Public, Private Partnership relationships that have “philanthro-capitalist dimensions” in some resemblance to what has been argued by Carol Thompson (though I hold reservations about her formulation). Despite relying on free-market rhetoric and policy mechanisms to gain entry into the Zambian market, South African companies themselves illicit significant forms of subsidization.

Methodology

This paper is informed by 10 months of archival and field research conducted in 2007 and 2008. The initial fieldwork was conducted for a PhD dissertation focusing on indigenous accumulation among Tonga farmers and pastoralists on private-titled land. Semi-structured interviews were gathered from 166 informants that included title-holders, farm workers, market vendors, government and industry representatives. The interview process included many dozen farm tours in the Choma and Monze districts of Zambia’s Southern Province. Archival work most relevant to this paper came from the Zambia National Farmer’s Union collection at their headquarters in Showgrounds, Lusaka.

In the following years I have monitored all online news sources related to the agricultural industry in Zambia (via Google alerts). For this paper I rely upon a variety of primary and secondary sources, including those of the Lusaka based Food Security Research Project, Government of Zambia, and The Indaba Agricultural Policy Research Institute and UNCTAD. Yet the majority of the paper focuses on company profiles that have been constructed with reference to a variety of eclectic sources, including marketing datasets, news sources, company websites and internal shareholder reports.

1. Complexities of Dispossession

Foreign direct investment (FDI) was never absent from the earliest development plans made by African governments in the post-independence years. For the first 26 years of independence it was, however, marginalized to a degree in support of policies of import-substitution industrialization (ISOI). Engagement with foreign investors was supposed to be on terms that were likely to enable technology transfer. Yet it gained new prominence with the rise of neoliberal policy, becoming one of the central tenants of the Washington Consensus. The global financial crisis of 2008 and the following dramatic rise in global food prices was followed by a rush of investor interest and opposition to processes now being described as “land grabbing” (Kachika, 2010, Akram-Lohdi, 2012).

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The literature on ‘land grabbing’ arose rapidly in response to what has been with a widespread process of foreign participants purchasing large tracts of land. Studies have emphasized various dimensions of these processes that paint a complex picture that involves multiple actors, both on and off the continent. There is no clear, single perpetrator as investment arrives from diverse places. Some come from neighbouring countries and others takes place as national investors have a role in displacing local smallholders for large-scale plantation farms. Thus studies have examined local agency in enabling land grabs and the complex combinations of local and foreign capital involved (Fairburn, 2013, Pearce 2012, Kenney and Mather, 2008). We have seen Intra-African land grabs (Dixon, 2014). South Africans settlers moving north (Hall, 2011). Polarizing positions have occurred over the possibilities of disciplining investments, and their relative poverty-alleviating potential (Bryceson, 2009, Collier and Dercon, 2009, De Schutter, 2011). Yet existing governing regimes are shown to clearly preference the investor over local opposition (Haberli and Smith, 2014).

Further still, the scope and scale of land grabbing has been put into question based on the quality of data, methodology of studies and social processes that have possibly sensationalized such claims (Edelman, 2013). These critiques, and others (Borras and , 2010, Akram-Lohdi, 2012) have pressed for deeper examination of social relations of production and the impact that land grab investments may or may not be having on them. Chatelard and Chu (2015) examine Chinese involvement in agrarian investments in Zambia, to show that contrary to common representations, Chinese state companies are not found to involved in “Land Grabs” within Africa. Nevertheless, there is a significant degree of engagement by small, independent, enterprising investors who venture without significant institutional support and undertake significant experimentation in crops, marketing and business structure in order to survive amidst challenging conditions.

Though a “diverse and disparate” group of investors as Chatalard and Chu (2015), have described of the Chinese portion. Sitko (2012) also notes about 120,000 capitalizing mid-sized farmers along the line of rail (on land typically ranging from 20-200 hectares in size). There are also significant proportions of Zimbabweans and South Africans moving north as Hall has demonstrated of the latter (Hall: 2011). I know of no study of the Zim inflow, though have seen its scope – with one reporter claiming there are 24 new large Zim land owners in the area of Choma, where my research was conducted. Many of those Zimbabweans are on land formerly owned by black Zambians who bought it after independence and lost it during the liberalizations, when interest rates rose to 300% in 1991/92 season. The rate hike was compounded by deep ecological changes, epizoological epidemics and the HIV/AIDS epidemic. In 2008, many of the Zim migrants were leasing or acting as farm managers for larger institutional investors. No research has determined whether these migrants have made longer-term plans to settle and whether they have actually purchased land themselves.

An additional challenge of the land grab literature is that it tends to overlook a variety of other ways in which Africans are being dispossessed of common ownership in the name of FDI. Thus if we are to focus “upon the changes in land-based social

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relations engendered by the land use changes that are being driven by agro-food capital” more broadly, we need to look at various trends in foreign investment that are driving or at least coinciding with the reorganization of these relationships (Akram-Lodhi, 2012). So, for example, one should examine inputs markets, transportation, seed development and other dimensions of the agricultural industry.

1. 2 Settler Cultural Portmanteau

When I took on the task of writing this paper I was determined to look beyond the land grabbing, yet have found it challenging to disaggregate it from its particular cultural dimensions. I would argue that if one wishes to understand the changes within the Zambian agricultural sector that have coincided with the penetration of South African capital it must be understood as being to a large degree inseparable from a settler society in all its colonial, racial and environmental history.

The notion of a “Portmanteau Biota”, was introduced by environmental historian, Alfred Crosby in explaining the consequences of European conquest of the Americas (Crosby, 1986). This concept can be usefully understood as something still in process, when applied to processes of agricultural settlement coinciding with the production of commodities for markets. Following Crosby, Beinart suggests that with the expansion of colonialism in Southern Africa, “the ‘biological ancient regime’ was often shattered as new forms of production were introduced”. Moreover, where “neo-europes” were introduced, pre-colonial ecological relationships were displaced, while new ecological relationships were established (1989: 147). This process of course was uneven, and fragmented settler societies held varying levels of authority within the regions they claimed control over. Nevertheless, particular approaches to nature arose in the late-colonial period as regimes attempted to understand and dominate the new environments they found themselves in (Beinart, 1984, Grove, 1996).

