The impact of teachers' unions on educational outcomes: What we know and what we need to learn

ARTICLE IN PRESSJID: ECOEDU [m3Gdc;March 23, 2015;17:12]

Economics of Education Review 000 (2015) 1–16

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Economics of Education Review

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/econedurev

Review

The impact of teachers’ unions on educational outcomes: What

we know and what we need to learn

Joshua M. Cowen a,∗, Katharine O. Strunk b,1

a College of Education, Michigan State University, 116-F Erickson Hall, East Lansing, MI 48824, United Statesb University of Southern California, United States

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:

Received 6 February 2015

Revised 17 February 2015

Accepted 22 February 2015

Available online xxx

JEL classification:

I20

J5

J51

J58

Keywords:

Economics of education

Teacher unionization

a b s t r a c t

In this paper we consider more than three decades of research on teachers’ unions in the

United States. We focus on unions’ role as potential rent-seekers in the K-12 educational

landscape, and specifically how teachers’ unions impact district and student outcomes. We

review important methodological improvements in the identification of union impacts and

the measurement of contract restrictiveness that characterize a number of recent studies. We

generally find that the preponderance of empirical evidence suggests that teacher unionization

and union strength are associated with increases in district expenditures and teacher salaries,

particularly salaries for experienced teachers. The evidence for union-related differences in

student outcomes is mixed, but suggestive of insignificant or modestly negative union effects.

Taken together, these patterns are consistent with a rent-seeking hypothesis. We conclude by

discussing other important union activities, most notably in the political arena, and by noting

that recent changes in state laws pertaining to teachers and teacher unions may provide

context for new directions in scholarship.

© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

Teachers’ unions, perhaps more than other public sector

unions, have remained controversial since their early incep-

tion in the 1850s. Although teachers’ associations were origi-

nally intended to advocate and provide support for members,

they have evolved into highly active and influential players

in local, state and national contexts. Teachers make up 26.6%

of state- and local-public sector workers and are unionized at

a higher rate than many other public sector workers (Sanes &

Schmitt, 2014). The two major teachers’ unions, the National

Education Association (NEA) and the American Federation of

Teachers (AFT), have grown from just 700,000 members in

1957 to a combined membership of over 4 million educators

∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 517 355 2215.

E-mail addresses: [email protected] (J.M. Cowen),

[email protected] (K.O. Strunk).1

Tel.: +1 213 740 2190.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2015.02.006

0272-7757/© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Please cite this article as: J.M. Cowen, K.O. Strunk, The impact of t

and what we need to learn, Economics of Education Review (2015)

and education support providers. In fact, the NEA today is

the largest labor union in the United States. The two teach-

ers unions spend more than any other public sector union on

federal lobbying activities.2

It is not just their size and political power that make teach-

ers’ unions important for focused study. Teachers’ unions

play an active role in setting school district policy through

their role as collective bargaining agent for teachers in the

45 states (plus the District of Columbia) that require or per-

mit teachers’ unions to collectively bargain with district ad-

ministrators. The resulting collective bargaining agreements

(CBAs, or contracts) regulate nearly every aspect of teachers’

work and school operations, which has led one scholar to note

that union contracts are the most important policy document

governing school district operations (Hill, 2006). CBAs regu-

late education policy regarding teacher salaries and benefits,

2 Data retrieved February 2014 from the Center for Responsive Politics,

www.opensecrets.org.

eachers’ unions on educational outcomes: What we know

, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2015.02.006


http://www.ScienceDirect.com

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mailto:[email protected]

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2 J.M. Cowen, K.O. Strunk / Economics of Education Review 000 (2015) 1–16


teacher assignment and transfers, teacher evaluations, class

size, grievance procedures, leaves, association rights, student

placement, instruction and curriculum, layoffs, preparation

periods and non-instructional duties and more (Goldhaber,

2013; Moe, 2009; Strunk, 2012, 2014). Although teachers’

unions cannot bargain on behalf of public school teachers

in the five states in which collective bargaining is explicitly

prohibited they may still have a voice in district-level policy-

setting (Fowles & Cowen, 2014).3 The two major teachers’

unions have local affiliates in every state, and often work

as professional associations in non-union locations, helping

teachers to understand their rights, advocating and lobbying

for teachers’ interests and taking action in local and state-

wide elections.

Although teachers’ unions are central actors in the pro-

vision and governance of public education, the literature on

teachers’ unions remains relatively thin, with myriad unan-

swered questions. However, the research base on teachers’

unions has improved dramatically over the past two decades.

In particular, recent studies have brought about two method-

ological innovations in the study of the impact of teachers’

unions on education outcomes, in both the identification of

plausibly causal union impacts and in the measurement of

union strength. As unions continue to occupy center stage in

policy debates over public education—for example in elec-

toral contests in states like Wisconsin and California, and in

battles over regulations for which unions have advocated and

fought such as tenure and due process—it is important to re-

turn to the literature to determine what is and is not known

about the impacts of teachers unions on education outcomes.

In what follows, we first review the current context in

which teachers’ unions are operating and discuss theoretical

motivations for union activity. We then review the literature

that has traditionally informed research and policy about

teachers’ unions, focusing on the methodological limitations

in earlier work and more recent innovations in both the

identification of union impacts and the measurement of

bargaining strength. Next, we review the extant literature

on the relationship between unions and student and district

outcomes. We close by discussing how these trends may be

extended and enhanced by studies exploiting new changes

to union-related policies nationwide, arguing ultimately

for an increased focus on teachers’ unions in economic and

policy analytic research.

2. The current context for teachers’ unions and collective

bargaining in the United States

As noted above, teachers’ unions have grown in both size

and political stature over the past half-century. In spite of,

or perhaps in part due to unions’ presence in the political

arena, many recent reform efforts intended to improve the

quality of teaching in American public schools have targeted

teachers’ collective bargaining rights as well as areas of legis-

lation that safeguard teacher protections fought for by their

3 In 15 states bargaining is permissible but not required. In these states

whether teachers negotiate collectively is determined at local district levels;

whether bargaining includes wages, working hours, conditions such as class

size, dismissal policies and teacher evaluation varies considerably between

these states (National Council on Teacher Quality, 2014a).

Please cite this article as: J.M. Cowen, K.O. Strunk, The impact of


unions. States have begun to weaken teacher job security

and change seniority provisions that have historically guided

teacher assignment and transfer. Traditional tenure protec-

tions are also being diminished across the country: 11 states

now make teaching effectiveness (rather than experience)

the preponderant criterion for attaining tenure and nine more

states are including student performance among those cri-

teria. Teacher ineffectiveness is now grounds for dismissal

in 20 states (National Council on Teacher Quality, 2014b).

Where legislative action has failed to materialize, reformers

are turning to the judiciary. In California, for example, a group

of students backed by school reformers has sued the state in

an attempt to remove seniority protections during layoffs and

limit teachers’ due process and tenure protections (Medina,

2014). In June 2014, the California Superior Court ruled that

these “challenged statues impose a real and appreciable im-

pact on students’ fundamental right to equality of education

and that they impose a disproportionate burden on poor and

minority students,” essentially violating the equal protection

clause of the California Constitution (Vergara v. State of Cal-

ifornia, 2014, p. 8). The ruling is now being appealed by the

state and the two teachers’ unions, who asked to be named

as co-defendants in the case. A similar lawsuit has been filed

in New York (Wright v. New York, 2014) and others are being

discussed in states around the country.

More fundamentally, policymakers across the country are

acting to restrict unions’ fiscal and membership resources.

Twenty-six states now limit or prohibit teachers’ unions’ abil-

ity to collect membership dues from teachers who do not ex-

pressly consent to paying such agency fees (National Council

on Teacher Quality, 2014b), and multiple court cases are sur-

facing that aim to reduce teachers’ and other public sector

unions’ abilities to collect membership dues from employees

who do not choose to join them. The U.S. Supreme Court re-

cently ruled in Harris v. Quinn (Case No. 11-681) that, in some

cases, public employee labor unions cannot require employ-

ees to pay membership dues (Estlund & Forbath, 2014). In Cal-

ifornia, Freidrichs vs. California Teachers’ Association (US Dis-

trict Case No. SACV 13-676-JLS) is challenging the California

Teachers’ Association’s right to require teachers to pay union

dues. The U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that the

case should be passed on to the U.S. Supreme Court, where

many believe the more conservative judiciary may overturn

the precedent-setting Abood vs. Detroit Board of Education

(Supreme Court Case 75-1153) 1977 decision that originally

legalized unions’ rights to collect “fair share” (Fensterwald,

2014).

