Home (/) / Gloal inight (/New-Knowledge/Gloal-inight) << ack to Inight (/New-Knowledge/Gloal-inight) TH IRAN DAL: ACHIVMNT AND STARTING POINT ditorial Marc Finaud At the rik of contriuting to the proliferation of ‘expert’ reaction to the comprehenive agreement on the Iranian nuclear programme concluded in Vienna on 14 Jul 2015 and hailed a “hitoric” ome or dued a “capitulation” (favourale to Iran) other, one can more oerl decrie it a oth a major achievement and a potential tarting point for new development. A Major Achievement No one can den that thi agreement, uilding on previou interim or framework agreement (concluded in Geneva in Novemer 2013 and Lauanne in April 2015), i a comprehenive one. (/New-Knowledge/Gloal-inight/The-Iran-Deal-Achievement-and-Starting-Point) 16 Jul 2015
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8/27/2015 The Iran Deal: Achievement and Starting Point GCSP
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<< ack to Inight (/New-Knowledge/Gloal-inight)TH IRAN DAL: ACHIVMNT AND STARTING POINT
ditorial Marc Finaud
At the rik of contriuting to the proliferation of ‘expert’ reaction to the compreheniveagreement on the Iranian nuclear programme concluded in Vienna on 14 Jul 2015 andhailed a “hitoric” ome or dued a “capitulation” (favourale to Iran) other, onecan more oerl decrie it a oth a major achievement and a potential tarting point fornew development.
A Major AchievementNo one can den that thi agreement, uilding on previou interim or framework agreement (concluded in Geneva in Novemer 2013 andLauanne in April 2015), i a comprehenive one.
It reult from ome 20 month of intenive negotiation that put an end to a proce initiated in 2003 three uropean countrie – France,German and the United Kingdom – a well a the U High Repreentative for Foreign A惱썌air and Securit Polic (U3) and enlarged in 2006 toChina, Ruia and the United State (from then on, the U3+3).
No reakthrough wa achieved until two major development occurred. One wa the hift of the polic until then applied the U3+3, aed onunilateral demand for ceation of uranium enrichment Iran and a et of anction, to a polic of containment of Iran’ nuclear civilianprogramme and the ue of the lifting of anction a a leverage. The econd wa the 2013 election of Preident Haan Rouhani on a platform ofremoval of the anction to allow for economic recover. It wa thu demontrated that a win-win agreement wa eaier to achieve throughengagement, dialogue, active diplomac than threat (including of militar trike), preure, iolation and unilateral demand.
Naturall, each ‘ide’ had it ottom line: for the U3+3, it wa preventing in a veri㥄꺑ale wa an poiilit for Iran to manufacture nuclearweapon; for Iran, it wa preerving the technolog and know-how it had acquired, preented in the form of a ‘right’ to enrich uranium a well aenuring the total lifting of the anction. Looking at the reult, one can onl con㥄꺑rm that oth ide have roadl ful㥄꺑lled their ojective.Comparing the actual commitment Iran with earl red line pulihed the Iranian Preident’ oゝ䄼ce, it i even clear that Tehran eventuallconceded more than it had oゝ䄼ciall anticipated.
Among the unprecedented apect of the Vienna agreement i the whole tem of veri㥄꺑cation put into place to enure that Iran will aide itcommitment (aleit diplomaticall called “voluntar meaure”): the IAA will monitor the prohiition of uranium enrichment aove 3.67 per centand the exce tockpile aove 300 kg; the numer of centrifuge in exce of the 5,060 authorized one intead of the current 20,000 (of the IR-1㥄꺑rt generation) will e ealed and tored under the control of the IAA, which will keep inpecting the total numer of centrifuge for 20 ear andfor 25 ear the production of uranium concentrate (“ellow cake”); in addition to the inpection allowed the IAA Additional Protocol forundeclared activitie or facilitie and the requirement of the 3.1 Code to notif an tranfer of uranium into a new facilit with ix month’ notice,negotiated acce to upiciou militar facilitie will e poile. The converion of the Arak heav-water reactor into a reearch facilit notproducing weapon-grade plutonium will alo take place under the crutin of the IAA, which will thu have acce to the whole Iranian fuel ccle,from mining to pent fuel (that Iran will not e ale to reproce).
The main reaon wh all the veri㥄꺑cation proviion are o detailed, and crupuloul decried in technical annexe, i the lack of mutual trut thatcharacteried relation etween Iran and motl wetern countrie, under the in陥솞uence of a whole hitor of cheating, diimulation, reneging onpat agreement or procratination Iran. Similarl, putting oneelf in the Iranian’ hoe, one would have kept in mind the reach of patagreement concluded under the Shah Wetern countrie and their denial of uppl of fuel or technolog to Iran’ peaceful programme, withoutomitting the active Wetern upport granted to Saddam Huein in hi war againt Iran. To the Reagan-tle “trut-ut-verif” Cold War mottoucceeded a new harh “ditrut-AND-verif” approach.
