The Emperor is dead! Long live the Emperor!:

A study of institutional persistence

Ken Ogata

York University

ogata@yorku.ca

Abstract

Previous studies of institutional change (Oliver, 1992; Ahmadjian and Robinson, 2001; Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings, 2002; Sherer and Lee, 2002) suggest that delegitimated institutions will subsequently lose coherence and dissipate (deinstitutionalization). However, this process has been assumed but not substantiated. Using a historical case study involving the Meiji Restoration in Japan between 1853-68, we argue that delegitimated institutions may persist indefinitely under certain conditions, even as replacement institutions achieve dominance. Moreover, dormant delegitimated structures may later be recovered and restored through relegitimation (Suchman, 1995; Deephouse and Suchman, 2008). This process of institutional persistence is explained using a combination of structuration theory (Giddens, 1984) and sedimentation processes (Cooper, Hinings, Greenwood and Brown, 1996). Thus, we suggest that deinstitutionalization may represent a separate phenomenon from that of delegitimation, although the literature has treated these phenomena as intertwined. Keywords: Delegitimation, deinstitutionalization, institutional theory, samurai, sedimentation, structuration.

The Emperor is dead! Long live the Emperor!:

A study of institutional persistence

INTRODUCTION

What happens to delegitimated institutions? The institutional theory literature (Scott,

2008) describes institutions as dependent upon legitimacy (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008),

such that delegitimated institutions should subsequently lose coherence and dissipate (i.e.

deinstitutionalization - Oliver, 1992). Alternatively, following an evolutionary process of

variation-selection-retention (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995), newly theorized and legitimated

institutions will replace delegitimated institutions (Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings, 2002;

Sherer and Lee, 2002). However, this process has largely been assumed but not substantiated

within the instititutional theory literature (Scott, 2008).

Using a historical case study approach (Suddaby, Foster and Mills, 2014) to examine

deinstitutionalization, it is argued that delegitimated institutions may persist indefinitely under

certain conditions, even as replacement institutions achieve dominance. Moreover, dormant

delegitimated structures may later be recovered and restored through relegitimation (Suchman,

1995). I use the example of the Meiji Restoration in Japan (Norman, 1940; Beasley, 1972;

Jansen, 1995a, 1995b) to illustrate the relegitimation of a delegitimated, but not

deinstitutionlized structure (Imperial rule under the Emperor). The Meiji Restoration represented

a societal level transformation of Japan from an agrarian feudal system under samurai military

rule, into a modern nation state (Okuma, 1909), with the consequential creative destruction

(Biggart, 1977) of the samurai class.

What makes this case unique (Siggelkow, 2007) was the ‘restoration’ of the Emperor to

active political leadership after almost 700 years of virtually unbroken military rule, rather than

the adoption of a more modern governance model. This was in contrast to most other areas of

Japanese society, where the new leaders sought to mimic the best examples from the West

(Westney, 1987). Restoration though was only possible due to the lack of deinstitutionalization

of Imperial rule. Thus it is argued that deinstitutionalization may represent a separate

phenomenon from that of delegitimation, although the institutional theory literature has treated

these phenomena as conjoined. In summary, I suggest that some delegitimated institutions may

avoid deinstitutionalization and persist indefinitely.

This process of institutional persistence is explained using the metaphor of sedimentation

(Cooper, Hinings, Greenwood and Brown, 1996), where the overlay of replacement structures

preserves existing structures. However, without some measure of reproduction over time,

institutional decay of overlaid structures would correspondingly occur over time. Hence existing

structures will only persist when there is sufficient inertia of the reproduction process. This

process of reproduction is explained using Giddens’ (1984) structuration theory. Combining

these two processes then extends the metaphor of sediminentation.

DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION

Deephouse and Suchman (2008) note that legitimacy is a central concept in organizational

institutionalism. Legitimacy reflects the validity of a long standing tradition, practice or activity

(Oliver, 1992), such as Imperial or samurai rule. Furthermore, “legitimacy is a generalized

perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within

some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions” (Suchman, 1995:

574). Delegitimation then represents the converse, or the absence of proper or desirable actions

from a socially constructed perspective. It is this loss of legitimacy that is deemed to result in

deinstitutionalization, where previously institutionalized practices are abandoned (Davis,

Diekmann and Tinsley, 1994). The first part of Greenwood et al.’s (2002) model of institutional

replacement (see Figure 1) captures the traditionally accepted pattern of deinstitutionalization.

[Insert Figure 1 about here]

Oliver (1992) describes deinstitutionalization as involving three processes: dissipation,

rejection or replacement. Dissipation involves gradual deterioration in the use and acceptance of

prior structures (lack of reproduction - passive), whereas rejection represents a more direct

assault upon the validity of prior structures (creative destruction - active). More commonly,

researchers suggest that alternative schemes are developed to replace existing ideas, often due to

a ‘precipitating jolt’ that challenges existing institutional legitimacy (Greenwood et al., 2002).

Empirically, a decline in the frequency or pervasiveness of use of an institution indicates

its deinstitutionalization (e.g. slavery, chivalry). For example, Maguire and Hardy (2009)

describe how delegitimation of the use of DDT as a pesticide led to its deinstitutionalization as

necessary and safe for agricultural use. It is important to note that in the case of DDT,

deinstitutionalization did not occur simultaneously with delegitimation.

Key to this study is the expectation that delegitimated structures will decay and dissipate,

with deinstitutionalization indicated by decreasing support or use of the institution over time.

Whereas deinstitutionalization is particularly evident in cases of rejection or replacement, it is

more difficult to discern under dissipation. To the extent that members continue to invoke

delegitimated structures to justify actions, would indicate the relative persistence and lack of

deinstitutionalization of these structures. In the case of Imperial rule, although the samurai class

held power after 1185, they continued to invoke the Emperor as justifying their command. This

despite two occassions where they could have ‘forsaken’ the notion of serving the Emperor; the

first after the failed Kemmu Restoration (1333-1336), and the second after the Era of Warring

States (1573–1603) and beginning of the Tokugawa bakufu.

