INTRODUCTION

THE GROWING END:

JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY

AND THE SHAPE OF MURRAY STUDIES

Todd David Whitmore

The theological task is to trace the stages of growth of the tradition as it makes its way through history. Scylla is archaism; Charybdis is anachronism. The task is to discern the elements of the tradition that are embedded in some historically conditioned synthesis that, as a synthesis, has become archaistic. The further task is to discern the "growing end" of the tradition; it is normally indicated by the new question that is taking shape under the impact of the historical moment. 1

- from "The Problem of Religious Freedom"

"The growing end" was a favorite term of John Courtney Murray's. It allowed him to refer, in brief fashion, to the idea that the object of inquiry whether it is the Catholic tradition or the "American experi­ment" in democracy - has elements of both ongoing continuity and dynamic change. The theologian and social theorist must attend to the verities of both. If one focuses only on the continuities, one risks falling into the errors of "archaism" and "anachronism."2 However, if one focuses only on the new aspects of a situation, one risks losing all trustworthy guidance for human action. The "growing end" is an organic metaphor and presupposes that all genuine growth, as op-­posed to mere change, is growth from a previously existing stage of the tradition. While Murray took into account historical change, he did not subscribe to what is now called historicism. History is dynamic, but it is also where we go to discern perduring truths. It is not merely

l. Murray, "The Problem of Religious Freedom," Theob)gical Studies 25 (1964): 569. 2. Murray also added to these errors that of "misplaced abstractness," which presents

certain views as fully abstract when in actuality they fit a particular historical setting. See ibid, 560-62 and 567-70.

v

vi Todd David Whitmore

a series _of �vents, bu_t a heritage. 3 Underpinning Murray's emphasis on contmmty, then, is an epistemological realism: Every proposition, if it is to be argued, supposes an epistemol­�gy of some sort: The epistemology of the American Proposi­tlon was, I thmk, made clear by the Declaration of Independence in the famous phrase: "We hold these truths to be self-evident .... " Today, when the serene, and often naive, certainties of the eighteenth century have crumbled, the self-evidence of the truths may legitimately be questioned. What ought not to be questioned, however, is that the Ameri­can Proposition rests on the forthright assertion of a realist epistemology .... To our Fathers .. . life of man in society un�er_government is founded on truths, on a certain body of obJectlve truth, universal in its import, accessible to the reason of man, definable, defensible. If this assertion is denied the American Proposition is, I think, eviscerated at one stroke. 4 From this quotation, it is evident that, for Murray, reading history as � way to d�scern truths constitutes more than merely a methodo­logic_al commitment abstractly considered. It is the approach a com­

�umty �us� take if it is to survive as a people, whether the community m question is the United States or the Catholic Church. Given_ Murray's own emphasis on both continuity and change, g _r�u�ded m turn on a realist epistemology and a sensitivity to the vicissitudes of history, any attempts to appropriate his writings must be attentive to the same. Such attempts, therefore, must have mo­ments each of the retrieval and the renewal of his work. The aim of this volume, and each of the essays within it, is to carry out both moments with attention and rigor. Like Murray, our concern with the identity of the Catholic tradition and the American proposition stems from a sense of practical urgency. Given political, economic, cultural a?d religious changes since Murray wrote, there is pressing need to discern a new growing end. It will be evident to the reader that the authors of the essays in this volume understand themselves to be in great debt to Murray. There is much retrieval. It will be also evident that the authors understand that the task of repaying that debt, to the extent that such debt can be repaid, is to critique and extend Murray's thought. There is, therefore, also much renewal. To help provide background for the movements of retrieval and renewal I "'.'i�l set ou�, wi�h a minimum of commentary, the stages of Murray'� �ntmg. _This will allow us to better understand the primary alterna­tives for mterpreting that writing, which I will then describe.

3. We Hold These Truths: 10-11. 4. Ibid., viii-ix.

The Growing End: John Courtney Murray and the Shape of Murray Studies vii

The Stages of Murray's Writing

It is possible to organize Murray's writings into five stages. His early writings (1942-45) focused on the problem of intercredal cooperation. A debate arose within Catholic circles concerning whether Catholics could cooperate with Protestants in the building up of society that would have to follow the Second World War. The primary concern for those who argued against cooperation,Joseph Fenton and Francis Connell, was the maintenance of the purity of Catholic doctrine. They charged that Catholics who cooperated with Protestants were risking "indifferentism " regarding doctrine. Murray countered both that Roman Catholics could cooperate with others and were morally bound to so cooperate. He argued that cooperation took place on the temporal plane of social interaction, and need not affect the spiritual dimension, which is the realm of doctrine. If one carefully distin­guished between the two planes, then indifferentism could be avoided. The question of whether in fact to cooperate with other Christian denominations in a particular instance depended on persons' pru­dential judgment in light of two guiding principles: Catholic unity and the common good. He writes, "It is again a problem of balance, of finding the center, and of avoiding the temptation to be drawn to one pole of the tension."5 How one strikes that balance depends on one's read of the state of Catholicism and of society. To Murray, the threat of indifferentism to the unity of Catholicism is less pressing than that of an undifferentiated -though often Marxist in motivation and articulation - materialism affecting Western society as a whole. "The uniqueness of the crisis lies in the fact that it is a spiritual crisis, but located at the heart of the temporal order. The task, briefly, is to effect a spiritual renewal of the social life of humanity, and to direct a structural reform of the social order. "6 Given the immensity of this task, co-operation becomes not only possible, but obligatory. "Con­fronted with this unique and colossal task, the church has appealed for allies among all men of good will, who believe in God and reverence His law. The premise of her appeal is both the nature of the task, and her own inadequacy to do it (not a doctrinal or spiritual, but a numerical and strategic inadequacy-the Church is the Body of Christ, but she is a minority group, and an 'out-group') ."7 Given the mag­nitude of the threat to the common good and the limited capacity of the Catholic community, cooperation in constructing a Christian social order is required. Murray is aware of the risk of indifferentism, 5. John Courtney Murray, "Co-operation: Theory and Organization," Theological Studies

4 (1943): 269, 270, and 271. 6. Ibid., 258. 7. Ibid.

