1 The ‘Berlin Wall’: Breaking Down Structures – Breaking Down Relationships Peter Herrmann ‘We are the people’. This phrase still sounds in my ears – and I see the crumbling of ‘the wall’, socialism had been building – rightly or wrongly – to protect itself against ... ‘We are the people’ they say now – and the walls of Tesco, Aldi, Mango, Springfield, Dell, MAC, BMW and all the others make it difficult to hear the real voices of many who are just following their own way, now whispering for instance in the thermal bath of Hajdubösösmerny. (Diary entry by the author while visiting Hungary in September 2008) Introduction Frequently, talk about walls is somewhat misleading since it deals with a rather simple manifestation of usually complex structures and processes. This has to be considered when approaching the subject of walls as manifestations of political moments. In these cases, it makes sense to view a particular moment as the culmination of a momentum, of a process, which has been set in stone, and as such it is of course a paradox. It develops its own momentum, not being able to actually really stand still or to move in the same way in which it had been emerging. To fully understand the building and ‘fall’ of the Berlin Wall, it is appropriate to apply the dialectical method, which had been claimed as the guideline for political
Transcript
1
The ‘Berlin Wall’: Breaking Down Structures – Breaking Down
Relationships
Peter Herrmann
‘We are the people’. This phrase still sounds in my
ears – and I see the crumbling of ‘the wall’,
socialism had been building – rightly or wrongly – to
protect itself against ... ‘We are the people’ they say
now – and the walls of Tesco, Aldi, Mango,
Springfield, Dell, MAC, BMW and all the others
make it difficult to hear the real voices of many who
are just following their own way, now whispering for
instance in the thermal bath of Hajdubösösmerny.
(Diary entry by the author while visiting Hungary in
September 2008)
Introduction
Frequently, talk about walls is somewhat misleading since it deals with a
rather simple manifestation of usually complex structures and processes. This has to
be considered when approaching the subject of walls as manifestations of political
moments. In these cases, it makes sense to view a particular moment as the
culmination of a momentum, of a process, which has been set in stone, and as such it
is of course a paradox. It develops its own momentum, not being able to actually
really stand still or to move in the same way in which it had been emerging.
To fully understand the building and ‘fall’ of the Berlin Wall, it is appropriate
to apply the dialectical method, which had been claimed as the guideline for political
2
action by its builders. It is important to proceed from the abstract to the concrete, from
the general to the specific. Before looking at the facts it has to be said that available
information is limited in two ways. On the one hand we are dealing with factors that
are highly political – in this light looking at simple ‘facts’ is disingenuous as these
facts are only understandable by their context – and this context is a matter of
structure and process. And on the other hand we are dealing with issues that are
strongly politically weighted and this means not least controlled by certain
conventions. Direct manipulation of the facts is only one thing – and possibly it is
only the smallest issue. More important is the pattern from which any arguments
about the ‘fall’ of the Berlin Wall are developed. They are very much formulated by
the general presuppositions of Western ideology as coined by the Enlightenment,
emerging from the Renaissance.
The Foundation
‘Lieber das halbe Deutschland ganz ….’
For example we see as well that Konrad Adenauer
rejected the note by Stalin because he did not want
German unity. It is well known that with this Konrad
Adenauer implemented on the one side the demand
by his brother-in-law John McCloy, who had been
asked to follow as high Commissioner of the USA in
Germany, the slogan ‘better having full control over
half of Germany rather than only little control over
the entire Germany,’ securing in this way that at least
part of Germany would join a western military and
economic alliance. And on the other hand he secured
his power in this way as he did not have to fear that,
in the case of all-German elections, the red east could
possible vote for a social democratic politician as
chancellor.
(Mein Parteibuch)
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Two points are usually seen as especially relevant when it comes to exploring
the foundation of the Berlin Wall. One is the general split between two political
spheres going back to the Russian Revolution. After WWI it was only one country –
or the political union of several countries – that emerged as a socialist system out of
the ashes of the war. However, it is remarkable that in other countries as well
upheaval had been a sign of the times: the after-WWI period had been in nearly all
countries characterized by strong political movements against the ‘ancient regime’ of
capitalism. In Germany of the time power could only be maintained by agreeing on
compromises with the revolutionary forces of the German Räterepublik. However,
only after WWII, had the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) been joined by
countries that remained independent nation states but had been nevertheless ready to
engage in a project of fundamental systemic change. It is important to note a
difference between the old socialist system and the newly joining countries. Whereas
the Russian revolution represented a fundamental change in a previously feudal
system, claiming to immediately establish a socialist system, the newly developing
socialist countries after 1945 emerged to a large extent from anti-imperialist
orientations, as they were coined by the experience of the Second World War. The
industrial base - though limited - in the respective countries has to be mentioned as
well.