MEIJI RESTORATION CASE STUDY

This study uses the example of the Meiji Restoration in Japan (1853–68) to examine the

relegitimation of a delegitimated institution (Imperial rule). Based upon the societal changes that

transpired within Japan during this period, it is argued that institutions may experience

delegitimation without suffering corresponding deinstitutionalization. This however should not

be interpreted as precluding institutional replacement, or suggesting that this is a frequent

phenonomeon; merely that the potential exists for the persistence of ‘illegitimate’ structures due

to the maintenance of structural elements and the power of reproductive inertia.

Historical accounts and analyses of the Meiji Restoration provide the data for this case

study. The work of three key authors provided the initial base data; the seminal book for

Western scholars (Norman, 1940), combined with noted Japanese historians Beasley (1972), and

Jansen (1995a; 2000). These sources are supplemented by additional articles and books

(Westney, 1987; Bix, 2000; Craig, 1959; Howland, 2001; Ikegama, 2003; Khan, 1998; Souyri,

2002; Waswo, 1996; Beasley, 2000; Hunter, 2006), including the Columbia Chronologies of

Asian History and Culture (Bowman, 2000) which identifies key historical actors and events, the

six-volume Cambridge History of Japan (Hall et al., 1988-99), and original Japanese historical

accounts of the Restoration (Monbusho, 1893; Okuma, 1909; Akamatsu, 1972).

According to historians, two events were critical to Japan’s development into a modern

nation state; the Meiji Restoration, and the US occupation after WWII (Hunter, 2006). The

former is significant in terms of prompting Japan’s economic development and emergence onto

the world stage, while the latter closed the door on Imperial rule and Japanese military strength

(not addressed within this article). While the focus for this study is upon the events that

transpired surrounding the Meiji Restoration, as noted by Berger and Luckmann, ‘institutions

always have a history, of which they are the products. It is impossible to understand an

institution adequately without an understanding of the historical process in which it was

produced’ (1967: 54 – 55). Thus, we begin with a brief description of events that occurred some

700 years prior to the Restoration, and how the samurai became the ruling class. Following this,

the key events of the Restoration itself will be described. As might be expected, this is a highly

simplified version of what transpired.

Prior to presenting the body of the paper, a few points of clarification are in order. First,

where appropriate, the Japanese terms for various concepts will be employed (e.g. feudal lords

are daimyo, and their domains are han). These terms will be defined accordingly upon their first

use. Japanese terms will be italicized for clarity, and are used interchangeably with their English

counterparts. Second, the term institution under institutional theory is considered to be

consistent with the term structure under structuration theory (Barley and Tolbert, 1997), and will

be used interchangeably. Finally, this case study is based upon English language versions of

Japanese and Western historians’ accounts (Warner, 1994) of events which transpired

surrounding the Meiji Restoration. As such, this data is subject to variations in historians’

interpretations and translation. To the extent possible, the ‘generally accepted’ account of events

based upon a combination of sources (Monbusho, 1893; Okuma, 1909; Norman, 1940;

Akamatsu, 1972; Beasley, 1972; Westney, 1987; Hunter, 1989; Jansen, 1995a, 1995b, 2000; Hall

et al., 1988-99; Bowman, 2000) has been used. Notwithstanding this potential limitation, the

events which transpired and the actions of key actors form part of the historical record, and are

used accordingly as data for this study.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Rise of Shogun Rule

According to Japanese legend, the Emperor is believed to be of divine descent from the

Sun Goddess through the Fujiwara family line, thereby establishing their hereditary authority to

lead the nation (Imperial rule), and serve as High Priest for the Shinto religion (Hall et al., 1988-

99). Since the seventh century A.D. until after WWII, Japan was under Imperial rule. Although

‘formally’ under Imperial rule, the military caste (Shogun and samurai) were the true

government after 1185, until 1868 (Souyri, 2002). In the 1160s, warlord Taira-no-Kiyomori

managed to seize control of the Imperial court and thereby political control. The Great Civil

War (or Gempei War) between the Taira and Minamoto clans began in 1180, with the Minamoto

clan ultimately victorious (Jansen, 1995b). Minamoto no Yoritomo would usher in the age of the

Shoguns in 1185 (Shogun means ‘supreme military commander’). Except for a brief period

between 1333-36, Japan was ruled by a Shogun government (bakufu) and the samurai class

(Jansen, 1995a). However, although the country was under Shogun rule, the Imperial court and

position of Emperor were maintained to provide legitimacy for military rule (i.e. the Shogun was

acting on the Emperor’s behalf, ‘freeing’ the Emperor to concentrate upon other duties). Thus,

the Emperor represented a ceremonial figurehead, decoupled from active governance, similar to

the monarchy in many modern nation states.

Shogun rule was exercised on a hereditary basis (like the Emperor), passed down within

clans. The first Shogun period was named the Kamakura period (1185–1333) after the location

of the Shogun’s headquarters. The Hojo clan held control during this period, until Emperor Go-

Daigo managed to briefly overthrow the bakufu with the help of rival lords (Kemmu Restoration,

1333-1336). Emperor Go-Daigo tried to restore direct Imperial rule similar to what had existed

at the beginning of the Heian period of 794-1185 (Bowman, 2000). By 1336 though, Ashikaga

Takauji succeeded in defeating the Emperor’s army and restored military rule, leading to the

Ashikaga (or Muromachi) period (1336–1573). Notwithstanding the samurai’s victory over the

Imperial Court, subsequent Shoguns maintained the fiction of Imperial rule. The reasons for

maintaining this conjoined state though are unclear (Wakabayashi, 1991). The Ashikaga bakufu

was instrumental in establishing Japan’s feudal system and agrarian based economy, as well as

the governing principles of the Shogun bakufu. By the 16th century, the Ashikaga bakufu was

losing control, resulting in increasing civil conflict between rival warlords. This led to the Era of

Warring States (1573–1603), an extended period of civil war. Three warlords from this period

shaped the course of Japanese society until the Meiji Restoration (Jansen, 1995b, Hall et al.,

1988-99; Bowman, 2000). Figure 2 provides a timeline of these events.

