“THE LAND OF BULLET HOLES”: IMPERIAL NARRATIVES AND THE UNITED STATES OCCUPATION OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, 1916-1924 A Dissertation Submitted to the Temple University Graduate Board In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY by Patrice Nicole Laurent May 2019 Examining Committee Members: Dr. Mónica Ricketts, Advisory Chair, Department of History Dr. Richard Immerman, Emeritus Faculty Department of History Dr. Alan McPherson, Department of History Dr. Harvey R. Neptune, Department of History Dr. Hiram Aldarondo, Department of Spanish and Portuguese
Transcript
“THE LAND OF BULLET HOLES”: IMPERIAL NARRATIVES AND THE UNITED STATES OCCUPATION OF THE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, 1916-1924
A Dissertation Submitted to
the Temple University Graduate Board
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
by Patrice Nicole Laurent
May 2019 Examining Committee Members: Dr. Mónica Ricketts, Advisory Chair, Department of History Dr. Richard Immerman, Emeritus Faculty Department of History Dr. Alan McPherson, Department of History Dr. Harvey R. Neptune, Department of History Dr. Hiram Aldarondo, Department of Spanish and Portuguese
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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines US media representations of Dominicans during the
American occupation of the Dominican Republic between 1916 and 1924. It argues that
American media images of the Dominican Republic changed to accommodate US
government policy. For example, when there was interest in annexing the country in the
mid-1800s, those who were in favor of annexation depicted Dominicans as white in order
to demonstrate that they could be integrated into the United States. In the early 1900s,
however, when the United States wanted to prevent foreign powers from intervening in
the Dominican Republic, US media representations of Dominicans were overwhelmingly
black to show the need for American oversight of financial matters. Whether depicted as
black or white, this dissertation argues that the primary lens the US media employed to
represent Dominicans was that of underdevelopment. Subsumed within this imperial
narrative of underdevelopment were malleable depictions of race and, by 1916, a new
element of humanitarianism that operated under the assumption that the Dominican
Republic was underdeveloped and thus in need of American guidance. Lastly, this
dissertation examines the shift in the US media in 1920 as American sources began to
critique the occupation.
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To Yukiko, my ever-faithful companion.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Without the love and support of friends and family, this dissertation would not
have been possible. I will forever owe a debt of gratitude to those who encouraged and
inspired me: Dr. Joanne Lucena for her fierce love and eternal guidance, Dr. Giuseppina
Russo for her help in reorganizing this in the final hour, Dr. Jason Knirck for always
being my advisor and mentor even when not my official advisor, Dr. Monica D’Antonio
for her spirit and explanation of the intricacies of the English language over bottles of red
wine on a street in Arzua, and all of my colleagues in the History department at
Montgomery County Community College who have been my cheering section over the
last seven years. Thank you to the members of my committee for your advice and insight
as well as the College of Liberal Arts for a travel grant to present this research. I would
be remiss not to acknowledge my children who have provided me with emotional support
throughout this process: Yuki, Abba, and my dearly departed Reef. Lastly, Dory
Chaefsky, the love of my life, thank you for getting me through the “ring of fire” during
the final months of this this project, you will forever have my heart.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................ ii
DEDICATION ................................................................................................................... iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................. iv
CHAPTER
1. INTRODUCTION: “THE LAND OF BULLET HOLES” .......................................... 1
2. FROM BLACK TO WHITE: TRANSFORMING DOMINICANS .......................... 36
3. “UNCLE SAM’S PERIODICAL BAD MAN” .......................................................... 70
4. A PRIMITIVE PEOPLE, AN UNDEVELOPED ISLAND ..................................... 100
5. HUMANITARIANISM, “THE MASTER NARRATIVE” ..................................... 130
6. SEEING BEYOND THE HUMANITARIAN NARRATIVE ................................. 163
7. INTERPRETING AMERICAN IMPERIALISM ..................................................... 194
8. CONCLUSION: AN ENDURING LEGACY .......................................................... 227
2 On Natera see Bruce J. Calder, The Impact of Intervention: The Dominican
Republic During the US Occupation of 1916-1924 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984), esp. 169-180. Alan McPherson added that Natera was one of the few bandits with a nationalist agenda. See Alan McPherson, The Invaded: How Latin Americans and Their Political Allies Fought and Ended US Occupations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 70-71.
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the Dominican police. In Bad Hombre, Kent was the hero time and again, not only
protecting Dominicans from the wrath of Natera but also ultimately saving the life of a
young Spanish woman, Juanita Canelon.
Canelon’s love for Kent allegedly drew from a deeper font of admiration for the
United States. Canelon viewed the United States as a land of promise. At the beginning
of the novel, she saw the Statue of Liberty when her ship sailed past New York on its
way to the Dominican Republic. As the image overtook her, she pondered on the
“millions of progressive people” living there. Though Canelon admitted that she had
never met an American before, her opinions about them were solidly grounded: “I have
read so much about them – their work, their aims, and the good they have done in this
world; especially for the smaller helpless nations.” Additionally, she stated that her
cousin Rafael lived in New York and as a result had been notably altered: “I noticed
particularly how splendidly changed he was – so resolute, so democratic, but best of all,
so full of fun.”3 Here, Flewelling emphasized the transformative power of the United
States and its enlightened attitude. As Canelon made clear, the United States was
ultimately a benevolent force, progressive in every way, with the ability to completely
alter people and assist the “smaller helpless nations.”
Canelon’s song of praise echoed throughout the book as Flewelling described
Americans completely dedicated to their altruistic objectives. On approaching Santo
Domingo by sea, Canelon saw the wreckage of the USS Memphis, an image that
saddened her greatly: “‘It seems so unfortunate,’ she remarked with casual concern, ‘so
3 William Wendell Flewelling, Bad Hombre (Boston: Meador Publishing
Company, 1931), 11, 14.
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unnecessary, that a few of the brave Americano sailors should lose their lives so close to
land – and yet, how noble their death sacrificing themselves for others.’” The US Navy
sent the Memphis to the Dominican Republic in July 1916 to protect American interests
in the wake of revolution. On 29 August, a storm hit the island and numerous tsunami
waves hit the Memphis, driving it to the bottom of the harbor and then into nearby cliffs.
Forty-three men lost their lives that day. By discussing the wreck of the Memphis,
Flewelling appealed to his readers’ sense of patriotism by emphasizing that these were
the noble deaths of Americans who were innocently trying to better a foreign republic
and paid the ultimate price. Like Christ, they were martyrs, as Flewelling described the
wreckage, “the forward fighting top of the warship, looking not unlikes a great cross,
securely in place; a fitting monument to its deceased warriors.”4
Novels like Bad Hombre succinctly demonstrated the imperial narrative that was
a crucial component of the US occupation of the Dominican Republic. Canelon’s praise
for the United States expressed the notion that America had the obligation to transform
backwards nations. In fact, all of Flewelling’s descriptions of Dominicans in Bad
Hombre pointed to a barbarous people, more animal than human. This reinforced the
notion of primitiveness and suggested not only that Dominicans needed the unsavory
elements of their population (men like Natera) neutralized but also that the people in
general needed paternalistic guidance. The way in which Canelon spoke about the
United States was almost entrancing as if American values like democracy and progress
were able to penetrate one’s being and completely alter a person as they had her cousin
Rafael.
4 Flewelling, Bad Hombre, 13.
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From the outset of the novel, Flewelling informed his readers that US actions in
the Dominican Republic constituted a noble cause. Views such as this permeated
American opinions before, during, and after the intervention, demonstrating that this
occupation was not one limited to battles on the ground between bandits and marines, but
one that was vehemently waged in novels, travel literature, newspaper reports, and
magazine articles as Americans justified their actions while simultaneously informing the
public. Embedded within news reports, works of fiction, and glossy pictorials were a set
of images about the Dominican Republic and its people as well as ideological values
about America’s actions abroad.
Representations of the Dominican Republic in the American media are the central
theme of this study with particular attention paid to the fictive world the American media
created by privileging some narratives, especially underdevelopment, and manipulating
others, such as race and culture. This world was the essential foundation upon which
America’s hold over the Dominican Republic sustained itself and garnered public support
until challenges emerged in the American media against the United States’s own
narrative of humanitarianism in 1920. This dissertation follows Michel Foucault’s idea
that “each society has its régime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the types of
discourse which it accepts and makes function as true.” In the case of the Dominican
Republic, the “truth” about the conditions of the country or the characteristics of its
inhabitants depended on economic and political factors, one of Foucault’s essential traits
contributing to the creation of truth. Additionally, this dissertation privileges the novel,
travel literature as well as articles in magazines and newspapers to understand how
“diverse forms, of immense diffusion and consumption” propagated representations of
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the Dominican Republic that served America’s economic and political needs.5
Furthermore, the work of Edward Said on the collision between the media and empire
informs this dissertation. In Orientalism, Said argues that binary representations of the
Orient reduced the Middle East to essentialized characteristics. Furthermore, they aided
in the creation of both an Orient and an Occident – two diametric opposites.6 In his later
work, Culture and Imperialism, Said maintains that imperialism and the novel shared a
close relationship in which certain narratives emerged and others were silenced. The
brilliance of this association was “the power to narrate, or to block other narratives from
forming and emerging,” – what Said argues is one of the main connections between
culture and imperialism.7 Additionally, Culture and Imperialism asserts the notion that
5 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings,
1972-1977, ed. and trans. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 131. Mary Louise Pratt expounds on the connection between travel literature and the economic needs of imperial powers. See Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (New York: Routledge, 1992). For more on the intersection between travel literature and empire see Steve Clark, ed., Travel Writing and Empire: Postcolonial Theory in Transit (New York: Zed Books, 1999). On the development of the genre of travel literature see Percy Adams, Travel Literature and the Evolution of the Novel (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1983).
6 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979). On Orientalism and American Empire see Warwick Anderson, Colonial Pathologies: American Tropical Medicine, Race, and Hygiene in the Philippines (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006); Sharon Delmendo, The Star-Entangled Banner: One Hundred Years of America in the Philippines (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2004); Allan Punzalan Isaac, American Tropics: Articulating Filipino America (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2006).
7 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), xiii. Shelley Streeby has demonstrated the confluence of literary works and US imperial ventures on mid-nineteenth century American culture. See Shelley Streeby, American Sensations: Class, Empire, and the Production of Popular Culture (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002).
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imperialism penetrates metropolitan culture, in almost imperceptible ways – from a
“shadowy presence” to an “outright concern.”8 This dissertation utilizes Said’s theories
as basis for exploring the imagery about the Dominican Republic as sources emphasized
Hispanic heritage or African descent depending on the goals of the time. Furthermore,
the American media’s creation of specific imagery centered around the concept of
underdevelopment reveals not only what Americans thought about the Dominican
Republic, but in turn, what they thought about themselves and their role in the world.
Additionally, this dissertation employs the work of scholars of media studies who
explore the various ways in which the media creates and reinforces both meaning and
definitions. In his study of the press and violence in the United States, John Nerone
shows the dual purpose of the media. On one hand, the press directs messages at a target
audience with the intention of producing a desired result; for example, a story lauding the
political promises of a presidential candidate with the expectation of attracting voters.
On the other hand, Nerone argues that this same story defines readers – in the case of the
presidential candidate, it is labeling those reading the article as voters and citizens.9 In
this way, the press not only communicates information to its audience but also defines
that audience by categorizing them in various ways – as voters, citizens, consumers, etc.
Likewise, this dissertation posits that in the case of American intervention in the
8 Said, Culture and Imperialism, xvi-xvii. Working from Said’s premises, other
scholars have demonstrated the intimate connection between empire and the metropole. See Catherine Hall and Sonya O. Rose, eds., At Home With Empire: Metropolitan Culture and the Imperial World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
9 John Nerone, Violence Against the Press: Policing the Public Sphere in US History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 14.
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Dominican Republic, the media not only defined Dominicans in very specific ways
(immature, unstable, insolvent) but also in turn, fashioned those Americans reading these
stories into humanitarians saving a backwards people through occupation forces.
Furthermore, as Michael Parenti demonstrates, the press has the power to set agendas and
to define what the public believes, accepts, or rejects allowing them to reinforce certain
ideological values.10 In his work on journalism, communication, and theory, James
Carey succinctly put it: “Journalism provides audiences with models for action and
feeling, with ways to size up situations, and it shares these qualities with all literary
acts.”11
Though the occupation of the Dominican Republic began in 1916, the United
States’s interest in the eastern portion of the island dated to the mid-nineteenth century,
providing Americans with decades of depictions of the Dominican Republic to choose
from to suit policy needs. Approaching the topic of the occupation by examining the
American media over a century before the occupation reveals the importance of
representations of both Dominicans and Americans in this imperial project.12 This
dissertation argues that the media’s shifting narrative about Dominicans, especially the
10 Michael Parenti, Inventing Reality: Politics and the Mass Media (New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 1986), ix.
11 James Carey, “The Problem of Journalism History,” in James Carey: A Critical Reader, eds. Eve Stryker Munson and Catherine A. Warren (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 91.
12 In this dissertation, the term media is employed to refer to published works whether books, magazines, or newspapers – material that serves as a filter to inform and instruct readers as to how they should view events, people, and ideas. See Parenti, Inventing Reality, ix; Niklas Luhmann, The Reality of Mass Media (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 1-2.
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mutability of their race and culture throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, reflected changes in American foreign policy. The American media made
Dominicans white when they desired annexation and black when they did not, focusing
on Hispanic origins to indicate potential and African ancestry to denote incapacity.
During the occupation, however, American sources did not alter their depictions of
Dominicans because there were no major shifts in policy. Rather than focus on race, one
major narrative operated over the centuries in the American media: underdevelopment.
Underdevelopment drew from a long history of representing Dominicans as backward
and uncivilized. As a part of this, humanitarianism came to serve as a way justifying
American objectives in the country and conquer underdevelopment. Humanitarianism
reflected more what America thought about itself than Dominicans.13 By portraying
America’s efforts as a humanitarian mission of uplift, the media reinforced
underdevelopment by creating a Dominican Republic in desperate need of outside
assistance because of countless revolutions, political graft, and a general malaise that left
the island a wasteland. The country was, as one author called it, “The Land of Bullet
Holes,” a place devoid of political stability without the paternalistic guidance of the
13 On humanitarianism see Merle Curti, American Philanthropy Abroad (Rutgers,
NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1963); Emily Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982); Gary Bass, Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention (New York: Knopf, 2008); Ian Tyrrell, Reforming the World: The Creation of America’s Moral Empire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011); Julia Irwin, Making the World Safe: The American Red Cross and a Nation’s Humanitarian Awakening (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Stephen R. Porter, Benevolent Empire: US Power, Humanitarianism, and World’s Dispossessed (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017).
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United States.14 However, by elevating the humanitarian angle as the primary motivation
of the United States, once media reports challenged this altruism in 1920, American
officials quickly began creating an exit strategy. Questioning humanitarianism certainly
was not the only cause for the end of the occupation. However, anxiety over America’s
reputation in Latin American factored prominently in the discussion to draw up
withdrawal plans. This anxiety along with the post-war depression and the mounting
costs of maintaining a military government prompted the end of the occupation in the
summer of 1924.
Colonialism, Independence, and the Dominican Republic
From the outset of interactions between the island of Hispaniola and outsiders,
Western observers viewed both the people and the landscape through a very distinct lens
depending on their agenda and interests. In search of the lands of Asia and India,
Columbus and his crew arrived on the island he christened Española in December of
1492. He recorded his initial impressions:
For these people of this land are the most docile and timorous and of good disposition . . . All [their] acts are like those of children, except for the fact that they are men, and nature prevents them from being such. And any act they witness, they do as they see others do; because if someone steals or does wrong, it is just as happens with children. They are [mentally] subtle, for they then go and do what they have seen done.15
14 In his 1920 travelogue, Henry Franck entitled his chapter on the Dominican
Republic, “The Land of Bullet Holes.” See Henry Franck, Roaming through the West Indies (New York: The Century Company, 1920).
15 Columbus, quoted in Nicolás Wey Gómez, The Tropics of Empire: Why Columbus Sailed South to the Indies (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2008), 408-409.
10
Attributing child-like qualities to the native Taíno, Columbus was the first to document
European impressions of the indigenous people of the island. Columbus’s observations
about these people, according to historian Nicolás Wey Gómez, were based on a long
history of “assigning unique physiologies, characters, and mores (customs)” to groups
based on their locations that imparted “unique positions in a hierarchy of polities” and
specific “roles in a teleological history.”16 This environmental determinism, present
since the initiation of European colonization in the Americas, had its roots in the writings
of ancient authors like Hippocrates, Aristotle, Vitruvius, Pliny the Elder, Ptolemy, Albu
Masar, Avicenna, and Averroës.17
From the initial encounter between Columbus and the Taíno, a pattern emerged in
which colonizers attempted to categorize the colonized, postulating on the nature, role,
and capabilities of indigenous people. In the colonial period, this deliberation was most
aptly represented in the debate between theologian and scholar Juan Gínes de Sepúlveda
and friar Bartolomé de las Casas.18 In 1550 a royal commission gathered in the Spanish
16 Wey Gómez, The Tropics of Empire, 69.
17 On these ancient writers and ethnology see Denis E. Cosgrove, Apollo’s Eye: A
Cartographic Genealogy of the Earth in the Western Imagination (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).
18 On the debate see Lewis Hanke, Aristotle and the American Indians: A Study of Race Prejudice in the Modern World (Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1959); Lewis Hanke, All Mankind is One: A Study of the Disputation between Bartolomé de las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda in 1550 on the Intellectual and Religious Capacity of the American Indians (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1974). Both Anthony Pagden and Joyce Chaplin also discuss European ideas about the natives of the America. See Anthony Pagden, The Fall of Natural Man: The American Indian and the Origins of Comparative Ethnology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Joyce Chaplin, Subject Matter: Technology, the Body, and Science on the Anglo-American Frontier, 1500-1676 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).
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city of Valladolid to discuss how the conquest of the Americas could be accomplished
“justly and in good conscience.”19 Rather than focus on the issue at hand, however, the
conversation devolved into a heated contest between Sepúlveda and Las Casas about the
characteristics of the natives of the New World. A former colonist turned Dominican
friar, Las Casas upheld the belief that the conquest of the natives was both unjust and
inhumane while Sepúlveda maintained that the indigenous people of the Americas were
savages who committed horrible crimes against nature, including cannibalism and human
sacrifice. In Sepúlveda’s opinion, the barbarous nature of the natives justified Spain’s
war against them and their enslavement.20 Las Casas chronicled his main points in A
Brief Relation of the Destruction of the Indies, later published in 1552. The work was an
attempt to reveal to Prince Philip II the appalling atrocities committed against the natives
of the New World by his Spanish subjects. In addition, Las Casas portrayed the natives
as good-natured, gracious, and submissive.
Though Las Casas’s intent was to create a change in New World policies, A Brief
Relation of the Destruction of the Indies served quite a different purpose in the hands of
Spain’s opponents. For those living in the Low Countries who found themselves under
Spanish control beginning in the mid-sixteenth century, the words of Las Casas about the
Spaniards’ behavior imparted the idea that characteristics like belligerence, intolerance,
and cruelty were innately Spanish. By the late 1570s, translated editions of Las Casas’s
19 Rolena Adorno, The Polemics of Possession in Spanish American Narrative
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 63.
20 Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, How to Write the History of the New World: Histories, Epistemologies, and Identities in the Eighteenth Century Atlantic World (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 173.