viii Todd David "'7iitmore

but is convinced of the inevitability of a ubiquitous materialism if the Catholic Church does not join with others to reverse prevailing cul­tural trends. Throughout the debates on intercredal cooperation, disagree­ments arose even among those who favored alliances as to what is the appropriate basis for their actions: is it religious doctrine or the natural law? Murray accents the latter, but in such a way as to not neglect the former. While a natural law basis is insufficient for bringing about the fullness of the kingdom of God, it is more than adequate for reconstructing a Christian social order. "In a social order based on the natural law in its integrity one would find operative all the moral precepts proper to Christianity; for strictly speaking, Christ instituted no new morality ... The natural law, therefore, would be adequate to base an integrally human social order."8 The issue arises as to how specifically Catholic Murray's answer is .. On the one hand he claims that Christ offers no new morality, and that cooperation "has, when strictly analyzed, no specifically religious character at all."9 On the other hand, he argues that coop­eration based on the natural law is also Catholic. "[E]very affirmation of nature ... so long as it is simply an affirmation, is entirely Catholic." In the next paragraph, he adds that, ultimately, at least for the Catho­lic, it is based on a particular theological understanding of the rela­tionship between nature and grace. "In fact, it [cooperation based on the natural law] is ultimately based on the essence of Catholicism, the fact of the Incarnation - that Christ was God and Man and one, and that therefore in the order of race human nature exists in its integrity, elevated, not destroyed."1 The question, then, is that of just how separable the theory of natural law is from Catholic theo­logical doctrine, both in Murray's mind and in fact. It is a question that is keenly debated in Murray studies, as we will see in the next section. It is a short step from the issue of building up society through intercredal cooperation to the problem of church and state, which draws Murray's attention in the second stage of his work. While his writing on this latter topic begins as early as 1945, the key series of articles appears in the early l 950's in Theological Studies. In what are now generally referred to as the "Leonine articles," Murray argues the case that Pope Leo XIII affirmed the basic distinctions necessary to accept religious liberty of the sort found in the American consti­tutional arrangement. In the last of the Leonine articles, Murray

8. Murray, "Co-operation: Some Further Views," Theological Studies 3 (1942): llO. 9. Ibid., 106.

10. Murray, "Co-operation: Theory and Organization," 274-275; see also "Co-operation: Some Further Views," 110-11.

The Growing End: john Courtney Murray and the Shape of Murray Studies ix

describes the opposing position, what he terms the "anonymous view " of church-state theory. According to this view, the Catholic state is the "ideal " or "thesis ": it is to be instituted wherever possible. Tol­eration of other arrangements is acceptable as a lesser evil only when a Catholic state is not possible. Legal establishment of Catholicism and legal intolerance of other religions is the norm.11 In order to support this view, appeal had been made to the writings of Leo XIII and his condemnation of religious liberty. To counter the anonymous view, Murray has to provide an alternative interpretation of Leo. Murray's first tack is to locate Leo historically. At the beginning of the first of the Leonine articles, he writes, "The historical situation is important. Leo XIII did not compose his doctrine in the midst of academic quiet, in the leisure of a library, sealed off from the swirling struggles in the marketplace of the late nineteenth-century world. Rather, he hammered it out as the head of an embattled Church, which was under attack more radical and total than any that the Church had previously encountered in history."12 The source of the unprecedented radical attack on the Church was Continental Liber­alism and its manifestation in "the sects." "The sects which Leo XIII identified as the Enemy were the organized adherents of the new political religions whose appearance on the national and international scene was perha�s the most formidable phenomenon of the nine­teenth century."1 The core of the threat of sectarian Liberalism was its claim regarding the utter autonomy of the individual conscience. Each person was his or her own judge of truth or falsity. As a result, the purpose of government was simply to serve the will of the people. Whatever the people willed was right and good. The state, serving sovereign conscience, itself became sovereign. Thus, while technically the church-state doctrine was one of "separation," the effect of the doctrine was a social monism, because Continental Liberalism ban­ished religion to the realm of the private, leaving the state as the only major social actor. In this situation, Leo's only options were either to give in to Continental Liberalism or to advocate governmental establishment of the Catholic faith. This is because the normal person, without aid, 11. "In other words, Catholics are intolerant when it is possible to be intolerant; they are

tolerant only when it is necessary to be tolerant. Intolerance is the ideal,justified by principle; tolerance is an evil.justified as a lesser evil by factual circumstances." John Courtney Murray, "Leo XIII and Pius XII: Government and the Order of Religion," 90. As I will discuss anon, this article was suppressed. I am indebted to Leon Hooper for obtaining a copy for me from the Murray Archives at Georgetown University. My page numbering follows that of Hooper's printout.

12. John Courtney Murray, "Leo XIII on Church and State: The General Structure of the Controversy." Theologi,cal Studies 14 (1953): 1. Murray makes reference to this historical context over 30 times in the texts of the Leonine articles.

13. Ibid., 3.

x Todd David "1hitmore

was not able to resist the wiles of Liberalism. Society was made up, for the most part, of the imperita multitudo, the ignorant or illiterate

masses. Such persons were vulnerable, and this made society vulner­able. "Leo XIII considered that the illiterate Catholic masses were in

effect children. Their ignorance made them incapable of self-direc­tion. Worse still, they were being directed - indeed manipulated -from above, by evil men, in a direction which would lead to social ruin . . . Let �overnment therefore stand to these quasi-children in loco parentis." 1

The effect of locating Leo XIII in his historical context is to make what otherwise appears to be church doctrine into an instance

of a specific application of doctrine in a concrete context. According to Murray, Leo himself was aware of the polemical context and did not make the paternalistic government required by the threat of Liberalism into an ideal to be pursued by other societies.15 The true

ideal is that of a Christian society as a whole. The question remains open to prudential judgment as to whether a particular society re­quires legal establishment and intolerance in order to be Christian. Indeed, what Murray calls the "traditional view" - as opposed to the

"anonymous view" - is the position that there are two distinct powers within society: the church and the state. For the Christian society, the freedom of the Church to practice in accord with its beliefs and to join in the shaping of society is the fundamental concern; legal establishment is only one among many means of achieving it. In the

case of the United States and in most other modern republics, it would be an inappropriate means. Murray stated repeatedly that the Ameri­can situation is not that of the Continent. 16

. . . To make his case, Murray had to appeal to history and its rela­tivmng effects. However, he also made the claim that Catholic doc­trine in itself does not change, that it is "transtemporal, independent of circumstances." 17 Supporting this claim for doctrine is a distinction ?etween principles and their application, and much of Murray's effort is taken up with identifying what is "pure principle" in Catholic

14. John Courtney Murray, "Leo XIII: Two Concepts of Government: II. Government and the Order of Culture," TheologualStudies 15 ( 1954) : 19. CT. also 30-31. On the illiterate masses, see, Murray, "Leo XIII on Church and State: The General Structure of the Controversy," 19 ; "Leo XIII: Separation of Church and State," Theowgical Studies 14 ( 1953): 183-85; "Leo XIII: Two Concepts of Government," Theowgical Studies 14 (1953) : 557-58, 567 ; "Leo XIII: Two Concepts of Government: II. Government and the Order of Culture," �7. ll-12 , 15-2 5, 32 ; and "Leo XIII and Pius XII: Government and the Order of Religion," 77. 15. Murray, "Leo XIII on Church and State," 14-15, 2 5-2 8; "Leo XIII: Two Concepts of Government: II. Government and the Order of Culture," 4-5. 16 . Murray, "Leo XIII on Church and State," 7, 13; "Leo XIII: Separation of Church and State," 145-47, 151-53, 155-63, 16 �9, 175-80, 184 -86 ; "Leo XIII: Two Concepts of Government: II. Government and the Order of Culture," 2 , 2 1. 17. "Leo XIII and Pius XII," 85.