The first was Oda Nobunaga, who defeated the Ashikaga bakufu and seized control over

Kyoto (the Imperial capital) in 1568. Nobunaga was successful in breaking the tie between the

Imperial court and the Shogun, subordinating the Imperial Court, but did not end the fiction of

Imperial rule. He ruled through force and established the principle of total obedience by samurai

to their daimyo. Nobunaga was murdered in 1582 and succeeded by his vassal, Toyotomi

Hideyoshi. Hideyoshi succeeded in unifying the country through daimyo alliances. He

delegated rule over various domains (han) to loyal vassals as a prelude to the daimyo feudal

system. Daimyo received local autonomy over their han in exchange for unquestioned loyalty to

the Shogun. Ongoing conflict resulted in establishing the samurai class as ‘permanent’ warriors

(previously worked the land). Samurai moved into castle towns and were provided an annual

stipend of bushels of rice (koku), thus making then dependent upon the daimyo’s favour. In

1588, Hideyoshi banned the possession of weapons by all except the samurai.

Tokugawa Ieyasu rose to power in 1598, after serving as a loyal vassal to Hideyoshi.

Tokugawa had been appointed daimyo of the Kanto plain (future site of Edo/Tokyo), which was

highly productive agriculturally, providing Tokugawa with significant resources. The Battle of

Sekigahara in 1600 ended the Era of Warring States, and Tokugawa was named Shogun in 1603.

The Tokugawa bakufu would subsequently rule Japan for over 200 years until the Meiji

Restoration. During this time, there existed a physical separation between the Imperial court (in

Kyoto), and the Tokugawa bakufu (in Edo), extended by a decree from the Shogun that the

Emperor and Imperial court dedicate itself to cultivating Japanese literature and traditional arts

like poetry and calligraphy (Akamatsu, 1972; Jansen, 2000). Thus, the regulatory pillar (Scott,

2001) defining the Imperial Court was maintained, even though it possessed no real power.

[Insert Figure 2 about here]

PRE-RESTORATION JAPANESE SOCIETY

Japanese Institutions

Before describing the events of the Restoration, it may be useful to identify some of the

key institutions shaping Japanese society. Institutions as described here represent social

constructions and rules that shape human interaction (Scott, 2008). Scott states that ‘social

institutions refer to relatively enduring systems of social beliefs and socially organized practices

associated with varying functional arenas within societal systems, e.g., religion, work, the

family, politics’ (1987: 499). These institutions spanned most of Japanese life, shaping their

society as normative obligations and taken-for-granted facts (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).

While the Emperor and samurai institutions affected politics, their influence extended to

religion (Emperor as Shinto High Priest), work and the economy (feudal agricultural system), the

family (Shogun and Emperor hereditary rule, battles between rival clans), and social class (caste

system with samurai at the top). A number of Japanese institutions represented socially accepted

structures that remained virtually unchanged until significant contact with the Western world in

the 19th century (aided by the sakoku isolation policy forbidding contact with foreigners).

The following key institutions within pre-Restoration Japanese society are particularly

relevant: the daimyo han feudal system, the hierarchical class structure of society established and

maintained by the Tokugawa bakufu, the samurai warrior code (bushido) with its concepts of

honour, duty and loyalty, the authority of the Emperor based upon his divine lineage, the

legitimacy of samurai/military rule, and the sakoku isolation policy/rejection of Western ways.

Following the Battle of Sekigahara in 1600 and the end of the Era of Warring States, Japan

settled into an extended period of civil peace under Tokugawa rule. The Tokugawa bakufu

established the han feudal system that would define Japan for over 250 years. Daimyo were

divided into two classes; fudai for those loyal to Tokugawa before the battle, and tozama for

those who had opposed him. Loyalty to the Shogun was rewarded with more favourable lands,

treatment and government posts. Among the key tozama clans were the Satsuma, Choshu, Hizen

and Tosa, who were also among the most distant han geographically from Edo. Although being

appointed daimyo implicitly carried an obligation of allegiance to the Shogun, daimyo enjoyed a

high degree of local autonomy, and therefore reaped substantial benefits from the han system

(peasants worked the lands and paid tribute to the daimyo). In general, although some lords may

have expressed dissatisfaction with the Tokugawa bakufu and desired a change in leadership, few

were advocating the demise of the han or caste system. Several additional key policies both

defined the Edo period, and would later set the stage for the Restoration.

First was the establishment of a rigid hierarchy of four social classes, with samurai at the

top, then peasants, artisans, and finally merchants (Jansen, 1995a). In theory, movement

between classes was restricted, though historical accounts indicate that movement occurred

through marriage and adoption (Norman, 1940). Political rule was restricted to the samurai, who

comprised about 6% of the population at the time of the Restoration. The samurai also held most

of the government posts, affording them greater literacy, numeracy and administrative skills.

The vast majority (80%) fell into the peasant class, who worked the land and paid koku taxes that

supported their daimyo. Thus, Japan’s feudal system differed from the European model in that

the ruling class was not the Imperial court, but rather the samurai military class.

Neo-Confucian doctrine with its notions of duty and obedience reinforced the established

social hierarchy. Both neo-Confucianism and bushido promoted samurai loyalty to their daimyo

(Ikegami, 2003) and respect for the established hierarchy. However, although the samurai

‘enjoyed’ higher social status, their fixed incomes translated into a ‘decline’ in their standard of

living over time due to inflation (Norman, 1940). Financial difficulties by the daimyo due to

poor harvest, disease and natural disasters exacerbated this situation by restricting and reducing

samurai stipends (Jansen, 2000). This fuelled discontent amongst the lower samurai ranks

(Norman, 1940; Craig, 1959; Ikegami, 2003) and created pressure for change. However, there

was limited challenge of the system itself, either from within or without.