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account appeared in French and Flemish with the following notice for their readers: “To
serve as example and warning to the seventeen provinces of the Low Countries.”21 After
these early editions, A Brief Account of the Destruction of the Indies appeared in Dutch,
French, English, German, Italian, and Latin by the end of the seventeenth century,
forming the basis of the Black Legend or la leyenda negra.22 This propaganda was
spread by Spain’s economic, political, and religious rivals who claimed that the manner
in which Spain acquired its empire, its treatment of people during the Inquisition, and its
interactions with the indigenous people of the Americas all revealed a deeply flawed,
barbaric culture. This amounted to a “typological emblem of religious and political
backwardness, slothfulness, and degeneracy.”23 Some scholars challenge the notion that
Las Casas is to blame for the origin of the Black Legend. As Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra
notes, there had been a long history of disdain for Spain dating to the Middle Ages,
largely the result of other Europeans viewing Spain as a “threatening frontier” owing to
its mixed population of Jews and Arabs. This depiction intensified during Spain’s wars
21 Adorno, The Polemics of Possession, 78.
22 Adorno, The Polemics of Possession, 79-80. On the Black Legend see Charles
Gibson, The Black Legend: Anti-Spanish Attitudes in the Old World and the New (New York: Knopf, 1971).
23 María DeGuzmán, Spain’s Long Shadow: The Black Legend, Off-Whiteness, and Anglo-American Empire (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 5. DeGuzmán also demonstrates how this identity attributed to Spain was used by Anglo-America to create a negative or reverse identity for themselves. This argument is similar to Linda Colley’s seminal work on British identity from the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries. See Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992).
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with the Netherlands, especially “in the hands of Protestant printers.”24 Benjamin Keen
also shows that the negative imagery associated with Spain can be found before Las
Casas among fourteenth-century Italians who based their observations on personal,
economic, political, and cultural exchanges.25 According to Keen, crediting the
development of the Black Legend solely to Las Casas is both an oversimplification and
simply incorrect. Certainly, A Brief Account of the Destruction of the Indies aided in the
diffusion of negative images of the Spanish, but, as Keen explains, it built upon a feeling
that was already present, motivated by colonial rivals, religious differences in the age of
Reformation, and bourgeoning nationalism.26
The emergence of the Black Legend demonstrates how imagery and depictions
are not only created but also disseminated and maintained. From early on, Western
observers had dueling images of Hispaniola. Additionally, one can see the influence of
this legend far past the colonial period. For example, J.H. Elliott argues that post-
independence Latin Americans utilized the notion of a cruel and backwards Spain to
24 Cañizares-Esguerra, How to Write the History of the New World, 132.
25 Benjamin Keen, “The Black Legend Revisited: Assumptions and Realities,”
Hispanic American Historical Review 49, no. 4 (November 1969), 703.
26 Keen, “The Black Legend Revisited,” 714. Keen also argues that not only did the Black Legend distort evaluations of Spanish colonial relations in the Americas, but the reactionary White Legend that emerged, touting Spanish altruism and cultural advances such as an end to human sacrifice and cannibalism, equally complicated assessments of Spain’s role in the Americas and its impact on indigenous communities. See also Paul J. Hauben, “White Legend against Black: Nationalism and Enlightenment in a Spanish Context,” The Americas 34, no. 1 (July 1977): 1-19.
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explain setbacks and failures as they established their new nations.27 During the Spanish-
American War of 1898, the Black Legend appeared vividly and graphically in
newspapers across the United States. The American media ran numerous stories
representing Spain as a pirate or demon, and utilized symbols of “gothic horror” such as
bloodied knives, skeletons, and skulls to communicate the depravity of the Spanish.
Here, Bonnie M. Miller argues, the American media employed the Black Legend to
“heighten a sense of impending threat against the imperiled female victim of Cuba.”28
Though by the time of the US occupation of the Dominican Republic, the specter of
Spain was largely neutralized. The longevity of the Black Legend demonstrates the
power of imagery and narrative on perceptions and actions. Furthermore,
characterizations of the natives of the Americas found in Columbus’s initial observations
or the commentary provided by men like Las Casas and other colonial writers all set a
precedent of privileging the viewpoint of those outside the culture they were writing
about and elevating essentialized representations. Aßlong these lines, this dissertation
argues that such depictions in the modern period are crucial to understanding the
relationship between imagery and the creation of imperialistic policy as images of
Dominicans in the US media changed to accommodate the goals of the American
government.
27 J. H. Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America 1492-
1830 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 404.
28 Bonnie M. Miller, From Liberation to Conquest: The Visual and Popular Cultures of the Spanish-American War of 1898 (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2011), 35.
15
For many Americans, the Dominican Republic was a land of perpetual ineptitude,
insolvency, and backwardness. Struggling from centuries of Spanish control, the
Dominican Republic won its independence in 1821, only to have this triumph
overshadowed by a Haitian takeover the following year. When independence came again
in 1844, it was a bittersweet story for Dominicans. Trying to break free from a colonial
past and build a modern, economically viable state with a stable political system was a
daunting task for most, and the Dominican Republic was no exception. Into the void left
by Dominican structural weaknesses came the United States. The search for new markets
for export products as well as the prevention of competitors, such as Germany, fueled a
desire to interfere in places like the Caribbean. With the end of the Spanish American
War in 1898, this desire grew exponentially with the acquisition of Cuba and Puerto
Rico. American interest in the region further intensified after the completion of the
Panama Canal in 1914.29 The Dominican Republic was not the only area subject to
American attention in this period. Cuba, Panama, Nicaragua, Mexico, and Haiti all
experienced various levels of interference and intervention. In the Dominican Republic,
as a direct result of economic downturn, the United States stepped in to prevent European
29 Most scholars credit the growing imperial power of the United States and its
desire to protect its economic interests, as well as thwarting European interference in the Western Hemisphere, as major reasons for American interest in the Dominican Republic. Dana Munro argues that the threat of European invasion, particularly a German one, was a primary factor for intervention along with the promotion of stability through democracy. See Dana Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964). See also Frank Moya Pons, The Dominican Republic: A National History (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publications, 1998), 321-340. Bruce Calder maintains that American involvement was not as much influenced by economic concerns since trade with the DR was less significant than other areas. See Calder, The Impact of Intervention, xii.
16
powers from invading the island and established the Dominican Customs Receivership in
1905, which put Americans in charge of servicing Dominican foreign debt. This fix,
however, could not remedy the host of problems confronting the Dominican government
and ultimately proved unsatisfactory in terms of American objectives in the Caribbean.
The US occupation government ruled the island from 1916-1924 under the control of the
US Navy and the US Marine Corps. American officials both in Washington and on the
island deemed this occupation, much like America’s actions across Latin America, as a
paternalistic, noble effort to impose order and progress on an immature, uncivilized
people that desperately needed guidance.30
Many scholars note the endurance of stereotypes in the maintenance of empire.
In his 1971 work on Haiti, Hans Schmidt argues that the Haitian occupation, which began
in 1914, was not the work of liberal internationalism or Wilsonian democracy, but rather,
an extension of the earlier American wars against Native Americans in the West and
general expansion in the Pacific and Caribbean. Just as the power of stereotypes
dominated the American mindset in those cases, Schmidt contends that American troops
and officials came to Haiti “equipped with racist concepts and stereotypes” that affected
the course of the occupation.31 Furthermore, Schmidt maintains that the dominant theme
in Haiti was materialistic rather than idealistic, as Americans relied on markers of
30 For example, Mary Renda argued that the US occupation of Haiti operated on
these same premises of paternalistic rule. See Mary Renda, Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of US Imperialism, 1915-1940 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), esp. 15-20.
31 Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971/1995), 8.
17
materialistic achievement such as the building of infrastructure to uplift Haitians rather
than the introduction of participatory democracy.32 Thus, Americans believed that
Haitians were so backwards that their transformation had to start with the basic building
blocks of civilization. David Healy similarly argues that public support for American
intervention in Haiti came from a combination of “racial prejudice, concern over
hemispheric security, and disapproval of the turbulence and instability of Haitian
politics.”33 Though Healy is most concerned with the relatively autonomous role of the
US Navy in determining policies on the ground, he does explore the intersection of public
opinion and stereotypes about Haiti on government policy.34 Likewise, Mary Renda
argues that cultural assumptions mediated the thoughts and actions of marines during the
American occupation of Haiti. Renda’s analysis relies heavily on the concept of
paternalism, which operated as “a form of domination, a relation of power, masked as
benevolent by its references to paternal care and guidance.”35 According to Renda,
paternalism infused with racial and cultural assumptions justified American actions and
policies in Haiti. In this vein, this dissertation builds upon the work of Schmidt, Healy,
and Renda by examining the longevity of stereotypical representations of the Dominican
32 Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 13. Schmidt adds that
practically speaking, Americans could not allow elections because Haitians would vote for anti-American candidates and thus undermine the entire occupation effort, see esp.154-173.
33 David Healy, Gunboat Diplomacy in the Wilson Era: The US Navy in Haiti, 1915-1916 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976), 123.
34 See Healy, Gunboat Diplomacy, esp. 118-132.
35 Renda, Taking Haiti, 15.
18
Republic dating to the mid-1800s and their influence on occupation objectives,
maintaining that the narrative of underdevelopment was the primary lens through which
the United States viewed the Dominican Republic.
This dissertation utilizes the work of other authors that have examined the
influence of racialized conceptualizations of Latin America in general. Analyzing
political cartoons from the 1880s-1960s, John Johnson argues that these negative images
endured in the American mind presenting the public with the sense that Latin America
was politically and economically impoverished and culturally deprived. At times,
cartoonists portrayed Latin Americans as monolithic, female, black, or childlike all in an
effort to demonstrate their deficiencies. Johnson shows that the fact that these
stereotypes survived over a century speaks to their “currency and conviction.”36 The
value in these cartoons was not only that they were in the leading publications of the
time, but that politicians, editors, and textbook authors also perpetuated and reinforced
these ideas. Thus Johnson contends that even though these images did not reflect reality,
the misrepresentation that they created was just as important because that became the
reality for the American public.37 Similarly, this dissertation asserts that even if
depictions of the Dominican Republic were inaccurate, the purpose was to justify and
maintain the American presence on the island. Therefore, descriptions of economic ruin
and political chaos served multiple functions and supported various foreign policy
objectives.
36 John J. Johnson, Latin America in Caricature (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 1980), 10.
37 Johnson, Latin America in Caricature, 22.
19
Also investigating American perceptions of Latin America, James Park argues
that for over a century, Americans built and sustained enduring conceptualizations of
Latin America primarily based on the idea of underdevelopment. Both Johnson and Park
indicate the durability of stereotypical depictions of Latin America as does this
dissertation in the case of the Dominican Republic. It was precisely these
conceptualizations that became the basis for intervention and validated American
imperial actions. Park notes that the term underdevelopment became most popular after
World War II, but he indicates that the antecedents of this existed since the 1830s as the
United States always depicted Latin America as its opposite. While the United States
was “forward, progressive, and advanced,” Latin American states were “backward or
retarded.”38 Over time, this view crystalized as underdevelopment, a term used to
indicate shortcomings like a lack of political stability and democratic framework as well
as scant economic growth and an absence of social integration. This contrasted with the
term undeveloped. According to Park, undeveloped was the base line at which every
country started, whereas underdevelopment meant the “willful failure to meet
potential.”39
Scholars working on American empire note that 1898 and the United States’s
involvement in the Spanish American War denoted an important shift in the American
38 James William Park, Latin American Underdevelopment: A History of
Perspectives in the United States, 1870-1965 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 2.
39 Park, Latin American Underdevelopment, 2.
20
mindset.40 In his study on American conceptualizations of Cuba, historian Louis A.
Pérez argues that America’s role in the Spanish American War shaped the way in which
Americans “constructed a sense of themselves and their place in the world.” While this
was significant in the case of Cuba, as Pérez maintains, this dissertation posits that this
strategy developed for Cuba continued to be actively employed by the media in the
Dominican Republic. According to Pérez, the United States utilized 1898 as “an
undertaking for humanity [that] served to fix the moral calculus by which Americans
thereafter imagined the purpose of their power and celebrated the virtue of their motives.”
In this way, Pérez maintains, the imperial project in Cuba afforded the United States an
opportunity to craft their reputation both at home and abroad as well as create a carefully
constructed view of Cuba. According to Pérez, Cuba “entered the American imagination
as a metaphor,” albeit one that changed over time. Using a wide variety of sources
including newspapers, theatrical works, poetry, diplomatic correspondence, novels,
40 Stephen Kinzer’s recent work on the Spanish American War notes the
importance of this event in creating the American empire. He approaches the subject from both the imperialist and anti-imperialist camps to explore how this was a momentous shift in American attitudes. See Stephen Kinzer, The True Flag: Theodore Roosevelt, Mark Twain, and the Birth of American Empire (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2007). On the impact of the war on the United States see: Philip S. Foner, The Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of American Imperialism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972); Gerald F. Linderman, The Mirror of War: American Society and the Spanish-American War (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1974); James C. Bradford, Crucible of Empire: The Spanish-American War and Its Aftermath (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1993); Kristin L. Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); Bonnie Goldenberg, “Imperial Culture and National Conscience: The Role of the Press in the United States during the Crisis of 1898,” Bulletin of Hispanic Studies 77 (2000): 169-191; Daniel Cohen, Yellow Journalism: Scandal, Sensationalism, and Gossip in the Media (Brookfield, CT: Twenty-first Century Books, 2000).
21
government documents, and films, Pérez demonstrates the pervasiveness of these
metaphors, which constituted an enduring narrative in which Cuba was at times portrayed
as a land of opportunity, and at other times as a land inhabited by primitive, backward,
unruly, and/or ungrateful Cubans. These metaphors constituted what Pérez refers to as a
“fictive world.”41 This dissertation similarly argues that a fictive world emerged out of
the pages of print media in its coverage of the Dominican Republic. While the term
metaphor is not used here, this dissertation analyzes a number of stereotypes and tropes
that existed in an imperial narrative employed to inform Americans about the Dominican
Republic.
Likewise, in exploring the relationship between theory, language, and metaphor,
historian Frank Costigliola demonstrates how these three facets work together within a
cultural framework to influence foreign relations. Costigliola argues that “meaning is not
intrinsic to an object or an event, but rather that people, acting within their respective
culture and historical frameworks, assign meaning to that object or event.” Additionally,
metaphors that “invoke race, gender, pathology, primitivism, and other hot-button issues
can spark emotions and influence how policy makers and others perceive, discuss, and
judge issues.” This study investigates representations of the Dominican Republic to
understand how the meanings and metaphors assigned to the people and the country
impacted foreign policy decisions. Additionally, this dissertation examines the binary
opposites created in the media to depict the Dominican Republic in contrast to the United
States. Thus, as Costigliola shows, this dissertation agrees that meaning and the creation
41 Louis A. Pérez, Cuba in the American Imagination: Metaphor and the Imperial
Ethos (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 110, 6, 2-3, 3.
22
of “emotion-evoking binaries” is often conceptualized “in terms of pairs that require one
item to be not just dissimilar, but less valued than the other. In other words, we tend to
organize, define, and evaluate things according to what they are not or to what they are
opposed.”42
The ability of written works to assign meaning and create representations of
foreign people speaks to the power of the media to shape the ways in which readers
conceptualize imperial projects. Jeffrey William Sommers demonstrates that in the case
of the occupation of Haiti, both the media and the US government presented “distorted
cultural narratives” that allowed the United States to justify intervention and exploitation.
As Sommers demonstrates, both reports by the press and the government provided “the
brick and mortar on which public and elite opinion were built for a consensus in support
of Wilsonian intervention and US colonial uplift.”43 These narratives about Haiti
emerged from a racialized framework that existed long before the American occupation
of 1915 as Lindsay J. Twa argues in her work on representations of Haiti in US culture.
Twa asserts that media representations of Haiti, particularly in popular magazines such as
National Geographic, were the only way in which the average American “experienced
Haiti.” These pieces not only gave Americans their first glimpse of the island but also
allowed them to “contemplate who they were not and how the US was triumphantly
42 Frank Costigliola, “Reading for Meaning: Theory, Language, and Metaphor,”
in Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, eds. Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Patterson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 288, 297, 301.
43 Jeffrey William Sommers, Race, Reality, and Realpolitik: US-Haitian Relations in the Lead up to the 1915 Occupation (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016), ix, viii-ix.
23
improving people’s lives.”44 Andrew Griffiths shows that in the British Empire,
newspapers and novels mediated empire by creating for their readers an “imperial
experience” that instructed them how to understand, process, and experience empire.45
Similarly, Matthew Rubery demonstrates the interconnectedness of novels and
newspapers that normalized empire for their readers.46 Works on American empire in the
Philippines, also note the various ways in which the media influenced public opinion
such as David Brody’s work, which notes the value of visual sources for communicating
subjective interpretations about empire, especially the tensions early on between pro- and
anti- imperialists.47 This dissertation asserts that published material of all kinds were the
main way in which the American public experienced empire, thus the media not only
filtered what was written about the Dominican Republic but actively created a certain
image of the Dominican Republic as well.
Various authors working on the press in Latin America note the power of
published material to manipulate public opinion. In his work on journalism in Peronist
Argentina, James Cane demonstrates the crucial role the press plays as an “instrument for
the creation of meaning and hierarchy,” which functioned as a “meaning-creating link
44 Lindsay J. Twa, Visualizing Haiti in US Culture, 1910-1950 (Burlington, VT:
Ashgate, 2014), xxiii.
45 Andrew Griffiths, The New Journalism, the New Imperialism and the Fiction of Empire, 1870-1900 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 4.
46 Matthew Rubery, The Novelty of Newspapers: Victorian Fiction After the Intervention of the News (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
47 David Brody, Visualizing American Empire: Orientalism and Imperialism in the Philippines (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010).
24
between the minutiae of everyday life, the shifting events of city, nation, and world, and
the abstract, universalizing expressions of the dominant ideology.”48 Though Cane does
not specifically deal with empire, his work is instructive in relating how the press creates
consent and crafts a dominant ideology. In the same vein, Jerry W. Knudson argues in
his work on Bolivia that the press closely operates within the political process as it not
only reports and comments on events but is also active in “gathering, writing, editing, and
displaying” information that is gradated by “its importance, setting the agenda for the
audience.”49 Likewise, this dissertation focuses on the ways in which media reports on
the Dominican Republic constructed meaning and consensus for the American imperial
project.
The Historiography of the US Occupation of the Dominican Republic
Though scholars have studied the US occupation of the Dominican Republic from
numerous angles, too little attention has been given to the significance of representations
of the Dominican Republic in the US media during the intervention.50 One of the most
48 James Cane, The Fourth Enemy: Journalism and the Power in the Making of
Peronist Argentina, 1930-1955 (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2012), 8.
49 Jerry W. Knudson, Bolivia, Press and Revolution, 1932-1964 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986), 1.
50 On the US occupation of the Dominican Republic see Melvin M. Knight, The Americans in Santo Domingo (New York: Vanguard Press, 1928); Charles Callan Tansill, The United States and Santo Domingo (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1938); Stephen M. Fuller and Graham A Cosmas, Marines in the Dominican Republic, 1916-1924 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1974); Jenny Pearce, Under the Eagle: US Interventions in Central American and the Caribbean (Boston: South End, 1982); David Healy, Drive to Hegemony: The United States in the Caribbean, 1898-1917 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988); Lester D. Langley, The
25
complete treatments of the occupation is Bruce Calder’s The Impact of Intervention.
However, Calder’s study primarily focuses on the military struggles between bandits and
US troops along with a discussion of the four key areas of American reform efforts:
education, public health, sanitation/public works, and the creation of the national
constabulary. Calder notes that guerilla resistance and general Dominican opposition
were “embarrassing” for the United States because they “tarnished” its image,
complicating diplomatic efforts in Latin America and causing concern in Europe over the
American insistence on self-determination.51 Unlike Calder, this dissertation delves into
the various ways in which the media used reforms in education, public health, public
works, and the constabulary to support America’s reputation as a benevolent force in the
Dominican Republic. Furthermore, this dissertation demonstrates that it was precisely
the challenge to this benevolent imagery that led to policy changes.