In any case, the other side has to be looked at as well. Whereas after WWI the
imperialist forces had been simply on the defence, the situation had been different
after WWII. (West) Germany had been the only country that had been in a
fundamentally defensive position. All other countries had been – despite their own
fascist involvement – well able to maintain a position of victors. Both France and
Britain had been explicitly victorious powers. Another important point to consider is
that already during the war plans for a new ‘world order’ had been forged, only a little
later merging into NATO and the ECCS/EEC.
Against this background we have to acknowledge the fact that any early
efforts geared on a strategy of peaceful coexistence between 1945 and 1949 had been
condemned to fail. These failures, especially attempts by the Soviets, led Konrad
Adenauer to declare: ‘Lieber das halbe Deutschland ganz…’ – stating that it would be
better to have complete control over part of Germany than to have little control over
the entire Germany.
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The Building Works
The ‘wall’ can be seen in multiple ways as an expression of a failed attempt at
a strategy of peaceful coexistence. On the one hand, efforts to establish socialism in
East Germany as an ‘educational project’ fell short of their goals, not least because
they were undermined by massive intervention from the West - targeted enticement,
especially of highly qualified individuals, and sabotage went hand in hand. However,
the huge efforts as well as the successes of socialism can be seen in many stories
about the Arbeiter- und Bauernfakultaeten (ABF) – worker and peasant schools.
These made higher education universally accessible, thereby changing the general
understanding of education. Here we find in many respects the roots of what would
later become known as a polytechnic approach to education. On the other hand,
failure meant that any success seemed to depend on cutting off the external danger:
the west. This would be done through the building of a wall.
In the early years, up to 1952, the border between the two German states could
be easily crossed. Actually the existence of ‘two separate states’ had been still
contested at that time - and long after. Especially the east had been considered not
much more than the SBZ - ‘zone occupied by the soviets’. Yet, it was of special
importance as it represented a borderline between the different systems. Though a
proper border did exist from about 1952, movement between the two sides was
relatively problem-free. In a way it was a border like any other, yet drastically
different: it was the line of competition between the two systems. All of Berlin, East
and West, was under the direct control of the victorious powers until 1955, when the
Soviet Union granted control rights to the GDR government. At that point Berlin
emerged as a problematic line of confrontation, the place where the clash between
two systems culminated. The fact that the city had been controlled by the four
victorious powers, squeezed into one location, played an important role. This, in
conjunction with the increasing pressure on the East on grounds of the brain drain, led
to the erection of the wall. August 13, 1961 was the date set for the establishment of a
strict closure of the border. The ‘wall’ had been built – a wall not only as physical
artefact but also in the minds of people.
5
Lost History
The biggest problem is not to let people accept new
ideas, but to let them forget the old ones.
(John Maynard Keynes)
Berthold Brecht once characterised communism as a simple thing difficult to
achieve. Without doubt the same can be said of socialism as communism’s
predecessor. It is of utmost importance to see each primarily defined in a positive
light: as a society
where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can
become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the
general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing
today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the
afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I
have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or
critic (Marx/Engels, 1845-46, p. 47).
The question is to what extent was socialism truly a different approach from
communism, based on an understanding of society with an entirely different
mechanism of societal integration. The complex dialectical principle of ‘auf
Aufhebung’ - a twofold process consisting of sublation and supersession - comes into
play.
Production1
Historically, a fundamental problem had been the building of walls ‘within the
process of production’, due to the strict orientation of capitalist production on
exchange values rather than utilitarian values. We are here talking about the
development of economic systems that shifted from a focus on actual production to
one on exchange. This meant a separation between production in the strict sense (i.e.
construction), and consumption, distribution and exchange, with the latter being the
1 The following borrows methodologically largely from Marx, Karl, 1957: 17-‐48
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ultimate aim of the entire economic process. This orientation of later economic
systems on exchange is, obviously, very different from earlier systems where the
economic process had been based on the ultimate goal of producing use values.