The Growing End: john Courtney Murray and the Shape of Murray Studies xi

doctrine on church and state.18 That Murray's own thought on the

issue of the relationship between doctrine and history is not altogether clear at this stage is evident in his claim that although doctrine does not "change," it can "develop'' or "progress." "With no change in

doctrine, but under development of doctrine, the Church must keep herself 'related' to the facts of man's political life . . . These political changes do not indeed change the doctrine of the Church; but they do 'open' the problem - or reopen it, if you like - and in this sense

they open or reopen the way to progress within the tradition." 19 Precisely what Murray might mean in such passages is a question that present Murray studies is focusing on. Moreover, in his turn to history, it is noteworthy that there are far fewer references to natural law theory. Such references as there are often occur simply in the quo­tations from the papal documents, and almost always are made in

passing. A key question for Murray studies is what to make of this apparent shift.

Study of Murray's thought, particularly during this period, must also pay attention to his own polemical context. Despite his disclaim­ers in the last of the Leonine articles that the "anonymous view" described above does not refer "to any particular author," his refer­ences to Alfredo Cardinal Ottaviani in the second of the articles - as well as in a public lecture and in private letters - indicates that he

does have the church official in mind.2 0 On March 2, 1953, Ottaviani gave a speech which Murray interpreted as putting forth the "the­sis/hypothesis" understanding of church-state theory. On November 15, Murray's Jesuit superior, Vincent McCormick, wrote a mandatum to the provincial, John J. McMahon, stating that "the time has come

for Fr. Murray to put down in simple, clear statements his full, present position regarding this Church-State question and to send it to me

for Father General." At the time, Murray was writing the last of the

Leonine articles. Murray promised a reply. However, before he

responded, Pope Pius XII issued Ci riesce, a discourse to a gathering of Italian jurists. Murray interpreted the discourse as a deliberate

reversal of Ottaviani, while others understood it to be affirming the

Cardinal's position. Still, Pius' statements gave Murray the confidence

to identify and critique Ottaviani's position in a public lecture. This

18. For references to "pure principle," cf. "Leo XIII: Separation of Church and State," 191 and 200; "Leo XIII: Two Concepts of Government: II," IO, 12 , 2 8-30.

19. Murray, "Leo XIII and Pius XII," 96 . 20. For the disclaimers, see "Leo XIII and Pius XII," 90 and 95: "I explicitly disavow any

intention of attributing the position to any Catholic author, living or �ead." For the references to Ottaviani in the Leonine articles, see "Leo XIII: Separation of Church and State," 146 , note 2 ; 169, note 33; and 188-9. For information on the lecture and letters, see Donald Pelotte, john Courtney Murray: Theologian in Confli�t (New Yor�: Paulist Press, 1975): 37-59. My account of the events surrounding Murray s formulation of his church-state theory follows Pelotte.

xii Todd David Whitmore

move brought attacks from Fenton in The American Ecclesiastical Review and an i?�uiry from Ottaviani with Cardinal Spellman. In response to the ongmal mandate, Murray had sent published articles to McCor­mick. When Murray sent the last of the Leonine articles, McCormick fmwarded it to the Vatican censors. They informed McCormick that it was unsuitable for publication. Murray's silencing came in the form of an indirect request from McCormick: "It seems to me a mistake to wish to carry on with that controverted question under present cir­cumstances. "2 1

�n-response, M�rray turned his focus to the broader question

of rehg10n and Amencan public life in general and to international affairs. In 1960, he brought together a collection of articles under

the title, We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition. Although a number of the articles were written during the period of the Leonine articles, the publication of We Hold These �ruths itsel� c�nstitutes an event and warrants, therefore, being iden­tified.as a distinct ph�se - the third - in Murray's career. The driving question and Murray s answer to it appears early on, in the forward: ":he quest .ion is sometimes raised, whether Catholicism is compatible

�th Amencan democracy. The question is invalid as well as imper­tinent; for the manner of its position inverts the order of values. It must, of course, be turned round to read, whether American democ­racy is c?�patibl� with Catholicism. The question, thus turned, is part of the cml qu�stlon, as put to me. An affirmative answer to it, given under somethmg better than curbstone definition of 'democracy,' is ?ne of the truths I hold."22 The timing of Murray's question was impeccable . . The book received its imprimatur from Bishop Robert Joyce of Burlmgton, Vermont on June 18. Five weeks later, the Demo­cratic party nominated John Kennedy to be its presidential candidate. On December 12, Time magazine featured Murray on the cover for a

story on "U.S. Catholics and the State." We Hold These Truths addresses topics ranging from education to nuclear war. Within each issue and in American public life generally, Murray finds a pluralism of perspectives that constitutes a "structure

of war" where each tradition "occupies ground."2 3 However, even this pluralism is not one of utter incommensurability between tradi­tions . "Pluralism implies disagreement and dissension within the

community. But it also implies a community within which there must be agreement and consensus."2 4 When Murray examines the content of the American consensus, he identifies two "truths": the nation

21. Pelotte, 52. 22. We Hold These Truths (Kansas City: Sheed & Ward , 1960): ix -x. 2 3. Ibid., 18-22 . 24. Ibid., x .

The Growing End: John Courtney Murray and the Shape of Murray Studies xiii under God and the tradition of natural law. It is the second of these that he develops further and makes fundamental to his argument that American democracy is compatible with Catholicism. The natural law tradition is present, Murray argues, in the Founders' notion of self­evident truths. These truths of natural law "firmly presided over the

great time of study, discussion, and decision which produced the

Federal Constitution." Moreover, the consensus built upon the natu­ral law still endures, "even in quarters where its origins have been forgotten."2 5 Again the question arises as to how specific to Catholi­cism is this theory of natural law. On the one hand, Murray argues that "the doctrine of natural law has no Roman Catholic presupposi­tions." On the other hand, he refers to Protestant and Enlightenment traditions as "seeds of dissolution" and acknowledges that natural law theory is a "challenge, if not an affront" to Protestant moral and