United States and the Caribbean in the Twentieth Century (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1989); Brian Patrick Moran, “Prison Reform in the United States Navy and the Dominican Republic: The Military Occupation and Prisons, 1900-1930,” (PhD diss., University of Illinois at Chicago, 2000); Rebecca Ann Lord, “An ‘Imperative Obligation’: Public Health and the United States Military Occupation of the Dominican Republic, 1916-1924,” (PhD diss., University of Maryland, 2002); April Janice Mayes, “Sugar’s Metropolis: The Politics and Culture of Progress in San Pedro de Macorís,” (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2003); Teresita Martínez Vergne, Nation and Citizen in the Dominican Republic, 1880-1916 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2005); Melissa Madera, “’Zones of Scandal’: Gender, Public Health, and Social Hygiene in the Dominican Republic, 1916-1961,” (PhD diss., Binghamton University, 2011); Alan McPherson, The Invaded: How Latin Americans and Their Political Allies Fought and Ended US Occupations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Ellen D. Tillman, Dollar Diplomacy by Force: Nation-Building and Resistance in the Dominican Republic (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2016).
51 Calder, The Impact of Intervention, xvii.
26
One of the most comprehensive works on the press and the occupation argues that
American journalists used popular perceptions of Haiti and the Dominican Republic to
justify intervention. Historian John W. Blassingame’s article, “The Press and the
American Intervention in Haiti and the Dominican Republic,” notes that from 1904 until
1919, there was widespread support in the United States for intervention in the
Caribbean. Most of what Americans read was infused with racial stereotypes and
references to Dominicans and Haitians as child-like and incapable of self-governance
owing to long periods of devastating revolutions. In this way, “American journalists
justified intervention on the basis of a paternalistic regard for a degraded people.”52
However, Blassingame maintains that not all periodicals supported intervention, most
notably The Nation. By 1920, however, Blassingame posits that most newspapers and
magazines changed their tone to be more critical of the occupation. However, he does
not explain why. While this dissertation largely supports Blassingame’s findings for the
1904-1919 period, it approaches the topic from a different angle by analyzing the
imagery produced by the media to explain how it supported American foreign policy
goals. Furthermore, this dissertation argues that 1920 was a watershed year because
many newspapers and magazines turned against the humanitarian narrative, challenging
America’s objectives and methods in the Dominican Republic.
Yet another source that explores the role of the media in the occupation of the
Dominican Republic is John R. Patton’s 2013 dissertation. Patton examines the
occupation from a cultural perspective that incorporates the role of the media in a limited
52 John W. Blassingame, “The Press and American Intervention in Haiti and the
fashion. Maintaining that the intervention occurred and persisted because of “culturally
predisposed mind-sets,” Patton argues that political and intellectual leaders from the
Dominican Republic and Latin America exerted pressure causing the withdrawal in
1924.53 Patton focuses on the power of political opposition, noting that Dominican and
other Spanish-speaking figures challenged the relationship between the United States and
the Dominican Republic by “using the institutions and people of the US and other nations
against their oppressor.”54 While much of Patton’s research relies upon government
documents, he does contend that Dominican resistance led by the former president
Francisco Henríquez y Carvajal generated public interest in Spanish-language
newspapers, periodicals like The Nation, and amongst anti-imperialist groups in the
United States. Ultimately, Patton argues that the leadership that Henríquez y Carvajal
provided along with allies of the Dominican cause in the US government led to
withdrawal.55 Two themes emerge from Patton’s work that warrants further examination:
the influence of cultural predispositions and the importance of 1920. Much of Patton’s
coverage of paternalistic attitudes is a cursory overview of the influence of Manifest
Destiny, Social Darwinism, and racism on American policy makers that does not probe
53 John R. Patton, “Intellectual and Political Resistance to the US Occupation of
the Dominican Republic, 1916-1924,” (PhD diss., University of Maine, 2013), 1-2.
54 Patton, “Intellectual and Political Resistance,” 2.
55 Patton maintains that this was this winning strategy for the Dominican Republic, especially when compared to Haiti or Nicaragua, both of which were also experiencing occupations at this time, but were unsuccessful at gaining back their sovereignty. This explanation is simplistic because it ignores prevalent racist attitudes (particularly toward Haiti) and also overlooks specific conditions in both cases. For a more comprehensive treatment of the occupations in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua see McPherson, The Invaded.
28
into the intricate ways in which these concepts infiltrated the media particularly in
cartoons and vivid written descriptions as this dissertation does. Lastly, he suggests that
1920 was a crucial year for the Dominican cause for freedom, but merely notes that this
was due to its emergence in the American presidential campaign.56 While this was an
important factor, this dissertation demonstrates that it was by no means the only one.
A more thorough treatment of the racialization of Dominicans comes from
Ginetta E. B. Candelario’s sociological work, Black Behind the Ears. In the first chapters
of her book, Candelario traces outside views of Dominicans throughout the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, primarily in travel literature, as a way of exploring Dominican
national identity or dominicanidad. Candelario suggests, with little evidence, that
Dominicans internalized travel narratives to create for themselves an identity based on
“negrophobia, white supremacy, and anti-Haitianism.”57 Although this dissertation is not
concerned with the creation of dominicanidad, Candelario’s observations are valuable if
one uses them as a lens for investigating the ways in which American writers
conceptualized Dominicans as they were largely the authors of this travel literature and
the American public their consumers.
From scholars who explore basic stereotypes to ones who demonstrate how these
conceptualizations became interwoven in the American mind, this dissertation utilizes
these works to explore the fictive world of the Dominican Republic created by the
American media. Beginning with travel literature in the 1800s and continuing the
56 Patton, “Intellectual and Political Resistance,” 165-167.
57 Ginetta E. B. Candelario, Black Behind the Ears: Dominican Racial Identity
from Museums to Beauty Shops (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), 3.
29
analysis via magazine articles and press reports of the early twentieth century, this
dissertation demonstrates how the narratives the media created and sustained played a
crucial role in normalizing empire and reinforcing the supposedly altruistic mission of
American forces. In turn, this dissertation also posits that once the media began to
question the benevolence of the United States in the Dominican Republic, calls for
withdrawal and an end to the occupation became more publicized.
Organization
The chapters that follow examine the role of the media in shaping a dynamic
imperial narrative about the Dominican Republic. Since the 1800s, the Dominican
Republic appeared in the American media as a beautiful yet troubled island. This
depiction continued into the twentieth century as political infighting and economic ruin
finally prompted the arrival of the US Marines in the summer of 1916 and the
establishment of the occupation government in November of that year. This dissertation
is divided into three parts in order to understand the foundation of narratives of the
occupation.
Part I examines how the American media conceptualized Dominicans beginning
in the late eighteenth century until the establishment of the occupation in 1916 because it
is essential to understand the foundation of these narratives. Chapter two begins with an
analysis of non-American sources and then proceeds to explore American travel writing
as well as American press reports throughout the nineteenth century to demonstrate the
shifting narrative about Dominicans in the American media. Chapter three focuses on the
early twentieth century to demonstrate the crucial link between American foreign policy
30
objectives and representations of Dominicans in the American media. These sources
reflected and reinforced imperialistic goals by characterizing the Dominicans and their
government as desperately in need of outside assistance. In turn, the more involved the
United States became in Dominican affairs, the more insistent the media was on the
necessity of an American presence on the island. The common themes found in these
works became the basis for a narrative about empire based on the concept of
underdevelopment that would later serve as justification for the occupation established in
1916. Furthermore, this chapter links policy goals with the media’s constant
manipulation of Dominicans’ race and culture.
Part II further explores underdevelopment and demonstrates how this narrative
worked with the concept of humanitarianism to justify and sustain the American
occupation of the Dominican Republic from 1916 to 1924. During this time, the themes
reported in the US media not only justified American involvement in the Dominican
Republic but also served as a blueprint around which to discuss the objectives of the
occupation. At every point the Dominican Republic and the United States were diametric
opposites. Chapter four investigates the themes of political instability, economic turmoil,
and backwardness embodied in the concept of underdevelopment that became essential
terms in an imperial lexicon Americans used to discuss the Dominican Republic during
the first four years of the occupation. Chapter five analyzes the media’s addition of
humanitarianism to this traditional account. The narrative of humanitarianism relied less
on describing Dominicans, revealing much more about what how the United States
viewed its intentions and actions on the island.
31
Part III investigates the change in American media coverage of the Dominican
Republic as articles appeared questioning the very humanitarianism the United States
claimed its dealings with the Dominican Republic were based upon. By 1920 there was a
definite shift in the American media that included a more critical discussion of the
occupation. Chapter six explores the media’s general resistance to criticize the
occupation, noting important critiques of Wilsonian idealism through the early months of
1920. Though the conclusion of the Great War provided an opportunity to finally debate
and then contest American actions in the Dominican Republic as wartime censorship
diminished, the majority of American media sources continued to support the occupation.
The process of publicizing criticism of the military occupation of the Dominican
Republic increased throughout 1920 particularly with indictments made during the US
presidential election of 1920 as shown in chapter seven. Crucial to understanding this
change in coverage were stories that called into question America’s reputation as a
benevolent force in the Caribbean. As journalists began reporting on the loss of
individual liberties, accusations of abuse and false imprisonment, and most importantly
the very ideologies that American foreign policy was based on, the experience of empire
for Americans was no longer a noble project, but rather one careening toward disaster.
In the conclusion to the dissertation brief mention is made of the withdrawal
process, the various plans devised to end the occupation, and the media coverage of these
events. More significantly, though, this section discusses media depictions and
evaluations of the Dominican Republic after the termination of the occupation. The end
of the occupation served as an opportunity to justify American imperialism and define it
exclusively by its noble intent, once again relying on the trope of underdevelopment.
32
Lastly, this chapter explores the legacy of the American occupation. While the goal of
the United States was to transform what officials saw as a primitive, underdeveloped
country into a prosperous and stable neighbor, the lasting legacy of the occupation was
not necessarily what those hoping to instill democracy had hoped for as aptly
demonstrated by the dictatorship of Rafael Trujillo.
33
PART I
SHIFITING IMPERIAL NARRATIVES, 1796-1916
Part I of this dissertation explores the various ways in which the American media
conceptualized Dominicans between the late eighteenth century and 1916. In order to
understand representations of Dominicans that justified and sustained the American
occupation of the Dominican Republic, it is essential to understand the foundation of
these narratives. Initial reports in the 1790s and 1830s about the island came from non-
American sources as the Dominican Republic had little appeal in the United States.
However, once the US government became interested in potentially annexing the country
by the mid-1800s, the American media reported on the vast economic opportunities
available there. Unbounded potential, the capability of Dominicans to be transformed,
and overcoming political failures all played a prominent role in accounts of the
Dominican Republic that promoted annexation. When American policy shifted away
from this after the failure to annex the country in 1870, a new narrative emerged stressing
the deterioration of the island and the complete inadequacies of Dominicans. Most
notably, American writers and politicians in this period manipulated race to fit their
agendas. These sources made Dominicans white when they desired annexation and black
when they did not, focusing on Hispanic origins to indicate potential or African ancestry
to denote incapacity. The two chapters that follow argue that the American media’s
shifting narrative about Dominican race and culture, spanning approximately a century,
reflected shifts in American foreign policy. Furthermore, common themes such as
financial insolvency, political disorder, and economic potential found in the media prior
34
to 1916 would became the basis for an imperial narrative that would later serve as
justification for the American occupation.
Additionally, an analysis of pre-occupation sources reveals common themes
essential to the maintenance of US control over the Dominican Republic. Early accounts
show the desire to identify the source of Dominican backwardness, noting either the
legacy of Spanish colonialism and a Hispanic culture that promoted indolence, or
proximity to an uncivilized and barbarous Haiti as the basis for degeneration. Therefore,
from the beginning of outside accounts about the island a consistent theme emerged that
maintained that Dominicans were highly susceptible to outside influence, molded by
those around them rather than agents of their own making. American interest in the
Dominican Republic began in the 1850s and continued for two decades with plans to
secure Samaná Bay as an American naval base and a push for outright annexation in
1869. The American media picked up on this surge of attention promoting closer ties to
the island through works that emphasized the lucrative potential of the island if Anglo-
Saxon industriousness were to be applied. The American press encouraged foreign
investment, reporting that the Dominican Republic was a land of political stability,
tranquility, and vast economic potential. Newspapers popularized the idea that
Dominicans had let their land go to waste and the solution was American productiveness.
Similarly, travel writers praised the Dominican Republic’s economic value and
encouraged annexation. American sources promoting annexation argued that
Dominicans were anything but black in order to demonstrate the potential of a people
who could be transformed. However, some remained incredulous about the abilities of
Dominicans contending that they were indeed more black than white and thus wholly
35
unlike and unfit to join the United States. The debate about the Dominican Republic
throughout the course of the nineteenth century allowed the United States to manipulate
their representations of Dominican race and culture to justify their actions. Over the
course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the media portrayed Dominicans as
white or black in order to suit foreign policy needs. Though the depiction of
Dominicans’ race changed over time, as evidenced in the American media, certain
aspects of this discourse remained constant particularly accounts that emphasized the
need for paternalistic guidance.
36
CHAPTER 2:
FROM BLACK TO WHITE: TRANSFORMING DOMINICANS
In order to validate their expansionist schemes, many American travel writers in
the nineteenth century emphasized the lucrative prospects of the Dominican Republic.
As an advocate for extending American economic interest in the Dominican Republic in
both books and newspapers, in 1860, Wilshire S. Courtney expressed a common
American viewpoint that privileged Anglo-Saxon productivity and claimed that the
Dominican Republic could be transformed under its guidance.
To the Anglo-Saxon race more perhaps than any other, we must ascribe the grand results in civilization, in the industrial economies, in commerce and finance, in machinery and inventions, in knowledge and free institutions and in the arts and sciences, of the nineteenth century. Through its agency more than that of any other race this tide of progress has so covered Christendom and arisen to its present hight [sic]. The day and the hour forbid that its herculean energies and its inherent genius and skill, should any longer exclude the wastes of Dominica from its theatres of enterprize [sic]. In the dimly discerned grand Moral and Divine order of the Universe, by which the Almighty weighs the actions of men, balances the destinies of nations and over-rules their iniquities, Spanish St. Domingo has already done a long and cruel penance for its cities founded in cupidity and bloodshed, its immolations of the innocent on altars of avarice and its plains drenched with fratricidal carnage. The equities of Heaven’s Chancery have been meeted [sic] out to it in sore afflictions for generations. That this gem of the Western Seas will sooner or later, through the enterprize of the Anglo-American be rescued from desolation, its valleys and plains transformed into elysian gardens and blooming fields, its mountains made to yield their golden stores and its now solitary rivers and pensive bays thronged with commerce, is inevitable.1
Recalling the age-old Black Legend, Courtney claimed Spanish greed and violence was
the root of Dominican backwardness. However, after centuries of penance, he believed
that the United States would inevitably rescue and transform the country turning it into a
1 Wilshire S. Courtney, The Goldfields of Santo Domingo (New York: A.P.
Norton, 1860), 142-144.
37
divine paradise that could finally take advantage of its rich resources and superior
location. Courtney’s opinions did not stand alone as he represented a shared perspective
many in the American media promoted throughout the mid-nineteenth century. From this
viewpoint many similarly emphasized the lucrative potential of the island if Anglo-Saxon
industriousness were to be applied.2
This chapter explores how the American media depicted Dominicans throughout
the nineteenth century, arguing that fluctuations in representations of Dominican race and
culture mirrored major shifts in American foreign policy. Furthermore, reports that
claimed that Dominicans themselves could be transformed with proper guidance
represented a crucial component of the long-term American narrative about Dominicans.
The first section of this chapter reviews two early works on the Dominican Republic to
illustrate the important precedents set by non-American authors in explaining Dominican
heritage. The next part examines American sources of the mid-1800s that aimed to
depict the island as a land of unlimited potential in order to attract American investment.
As plans to annex the Dominican Republic unfolded in the 1860s, the American media
focused their attention on both the economic viability of the country and the race of its
2 Reginald Horsman, Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial
Anglo-Saxonism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981); Anders Stephanson, Manifest Destiny: American Expansionism and the Empire of Right (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995); Deborah L. Madsen, American Exceptionalism (Jackson, MS: University of Mississippi Press, 1998); Amy S. Greenberg, ed., Manifest Destiny and American Territorial Expansion: A Brief History with Documents (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2012); Fabian Hilfrich, Debating American Exceptionalism: Empire and Democracy in the Wake of the Spanish-American War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Victor Kiernan, America: From White Settlement to World Hegemony (New York: Zed Books, 2015).
38
people. This portion of the chapter argues that the American media utilized race and
heritage to either support or counter annexationist claims.
Setting Precedents: Moreau de Saint-Méry and Mackenzie
Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, Americans had little interest in the Dominican
Republic and thus information about it came from outside sources. Martinique-born
lawyer, politician, and author Médéric Louis Elie Moreau de Saint-Méry penned A
Topographical and Political Description of the Spanish Part of Saint-Domingo in 1796.
Moreau de Saint-Méry relocated to Saint-Domingue after studying law in Paris. On the
island he worked tirelessly collecting information about history, legal traditions, the
environment, people, and the economy.3 This information was especially useful to
French administrators who had signed a peace treaty with Spain the year before granting
them control over the eastern two-thirds of Hispaniola, which they would retain until
1809. One of the first travel books on the Spanish part of the island, Moreau de Saint-
Méry’s work laid the foundation for American perceptions with its 1798 English
language edition published by Philadelphia’s Philosophical Society. The book had over
100 subscribers including such illustrious men as Vice President John Adams, Benjamin
Franklin, and famous Philadelphian Matthew Carey along with numerous booksellers
requesting multiple copies.4
3 Laurent Dubois, Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian
Revolution (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 2004), 9-10.
4 The first few pages of Médéric Louis Elie Moreau de Saint-Méry’s book listed subscribers and booksellers in the United States that requested copies of the text.
39
Later cited by many American authors, Moreau de Saint-Méry’s book became an
authoritative text on the colony of Santo Domingo and underscored the potential of the
island. However, he viewed Hispanic culture as a barrier to developing the assets present
there. Moreau de Saint-Méry maintained that Santo Domingo was a rich area filled with
many natural resources, but unfortunately lacking in development because the Spanish
creoles were negligent, idle, and uneducated. Commenting on the Spanish custom of
siesta, Moreau de Saint-Méry was not surprised this was a common practice “among a
people always indolent.” This inactivity made for a backward colony in a constant “state
of mediocrity and decay.” According to his research, the people of Santo Domingo were
almost all illiterate because there were no schools save for a few in the capital city.
Moreau de Saint-Méry blamed this deficiency on what he observed about the Spanish
character. In his opinion, the Spanish creole had “few wants,” was “easily satisfied,” and
generally “pass[ed] their lives without wishing to better their lot.” As further proof of
Dominicans’ disdain for progress, Moreau de Saint-Méry remarked on the pitiable
condition of health on the island, a result of the scarcity of physicians and surgeons and
the fact that they did not inoculate for smallpox.5 Though he did note that whites, freed
people, and slaves constituted the island’s population, the majority of Moreau de Saint-
Méry’s comments focused on Hispanic heritage as the source of degeneration. For a man
devoted to science and the Enlightenment, this disregard for education and progress was
5 Médéric Louis Elie Moreau de Saint-Méry, A Topographical and Political
Description of the Spanish Part of Saint-Domingo, Containing, General Observations on the Climate, Population and Productions; on the Character and Manners of the Inhabitants; with an Account of the Several Branches of Government, trans. William Cobbett, vol. 1 (Philadelphia: Philosophical Society of Philadelphia, 1798), 51, 77, 60, 50, 48, 52.
40
at the root of Santo Domingo’s backwardness along with a distinct Spanish character,
which, he argued, naturally lent itself to idleness.
Published in 1830, just eight years into the Haitian occupation of the Dominican
Republic, Notes on Haiti Made during a Residence in that Republic blamed Haitians for
the country’s backwardness. Rather than blame Santo Domingo’s deficiencies on an
innate Spanish character as Moreau de Saint-Méry had done, Charles Mackenzie linked
underdevelopment to Haitian control. Mackenzie was the British Consul-General in Haiti
from 1826-1827 and spent fourteen months traveling throughout Hispaniola during this
time. Coming a little over three decades after the Haitian Revolution, much of
Mackenzie’s writing focused on explaining the current state of affairs in the new nation.6
His work represents the only English-language account of the era of Haitian unification,
1822-1844.7
Much like Moreau de Saint-Méry, Mackenzie remarked on the lack of education.