Consumption
For a long time, consumption characterised the German situation due to centre-
periphery relations. Before (and even during) WWII, the East had been Germany’s
‘poorhouse’: the part of the country where agriculture maintained dominance and
provided to a large extent the West with farm products. Sure, there had been
‘poorhouse-pockets’ as well in the ‘old West,’ ‘industrial poorhouses’ as, for instance,
in the mining and steel industries near the River Ruhr. However, these had been
locations of ‘ordinary class divisions’, whereas the split between the traditional East
and West had been very much a structural split between regions within the country -
not only in terms of class but also in terms of patterns of development.2
One can draw a parallel between the four physical dimensions of the wall –
the foundation, the top and the two sides - and the structuring of the process of
production, which consisted of construction, consumption, distribution and exchange.
One side (which later would become the GDR) constructed in the traditional and
literally autochthonous way; the other (which would later become the FRG)
constructed in a way which had to some extent already in reality, to some extent only
potentially, shifted away from the traditional system towards a highly exchange-
driven system. This contrast manifested itself not least in the development of
industries that had been in some respects distant from the actual process of
consumption (in the sense of daily consumables): heavy industries (excluding car
manufacturing) and also to a large extent light industries (chemicals) were not
necessarily oriented towards consumer markets.
Distribution
Distribution referred specifically to distribution between East and West.
2 This can be said in a similar way in a wider sense – we have to remember that the Russian revolution took place in a country that at the time in question did not dispose of much industry. One may even go further and say that the final failure had been due to the fact that the step from feudalism directly to socialism proved to be impossible.
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Thus, within the old Germany – prior to WWII and to its eventual partition -, we find
a peculiar division and de facto separation of the country (or a ‘wall’) between East
and West at multiple levels:
* economic division – as a quasi-paradox of artificial maintenance of the country’s
integrity. In other words, the country’s economy had been highly segregated and
regionally dispersed; this concerned in particular the concentration of industry in
parts of the West and the prevalence of agriculture in the East. * class division – as
antagonism between different interests;
* regional division – as quasi-separation of the country into two distinct principal
regions;
* political division – as ambiguity between class affiliation and regional belonging
For the process of distribution these represented highly tensional divisions.
In general, within capitalist society these tensions had been normal – as
normal as it had been for the old Germany to instigate two world wars. But for the
emerging socialist countries the ideal was to overcome these various divisions and
contradictions. The solution offered under Adenauer and the Western allies, the policy
of scission, meant that the newly emerging GDR would have to accept dissociation
from the West.
Exchange
A challenge which turned out to be a major factor in the difficulties of the
socialist system, later turning out to be one of the fundamental stumbling blocks that
led to its fall and to the re-erection of said walls of division - economic, class,
regional and political - had to do with different dimensions of exchange. From the
outset, after WWII, the newly established FRG had been the economically stronger
part of Germany. Looking at the two countries, the FRG in the west and the GDR in
the east, we find that:
* a partially destroyed industrial system stood against the Eastern rural tradition;
* a surely also destroyed West stood against the entirely devastated East (wrecked by
the policy of scorched earth, broken by unnecessary devastation by the Allies, who
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destroyed war-irrelevant industries as well as civilian communities in the last
months of the war);
* the U.S. Marshall plan supported reconstruction of the West whereas the East had
been obliged to pay compensation for war damages to the Soviet Union.
Another factor in the GDR’s initial competitive advantage over the FGR was
the fact that its reconstruction was geared towards an entirely different socio-
economic system. Its economic policy sought to overcome the division between the
elements of production (construction), consumption, distribution and exchange by
way of fundamental ‘socialisation’. Not only the means of production in the narrow
sense were part of this process - VEB [Volkseigne Betriebe] and LPG
[Landwirtschaftliche Produktionsgenossenschaften] – but also popular enterprises and
cooperatives of agricultural production. This implied in several areas a change in the
measuring of productivity. Measurement by GDP was complemented by
measurement of ‘collective welfare,’ including the following: relatively low-stress
working environments; factory-based social provisions such as childcare; factory-
based and societal governance, in both micro- and macroeconomic planning.