South African settler farmers have historically played an instructive role for their counterparts in what is present-day Zambia. In fact, colonial agricultural management efforts in veterinary and crop sciences relied on region-wide collaboration over matters of breeding, disease management and seed development. The Commercial Farmer’s Bureau of Zambia (now the Zambia National Farmers’ Union) maintained relations with their Zimbabwean counterpart1 and since 1992 Settler farmers throughout Southern Africa have been collectively organized through the Southern Africa Confederation of Agricultural Unions (SACAU). Generally, social connections between white settler farmers were stronger with Rhodesia, in part because Northern Rhodesian tobacco crops were marketed via Salisbury. Yet, farmers have seen South Africa as hub from which technological advancements disseminate. White settler farmers in Zambia have

1 Before independence the Zambian CFB was named the Rhodesian National Farmers Union, while the Rhodesian (Zimbabwean) affiliate held the same name. Prior organizations were the Rhodesian Farmers and Landowners Association (RFLA), the Matebeleland Farmers’ Association and the Rhodesian Agricultural Union. The latter two merged in 1943 to create the Rhodesian National Farmers’ Union (Rhodesia). While the two bodies shared the same name, they were separate entities. There is discrepancy in the title for the Northern Rhodesian equivalent. Öjermark and Chabala (1994) describe it with the “Northern” prenom, though the ZNFU describe it without the “Northern” prenom.

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for many years sent their children to South African schools and continue to do so.2 Nevertheless, the performance of race in Northern Rhodesia, and later Zambia, has had marked differences from the white settler regimes to the South. It was somewhat less rigidly oppositional and more collaborative. As the white population was relatively small in comparison, they often had to rely on local populations more. Intermarriage was somewhat common.3

In turn, settler farmers in Zambia have long played an instructive role for local farmers, particularly among the Plateau Tonga (Chipungu, 1988, Vickery, 1986). After independence, the latter were encouraged to buy private-titled land originally cleared of Tonga inhabitants for white settlement. The UNIP government expanded support for all peasant farmers, yet those closest to the line-of-rail benefitted disproportionately from marketing infrastructures, government services and capital in the form of subsidized loans and inputs. For a brief period these farms were significant sites of production, utilizing permanent and temporary waged labour.

Critiques of import-substitution policies and graft associated with the National Agricultural Marketing Board (NAMBoard) by people like (Bates, 1981 and Collier) obscure the fact that many significant achievements had been made in the agricultural sector in the post-independence years. They were highly uneven, but Carolyn Baylies, (1976), Samual Chipungu, (1988), Jotham Momba (1982) and more recently, Jeremy Gould, (2010), and my own research (2010, 2015) shows there was growth and expansion of the market, with significant accumulation, re-investment and employment (along with differentiation) taking place in the sector. This is consistent with Thandika Mkandawire’s (2001) argument about the history of the developmental state in Africa that is contrary to the positions taken in the Berg report (1981) and many other places since. Rarely have studies considered the functions of the national veterinary infrastructures, challenges involved in regulating veterinary pharmaceuticals, vaccines, and making them available. Only rarely have studies considered the particularities of Zambia’s fertilizer production, standardization of grades and regulation of the industry.4 Furthermore, for agriculture, 25 years after the 1990 financial liberalization, the largest issues still appears to be the inability to deliver accessible seasonal loans and insurance products.5

The material force behind an agro-industrial complex is ultimately a plantation model that is structured around white authority, within a juridical approach to land and nature that enables the commodification of the life-world. Furthermore, this relationship plays some form of sub-imperialist role for an agro-industry strongly tied to the American hegemony (or an “empire of capital” that has a special relationship with the American state) (Wood, 2003, Panitch and Gindin, 2013, 2014 Bond and Garcia, 2 It is almost exclusively the norm, which is emulated by the larger black farmers.3 Kenneth Vickery has written a classic study on the early history of white settlement in Southern Zambia (1986), though these claims are informed by field interviews. Most importantly, they are influenced by a series of interviews with Anthropologist, Elizabeth Colson, whose work in Zambia was initiated as an employee of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute and she has continued ethnographic work in the country to this day.4 Mason, et al (2015, 2013) provides a rare exception5 Chulu, K. “‘Realign agricultural loan repayments’, September, 14, 2015 https://www.daily-mail.co.zm/?p=43681, accessed, September 16, 2015

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2014). To be sure, conglomerations of capital that have invested in Zambia since 1991 have taken hybridized forms. Many are rooted in diverse combinations of home-states that include nations with significant autonomy from US hegemony and closer relations with other economic blocs – particularly the EU (The Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and Dubai bring particular country examples). In these ways Hall (2011b) is correct to suggest; “The phenomenon cannot be fully understood as ‘South African Imperialism’ in Africa. The interests shaping it, the financing and the destination markets, extend far beyond South Africa. This is global capitalism.” Yet, the historically particular multi-polarity of this moment in global capitalism must be considered (Desai, 2013). Taylor (2014) has described the present circumstances for Southern African states as one of “diversified dependency” within a multi-polar world. The degrees of empire in such a context are of course open to significant debate beyond the scope of this paper.

The agricultural industrial package described here is subservient or subjugated to an “extractive, high-carbon economic model that threatens to amplify the catastrophic environmental and social destruction of advanced capitalism” (Bond and Garcia, 2014). There is a question as to whether South Africa should be included in the BRICS nations as the other members economically dwarf it. One prominent new study omits them for this reason (Taylor, 2014). Then there is the level of penetration. Bond and Garcia have proposed with understand this in neogramscian terms as being driven by forces that come from above, below and middle. Within this matric, the South African agricultural sector supplies elements of all three.

2. Overview of Investment Data

A challenge in trying to assess the impact of South African involvement in the Zambian Economy is that it is impossible to say what it would be like in its absence. There is certainly little to romanticize about the Zambian economy between the 1980s and 1994, when the privatization process was opened up to international investment. In this way, it was by no means unique among African countries, who generally were experiencing a systemic crisis following on the oil shocks of 1973, declining terms of trade and crippling debt as a result of the Volcker shocks (Moorsom, 2010, Bracking 20). Much has been written about the failures of Zambian agricultural policy in these years (Good, 1986a, 1986b, 1990, 1993, Klepper,1979). Yet at the same time, I argue, as has Chipungu (1988), that significant achievements were made in the post-independence years. This is also consistent with Mkandawire’s findings for the continent more broadly, that show a number of African countries had been experiencing growth and a developmental, capitalist class was emerging, even if its entrance was closely connected to forms of graft (2001). Though there is evidence showing that African commercial farmers had the highest loan repayment rates among any group in the UNIP era. The question then is whether or not they would have been able to maintain dominant and productive positions in the economy if it were protected from South African investment and imports.