At the federal policy level, large initiatives such as waivers

to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Race to the

Top and the Teacher Incentive Fund have incorporated re-

quirements that directly counter long-held union-supported

protections. Elements of these three federal programs require

the creation of large data systems that link teachers to their

students, teacher evaluation systems that expressly calcu-

late teacher performance in part based upon their students’

achievement, and systems that tie teacher compensation to

their classroom performance rather than solely to experience

and educational credentials. In short, teachers’ unions, along

with other public employees, are facing clear challenges not

only to their closely held policy priorities but to their exis-

tence itself (Freeman & Han, 2012).

teachers’ unions on educational outcomes: What we know



J.M. Cowen, K.O. Strunk / Economics of Education Review 000 (2015) 1–16 3


4 There is a third view of unions’ role in education policy that takes the per-

spective that teachers’ unions act as professional organizations. Advocates

of this point of view conceive union motivation to be based in the desire to

raise the professionalism of teaching by ensuring better working conditions

for teachers, providing teachers with individual supports to enhance their

practice, and helping teachers to become “knowledge workers” (e.g., Bascia,

1994, 2000; Kerchner, 2003, 2004; Kerchner & Koppich, 1993, 1999, 2000;

Kerchner, Koppich, & Weeres, 1997, 1998).

The immediate result of these changes is that unions

are operating across a changing and increasingly diverse

set of policy and political conditions (Winkler, Scull, &

Zeehandelaar, 2012). Yet still little is known about the im-

pact of teachers’ unions on district and student outcomes,

and therefore about the implications, if any, of current leg-

islative, judicial and policy changes. This paper is intended to

clarify what is, and is not, understood about the impacts of

teachers’ unions on these outcomes, and to highlight fruitful

avenues for future research.

3. Theoretical perspectives on union motivation

Before an extended discussion of the innovations in the

literature on teachers’ unions, it is important to contem-

plate why teachers’ unions theoretically might impact stu-

dent and district outcomes. From one perspective, that most

closely associated with the fields of labor and public eco-

nomics, unions impact outcomes as actors in the market

for educational production. From this standpoint, unions are

rent-seekers (Hoxby, 1996), looking to gain from their in-

volvement in public education through increases in salaries

and enhanced working conditions, exhibited through pro-

visions such as class size (smaller classes are easier for

teachers to manage, but also provide greater membership

for unions), longer planning periods, shorter work days and

school years, and the like. The rent-seeking model of teach-

ers’ unions suggests that teachers’ unions extract rent from

school districts by negotiating increases in their own salaries

and working conditions. Because unions are also able to ne-

gotiate strong job protections, districts may hire and retain

more teachers, and specifically more lower-quality teach-

ers, than is optimal under the same levels of salary ex-

penditures (Eberts & Stone, 1984). The predicted result of

such conditions is a scenario in which unions achieve these

rents while providing no commensurate gains to—perhaps

even harming—district productivity as measured by student

outcomes.

Political science has also contributed a theoretical orienta-

tion germane to understanding how teachers’ unions impact

outcomes in educational policy. The work of Terry Moe in par-

ticular has stressed the role of teacher unions as organized

interest groups with stakes in the policymaking process. In

Moe’s framework (e.g. Moe, 2011, forthcoming) union activ-

ity is not only geared toward maximizing salaries and protect-

ing teacher jobs, but also toward the opposition of any policy

change that weakens the union position vis-à-vis those and

other priorities. Moe’s framework is also clarifying in that

it includes the notion of unions as actors within the public

sector, rather than simply one side of a bilateral negotiation

over resources. Through this lens, which is in some ways an

extension of the rent-seeking view taken by economists, ar-

guments such as NEA President Lily Eskelsen-Garcia’s that

unions serve the public interest by fighting for public schools

and school children and even other social causes (e.g. Bryant,

2014) are predictable responses to any efforts to curb their

power. Like other special interests groups jockeying for po-

sition, unions’ activity functions not to promote the public

good per se, but to align the definition of that public good to

their own preferences. As a result, unions’ support of fixed

salaries, lifetime tenure, and seniority-based staffing, as well



as their opposition to charter schools, school accountability

programs and teacher evaluation, become matters of fairness

and equity, due process, the value of public schools and the

limits of standardized testing.4

Although we focus on the rent-seeking perspective in

this paper, we do discuss (albeit briefly) the notion of

unions as politically active interests groups, which leads

to very different—though not necessarily incongruent—

organizational points of emphasis for any comprehensive

discussion of union effects. Critics of collective bargaining

itself may (or may not) also fault union electoral or lob-

bying activity—and supporters may likewise defend these

tendencies—but they occur at different levels of government,

are carried out by different individuals and affiliate groups,

with different sets of resources and, however the two may

ultimately align, toward a different set of outcomes and ob-

jectives.

4. Empirical challenges and new developments in studies

of union impacts

Over the past three decades a number of studies have as-

sessed the proposition that teachers’ unions are rent-seeking

by attempting to estimate the impact of unions on achieve-

ment and other outcomes. In large part, this research has done

so by modeling the relationship between a simple measure

of unionization (e.g., whether the state or district is union-

ized or the proportion of unionized teachers in a district) and

the outcome of interest. The most recent complete review

of the research on the impact of teachers’ unions on student

achievement, published in 2006, made clear that the body of

research up to that date rested on “shaky empirical ground”

(Goldhaber, 2006, p. 157). Goldhaber’s book chapter reviewed

extant literature through the year 2000, and noted that only

one of the economic papers on teachers’ union impacts at-

tempted to correct for potentially endogenous relationships

between unionization status and any number of district or

student-level outcomes.

Table 1 (below) outlines all of the papers that have at-

tempted to address the impact of teachers’ unions on district

and student outcomes, listing them chronologically and sum-

marizing their main methodological strategies. These stud-

ies can be split into two distinct areas: those that study the

impact of teachers’ unions on district expenditures, most of

which focus on union impact on teachers wages, and those

that examine the impact of teachers’ unions on productiv-

ity as measured by student outcomes (achievement tests

and graduation rates). The earliest of these suffer from two

main impediments to the accurate prediction of the impact

of teachers’ unions on student achievement: 1.) they utilize

econometric techniques that fail to correct for bias due to en-

dogeneity or other issues with specification; and 2.) they use

simple indicators of union status that may no longer reflect




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Table 1

Summary of union/CBA studies relating to district and student outcomes.

Author Year Data Method Results

Chambers 1977 Two cross-section samples of school districts

from a sample of 39 elementary districts

and 50 unified districts in California,

combined with data provided by the

California Teachers Association.

OLS: average teacher salaries and school

expenditures predicted by school and

district characteristics, including controls for

non-bargaining districts located near

bargaining districts (regional bargaining

effects).

Bargaining districts spend between 5.7 and 12.2% more on teacher

salaries; 3.5–12.2%; more on administrative salaries; regional

bargaining effects of 5.3–7.9% on district spending overall.

Gallagher 1979 1974 expenditure data from 133 bargaining

(65) and non-bargaining (68) small/med

Illinois districts, stratified by district

wealth.

OLS: spending on district bargaining status and

controls. N � 40–50/regression (stratified by

wealth).

Bargaining districts spend more on teacher salaries than do

non-bargaining districts. Medium- and high-wealth bargaining

districts spend more overall (8–13%) and on non-teacher salary

expenditures than do non-bargaining med/high wealth districts.

Eberts 1983 1976–1977 CBA data from New York State

paired with district-level NY DoE data on

finances and student and teacher

characteristics.

Examines 53 individual regulations and 5

areas in CBAs.

Generates 2 measures of contract

strength/restrictiveness: index of #

provisions and Guttman scaling

technique-based measure.

Descriptive statistics and content analysis of

CBAs.

OLS: spending on CBA measures and

controls.

CBA strength and the existence of specific provisions (especially

regulating RIF and dismissal) are associated with district resource

allocation. Magnitudes are relatively small (e.g., having specific RIF

provisions is associated with increase of about 0.5–1 cent per pupil

spending on instruction, 0.75 of a cent increase per pupil in

spending on salaries).

Eberts and Stone,

chap. 2

1984 1972–1973 and 1976–1977 CBA data from

New York State. Focus on RIF protection as

a representative provision. Matched to

district financial and student

characteristics data.

Logits: regress whether districts have, lost or

gained the RIF provision between 1972 and

1976 on budget measure (expenditure level

or change in spending on instruction,

benefits or services) and district controls.