Third was the ‘internment’ of the Emperor and the Imperial Court in Kyoto. The Emperor

was retained by the Shogun as a figurehead without any real power, and dependent upon stipends

(koku) from the Shogun. However, while the Emperor and Imperial court had been largely

stripped of power, no Shogun dared refute either the court or the Emperor’s claim to power

(though obeisance to the Emperor waned during Tokugawa rule – Hunter, 2006). There

remained an element of legitimacy amongst the people because of the sustained mythology of

divine lineage (Okuma, 1909), combined with the bakufu’s fiction of the Shogun ‘alleviating’ the

Emperor of worldly duties by ruling on his behalf (framing the legitimacy of Shogun rule). The

series of annual rituals and ceremonies to be performed by the Emperor contributed to

preservation of the Imperial Court. Thus, the Shogunate encouraged continued reproduction of

the institution of Imperial ‘rule’ (i.e. institutional maintenance), even though decoupling had

occurred (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). In this way, although Shogun rule overlaid Imperial rule,

the basis of Shogun rule served to preserve the other.

THE MEIJI RESTORATION

Overview of the Restoration

The Meiji Restoration is described by historians as the transformation of Japan into a

modern nation state. In brief, the chronology of the Restoration is as follows. The arrival of

Perry’s ‘black’ steam-powered warships into Edo Bay in 1853 marked both the end of Japan’s

sakoku policy of isolation and the beginning of the end of the Tokugawa bakufu (bakumatsu).

Rival forces in Japan sought the downfall of the Shogun (in 1867), replacing the Shogun with the

Emperor as leader (in January 1868). The Charter Oath in April 1868 formalized the Emperor’s

position as ruler, and the capital was moved from Kyoto to Edo (renamed Tokyo) later that year.

While historians initially defined the Restoration as the events of 1867-68 involving the

resignation of the last Shogun, restoration of the Emperor as head, and declaration of the Charter

Oath, a broader time frame is considered (1853-1868) here to identity key events, broken down

into pre-Restoration and Restoration periods.

Pre-Restoration Precipitating Events (pre- 1867)

While the arrival of Commodore Perry represented a precipitating jolt (Greenwood et al.,

2002) that served to demonstrate the inability of the Tokugawa bakufu to protect Japan and the

Emperor from the Western ‘barbarians’, several Japanese leaders had already recognized the

growing threat from the West. The defeat of the Chinese by the British during the Opium Wars

of 1840-42, foreshadowed Japan’s likely fate. As the Japanese traditionally regarded the

Chinese as their ‘superior’, and Japan’s defences were of similar calibre, prospects for

maintaining their independence appeared limited. Initially, Japan was able to restrict American

foreign access to two minor ports, but the subsequent Commercial Treaty of 1858 negotiated by

Townsend Harris represented the first real opening of Japan to trade and foreigners. This treaty

marked the beginning of Japan’s foreign ‘domination’ as the bakufu granted many of the same

concessions that the Chinese had previously made to the British.

Coinciding with these events were two growing political social movements within Japan of

a diametrically opposed nature. One faction advocated maintaining the sakoku isolation policy,

rallying around the slogan ‘expel the barbarians’ (joi). Another began promoting the slogan

‘revere the Emperor’ (sonno). Together, these conservative forces pressured the Shogun to

uphold sakoku and defend Japan from outside ‘contamination’. The sonno joi movement gained

force in 1860 and represented the beginning of the relegitimation of the Emperor as political

leader, in part due to the increasingly apparent weakness of the Tokugawa bakufu. Although the

tozama clans did not necessarily support continued isolation, their anti-Tokugawa bakufu stance

prompted their support of the sonno joi activists. To an extent, this fracturing of ‘military’

support of the government mirrored the Emperor’s downfall some 700 years. Notwithstanding

the authoring of Tokugawa bakufu delegitimating texts (Maguire and Hardy, 2009) by the sonno

joi movement, neither the activists nor tozama daimyo authored alternative texts (i.e. restoration

of Imperial rule).

The weakness of the Tokugawa clan was manifest not only in terms of growing dissent

amongst the daimyo and others, but also by its succession difficulties. Tokugawa Iemochi

became Shogun in 1858 at the age of 12, but was unable to provide strong leadership prior to his

death in 1866 (Beasley, 1972). Notwithstanding the young Shogun’s limited leadership skills

and political power base, the Emperor’s situation was only marginally better. The former

Emperor also died in 1866, and the new Emperor Mutsuhito (later renamed Meiji), was only 15

years old at the time of his ascension in 1868. Thus, the ultimate transition of power was

influenced in part by the relative support or lack thereof by other parties (e.g. daimyo) rather than

the leadership provided by the new Shogun or Emperor (although the last Shogun did propose

that the Emperor should reassume power as leader – Okuma, 1909; Akamatsu, 1972). This was

not a revolution in the traditional sense of coalescing support around an inspirational, charismatic

transformational leader.

The Meiji Restoration (1867-68)

The Meiji Restoration in 1868 ended almost 700 years of military rule by the samurai class

through the creation of a new central government headed by the Emperor. While historians

acknowledge that coercive isomorphic pressure from the Western powers motivated Japan’s

move towards a modern nation state, the growing strength of normative influenced anti-bakufu

forces (i.e. tozama daimyo) combined with weakening of the Tokugawa clan also contributed to

the end of Shogun rule. While this sequence of events appears consistent with a typical

institutional theory change process, the Japanese experience deviated from typical mimetic

isomorphic change (Ahmadjian and Robinson, 2001) as the country did not adopt Western forms

of democratic governance (Westney, 1987).

Supported by the tozama anti-Tokugawa forces (the Satsuma, Choshu, Hizen and Tosa

clans) and financial backing from merchant houses in Osaka, ‘lower’ (in hierarchy) samurai

members forced then Shogun Tokugawa Yoshinobu to step down in November of 1867

(Norman, 1940). However, his removal did not immediately result in the creation of a new

government as there was no government in waiting (delegitimation without an alternative –

Maguire and Hardy, 2009).