Instead of Spanish inadequacies, however, Mackenzie criticized the Haitians who forced
Dominicans into military service and stymied educational aspirations:
6 “Review Article: Notes on Haiti Made during a Residence in that Republic,” The
Monthly Review – May to August 1830, vol. 14 (London: Henderson, 1830), 160-177.
7 Ginetta E. B. Candelario, Black Behind the Ears: Dominican Racial Identity from Museums to Beauty Shops (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), 42.
41
[T]heir university no longer exists; the public schools are destroyed; and they insist that it is a mockery to talk of national schools, the teachers of which are utterly incompetent; but the greatest grievance (and it is a terrible one) is that, at the very age when their sons require the utmost care of a parent, they are bound by the existing law to become soldiers, and to be initiated into all the profligacy of a guard-house, as privates; from which sense of degradation no merit can raise them, while the son of the most worthless chief in the west is at once raised to the rank of an officer.8
According to Mackenzie, Haitians cared more about war than education. Furthermore,
his comment that Dominican sons served under the “worthless” chiefs of the west
indicated what he saw as a grave error – the uncivilized Haitian had not only taken over
the eastern side of the island, but was now lording his position of authority over his
helpless neighbor. Additionally, Mackenzie noted that the Spanish side of the island
lacked in both commerce and consumption. Dominicans produced only what was needed
to survive, failing to capitalize on their extensive resources. 9 Mackenzie viewed this as a
further testament to Haitian mismanagement.
Both Moreau de Saint-Méry and Mackenzie demonstrated the fluctuation of race and
culture in written accounts about the Dominican Republic. Though both authors wrote of
a lush land ripe with economic possibilities, they each noted the lack of development on
the island, crediting different cultural factors. Moreau de Saint-Méry emphasized
Spanish heritage as the source of indolence, which caused economic stagnancy. Though
he did not propose a remedy for this, his discussion of the lack of schools, traversable
roads, and healthcare suggest that under a different cultural influence, Dominicans might
have been able to improve. Mackenzie maintained that backwardness and
8 Charles Mackenzie, Notes on Haiti Made during a Residence in that Republic,
vol. 1 (London: Colburn and Bentley, 1830), 291.
9 Mackenzie, Notes on Haiti, 293.
42
underdevelopment stemmed from Haitian control, implying that removing this influence
would dramatically alter the eastern portion of the island. In both accounts, what made
the Dominican Republic so unique was its susceptibility to outside influence. This would
be an important characteristic that Americans would also attribute to Dominicans to
justify US objectives. This ability to shape the very nature of Dominicans was possible
because other than investors, travel writers, and political officials, most Americans never
traveled to the country so it remained an area that was relatively unknown outside of the
pages of these sources. Therefore, mostly people with economic and political motives
molded the image of the Dominican Republic that appeared in newspapers, travel
literature, and official policies. Regardless of the source, in most cases, Dominicans
appeared as passive subjects easily manipulated to fit the needs of the author.
Island of Untapped Resources
The American government’s interest in the Dominican Republic initially began in
the 1850s. In 1854, American President Franklin Pierce sent a group of US Army
engineers to survey Samaná Bay as a potential naval base.10 Though treaty negotiations
ultimately failed, the attention the island received drew in American businessmen who
continued to push for closer ties between the two countries. One such entrepreneur was
Texas pioneer William Cazneau, who served as a special agent to the Dominican
Republic twice in the 1850s. Cazneau purchased land near Samaná Bay and spent the
next two decades concocting moneymaking schemes to enhance his own investments and
10 Eric T. Love, Race Over Empire: Racism and US Imperialism, 1865-1900
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 35.
43
attract American financiers.11 Beyond individuals like Cazneau, many southerners in the
United States expressed interest in acquiring Caribbean locales. As historian Robert E.
May demonstrated in his work The Southern Dream of a Caribbean Empire, southerners
were active in pursuing foreign policies that would grant the United States control over
new slave territories in places like Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central America. The
purpose of this was to counter free states being admitted to the union so that those who
supported slavery could protect the institution itself and maintain a balance of power in
Congress.12 Similar to May, historian Matthew Karp noted the huge influence
southerners had in the United States prior to the American Civil War. These southern
slaveholders were at the forefront of American foreign policy, many of them members of
the executive branch of government, actively promoting their interests in defending
slavery.13 As Karp showed, southerners desired places like the Caribbean and Latin
America because they wanted to maintain systems of slavery in areas where it already
11 Love, Race Over Empire, 35. For more on the Cazneau’s and their role in
American political and economic expansion in the mid-1800s see Robert E. May, “‘Plenipotentiary in Petticoats’: Jane M. Cazneau and American Foreign Policy in the Mid-Nineteenth Century,” in Women in American Foreign Policy: Lobbyists, Critics, and Insiders, ed. Edward L. Crapol (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987); Robert E. May, “Lobbyists for Commercial Empire: Jane Cazneau, William Cazneau, and US Caribbean Policy, 1846-1878,” Pacific Historical Review 48 (January 1979): 383-412. Jane Cazneau wrote two books about her time in the Dominican Republic. See Jane Cazneau, Life in Santo Domingo: By a Settler (New York: G. W. Carleton & Company, Publishers, 1873). Under her pen name Cora Montgomery, Cazneau self-published another travel narrative about the Dominican Republic in 1878. See Cora Montgomery, Our Winter Eden: Pen Pictures of the Tropics (New York, 1878).
12 Robert E. May, The Southern Dream of Caribbean Empire, 1854-1861 (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 1973), 10 -11.
13 Matthew Karp, This Vast Southern Empire: Slaveholders at the Helm of American Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), 3-5.
44
existed and implement it in locations where they believed it would generate the most
economic potential. Given this context, the Dominican Republic was one of the key
areas southerners wanted to acquire.
As American writers became more interested in the Dominican Republic, works
followed that emphasized the lucrative prospects of the island. In Imperial Eyes: Travel
Writing and Transculturation, Mary Louise Pratt argues that travel writers constituted the
“capitalist vanguard” because their writing focused on the economic potential of certain
areas while simultaneously lamenting their backwardness as a way to authenticate and
consecrate expansionist schemes.14 Pratt contends that the capitalist vanguard emerged
after the wars for independence in Latin America as Europeans attempted to justify their
imperial aspirations. However, this same language appeared in American works on the
Dominican Republic beginning in the middle of the nineteenth century. Just as
Europeans had “reinvent[ed] America as backward and neglected, to encode its non-
capitalist landscapes and societies as manifestly in need of the rationalized exploitation
the Europeans bring,” so too would American travel writers of the mid-1800s present the
Dominican Republic as a land of untapped potential in need of American involvement.15
Wilshire S. Courtney’s 1860 work on the Dominican Republic aimed to convince
readers that all that was missing there was the efficiency and ingenuity of the Anglo-
Saxon race. Commissioned by the editor of the New York Herald, a newspaper known
for its explicit promotion of Dominican annexation, Courtney’s The Gold Fields of Santo
14 Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (New
York: Routledge, 1992), 148, 152.
15 Pratt, Imperial Eyes, 152.
45
Domingo informed Americans of the unlimited possibilities of their Caribbean
neighbor.16 According to Courtney, Americans excelled because “they apply themselves
to exploring new fields of industry, trade, commerce, manufactures, art and skill.” In
Courtney’s book, Santo Domingo was a land of “vast mineral, agricultural,
manufacturing and commercial resources.” All that was needed on the island was “the
Anglo-Saxon race” who in just a “few years [would] transform that gem of the Western
seas into an earthly Paradise [because] the elements of material wealth and prosperity are
there in unlimited and inexhaustible abundance.” Writing in the mid-1800s, Courtney
remarked that the American talent for hard work had been spent on places like Kansas,
Texas, and California as their “surplus of mental and physical energy” sought out “a
proper market, outlet, or theatre of activity.” Now, however, was the perfect moment for
Americans to direct that momentum of westward expansion toward the Dominican
Republic. Courtney hoped his book would be a source of knowledge and enlightenment
for the American public – a group whom he claimed had only a vague notion of the
location of the Dominican Republic.17
Additionally, Courtney’s work aimed to dispel popular impressions about the
Dominican Republic, which he thought would be a barrier to American interest and
investment. He wrote that most Americans believed that the island was full of poisonous
snakes, adverse weather, and disease. Certainly this prevailing attitude had to be
countered if Americans were even to consider traveling there. Courtney claimed that this
16 Candelario, Black Behind the Ears, 51.
17 Courtney, Goldfields, 8, 9, 35, 8.
46
popular depiction could not have been farther from the truth and that in reality the
Dominican Republic was “uniformly healthy and salubrious” as well as “conducive to
longevity.” He acknowledged that there were cases of yellow fever now and again, but
this was no more of a threat than what already existed in the “swampy areas” of the
southern United States. As for the chaos that seemed to dominate the political scene,
Courtney assured his readers that “[t]hese insurrections and revolutions are almost
exclusively confined to the few politicians, government officials and hired soldiers, and
scarcely ever involve the masses of the people.” To further emphasize this point,
Courtney contended that, from the time the Dominican Republic became independent
from Haiti in 1844, uprisings were not “destructive to the life or property” of foreigners
and that Dominicans respected their rights.18 Other than comments such as these,
Courtney largely avoided discussions about Haiti. This deliberate omission spoke to
Courtney’s objective of attracting American investment and the possibility of annexation
as all of his topics pointed to the potential of the Dominican Republic and its safe
environment both in the sense of human health and financial investment.
Aiming to attract investors, Courtney portrayed Dominican culture as definitively
Spanish. He estimated the population of the eastern two-thirds of the island at 120,000,
which consisted of – “Spaniards, Spanish Creoles, and some Africans and people of
color.” The word “some” implied that the majority of the population was of Spanish
descent. In fact, Courtney insisted that Dominicans retained “all the civilities and social
amenities of their refined and urbane Spanish ancestors.” Though Dominicans were
steadfastly Roman Catholic, Courtney assured readers that “their religious and patriotic
zeal however, is not by any means of an indurated, bigoted or evangelizing character.
They are tolerant and liberal.”19 Commentary about religious toleration and a refined
Hispanic character served as further proof of Dominican malleability. According to
Courtney, Dominicans were a civilized people with European sensitivities and thus a
secure place of investment.
“If this country is so rich, why don’t people take advantage of it?” The answer,
according to Courtney, lay within the characteristics and shortcomings of Dominicans
themselves. Courtney described a population almost entirely lacking in education save
for the cities and towns where wealth and intelligence abounded. Other than these areas,
the country people “although habitually honest, hospitable and sincere, are poor,
uneducated and inoffensive.” In Courtney’s eyes, the deficiency of the general
population spanned many areas:
The mass of the population wholly lack that thrift and industry necessary to their own material well-being and the redemption of their country from the desolation into which it has fallen. They are not progressive, but from year to year live on precisely as the generation before them lived, adopting no improvements in their mode of life – in new systems of industrial, domestic or social economy.20
This general lack of industriousness came from Dominicans’ Spanish heritage, as
Courtney maintained that the Spaniards had lived in “opulence and ease” and were
“averse to manual labor.” Courtney’s Dominicans were much the same as those of
Moreau de Saint-Méry sixty years before – idle and content to live off the natural bounty
19 Courtney, Gold Fields, 132, 133, 136.
20 Courtney, Gold Fields, 132-133.
48
of the land. “No allurements of wealth will arouse them from their indolence and
lethargy. They will sit by, smoke their pipes or cigarettes, and look on without
covetousness and with supine indifference while the man of industry and application
mines the gold or cultivates the soil.”21
The only hope the country had was in the firm guidance of Anglo-Saxons. Some
writers attempted to demonstrate how truly profitable the Dominican Republic could be
with the application of American productivity. While Courtney attempted to appeal to
the American spirit of expansionism, a friend and business partner of Cazneau and former
US consul actually took on the challenge. Joseph Warren Fabens’s Into the Tropics: By a
Settler in Santo Domingo, published in 1863, told the story of one man’s escape from the
harsh winter climate of New York and his year-long foray in the warm island sun of the
Dominican Republic. The book constituted a diary of sorts, with each month of his stay
detailed in terms of accomplishments (mostly in farming) and also general observations
about the land and people. In the book, the fact that Fabens had a flourishing garden
within mere months of his arrival astounded Dominicans. Equally impressive was
Fabens’s ability to turn the bitter oranges that were so prevalent on the island into sweet
ones. Throughout Into the Tropics, Fabens emphasized his industriousness and
knowledge, particularly his use of pruning and grafting. Fabens the gardener, settler, and
American stood in stark contrast to Dominicans, people who Fabens claimed worked
with minimal effort and without technology, know-how, or even an awareness of
laborsaving devices. In the end, Fabens claimed that the Dominican Republic would only
21 Courtney, Gold Fields, 137, 132, 132, 138.
49
be improved by an influx of “intelligent laborers,” “men who know how to make wood
and iron perform the severest part [of labor], to the sparing of human sinews; men who
can work steam in harness, these are what is wanted here.”22 With Courtney, who
maintained that Anglo-Saxon productivity would transform the land, Fabens seemed to
agree: “Under the warm sun of the tropics, intelligent working men and machinery will
yet open the grandest field of civilization ever realized.”23
Fabens’s comments in Into the Tropics made little mention of race. This made
sense given that his work was aimed to encourage American investment, not promote
annexation. By the time Fabens arrived in the Dominican Republic, Spain had reannexed
the country. In a paper given to the American Geographical and Statistical Society of
New York in that same year, Fabens commented that owing to their “isolated position”
and “inherent weakness,” Dominicans had difficulty maintaining their government. The
lack of roads and postal facilities and the fact that Dominicans were “totally ignorant of
the various mechanical inventions which assist labor and add to capital” further hampered
governmental success.24 Though Dominicans appealed to Europe and the United States
for help, the only “sympathetic response” they received came from Spain. Fabens
praised Spain for making the Dominican Republic even more appealing to foreign
investment. In an attempt to attract Americans, he claimed that Spain was in the process
22 Joseph Warren Fabens, Into the Tropics: By a Settler in Santo Domingo (New
York: Carlton, 1863), 144.
23 His emphasis, Fabens, Into the Tropics, 145.
24 Joseph Warren Fabens, Resources of Santo Domingo: A Paper Read Before the American Geographical and Statistical Society of New York (New York: Carelton, 1863), 29.
50
of cleaning up the cities and rebuilding infrastructure, on top of already abolishing
slavery and establishing “perfect political equality of the races.”25 As further enticement
to investment, Spain would be reducing duties on imports, repealing duties on exports,
and, most importantly, throwing “open her doors” to invite “colonization from all
quarters.”26
The absence in Fabens’s commentary of both Dominicans’ race and of Haiti
suggested that only when the United States was interested in direct control did these
factors matter. With Spanish reaanexation between 1861 and 1865, Fabens simply
wanted to attract American investment in his discussions of an Edenic paradise in need of
Anglo-Saxon initiative. Furthermore, with the American Civil War raging during this
same period, the Dominican Republic remained far from most Americans’ minds.
American Annexation and the Manipulation of Race
After the conclusion of the Civil War in the United States and the Dominican
victory over Spain during the War of Restoration, both in 1865, American attention once
again turned toward the Dominican Republic. In January 1866, President Andrew
Johnson sent Secretary of State William Seward to meet with Dominican President
Buenaventura Báez about once again securing Samaná Bay in the northeast of the
country as a US naval base to prevent European intervention in the Caribbean. Báez
agreed to sell, even mentioning his desire for the potential annexation of the whole
25 Fabens, Resources of Santo Domingo, 30.
26 Fabens, Resources of Santo Domingo, 30.
51
country despite protests by Dominican nationalists.27 In the United States, Johnson
broached the subject in his fourth annual message to Congress in December 1868.
Johnson stated that “the long-indulged habits of colonial supineness and dependence
upon European monarchical powers” on the island had stymied attempts in both countries
to establish stable republics. Though the United States did not want to see the
reestablishment of European power in the Western Hemisphere, Johnson lamented that,
“too little has been done by us . . . to attach the communities by which we are surrounded
to our own country, or to lend even moral support” to their efforts in creating “republican
institutions.” Citing the political and social difficulties in both Haiti and the Dominican
Republic, the president noted that it would not be long before the United States would
have to “lend some effective aid.”28
American intervention in the Dominican Republic benefitted many individuals.
As the United States acquired land around the region over the course of the nineteenth
century with the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, the procurement of Spanish Florida in
1819, and the massive territorial gains as result of the Mexican-American War in 1848,
American interest in the region had grown considerably.29 As Americans settled in these
regions and established trade and transportation networks, both Central America
27 Silvio Torres-Saillant and Ramona Hernández, The Dominican Americans
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998), 20.
28 Andrew Johnson, “Fourth Annual Message to Congress” (speech, Washington, DC, 9 December 1868), The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu.
29 Eric Roorda, The Dictator Next Door: The Good Neighbor Policy and the Trujillo Regime in the Dominican Republic, 1930-1945 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press 1998), 10.
52
(particularly Panama and Nicaragua) and the Caribbean became strategic economic areas
for the United States. For his part, President Báez had many political enemies who
wanted him out of office at any cost. Just days after being sworn in as president for his
fourth non-consecutive term, Báez notified American officials that he was willing to sell
them Samaná Bay for the cost of $1 million in gold and $100,000 worth of munitions.
While negotiations were underway, Báez also wanted three battleships to help preserve
his precarious position against his rivals who had allied themselves with Haitian rebels to
overthrow him.30 For American businessmen such as William Cazneau and Joseph
Warren Fabens, closer ties between the United States and the Dominican Republic would
secure their investments. Cazneau owned a plantation near the bay and Fabens owned
hundreds of acres of land (his reward for a geologic and cartographic survey of the island
in 1868). Eventually these two men owned about one-tenth of the land in the Dominican
Republic, prompting them to promote the treaty to politicians in Washington.31
The American press also seemed to encourage foreign investment in the
Dominican Republic. Articles from late 1869 and early 1870 noted the political calm and
economic opportunities there. Reporting in February, the New York Times cited President
Johnson’s message and added that Dominicans greeted his words with “the liveliest
satisfaction.”32 The article indicated the presence of French and British capitalists on the
30 Frank Moya Pons, The Dominican Republic: A National History (Princeton,
NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2010), 237. Love, Race Over Empire, 37.
31 Love, Race Over Empire, 35, 36.
32 “St. Domingo: Visit of English and French Capitalists,” New York Times, 2 February 1869, 5.
53
island, perhaps as a further inducement for Americans to claim what they referred to as
“another California.” To allay concerns, the Times concluded: “Except some occasional
guerilla raids on the border, the country is in perfect calm. Trade is reviving; crops,
particularly tobacco, are unusually fine this year.”33 Washington’s Daily National
Intelligencer stressed that the Dominican Republic’s reputation as a “theatre of many
political vicissitudes” lay in the past. Armed with a “commanding political position in
the Caribbean, magnificent harbors, valuable forests, rich mines, and fertile territory,” the
country remained of value.34 The New York Herald claimed the Dominican Republic had
“marvelous sources of vegetables and mineral wealth.”35
Reviving antebellum images of indolence, newspapers also focused on
Dominicans’ lack of productivity. The New Hampshire Patriot and State Gazette
concurred that the Dominican Republic could be a lucrative acquisition for the United
States, but blamed the natives’ slothfulness and passion for political instability as the root
of backwardness. According to the paper, Dominicans were “ignorant, indolent and
stupid, and as long as they can get plantains to eat, and swing in their hammocks, they are
satisfied, but they love the excitement of a revolution.”36 These depictions stressed the
idea that the only energy Dominicans’ possessed was for rebellion. The press
popularized the idea that Dominicans had let their land go to waste and it would only be
33 “St. Domingo,” 5.
34 “The Annexation of Santo Domingo,” Daily National Intelligencer, 6 February
1869, 2. 35 “Santo Domingo,” New York Herald, 14 January 1870, 6.