Economic events such as budget changes, enrollment changes or

school closures do not impact whether CBAs contain RIF provisions.

However, decreases in district total operating expenditures are

associated with the loss of RIF CBA protections and increases in

expenditures are associated with gaining a RIF protection.

Eberts and Stone,

chap. 4

1984 1972–1973 and 1976–1977 CBA data from

New York State. Focused on 80 CBA

provisions. Measure bargaining strength

through class size and RIF seniority

provisions as well as change of total

budget going to personnel.

Matched to random sample of elementary

and secondary classroom teacher data and

to census data.

Level and first-differenced OLS wage

regression: regressed change in ln(wage) on

a set of first-differenced covariates and an

indicator of becoming a union member

between the two time periods for each

teacher.

Greater bargaining strength is associated with stronger contracts in

terms of employment security provisions.

The estimated premium for a union joiner is 8% greater in 1977

versus 1973, and is 4% in 74 and 12% in 77.

Eberts and Stone,

chap. 5

1984 1972–1973 and 1976–1977 CBA data from

New York State. Code for 80 provisions

within CBAs. Also generate a measure of

CBA restrictiveness using a Guttman

scaling technique. Also examine 18

individual items and an index made up of

summing those items.

Matched to random sample of elementary

and secondary classroom teacher data and

to census data.

OLS: regressed expenditure areas (all per

pupil: instruction, administration, benefits,

other, salaries, teacher, average salary) on

individual CBA items and a set of controls.

Alternative regressions use an index variable

as measure of CB strength.

Stronger CBAs are associated with increases in spending overall and

in subareas: having greater than average # of items is associated

with increases in funds to instruction, benefits and salaries, and

decreased spending on "other." CBA Arbitration and grievance

protections are not associated with non-wage budget items.

However, protections against RIFs and dismissals are associated

with greater overall spending and greater expenditures on teacher

salaries.

Eberts and Stone,

chap. 6

1984 1972–1973 and 1976–1977 CBA data from

New York State. Matched to district

financial and student characteristics data.

OLS: regress achievement on district

covariates in both union and non-union

districts. Then sum the coefficients of the

parameters earlier research indicates are

associated with CB.

Achievement is higher in unionized districts (�4%). Unions have

strongest benefit for students who are near the average pretest

score – but are less beneficial for students at the tails.

(continued on next page)

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Table 1 (continued)


Woodbury 1985 1977 Census of Government data for

national sample of 4851 districts.

OLS and 2SLS: regress student–teacher ratios

and teacher salaries on indicators of state

legality of bargaining class size and district

CBA class size regulations and controls.

Districts that bargain have higher student–teacher ratios (2–4%). This

results from tradeoffs with salaries (smaller class sizes and lower

salaries). Districts in states that must bargain over class size have a

student–teacher ratio that is 6.3% lower and teacher pay that is

15.7% lower.

Eberts and Stone 1986 Sustaining Effects Study (200 elementary

schools); High School and Beyond (893

high schools).

OLS predictions of district expenditures as a

function of district demographics and

bargaining status; Heckman corrections

included as sensitivity analysis.

Unionized districts have 7–15% higher costs; similar impacts when

union effect is allowed to vary by level of district productivity

measured by student math achievement.

Eberts and Stone 1987 Sustaining Effects Study including

14,000 + students in 328 schools.

OLS predictions of student achievement

differences as a function of school, student

and teacher demographics.

Positive union effect for average students; negative effect for higher

and lower achieving students, estimated separately by union and

non-union district status; post-estimation predictions used to

calculate productivity differentials; at the sample mean

union-nonunion differential = 0.67; similar but opposite direction

in favor of nonunion schools for children very high above or low

below mean; average union effect is positive at 0.33 across sample.

Kurth 1987 Author compiled state-level data on SAT

average scores; state educational

expenditures; teacher labor market

attributes 1960–1980.

OLS predictions of % change in state average

math/verbal SAT from 1972 to 1982 as a

function of state demographic changes and %

of teachers under CBA and meet-and-confer.

State-level SAT scores 0.7–0.8 points lower as % of teachers covered

by CBA increases; 0.8–0.11 points lower as % of teachers under

meet-and-confer increases.

Easton 1988 1969–1982 sample of all 55 large unified

Oregon districts paired with financial data.

OLS of district expenditures, class sizes and

teacher salary levels on set of covariates, run

on data from before and after legalized CB.

First-difference regression to predict change

in salary levels between two years post CB.

2SLS as specification check.

The onset of CB did not change relationships between ability or

willingness to pay and spending outcomes.

Kleiner and Petree 1988 Author compiled state-level data from 1972

to 1982, including measures of union

participation rates; changes to bargaining

laws; state averages on college entrance

exams and graduation rates from NEA, U.S.

Census and Educational Testing Service

sources.

OLS and state fixed effects models of the

impact of union membership and coverage

rates on college entrance exam and

graduation rate averages.

Increase in proportion of union members from 0 to 1 increases

SAT/ACT scores between 6 and 8%; elasticity of test scores to

unionization is 0.5–0.7; insignificant relationships between union

coverage and outcomes; inconsistent impacts on graduation rate.

Register and Grimes 1991 National Assessment of Economic Education

Data on 2360 students in 1987

supplemented with author-collected data

on CBA status of each district.

OLS predictions of SAT and ACT scores as a

function of student and school

characteristics, with Heckman-corrected

estimates to adjust for selection bias in

sitting for college exam.

Students in CBA districts have average 46.3 SAT (or SAT-equivalent)

points (4.7%) higher than non-CBA districts.

Argys and Rees 1995 National Educational Longitudinal Survey

(1988); tenth grade standardized testing

data.

OLS controlling for 8th grade test scores. Students in unionized schools have an average of 1.1% higher

achievement scores in mathematics; negative impacts of

approximately 0.5% for students at high and low ends of

achievement distribution; distributional effects mitigated by

inclusions of class characteristics in production function.

Duplantis, Chandler,

and Geske

1995 Survey data of 82 school districts with more

than 10,000 students nationwide.

Instruments include questions on

certification elections; election results;

CBA negotiations and superintendent

perceptions of union growth.

OLS predictions of log wages, log employment

and log district expenditures as a function of

CBA presence and union endorsements of

board candidates.

9.5% increase in teacher salaries and 15.6% increase in expenditures

in districts with bargaining agreements; 4% increase in

expenditures associated with union endorsements; no union

impacts on employment.


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Zwerling and

Thompson

1995 1984 Administrator Teacher Survey of NELS;

High School and Beyond.

OLS prediction of teacher salaries as a function

of teacher professional and demographic

characteristics, school working conditions,

local school enrollment trends and teacher

union density by state.

Unionized districts spend on average 5.5% more on teacher salaries;

no differences after adjusting for statewide union density

(spillover); both direct union and spillover effects concentrated at

higher experience levels, no difference for entry-level salaries.

Hoxby 1996 Author compiled district-level data

(1960–1992) from NEA, US Census of

Governments, Census of Population and

Housing sources.

OLS, difference-in-differences; instrumental

variables predictions of per pupil

expenditures, teacher salary levels,

student–teacher ratio and drop-out rates as

functions of district demographics and

district adoption of bargaining agreements;

diff-in-diff and IV used to correct for

endogenous district characteristics.

Unions increase per pupil expenditures by 2.9–12.3%; teacher salaries

by 1.6–5.0%; reduce student–teacher ratios by 1.1–1.7 students;

worsen drop-out rate by 1.8 points, while drop-out rates less

responsive to input changes in union schools.

Nelson and Rosen 1996 Author compiled state-level data on 1995

SAT scores; 1994 NAEP scores

supplemented with state-level data from

NCES Schools and Staffing Survey and ETS.

Descriptive statistics; OLS predictions of

state-averaged SAT and NAEP scores as a

function of state testing-taking

demographics.

CBA states have regression-adjusted SAT scores of average 36 points

higher than non-CBA states; regression-adjusted NAEP scores in

CBA states are 9 points higher.

Zigarelli 1996 Collective Bargaining Law Data Set (1984)

combined with High School and Beyond

(HSB, 1982) and the Administrator and

Teacher Survey (1984) from HSB.

OLS predictions of natural log of teacher salary

and average student time per day spent in

class as a function of state law indicators

associated with unionization (right to strike,

arbitration) controlling for teacher and

school characteristics.

Right-to-strike laws associated with 11.5% higher teacher salaries;

37 min of class time fewer per day; de facto right to strike increases

salaries by 5.7% and reduces class hours by 44 min; arbitration

availability increases salaries by 3.6% and reduced class hours by 70

fewer minutes.