Hitor wa not aent from the agreement in the ene that Iran alo accepted to dicloe it pat activitie with a “poile militar dimenion”which had given rie to the international communit’ upicion. ut the negotiator were wie enough not to make uch revelation a reakingpoint and rather focu on the future. In the end, with the monitoring mechanim put into place that will enure a common uperviion of the
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8/27/2015 The Iran Deal: Achievement and Starting Point GCSP
There are till too man area of diagreementetween Wahington and Tehran and the
hitor of their hotilit i till too recent toallow for rapid normaliation. However, thi i
no reaon for the U.S. not to tr and argain fora more poitive in㥄꺑uence Iran in area of
American interet in exchange for morecooperation.
implementation of the commitment (Joint Commiion, miniterial meeting ever two ear at leat), the whole agreement can e aeed a amodel of cooperative ecurit approach.
A Potential Starting PointThe endle hour pent in negotiation and dialogue, epeciall the top US and Iranian negotiator, John Kerr and Mohamad Zarif, including inprivate converation, preumal o惱썌ered a unique opportunit to dicu iue other than percentage of enrichment and numer ofcentrifuge. The mere fact that the were held in addition to the direct communication etween Preident Oama and Preident Rouhanicontitute a igni㥄꺑cant change in the foreign polic of oth countrie. What ha tranpired pulicl of uch talk and the fairl contant rhetoric ofthe Iranian leaderhip hould exclude an dramatic normaliation imilar to the one etween the U.S. and Cua.
There are till too man area of diagreement etween Wahington andTehran and the hitor of their hotilit i till too recent to allow for rapidnormaliation. However, thi i no reaon for the U.S. not to tr andargain for a more poitive in陥솞uence Iran in area of American interetin exchange for more cooperation.
However in the hort term, whether oth countrie have concludedecret accord or not, chance are that Iran will avoid the rik ofjeopardiing the Vienna agreement too aggreive a ehaviour inother area (e.g., in upport of Hezollah or other Shiite militia in Sria,Iraq or Yemen). Alread, de facto an ojective alliance i emerging on theground etween on the one hand Iran, upported Ruia, and on theother hand the other enemie of the ‘Ilamic State’, including the Wet, the Gulf State and even Irael. Saudi Araia i certainl war of anhegemonic attitude of it arch rival in the Middle at, and the Iraeli government will maintain it oppoition to the Vienna agreement ecaue itdeprive it of it main pretext for refuing a peace agreement with the Paletinian and the Ara countrie. Ultimatel, realignment and tacit,realit alliance againt common enemie ma well appear a new trategic urprie that thi region i familiar with.
Another potential conequence of the implementation of the agreement with Iran, and urel one of the calculation of the Oama adminitration,i that, over time, thank to the gradual lifting of anction and reintegration of Iran into the international communit, foreign invetment andinternational trade, attracted the countr’ potential in energ uppl and a market of ome 80 million conumer, will contriute to economicrecover and ocial dividend. It can afel e expected that the illion of dollar in unfrozen aet and potential revenue of new oil and gaexport will not e maivel reinveted in militar pending or upport for terrorit group ut actual economic need. Certainl a a wa ofplacating the conervative opponent to normaliation, the rhetoric will remain critical (epeciall againt Irael) and the veted interet of omepowerful group uch a the Revolutionar Guard or the cleric will e preerved. ut popular preure for more openne, eaier travel andgreater freedom of expreion will no dout e exerted dometicall. How the regime will repond to it will determine the future of the countr.
8/27/2015 The Iran Deal: Achievement and Starting Point GCSP
When it i clear that Iran will never e in apoition to ecome a nuclear-weapon tate, thepreure on the Iraeli nuclear capailitie willincreae and the rik of equating the Iran dealwith doule tandard will ecome evident.
Finall, will thi agreement poitivel in陥솞uence other nuclear proliferation crie? Of coure, it i diゝ䄼cult to peculate or generalie. One of thereaon for Irael to worr aout the Vienna agreement wa demontrated when it torpedoed the recent Non-Proliferation Treat ReviewConference that wa on the verge of agreeing to a conference on a zone free of weapon of ma detruction (WMD) in the Middle at.
When it i clear that Iran will never e in a poition to ecome a nuclear-weapon tate, the preure on the Iraeli nuclear capailitie will increaeand the rik of equating the Iran deal with doule tandard will ecomeevident. Of coure, there are other hort-term prioritie in the Middle atand the proce of dicuing a WMD-free zone will proal requiremore rapprochement etween all the current enemie. ut ultimatel,the Vienna agreement could ecome a model for managing nuclearproliferation crie in environment characteried mitrut and a high
degree of militariation. Thi cooperative approach would deerve to e attempted in South Aia and the Korean Peninula, the two other mainregion with a high potential of detailization and con陥솞ict.
Naturall it would onl help if the nuclear-weapon tate alo et the example in reducing further their own nuclear arenal and the reliailit oftheir own ecurit on nuclear weapon, a more convincing argument to actual or potential proliferator than the current doctrine aed on “do a Ia, not a I do”.
[1] Jeffre Lewi, “It’ a Damn Good Deal”, Foreign Polic, 14 Jul 2015.
Note: the author, Marc Finaud (/New-Knowledge/xpert/Staff/Mr-Marc-Finaud), i Senior Programme Advior in GCSP' merging Securit Challenge Programme. He expree peronal
view.
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