36 “San Domingo,” New Hampshire Patriot and State Gazette, 11 May 1870, 2.
54
under American industriousness that the riches of Santo Domingo could be cultivated. In
January of 1871, the New York Herald echoed these themes:
There is probably no country in the world possessed of greater natural resources than St. Domingo. Her climate is healthier than that of any other West India Islands, being mild and salubrious. The soil is remarkably fertile, producing everything grown in the tropics. . . . Gold and silver abound in the country, but the same indolence which has left the soil virgin of the plough has left these precious metals undisturbed in the bowels of earth.37
While these articles avoided a blatant discussion of race, they implied that laziness,
political instability, and backwardness were simply innate attributes of Dominicans. In
this way, reports such as these created a Dominican identity for their readers perpetuating
a narrative that could only be altered by American intervention.
Travel writers also continued to praise the economic value of the Dominican
Republic and to push for annexation utilizing similar themes. In his 1870 book, San
Domingo: Pen Pictures and Leaves of Travel, Romance and History, De Bennevile
Randolph Keim noted the need for another book on Santo Domingo because of the lack
of information about the island. As a result, he traveled there in the summer of 1869 as a
special correspondent for the New York Herald. Dedicating his book to President Ulysses
Grant, Keim lauded the fecundity of the environment by describing teeming rivers,
abundant forests, mountains filled with precious metals, and rich soil. Keim portrayed
Santo Domingo, the capital, as civilized. “In every respect,” it was a “Spanish city,”
which “bore the traces of antiquity” since it was “the oldest living European city in the
Western Hemisphere.” Though Keim underscored the connection to Europe and its
37 “Sketch of the Resources and History of St. Domingo,” New York Herald, 11
January 1871, 3.
55
Hispanic heritage, he also lamented that the city, which had once been the staging ground
for the great conquistadors, was now a land of “poverty and decay.” To encourage
annexation, Keim’s book deemphasized race and ignored Haiti. According to Keim, the
source of deterioration was constant uprisings that had bankrupted the government.38
To underscore the need for American guidance, Keim related his interview with
Dominican President Báez. The president mourned the state of affairs in his country, the
result of “a handful of fugitives from justice, and desperadoes” who did not represent the
popular sentiment of the people and had caused the country to go “backward instead of
forward.” Asked if there was any hope for a better future, President Báez apparently
replied, “We look to your government. If we had your strong arm to lift us up, you
would see how soon we would be able to return all of your assistance.” Keim
summarized his findings and the thoughts of the president for his reader: “With a strong
Government, and a few examples, for the edification of the turbulent spirits, I feel
assured that there is enough virtue left in the Dominican people to make a peaceable,
industrious and enterprising race. All they need, is example.”39
Many in the United States, the president included, had more than just example in
mind as plans for the annexation of the Dominican Republic surfaced in 1869. Under
the tenure of President Ulysses S. Grant, the idea of gaining hegemony in the Caribbean
and increasing commercial wealth through closer ties with island nations resurfaced.
38 De Benneville Randolph Keim, San Domingo: Pen Pictures and Leaves of
Travel, Romance and History (Philadelphia: Claxton, Remsen & Haffelfinger, 1870), vi, 37, 38, 40, 60, 67.
39 Keim, San Domingo, 68, 70, 71, 319.
56
This objective prompted his attempt to annex the Dominican Republic with the
possibility of later making it a state.40 In 1869, US officials brokered an annexation
treaty with President Báez, who saw this as a favorable way to protect his country from
European encroachment and provide his government with much needed funds to take
decisive actions against his political enemies.41 In the treaty signed on 29 November
1869, the United States agreed to pay Báez $100,000 in cash and $50,000 in arms in
return for the annexation of the country. Put to a vote, the treaty passed in the Dominican
Republic.42 Approving the treaty in the United States, however, turned into a long
process. Submitted to the US Senate in early January 1870, the senators debated on the
topic for over five months, finally putting the treaty to a vote on 30 June 1870. The result
was a tie of 28-28, which failed to attain the necessary two-thirds for ratification.43
Disappointed by the outcome, President Grant continued to push for annexation in the
coming months.
40 Dennis Hidalgo, “Charles Sumner and the Annexation of the Dominican
Republic,” Itinerario 21, no. 2 (July 1997): 51-65. On the long history of diplomatic relations and the desire for annexation see William Javier Nelson, Almost a Territory: America’s Attempt to Annex the Dominican Republic (Newark, DE: University of Delaware, 1990). For more information on early diplomatic connections see Charles Callan Tansill, The United States and Santo Domingo, 1798-1873, A Chapter in Caribbean Diplomacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1938).
41 Moya Pons, The Dominican Republic, 229-230.
42 Frank Moya Pons noted that these votes were largely obtained through intimidation and came mostly from poor, illiterate Dominicans. See Moya Pons, The Dominican Republic, 229.
43 Harold T. Pinkett, “Efforts to Annex Santo Domingo to the United States,” The Journal of Negro History 26, no. 1 (January 1941), 37. Love, Race Over Empire, 64.
57
In his second inaugural address in December 1870, President Grant attempted to
sway public opinion and pressure his political opponents. In his speech, he warned that if
the United States abandoned the Dominican project, European powers would quickly
seize the commercial opportunity. President Grant provided listeners with a long list of
positives: geographic control over the Caribbean, mining and agricultural opportunities,
stabilization of the balance of trade, a market for American products, national protection,
control over isthmian commerce, and even the potential to destabilize slavery in Cuba,
Puerto Rico, and Brazil. Obviously influenced by the extensive discourse about the
island, Grant insisted that though the Dominican Republic was a “weak power,
numbering less than 120,000 souls,” it had “one of the richest territories under the sun,
capable of supporting a population of ten million people in luxury.” He continued: “The
people of San Domingo are not capable of maintaining themselves in their present
condition, and must look for outside support;” what they needed was, “a stable
government, under which her immense resources can be developed.”44 Mirroring the
existing narrative of the Dominican Republic presented in travel narratives and the press,
Grant saw annexation as the best option for both the Dominican Republic and the United
States.
The following month, still insistent on annexation, President Grant sent an
investigative committee to the island to report on conditions with the hope of persuading
Congress to revisit the issue. The commission arrived in the Dominican Republic in
44 Ulysses S. Grant, “Second Annual Message to the Senate and House of
Representatives” (speech, Washington, DC, 5 December 1870), The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29511.
58
January 1871 led by Republican senators Benjamin D. Wade (Ohio) and Andrew D.
White (New York), along with Dr. Samuel G. Howe and Frederick Douglass, the former
abolitionist-turned-diplomat who now served as the commission’s assistant secretary.
Grant wanted to prove that Dominicans wanted annexation and perhaps his selection of
four abolitionists to lead the commission was an attempt to prove the altruistic intentions
of the United States.45 Accompanying them was a host of specialists including
geologists, mineralogists, botanists, and zoologists as well as members of the press and
men representing American commercial firms.46 Their reconnaissance produced a report
that highlighted the improved political situation and economic possibilities of the island,
as well as the potential of its inhabitants.
Though the majority of the commission’s findings included reports on resources,
the commissioners made sure to dispel potential investors’ qualms about the political
situation in the republic. Acknowledging the political turbulence of previous years, the
commission maintained that, under Báez, the government was “organized and in
complete operation of all of its departments, exercising every function of a legitimate
government.” Addressing recent disturbances led by José María Cabral and Gregorio
Luperón, the report dismissed both as selfish profiteers who cost the government money
45 Senator Wade was a prominent Radical Republican who also supported
women’s suffrage and African American equality. Senator White was an historian and educator as well as the co-founder of Cornell University. Dr. Howe had served in the Greek Revolution as a surgeon, founded the Perkins School for the Blind and was married to Julia Ward Howe writer of the “Battle Hymn of the Republic.” Frank Moya Pons claimed that the favorable report produced by the commission was the result of bribes by President Grant and his supporters. See Moya Pons, The Dominican Republic, 230.
46 Torres-Saillant and Hernández, The Dominican Americans, 22.
59
with their “annoying guerilla warfare.” Rejecting Cabral’s claim to power, the report
noted that in referring to himself as the “Chief of the Revolution,” he clearly had no real
authority or respect for the constitution. As for Luperón, Dominicans testified that he
was “simply a bandit stained with crime,” financed through robbery and “piratical actions
on the coast.” To further indicate their illegitimacy, the commission noted that both
reportedly received funding from Haiti. The report failed to mention that part of Báez’s
desire for annexation was precisely to gain financial support and the political backing of
the United States against these adversaries, instead labeling these individuals as greedy
bandits. Lastly, the report mentioned the issue of “provincial jealousy” and “petty
military chiefs” (caudillos) who were relatively autonomous and thwarted central control.
The commissioners believed that a “union with a strong government” would give
Dominicans the authority needed to bring these caudillos in line.47 Like many American
sources on the Dominican Republic, the commission’s report failed to analyze the
political intricacies of the country and made broad distorted by their goal of obtaining
support for annexation. Furthermore, the issues the report so easily dismissed such as
guerilla warfare, caudillismo, and Haitian incursions had not been solved and, in fact,
would continue to plague Dominican and then American administrators for decades to
come.
As further testament to the peaceable conditions in the republic, the
commissioners noted that, throughout their trip, they never worried about their own
47 US Senate, Report of the Commission of Inquiry to Santo Domingo
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1871), 6, 7, 8. The press also printed portions of this report. See “Report of the St. Domingo Commissioners,” Sun, 1 March 1871, 1.
60
safety. In Santo Domingo they slept with doors “slightly secured” or sometimes
completely unlocked and their windows wide open. During their stay, they did not
employ guards nor did they carry weapons. Local judges assured the commission that
“high crimes” such as burglary, arson, and murder were unknown on the island. The
report stated that they “never encountered any shadow of hostile demonstration; nothing
but kindness met them in all quarters and among all classes.” When the topic of
annexation came up in multiple conversations with Dominicans, the commissioners
claimed they witnessed absolutely no antagonism. Even in the remotest villages, they
maintained people had intelligently discussed the issue “and everywhere there was a
general agreement in the declaration that their only hope of permanent peace and
prosperity is in annexation to and becoming part of the people of the United States.”48
Precisely because Báez had a vested interest in annexation, and his political opponents
had supporters in the country (as evidenced by the high numbers of political prisoners), it
was likely he carefully selected who the commissioners would meet and what those
people would say when asked about their support for US annexation.
The investigation also aimed to counter previous depictions of Dominicans as
indolent. Though the commissioners reported that the people did not cultivate as much as
they could given the fertility of the land, this was not due to laziness but rather to the
simple fact that they did not know if they would reap the benefits of their work. Whereas
previous authors blamed Spanish culture as the source of idleness, the commission
countered this stating that those with “Spanish blood” were especially capable of physical
48 US Senate, Report of the Commission, 12, 11.
61
exertion. The emphasis on Dominicans’ Hispanic roots was likely employed to
differentiate them from Haitians and also African Americans – two groups many
Americans viewed as lazy because of their African heritage. Furthermore, they claimed
that the “evidence taken shows that the Dominican people are not averse to work when
certain of reasonable reward, but are good and faithful laborers.”49 Because the
commission wanted to stress the industriousness of Dominicans, it was important to
explain the cause of underdevelopment. To this end, the commission emphasized that
constant warfare, not Spanish culture, was to blame as the war with Haiti had imparted a
sense of uncertainty about the future and thus discouraged farmers from producing more
than they needed.
Given that the job of the commissioners was to report on the potential of the
Dominican Republic and the benefits of annexation, the commissioners made sure to
comment extensively on culture and race. As with President Grant’s previous discussion
of granting the Dominican Republic statehood, it was important to depict them as
anything but black. Though Dominicans were not “pure white,” as the report indicated,
they were not “pure black” either, but instead of “mixed blood.” The “majority,” it
stated, “were much nearer white than black.” The best way to explain race in the
Dominican Republic was in comparison to Haiti, noting the intrinsic differences between
the two halves of the island. In a discussion of the border, the report noted that this
boundary line not only divided the island politically but also marked “the separation of
different languages, different national trades, characteristics, different modes of holding
49 US Senate, Report of the Commission, 14.
62
and surveying the soil, different peoples.” In fact, according to the report, Haitians
“differ[ed] widely” from Dominicans because “[n]egro blood preponderates very largely
in Hayti; but the pure negro of African type is not common even there. White blood
preponderates largely in Dominica, but pure whites, in the popular sense of the word are
not numerous.” The commissioners assured their audience that only in Haiti was the
“black race” in “complete ascendancy.” In the Dominican Republic, meanwhile, a more
civilized people inhabited the land – a people courteous, hospitable, respectful, and
polite. In fact, the commissioners declared their surprise in finding the “physical, mental,
and moral condition of the inhabitants . . . much more advanced than had been
anticipated.”50
The American media publicized the commission’s findings to the general public.
While newspaper reports tended to be more substantive on the subject, magazines articles
dedicated more space to the topic and provided pictures. One of America’s most popular
journals, Harper’s Weekly, depicted sketches of the commissioners and a scene from the
Dominican Republic on the cover of their 11 March 1871 edition. Though the piece
focused almost exclusively on biographies of the three commissioners, the caption for the
sketch and the image itself instructed readers how to view the country. Dominating the
bottom third of the cover was a scene of a primitive tropical village with the caption,
“View in San Domingo City – Altar Erected by Columbus.”51 The image was of an
unpaved street filled with barefoot, dark-skinned figures and huts with thatched roofs and
distant palm trees; in the street children played and a man rode a donkey. At the center of
50 US Senate, Report of the Commission, 13, 15, 28, 3, 15, 13.
51 Harper’s Weekly 15, no. 741, 11 March 1871.
63
the image was a stone structure, a stark contrast to the shacks around it. In front of it, a
Dominican woman bowed down to an altar while her child stood solemnly at her side.
The article maintained that Columbus built the house as a residence for himself and the
altar served as a temporary place of worship. Though Columbus constructed the house
from “stone and mortar,” the article explained that at present it had crumbling walls and
lacked a roof. The reader obtained a sense of history from the sketch and a strong
connection with the European past via Columbus – a past that some Dominicans still
venerated as evidenced by the woman and her child. However, the commentary that the
building itself was in a state of disrepair led the reader to the conclusion that this place,
San Domingo City, had fallen from its previous glory. Further evidence of the
deterioration of the city emerged in the crude tropical huts and the shoeless figures that
littered the dirt road. Though the article itself did not comment on the race of
Dominicans, the image led the reader to the conclusion that, though they had a Hispanic
connection to the past, at present, they possessed darker skin and lived in squalor.
Harper’s Weekly thus presented a narrative that highlighted the historic European roots of
the Dominican Republic but questioned its present condition. As the image in Harper’s
Weekly demonstrated, despite the glowing report of the commission extolling the
industrious and civilized people in the Dominican Republic, some still doubted the
potential of the country and the people, as they could not see them as anything but
primitive.
Despite the detailed report of the commission, some senators still doubted their
findings. Much like the cartoonist from Harper’s Weekly, there were senators that
remained incredulous about the potential of Dominicans. Leading the charge against
64
Dominican annexation were Senators Charles Sumner from Massachusetts and Justin
Morrill from Vermont. From the beginning of discussions about the Dominican
Republic, Sumner believed annexation jeopardized Haitian independence and was the
byproduct of shady commercial and diplomatic dealings.52 Furthermore, as historian
Dennis Hidalgo shows, Sumner adhered to the concept that certain races should remain in
geographically determined areas, thus, Dominicans belonged in the tropics rather than the
United States.53 Morrill, however, believed that Dominicans were “unaccustomed to a
free Government.”54 He lambasted Dominicans as a worthless people “wholly without
education, led in factions by unprincipled and desperate chiefs, destitute of all ambition
which a high civilization inspires, reeking in filth and laziness” and never having
“invented anything nor comprehended the use of inventions of others.”55 It was a “vain
idea,” he added, to think the United States could “fire the languid brains and torpid
muscles of the Dominicans to make sugar, grow coffee, and hack down mahogany
52 Much of this is outlined in Sumner’s December 1870 speech to the US Senate.
See Charles Sumner, “Naboth’s Vineyard” (1870) in Naboth’s Vineyard (Washington, DC: F. and J. Rives and George A. Bailey, 1870). Many of the same points Sumner made in his “Naboth’s Vineyard” speech appeared in later speeches published by the press, for example see “San Domingo: Armed Negotiation in Favor of Usurper,” Chicago Tribune, 28 March 28 1871. Dennis Hidalgo also outlined these concepts in his article. See Dennis Hidalgo, “Charles Sumner and the Annexation of the Dominican Republic.”
53 Hidalgo, “Charles Sumner and the Annexation of the Dominican Republic.”
54 Justin Morrill, “Annexation of Santo Domingo” (1871) in Annexation of Santo Domingo (Washington, DC: F. and J. Rives and George A. Baily, 1871), 8.
55 Morrill, “Annexation of Santo Domingo,” 8.
65
trees.”56 Morrill’s fiery statements challenged the commission’s image of Dominicans as
potentially hardworking if given American direction.
In the end, the most vehement arguments from the senators revolved around race.
Like other anti-imperialists of the time, both Sumner and Morrill effectively used racist
rhetoric to counter annexationist claims. Relying on theories of scientific racism popular
at the time, these anti-imperialists claimed that those who were racially different from
whites could never be fully assimilated.57 Ignoring the commission’s claims that
Dominicans were mostly white, unlike their Haitian neighbors, Sumner referred to the
entire Caribbean as homogeneous “colored communities” where the “black race was
predominant.”58 Morrill concurred, stating that the population was comprised of “mainly
descendants of Indians and forty different Africans races.” According to Morrill,
Dominicans were:
A foreign, incompatible race, and never can be homogenous, in manners or customs, language or religion, with our people; because, having a diverse and incoherent origin, and a climate always tending toward effeminacy, they have also for ages been intermixed with a stock which neither learns virtues nor forgets vices, and which clings with the sublimest faith to revolutions and the Catholic priesthood of Santo Domingo.59
56 Morrill, “Annexation of Santo Domingo,” 7.
57 Love, Race Over Empire, 31-32, 55-56. Sumner and Morrill were not the only
contributors to this debate as Senator Charles Schurz also relied on the idea that the tropical environment of the Dominican Republic imparted a racial identity on Dominicans that made them incompatible with white Americans. See Fidel Tavárez, “‘The Moral Miasma of the Tropics’: American Imperialism and the Failed Annexation of the Dominican Republic, 1869-1871,” Nuevo Mundo, Mundos Nuevos (2011). Available from: https://journals.openedition.org/nuevomundo/61771?lang=en.
58 Charles Sumner quoted in Hidalgo, “Charles Sumner and the Annexation of the Dominican Republic,” 59.
59 Morrill, “Annexation of Santo Domingo,” 8.
66
This statement indicated that the United States and the Dominican Republic were
diametric opposites and that Dominicans’ Hispanic heritage was partly to blame. In
Morrill’s opinion, rebellions and a blind devotion to Catholicism separated Dominicans
from Americans, making the two incompatible. Furthermore, Morrill argued that it made
more sense for America to focus its efforts north, incorporating the people of Alaska, for
example, because they were of a “kindred stock and tongue” and thus possessed more
potential to assimilate. By contrast, Dominicans belonged with Haitians, as Santo
Domingo was “a portion of an island greatly coveted by Hayti, from which it was
violently wrenched in 1844 and to which it geographically belongs.”60 Facing a rising
chorus against annexation and much to Grant’s chagrin, the topic did not lead to a
reconsideration of the 1869 treaty.
With the final defeat of annexation, the Dominican Republic receded as a topic of
interest in the American media. Though he had personally traveled with the
commissioners in 1871, Samuel Hazard’s book, Santo Domingo: Past and Present, with
a Glance at Hayti, was not published until 1873. Much of his book included long
passages extracted from the commission’s report extolling the potential of the Dominican
Republic. However, Hazard’s conclusion demonstrated the turn away from the island.