Milkman 1997 High school and beyond 1979–1980 and

1982 follow-up; include 2684 minority

student surveys and scores.

OLS estimates of math scores as a function of

prior math, student, teacher and school

characteristics including; estimated

separately by union non-union status.

Union/nonunion productivity differential is 0.24 for minority

students compared to 0.39 for all students; -0.14 for minority

students in majority schools, 0.31 for minority students in minority

schools.

Carini, Powell, and

Steelman

2000 Author compiled state-level data based on

Schools and Staffing Survey (1993–1994)

1993 SAT scores; 1994 ACT scores and

state demographics from US Census.

OLS predictions of SAT and ACT scores as a

function of state demographics and

unionization rate calculated from SASS.

1 point change in unionization rate associated with SAT increases

between 0.27 and 0.51 in preferred models. Similar results when

ACT averages are the dependent variables.

Goldhaber et al. 2008 1999–2000 Schools and Staffing Survey. LPM predictions of the adoption of formal and

informal merit pay systems as a function of

district performance, costs, and community

characteristics; tested against instrumental

variables models based on state partisan

control of legislatures.

Districts with non bargaining agreement 6% more likely to adopt

formal merit pay plans; more than 8% more likely in right-to-work

states.

Lovenheim 2009 Author compiled district-level data from

case laws (LexisNexis); union certification

election results from Public Employment

Relations Board in IA, IN, MN; Census of

Governments.

State by year and district fixed effects models

of effect of union certification on teacher

salaries, employment levels,

student–teacher ratios, district expenditures

and drop-out rates.

Few consistent, significant union increase on district resources; no

long-term union impact on drop-out rates (1.8% increase in

short-run, insignificant after 7.7 years).

Moe 2009 1989-9 CBA data from 371 randomly

selected California districts. Measure of

CBA restrictiveness/strength: uses factor

analysis incorporating 41 CBA items into

15 factors.

Matched to district achievement and

demographic data.

School-level OLS: regressed school

achievement growth over five years on

measure of CBA restrictiveness

(district-level), base year achievement, base

year demographics and changes in

demographics. Clusters SEs to the district

level. Separate regressions for elementary

and secondary schools.

OLS: regressed contract strength on district

covariates.

More restrictive CBAs are associated with smaller achievement

growth over time (impact sizes of -0.24 and -0.32 in elementary

and secondary districts, respectively). This is driven by the

relationship between CBA strength and achievement growth in

large districts (impact sizes of -0.44 and -0.57). In large districts,

the negative relationship between contract restrictiveness and

achievement growth is exacerbated in districts with greater

proportions of minority students. In addition, larger districts have

more restrictive CBAs.


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Cowen 2009 1999–2000 Schools and Staffing Survey,

focus on 1066 districts in 14 states with

substantial variation in district

non-bargaining/bargaining status;

supplemented with expenditure data from

School District Finance Surveys.

District-level OLS prediction of log

expenditures on salaries/benefits as a

function of district covariates supplemented

with state-level data on laws affecting

bargaining; state fixed-effects; interactions

between bargaining status and

student–teacher ratio.

CBA-related increases in compensation (salaries or benefits) of

approximately 20%; bargaining-related differences greatest at low

levels of students/teacher ratios and for district with high levels of

locally sources revenue.

Strunk and Grissom 2010 2005–2006 CBA data from 113 California

school districts with 4+ schools. Generate

a measure of overall CBA restrictiveness

using 639 items in a Partial Independence

Item Response (PIIR) Model; generate PIIR

restrictiveness measures for transfer and

vacancies, evaluation, association rights

and class size sub-areas.

Matched measure to survey data from

school board members re. union power

and direct political mechanisms through

which unions exert influence (fundraising

assistance, volunteer mobilization and

endorsements) as well as other special

interest group power and influence.

Matched to district demographic and

financial variables.

OLS: regress CBA restrictiveness (overall,

subarea, provision) on survey measures of

union power/influence, relative to business

group power/influence and district controls.

2SLS regression of CBA restrictiveness on

measures of teacher salary, instrumented

with revenue limit assigned to district.

More powerful unions negotiate more restrictive CBAs than do less

powerful/influential unions (e.g., a 1 SD increase in CR is associated

with a 0.14, 0.20 and 0.33 SD increase in "other working

conditions," "transfer and vacancy" and "evaluation" subareas).

Rather than tradeoffs occurring between contract restrictiveness

and teacher salaries, the two are positively and significantly

related.

More powerful unions negotiate CBAs with more restrictive

individual provisions.

Boards with more educators on them have more restrictive CBAs,

boards with more Republicans have less restrictive CBAs.

Strunk and Reardon 2010 2005–2006 CBA data from 466 California

districts with 4+ schools (83%). Utilizes

639 objectively chosen items from CBAs.

Uses a Partial Item Independence Response

(PIIR) model to generate a measure of

contract strength.

PIIR measure of union strength has a number of advantages over

other measures of contract strength/unionization. It is an objective

and statistically sound approach and generates transparent

measure along a probabilistically-based interval scale. Places

contracts according to their specific level of contract restrictiveness

and provides standard errors of measurement and measure

reliability. Allows for measurement of restrictiveness of provisions

within CBAs.

Rose and Sonstelie 2010 1999–2000 data from 771 California districts

that provided CA Department of Education

with their salary schedules (J90 dataset).

Matched to California achievement and

demographic data.

OLS: regress bargaining outcomes (base salary,

experience premium and teacher–pupil) and

achievement on a measure of union power

(# of eligible voters in the school district,

students/eligible voter or % homeowners in

district) on district-level controls and

measures of budget constraint. Cluster SEs to

the region. 2SLS robustness checks.

Union power (district size) is positively associated with bargaining

outcomes (teachers’ salaries – both base and experience premium

– and pupil–teacher ratio). The 10 largest districts in the sample

would have a base salary about 7% higher and an experience

premium about 11% higher than the average district. The 10 largest

districts would have teacher–pupil ratios about 6% lower than the

average sized CA district. Achievement is negatively related to

union power (district size).

Strunk 2011 2005–2006 CBA data from 465 California

districts with 4+ schools (82%). Generates



Item Response (PIIR) Model.

Matched with district financial,

achievement and demographic data.

OLS: regress expenditures (overall and

categories) on measure of contract

restrictiveness and covariates; regress

achievement and one-year growth in

achievement on contract restrictiveness and

covariates.

CBA restrictiveness is positively associated with overall expenditures

(1 SD stronger CBA spends 13% more). Spending driven by

increased expenditures on administrator salaries (1 SD stronger

CBA spends 0.15%), classified personnel benefits and

instruction-related functions. CBA restrictiveness is negatively

associated with expenditures on textbooks and other instructional

materials (1 SD stronger CBA spends 0.20% less on textbooks and

supplies) and on schoolboard related activities.

CBA restrictiveness is negatively associated with same-year

achievement score, but not with growth in achievement (1 SD

stronger CBA is associated with a �4.5 point decrease in

achievement).


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Table 1 (continued)


Strunk and McEachin 2011 2005–2006 CBA data from 465 California

districts with 4+ schools (82%). Generate a

measure of overall CBA restrictiveness


Item Response (PIIR) Model.

Matched with district achievement and

demographic data from 2005–2006

through 2008–2009.

OLS and Logits with year FEs: regress

achievement on CBA restrictiveness and %

minority, % low income, % proficient and

district covariates. Iterations of models

include interactions between CBA

restrictiveness and indicators of

hard-to-staff districts.

HLM and HGLM for models using school and

district level data.

CBA restrictiveness is negatively associated district aggregate student

achievement (district math and ELA proficiency levels and

graduation rates; positively associated with likelihood of failing

NCLB (PI) and continuing to fail NCLB (higher levels of PI)). A 1 SD

increase in CBA restrictiveness is associated with a 7.7% increase in

the probability that a district will be in PI and a 4.5% increase in the

likelihood that district will progress to higher levels of PI, and with

a 1.3% decrease in grad rates. Results are amplified in hard-to-staff

districts.

At the school level, there is no relationship between CBA

restrictiveness and schools’ likelihood of failing NCLB, nor between

CR and school-level proficiency or graduation rates. However,

negative relationships between hard-to-staff school characteristics

and school achievement measures are amplified in districts with

more restrictive contracts.

West and Mykerezi 2011 Schools and Staffing Survey and TR3

(National Council on Teacher Quality).