1. . h h 26

re 1g10us t oug t. The fourth period of Murray's writing takes place during the

Second Vatican Council, with his contribution to the Declaration on Religious Freedom (Dignitatis humanae). Although Murray was not in­vited - or in his words, was "disinvited" - to the first session of the

Council, American bishops sought out his expertise. Francis Cardinal

Spellman then invited him to the second session. Murray's case for

religious freedom followed, in large part, the argument of the Leonine

articles. In a 1964 article written at the critical juncture between the

second and third drafts of the Declaration, for instance, there is the

comparison between the two primary positions. This time, instead of calling them the "anonymous view" and the "traditional view," he uses the more even-handed terms "First View" and "Second View." How­ever, Murray draws the differences between the two positions even more sharply than before. "The First and Second View do not con­front each other as affirmation confronts negation . Their differences are at a deeper level - indeed at a level so deep that it would be difficult to go deeper. They represent the contemporary clash be­tween classicism and historical consciousness."27 It appears, then, that Murray himself underwent a growing sense of the importance of his historical method for the substantive case he wanted to make regard­ing religious liberty. Though Murray fell ill before the writing of the

final draft, Dignitatis Humanae is in large part his document. The debate in Murray studies today is over the question of the sources and

2 5. Ibid., 31. 26 . Ibid., 109, 42, and 17. 2 7. Murray, "The Problem of Religious Freedom," Theologi,cal Studies 2 5 ( 1964): 560; cf.

also "The Declaration of Religious Freedom" (and following discussion ). In John H. Miller , ed. , Vatican II: An Interfaith Appraisal (Notre Dame, Ind : University of Notre Dame Press, 1966): 581.

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degree of the increased awareness on Murray's part of an explicitly historical method. In the fifth and final stage of his work, Murray extended his discussion of religious freedom to the internal practices of the Catho­lic community on the one hand and to atheism on the other. For Murray, both moves were a natural, even inevitable, consequence of the Vatican Council's treatment of religious liberty. With regard to the question of religious freedom in the church, he responds by locating the questions of authority and freedom in the context of the question of community. The former two - authority and freedom -find their right balance by serving the community. If earlier church documents extended authority further than presently desirable, this was "historically inevitable and doctrinally justifiable " due to the threats to the church discussed above. However, persons' growing awareness of their dignity warrants greater accent on freedom. As a result, church officials are to carry out their authority first of all through dialogue. The directive and punitive functions of officials, while still important, must take place in the context of conversation. Conversely, dialogue is not an end in itself, but "looks toward decisions and directives. In their issuance and acceptance, the community comes together in a new way."28 The result is a balance between freedom and authority fitting for "the signs of the times." Extending the concept of religious freedom to atheists involves two moves on Murray's part. First of all, he affirms the presence of a faith that is "implicit in all men of good will. "29 Secondly, he highlights that aspect of the Church's own belief and practice that facilitates, and is in part responsible for, the unbelief that marks the vast majority of persons in the world. Murray addresses this latter theme most thoroughly. The unbelief of the Christian can serve as a base point for understanding the unbelief of others. Murray devel­ops the theme through a discussion of the Church as sacrament and as historical community. While the church is a sacrament - a visible sign of Christ - it is also a human community that, because it is human, obscures Christ. This recognition that the Church "casts shadows " over the divine plan does not absolve unbelievers from responsibility for their unbelief, but it does break down the insider/ outsider con­struct for addressing unbelief. Dialogue with avowed atheists - and extending a kind of religious freedom to them -is therefore possible. Murray's untimely death from a heart attack on August 16, 1967 brought short his attempts to extend his work on religious liberty. However, the five stages of his writings, taken together, provide ample 28. llnd., 740. 29. Murray, "The Unbelief of the Christian," in Christopher Mooney, ed., The Presence

and Absence of God (New York: Fordham University Press, 1969): 75.

The Growing End: john Courtney Murray and the Shape of Murray Studies xv

material for reflection by the next generation of thinkers for whom the question of Catholicism and American public life remains crucial. The Shape of Murray Studies

The essays in this volume address a wide range of issues, both generally methodological and specifically topical. It is fair to say that even those focusing on particular concrete issues take into account, even if tacitly, the question of the degree of development - of the balance between continuity and change, retrieval and renewal - that is proper in appropriating Murray. For the authors of these essays, the question leads directly to that of how Murray himself struck that balance. The debate concerning how he did so can be traced to articles by John Coleman and David Hollenbach in Theological Studies in 1976.30

Hollenbach chaired a forum, held at the annual meeting of the Catholic Theological Society of America, the papers of which were published in Theological Studies in 1979. The other participants in­cluded persons who are all contributors to this volume: Coleman, Bryan Hehir, and Robin Lovin.31 The debate took on new life among academics in 1986 with the publication of Leon Hooper's The Ethics of Discourse .32 It has been continued through, among other publica­tions, George Weigel' s Tranquillitas Ordinis and Catholicism and the Renewal of American Democracy and Robert McElroy's The Search for an American Public Theolog;y.33

Linked to this exchange on continuity and change is a debate over whether the core of Murray's corpus is a philosophical approach grounded in natural law, or a more theological approach that draws freely and explicitly from specifically Christian doctrine . The con­nections that are made are, in general, these: the emphasis on con­tinuity joins with the interpretation of Murray as a natural law philosopher. This is because the general norms of the natural law tradition are taken to be perennial and universal. Murray wrote of 30. John Coleman, "Vision and Praxis in American Theology: Orestes Brownson, John

A. Ryan, and John Courtney Murray," Theological Stud'ies 37 (1976): 3-40. David Hollenbach, "Public Theology in America: Some Questions for Catholicism after John Courtney Murray," Theological Studies 37 (1976): 290-303.

31. David Hollenbach, ed., "Current Theology: Theology and Philosophy in Public: A Symposium on John Courtney Murray 's Unfinished Agenda," Theological Studies 40 (1979): 700-715.

32. J. Leon Hooper, SJ., The Ethics of Discourse: The Social Philosophy of John Courtney Murray (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1986).