Maintaining that major changes were needed, Hazard conceded that these did not have to
come from the United States and, instead, could be carried out by some other
60 Morrill, “Annexation of Santo Domingo,” 18, 9, 10-11.
67
“progressive Government,” noting the already strong German presence there.61 Previous
authors mentioned foreign involvement as further inducement to American intervention;
here was just the opposite as Hazard stated that the Germans could easily fulfill the task.
Robert T. Hill’s 1899 work, Cuba and Porto Rico, with the Other Islands of the West
Indies, devoted two chapters to the Dominican Republic, explaining its constant political
revolutions and general turmoil as it was “perhaps the most impoverished and backward
of the Great Antilles.” Hill’s chapters repeatedly focused on the deterioration of the
island, which he claimed began as early as 1540. He stated that the “population is neither
savage nor vicious, although its vitality has been greatly sapped by the unfortunate
political events.”62 Most notably missing from Hill’s book were statements encouraging
American intervention. This absence was also notable in travel literature. Francis C.
Nicholas’s Around the Caribbean and Across Panama, published in 1903, did not even
mention the Dominican Republic.63
Though for a brief period the Dominican Republic retreated from view, its
century-old images reemerged in travel literature, the press, and official reports when the
subject did. Prominent in early twentieth century depictions of the Dominican Republic
were reports of unbounded economic potential, the ability of Dominicans to be
transformed, and the overcoming of political failures. Most notable, however, was the
61 Samuel Hazard, Santo Domingo: Past and Present, with a Glance at Hayti
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1873), 469.
62 Robert T. Hill, Cuba and Porto Rico, with the Other Islands of the West Indies (New York: Century, 1899), 236, 253, 258.
63 Francis C. Nicholas, Around the Caribbean and Across Panama (Boston: HM Caldwell Company, 1903).
68
mutability of Dominican culture and race. As American writers and politicians
manipulated the race of Dominicans to fit their agendas – making them white when
annexation was desired or black when it was not, focusing on Hispanic origins to indicate
potential or African ancestry to denote incapacity – the media of the twentieth century
followed suit, continuing to mold Dominicans according to their motives.
Conclusion
An analysis of pre-occupation sources reveals common themes essential to the
maintenance of US control over the Dominican Republic. Early accounts showed the
desire to locate the source of Dominican backwardness, identifying either the legacy of
Spanish colonialism and a Hispanic culture that promoted indolence, or proximity to an
uncivilized and barbarous Haiti as the basis for degeneration. Therefore, from the
beginning of outside accounts about the island a consistent theme emerged that
maintained that Dominicans were highly susceptible to outside influence, molded by
those around them rather than agents of their own making. US newspapers and travel
literature in the nineteenth century demonstrated the malleability of representations of
Dominican race and culture as they created and reinforced imperial views and stereotypes
based on American foreign policy desires. President Grant’s desire to annex the
Dominican Republic initially prompted investigations into the country that highlighted
vast economic opportunities and the whiteness of Dominicans who, with American
guidance, could realize their full potential. The pushback against the annexationist
scheme utilized language to demonstrate the differences between Dominicans, who they
claimed were more black than white. The constant shifting in this imperialist narrative
69
allowed the United States to manipulate their representations of Dominican race and
culture to justify their actions. Though the depiction of Dominicans’ race changed over
time, as evidenced in the American media, certain aspects of this discourse remained
constant. No matter what the objective, US observers continued to view Dominicans as
children in need of paternalistic guidance and tutelage. Additionally, the treatment of the
Dominican Republic as a land of untapped economic potential persisted as a prime
motivator for American occupation forces.
70
CHAPTER 3:
“UNCLE SAM’S PERIODICAL BAD MAN”
Commentary in the American media on the economic woes and political
instability of the Dominican Republic in the early twentieth century highlighted the utter
incapability of Dominicans to effectively administer their country. Writing in 1914,
William D. Boyce recounted the political vicissitudes in the Dominican presidency
starting with the dictatorship of Ulises Heureaux in the late 1800s:
Many are the stories they tell of his [Heureaux’s] depravity and cruelty, how he slaughtered those who opposed his wishes and turned over concessions, monopolies, even the customhouse, on receipt of “cash payments.” This reign of terror was brought to a close by a well-placed bullet from the pistol of Caceres, whose father he had murdered. Later on, Caceres himself became President, to meet the same fate at the hand of an assassin.1
In order to emphasize the chaotic state of governance in the country, Boyce characterized
the Dominican financial situation as utterly hopeless without the intervention of the
United States.
The Dominicans do hold all records for the scandalous handling of public funds. Soon after they broke away from Spain they started on this mad career, borrowing right and left, until they had piled up a mountain of debt, over $30,000,000 and nothing to show for it! This forty years’ spree was filled, “acrobatically speaking,” with all sorts of daring exhibitions of financial tumbling. From the “hard up” state they slipped down into the “dead broke” class. Then the foreign creditors demanded their money. Their sheriffs were warships. Then the Dominicans appealed to the United States for aid and protection and Uncle Sam threw out a life preserver. This was back in 1905.2
1 William D. Boyce, United States Colonies and Dependencies, Illustrated
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1914), 567.
2 Boyce, United States Colonies and Dependencies, 577.
71
Like many American writers of the early twentieth century, Boyce related a story of utter
incompetence combined with political pandemonium. Stories such as these served as
justification for increasing American intervention in the Dominican Republic.
This chapter explores the various ways in which the American media
conceptualized Dominicans in the early twentieth century, further emphasizing the
crucial link between American foreign policy objectives and representations of
Dominicans in the American media. A major turn appeared in American sources as the
desire of US politicians moved away from the annexation plans of the nineteenth century
and instead focused on establishing a stable and financially prosperous neighbor. In
order to accomplish this, the United States created the Dominican Customs Receivership
in 1905, which collected customs duties in an effort to ensure the repayment of foreign
loans. During this period the common depiction of Dominicans was one that emphasized
their similarities with neighboring Haiti and increasingly showed them as black. When
the customs receivership failed to create political stability, American sources shifted their
attention from the topic of race to that of corrupt government complete with graft,
nepotism, and a penchant for revolutions because, according to these accounts, American
intervention could solve these problems. The manipulation of representations of
Dominicans corresponds to Michel Foucault’s idea of a “régime of truth” as these
depictions became the “true” image of Dominicans that influenced policies. Moreover,
the ease with which they transformed depending on the needs and desires of the United
States demonstrates how and why Americans created this “Other.”3
3 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings,
1972-1977, ed. and trans. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 131. The
72
A New Era in American Diplomacy
The Spanish American War of 1898 brought areas of the Caribbean and Pacific
under America’s control, generating a greater interest in guarding its newly acquired
assets. This desire to protect its latest possessions intensified with the signing of the Hay-
Pauncefote Treaty in 1901, which allowed the United States to build and manage its own
canal; the US Senate voted in favor of completing this project in Panama the following
year. With places like Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Panama in its sightlines, the Caribbean
gained in strategic value for the United States, one it was not willing to compromise
because of unpaid debt to European creditors. Though the Monroe Doctrine warned
Europeans to stay out of the Western Hemisphere, over the course of the 1800s this had
not led to significant US interventions to enforce it. By the turn of the century, however,
the United States was finally in a position to act. In December 1902, Venezuelan
President Cipriano Castro failed to pay his country’s foreign loans, leading Italy,
Germany, and Great Britain to enact a naval blockade, which, in turn, prompted the
United States to take action. When a similar situation threatened the Dominican
Republic, the United States, backed by the press, was ready to act.
From 1882 until 1899, Ulises Heureaux ran the Dominican Republic and drove
the country deeper into debt. Holding the presidency at various points during his almost
two-decade rule, Heureaux’s dictatorial tenure involved attempts at developing
infrastructure, expanding military forces, and supporting his lavish lifestyle – much of
this financed by foreign creditors. Many of these loans ended up in the hands of the San
Dominican “Other” functioned many times like the Orientalized “Other” as defined by Edward Said. See Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979).
73
Domingo Improvement Company, an American firm founded in 1893.4 Nonetheless, the
government still owed money to creditors in Germany, Italy, Belgium, Great Britain, the
Netherlands, and France, and the assassination of Heureaux in 1899 revealed the
acuteness of the financial situation. With over $30 million in debt, the Dominican
government faced a crisis.
The American press reported on the Dominican Republic’s financial woes,
highlighting the country’s downfall rather than its economic potential with stories that
spoke of a state rife with rebellion and plagued by instability. Most articles that
appeared in the New York Times were at most two to three sentences in length, but
effectively communicated the dire conditions of the island with headlines such as:
“Revolt in Santo Domingo,” “Another Dominican Revolt,” “Fall of the Dominican
Government Expected,” and “Crisis in Santo Domingo.”5 With the deterioration of
governmental strength and the subsequent failure to address foreign debt, European
creditors began not only pressuring the Dominican Republic to pay its loans but also
threatening it with the possibility of military action. In September 1903 the New York
4 Ellen D. Tillman, Dollar Diplomacy by Force: Nation-Building and Resistance in the Dominican Republic (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2016), 24-25. Alan McPherson also mentioned this company see Alan McPherson, A Short History of US Interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean (Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell, 2016), 48. See also Cyrus Veeser, A World Safe for Capitalism: Dollar Diplomacy and America’s Rise to Global Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).
5 “Revolt in Santo Domingo: Insurgents Capture a Coast Town, but Are Afterward Driven Out – Martial Law Throughout the Country,” New York Times, 1 April 1902; “Another Dominican Revolt: Vice President Vasquez Said to be Leading It – It Is Believed that It Will Be Suppressed,” New York Times, 29 April, 1902; “Fall of the Dominican Government Expected: The Rebels Hold the Whole of the Country Except the Capital and the City of Puerto Plata,” New York Times, 3 May 1902; “Crisis in Santo Domingo: New Government Cannot Last – President Vasquez Mentally Affected,” New York Times, 29 June 1902.
74
Times ran an article stating the significance of the Monroe Doctrine by arguing that the
countries to the south of the United States would quickly learn that it “imposes upon
them duties as well as confers upon them rights.”6 No longer would Latin America be a
refuge for debtors and it was now time to “lay down the law” in places like the
Dominican Republic. The author of the article feared that Europe would take advantage
of the weakened state of affairs there and “make it profitable for themselves.” In
response, the author maintained: “We will not allow the exclusive possession or any
occupancy of any part of the territory of the republic by any European Power in time of
peace, and still less in time of war.”7
From experiences such as those in Venezuela and the Dominican Republic, a new
policy formed in the United States that would change the way America viewed itself and
its role in Latin America. In his State of the Union Address in December 1904, President
Theodore Roosevelt formulated what would later be referred to as the Roosevelt
Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Roosevelt’s speech emphasized that the United States
did not “feel any land hunger” but instead cared about the welfare of other countries in
the Western Hemisphere. He assured listeners that those countries that could “act with
reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters,” “keep order,” and most
importantly fulfill their financial obligations would win the friendship and support of the
United States. However, in cases of “chronic wrongdoing,” the United States would be
forced to intervene in order to protect hemispheric interests and keep European creditors
at bay. Roosevelt stated: “All that this country desires to see is the neighboring countries
6 “Laying Down the Law,” New York Times, 21 September 1903, 6.
7 “Laying Down the Law,” 6.
75
stable, orderly, and prosperous.”8 These words turned the Monroe Doctrine into a
belligerent policy in which the United States intervened in Latin America when peace
was threatened. Instead of the promotion of annexation to create stability, the Roosevelt
Corollary justified sending in US marines to ensure the payment of debt in countries like
the Dominican Republic, signaling the beginning of dollar diplomacy to keep Europe
out.9
In an effort to prevent European intervention in the Dominican Republic, in 1904
the United States pushed for an agreement in which US agents would collect customs and
handle the repayment of debt. These negotiations produced the Dominican Customs
Receivership in April 1905.10 The American president appointed the head of the
receivership, which collected all customs in the country. In order to facilitate the
repayment of foreign loans, the receivership reserved fifty-five percent of customs taxes
to pay off debts and remitted forty-five percent to the national government.11 This
agreement became a formal treaty in 1907 between the Dominican Republic and the
United States with the added stipulations that its entire administration be placed under the
8 Theodore Roosevelt, “Fourth Annual Message to Congress” (speech,
Washington, DC, 6 December 1904), TeachingAmericanHistory.Org, http://www.teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/roosevelt-corollary-to-monroe-doctrine/.
9 McPherson, A Short History, 61.
10 McPherson, A Short History, 48; Fred J. Rippy, “The Initiation of the Customs Receivership in the Dominican Republic,” Hispanic American Historical Review 17, no. 4 (November 1937), 420.
11 Bruce Calder, The Impact of Intervention: The Dominican Republic during the US Occupation of 1916-1924 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984), 4.
76
Bureau of Insular Affairs and that the Dominican government accept a loan of $15
million from a New York bank to pay off all outstanding foreign debt.12
The American desire to restrain European creditors not only influenced major
policy decisions like the Roosevelt Corollary and the establishment of the receivership
but also elicited language that painted Dominicans as children incapable of self-
government and in need of parental care. On 25 December 1904, the New York Times
prepared its readers for the possibility of more direct American intervention. Referring to
the country as the “little ‘republic,’” placing the word republic in quotation marks, the
article emphasized the opinion that governmental functions on the island were a farce.13
The diminutive reference to the Dominican Republic further underscored its immaturity
and child-like nature. Though the Times assured their readers that financial issues would
not dredge up President Grant’s old plans of annexation, it did note that the United States
would take on a more active role in the Dominican Republic to help establish a “decent
Government.” In another article, the Times accentuated the need for American guidance,
stating that the receivership was a necessary step because the United States had to “guard
these countries in the south against the ultimate consequences of their own misbehavior.”
Echoing President Roosevelt’s speech, the article contended that the holding of a “big
stick” via the Monroe Doctrine allowed the United States to “constrain our neighbors to
12 Calder, The Impact of Intervention, 4.
13 “May Seize Santo Domingo: Occupation for Debt Believed in Washington to
be Near,” New York Times, 25 December 1904, 1.
77
the performance of their international duties.”14 According to the author, “Santo
Domingo seems to stand in need of good advice.”15
The Dominican Customs Receivership marked a new beginning in the
relationship between the United States and the Dominican Republic, one increasingly
depicted as paternalistic. In effort to bring financial solvency to the island, the United
States was like a parent patiently guiding its wayward child – and not a child of just any
race. In December 1904, the New York Tribune referred to the Dominican Republic as a
“mulatto baby just about sixty years old, but exceedingly small for its age.”16 Before
American intervention, debts went unpaid because, since its birth, the Dominican
Republic “suffered from internal disorders that have wasted its strength and stunted its
growth.”17 Similarly, in January 1905, the Spokane Press reported that the Dominican
Republic had been historically “torn by revolution, misgoverned and despoiled” and was
now to “feel the chastening influence of the ‘big stick.’”18 With its new authority, the
United States would order the Dominican Republic “to pay its debts and be good.”19
Taking the metaphor of the unruly child even farther, the St. Paul Globe referred to the
Dominican Republic as “Uncle Sam’s New Ward,” a country with so much trouble that
14 “Dominica's Adviser,” New York Times, 21 January 1905, 8.
15 “Dominica's Adviser,” 8.
16 “The Mulatto Republic,” New York Tribune, 11 December 1904, 4.
17 “The Mulatto Republic,” 4.
18 Jacob Waldeck, “A US Receivership for Santo Domingo,” Spokane Press, 10
January 1905, 3.
19 Waldeck, “A US Receivership for Santo Domingo,” 3.
78
the United States had been compelled to “Put [it] Over Our Knee and Spank [it] in Order
to Make it Good.”20 In an article for New England Magazine, reprinted in the
Washington newspaper the National Tribune, American author Winthrop Packard
referred to Dominicans as a “semi-barbarous but simple and child-like people.”21
Packard stated that Dominicans should be “regarded as children; good children in the
main, and perhaps capable of growing up, but needing for the present, and possibly for a
good while to come, a strong guiding hand.”22
The depiction of the Dominican Republic as a child in this period was joined with
a shift in the portrayal of race. Whereas the pro-annexationist literature of late 1800s
highlighted the whiteness and Hispanic roots of the country, the rhetoric of the
receivership period harkened back to anti-annexationist portrayals of the Dominican
Republic that focused on blackness and a lack of civilization. The St. Paul Globe
maintained that Dominicans were “rotting away” and that their constant revolutions
reduced the population to “acute misery” resulting in a people that had “practically
reverted to African savagery” as “most of the evidence of Spanish civilization had been
swept away.”23 Other articles noted the scarcity of whites on the eastern half of the
island or emphasized the degeneration of the people by underscoring the peculiar racial
20 “Uncle Sam’s New Ward, Turbulent Little Santo Domingo,” St. Paul Globe, 19
February 1905, 31.
21 Winthrop Packard, “Facts About Santo Domingo,” National Tribune, 15 March 1906, 8. This article was a reprint of Packard’s piece with the same title in New England Magazine. See Winthrop Packard, “Facts About Santo Domingo,” New England Magazine 34, no. 1 (March 1906), 3-16.
22 Packard, “Facts About Santo Domingo,” 8.
23 “Uncle Sam’s New Ward,” 31.
79
mixture of the population.24 In his piece in the New England Magazine, Packard argued
that miscegenation had not led to “a race, but a mongrel” lacking virility and the physical
stamina to be productive.25 Packard claimed that the majority of the population was
“semi-savage” and lived in “feudal times.”26
In contrast to the literature of the annexation period, which stressed the
differences between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, newspaper reports in the early
1900s conflated the two. The American press attributed voodoo ceremonies, human
sacrifice, and cannibalism to the Dominican Republic in an effort to emphasize its
savagery and African roots. The Washington Post quoted extensively from Professor
Jesse Walter Fawkes from the Bureau of Ethnology in a 1903 article. Fawkes stated that,
although everyone in the Dominican Republic claimed to be Catholic, this was merely a
façade because “beneath this surface, lies the paganism of old Africa, with its human
sacrifices, cannibalism, obscene rites and ceremonies, every bit as strong, if not stronger,
than it is or ever was in the depths of the African forest.”27 In another piece published in
The World To-Day, a monthly magazine offering original content and color imagery in its
coverage of world events, author Sigmund Krausz questioned the extent of voodooism in
the Dominican Republic, arguing that, although Dominicans likely did not participate in
human sacrifice or cannibalism, “there is truth in the horrible stories of the survival of
24 “Waving Big Stick Over San Domingo,” Times Dispatch, 29 January 1905, 1.
“The Mulatto Republic,” 4.
25 Packard, “Facts About Santo Domingo,” 8.
26 Packard, “Facts About Santo Domingo,” 8.
27 “Santo Domingo Voodooism,” Washington Post, 17 May 1903, 11.
80
fetish worship in the remoter districts of Santo Domingo.”28 Addressing the long history
of differentiating between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, the New York Times
claimed that, even though Dominicans maintained that they were different from their
neighbors, “it is the reverse of creditable for a white republic to have conducted its affairs
in about the same way as those of the black republic.”29
Cartoon representations of Dominicans in the early 1900s allowed the American
public to identify swiftly the blackness and backwardness of the island through a series of
racially loaded images.30 Most cartoons depicted their Dominican subject as both child-
like and black, the pickaninny figure, an image used to illustrate Cubans, Puerto Ricans,
28 Sigmund Krausz, “Santo Domingo, the Home of Revolution,” The World To-
Day 8 (July 1, 1904-January 1, 1905), 1029.
29 “Topics of the Times: An Island with Possibilities,” New York Times, 24 January 1905, 8.