OLS estimates of effect of presence of

bargaining agreement on a set of dependent

variables related to teacher pay, controlling

for district characteristics; IV estimates

based on exogenous variation in timing of

state laws affecting unionization and public

sector union membership rates.

Presence of a CBA decreases the probability of merit pay adoption by

20 percentage points; increase in average salaries by 3.9%; similar

returns to experience (1.1–1.2%) for early and later career teachers.

Winters 2011 1999–2000 Schools and Staffing Survey. GMM estimator accounting for spatial

correlation in salaries between districts:

salaries in nearby districts are instrumented

with distance-weighted averages of

explanatory variables in adjacent and other

local districts.

Relative to states with no collective bargaining membership, states

with all teachers as CBA members have average salaries 18% higher

for experienced teachers; states with greatest membership density

have 28% higher salaries for experienced salaries than those with

lowest density of membership.


districts with 4+ schools (82%). Generates



Item Response (PIIR) Model. Also focuses

on 95 representative provisions in CBA

areas: compensation, evaluations, leaves,

transfer/vacancy, class size, non-teaching

duties, and school calendar/year. Matched

with district demographic data.

Descriptive analysis examining 95 provisions

by provision district % of FRPL, % minority

and urban location.

OLS: regressed existence of provision (LPM)

and overall CBA restrictiveness (OLS) on

district demographic variables.

Although CBA regulations largely constrain principal and district

autonomy, there is some flexibility in CBAs and CBA provisions

serve to enhance teachers’ professional working conditions.

Hard-to-staff districts have particularly restrictive CBA provisions,

but also have some of most flexibility-enhancing provisions.

Districts with greater % minority, controlling for other covariates,

have more restrictive CBAs, as do urban and larger districts.


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Table 1 (continued)


Brunner and Squires 2013 2007–2008 Schools and Staffing Survey data

of nationally representative sample of

districts. Matched with demographic data

from the 2005–2009 American

Community Survey and NCES data.

OLS with labor market and state FEs: regressed

bargaining outcomes (base salaries, 2

experience premium measures and

teacher–pupil ratio) on the # of eligible

voters in the district (size, or union power),

the interaction between size and a state

indicator of CB status, and vector of controls.

In states that mandate CB, union strength (district size) is positively

associated with bargaining outcomes (higher beginning salaries

and salary returns to experience, lower teacher–pupil ratios). In

states in which CB is not permitted, there is a positive relationship

between union power (size) and certain bargaining outcomes

(higher beginning teacher salaries and lower teacher–pupil ratios),

but there is a negative relationship between district size and

returns to experience for teachers. Results suggest that more

powerful unions bargain for more generous returns to teacher

seniority at the expense of staffing ratios and base salaries. In states

that mandate CB, moving from a district with 1 SD below the mean

to one SD above the mean in district size would increase the base

salary of teachers by 4.5% and the salary premium paid to

experienced teachers by 2.4% for teachers with a BA and 3.6% for

teachers with an MA.

Goldhaber,

D-Entremont, Fang,

Lavery, and

Theobald

2013 Uses 2010–2011 CBA CBA data from all 270

districts in Washington state. Generate a



Item Response (PIIR) Model, as well as

measures of subarea restrictiveness

(Accessibility; association rights;

evaluation; grievance;

layoffs/benefits/leaves; hiring and

transfers; workload; a cherry picked

subset of dramatic provisions).

Matched to district demographic data.

Replicates Strunk and Reardon (2010) PIIR

method in WA state to assess overall CBA

restrictiveness and the restrictiveness of

subsets of CBA items. Uses correlations and

t-tests to assess relationships between areas

of CBAs and with district characteristics.

WA state CBAs that contain many provision in one area of the CBA

tend to also contain many provisions that regulate other areas of

policy. Highly restrictive CBAs are larger, have more Asian/PI, black,

bilingual students, and get greater % of funding from local funds

but less from state.

Lott and Kenny 2013 721 nationally drawn districts with more

than 10,000 students, drawn from

www.schooldatadirect.com;

supplemented with IRS and NCES data on

school/district characteristics plus union

dues and expenditures per student.

OLS predictions of 4th/8th grade math and

reading proficiency percentages as a

function of school/district demographics and

union dues/expenditures plus IV corrections

using right-to-work laws as instruments.

1 s.d. rise in union dues/teacher decreases math and reading

proficiency percentages by 3.7 points; 1 s.d. rise increase in union

expenditures/student decrease proficiency by 3.2–3.4 points for

math and reading, respectively. IV estimates of dues and spending

relationships comparable at 2.2–3.7 decreases per 1 s.d. increase of

union resources.


districts with 4+ schools (90%).

Descriptive statistics. CBA regulations largely constrain principal and district autonomy to

respond to education reforms although there is some flexibility in

CBAs to enable reform.

Goldhaber, Lavery,

and Theobald

2014 Uses 2010–2011 CBA CBA data from all 270

districts in Washington state. Generate a



Item Response (PIIR) Model, as well as

measures of subarea restrictiveness

matched to district demographic and

geographic data.

Replicates Strunk and Reardon (2010) PIIR

method in WA state and uses measures of

CBA restrictiveness in a spatial econometric

approach to explore impact of bargaining

outcomes in nearby districts on an

individual’s district’s contract.

OLS and ML estimation of spatial lag model,

see OLS is likely biased and use ML

estimates. Also use 2SLS in case of OVB using

proximity as instruments.

Spatial relationships play an important role in determining

bargaining outcomes as measured by CBA restrictiveness, although

shared institutional bargaining structures seems to be what really

matters (Education Service Districts, or ESDs) and Uniserv councils.

The influence of geographic distance found in previous studies of

teacher wages may actually reflect influence of bargaining

structures. Spatial relationships are consistent over all subareas of

CBAs, except transfer and hiring provisions (Uniserv drives spatial

relationship) and grievance provisions (ESD drives relationship).

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http://www.schooldatadirect.com




the context in which unions operate. In what follows, we first

outline the empirical challenges faced by much of the earlier

set of research addressing union impacts. We then discuss

what is known in light of these challenges about the impacts

of unions on district spending, and especially on teachers’

wages, and on student achievement.

4.1. Identifying union impacts

Most of the studies that addressed union impact through

the early 2000s did so by estimating models that did not ac-

count for endogeneity or other sources of bias. In particular,

the possibility that the presence of a local union was en-

dogenous to variation in the outcome of interest was largely

(but not wholly) unexplored in this early work. Until 1996,

the dominant empirical studies of union impacts were those

conducted by Eberts and Stone (e.g. 1984,1986, 1987) which

essentially adjusted mean differences in district or student

outcomes via Ordinary Least Squares regressions, accounting

for a number of demographic and institutional characteris-

tics. Later studies (e.g. Argys & Rees, 1995; Kleiner & Petree,

1988; Kurth, 1987) employed a similar approach. Only two

studies during this period moved beyond a basic OLS frame-

work: Eberts and Stone (1984)’s estimate of a teacher-level

hedonic wage model, which incorporated teacher fixed ef-

fects that also captured time-invariant district characteris-

tics, and Woodbury’s (1985) two-stage least squares (2SLS)

models incorporating variation in community demographics

as a source of exogenous variation in resources. Neither study,

however, was explicitly concerned with the unobserved loca-

tional differences that may have predicted both unionization

status and the outcomes of interest.

These limitations reflect the field at the time, and remain

important contributions to the base of knowledge concern-

ing the relationship between unionization and district out-

comes and productivity. However, while this early research

assesses the difference in outcomes in unionized versus non-

unionized districts, these studies’ ability to interpret these

differences as causal union impacts is limited. In particular, it

is entirely plausible that districts choose to unionize and/or

greater proportions of teachers join a union when district ad-

ministrators spend money in specific ways, or when student

achievement is particularly high or low. As such, the findings

of this early research should be considered descriptive rather

than causal.

Hoxby’s (1996) work was the first to pay explicit atten-

tion to the possibility that unobserved determinants of dis-

tricts’ unionization status may also determine resource al-

location and district productivity. As we describe in greater

detail below, Hoxby leveraged a combination of difference-

in-differences and instrumental variables approaches (pre-

viewed to some extent a decade earlier in the Eberts and

Stone (1984) and Woodbury (1985) studies) as an empiri-

cal solution to this theoretical problem. A number of other

scholars (e.g. Lott & Kenny, 2013; Lovenheim, 2009; West &

Mykerezi, 2011) have since followed suit, while other recent

work (Brunner & Squires, 2013; Winters, 2011) has exploited

variation in local or regional labor markets to identify union

effects on wages. We discuss these approaches in our survey

of the evidence below.