33. George Weigel, Tranquillitas Ordinis: The Present Failure and Future Promise of American Cath olic Th ought on W ar and Peace (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Weigel, Cath olicism and the Renewal of American Democracy (New York and Mahwah, NJ.: PaulistPress, 1989); RobertW. McElroy, TheSearchforan American Public Theology: The Contributi on of john Courtney Murray (New York and Mahwah, NJ.: Paulist Press, 1989).

xvi Todd David Whitmore

th� "eternal return " of natural law theory. Theological doctri n es in this d�bate , on the contrary, are associated with specific and histori­cally situated communities. Again , Murray himself claimed in We Hold The_se Truths that n�tur�l law_ theory begins with an ethical a priori wh1c? _transcends h1stoncal circumstances, and made a point of em­ph�s�zmg tha _t n�tural law theory has no specifically Catholic presup­pos1t1on�. W1thm �e p�esent debate , there is the general tendency - not without quahficat1on and even with some counterinterpreta­ti�ns, �s we . will se� - to understand the natural law approach as pnmanly philosoph�cal �nd to a�d, in some cases , that when Murray's app{,rach became h�st?ncally onented, it also became more theologi­cal. These. assoc1au�ns of continuity with natural law philosophy a�d c?a�ge with a specifically theological approach are only tenden­cies withm the debate on Murray, but together they allow us to outline a fo�rfold typology as a means of understanding the shape of Murray studies today. �ype 1 : Natural la�-sufficient The center of gravity of Murray's writing zs natural law philosophy, and this is by and large sufficien t - even �ecessary - to addres� the problems of Catholi cism and American public life today. Murr_ay did not fundamentally change, and it is not necessary for us to alter his thought in any fundamental way. . In the 1979 symposium, Bryan Hehir argues that "Murray's writ­mg represents the mo�t nua��ed and sophisticated contemporary exampl� of the C�thohc trad1t1on of �hilosophic discourse on the normative foundations of public life." 5 He then goes on to make the cas� that �e s�ould continue the example because both the fact of the mcre�smg mterdependence of diverse groups in society and the broadenmg, even global, scope of Catholic social teaching requires a common mediating language for the conduct of public discourse. �atural law theory offers that language. Hehir qualifies his thesis in i�porta�t ways that allow for theological and historical considera­t10ns. Fir�t. of a�,l , even natural law theory is "rooted in theological presuppos1Uons. . The p�int . is merely that those presuppositions shoul� not �n�er I�t? pubhc discourse in a pluralistic society. Corre­spondm�l�, 1t is legiumate for the discourse within particular religious com�umues �o. be specifically theological. "This question of shaping the �n�ern�l v1s1on and conviction of the Christian community must be d1�t�ngm�hed, ho�ever, fr_om ��g equally significant task of sharing the v1s10n with the wider society. Hehir and the others within this 34. Hooper, The Ethics of Discourse, 8 and 197. 35. ]. Bryan Hehir, "The Perennial Need for Philosophical Discourse " in Hollenbach ed., op. cit ., 710. ' ' 36. find., 71 1 .

The Growing End: john Courtney Murray and the Shape of Murray Studies xvii

type remain confident that the public sharing can take place while

excluding, in large part, the background beliefs that move the initial articulation of the internal vision. Second, Hehir allows and even calls

for some development in Murray's thought . It needs to be expanded

to take into consideration the fact of inte rdependence and the global

scope of Catholic teaching. However, the changes are limited to

specifics. The fundamental approach remains unmodified. In his

essay for the present volume , Hehir acknowledges, "Over the years

the style of the argument became more personalist in tone and more

dynamic in its conception of how human nature is to be understood, " but, at bottom, "Murray never wavered from a Natural Law method

f ,,37 o argument. Robert McElroy is in basic agreement with Hehir. Therefore , eve n though his book is titled, The Search for an American Public Theology: The Contribution of John Courtney Murray, the accent is on the natural law approach. This is because of the way McElroy defines "public

the ology " as "the effort of the mainstream Christian churches and

the ologians in the United States to articulate a substantive role for

spiritual values in public life which does not violate the spirit of American pluralism."38 Any approach that brings those spiritual val­ues into play is by definition theological , even if there is no reference to Christian doctrines or biblical themes. If natural law can fulfill this role then, on this definition , it is a public theology. In principle , public theology need be "neither "specifically Christian nor specifically c onfined to mainstream Christian churches."39 Within the under­standing used in this introduction and in Hehir's thought, however, natural law theory is a philosophical theory, even if it is reinforced

by theological background beliefs. To allow for the theological di­me nsion, McElroy makes distinctions similar to Hehir's. He distin­guishes between a "public theology, " which a community draws upon

to speak to the wider society, and a "comprehensive social theology, " which, unlike the former, makes explicit reference to the background

Christian doctrines. When it is a question of public theology, the

biblical and other religious symbols of the comprehensive theology of a community are to be "strictly mediated by the precepts of the

natural law. " McElroy elaborates, "Biblical and religious claims which cannot be substantiated by independent recourse to natural law should have no place in contemporary public theology. "40 The natu­ral law approach is both definitive of Murray and incumbent upon

37. See Hehir's essay in chapter 11 below. 38. Robert McElroy, The Search for an American Public Theology, 5. 39. Ibid., 1 85, note 12. 40. Ibid., 1 54-55. The role of religious language is a motivational one : it must inspire persons in their efforts to construct a more just social order. Cf. 154.

xviii Todd David Whitmore

us, given the kinds of problems in conducting public dialogue that beset a pluralistic society. McElroy argues that those problems are not radically different now than when Murray wrote.41 Indeed, there is much continuity. Murray's natural law theory, therefore, is both sufficient and necessary. George Weigel entered into the debate over how to interpret Murray with the publication of his Tranquillitas Ordinis: The Present Failure and Future Promise of American Catholic Thought on War and Peace and Catholicism and the Renewal of American Democracy. Neither book is simply a commentary on Murray. Weigel presents specific construc­tive projects, the former aims to set Catholic understanding of the morality of warfare within an interpretation of the 1987 geopolitical context, the latter to draw upon Catholic resources to support Ameri­can constitutionalism. However, in each case, there are individual chapters focusing on Murray's work, and Weifel is clear that he views his own work as a continuation of Murray's.4 Like Hehir and McEl­roy, Weigel does not deny the role of explicitly theological language within particular worshipping communities, but argues that there is a need in pluralistic society for a "mediating " language, and that the natural law theory as found in Murray is the language best able to suit this purpose. Type 2: Natural law-insufficient The center of gravity of Murray's writing is natural law philosophy, and this is not sufficient to address the problems of Catholicism and American public life today. Murray did not fundamentally change, but it is necessary for present interpreters to alter his thought in some fundamental way, given changes in the American public consensus. This option for interpreting Murray is first articulated in the 1976 article by David Hollenbach. The article is written in response to the essay published earlier that year by John Coleman that held up Murray as a key resource for contemporary American Catholic social thought. Hollenbach describes what he coins the "Murray project " : "The entire Murray project-and the precise form the project took-is based upon the hope that there is enough life in the American public philosophy effectively to establishjustice, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings ofliberty for all."43 Here, the accent is on public philosophy, and Hollenbach concurs with Hehir, McElroy, and Weigel that natural law theory grounds Murray's thought. "Mur­ray's strategy in this effort was to base the entire structure of his social ethic on the tradition of natural law and natural reason, rather than 41. Ibid., 164-169 and 1 76ff. 42. Weigel, Tranquillitas Ordinis, 1 37-38. 43. Hollenbach, "Public Theology in America," 297.