Some historians (Craig, 1959; Howland, 2001) have debated this image of the Restoration

as a ‘lower samurai’ movement akin to Western bourgeoisie revolutions. Given the role and

position of several key change proponents within the bakufu and opposition forces (e.g. Saigo

Takamori), a combination of lower, middle and upper samurai may have been involved.

Notwithstanding these differences in interpretation, the key point is that one group of samurai

stripped control from the Tokugawa clan and installed the Emperor as the new head of state

through a coup d’etat (Norman, 1940; Beasley, 1972). Rather than assume control under a new

Shogun as in previous successions, the ‘reformers’ chose a new/old form of government based

upon the Imperial court from the 8th century Heian period (Akamatus, 1972; Jansen, 2000).

Thus, the Restoration did not follow the trajectories of either insider elite driven, or outsider

driven institutional change as described by Maguire and Hardy (2009). Moreover, the reformers

did not mimetically adopt a Western style of government, as they did in many other spheres of

Japanese society, but rather a uniquely Japanese dialectical synthesis emerged, one that honoured

the past (sonno), while opening the door to the future (without joi). While this may not be

peculiar from a Japanese perspective (Khan, 1998) as reflected by the Japanese adage wakon

yosai (Japanese Spirit), which translates as taking from the west what was needed in terms of

knowledge and technology, and adapting these to meet local norms (Warner, 1994), Western

organizations may be wise to consider how this may affect negotiations and relations with their

Japanese counterparts.

Backed by the anti-Tokugawa clans, an Imperial edict was issued on January 3, 1868

declaring that the Emperor had been reinstated as the head of state (Akamatsu, 1972; Khan,

1998). On April 8, 1868, the Charter Oath containing 5 key principles was issued by the

Emperor (Monbusho, 1893). The Oath established the new central government, called for

national unity (between classes), allowed individual development (beyond class), officially

ended sakoku, and advocated the adoption of Western ways and technology (modernization). As

noted by Okuma (1909: 571), ‘They have welcomed Occidental civilization while preserving

their old Oriental civilization.’ The way forward for Japan would feature a mix of modernity

tempered by tradition.

Japan after the Restoration (post-1868)

The Meiji Restoration marked the beginning of a series of dramatic changes in Japan that

would result in its growth into a major power in the Far East within 50 years (Okuma, 1909). By

1904-05, Japan was able to challenge and defeat a Western power (Russia) militarily, thereby

establishing itself as an equal with the West in the Pacific (whereas China and India were not).

Although the change in government at the top was significant, as was the end of Shogun rule,

many other institutions still required consequential changes to create a more Western-style

modern nation state (Westney, 1987; Hunter, 2006; Pyle, 2006). Aiding this process was the

invitation of Western advisors to Japan (military, justice, education, government, etc), as well as

the Iwakura mission (1871-73) to the US and Europe to study Western ways directly (Okuma,

1909; Hall et al., 1988-99).

JAPANESE INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

The Delegitimation of Japanese Institutions

Institutional theory (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2008)

suggests that institutional delegitimation will subsequently lead to deinstitutionalization (Oliver,

1992). Several key Japanese institutions existed during the Edo Period: the daimyo han feudal

system, the hierarchical class structure of society, the samurai warrior code (bushido), the divine

authority of the Emperor, the legitimacy of samurai/military rule, and the sakoku isolation policy.

Events prompting the delegitimation of these structures included: the arrival of US warships

(1953), the Tokugawa bakumatsu and Charter Oath (1868), various Imperial edicts (e.g. revoke

wearing of samurai swords), and the Meiji Constitution (1889). Additional factors associated

with their demise are discussed below.

The Meiji Restoration involved dramatic shifts in standing for several institutions. First

was the decline in legitimacy of the Tokugawa bakufu and the position of Shogun. The inability

of the bakufu to ‘protect’ the nation from the Western barbarians and uphold sakoku eroded its

support and legitimacy amongst the tozama daimyo and other leaders. Support also declined for

the daimyo han system, due in part to high peasant taxation and the decline in living standards

among samurai (no increase in koku). Samurai were restricted in their ability to improve their

position by the social structure and the limited number of administrative posts within the bakufu

and han. A further impediment to hierarchical advancement was the hereditary nature of many

positions, passed down from generation to generation (Akamatsu, 1972), combined with the lack

of battles that might bring honour and advancement. An increasing number of lower ranked

samurai found the burden of duty too great and chose to become ronin. Finally, the taken for

granted legitimacy and ‘superiority’ of Japanese society was directly challenged by Western

ways and technology. These institutions could not be sustained, forcing Japanese leaders to

replace them with appropriate new structures. How these changes were effected though diverged

from theoretical expectations.

The Meiji Restoration ended nearly 700 years of military rule by the samurai class through

the creation of a new central government with the Emperor as ruler. While previous shifts in

government had occurred during this period, this transition was markedly different from its

predecessors as the ‘reformers’ did not seek to secure power for themselves. Here the break with

the past was twofold. Not only was the continuation of samurai military rule rejected, but also

the Chinese and Confucianism based bureaucratic governance systems that coincided with

samurai rule. The shift back to Imperial rule would not have been possible though without the

persistence of the institution of Imperial rule, together with the perceived ‘superiority’ of the 8th

century Heian period model of the Emperor as supreme leader.

Successive Shogunate had maintainined the myth and ceremony (Meyer and Rowan, 1977)

of Imperial rule by the divinely descended Emperor, even though they were in full control. The

Shogun derived his authority to govern from the Emperor, ‘relieving’ the Emperor of worldly

responsibilities, usurping while simultaneously preserving the institution of Imperial rule by

overlaying this new governance structure upon the remains of the former. Maintaining the

institution of the Emperor included physically providing for the needs of the Imperial Court

through an annual stipend, though at times this stipend was insufficient to allow for an opulent

lifestyle (Okuma, 1909). While some described the Imperial Court as virtually imprisoned in

Kyoto (Jansen, 2000; Hunter, 2006), there was never any action taken to abolish it, even after

several centuries of samurai rule (both the end of the Kemmu Restoration, and the Era of

Warring States afforded opportunites to do so).