4.2. Measuring contract strength

The discussion above highlights how research about

the impacts of teachers’ unions has improved in the

identification strategies since the earliest studies undertaken

in the 1970s. However, even the more recent studies largely

consider unionization in a binary sense: districts are either

unionized or they are not; teachers either are members of

their union or not. Studies that attempted to measure the

impacts of unions on student achievement and other impor-

tant education outcomes during this time period were able to

measure union impacts as a function of whether a district did

or did not have a collective bargaining agreement, a registered

teachers’ union, or in some cases the proportion of teachers

who were unionized in a district. For instance, the Eberts and

Stone studies measured unionization as a simple dichoto-

mous indicator of union versus non-union school districts in

New York state in the 1970s. Similarly, using national survey

datasets from the National Center on Educational Statistics

(NCES), other work by Eberts and Stone (1986, 1987) mea-

sured unionization as a function of district’s collective bar-

gaining status. Similar measures of unionization were em-

ployed by nearly all researchers tackling questions of union

impacts around this time (e.g., Argys & Rees, 1995; Milkman,

1997; Nelson & Rosen, 1996; Register & Grimes, 1991). These

dichotomous indicators of union status fit the context at the

time, when unions were just entering the scene.

At about the same time, researchers with sufficient data

began to expand on union measures, focusing on the propor-

tion of teachers at the state and/or local level at three levels of

union activity: operating under a collective bargaining agree-

ment; under a meet and confer agreement (by which unions

can meet and consult with district administrators, but results

of these conferences are not binding); and without CBA pro-

tections (Kleiner & Petree, 1988; Kurth, 1987). Hoxby (1996),

used a stricter definition of unionization than much of the

previous work at that time, measuring unionization as dis-

tricts with at least 50% union membership, that reported that

they collectively bargained and that had in place a collec-

tively bargained contract. In addition, she instrumented for

unionization using the timing of the passage of laws explic-

itly enabling collective bargaining and those allowing teacher

agency shops and union shops.

Many of the more recent studies about unions have fo-

cused on the methodological challenges associated with at-

tempting to measure union strength, focusing on the activity

that gives unions the most power at the local level: the col-

lective bargaining agreement (CBA) itself. These studies have

worked to assess contract “restrictiveness” (variously called

“strength” or “determinativeness”). Four sets of researchers

have attempted to use statistically-based approaches to com-

pile multiple CBA items into a single measure of contract

restrictiveness. Eberts (1983) and Eberts and Stone (1984)

were the first to do so, using a Guttman scaling technique

to generate a measure of contract strength based on the dif-

ficulty of negotiating each of a set of 18 items within New

York union contracts in the late 1970s. Moe (2009) gener-

ated a measure of California school districts’ contract re-

strictiveness, taken from the 1998–1999 school year, using

a factor analytic approach that incorporates a selection of 41

contract items into 15 factors. Strunk and Reardon (2010)






expand on these techniques using a larger set of 639 pro-

visions from California contracts in place during the 2005–

2006 school year, selected objectively rather than due to any

particular rationale regarding their likelihood of impacting

district and school operations. Strunk and Reardon’s (2010)

measure uses a Partial Independence Item Response (PIIR)

Model to model the entire contract as a function of a contract-

specific latent level of restrictiveness. This method has since

been replicated in Washington State by Goldhaber and col-

leagues, who have confirmed its internal validity as a mea-

sure of contract restrictiveness or strength (Goldhaber, Lav-

ery, Theobald, D’Entremont, & Fang, 2013). In later work,

Strunk and Grissom (2010) also confirmed the external va-

lidity of Strunk and Reardon’s (2010) PIIR-based measure

of contract restrictiveness in a study that shows that con-

tract strength is associated with school board-reported union

strength.

4.3. Summary of developments

As discussed in the preceding paragraphs, a number of re-

searchers have begun to address either the identification or

measurement problems highlighted in the preceding discus-

sion. Given persistent challenges concerning the availability

of data, few papers have been able to address both the iden-

tification and measurement difficulties. Because of the rela-

tively nascent stage of research on the latter, it is no surprise

that the majority of studies that examine relationships be-

tween contract determinativeness and relevant predictors or

outcomes lack strong causal inference. As more scholars con-

tinue to delve into issues of teachers’ unions and contracts

and build longitudinal and cross-state datasets, ideally more

work will emerge that can identify cause-and-effect relation-

ships while recognizing considerable variation in bargaining

agreements themselves. As we note below, many of the policy

changes associated with teaching and teacher unionization

may indeed provide empirical leverage to this end. The po-

tential for these future developments notwithstanding, the

current state of research is far better able to inform policy

discussions and future research about union impacts in ways

that it was not in Goldhaber’s 2006 review. In the section

below we discuss the current evidence for what we know

about the impact of teachers unions on expenditures and

achievement.

5. Unions and district outcomes: what does the evidence

say?

5.1. Expenditures and wages

The preponderance of the evidence available over the

years of union scholarship generally indicates that average

teacher salaries and payments for fringe benefits may be

higher in unionized districts, with estimates of union salary

advantages at least as high as 5% (Baugh & Stone, 1982;

Brunner & Squires, 2013; Cowen, 2009; Duplantis, Chandler,

& Geske, 1995; Eberts, 1983; Eberts & Stone, 1984, 1986;

Freeman, 1986; Hoxby, 1996; Kaspar, 1970; Lott & Kenny,

2013; Winters, 2011; Zigarelli, 1996), with some studies

showing considerably larger differences. At the very least,

unionization may raise overall levels of district spending by



2–15%, depending on the study, even if salaries themselves

are not notably increased (Easton, 1988; Kleiner & Petree,

1988; Lovenheim, 2009). Variations in these figures may be

partly explained by variations in the distribution of bargain-

ing districts within a given state (Zwerling & Thomason, 1995)

or region (Chambers, 1977), or by the overall budget flexibil-

ity of the district (Gallagher, 1979).

Although many of the early studies in the field provide

preliminary evidence about the existence of a relationship,

more recent work more precisely and accurately identifies

the magnitude and significance of these relationships. As

discussed above, although earlier studies have raised the

question of endogenous relationships between unionization

and outcomes of interest, the effort to mitigate such con-

cerns began in earnest with Hoxby’s (1996) study of union

rent-seeking. Hoxby exploits changes to state laws affect-

ing unionization between 1960 and 1992 in both difference-

in-differences and instrumental variable estimates of union

impacts on district expenditures, finding union effects on

salaries between 1 and 5%. However, employing a strat-

egy based on within-state variation in the timing of union

certification election in a number of Midwestern districts,

Lovenheim (2009) found few overall differences in overall

district spending—especially in the long run—and no impact

on teacher pay associated with historical adoptions of bar-

gaining agreements over time. More recently, Brunner and

Squires (2013) exploit within-state and within-local labor

market variation in district size (a proxy for union strength),

finding as much as a 4.5% increase in teacher salaries due

to union strength and a 3.6% higher salary premium paid

to experienced teachers with a masters degree. This is sim-

ilarly the case in California: Rose and Sonstelie (2010) em-

ploy a sample of 771 districts in the 1999–2000 school year

and find that the 10 largest districts in the sample have base

teacher salaries that are approximately 7% higher and expe-

rience premiums about 11% higher than the average district.

In addition, these districts have teacher–pupil ratios that are

about 6% smaller than the average-sized California school

district.

Regardless of absolute level of pay, unionization does ap-

pear to promote compensation systems that reflect rent-

seeking behaviors. Arguing that teacher salaries are at least

partly a function of neighboring district salaries, Winters

(2011) employs a generalized method of moments (GMM)

estimator in which salaries in neighboring districts are instru-

mented with distance-weighted averages of explanatory de-

mographics and staffing characteristics from neighboring dis-

tricts. Depending on the measure of union activity, Winters

finds little evidence of union-related differences in salaries

for beginning teachers, but gains to salaries of experienced

teachers—between 18 and 28%. This can be read as evidence

of rent-seeking given strong evidence in the field that gains

in experience—at least for very senior teachers—is not as-

sociated with improvements in teacher performance (e.g.