A second pillar of the system was the development of a change in social
policy. Social policy was considered a productive factor, an integral part of economic
policy. It is of particular interest that education was treated as crucial to _______(?).
The old slogan of the working class, ‘Wissen ist Macht’ (Knowledge is power) was
made a reality as education became available to the working and peasant classes.
Initially, the Arbeiter- und Bauernfakultaeten – the worker and peasant schools – were
a most exciting innovative project, going far beyond pedagogical institutions. As a
consequence of the war, teachers in the traditional sense didn’t exist – at least not in
sufficient numbers. The ABFs embodied the breaking down of two walls: that which
kept workers and peasants outside the educational system and that that separated
teachers from learners. The new educational system was collaborative and centred
on mutual education and training. It provided a basis for the later development of a
polytechnic orientation of the educational system.
A common critique from the West was that Marxism-Leninism as a ‘ruling
ideology’ strictly guided education in the GDR – and ‘ML’ was indeed the guiding
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ideology of the time. However, the West did not hesitate to lure away a highly
qualified workforce with the promise of better positions.
Inner Enemy
Basically, the economic challenge for the GDR had been twofold: (1) entering
competition on unequal terms with a capitalist market society, and (2) entering
asymmetric competition by positioning an integrated economic and social policy
against a purely competitive system. These two competitive engagements impacted
each other in an extremely disturbing way. The ‘new socialists’ were caught up in the
big-brother mindset of wanting to do ‘as well as they do’. This limited their ability to
give power really away, to break down the walls between the emerging ‘political
class’ of the GDR and the people. In some respect this was a structural problem:
entering competition with capitalism required strong leadership and this meant the
emergence of a political class. However, - and one should not underestimate this fact
– this was not a structural problem of socialism. Socialism proved itself quite able in
many ways to cope with the breaking down of inner walls: the ABFs have been
mentioned; the mainstream educational system demonstrated various ‘participatory’
features that brought down internal borders; the Volkshilfe (peoples’ help)
neighbourhood and factory committees, although they included mechanisms of
control, they equally included mechanisms of democratic involvement.
The real problem was one of ‘direct control’, of communities being caught in
an ambivalence of self-determination/emancipation and obstructive mutual control.
And, thus, – at least in hindsight – a hopeless attempt followed: the erection of the
‘Berlin Wall’ with the aim of barring an external enemy, rather than the
acknowledgment that the task ahead was really the eradication of an inner enemy, the
demolition of the internal walls inherited from the past (outlined above).
Foundations of Walls
There are two closely linked factors associated with fundamental change. One
is the role of communities as frames of control or frames of emancipation. The other
concerns itself with a question raised for centuries in respect to various political
systems: can fundamental socio-political (?) change be maintained if change is limited
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to a single country or region, or can it only be maintained if it occurs globally? And,
in regards to a fundamental change in economic policy, can competition be shifted
away from the standards of the ancient regime towards new standards – be it under
conditions under which the old system still exists outside of the revolutionised system
or be it under conditions where a radical change occurred globally? In terms of
political science we are confronted with the fact that in very general terms ‘the
territorial state emerged concurrent with the deterritorialization of political economy
and geographical imagination’ (Steinberg, 2009: 468). Then, the obstacle to coherent
development of the GDR resulted from a dialectical tension: de-territorialisation of
the economy hand-in-hand with geographical re-territorialisation. Though there had
been an intention to overcome the segregation of the economic process into
consumption, production, redistribution (distribution?) and exchange as separate
entities, the GDR did not succeed in pursuing such policy. Inner societal separations
persisted. In consequence we find as well the concentration – and centralisation – of
competencies. Such division goes far back and has its roots in the concept of the
separation of powers (Montesquieu). As we usually accept without question the
separation of powers as a fundamental principle of modern democracy, we easily
overlook its ambiguity. The separation of powers among executive, legislative and
judicial has to be seen as a system of checks and balances on the one hand. But on the
other hand it can easily result in a segmented system with a problematic shift in terms
of accountability that results in the concentration of political power in a specific
body consolidating itself in the form of the territorial nation-state. Stephan Leibfried
and Michael Zuern describe the nation-state as comprising of the following
dimensions:
The resource dimension comprises the control of the use of force
and revenues, and is associated with the consolidation of the modern
territorial state from scattered feudal patterns. The law dimension
includes jurisdiction, courts, and all the necessary elements of the
rule of law, called ‘Rechtsstaat’ or constitutional state in German-
speaking countries where it is most closely identified with the
widely held concept of the state. Legitimacy or the acceptance of
political rule came into full bloom with the rise of the democratic
nation-state in the 19th century. And welfare, or the facilitation of
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economic growth and social equality, is the leitmotif of the
intervention state, which acquired responsibility for the general well
being of the citizenry in the 20th century (Leibfried/Zuern, 2005: 2
f.).