What further makes the Japanese situation curious was that direct monarchy rule in

Western countries was waning; nevertheless, Japan chose to revert to this traditional form of

governance. Bix (2000) notes though that Japanese Imperial rule should not be equated with a

constitutional monarchy, as the Emperor transcended the Constitution. However, Japan

intentionally made concerted efforts to adopt the ‘best’ of Western ways (e.g. British Navy,

Prussian Army, French school system) in most other areas of society as part of becoming

modern. “And yet in nearly all areas the nation’s transformation relied heavily on the deliberate

emulation of Western organizations…by the end of the Meiji period there were few

organizations in the major Western industrial societies that did not have their counterparts in

Japan.” (Westney, 1987: 4-5). Western models for governance structures though were

consciously not adopted. Rather, the transitional government chose to restore a distinct link to

the past, following the Heian period model for the Emperor. The institutional vacuum created by

the lack of an acceptable alternative structure, combined with the influence of the sonno joi

movement, though may have prompted this reversion. In other words, building upon Maguire

and Hardy’s (2009) study of DDT, while delegitimating discourse disrupted and resulted in the

abandonment of Shogun/samurai rule, alternative discourse supporting new practices was absent,

and translation of western goverance models was explicitly rejected.

Restoration vs. Revolution

Complicating the analysis is the ‘unique’ nature of Japan’s reforms. According to several

historians (Craig, 1959; Waswo, 1996; Howland, 2001), although the Restoration shares the

theme of shifting from an agrarian feudal society to a modern nation state, it should not be

equated with European versions of bourgeoisie revolution and class struggle. While the

bureaucracy was revised together with the new government, it was still dominated by former

samurai (due to the literacy skills and administrative experience acquired through the Tokugawa

bakufu). Beasley (1972) suggests that Japan’s experience resembled a coup d’etat rather than

revolution (also Craig, 1959). Okuma (1909) is more forthright, stating that Japan ‘has never

experienced a revolution…either a radical change in the form of government or a violent

downfall of the reigning dynasty (1909: 7)’. Thus, the focus of reformers’ efforts appeared to be

upon a change in power as an insider elite driven form of institutional change (Lawrence and

Suddaby, 2006; Maguire and Hardy, 2009), rather than a change in governance systems.

Hunter (1989) notes that the Japanese term for the Restoration is ishin, which should be

translated as ‘renovation’, implying coincident renewal and forward looking. In other words, the

events which transpired did not represent a sweeping away of old structures as under previous

studies of deinstitutionalization or evolutionary change (Greenwood et al., 2002; Sherer and Lee,

2002; Heracleous and Barrett, 2001; Biggart, 1977). Rather, the Restoration involved a synthesis

of linkage to the past (through the Emperor), combined with the adoption of new institutions

(Western technology), which is reflected in the Meiji Constitution and wakon yosai. Khan

(1998) notes that the Constitution incorporated both the traditional Japanese conception of a

divinely descended Emperor and benevolent ruler, together with Western influenced

Constitutional limits to the sovereign’s power (but not strict imitation). Effectively, change in

Japan involved a dialectical approach, where the continuation of previous institutions was

melded with newly theorized structures, many of which were mimetically adopted (Westney,

1987). Restoration though required the persistence of a delegitimated structure (Imperial rule),

aided by a combination of structuration (Giddens, 1984) and sedimentation (Cooper et al., 1996)

processes, thereby allowing for future excavation and relegitimation (Suchman, 1995).

Institutional Persistence

This study has attempted to demonstrate the relative persistence of the Japanese institution

of Imperial rule under a divinely descended Emperor. Though delegitimated and superceded by

Shogun rule, the Emperor as leader remained coherent and was relegitimated centuries later.

Other institutions of that period (e.g. han system) though did not survive. Thus, contrary to the

notion that delegitimated institutions will erode and disappear as they are replaced by newer

forms (Oliver, 1992; Ahmadjian and Robinson, 2001), the Meiji experience suggests that

institutional dissipation may not occur in all cases. Evolutionary selection represents but one

possible outcome for delegitimated institutions. Moreover, the extent to which institutions

endure may exceed the parameters previously suggested. A summary of persistent and

deinstitutionalized Japanese social structures is provided in Table 1.

[Insert Table 1 about here]

So how do delegimated institutions persist? Two alternative paths are suggested by the

literature. The first path builds upon the notion of sedimentation (Cooper et al., 1996). Under

sedimentation, former structures are buried and ‘preserved’ by the overlay of new structures,

allowing for future recovery (to the extent they remain intact). Notwithstanding the overlay of

new structures, the former may still periodically exert influence upon organizational actions.

Cooper et al. (1996) described how partnerships and professionalism are changing in accordance

with two key archetypes: the professional partnership model (P2), and the Managerial

Professional Business (MPB). Cooper et al.’s key argument is that organizational change does

not occur through a shift between archetypes (i.e. replacement), but rather the layering of one

archetype (the MPB) upon the other (P2) using a geological metaphor.

This notion of sedimentation differs from that described by Tolbert and Zucker (1996) in

referring to the institutionalization of new institutions as taken-for-granted, or management

innovations becoming rooted and embedded within existing organizational discourse and

practice (Strang and Macy, 2001; Heusinkveld and Benders, 2012). In general, as new

mangement fashions (Abrahamson, 1991) are introduced and become sedimented (Heusinkveld

and Benders, 2012; Strang and Macy, 2001), former practices are likely to lose their influence.

However, in the case of management fashions, new institutions are embedded within the

existing stratum of organizational systems (vocabulary, processes), whereas under Cooper et al.’s

variant, a new stratum of organizational systems covers over existing systems. The new

archetype will be built upon the remains of the former (leaving institutional flotsam and jetsam -

Schneiberg, 2007), such that the former is merely suppressed. However, though muted, the

influence of prior values, ideas and practices may persist, even as new structures/systems

emerge. This is consistent with Reay and Hinings (2005), who demonstrate that replacement

logics may fail to achieve dominence, such that dual logics may be in play. Key to this study is

the notion of the persistence of former archetype features, with the potential for their re-

emergence and restoration to dominance in the future.