The Growing End: John Courtney Murray and the Shape of Murray Studies xix on directly and explicitly theological foundations."44 However, Hollenbach disagrees with the other three on the precise relationship between natural law as public philosophy and whatever implicit theo­logical claims there may be. Hehir, McElroy, and Weigel hold that natural law thought still allows for explicitly theological discussion within faith communities. Hollenbach argues that natural law as Murray understood it depends on theological affirmations, however implicit, that must be made by all who accept the "tradition of reason" of which natural law is a part. Philosophy and theology are not so detachable.

Murray's concept of reason contains within itself an orienta-tion toward the transcendental, the metaphysical, and ulti­mately the theological. .. . Despite Murray's disclaimers about the lack of Catholic presuppositions behind the natural law theory he employed in developing his social ethic, there can be no doubt that the theological concern to make belief intelligible in a distinctively Catholic mode was operative to giving shape to his concept of reason .... There is a theological principle operative throughout the whole of Murray's episte­mology and social philosophy . . . This principle, which is called "the primacy of the spiritual, " shapes his notion of reason, his theory of the foundation of moral obligation in the dignity of the human person, and his defense of maximum freedom and minimum social control. ... The success of his appeal to reason as the basis of justice and human rights depends on the presence within society of a concept of reason which allows the sacredness of the human person to be widely experienced, publicly debated, and socially protected. 45 Hollenbach argues that there are good reasons - for instance, the dangerous temptation to repress pluralism through theocracy -for Murray to endeavor to keep explicitly theological claims out of public discourse at the time that he was writing. Murray's concerns here should be no less ours. However, there is a countervailing consideration: the American consensus is no longer grounded in shared, if tacit, theological affirmations. Here is another point at which Hollenbach departs from Hehir, McElroy, and Weigel. There have been changes of a fundamental sort - and not just in the par­ticulars -in the shape of American public life. As a result, even those who desire to continue the Murray project of finding support for the American proposition of limited government must do so in a way that departs significantly from the strategy that he adopted. We must move from public philosophy to public theology.

44. Ibid., 293. 45. Ibid., 294-96.

xx Todd David Whitmore One can no longer presuppose, as Murray did, that the Ameri­can public philosophy is rooted in and supported by the broad theological tradition of Christian history. If it is seen as de­sirable that this theological perspective should be influential in shaping American public debate and ultimately public pol­icy, then this perspective must be brought into the public arena in explicit terms .... In particular, American Catholics need to move beyond an approach to public questions based on Murray's version of the public philosophy to the formation of a public theology which attempts to illuminate the urgent moral questions of our time through explicit use of the great symbols and doctrines of the Christian faith ( emphasis in 46 text). Hollenbach -like Hehir, McElroy, and Weigel - recognizes the realities of pluralism and interdependence and the need for public discourse. However, he offers a contrasting understanding of the

theoretical and h istorical relationship betwe en natural law philosophy and Christian theology and a different interpretation of what has changed since the time of Murray's writing. His conclusion , therefore , is that Catholics concerned with the American experimen t in ordered liberty must draw upon resources outside of the .Murray corpus in order to enter into public discourse in a way significantly at variance with the natural law approach as practiced by Murray. Hollenbach 's view is supported and amplified by John Coleman and Robin Lovin in th e 1979 symposium.47 However, it would be a mistake to interpret Hollenbach , Coleman, or Lovin as rejecting Murray tout court as being utterly superseded by current approaches. Rather, their concern is , in Hollenbach's words, that "exclusive reliance " on strictly philosophi­cal discourse "carries serious dangers " in an era where one cannot assume that Christian presuppositions underpin the national consen­sus.48 What Hollenbach recommends is a "fundamental political theology " that relates public theology and public philosophy.

Public theology is the effort to discover and communicate socially significant meanings of Ch ristian symbols and tradi­tion. Public philosophy is the effort to discover and commu­nicate the significant meanings of common social and political experience in our pluralistic culture. Discovery of the rela­tionship between these two spheres of meaning and of the relationship between the moral norms that these meanings imply is a properly theological task. It is a task that can be

46. Ibid., 298-99. 47. See John Coleman, "A Possible Role for Biblical Religion in Public Life," in Hollenbach, ed., "Current Theology," 701-706; and Robin W. Lovin, "Resources for a Public Theology," in Hollenbach, "Current Theology," 706-710. 48. Hollenbach, "Current Theology," 713.

The Growing End: John Courtney Murray and the Shape of Murray Studies called fundamental political theology ... Without such refle�­tion public theology will lose conta�t with the_ w_ays Go� is actively present in the contemporary social.world. S1.�Ilarly, with­out such reflection public philosophy nsks un�n.ucal �ffirma­tion of cultural biases which are in contrad�ct_1on wit\9the moral content of the Christian faith (emphasis m text).

xxi

Type 3: Historical ly conscious-sufficient T_he cen�er_ of gravity of Mur­ray 's writing is found in the later articles which �xhibit an . a?proa�h that is at once more historically conscious and theologically explicit. This _l�ter Murray is in large part sufficient to address the problems of Catholicism and American public life today. Murray did fundamentally change, and this change allows for more extensive retrieval of his work than would otherwise be possible. Th is view is set out most th oroughly in ]. Leon Hooper's The Ethics of Discourse, published in 1986. Th e book is, on one leve�,. an intellectual biography. Here, Hooper provides a detailed expos1t1on

of the multifaceted development of Murray's though t from t�e. de­bates on intercredal cooperation, through the early work on reh�ous liberty, the "proposition " of We Hold These Truths, the S�cond �aucan

Council, and the post-conciliar publications. !�e Ethics of Discourse chronicles major paradigm shifts in Murray's wnungs: from an ess�n­tialistic natural law doctrine to a developed consensus. th�o.ry w�1c_h take s full account of human historicity, and from an md1v1duahst1c cognitivism to a socially based epistemol�gy .. Thou�h t�ese chan?es take place throughout his career, the crucial_ time penod 1s that d�rmg and following the Council, after Murray discovers and appropriates

the work of Bernard Lonergan. . These two shifts -towards human historicity and a socially based epistemology _ facilitate two other changes in Murray'� work .. Fir�t, they allow Murray to make room for explicitly theological claims m public discourse. [B]y learning that all public arguers ar� situated wit�in their

environments , and that the act of pubhc argument 1s always interactive with actual historical persons, Murray could then come to the notion of a social arguer always in social in�er�c­tion with a historical God. Only in the last years of his hfe could he consciously conceive the task of social argument as

49. Ibid., 714-15.

xxii Todd David lVhitmore

itself intrinsically theological, as the pursuit of a God who offers redemption to peoples as well as to persons . 50

Lonergan's un�ers�a?ding of historical consciousness allows Murray to a_cce�t �he h1stonc1ty of theological beliefs without moving towards a h1stonc1sm that claims that there is no rational way to adjudicate between the beliefs of different communities. Second, the shifts toward �istorical c,onsciousness �nd a social epistemology facilitate a

change m Murray s understandmg of the very task of social e thics. T�ere_ is movement away from a focus on right reason and the deter­�mat�on of specific prescriptions to a primary concern with the way m which persons enter into public discourse on issues.