The process of opening up and regionalizing the Zambian economy has been uneven. This is partly because of its overlapping membership in various regional intra-

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state organizations. As a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Zambia became subject to a phased program of tariff reduction from 2001 and formally launched an FTA in August 2008 that places zero duty on 85 percent of intra-regional trade (Sandrey, 2013, Nagar, 2012: 138). According to Sandrey, in practice Zambia may be the most open of all SADC partners.

Trade data for the region is generally unreliable, in part because of the significant degree of informal trade that takes place, but also as a result of institutional failures and the widespread use of offshore banking transactions and intra-corporation transfer payments. The inclusion or exclusion of transport costs also complicate data, meaning exports from one country and recorded imports in the country of destination will not match. Nevertheless, it is clear that South Africa dominates trade within the SADC, with the majority of that trade being exports out of the Republic of South Africa (RSA). One figure placed it at 68% of intra-SADC trade in 2010 (Sandrey, 2013). In the same year, Nager notes that “South Africa accounts for 85% of Foreign Direct Investment and 70 percent of all multinational corporations (MNCs) within SADC. It is by far the largest source of inputs for South African imports (Fig. 1).

Figure. 1

The most dramatic fact about Zambian trade is that agriculture is dwarfed by interests in mining sector in both trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Of the top ten export commodities between 2011 and 2013, only two are agricultural; Maize, Tobacco and sugar for export – lowest cost production in the world. Of the top ten imports, all but two are for mining purposes, while the remaining two are fertilizers and motor vehicles (UN Comtrade, 2013). The size of the mineral economy can also be seen in export data, in which Switzerland is the destination for export due to the dominance of the tiny country in metal trading markets (fig 2). Overall, South Africa is Zambia’s Second largest trading partner, taking formal sector imports and exports into account. Yet with exports alone, RSA is third, after Switzerland and China.6

6 Bank of Zambia, 2011 statistical annex http://www.boz.zm/Publishing/69/69_ZAMBIA%20DIRECTION%20OF%20TRADE%20REPORT%20Q2%202012%20.pdf

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Figure. 2

There are a number of trends in the export data from South Africa. Foremost is the fact that there are huge increases in exports since 1994, tripling in the last 10 years, with the most pronounced boost following the introduction of the SADC FTA in 2008 (fig. 3). In disaggregating these exports by various product types common to the agricultural sector we see that they are dominated by the import of small machinery, parts, electronics and small appliances (fig. 4). Clearly not all imports of this nature will be into the agricultural sector, though I argue that it is indicative of increased mechanization in the sector that can be corroborated in other data. We see a pronounced growth in the poultry industry (supported also by Abrahams: 2010), irrigation, cultivation equipment as well as the popularization of truck ownership among medium-sized farmers. We also see an increase in plastics, rubber, chemicals and other factors in agricultural production, which also have uses in mining industry.Perhaps the most significant increases in imports related to the agricultural sector seen in (figure 4) are simply those related to the import of vegetable products, animal fats and oils and prepared foodstuffs.

Figure 3. RSA Exports to Zambia – All goods, Source: Department of Trade and Industry, RSA

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Figure 4: SA Exports by type: Inputs Source: Department of Trade and Industry, RSA

The growth in exports of prepared foodstuffs can be more clearly discerned in (figure 7). I would suggest a number of inferences could be drawn from this category,

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which are accentuated when one examines a “map of economic complexity” that I created via the visual representation tools provided by the Harvard Atlas of Economic Complexity. The map I have created is for the export of “Frozen Vegetables” from South Africa and the link is available here:

Figure 6.http://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/explore/tree_map/export/zaf/show/0710/2013/

The data currently available in this service is limited to the period between 1995 to 2013. This does, however, allow one to see the very significant growth in exports within Africa (all countries in pink) and the region. If you press the play button at the bottom left of the visualization it will be apparent that in 1994 Zambia is marginal in South African exports of this product, while in 2013 it is one of the largest recipients of South African frozen vegetables. One can explore the data further in a number of ways.

Frozen vegetables is a meaningful indicator of broader market changes because it requires cold storage transport, retail or restaurant infrastructure for further sales and it requires the purchaser to have a freezer. In any given year, 75-90% of refrigerators and freezers are South African imports (Harvard Atlas).7 In this way the “white goods” market supplied by South African chain stores like Game are an extension of the Minerals Energy Complex (MEC), that imposes a restrictive structural impediment on the South African economy (Marais, 2011 following on Fine and Rustomjee, 1996). Furthermore, frozen vegetables are a valuable indicator because their importation undoubtedly displaces local agricultural alternatives and is so closely connected to processes of supermarketization and changing diets among Zambians.

7 http://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/explore/tree_map/import/zmb/show/8418/2013/?prod_class=hs4&details_treemap=2&disable_widgets=false&disable_search=false&node_size=none&queryActivated=true&highlight=

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Figure 7. Prepared Foodstuffs:

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The agricultural model being promoted by South African trade with Zambia is an integrated technology package that includes mechanization, chemical and pharmaceutical inputs and hybridized seed. There has been significant growth in importation of fertilizers and chemicals from South Africa in recent years, as is seen in Figure 8. In most years since 1995 100% of nitrates imported to Zambia arrive from SA. There is, however, much more variation in sourcing of “Mineral or chemical fertilizers, potassic” and with “Mineral or chemical fertilizers, nitrogenous”. The fertilizer industry varies immensely by origin, likely because their unprocessed state means a company can easily alter sources depending on currencies and price fluctuations. It is also likely that companies play with their accounting processes to take advantage of tax incentives. The topic warrants further research. Figure 9 shows there is little correlation between prices of fertilizer inputs and the actual volumes being sold. They are clearly subject to significant fluctuations in prices, while some minerals are cheap, with relatively higher transport costs.

Since the early 2000s South Africa has dominated the market in imports to Zambia of “Mechanical appliances for dispersing liquids or powders; fire extinguishers; spray guns; steam or sand blasting machines”. The same is true for “Harvesting or agricultural machinery”, which was previously dominated by British imports. In “Milking and dairy machines”, South Africa faces more competition. In imports of “pumps for liquids”, in most years close to 80% come from South Africa, though they are gradually facing competition from China and India.