Class conflict and the establishment of the new, modern, capitalist state in the
context of the Enlightenment resulted in a fundamental contradiction. Although the
Enlightenment promised individual freedom, it established a semi-political class
accountable to the system of the nation-state rather than to the people. This is
reflected in one of the ambivalences of constitutional German Basic Law: on the one
hand, ‘[a]ll state authority is derived from the people’ (article 20 [2]; https://www.btg-
bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf - 08/11/2009 8:17 a.m.); on the other hand, ‘The
exercise of sovereign authority on a regular basis shall, as a rule, be entrusted to
members of the public service who stand in a relationship of service and loyalty
defined by public law’ (article 33 [4]). Another point of ambiguity in the rise of the
nation-state is that, although the emerging industrial society promised individual
freedom in terms of equality and economic prosperity, instead it embraced ‘free’
trade, which depended on the labour of the industrial wage worker - who was ‘free’ in
the double sense of not being owned and of being free of property. Both
contradictions brought about the insurmountable
frailty of the binary oppositions embedded in the sociospatial logic
of the sovereign, territorial state: oppositions between inside and
outside; between unit and system; between land and sea; between
fixity and movement; and between experienced place and relative,
abstract space (Steinberg; op.cit.: 468).
In the context of these contradictions, one can interpret the strict borderline
between the East and the West as a paradox of history that cannot be properly
assessed if we look only on the surface level at the political decisions.
The three main paradoxical effects of the partition into East and West were the
following:
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* The shift in borders: although the responsible cadres in the GDR hoped that the
wall would externalise certain problems, these were paradoxically preserved within
the new state in the separation of powers and the social divisions;
* The shift in competitive goals: whereas the GDR tried frantically to compete with
the FRG in matters of economic growth, the FRG managed pretty well in
competing by establishing a social security system. This happened by making real
concessions (a more detailed analysis would be required to look at the political
movements and syndicalism in the West after WWII); but it is questionable
whether success resulted from its own ‘productive social policy’, which had been
featured as social market economy.3
* The shift in time (?): This created over time a paradox with time itself. In a first
attempt one could say that whenever the tortoise arrived before the hare, it was so
exhausted that it could not take a deep breath to start the next round of competition.
But, actually, the situation had been different: the fable by the Brothers Grimm
talks of two tortoises and one hare. Similarly, our story is about two Western hares
and one Eastern tortoise. One hare had been running the competition of economic
growth; the other, entering the rivalry of social integrity. The poor tortoise,
disoriented and thinking it had to compete in both fields at the same time, collapsed
under exhaustion and fell into a state of partial dementia.
Looking Forward into the Past: The Fall of the Wall as
Foundation for the Reconstruction of the Inner Wall
In 1989, ‘Wir sind das Volk’ (‘We are the people’) was the slogan that echoed
against the wall from the East, perhaps in some way reminiscent of the trumpets at the
walls of Jericho. And in the West, Willy Brandt - former Chancellor of the FRG
(1969-74) who had signed the so-called Ostpolitik (Eastern Policy) and was pushed
by the left in East and West to move forward in the negotiations of the Conference on
3 To characterise this as questionable is not least based on the fact that the provisions had been cut back as soon as the system competition had not been relevant anymore.
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Security and Co-Operation in Europe4-, banked on the expectation that ‘jetzt
zusammen [wächst], was zusammengehört’ (‘Now grows together what together
belongs’) (Willy Brandt on 10.November 1989). But this merger, the re-unification
of Germany, represented to a large extent the re-establishment of the old system and
its divisions as they had been outlined above:
* the economic division - between the rich west and the poor east;
* the class division – as antagonistic contradiction between different interests. In part
this had now been overshadowed by the artificial division of the German middle
class. At least on a superficial level it seems that East had been suppressed by
West;
* the regional division – as quasi-separation of the country into two distinct principal
regions;
* the resulting political division – as ambiguity between class affiliation and regional
belonging.