As �erhaps old_ and seasoned people are wont to do, he began to VIew all pubhc, prudential discussions in terms of what effect the style and content of those discussions would have on collective �oral will .... Murray came to recognize that any and all social arguments either encourage or deaden that �oral �115 sometimes unknown to the person who is arguing m pubhc.

What. deadens co?versation is the narrowing of who participates or of which ?erspect1ves are engaged. Therefore the primary normative concern is to broaden the scope of discussion. Ultimately, this con­cern �n? the ?blig�tion which follows has theological grounds, be­cause It Is precisely m broad and inclusive conversation that one finds G:od l?cated.. "How can one locate the saving presence of God in h1stoncal soc�ety? _ ... Wherever one finds a will to community that s�ek� expressmn m conversation, one finds a truly redemptive drive w1thm both the church a.nd the larger social arena."52

. It_is in his exposition of Murray's turn to a theologically grounded obhgat1on to engage in conversation that Hooper also move s to a �evel o _f analysis deeper than that of intellectual biography. Here, he Is makmg the case that Murray's developing concerns should be those of the Roman Catholic Church, theological ethicists in general, and all per�ons and groups who seek to be a part of the public debate on social issues. Hooper is explicit early on in the text that this is one of his tasks.

50. Ho�pe_r, The Ethics of Discourse, 8; cf. also 197: u [I)t seems to me that, toward the end of ?I� life, M?r1:1y ?ecom� � consc_i�usly theol.ogi,cal ethician, arguing in both civil and religious societies m explicitly religious categories. This new consciousness was the result_ of a final break with elem�nts in his earlier epistemological and ecclesiological theone_s that blocked what might be called a social spirituality - a conscious recogmtion of, and interaction with, an historical God" (emphasis in text). 5 1 . Ibid., 205. 52. Ibid, 21 1-12.

L

The Growing End: John Courtney Murray and the Shape of Murray Studies xxiii This study, then, is not simply a description of the develop­ments in Murray's own social ethical theory, nor simply a description of the social realities that he encountered and attempted to define and shape. It is also meant to be an examination of the ethically normative aspects of social argu­ment, an examination of what makes a social argument moral or immoral independently of the specific issue or issues under d. . 53

lSCUSSIOn .

This second, normative level of The Ethics of Discourse shapes the first and descriptive level. Hooper's normative concern is with how we are to conduct public discourse now. Because this concern must take accoun t of present social conditions, the descriptive evaluation of Murray's writings gives added weight to his later thought, where the conditions are most like our own. Thus the emphasis on the post-con­c iliar works, which themselves become normative in Hooper's por­trayal of Murray. Type 4: Always historical ly conscious, always theologic�I Desfite so_me shifts in emphasis, historical consciousness and a theological orientation is evident virtually throughout the Murray corpus. Therefore, the sharp distinctions between the Murray of classicist natural law philosophy and the Murray of historically conscious theology are overdrawn by all of the first three options for interpreting his work. . . . . This type is a new one with the pubhcat1on of this volume. It is evident, though not directly argued, in the article by Thomas Hugh­son. It is forcefully presented in the essay by Joseph Komonchak. Both are worth detailing. Hughson's effort is to find points of conta�t between the project of practical theology as elaborated by Denms McCann and Charles Strain on the one hand and Murray's work on the other.54 At the core of practical theology is the idea of praxis: the claim that theory and practice are mutually informing and cri­tiquing. Some of Murray's statements make i_t appear as if pra�tice is utterly subordinate to theory, never amoun tmg to more than illus­trations for the theory in concrete circumstances. However, Hughson examines writings from three differen t periods of Murray's career, and in each finds that Murray allows for human practice in history to shape theoretical constructs, whether his own or those he an�lyzes. The first article Hughson scrutinizes, "Governmental Repress10n of Heresy, " was written in 1948, whif.J1 falls into the second period of Murray's career as outlined above. Here, Hughson finds an empha-53. Ibid., 8. . n... · z 54. Dennis McCann and Charles Strain, Polity and Praxis: A Program for American nactica

Theowgy (Minneapolis: Winston Press, 1985). ,, . . . . 55. Murray, uGovemmental Repression of Heresy, Proceedings, Cath olic Theowgical S ociety

xxiv Todd David 'Whitmore

sis in Murray on how the deeds of kings and popes led to the devel­opment of church-state theory. Murray does not offer an explicit accou?t of the relationship between theory and practice , but his

analysis of the development of doctrine highlights a movement back and forth between the two, indicating a reciprocity. Hughson also as�e�ses We Hold These Truths (1960) , from the third period of Murray's

wntmgs, and argues that Murray understands the Declaration of In­?ependence, where the truths that we hold are first articulated, to be mseparable �rom the act of independence. Moreover, Murray's con­cept of pubhc �ons�n�us allows public opinion and practice to lead

to new theo�etlc�l ms1ghts. Finally, Hughson details the argument Murray pro':1de� m the . 1965 publication of The Problem of Religfous Freedom - which 1s a repnnt of a 1964 article written during the fourth

stage �f .the latter'� career - and lifts up the fact that the focus is on how cnt1cal reflecuon on a preconceptual aspiration to freedom leads

to the development of Catholic teaching on religious freedom. Hugh­son makes the argument that in these three articles each written during a different period, there is compelling eviden�e that Murray understands theoretical constructs to be a part of the historical proc­ess . . Therefore, as in practical theology, such constructs inform and

are mformed ?� concrete practices. While Hughson 's aim is not to set out an �xphcit alternative to the first three options for interpreting Murray, his argument leads in that direction.