Figure 8. Fertilizers and chemicals by value

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Figure 9. Fertilizers and Chemicals by Volume (not value in USD)

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The relatively high value of machinery to other imported, agricultural-related products (figure 10.) is indicative of the fact that growth is not labour intensive, but in fact supports a broader trend in which agricultural production is shedding labour in the region and globally. In recent years there has been significant enthusiasm about the growth possibilities presented by an emerging middle class in Zambia. Export data suggests this is largely overstated in comparison to the larger economy. This can be grasped by comparing the market in consumer goods versus those imported for agricultural and industrial purposes. In Figure 10 we can see the comparative value of the market for prepared foodstuffs versus machinery and mechanical appliances. This relationship is more pronounced in figure 11, shows the relative value of plastics imports to other consumer goods commonly used in middle-class homes (footware, apparel, textiles and ceramics).

It is true that plastics have a wide variety of industrial uses beyond the agricultural sector (including chemical storage, plumbing, major infrastructure projects and many basic household goods are plastic molding). Yet I am suggesting here that they are integral to all aspects of current expansion in the agri sector, from packaging of chemical inputs, to irrigation and drainage, storage and packaging for shipping and retail. Clothing and household tableware comprises a small portion of exports in

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comparison to fertilizers, irrigation and farming equipment. In comparison, the highest value agricultural export from Zambia is tobacco, with value of $115,039,000 USD in 2010 (just over half the value of plastics imports from SA alone) (FAO). Raw sugar is at $29,233,000 and Cotton lint $39,409,000. Zambia’s total exports are over $5 billion, mostly from mineral extraction.

Another broader trend is hidden within the data on plastics and the fact that much of the growth in these imports is subsidized by international aid at various levels. In 2008 an OECD report revealed that the largest donor contributions to Fifth National Development Plan for 2006-2010, was for irrigation support (OECD, Bonaglia, 2008). As we will see in the following section, many of the South African companies trading with Zambia are in fact heavily dependent on subsidies and other forms of state protection. These trends are in contradiction with the means by which the companies have accessed the markets (i.e. the pre-text of free trade agreements).

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Figure 10. Comparison of Value (USD) Machinery Versus Prepared Foodstuffs

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Figure 11. Relative size of apparel and footwear to plastics

South African imports arrive into a Zambian agricultural sector currently defined by diversified ownership and its governance structures have multiple points of power (Abrahams: 2010). Thus it is not yet dominated by monopolies, though according to studies conducted by the Indaba Agricultural Policy Research Institute (IAPRI), grain millers wield a significant degree of political power within the country and have been blamed for distorting the economy and obstructing goals of food security even in years of surplus (Chisanga et al, 2015, Kuteya and Sitko, 2014, Kuteya and Jayne, 2012). Their power is paradoxically aided by the actions of the Food Reserve Agency, intended to alleviate food insecurity, but then sells subsidized maize to millers who do not pass on the subsidy to retail buyers. This, the authors argue is partly due to their crowding out of smaller-scale grain merchants. The broader economy is still accurately described as one of combined and uneven development. The unevenness penetrates and fractures society at all levels in complex class relations, where many households have various exploitative relations within them (Sitko…). In short, the minerals economy sits amidst intensified forms of neofeudalism.

The agricultural sector is not growing as a percenage of GDP, despite the fact more than 70% of the population takes part in it. This is not to say the sector it is not

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growing, but that the economy is not being diversified, despite decades of rhetorical commitments to that end. This suggests then that growth in exports by South African companies means they are taking market share, rather than invigorating the industry. The sector’s ‘decline’ as represented in figure 12 is relative to fluctuations in other sectors, so when minerals prices were high, between 2008 and 2013, they may have been in fact growing.

Figure 12:

Source: Zambian Central Statistics Office

3. Forms of South African Capital in the Zambian Agricultural sector: Company and Sub-sector profiles.

In recent years the Zambian government has been aggressively courting foreign investment in the agriculture sector. The Zambia Development Act of 2006 has a variety of investment incentives and allowances relevant to the agricultural sector, which includes sweeping tax exemptions for 5 years, tax holidays on dividends, amidst reduced base tax rates. The Act provides additional tax reductions for those investing over US$500,000 in set priority subsectors including: Floriculture, Horticulture, Processed foods, Beverages and Stimulants, Production and the processing of the following products in the textiles sector Cotton, fabric and Yarn. Production and processing of the Cattle hides, Crust leather, Leather products, Garments.

A fair amount of FDI is within products destined for export (cotton, tobacco, horticulture and floriculture), however, the predominant interest is in serving the indigenous and regional market. On the latter, Congo is the dominant target as its extractive labour force cannot be fed by internal agricultural producers. This is how and why the large farmers and input companies (primarily seed, feed and fertilizer) rely on the Zambian state to increase its market share beyond the ability of individual participants. Foreign investment is also intimately tied further to “middle-players” such

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as NGOs, International Aid bodies (such as USAID, SIDA, World Bank) and industrial lobby and corporate representative bodies. The ZNFU is the most prominent of them, but there are various Industry organizations that coincide and are often members of it. Advocacy therefore meets up with social policy as the largest players rely on subsidies from the Zambian state. Since 1990 they have influenced the dismantling of local research and development and extension services formerly funded by the Zambian state and its place promoted foundations/trusts and Public Private Partnerships to provide training and support to the majority, small-scale farmers.

Zambia Agricultural Research Institute (ZARI) is the country’s principal agricultural research agency, although two non-profit agencies also conduct research: the Golden Valley Agricultural Research Trust (GART), which more than doubled its capacity in the past decade and focuses on smallholder crop and livestock technologies (including significant investments in maize), and the Cotton Development Trust. (Smale et al. 2013).