The re-establishment of the old system and its divisions was soon put
inmotion by the harsh measures of re-privatisation:
To create capitalist labour conditions, nationalized businesses, facilities and
combines are to be turned into corporations, according to a regulation adopted
by the Council of Ministers that obligates all nationalized enterprises to
transform themselves into companies, limited liability corporations (GmbH) or
stock corporations (AG). A Trusteeship Agency is created for this purpose
under the authority of the Council of Ministers. The government further
approves a draft law on the right of establishment, which allows foreign firms
- formerly permitted only representation - to establish their own branches on
the territory of East Germany for the purpose of economic activity (Thursday,
1. March 1990; Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag; 1999; http://www.chronik-
Economically it is quite clear if we look open-mindedly at the re-unification of
Germany, it was the opening of a huge sell-out of the East. The socialist model of
productivity, one ‘going beyond GDP’ and aiming at social responsibility as part of
industrial policies5, was disregarded and enterprises were sold for symbolic amounts,
in many cases bought to avoid a competition that would now be on the ‘single
German (and global) market’ (REFERENCE?). The new economy would be a niche
economy: predominantly one that would (i) allow ‘Western’ enterprises to avail of
inexpensive new plants,6 and (ii) act as supplier for large enterprises.7
Politically, it is rather clear that a wall could not be a solution to economic
class, social and political conflict as long as it shifted the tensions and divisions into
uncontrollable terrain. And it could not be a solution under the condition that it would
be abused for a policy of escalation by the Western powers. Now, the re-emerging
glass walls within the so-called ‘unified’ Germany function as stabiliser of
Manchester-like casino capitalism and represent a return to the past.
If not anything else – through the huge gap between rich and poor, the
retrenchment policies with their cutbacks, the policy of ‘forced individualisation’, the
ongoing and sharpening lack of environmental sustainability (with environmental
protection seen mainly as a source of additional profit) – the 2008 crisis teaches us
about the consequences of unbridled capitalism. It teaches us about the effects of
exchange processes blocked off and left uncontrolled by a productive economy:
financial streams flow with such speed that productive forces are easily wiped out
during the ongoing financial crisis.
In the end, the case of Germany leaves us with one question unanswered: how
is it possible to break down the economic, class, regional and political tensions or
‘walls’ within a society in a world that is hostile to reforms? Can fundamental socio-
5 for instance by providing childcare in the workplace, by providing a kind ‘community work’ in enterprises, by establishing a wide range of health services for everyone etc.
6 Utilising mechanisms such as acceleration of depreciation, support of investment and not least cheap labour.
7 It is not by accident that we find at the same time the emergence of a ‘new economy’: the promotion of small enterprises, the introduction of workfare measures, the increase of precarious employment etc. – Sure, all this has to be seen in a wider context and it has its inner-‐German dimension as much as it has its global dimensions in the context of the rearrangement of global powers, later to be completed by the emerging new powers from Asia, and in particular China.
15
political change be maintained if change is limited to a single country or region, or
can it only be maintained if it occurs globally? The repression against Barack
Obama’s public health plan – not really a revolutionary one – is just one more
example of the fact that reformist strategies in a stubbornly anti-reformist world tend
to fail.
References
Leibfried, Stephan/Zuern, Michael [eds.], 2005: Transformations of the State;
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Marx, Karl/Engels, Frederick, 1845-46: The German Ideology. Critique of modern
German Philosophy According to its Representatives Feuerbach, Ba. Bauer and
Stirner, and of German Socialism According to its Various Prophets; in: Karl
Marx/Frederick Engels. Collected Works. Volume 5. Marx and Engels: 1845-47;
London: Lawrence& Wishart, 1976
Marx, Karl, 1957: Introduction (to the Economic Manuscripts of 1857-1858 [First
Version of Capital]); in: Karl Marx. Frederick Engels. Collected Works; volume 28:
Karl Marx: 1857-61; London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1986