The second path for institutional persistence builds upon Giddens’ (1984) structuration

theory. Structuration focuses upon process, and how structures are produced and reproduced

over time through member enactment. Structure represents the rules and resources involved in

social interactions, many of which are taken for granted (Garfinkel, 1964). The reproduction of

these structures over time gives social systems structural properties that provide a measure of

predictability to actors’ actions, while also framing our conception of reality. These structures

guide our understanding and correspondingly shape our actions by constraining our notions of

what can or cannot be done, of what should or should not be (like grammar).

Structuration reconceptualizes the subject-object dualism as a duality of structure, where

the structural influences of social systems influence actors only if they are reproduced over time

and space. As actors draw upon structures as the basis for their actions, they concurrently

reconfirm the legitimacy of those structures and thereby perpetuate their existence and influence.

Thus, structures are both medium and outcome (duality of structure).

Key to this study is the reproduction of structures over time, wherein by acting in

accordance with certain structures, actors both legitimate and perpetuate their influence. How

this cycle is sustained or broken is critical. Traditionally, institutional theory suggests that an

evolutionary process occurs, where structural demise occurs through creative destruction,

discontinued use or neglect (dissipation). However, as structures achieve taken-for-granted

status (institutions), they may continue to be reproduced through inertia as much as conscious

action. Thus, delegitimated structures may persist due to inertia of the structuration process, and

may not automatically experience extinction with the advent of newly legitimated structures.

The Meiji Restoration and Relegitimation

The Meiji Restoration can be regarded as removal of the overlaid institution of

Shogun/samurai rule, consistent with the ishin perspective (Hunter, 1989). Consistent with this

was the intent by reformers to ‘return’ to Heian era style Imperial rule. However, if we extend

the geological metaphor of sedimentation, where an overlay of sediment preserves artifacts, it is

unlikely that such artifacts would survive intact without some measure of decay. So how can

‘unearthed’ structures retain power/influence without decay? To address this, we build upon the

second path of structuration theory.

Under structuration (Giddens, 1984), the inertia of prior reproduction combined with

subsequent affirmation of particular structures, may serve to perpetuate these overlaid

institutions without significant decay. While the institution of the Emperor was not specifically

delegitimated with the advent of Shogun rule in 1185, Imperial rule under a strong Emperor was.

Emperor Go-Daigo’s inability to retain power after the Kemmu Restoration (1333), combined

with Oda Nobunaga’s severing of ties between the Imperial court and the Shogun in the 1500s,

combined with the longevity of Shogun rule, would suggest that Japanese society had moved

beyond Imperial rule as a viable form of governance. This however was not the case. The

relative ‘ease’ of Japan’s reformers to restore the Emperor to power suggests that corresponding

institutional supports continued to be reproduced and maintained over time. The process

whereby the vigour of these institutions was preserved without decay required the

complementary process of institutional maintenance through periodic enactment under

structuration. Contributing to this process was ‘preserving’ the supremacy of the Emperor under

samurai rule, even though only in a cermonial sense.

The persistence of the institution of the Emperor as ruler suggests that an incomplete

deinstitutionalization occurred. Vestiges of the former order remained, thereby allowing their

future restoration. In the case of the Emperor, delegitimation did not lead to active dismantling

of the Imperial court, either through rejection or replacement (Oliver, 1992). The Tokugawa

Shogunate directed the Imperial court to dedicate itself to the preservation and exercise of

Japanese literature and traditional arts (Akamatsu, 1972), revising yet sustaining its role in

society (vs. dissipation). A key aspect of that institution, that of a divinely descended Emperor,

was never challenged, allowing it to survive. The Emperor and Imperial court continued in

Kyoto, preserved to provide ‘legitimacy’ to Shogun rule, but also as the stewards of Japanese

religion and culture. The Shogunate also engaged in active institutional maintenance work

through the provision of an annual stipend. The Emperor thus acquired a mythical, artifactual

status, serving as the living embodiment of Japanese society, then and into the future. In this

sense, the institution of the Emperor was not allowed to change, and was faithfully reproduced

accordingly (i.e. time-space distanciation). Therefore, although the Imperial court’s role within

society had changed, its presence and significance did not.

Implications for Organization Theory

The case of the Meiji Restoration, and the institutions of the Emperor and Imperial rule,

suggest that delegitimation and deinstitutionalzation may represent linked rather than conjoined

processes. Although institutional theory speaks to the persistence of taken-for-granted

structures, such persistence may extend beyond that previously envisioned. This persistence may

depend upon the nature and presence of institutional supports, as well as the physical versus

socially constructured nature of that institution.

In other words, as noted by Maguire and Hardy (2009) in describing their use of discourse

analysis, the extent to which discourses are structured and coherent as they relate to particular

institutions will contribute to their preservation over time. In the case of singular institutions,

specific delegitimation may be sufficient to enable subsequent delegitimation. However, in cases

where institutions represent a series of interlinked ‘discourses’, delegitimation of one may be

insufficient to produce deinstitutionalization.

In the case of Imperial rule, although the institution was delegitimated as the government,

other institutional supports (e.g. myth of divine descent, Kyoto castle, cultural leader) remained

intact. The lack of creative destruction (Biggart, 1977) of these supports, combined with the

physical artifactual quality of the position, its taken-for-granted nature, and the inertial quality of

its reproduction under structuration, served to enable its persistence and avoid

deinstitutionalization. This also served to enable its subsequent restoration in a form similar to

that of the Heian period (survival of strong Emperor model).

Under these conditions, it is suggested that although former structures may continue to

enact influence upon organization actions, the extent to which overlaid structures (sedimentation)

will have influence upon organizational practices will depend upon the extent to which they are

actively maintained and faithfully reproduced over time (structuration), even if unintentionally.