Fertilizer

Fertilizer is one of the most political of all products in the economy. Nitrogen Chemical of Zambia is one of the only remaining parastatals from the UNIP days and it has never had the capacity to serve the entire country. Most inputs have to be imported at costs that render them among the most expensive fertilizers in the world. There are significant limits to profitability due to high transport costs that, according to International Fertilizer Development Corporation (IFDC) hinder interest among foreign investment. As a result, the Fertilizer Input Support Program (FISP) remains a dominant aspect of the industry. FISP provides subsidized fertilizer and seed for 1 hectare of production in effort to promote food security. The industry is also legally protected from industries in other states, though smuggling of fertilizers from Tanzania has been ongoing.8

According to the IFDC “the number of importers who are also involved in wholesaling and distribution in Zambia is estimated at 13” and includes Greenbelt Ltd (which also trades and blends in Tanzania and Mozambique, Zambia Fertilizers Ltd., Bridgeways Commodities, Pro-vet, Nyiombo (Zambia-based), Omnia Ltd., Louis Dreyfus and Export Trading Group (ETG). “Most of these companies are headquartered in South Africa.” (IFDC, 2013)

The FISP is usually served by two companies that are given the tender for an agricultural season following a competitive bidding process. Nyiombo and Omnia have dominated the government subsidy program, winning tenders for most recent seasons. Others importers sell under competitive commercial market conditions parallel to the subsidy program. Greenbelt supplies sugar plantations, while “Omnia dominates large farm sales” (IFDC 2013).

Seed 8 e.g. “Govt protecting local products”, ZNBC http://www.znbc.co.zm/?p=21768

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According one study conducted for “Harvest Plus”, a project of the “Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research”, an international, multi-stakeholder, World Bank initiated organization9: “Over the last decade, 126 new varieties have been released by 14 different companies, and the rights of almost all these varieties are held by private companies”. The authors found there were no single improved variety that covered more than 10% of maize area, and only two varieties that covered more than 5%. The 20 most popular improved varieties together covered less than half of maize planted. This means there is significant room for growth in market share if traditional varieties are displaced. The new varieties also show only limited spatial patterns of distribution. There is, therefore, no dominant variety or company throughout the country.

“most popular hybrid, Pan 53, is found more often in Central, Eastern and Southern Provinces. The second, MRI 624, is found relatively less often in Eastern and Northern, and the third, SC 627, is grown less frequently in Eastern and Southern Provinces.” (Smale et al, 2013)

Leading Varieties are “Seedco, MRI, and Pannar, followed by Zamseed. Monsanto and Pioneer follow, at much lower percentages”. The latter, however, just got allocated the tender to contribute a minimum 10% share of national subsidized maize seed pockets.

As with the fertilizer companies, FISP allows major international conglomerates to expand markets to smallholders who would not otherwise have purchased hybrid seed. The FISP has promoted Pannar seed, is a South African company started in 1958. In October, 2013 Pannar was bought by DuPont Pioneer of the US. DuPont has licenses and joint ventures with Syngenta, which owns MRI seed of Zambia. Syngenta is a subsidiary of Monsanto. Thus, although there is an appearance of competition within the Zambian seed industry, it is rapidly narrowing.

MRI – Swiss, Syngenta – Syngenta, like Dupont, has its roots in the chemical industry and originated the application of DDT for insecticides in 1939. In 1979 it was bought by pharmaceutical company Sandoz, and in 1983 they took up a biotech unit. A series of mergers leads them through a range of companies, including Novartis, and Zeneca (which produces the first GM tomato in 1997). In 2001 Syngenta is formed and globalizes operations through various acquisitions and patent agreements with companies like Dupont, Bayer, Dow Agrisciences, Monsanto, and Pioneer among others. With these companies there is a merging of pharmacuiticals, plastics-synethetics and biology/genetic ownership.

Zambia Seed Company Ltd:

9 Harvest Plus is one of many examples of PPPs that have come into prominence in the last 20 years. The bodies have highly opaque financing and governance structures which ultimately advocate for policies that serve to benefit many of the companies who contribute funds with little transparency. Within Zambia, the ZNFU and Golden Valley Research Trust are similarly structured.

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Some changes at shareholding level took place in March 1999 whereby GRZ shareholding in the company was reduced from 40% to 37.5 %. ZCF and ZSPA combined shareholding was also reduced from 40% to 10%. As a result of this Svalof Weibull AB (Sweedish) shareholding increased from 10% to 27.5 % while Swedfund International AB shareholding increased from 10% to 25%.

Seed Co Ltd, 1983 merger of Seed Maize Association and Crop Seeds Association into a Seed Cooperative Company of Zimbabwe. 1996 public floation on Zimbabwe stock exchange, raising $45 million. In 2000 a research and technical agreement was reached with Syngenta. 2014 Limagrain “equity partnership”. Seed Co pty ltd South Africa. In 2014 Zambia represents 23 percent of its revenue and 19% of its sales (a $47 million company). Among the largest shareholders are Old Mutual Life Insurance (Zim) and Old Mutual Zimbabwe, Stanbic Bank. Interestingly, the largest is Vilmorin (French seed company).

Millers

Zambia has a number of market participants with various informal, small and medium scale participants, yet there are three dominant companies that together handle the largest percentage.

The market is dominated by Novatek (which is part of Zambeef Products Plc), with an estimated 30% market share, while Africa Feeds (Tiger Feeds) and National Milling each have a share of around 20%. Nutrifeeds, Simba and Olympic Milling make up the bulk of the remainder of the market (Sutton and Langmead, 2013). The largest commercial millers have at times benefited from government subsidies, while smaller firms have not (Kuteya and Jayne, 2012).

Mpongwe Milling, bought by Zeder Investments, via subsidiary Chayton Africain 2013 for $27.5 million. Incorporated in South Africa and had private ownership since 2006.10 The company claims Mpongwe is a “leading Maize and Wheat miller” with interests in the Congo. Thus Zeder is planning to target sales in the DRC from Zambia.11

Oilseed production:

Zaminata ltd, largest edible oil producer, formerly a holding of Zambeef, purchased in Jan 2008 for $16 million USD. 100 percent of stock to Cargill (Circular to Shareholders, March 16, 2015). The government of Zambia, on March 19th 2015 imposed an import ban on edible oils. This was only two weeks before Zambeef was scheduled to have the company board of directors vote to approve the deal, on the same day as Zambeef 10 Lusaka Voice, Accessed, March 31 2015 http://lusakavoice.com/2013/11/13/mpongwe-milling-sold-for-27-5-million-to-a-south-african-company/11 Hassenfuss, M (2013) “Agribusiness investor Zeder deepens roots in Zambia “Business Day, November, 13, accessed, September 25, 2015 http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/agriculture/2013/11/13/agribusiness-investor-zeder-deepens-roots-in-zambia, supported by the Chairman’s letter in Zeder’s 2014 annual report, P. 9 http://www.zeder.co.za/wp-content/uploads/pdf/Zeder_AR_2014.pdf

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shareholders were to vote on the terms of sale (April 8).12 They essentially gave Cargill a closed market. The irony is that Cargill is allowed to purchase Zambian companies under the principle of free trade, yet once they are in they want a protected market.13

Cotton - Outgrower contract farming

The parastatal Lintco, was bought by Lonrho (formerly “London Rhodesian Land and Mining Company”), renamed Mumbwa. In 2000 it was bought by a private owner and began operating under the name Dunavant. In 2012 was bought NWK limited bought it. NWK is a SA parent company, but its ownership is via another “parent company” AfricaNeth, Netherlands (60%) and Dubai (40%).