Chingos & Peterson, 2011; Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2006;

Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 2005; Rockoff, 2004). Along the

same lines, Grissom and Strunk (2012) find that unionized

school districts favor salaries that reward veteran teachers

above novices, even when such salary schemes do not appear

to produce increases in student achievement outcomes. Pro-

viding further evidence that teachers’ unions promote com-






pensation mechanisms that reward characteristics that are

not known to be associated with student performance, West

and Mykerezi (2011) use OLS models alongside robustness

checks based on Hoxby’s instrumental variables approach to

show that unionization leads to compensation on the basis of

credentialing and experience, but reduces the probability of

pay-for-performance adoption by as much as 20 percentage

points. Goldhaber, DeArmond, Player, and Choi (2008) sim-

ilarly find unionization reduces the likelihood that districts

employ pay-for-performance compensation structures. All of

these salary structures promoted in unionized districts may

limit district capacity to recruit teachers via higher salaries for

higher ability (Figlio, 2002). Indeed, Hoxby and Leigh (2004)

argue that, due to a union-related compression of the salary

scale in which pay is not determined by job performance

but rather by experience and education credits, highly qual-

ified teachers face high opportunity costs to entering the

profession.

Only three studies have directly examined how contract

strength—at least as defined by specific provisions or the

determinativeness of district CBAs—are associated with dis-

trict spending and resource allocation (Eberts, 1983; Eberts

& Stone, 1984; Strunk, 2011). The most recent work from

California shows a one standard deviation increase in CBA

strength is associated with a 13% increase in total expendi-

tures (Strunk, 2011). This finding is remarkably consistent

with earlier work that shows that unionized school districts

have 8–15% higher operating expenditures (Eberts & Stone,

1986; Hoxby, 1996).

In addition, all three studies show that contract strength

or restrictiveness is associated with the ways districts spend

money. Eberts (1983) and Eberts and Stone (1984) use data

from New York State and show that contract strength and

the existence of specific provisions—especially those regu-

lating reductions in force and dismissal procedures—are as-

sociated with the ways in which districts allocate resources.

Specifically, they spend more money on instruction, bene-

fits, salaries, and average salary but less on other areas of the

budget that they speculate may not be preferred by teachers.

Conversely, Strunk (2011), using data from California nearly

three decades later, shows that districts with more restrictive

CBAs have greater overall expenditures, but that this spend-

ing does not seem to be driven by the increased allocation

of resources to teachers’ salaries or benefits. Rather, the in-

crease in total spending is partly driven by increased funds

for administrators’ salaries, classified personnel benefits and

instruction-related functions that include training, support

and evaluation of classroom teachers. In particular, Strunk

(2011) shows that districts with contracts that are one stan-

dard deviation more restrictive than the mean California CBA

spend more on administrator salaries, effectively giving these

administrators a 3.6% raise, or an increase of $3824 in aver-

age administrator salaries. Although districts with stronger

CBAs spend more on instruction-related services, such that

a one standard deviation increase in contract strength is as-

sociated with a 0.41% increase in spending on such services

(equivalent to $38 per student in the 2005–2006 school year),

districts with stronger contracts spend less on textbooks and

other instructional materials. Districts with CBAs that are one

standard deviation more restrictive than the mean spend ap-

proximately $54,000 less than the median district on school



board-directed activities, which include a range of activities

including negotiations with labor unions.

Altogether, the research that explores the relationship

between unions or contracts and fiscal outcomes suggests

that unionized districts and districts with more restrictive

contracts spend more money, and spend it differently. The

majority of studies find that unionized districts have higher

spending and specifically higher spending on teachers’

salaries, and especially salaries for veteran teachers. In addi-

tion, research that examines the restrictiveness of contracts

in unionized districts finds that, once unionized, districts with

more powerful unions spend more overall, although differ-

ent studies point to different drivers of costs. Interestingly,

the most recent research in this space indicates that con-

tract strength may no longer be associated with increased

teacher salaries, as much as other elements of district spend-

ing (Strunk, 2011).

5.2. Student outcomes

Using a variety of datasets and methodological ap-

proaches, scholars have attempted to discern the relationship

between unions and student outcomes (e.g. Carini, Powell, &

Steelman, 2000; Eberts & Stone, 1984, 1986, 1987; Hoxby,

1996; Kurth, 1987; Kleiner & Petree, 1988; Lovenheim, 2009;

Moe, 2009; Nelson & Rosen, 1996; Register & Grimes, 1991;

Strunk, 2011; Strunk & McEachin, 2011). Similar to the work

described above that explores the impact of unions on ex-

penditures, research on the relationship between unions and

student outcomes has grown more attentive to the poten-

tial for endogenous relationships between these two sets

of variables. One early view of the evidence suggests that

unionized school districts perform better on average while

students at the tails of the performance distribution have

lower test scores and higher dropout rates (Eberts & Stone,

1984, 1987). These studies estimate that achievement scores

are as much as 4% higher in unionized districts on average,

though students at both tails of the achievement distribu-

tion may not benefit from this average positive impact. In a

later study, Argys and Rees (1995) also find evidence of such

an inverted-U shaped relationship to achievement, but find

that larger class sizes for such students in such schools may

explain some of this difference. Three studies with the most

rigorous methodologies paint different pictures. In particular,

the Hoxby (1996) study discussed above shows that union-

ized, and “stronger” unionized districts have higher dropout

rates by nearly 2 percentage points, indicating that students

at the lower tail of the performance distribution are harmed

by teacher unionization. Similarly, Lott and Kenny (2013) ex-

ploit differences in state law—in their case, whether states

had Right-to-Work requirements—as an exogenous source

of variation in unionization efforts (operationalized as union

dues per student and union expenditures per student), es-

timating between a 2.2–3.7 point drop in student math or

reading proficiency rates. On the other hand, Lovenheim’s

(2009) study based on differences in the timing of district

union certification elections found that adopting union con-

tracts had no significant impact on student outcomes. When

taken in conjunction with the research reviewed above that

shows that unionized districts spend more, likely due to the

provision of higher salaries and better working conditions for






teachers, it seems that the rent-seeking hypothesis may be

justified.

Recently, a small number of studies have explored the

relationship between the determinativeness of CBAs in con-

straining administrator autonomy and student outcomes—all

in California (Moe, 2009; Strunk, 2011; Strunk & McEachin,

2011). Strunk (2011) and Strunk and McEachin (2011) find

that more restrictive contracts are negatively associated with

both an aggregate district-level measure of student achieve-

ment (the Academic Performance Index, API) and graduation

rates. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in CBA

restrictiveness is associated with approximately a 6.5% de-

crease in API and with a 1.3% decrease in district graduation

rates. They also show that contract strength is positively as-

sociated with the likelihood that schools and districts are in

Program Improvement and at higher levels of Program Im-

provement under the No Child Left Behind Act, such that a

district with a contract that is 1 SD more restrictive has a

7.7% greater likelihood of failing to achieve NCLB targets and

being placed in Program Improvement. In addition, Strunk

and McEachin (2011) show that the negative relationship be-

tween contract strength and student achievement is ampli-

fied in schools and districts that have higher proportions of

minority, low-income and low-achieving students. However,

while Strunk (2011) does not find evidence of a relation-

ship between CBA strength and two-year growth in student

achievement (API), Moe (2009) finds that stronger contracts

are associated with smaller API growth over the ensuing five

years. His results indicate that a one standard deviation in-

crease in contract strength is associated with 0.24 and 0.32

of a standard deviation decreases in five-year API growth for

elementary and secondary schools, respectively. In addition,

Moe (2009) finds that the relationship between CBA strength

and achievement growth varies greatly with district size. In

large districts, contract strength is significantly and substan-

tially associated with achievement growth, whereas in small

districts this relationship is close to zero. The discrepancy

in results between Strunk (2011) and Moe (2009) may oc-

cur because the two authors’ studies differ in the sample of

districts and CBAs included, the methods they use to assess

the relationship between contract strength and achievement

growth, and the measures of contract restrictiveness them-

selves. Given these differences in methods, measures and

sample, and the focus on contracts in only one state, more

research is clearly needed on this topic.

In sum, the research that explores the relationship be-

tween unions or contracts and achievement outcomes sug-

gests that unions may be rent-seeking, although the degree

to which this is the case is unclear. Hoxby (1996) and oth-

ers find that unionized districts see lower student achieve-

ment and higher dropout rates, but it is as yet unclear the

impacts of stronger unions on achievement. Meanwhile, the

studies cited above suggest that there is a negative relation-

ship between contract restrictiveness and average student

outcomes (e.g., Moe, 2009; Strunk, 2011; Strunk & McEachin,

2011). It remains to be seen whether CBA strength drives

lower achievement or if stronger CBAs simply exist in lower-

achieving districts. The current state of research does not

allow us to draw certain conclusions about the direction-

ality of CBAs’ impact on resource distribution or student

achievement.