Thus, an extension of the sedimentation metaphor would involve recognizing that overlaid

structures are likely to decay in terms of influence over time, unless there is an element of

reproduction over time. Such reproduction, according to structuration, will depend upon

periodic enactment of these structures over time by institutional actors, either as part of

institutional maintenance work, or inertial reenactment due to established routines (i.e. we’ve

always done things this way). Periodic enactment though will need to be in a form that

maintains the institution in its historic state, rather than translated over time (Latour, 1986).

Figure 3 summarizes both the linked nature of delegitimation and deinstitutionalization, and the

influence of sedimentation and structuration processes upon institutional preservation.

From a practical perspective, the reproductive inertia of existing structures, when

combined with complementary institutional supports, may prevent change from occurring unless

managers consciously undertake creative destruction of taken-for-granted cognitive structures.

However, even where such destruction occurs, there remains the potential for the future

apprehension and restoration of such structures, unless deinstitutionalization accompanies

delegitimation. Moreover, the process of deinstitutionalization may take longer than anticipated

if insufficient delegimation and subsequent shift is discourse is not achieved.

In terms of limitations of this study, it is acknowledged that this may represent a singular

unique case with limited generalizability (Siggelkow, 2007). This situation may also be context

dependent (unique confluence of Japanese culture and/or historical events). Notwithstanding

these limiting conditions, this case serves to illustate that institutional persistence may be greater

than previously considered, and correspondingly that delegitimation need not lead inevitably to

deinstitutionalization. Greater understanding of the process of delegitimation leading to

deinstitutionalization may be necessary if organizations wish to avoid relegitimation.

As such, future research may involve identifying similar examples of institutional

persistence beyond delegitimation. To the extent that additional examples are identified, the

factors contributing to persistence should be examined to determine whether our generalized

understanding of conjoined delegitimation and deinstitutionalization may be undertheorized, and

warrant revision. While the institutional work literature has served to promote studies of the

creation and disruption of institutions, less attention has been paid to institutional maintenance

work (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006), and how institutions may be preserved over time.

[Insert Figure 3 about here]

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study has used the example of the Meiji Restoration to explore what happens to

delegitimated institutions, and the potential for their persistence. Consistent with new

institutional theory, certain institutions may display remarkable resilience over a considerable

length of time. In contrast to both new and neo-institutional theory, this case suggests that the

delegitimation of institutions may not automatically result in their demise

(deinstitutionalization). Selection and replacement by newly theorized structures (Greenwood et

al., 2002) represents but one possible path. As illustrated by the Emperor and Imperial rule,

delegitimated institutions may retain their coherence and influence generations later.

It is argued that the mechanisms whereby delegitimated institutions retain their coherence

can be explained through a combination of structuration theory (Giddens, 1984) and

sedimentation processes (Cooper et al., 1996). Under structuration, actors actively sustained the

delegitimated structure to preserve the legitimacy of associated structures. Thus Imperial rule

was preserved with sufficient coherence that limited relegitimation was necessary. This

institutional relegitimation was possible though because of the lack of decay of supportive

structures, due in part to their ‘preservation’ through sedimentation. Notwithstanding the

persistence of the former institutions, each of the ‘replacement’ structures represented fully

theorized and legitimated institutions that co-existed with the others. This example calls into

question the notion that delegitimation automatically leads to deinstitutionalization and the

dissolution of former structures. Whether the Meiji Restoration represents an isolated situation,

or suggests alternate pathways for delegitimation and deinstitutionization, will require additional

research.

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TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1 - Persistent versus Deinstitutionalized Structures

Persistent Deinstitutionalized

Emperor Shogun government (bakufu)

Samurai code (Bushido) Class hierarchy

Samurai warrior spirit Samurai class

Japanese identity/Foreign barbarians Sakoku isolation

Daimyo han feudal system

36

Figure 1 – Process of Deinstitutionalization

Adapted from Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings, 2002

PRECIPITATING*JOLT*

!Social!Technological!Regulatory!

DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION*!Emergence!of!new!players!Ascendance!of!actors!Institutional!entrepreneurship!

PREINSTITUTIONALIZATION*!Independent!innovation!Technical!viability!paramount!

DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION*DELEGITIMATION*

THEORIZATION*!Speci=ication!of!general!organizational!failing!Justi=ication!of!abstract!possible!solution!Moral!and/or!pragmatic!legitimacy!

37

Figure 2 – Chronology of Key Events

KAMAKURA PERIOD (1185 – 1333)

ASHIKAGA PERIOD (1336 – 1573)

ERA OF WARRING

STATES (1573– 1603) EDO PERIOD

(1603 – 1867)

KEMMU RESTORATION

(1333-1336)

MEIJI RESTORATION

(1868)

BEGIN SHOGUN

RULE (1185)

MINAMOTO NO YORITOMO

BECOMES SHOGUN

(1185)

EMPEROR GO-DAIGO

(1333)

TOKUGAWA IEYASU

(1598)

SAKOKU POLICY

(1639)

COMMODORE PERRY (1853)

TOYOTOMI HIDEYOSHI

(1582)

ODA NOBUNAGA

(1568)

BATTLE OF SEKIGAHARA

(1600)

YOSHINOBU (LAST SHOGUN)

RESIGNS (1867)

1900 1600 1700 1800 1500 1400 1300 1200

38

Figure 3 – Sedimentation and Structuration

PRECIPITATING*JOLT*

!Social!Technological!Regulatory!

DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION*!Emergence!of!new!players!Ascendance!of!actors!Institutional!entrepreneurship!

PREINSTITUTIONALIZATION*!Independent!innovation!Technical!viability!paramount!

DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION*DELEGITIMATION*

THEORIZATION*!Speci=ication!of!general!organizational!failing!Justi=ication!of!abstract!possible!solution!Moral!and/or!pragmatic!legitimacy!

STRUCTURATION*SEDIMENTATION*