Therefore, South Africa acts as a regional organizational hub for a larger company in a former colonial nation. Brownfield investment. Has roughly 120,000 outgrowers. It has “seven gin sites, nine regional agricultural offices, 50 agricultural sheds and a network of over 1 000 distributors”

More details on the cotton industry are available in Hertel and Winters (2006)

Clark, one of three major cotton producers was bought by Cargill in 2006.

227,000 farmers with Dunavant, 160,000 mt Clark, 254,180 ha China-Mulungushi

“Zambia is mainly a raw cotton exporter; it was ranked 24 th in world cotton exports in 2007. Raw cotton exports have been increasing in the last ten years from about US$ 5 million in 2000, to as high as US$ 122 million in 2004, and currently around US $ 30 million per annum. Raw cotton exports from Zambia have been targeted mainly to South Africa, Mauritius and East Asia. “ (GRZ, 2011 Zambia Agriculture Sector Profile)

Poultry

“The Zambian food service sector uses large quantities of locally produced raw bulky cuts from major poultry producers. These producers include Verino, Crest, Eureka and Zamchick that grow chickens from day old chicks from own hatcheries or import from hatcheries outside the country.

Despite the stiff competition that chicken products face from fish products and pork, the sector has maintained its competitive edge overtime. This is because, poultry products in Zambia remain the most affordable and sustainable form of animal protein thereby ensuring continued demand and investment potential of the sector. “

12 Cargill, “Cargill's purchase of Zamanita moves closer as Zambeef shareholders unanimously approve deal”, Press Release http://www.cargill.com/news/releases/2015/NA31773655.jsp13 “Oil Ban will protect jobs” Daily Mail, March 21, 2015. Accessed September 26, 2015 https://www.daily-mail.co.zm/?p=23899

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(Zambian Development Agency, 2011)

Tied to “super-market revolution”, increasing urban consumer goods and a major area of Growth (Abrahams, 2010)

Ross Breeders – owned by Country Bird Holdings in South Africa

RCL Foods Ltd RSA, 49% share in Zamchik and Zamhatch.

Hybrid Poultry Farm (from Pre-independence days), bought by a Kenyan Family consortium

Dairy

Bonnita (SA) to – it was bought by Parmalet (France’s Lactalis) (slight ‘success’ story)

Parmalat Zambia has an installed capacity of 120,000 L of milk per day and produces 50,000 L (40% of capacity).6 It processes around half of the rawmilk produced in Zambia by commercial and small-scale farmers (70% of which comes from the commercial farmers). The company buys 45–50 million litres of rawmilk per year, around 8% of which is from small-scale dairy farmers largely working under cooperative schemes and backed by donor funding. Parmalat Zambia purchased most of its milk from some 21 commercial dairy farmers in 2004, and this number increased to 24 commercial farmers by 2008.

Horticulture

The sector had been expanding but reached a peak in 2003 with export earnings amounting to US $45,969,290.00. Since then it has been experiencing a decline in both export volume and earnings.

According to the Zambia Development Agency “This general decrease in exports over the past years had largely been attributed to decline in production volumes following the collapse of a few of the main players in the industry and the subsequent cessation of support to out growers by one of the major producers.” (2011)

Floriculture

Agriflora, $4 million dollar investment, in 2003 owned by Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa, with a $3.6 million “gross exposure” guarantee from the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency

In 2003 “Agriflora is the second largest agricultural company in Zambia and employs over 5,000 people.”, FAO states in 2001 that “Agriflora Ltd. is Zambia’s biggest

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commercial rose grower with over 50 million stems of export quality roses for the world market.” Liquidated in 200414

Zambia Produces the highest premium of cotton in Africa (Tschirley, 2009)

Irrigation Technology

According to the FAO/IFC there has been “a dramatic escalation in the value of imported irrigation equipment in recent years”. The net imports grew at an annual average rate of 40 percent between 2009 and 2012, reaching an estimated USD 70 million. Overhead center pivots represent 45 percent of imports, most destined for commercial farms. “Small-scale farmers generally use local markets to purchase their equipment.” (FAO/IFC Zambia Irrigation Market Brief).

The FAO further claims that Zambia has “vast water resources… second only to Angola in southern Africa”. In figures its nearly 6 000 cubic meters of water per inhabitant. Yet practical utilization of these resources requires holding facilities (dambos mostly) that are generally too large an investment for one farmer. As a result, the government plays a significant role in making such facilities available and they are installed in new farming blocks (ibid: 25).

NGOs are a channel for a significant portion of sales as they “provide technical assistance and facilitate equipment access, which has increased small-scale farmers’ adoption of low-cost irrigation technologies such as treadle and motorized pumps.” (FAO/IFC 4, 14) and microfinance options as well.

The major companies importing irrigation equipement are; Amiron, Division of Balton CP (UK/Israel). Amiron is also an agent for many Israeli companies such as Azrom greenhouses. Pumps Via KSB (South Africa) through United Chemolide in Lusaka, Center Pivots are brought from Zimmantec (SA/US) and PVC pipes from SA (origin unknown). Also in Security, Telecom (GSM), water treatment plants, power generators

Irritech, sells Netafilm Israeli drip irrigation systems.

Roto (South Africa) sells plastic barrels and is aiming to create smaller scale center-pivots for 1-2 hectare areas (at present, 30 hectares of irrigation are necessary for it to provide sufficient return on investment.

Figure 13. Working Matrix on company structures

Branch Company Financing/Parent Products/Market Subsidies/State support

Seed PioneerMonsanto,Zambia Seed/ Zamseed

Dupont AGresults/ “Harvest Plus, Orange Maize, Provitamin A- rich

14 http://zambiareports.com/2015/01/19/hh-accused-misconduct-liquidation-agriflora/ accessed, March, 30, 2015

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PannarMRI (Syngenta)

Seed Co ltd

Dupont

(SA, via Zim/Old Mutual/Stanbic)

hybrid seed

FISP/FRA

Feed Tiger Feeds est. 1997 part of Meadow Feeds (Cargill)

Nutrifeeds

Afgri

Cargill

Fertilizers Omniaand Protea Chemicals

Sasol Zambia

JSE, Germany x 3 and the US

Sasol Group, South Africa.