6. Union influence on state and federal policy

Although our focus in this discussion has been on studies

that either directly or indirectly consider models of unions as

rent-seekers within school districts, we acknowledge an en-

tirely separate body of work—largely from political science—

stressing the role unions may play in setting state and, in-

creasingly, federal educational policy. These policies in turn

may shape many of the district outcomes prioritized in the

rent-seeking framework. Indeed the political influence of

teachers’ unions, as one of the leading scholars on the topic

has argued, “may be even more consequential than the power

they wield in collective bargaining” (Moe, 2011, p. 275). If

identification and measurement pose continued challenges

to studies of union impacts on district resource allocation or

productivity, the literature on political influence remains for

the most part even further behind on this score. Descriptive

evidence may be instructive, however, particularly in a pol-

icymaking context in which district expenditures, especially

on salaries, and district performance have increasingly drawn

the attention of decision-makers at higher jurisdictional

levels.

Three general themes are apparent in this line of work.

The first stresses, as noted in the introduction, teachers’

unions’ enormous political and lobbying expenditures on

political candidates and union-friendly causes, which have

been among the highest contributors to state and federal

election candidates (Moe, 2011; Winkler et al., 2012). The

NEA and AFT combined spent more than $59 million on fed-

eral elections between 1989 and 2010—more than any other

organizational contributor—and 95% of these contributions

went to Democratic efforts (Moe, 2011). Other evidence in-

dicates that unions similarly influence elections to state leg-

islatures and governorships, as well as ballot initiatives di-

rectly pertaining to reform agendas (Hess & Leal, 2005; Lott &

Kenny, 2013; Moe, 2011), with $24 million spent on statewide

candidates and $37 million on ballot initiatives in 2008

alone.

The second theme has centered on teachers’ unions’ role

in setting policy, and particularly in opposing education re-

forms (e.g. Hartney & Flavin, 2011; Moe, 2011). The rationale

for teachers’ unions’ championing the status quo and block-

ing reforms stems from their relative position of advantage

in the current operation of school districts and their inherent

motivation to protect their own job interests (Moe, 2001a,

2003a, 2003b, 2006a, 2006b, 2011, 2014). The evidence on

unions’ role in shaping No Child Left Behind, while limited,

follows this pattern. The law itself says little about collective

bargaining, per se, except for a short provision that stipu-

lates that the new provisions cannot override locally agreed

contracts. Although the national unions—and in particular

the NEA—took credit in communication with its members

for vigorously defending that provision, some observers have

suggested that union influence was actually overstated, and

that the focus on explicit provisions pertaining to bargain-

ing shifted union efforts away from the more substantive

changes regarding teacher quality (Manna, 2006). During the

law’s implementation stage, both the NEA and AFT lobbied—

apparently successfully—to prevent an unfriendly regulatory

interpretation of the bargaining provision by the U.S. Depart-

ment of Education (Manna, 2006).






The final point of emphasis in studies of union politi-

cal power is located within school districts and may pro-

vide some explanation, albeit non-systematic, for the way

unions achieve their rent-seeking objectives outlined above.

At the local level, where bargaining occurs, unions can

influence negotiations not simply by stressing particular

contract provisions, but by determining at least in part the

priorities of the school district itself. As Moe (2005, 2006b,

2006c) and Hess and Leal (2005) have shown, unions are ac-

tive players in the election of local school board officers who

oversee them. Strunk and Grissom (2010) lay out two likely

venues for teachers’ unions to influence school board elec-

tions: through campaign activity in favor of supported candi-

dates, such as providing union endorsements and working on

behalf of favored candidates to fundraise and mobilize voters,

and through mobilizing union members themselves to vote

in board elections.

Extant research suggests that unions are effective at both

sets of activities (Hess & Leal, 2005; Moe, 2006a). Even subse-

quent to election, the policy preferences of union-endorsed

candidates are better aligned (by a factor of 0.52 standard de-

viations on survey responses) with union preferences (Moe,

2005). Once school boards are seated, the evidence suggests

that those with more members traditionally sympathetic

to teachers (such as former educators themselves) negoti-

ate contracts that limit administrative flexibility, while more

flexible contracts are negotiated by boards with members

less aligned with union interests (such as Republican mem-

bers and those with ties to the business community; Strunk

and Grissom 2010).

7. Current policy debates: a path for future research

Public debates over teachers’ unions tends to divide the

question in normative terms: are teachers’ unions “good” or

“bad” for American education? The literature reviewed above

suggests that the answer to this question is not as simple as

it once was perceived to be. Teachers’ unions, though fac-

ing new challenges to their priorities, continue to be forceful

actors in local, state and national education policy. Whether

unions are rent-seeking, and the results of any rent-seeking

behavior, may be less important today than are the results

of the activities unions undertake and the policies they en-

dorse and/or block. The intent of this article is to update our

knowledge about the impacts of teachers unions themselves

and the ways that we might start to examine the charac-

teristics of unions and their actions that are more germane

to today’s policy context. In so doing, we hope to shift the

discussion away from the normative question about unions

towards more substantive questions about union strength

and actions.

As policymakers increasingly propose and enact meaning-

ful changes to policies that teachers’ unions have long pro-

tected, implement reforms that unions have historically op-

posed, and limit unions’ ability to garner political resources,

the groundwork will be laid for more fruitful avenues of re-

search on not only the impacts of unionization, but the im-

pacts of unions’ activities and strength on relevant outcomes.

In particular, recent changes to state laws provide multiple

opportunities for further study. State law represents the pri-

mary authority not only for labor relations but for education



itself, and heavily influence the flexibility with which dis-

tricts can set local, context-specific regulations and contracts.

Recent state-level changes to teacher-related policy provide

important sources of variation that scholars may use to im-

prove the methodological rigor of studies of union effects

on district operation. Future studies may follow in the foot-

steps of earlier work (e.g., Hoxby, 1996; Lovenheim, 2009;

Lott & Kenny, 2013) that has already exploited differences in

statewide laws concerning unions over time to introduce pre-

sumably exogenous variation in local conditions that might

affect union strength and district level outcomes.

Another point of entry into research on teachers’ unions

might occur in the ways scholars measure union activity and

contract strength. We have shown how scholars have recently

exploited cross-sectional variation in teacher contracts to

expand counterfactual scenarios beyond binary union/non-

union distinctions or simple union size measures to a range

of union influence and strength (e.g., Goldhaber et al., 2013;

Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald, 2014; Moe, 2009; Strunk,

2011; Strunk & Grissom, 2010; Strunk & McEachin, 2011).

The provisions of these contracts may themselves be chang-

ing in response to perceived and actual challenges to ar-

eas that unions have long prioritized. Further longitudinal

study of contract restrictiveness and the provisions included

in contracts will enable greater identification of the causal

effects of policy change and contract strength on educa-

tional outcomes. In addition, as more and more researchers

employ increasingly sophisticated ways to measure union

strength, it will become possible for scholars to pursue cross-

state analyses that capitalize both on these technical im-

provements and state-level variation in policy and policy

shifts.

States that have seen the enactment or the attempted

enactment of policy reforms intended to curb union power

and/or remove union-advocated protections also offer fertile

ground for qualitative explorations of the teachers’ unions’

role in these policies. In addition, in instances where there

are multiple states changing specific types of laws in similar

ways (e.g., the tying of teacher evaluation to student achieve-

ment, tying tenure/promotion to teacher evaluations, and the

implementation of Right-to-Work laws), researchers have the

opportunity to assess if indicators of union power (e.g., money

spent in state elections, the degree to which previous state

education codes favor teachers’ unions’ preferences, and col-

lective bargaining agreement restrictiveness or the inclusion

of specific regulations in CBAs) are associated with the uptake

of such policies or change as a result of the enactment of such

policies.

In this dynamic policymaking context, we conclude not

simply with the usual call for more research, but for more

research of a certain kind. The variation in union strength

identified in recent literature, the new policy experiments oc-

curring in states across the country, and the sheer availability

of large administrative datasets that link individual students

to teachers in school across the country now allow a new field

of highly focused questions that link educational outcomes

to rules, regulations and conditions directly attributable to

union efforts. We do not expect the results of this work to

end all controversy on the topic, but perhaps the debate may

shift from one that assigns blame to one that identifies par-

ticular, evidence-based solutions.






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The impact of teachers' unions on educational outcomes: What we know and what we need to learn

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