30 On the value of cartoons as an historical source see Thomas Mitton Kemnitz, “The Cartoon as a Historical Source,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 4, no.1 (Summer 1973): 81-93. For a specific analysis of cartoons about Latin America see John J. Johnson, Latin America in Caricature (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980). Cartoons played a key role in shaping Americans views of Cubans during the Spanish American War as well. On American media at that time see Bonnie M. Miller, From Liberation to Conquest: The Visual and Popular Cultures of the Spanish-American War of 1898 (Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2011). On the various imagery Americans associated with Cuba see Louis A. Pérez Jr., Cuba in the American Imagination: Metaphor and the Imperial Ethos (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008). For pictorial representations in the Philippines (including cartoons and photographs) see Servando D. Halili, Iconography of the New Empire: Race and Gender Images and the American Colonization of the Philippines (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 2006); Kent Worcester, “Introduction: Symposium on Editorial Cartoons,” Political Science & Politics 40, no. 2 (2007): 223-227; Roland Sintos Coloma, “‘Destiny Has Thrown the Negro and the Filipino under the Tutelage of America’: Race and Curriculum in the Age of Empire,” Curriculum Inquiry 39, no. 4 (September 2009): 459-519; Nerissa S. Balce, Body Parts of Empire: Visual Abjection, Filipino Images, and the American Archive (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2016).
81
Haitians, Chamorros, and Hawaiians in this same period.31 The pickaninny figure
possessed stereotypical features including engorged lips, kinky hair, and ink black skin.
These physical qualities along with a child-like stature pointed to a subject that was
immature and possessed animal-like features that hinted at a wild and savage disposition.
As sociologist Kelvin Santiago-Valles articulated in his analysis of cartoon images of
American empire, the pickaninny body presented both a child-like copy of an adult and a
parody of a civilized white body, a representation that communicated the need for
tutelage and instruction.32 Furthermore, the use of the pickanniny to represent multiple,
diverse groups in the Caribbean, Pacific, and the American South relayed the notion that
“no specialized or socio-culturally specific expertise is required to instruct and
administer” these people.33 Thus, American viewers could readily contextualize
Dominicans through cartoons that made them little different than the more familiar
images of Cubans, Puerto Ricans, or even African Americans from the southern United
States.
The St. Paul Pioneer Press published two cartoons by illustrator George W.
Rehse in 1904 and 1906 that reinforced the conceptualization of the Dominican Republic
as a black, uncontrollable child in need of American supervision. A 1904 cartoon
showed Uncle Sam leaning out the window of house with the letters “U.S.” over the door.
Outside, a shoeless black child with a ratty straw hat emboldened with the words “San
31 See Kelvin Santiago-Valles, “’Still Longing for de Old Plantation’: The Visual
Parodies and Racial National Imagery of US Overseas Expansion, 1898-1903,” American Studies International 37, no. 3 (October 1999): 18-43.
32 Santiago-Valles, “’Still Longing for de Old Plantation,’” 31.
33 Santiago-Valles, “’Still Longing for de Old Plantation,’” 33.
82
Domingo” threw a temper tantrum in the street. One of the child’s hands was clenched in
a fist and the other held a straight razor with the word “revolution” on its blade. The
caption read, “Uncle Sam: ‘Maybe I’ll have to bring the boy into the house to keep him
quiet.’”34 Rehse drew the “boy” or San Domingo as a typical pickaninny figure. Clearly
needing the discipline of the mature and stable Uncle Sam, the cartoon conveyed the idea
that the unruly Dominican might have to be brought under American supervision to keep
him calm and orderly. A similar depiction appeared in a 1906 cartoon entitled: “Uncle
Sam’s Periodical Bad Man.” Here, Rehse’s Dominican once again wielded a straight
razor while his other hand clutched a bottle of “Revolution Gin” which clearly made him
drunk as he stumbled off-kilter down the street in an attempt to avoid a truncheon-
brandishing Uncle Sam dressed in a policeman’s uniform.35 Again, represented as the
pickaninny, the Dominican figure wore a sombrero with the words “Santo Domingo” on
its brim, complete with ragged clothes held together with a safety pin and bare feet that
appeared to be dirty because they left footprints on the pavement. Drunk on revolution,
Santo Domingo needed the discipline a mature, sober Uncle Sam could provide.
Other cartoonists utilized the pickaninny image to depict the Dominican Republic
as disobedient and plagued by revolution. Robert Satterfield’s 1904 image showed “San
Domingo” raising a sword and pistol over his head as he stormed forward in a cloud
forming the word “Revolution” around him. Uncle Sam gazed down on him, four-times
34 George W. Rehse, “Uncle Sam: ‘Maybe I’ll have to bring the boy into the
house to keep him quiet,’” in Cartoon in John J. Johnson, Latin America in Caricature (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980), 183.
35 George W. Rehse, “Uncle Sam’s Periodical Bad Man,” in John J. Johnson, Latin America in Caricature (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980), 189.
83
as large and dressed in a police uniform with a billy club near his hand and a harsh look
on his face. The cartoon’s caption read, “Revolution number sixty-seven is now in
progress in San Domingo, and Uncle Sam is, as usual keeping an eye on ‘American
interests.’”36 Charles G. Bush’s 1904 cartoon, “The Strenuous One Will Catch You, If
You Don’t Watch Out!” conveyed a similar message. In this cartoon, two faceless
“revolutionists” sat atop a giant watermelon with the word “San Domingo” on it as they
carved up the fruit with their machetes. Their wide-brimmed hats and completely
blackened faces obscured all facial features. A giant Theodore Roosevelt smiled above
them with what appeared to be a bucket ready to scoop them up.37 The image of the
watermelon, a common feature of cartoons depicting African Americans, reminded
readers that Dominicans were black. Yet again, the larger American figure, in this case,
President Roosevelt, was ready to rescue Dominicans from their own infighting.
With these powerful images, cartoonists instantaneously conveyed a
representation of the Dominican Republic that the American press pushed since 1903.
This depiction presented Dominicans as financially insolvent, incapable of self-
governance, prone to revolutions, child-like, and unruly. The easiest way to convey this
narrative to the American public was to make Dominicans black. The American media
accomplished this racial transformation in articles that spoke of voodoo practices and
African primitiveness and in cartoons that portrayed Dominicans as pickaninnies that
36 Bob Satterfield, “Revolution number sixty-seven is now in progress in San
Domingo, and Uncle Sam is, as usual keeping an eye on ‘American interests,’” in Tacoma Times, 17 February 1904, 4.
37 Charles G. Bush, “The Strenuous One Will Catch You, If You Don’t Watch Out!” in John J. Johnson, Latin America in Caricature (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980), 185.
84
were disobedient, drunk, violent, and in need of parental control. This shift in the
rendering of Dominicans demonstrated the plasticity of race as the American media
changed Dominicans depending on national and individual objectives. The media
stressed Hispanic heritage and whiteness when annexation was the goal – these
Dominicans had the potential to be industrious because deep down, they were European.
However, when the desire to take over the island was no longer the objective, and the
United States instead wanted a stable neighbor that paid its debts and allowed the US to
control its customs, the Dominican people became black. As with US images of Cuba,
Hawaii, or Puerto Rico, blackness conveyed the idea that white Americans had to oversee
these groups because they were immature, unstable, and ultimately incapable of
managing their own affairs, a characterization that perfectly fit with already existing
paternalistic assumptions in the United States.
The Island of Misrule
With the customs receivership in place in 1905, rosy reports appeared in
American newspapers justifying US actions with accounts of growing income, debt
repayment, and political calm, all fortifying the paternalistic narrative that Dominicans
needed American guidance. The New York Times informed readers that Dominicans
were “supremely happy” and that political stability dominated the island as “revolutions
that were threatened three months ago never materialized, and there are peace and quiet
in the whole country.”38 Another article praised the receivership because of the rapid
increase in customs duties and the ability to pay off hundreds of thousands of dollars in
38 “Santo Domingo Happy with Our Collectors,” New York Times, 3 June 1905, 8.
85
foreign debt.39 An even more positive assessment appeared in the San Francisco Sunday
Call in November 1911 claiming that the receivership produced a magical transformation
in the Dominican Republic. “In Santo Domingo, Uncle Sam has waved the wand that
produces national transformation, and lo! a republic has appeared where government is of
the people, peace assured, prosperity perennial.”40 The New York newspaper the Sun
commented on the ability of the Dominican Republic to finally meet its financial
obligations thanks to American oversight. This had, in turn, led to internal improvements
in the country such as the construction of “good roads” and “clean streets, properly
lighted” with “harbor improvements” on the way.41 These assessments of the merits of
the receivership highlighted the ability of the United States to ensure financial security,
internal development, and a stable government – components that had remained elusive
without American involvement.
Missing from most American press reports, however, were details about the actual
political situation in the country. Though the press attributed the onset of stability and
order in the Dominican Republic to the receivership, it failed to credit Dominican
President Ramón de Cáceres for much of the calm in the country. Elected in 1906, de
Cáceres proved to be not only a popular leader in the Dominican Republic but also a
long-tenured one when compared to the chaotic political situation following the
39 “Domingan Income Growing,” New York Times, 16 September 1905, 6.
40 “How Uncle Sam May Stop the Scrapping and Pull the Central American
Republics Out of the Hole,” San Francisco Sunday Call, 11 November 1911.
41 “Santo Domingo in Uncle Sam’s Care,” Sun, 14 April 1912.
86
assassination of President Heureaux in 1899.42 De Cáceres’s own assassination in
November 1911 brought an end to peace and, once again, revolution returned to the
Dominican Republic, bringing with it at least eight separate administrations over the
course of the next five years.43
Though de Cáceres was out, the receivership remained, and now the American
press had to explain the return of political turbulence. The solution to this dilemma came
in the form of returning to the old trope of bad government. For example, American
author Frederic J. Haskin maintained in his 1912 article for the Washington paper the
Evening Star that, although US officials had hoped that the customs agreement would put
an end to revolutions, this was not possible as Dominican politicians cared more about
greed, nepotism, and power than peace.44 Reporters like Haskin and travel writers from
this period continued to ignore the political intricacies of the Dominican Republic, and
more importantly how US demands undermined the authority of Dominican politicians.
At various points between 1911 and 1916, the United States sent in marines, threatened to
cut off customs funds, forced the resignation of constitutionally elected leaders, and
attempted to impose reforms that placed more power in the hands of American officials
who could operate above Dominican supervision.45 In the end, this side of the story did
not end up in the American media; instead, the focus returned to the supposed quality of
Dominican political incompetence.
42 Calder, The Impact of Intervention, 4, 5.
43 Calder, The Impact of Intervention, 5.
44 Frederic J. Haskin, “Caribbean Politics,” Evening Star, 14 May 1912, 10.
45 On these complexities see Calder, The Impact of Intervention, 5-7.
87
Throughout 1914 the American media shifted from commentary on race and
economic potential to an almost exclusive focus on the instability of the Dominican
government. In part, this rhetorical adjustment reflected the chaotic political situation
following de Cáceres’s assassination, though very few if any sources actually noted this
fact. However, by creating a narrative in which revolution and political volatility almost
seemed to be part of the Dominican national character, American sources validated the
need for further action beyond just controlling customs. For example, the magazine New
Outlook praised the receivership for its success in doubling Dominican revenue but also
noted that financial turmoil was a product of “revolutions and incompetent and dishonest
administration” that had continually plagued the country.46 The Chicago publication The
Day Book characterized both Haiti and the Dominican Republic as troublesome areas due
to the “reign of rapine and anarchy.”47 In a discussion of sending US marines to the
island, the Sun stated the necessity of this action since Haiti and the Dominican Republic
had suffered from at least a century of “barbaric internal warfare” and were both “filled
with corruption.”48 A piece that appeared both in the West Virginia newspaper the Daily
Telegram and in Vermont’s Burlington Weekly Free Press referred to the Dominican
Republic as “the island of revolutions” and even claimed that it was “the official program
of Santo Domingo.” The two papers agreed that it was “quite difficult to keep an
46 “Our Work in Santo Domingo,” New Outlook, 3 January 1914, 618.
47 “US to Step Into Hayti and Santo Domingo,” The Day Book, 14 July 1914.
48 “US Control of Caribbean Sea Now Menaced,” Sun, 19 July 1914, 1.
88
accurate account of the number of revolutions that have taken place in the pugnacious
little Republic.”49
Further underscoring the persistent narrative of the Dominican Republic as a land
of revolution, the magazine Literary Digest ran a piece in August 1914 maintaining the
similarities of the country with Haiti. Noting the need to protect the Panama Canal and
keep the Germans at bay, possibly because of the outbreak of World War I, the author
worried that the two Caribbean nations were “going to pieces” owing to “endless
‘barbaric internal warfare.’” Despite constant diplomatic attempts, the need for armed
intervention to “enforce order and safeguard life” was imminent.50 To further relay the
dire situation, two cartoons appeared alongside the article. In one, Uncle Sam had a
small pickaninny child labeled Haiti in his lap. Throwing a fit at being spoon-fed
medicine, Uncle Sam laments in the caption, “Gosh! I’m getting’ tired of stoppin’ these
internal disturbances.” In the other cartoon, President Woodrow Wilson appeared as a
teacher at the front of a classroom labeled “School for Young Republics.” In the
background, racialized pupils read a book entitled “New Freedom,” while Wilson
chastised Santo Domingo. Dressed in a soldier’s uniform, the small pickaninny figure of
Santo Domingo fussily rubbed his face with one hand while the other clutched a sword.
To emphasize the role of Wilson as disciplinarian, in one hand he held a switch and in the
other he gripped a figure representing Mexico by the collar. The cartoon communicated
the essential idea that the United States, here depicted as President Wilson, was a
49 “Something About Santo Domingo,” Daily Telegram, 15 August 1914. This
exact same article appeared in September in the Burlington Weekly Free Press, see “Something About Santo Domingo,” Burlington Weekly Free Press, 17 September 1914.
50 “Quieting Haiti and Santo Domingo,” Literary Digest 49, part I (1 August 1914), 179.
89
disciplinary force in Latin America, tutoring “young republics” and teaching them how to
behave. Unlike purely written sources that avoided race, the cartoons accompanying the
article continued to rely on a stereotypical depiction of the Dominican Republic.
The tendency to concentrate on the shortcomings of the Dominican government
continued in travel literature and reinforced the justification for American involvement.
Famous for his role as the founder of the Boy Scouts of America, William D. Boyce was
also an avid traveler, publishing his views on America’s role in the world in 1914’s
United States Colonies and Dependencies, Illustrated. For Boyce, the Dominican
Republic or the “foster-child of Uncle Sam” was a land dominated by revolutions and
greed. Upon rowing up the Ozama River from the bay, he joked that the price the
boatman attempted to exact was outrageous because, after all, they were not called
“DOUGHminicans” for nothing. Boyce recalled the accumulation of debt under
President Heureaux noting that after winning their independence from Spain, Dominican
officials continuously borrowed from foreign creditors amassing “a mountain of debt
over $30,000,000.” As creditors demanded payments Dominicans could not make, the
government turned to the United States for aid and protection. Boyce noted that since the
establishment of the receivership in 1905, swift and vast improvements abounded. The
capital now possessed telephones, electricity, and paved streets for their new
automobiles.51 The emphasis here was that this had all been possible because of
American intervention.
For Boyce and other travelers he spoke with while in the Dominican Republic, the
real issue was the corrupt politicians who had caused their country to become so
51 Boyce, United States Colonies and Dependencies, 566-567, 567, 572.
90
backward. These politicians “jail people on trumped up charges” and, in the rural areas,
jefes or “petty rulers” embezzled directly from the people. Interviewing an American
who had been working on a sugar plantation there for the last eight years, he asked him
what was wrong with the Dominican Republic. The man replied that it was a rich, fertile
land that could support millions rather than just thousands. However, the real issue was
politics. According to the sugar man, “Trouble is, they all want to be President, even if
they get shot for it. They certainly did need us Americans down here to count the cash.”
Boyce’s interviewee feared that, if the United States terminated its current position of
controlling customs in the Dominican Republic, then “the politicians will get their grip on
the treasury [and] there will be a revival of the dear old business of killing each other.”
According to Boyce, what the Dominicans needed was more American supervision rather
than less. Here was a people used to “small rations and the smell of gunpowder,” and
without American mediation, the situation would never improve.52
Boyce’s opinion toward all countries explored in the book, not just the Dominican
Republic, was one that focused on the necessity of American intervention. From the
outset, Boyce set the tone by reminding his readers that “every square foot of the soil that
now constitutes our country and its colonies once was owned or claimed by some foreign
power. That it finally became the home of self-governing people has been the largest and
most hope-inspiring of all facts.” Boyce waxed paternalistic as he claimed that, “in our
colonies” the role of the United States “is to protect and hold and train them to become
self-governing units.” In this context, American involvement in the Dominican Republic
appeared not as an opportunistic power move on the part of the United States, but instead,
52 Boyce, United States Colonies and Dependencies, 577, 593, 594.
91
as a benevolent mission in which to improve the country and make it like the United
States. The biggest obstacle to this was bad government. Though Boyce briefly
mentioned race, calling the country the “Black and Tan Republic,” and noted its racial
diversity, the focus remained on governmental failures, a problem Boyce believed the
United States could fix.53
This conceptualization of the Dominican Republic as a land plagued by political
turmoil continued in A. Hyatt Verrill’s Porto Rico Past and Present and San Domingo of
To-Day, published in 1914. Verrill was a well-traveled author, illustrator, and explorer
with a passion for zoology and writing science fiction. His journeys took him all over the
Western Hemisphere, with considerable time spent in the Caribbean, particularly in
Puerto Rico, where he lived for some time. Verrill claimed that the Dominican “fondness
for revolutions” was both their national pastime and one of their few native customs.
Though, like Boyce, Verrill largely avoided the topic of race, he seemed to argue that a
sort of bloodthirstiness and disposition toward violence were part of the Spanish colonial
heritage: “Here was shed the first blood of Europeans in conflict with the Indians.” If the
Dominican Republic were to rise to greatness, according to Verrill, it would have to
transcend a past in which it had been “baptised in blood, civilised by ruthless slaughter of
countless thousands of human beings, and for centuries … torn with massacres,
revolutions, and warfare.” Verrill claimed that these early atrocities were further
exacerbated by the wars for independence, first against Spain and then Haiti, which
predisposed Dominicans to belligerency. According to Verrill, these struggles “infected
[Dominicans] with the ‘insurrecto’ germ, they cannot overcome their tendency to revolt
53 Boyce, United States Colonies and Dependencies, xi, 566, 572.
92
on any and every occasion … their effect upon the progress and welfare of the country is
incalculable.” This of course led to financial problems, as peasants became soldiers,
leaving behind farms and hindering the economic development of the country. The
frequency of revolutions and fighting had also led to a lack of foreign loans because
investors believed this to be a highly unstable area.54
Like those before him, Verrill compared the Dominican Republic with Haiti,
explaining the vast differences between the two countries in terms of “habits, manners,
people, and language.”55 However, despite this distinction, Verrill maintained that one
feature applied to both countries: “They are torn by frequent revolutions and have not yet
learned that peace spells prosperity.”56 Other sources argued that Haiti and the
Dominican Republic were more alike than different in terms of their political instability.
In 1915, the Sun reported that, since independence, both countries had been “in a state of
constant upheaval and bloodshed as the result of a practically unbroken succession of
revolutions.”57 There was no way this could go without action any longer and no one can
deny that they needed “nothing short of absolute control by the United States under some
sort of protectorate or regency.”58
54 A. Hyatt Verrill, Porto Rico Past and Present and San Domingo of To-Day
(New York: Dodd, Mead, and Company, 1914), 235, xx, xxi, 235, 235-236.
55 Verrill, Porto Rico Past and Present, 227.
56 Verrill, Porto Rico Past and Present, 228.
57 “Hard Problems for US in Hayti and Santo Domingo,” Sun, 1 August 1915, 1.
58 “Hard Problems,” 1.