Komonchak, in contrast, is clear that such an alternative is

precisely what is at stake. He begins by citing the writings by Hollen­bach, Col.eman, Lovin, Hooper, and others who argue that Murray is

not sufficiently theological, at least up until his latest work. The task of the essay, then, is to survey early and middle periods of Murray's

work to demonstrate the presence of an explicitly theological project. Komonchak focuses first on lectures and essays in the first half of the l 94?s , In 1940, Murray gave three lectures at Loyola University in

Baltimore on "The Construction of a Christian Culture." His ap­proa�h was to focus on a contemporary problem, identify the Christian

doctnne tha_t can address it, and then set out the implications that fo�low. For mstance, the problem of materialism leads to a spiritual �01d. A theology of the incarnation addresses the problem by reveal­i�g _the transcendent dignity of the person. Or the doctrine of the

tnmty addresses the problem of individualism and illumines the fact ·of a �nity amidst .the diversity of persons. This theological dimension

remams present m the articles on in tercredal cooperation ( 1942-46) , where Murray first uses the language of natural law. While this latter

language serves the pragmatic purpose of aiding the identification of

of America ( 1948) : 2�98.

The Growing End: john Courtney Murray and the Shape of Murray Studies xxv

commonalities between the different religious communities, Murray continued to affirm that social cooperation provides only a partial solution to the problems that beset society. The full solution is found

only in Christ. Action in accordance with natural law brings about only ordered society, not the kingdom of God.

In a 1953 article, later published in We Hold These Truths, Murray makes a distinction between an "incarnational humanism," which emphasizes the ways in which grace perfects nature, and an "eschato­logical humanism" which is biblically based and accents the disconti­nuities between grace and nature. Murray goes on to argue that both perspectives are necessary and that they are not mutually exclusive. This suggests, according to Komonchak, that in the turn to natural law theory, and the incarnational humanism it implies, Murray was

not abandoning the possibility of an explicitly theological approach backed by an eschatological humanism. Whatever shift there may have been in the middle period of Murray's work towards an accent on natural law theory was strategic and temporary, and little more. This accent, "was not the abandonment of a specifically Christian anthropology or socio-political theory, but the selection, theologically motivated, of a particular method by which to try to achieve a partial realization in modern circumstances of the Christian doctrine of the

human person and society."56 For Komonch ak, Murray's natural law theory is not as detachable from its foundations as Hehir, McElroy, and Weigel seem to suggest when the dialogue in question is a broad public one that crosses confessional communities. Here, Komonchak is in agreement with Hollenbach. However, unlike the Hollenbach of 1976 and 1979, Komonchak holds that the move to explicit theo­logical appeals does not constitute a break from Murray. Such appeals

were always a possibility, even if not always strategically wise. Finally, Komonchak parts with the Hooper of The Ethics of Discourse in arguing that it was not a late turn to historical consciousness that opened

Murray up to the possibility of public theological claims. There is

more continuity across the periods of Murray's writing, and part of that continuity is a willingness, when the occasion called for it, to argue in theological terms. The articles by Hughson and Komonchak suggest, therefore, a fourth option for interpreting Murray's work.

Hooper 's paper in the present volume may be interpreted as an attempt to bridge the best of the third and fourth options. There is

much more emphasis on the way in which Murray's early work adum­brates the later writings than in Hooper's earlier account. This occurs

56. Komonchak , "John Courtney Murray and the Redemption of History: Natural Law and Theology." See chapter 4 below .

xxvi Todd David Whitmore

in two ways. First of all, Hooper recognizes Murray's early work as theological. He divides Murray's career into three periods . In the first period (pre-1950) , Murray was theological. Here , we will find "a distinctly Catholic understanding of how Catholic religious resources might transform human nature ... "57 It is only in the second period (1950-64) - that of "a natural law interlude " - that Murray "emphati­cally suspended any strictly theological discussion of religious free­dom."58 In the third period (1964-67) , Murray's language is again theological. With this new chronology, the third period is viewed as a return of the theological. Secondly, even the .natural law interlude undergoes developments that enables this return of theology. Over the course of this period, Murray reconceived his understanding of natural law; it became more historically oriented.

Murray first conceived natural law, as well as theology, as a-historical. Eventually, he claimed that there had emerged within Western societies, outside the church and often op­posed by the church, a deeper understanding of human dig­nity and the limited role of the state. These insights and commitments arose within history; they were not derived from a realm outside particular historical societies.59 Hooper makes the case that this turn toward history in Murray in­cluded a reconceptualization of God's agency to affirm God's action through particular historical communities. As a result, Hooper ar­gues, "The very possibility of theological discourse . . . was opened by his turn to concrete historical societies."60 The turn to history enabled Murray's return to explicit theology. The result of Hooper's nuancing of his earlier account of Murray's development is a greater emphasis on the continuities between the different phases. The early period, though not historically oriented, was theological. The middle period, though not explicitly theological, became historically oriented. The final period was both. Taken togethe r, the four options and Hooper's most recent nuancing constitute a genuine argument on how to interpret Murray's work. Here , it is important to note that Murray distinguished between argument and confusion. The former includes sufficient agre ement, such that whatever disagreements there may be become clarified in the exchange. "We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about th "61 G . d. M . h. em. enmne argument, accor 1ng to urray, 1s an ac 1evement. 57. Hooper, "The Theological Sources of john Courtney Murray 's Ethics." See chapter

6 below. 58. Ibid. 59. Ibid. 60. Ibid. 61 . We Hold These Truths, IO.

The Growing End: John Courtney Murray and the Shape of Murray Studies xxvii "[D] isagreement is not an easy thing to reach."62 Confusion lacks any identified consensus , such that even the points of contention are

distorted and lost. "And when [the different views] clash, the issue

of agreement or disagreement tends to become irrelevant. The im­mediate situation is simply one of confusion . One does not know what the other is talking about."63 The academic debate over Murray is on e over disagreements. There is not only the shared conviction

that Murray's corpus is worth retrieving in order to address the present

question of Catholicism and American public life , but ther� are also shared concepts around which the debate centers. The aim of the

articles in this volume is to build on that achievement by continuing the argument. The articles unfold in three distinct sections. Those in the first

section address the general question of the basis for and possibility of dialogue , particularly in the case of Catholicism and Ameri�an

public life. The articles in the second section focus on the specific issue that most absorbed Murray, that of religious freedom. The

fundamental interpretive issue here concerns how Murray understood religious freedom, as simply a negative immunity against governmen­tal and other forms of interference, or as both an immunity and a positive empowerment achieved through state accommodation of the church. The articles in the third section examin e a range of other

public and ecclesial issues - censorship, foreign affairs, a�d the r?le

of the laity in the Catholic Church - that Murray turned his attent10n

to and that must be included for any volume on Murray to be complete .

62. Ibid., 15.

63. Ibid., 15-16.