“The fertiliser and other agriculture chemicals unit, which contributes more than a third of group earnings, is the only segment which we think will drive the company in the next 12 months.“, Nov 2013

Ag Inputs Credit Program 92-94Agricultural Credit Management Program – 1994=97Food Reserve Agency,/ FISP (Fertilizer Import Support Programme). 1997-present80% of GRZ Agri budget (2011)

Outgrower and contract farming

Dunavant (NWK)

Clark

NWK is a SA parent company, but its ownership is via another “parent company” AfricaNeth, Netherlands (60%) and Dubai (40%).Afgri ltd

Brownfield investment. Has roughly 120,000 outgrowers. It has “seven gin sites, nine regional agricultural offices, 50 agricultural sheds and a network of over 1 000 distributors

Dunavant, has 227,000 outgrower farmers

Clark 160,000

Millers, Oilseed processing

Tiger Feeds (30%), est. 1997

Zaminata ltd

Mpongwe

Meadow Feeds (Cargill)

Cargill (Zambeef until April, 2015)

Zeder Investments, via subsidiary Chayton Africa

After Zaminata was bought, Zambian government introduced a ban on processes imported oils (company needs ‘open markets’ to enter, then wants protected markets)The largest commercial millers have at times benefited from government

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in 2013 for $27.5 million

subsidies, while smaller firms have not (Kuteya and Jayne, 2012)

Poultry RCL Foods Ltd RSA, 49% share in Zamchik and Zamhatch

Ross Breeders – owned by Country Bird Holdings in South Africa

Includes Vector “logicssolutions”,

BEE 7.6 %

Remgro 76%

Public 20%

Everything from aluminum, infrastructure, Total petrol, education, transport,

Banking and insurance

Stanbic $40,mllion (USD) for “commercial farmers” lending, 2014

Banking and insurance

Old Mutual – bought BankABC

$25 million backed by Africa Agriculture Trade and investment fund (international PPP). For lending in Southern Africa

Mechanization AFGRI Corporation Zambia Limited, 2003

KSB (South Africa)

Zimmantec

Partnered with Stanbic

Via United Chemolide in Lusaka

SA/US/ Amiron UK

John Deer, milling, feeds, grain handling, financing

Pumps

Much of the equipment being sold is manufactured by Israeli companies.

Commodity trading FRA

Plastics RotoNampak

SASA/JSE

200 employees in Zam. 58 operations, accounting for 47% of thegroup’s trading profit. Intherest of Africaand UK 20 and 9 operations, accountingfor 30% and7% of trading profit respectively.

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Plastics cont. Africa Plastics SA independent

Floriculture Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa (was 2nd largest agri company in Zambia in 2003)

a $3.6 million “gross exposure” guarantee from the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency – liquidated in 2004

Conclusion: What does the case of Zambia reveal?

I believe the data presented here offers some basis from which to enter a discussion on the South African Imperialism versus Sub-Imperialism debate - a debate that inevitably extends to the nature of contemporary (global) capitalism. Yet such a discussion should follow a summary of claims that can be made based on the material presented above.

1. South Africa is largest source of imports to Zambia, not ‘exports’ (Switzerland!)

2. There is a clear correlation between the implementation of the SADC Free Trade Area that came into effect in 2008. It also suggests some displacement of Zambian produce in the local economy.

3. Within Zambia, minerals extraction still overwhelmingly dominates economy, despite 80 years of rhetoric about diversifying the economy, especially via agricultural development

4. Yet minerals economy is stagnating, while financial services are booming (Supporting Marini’s theory of sub-imperialism).

5. Within agricultural sector we see trends that South African investment supports a broader agri-business model that coincides with rhetorical support for a ‘new green revolution’. This, I argue should be understood to some degree as portmanteau biota that is linked to on the broader social ensemble that reproduces the colonial racial order, albeit with a slight alteration of having some Chinese owners. Generally the latter are not large state corporate enterprises, but smaller, family businesses. While this is the case, there is little discussion about the racial dimensions of South African farmers moving into Zambia.

6. South African investments are also promoting an agricultural model that is heavily dependent upon mechanization and plastics, which coincide also with the processed food industries. These all serve to eliminate labour in production, rather than absorb it similar processes are taking place in the mining sector. Companies will blatantly state in their annual reports that their response to Marikana is to make investments that further reduce their reliance on labour.

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7. Investments are concentrated in seed patent ownership, breeding, poulty, dairy, irrigation technologies. The underlying ownership is mostly US and European (Dupont, Monsanto, Cargill BSAF, fizer).

8. Irrigation technology is closely linked to Israeli companies – as well as ones established by the Commonwealth Development Corporation in the late-colonial days. This coincides with government, world bank financing toward the construction of new private titled plots (dispossessing land of others), then diverting water resources, further dispossessing those in areas of communal ownership, much as is being done in Palestine. IFI’s further extend the market of the irrigation tech companies, by making it available to smallholders via various charity/micro-finance development projects. Impacts upon ground water and surface water diversion are difficult to assess, in part because their implications are often only observable many years

9. Investments are heavily subsidized and protected by the state and IFIs. Companies break in under rules of the ‘open market’, but then have IFC and Multi-lateral Investment Agency branches of the World Bank guarantee financing (insured against losses), they secure state-contracts, such as supplying the Fertilizer Input Support Program – which is supplied entirely by two South African companies. They then close market access once.

10. Ultimately these issues relate to the South African economy as they are financed heavily by retirement funds, with many finding ways to write it off as ethical funds, and carbon offsetting.

The possible benefits of changes in the agricultural sector brought about by South African capital are of course relative. Areas of new growth are met with rising levels of poverty. Privatization of marketing and veterinary services has a far greater impact on those outside the line of rail. Yet at all levels of the value chain the influence of South African capital within Zambian agricultural sector is only minimally developmental. They aid in the process of creating a working class, but the segments of the working class it enables is the least capable of defending its own right to a basic livelihood. The chemical-life-synthetic mechanization package it coincides with sheds labour and attacks indigenous knowledge. On the retail front the situation is no better. Shoprite, in 2013 fired its entire unionized workforce. The Zambian Government let them do it.

Zambia cannot boast a growing middle class as many triumphalist narratives offer (e.g. Juma, 2011). Relative to Sub-Saharan Africa, Zambia has a smaller middle class. In 2010, 9% of Zambians lived for US$2-4 a day and 6% for US$4-20 a day, compared to the entire Sub-Saharan Africa where 14% lived for US$2-4 a day and 10% for US$4-20 a day.43 There is no growth in formal employment. According to Oxfam poverty is stagnant while inequality is growing between Zambians who have much and those that have nothing at all.

Agriculture is by far the lowest paid of all sectors and the sector offers dangerous work. An ILO study using a 2008 labour force survey revealed that 8.1% of the respondents had been injured at work in the previous 12 months (10% of males,

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and 6.2% of females). Three out of five (61%) of those injured, stayed away from work as a result. The most common injury was an "open wound" (82%).”(ILO, 2013).

Zambia’s private sector is sharply divided into large enterprises and micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs). Although the large enterprises generate most of the economic growth, exports and tax revenues, they employ fewer workers overall than small, most often informal, enterprises (ibid). Most workers in MSMEs are unpaid family members or workers paid in kind. Workers in the informal economy generally possess low levels of skills and education with 65.5 per cent of workers in the informal economy possessing either no education or solely primary education. (ILO, 2013: 7, Chigunta, Chisup, and Elder, 2013).

The youth labour underutilization in Zambia stands at 64.8 percent. Only 14.2 per cent of Zambian youth are in regular employment with a contract greater than 12 months (ILO, 2013). Less than 1% of employed youth are in the mining sector. More than 30% are in retail trade (essentially hawkers). In formal sector employment, most (40%) are working less than 20 hours per week. The vast majority consider their work unsatisfactory, low-quality jobs. Understandably, the level of job satisfaction experienced decreases with ones level of precarity. Huge numbers of young people are not attending school. 1.6 percent attends university (Though most have attained more education than their parents). Amidst this, youth are not losing hope but have unfulfilled aspirations. They maintain a desire for success in work, family and making a meaningful contribution to society. Only about 10% suggest their primary desire is to make a lot of money (ibid).

The question is whether or not South Africa’s influence on the Zambian agricultural sector can positively impact the circumstances for the majority living in reserve lands without private title. The evidence so far suggests the opposite; the impact of South African capital seems to accentuate the differences and thus furthers the combined and uneven nature of capitalism in Zambia. Yet, even then, although the Zambian government attempts to attract large-tract foreign investments in agriculture, they have had little up-take on plans to build more FDI farm blocks.

The Sub-Imperial Question

The notion of “sub-imperialism” requires a prior definition of ‘imperialism’. Generally, following Lenin, a notion of imperialism can be understood of a displacement of economic crisis in the capitalist metropole. It is a moment when finance capital supercedes the power of industrial capital, yet finance capital is simultaneously faces declining rates of profit. Rosa Luxemburg (1968) stressed that an essential dimension of imperialism was the “extra-economic coercion associated with exploitation between capitalist and non-capitalist spheres under conditions of capitalist crisis”. Imperialism also of course has an ideological dimension in which the capitalist core is overly triumphant of its capacities at the same time it manages to reconstruct the image of the conquered. Thus, there is an implicit double-movement of sorts, which imposes a limiting logic on the colony. In Luxemburg’s words; “‘Capital cannot accumulate without

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the aid of non-capitalist’ relations and ‘Only the continuous and progressive disintegration of non-capitalist organisation makes accumulation of capital possible.’”

For Ruy Marini the notion of Sub-Imperialism derives from “new integrationist tendency of world capitalism that arises out of post-Second World War capital movements.” As he states:

Sub-imperialism corresponds with, on the one hand, the rise of intermediate points in global capitalism’s organic composition as the integration of production systems intensifies – and, on the other hand, the arrival of a dependent economy at the monopoly and finance capital phase. (Marini 2012, 41)

Thus, the dependent economy is subject to overaccumulation, externalization and financialization (finance superceding industrial capital). The dependent economy therefore seeks to develop a regional platform for expansion via “a division of policing labour that allows the world capitalist system to continue with expansion of contracts, their enforcement and the extraction of adequate flows of materials”. Therefore, sub-empires need their own spatio-temporal fixes for the resolution to their own crisis of profit realization (SA troops in CAR and Congo, protecting mineral claims).

On many levels this seems to fit the South African case, yet Moyo and Yeros address one of the fundamental weaknesses of the Sub-Imperial claims as they suggest:

“in the case of South Africa, it is increasingly difficult to speak of an autonomous domestic bourgeoisie, given the extreme degree of de-nationalisation of its economy in the post-apartheid period. The degree of participation in the Western military project is also different from one case to the next although, one might say, there is a ‘schizophrenia’ to all this, typical of ‘sub-imperialism’.”

South Africa also faces competition from other middle-powers, making Ian Taylor’s term “diversified dependency” a compelling description for Zambia’s circumstances.

In a recently released volume, Luce (2015) rightly also points to the broad dimensions of the entire social assemble that accompanies investments in the region arguing that;

“sub-imperialism has to be understood as a hierarchical level of the world system and at the same time as a stage of dependent capitalism (its highest stage) out of which some socio-economic formations are transformed into new links in the imperialist chain without ever leaving the condition of economic dependency. Besides transferring value to imperialist centres, they also move into appropriating the surplus value of weaker nations for themselves. (Luce, 2015:29)

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Hall (2011) avoids this question by simply stating that this is “global capitalism”. Ultimately she is correct, yet the retreat from the debate avoids having to explain the ways in which capital still maintains national home countries and manages its crisis through the disarticulation of weaker economies. One might also argue that there are, certain colonial dimensions to the penetration of South African capital in the regional agrarian economy. The notion of a ‘portmanteau biota’ should not be understood as promoting ‘neo-europes’, in the manner Crosby intended because what is happening is very different than whatever happened in Europe (and some settler, colonial countries were far removed from the European agrarian capitalist societies – i.e. Israel and South Africa). Moreover, the ways in which life forms are increasingly subjected to capitalist demands takes on, quite literally, ‘hybrid’ dimensions. It takes from the local genetic stock and transforms it, then sells it back. At its core, this is a biopolitical project.

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