93
By December 1914, the political chaos in the Dominican Republic appeared to be
dwindling with the election of President Juan Isidro Jimenes, but continued pressure by
American officials eventually toppled Jimenes’s government. For years, the United
States had been trying to get the Dominican government to agree to expand American
control. In addition to the receivership, the United States wanted to place two American
officials within the Dominican government. Both appointed by the US president, one
would serve as the director of public works and the other would be a financial adviser
who would establish a national budget and authorize all public expenditures. Moreover,
the United States wanted to enlarge the authority of the customs receivership by having it
collect and control internal revenue.59 American demands further intensified as US
officials wanted to expand the powers of the financial advisor and disband the Dominican
armed forces in favor of a constabulary controlled by a person selected by the US
president.60 Though Jimenes accepted these terms, the Dominican Congress did not, and,
instead of pulling back, the United States stood firm, willing to send in military forces to
ensure their requests. The situation continued to devolve, and by 1916 Jimenes had few
moves left. Though the US was willing to back him militarily, Jimenes did not want the
US to send in troops. With little support in his own government, in the spring of 1916,
the Dominican Congress passed a resolution to impeach Jimenes, leading to the landing
of US marines in May 1916.61
59 Calder, The Impact of Intervention, 6.
60 Calder, The Impact of Intervention, 7.
61 Calder, The Impact of Intervention, 8. The continued pressure of American
officials and their increasing demands in the early twentieth century fits well with the transition from informal to formal imperialism as defined by John Gallagher and Ronald
94
Limited coverage on the Jimenes administration appeared in the American press;
instead, US sources continued to express generalizations about bad government. For
example, the New York Times published very short articles on events in the Dominican
Republic throughout the first half of 1916, relating basic details about political events and
noting the impending impeachment of Jimenes and the likelihood of sending in US
marines to protect the American legation.62 Notably absent from the articles in the Times
was any mention of the demands placed on Jimenes by US officials. In its place, articles
persisted in publicizing the narrative of misrule. Noting the similarities between Haiti
and the Dominican Republic, the Clarksburg Daily Telegram referred to the two
countries as “Siamese Twins.” Maintaining that revolutions in the two republics went on
“seemingly forever,” the Telegram quoted from a National Geographic report that
claimed that Haiti and the Dominican Republic “have followed each other like birds of
passage, flight, assassination and forcible removal from office being the rule rather than
the exception.”63
By May 1916 the United States had occupied Haiti for almost a year, and articles
suggested that a similar fate would soon benefit its troubled neighbor. The Washington
Robinson, see Gallagher and Robinson, “The Imperialism of Free Trade,” The Economic History Review 6, no.1 (1953): 1-15.
62 See New York Times, 3 May 1916, 5; “General Jimines [sic] Impeached,” New York Times, 3 May 1916, 10; “Warns Santo Domingo Our Marines May Land,” New York Times, 5 May 1916, 1; New York Times, 7 May 1916, 7; “Dominican President Quits Under Pressure,” New York Times, 8 May 1916; 11. “More Marines Landed,” New York Times, 9 May 1916, 8. Other American newspapers besides the Times had little if anything to say about the Dominican Republic.
63 “’Siamese Twins’ in the Family of Nations,” Clarksburg Daily Telegram, 18 May 1916, 8.
95
newspaper the Sunday Star supported this proposition in an article by American author
Charles M. Pepper. Pepper claimed that the Dominican Republic was the sight of
constant marine landings simply because of the “persistence of revolutionary factions” in
the country.64 Arguing that the Dominican Republic was just like other Latin American
states, Pepper contended that politicians there only wanted “to control revenue and ignore
the welfare of the masses.”65 As further testament for the need for American
intervention, Pepper described the benefits of the US protectorate in Haiti, maintaining
that it was “not an invasion of Haitian sovereignty, because it is accepted by the bulk of
the Haitian population.”66 The New York Times concurred that Haiti was a shining
example of American success in the Caribbean. In an article in September 1916, the
Times reminded readers that the United States was not interested in taking over territory
in foreign countries, but instead embarked upon projects like that in Haiti at a huge
personal cost. Affirming the humanitarian objective, the article claimed: “Our purpose
has been to aid these neighbors, not to take any of their possessions, to exercise a
controlling influence in their elections, or in any way to subject them to the domination of
the United States.”67 As the American presence in the Dominican Republic grew,
eventually leading to the proclamation of the US occupation in November 1916, the
narrative in the American media continued to stress the beneficent nature of US
64 Charles M. Pepper, “Santo Domingo and Intervention by the United States,”
Sunday Star, 28 May 1916.
65 Pepper, “Santo Domingo and Intervention.”
66 Pepper, “Santo Domingo and Intervention.”
67 “Help for Our Neighbors,” New York Times, 1 September 1916, 6.
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intervention, that, as the Times noted, had been conducted in a “fatherly way, to help a
country tormented by chronic revolution.”68
Conclusion
US newspapers and travel literature in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
demonstrated the plasticity of images about Dominican race and culture as they created
and reinforced imperial views and stereotypes. When annexationist schemes failed and
American foreign policy shifted to dollar diplomacy, the American media claimed that
Dominicans were more like their Haitian neighbors in their tendency toward revolution
and their African ancestry. In this way, American sources contended that the United
States had to take on the role of a father figure in assisting the child-like republic on the
path to financial solvency and political tranquility. As the political situation devolved,
particularly after the assassination of President de Cáceres in 1911, the narrative once
again adapted with a sharpened focus on the so-called intrinsic revolutionary tendencies
of Dominicans. With this depiction firmly in place, the United States continued their
intervention in Dominican political affairs, landing marines in May 1916 and eventually
establishing the occupation government in November of that year.
The constant shifting in this imperialist narrative allowed the United States to
manipulate their representations of Dominican race and culture to justify their actions.
Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the media portrayed
Dominicans as white or black in order to suit foreign policy needs. Though the depiction
of Dominicans’ race changed over time, as evidenced in the American media, certain
68 “Help for Our Neighbors,” 6.
97
aspects of this discourse remained constant. No matter what the objective, the United
States continued to view Dominicans as children in need of paternalistic guidance and
tutelage. Additionally, the treatment of the Dominican Republic as a land of untapped
economic potential persisted as a prime motivator for American occupation forces.
Throughout the years of American military rule these narratives established throughout
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries continued to thrive in the American media as
variations on Dominicans’ race and culture shifted according to the political exigencies of
the time.
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PART II
NARRATIVES OF THE OCCUPATION –
UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIANISM, 1916-1924
Part II of this dissertation examines two crucial ideas that helped justify and
sustain the American occupation of the Dominican Republic from 1916 to 1924. The
narrative of underdevelopment relied on the classical conceptualization of the Dominican
Republic as a land of political chaos, constant revolution, and indebtedness. Though this
theme was not new, as it had been present from the outset of travel literature about the
eastern half of the island written by both foreign and American sources, its longevity and
endurance demonstrate that it was the primary filter through which the United States
viewed the Dominican Republic. This was especially significant given that previous
discussions about race that had dominated the pre-occupation period were largely absent
during the initial years of military rule. Added to this traditional account was a new
humanitarian component that revealed more about what the United States thought about
itself than how it viewed Dominicans. Although the American media had employed
language noting the altruism and benevolent sacrifice of the United States in areas like
Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines since 1898, this rhetoric did not enter the
discussion about the Dominican Republic until 1916. The paucity of this discourse prior
to 1916 suggests that in this period, only in cases of direct occupation did the United
States employ this rationale. The two narratives of underdevelopment and
humanitarianism worked in tandem to create a problem and a solution; underdevelopment
identified the cause of the Dominican Republic’s problems and American
99
humanitarianism solved key issues as the United States could point to specific projects as
evidence of its success.
100
CHAPTER 4:
A PRIMITIVE PEOPLE, AN UNDERDEVELOPED ISLAND
Though published a year before the American occupation of the Dominican
Republic, Roger Ward Babson’s The Future of South America conveyed the common
conceptualization that the country was a political, social, and economic backwater.
The people are uneducated; the cities are dirty; communication is practically nil, and the entire island looks like a deserted, but once beautiful garden. Of course the government is wretched; there are no conveniences or modern improvements, and it is the last place where one would want to bring up a family. Paradoxical as it may seem, the capital of Santo Domingo, or Santo Domingo City, is both the oldest and the most backward city of the Western Hemisphere . . . It is interesting to realize that the first land discovered in this hemisphere will probably be the last to be developed. At any rate, it is to-day the most backward place in this section of the world.1
Babson’s description was not meant to deter American interest in the Dominican
Republic but rather to encourage it. His vivid account hinged on the idea that though this
was a backward and underdeveloped country, it was ripe for the adventurous man looking
for investment opportunities. Other American sources dating to this period similarly
emphasized the primitive state of the Dominican Republic – a land desperately in need of
outside control and guidance.
This chapter argues that American media sources portrayed the Dominican
Republic as primitive and backward to justify and sustain the occupation. The narrative
of underdevelopment relied on the classical conceptualization of the Dominican Republic
as a land of political chaos, constant revolution, and indebtedness. Though this theme
was not new, as it had been present from the outset of travel literature about the eastern
1 Roger Ward Babson, The Future of South America (Boston: Little, Brown, and
Company, 1915), 47-48, 48.
101
half of the island, its longevity and endurance demonstrate that it was the primary filter
through which the United States viewed the Dominican Republic. This was especially
significant given that previous discussions about race that had dominated the pre-
occupation period were largely absent during the initial years of military rule. This
chapter examines the establishment of the occupation and its portrayal in the American
media and investigates underdevelopment as American sources continued to focus on
misrule, revolution, and debt as an explanation for the backwardness and primitiveness of
the Dominican Republic’s land and people. By focusing on these particular areas, once
the occupation was underway, American officials had a clear blueprint for projects that
centered on combatting problems such as political discord, public health, and the lack of
infrastructure as the United States claimed that it was battling against underdevelopment
in the Dominican Republic.
Establishing the American Occupation
As 1916 unfolded, the political situation in the Dominican Republic rapidly
devolved, leading to the landing of US troops in May. Though the United States was
willing to bring in forces “to suppress insurrection and maintain order” if requested,
Dominican President Juan Isidro Jimenes did not want American forces sent in.2
However, the president had little support in his own government as Congress passed a
resolution to impeach him on 1 May. Four days later, American ships landed, and
Jimenes resigned just two days later on 7 May. As armed revolutionaries amassed under
2 “Secretary of State (Lansing) to Minister Russell,” January 24, 1916, FRUS,
1916, 220-221.
102
the control of Minister of War Desiderio Arias, the United States claimed to be sending in
marines to protect the American legation and consulate in Santo Domingo as well as
American citizens there who might be in danger.3 In reality, a major fear was of a
Dominican Republic headed by Arias, a man both the American government and media
considered anti-American.4 US forces gave Arias an ultimatum: Surrender by 15 May or
face American occupation and war.5 To avoid confrontation, Arias and his supporters
evacuated the city and US troops moved in. Rather than support elections to fill the
vacant presidency, American officials worried that such an action would only give more
power to Arias, who was likely to garner a majority of the votes. Furthermore, if Arias
were to win, officials believed this would contradict the American policy of not tolerating
revolutions in the region.6 For many American officials, allowing Arias to control the
Dominican Republic amounted to supporting the exact political culture that Americans
had always equated with the Dominican Republic.
Following the end of President Jimenes’s tenure, instability ensued as Dominican
politicians struggled amongst themselves. Additionally, American officials refused to
support any presidential candidate who would not acquiesce to their demands of allowing
the United States to control internal revenue, the national budget, and the Dominican
3 “Minister Russell to American Legation,” May 3, 1916, FRUS, 1916, 223.
December 1916, 4. “Put Santo Domingo Under Martial Law,” New York Times, 1 December 1916, 1.
5 “Admiral Caperton to Secretary of Navy,” May 13, 1916, FRUS, 1916, 226.
6 “Minister Russell to Secretary of State (Lansing),” May 15, 1916, FRUS, 1916, 227.
103
military.7 To fill the vacant executive, Congress agreed on a compromise candidate,
Federico Henríquez y Carvajal, the Supreme Court’s chief justice. However, the United
States would not support Henríquez y Carvajal because he had made it clear that he
would not accept American demands. When it was revealed that his political opponents
colluded with Americans to arrest his own supporters, Henríquez y Carvajal withdrew his
candidacy. Without Henríquez y Carvajal as a compromise candidate, Congress was at
an impasse. Political factions agreed to elect Federico’s brother, Francisco Henríquez y
Carvajal who became the provisional president on 31 July 1916.
President Henríquez y Carvajal struggled from the outset. Continued political
infighting and the United States’s refusal to disburse funds from the customs receivership
hampered the success of his administration. An article from August 1916 in the New
York Times outlined the issues for readers, noting that American President Woodrow
Wilson would not recognize the newly elected Henríquez y Carvajal until he accepted
“virtually the same sort of fiscal protectorate” that existed in Haiti.8 Stating that the
customs receivership greatly benefitted the Dominican Republic, the Times explained that
the internal revenue of the country, still collected by Dominican officials, only resulted in
paltry sums because of “maladministration by native officers.” Thus, until Dominicans
accepted a “financial protectorate” and “a complete reorganization of military forces
through the creation of a native constabulary officered by American navy and marine
7 Bruce Calder, The Impact of Intervention: The Dominican Republic during the
US Occupation of 1916-1924 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984), 4.
8 “Washington to Run Dominican Finance,” New York Times, 22 August 1916, 20.
104
officers,” the United States would continue to withhold receivership funds and official
recognition of Henríquez y Carvajal’s government.9
From July until November, tension in the Dominican Republic remained high.
American forces were not only present in Santo Domingo but had also moved in to the
northern areas of the republic. At this point, the customs receivership not only controlled
external but also internal revenue, crippling both Henríquez y Carvajal’s government and
the Dominican economy at large when the United States cut off the disbursement of
funds until all its demands were met.10 Furthermore, the same act that had made
Henríquez y Carvajal provisional president required Congress to create a constitutional
assembly and write reforms by December 1916. Once again, US officials feared that
elections would favor Arias by either granting him the presidency or a majority of his
supporters seats in Congress.11 US Secretary of State Robert Lansing described the
situation to Wilson as “approaching a crisis” in which “revolution and economic disaster
are imminent.”12 The chief of the Latin-American division of the State Department
concurred, stating that the only solution was to “declare martial law and place Santo
Domingo under military occupation.”13 Officials justified this decision by claiming that
the Dominican government had violated their 1907 treaty with the United States and
9 “Washington to Run Dominican Finance,” 20.
10 Calder, The Impact of Intervention, 11-12.
11 “The Chief of the Latin-American Division to the Secretary of State,”
November 21, 1916, FRUS, 1916, 241.
12 “Secretary of State to the President,” November 22, 1916, FRUS, 1916, 240.
13 “The Chief of the Latin-American Division to the Secretary of State,” 241.
105
because of the “present unsettled conditions in the Republic.”14 US Navy Captain Harry
S. Knapp moved before a constitution could be written or elections held delivering the
proclamation of American occupation on 29 November 1916.
The proclamation drew heavily on the narrative of debt, demonstrating that when
policy needs arose, American officials relied on classic tropes to justify their actions.
Making it clear that American actions were enacted on behalf of Dominicans who were
unable to achieve peace on their own, the proclamation quoted from the 1907 treaty
between the United States and the Dominican Republic. Article III stated: “Until the
Dominican Republic has paid the whole amount of the bonds of the debt its public debt
shall not be increased except by previous agreement between the Dominican Government
and the United States.” Citing the increase in public debt “on more than one occasion” as
a breach of the treaty, the proclamation noted that though “the Government of Santo
Domingo has from time to time explained such violation by the necessity of incurring
expenses of incident to the repression of revolution,” this constant instability was a
primary reason for American intervention. Claiming that the end of revolutions was not
in sight, the proclamation maintained that “domestic tranquility has been disturbed and is
not now established, nor is the future observance of the treaty by the Government of
Santo Domingo assured.” As a result, the United States “is determined that the time has
come to take measures to insure the observance of the provisions of the aforesaid treaty . .
. and to maintain the domestic tranquility” of the Dominican Republic.15
14 “The Chief of the Latin-American Division to the Secretary of State,” 241.
15 “Proclamation of Occupation and Military Government,” November 29, 1916,
FRUS, 1916, 246, 247.
106
Additionally, the proclamation portrayed the United States as a benevolent force
whose only interest was peace and stability for the Dominican Republic. The
proclamation assured Dominicans that
This military occupation is undertaken with no immediate or ulterior object of destroying the sovereignty of the Republic of Santo Domingo, but, on the contrary, is designed to give aid to that country in returning to a condition of internal order that will enable it to observe the terms of the treaty aforesaid, and the obligations resting upon it as one of the family of nations.16
As a further guarantee of sovereignty, the proclamation stated that Dominican laws
would remain in effect as long as they did not conflict with the objectives of the
occupation. Government administration would continue by Dominican officials though
they would be “under the oversight and control of the United States Forces.” Although
“contempt or defiance of the authority of the Military Government” would be “tried by
tribunals set up by the Military Government,” the proclamation stated that civil and
criminal cases would continue to be overseen by the Dominican judicial system.
Occupation forces would act with “respect for the personal and property rights” of
Dominicans, upholding Dominican laws “in so far as they do not conflict with the
purposes for which the Occupation is undertaken.” Lastly, the occupation government
would control both internal and external revenue. All of these measures were aimed to
restore “domestic order and tranquility” and bring about “the prosperity that can only be
attained under such conditions.”17
Most US newspapers informed their readers of the establishment of the military
occupation, but the articles remained rather short, stating a few basic facts that avoided
16 “Proclamation of Occupation and Military Government,” 247. 17 “Proclamation of Occupation and Military Government,” 247.
107
any critical analysis of the event. Reports instead relied on the common themes of debt
and revolution to explain American actions in the Dominican Republic. From Georgia to
South Dakota, Washington State to California, newspapers at first included only a few
sentences on the proclamation of military rule the day after the event.18 Articles that
appeared in the days following included more information, much of it mirroring the
sentiment, if not quoting direct passages, from the official proclamation. Furthermore,
the language and imagery employed reinforced already existing narratives about the
constant revolutions in the Dominican Republic and built upon an emerging notion of
American benevolence and humanitarianism.
Running under different headlines, multiple versions of the same article appeared
in newspapers across the United States in the first days of December 1916, presenting the
American public with a common understanding of military actions in the Dominican
Republic.19 South Dakota’s Aberdeen Daily American informed its readers that the
establishment of military rule in the Dominican Republic was a necessary step “to
suppress existing political chaos in the little republic and [to] pave the way for
guaranteeing a future quiet by establishing there such a financial and police protectorate.”
18 “Named Military Governor,” Columbus Ledger, 30 November 1916, 1. “US
Takes Charge of Santo Domingo,” Aberdeen Daily News, 30 November 1916, 1. “Naval Captain Takes Charge of Dominican Affairs,” Bellingham Herald, 30 November 1916, 1. “Martial Law Proclaimed,” Evening News, 30 November 1916, 5.
19 “US Navy Forces Rule in Santo Domingo,” Boston Journal, 1 December 1916, 1. “Uncle Sam Takes Things Under Wing,” Daily Alaska Dispatch, 1 December 1916, 1. “Independence Santo Domingo Be Maintained,” Aberdeen American, 1 December 1916, 1. “American Military Rule in Dominican Republic,” Anaconda Standard, 2 December 1916, 4. “US Object is to Aid Santo Domingo,” Colorado Springs Gazette, 2 December 1916, 4. “Santo Domingo Under Martial Law,” Presbyterian of the South, 6 December 1916, 21.
108
Utilizing the idea of political chaos, the article explained that if the Dominican Republic
were to have a prosperous future it would come only with American oversight. The term
“little republic,” a common epithet, further underscored its immaturity and need for
paternal supervision. Emphasizing the temporality of the occupation, the article stated
that the 1,800 marines stationed there would “maintain order, at least until elections in
January.” Additionally, these troops were to “supervise the conduct of government” and
“disburse the customs revenues,” implying that Dominicans were not capable of
managing these tasks on their own.20 The Aberdeen Daily American admitted that this
was a “drastic step” but one that had been considered for several months since the
overthrow of President Jimenes. This same article appeared in the New York Times under
the headline, “Put Santo Domingo Under Martial Law,” with the added subheading:
“MARINES TO KEEP ORDER: Plan is to Check Revolutions and Arrange for Prompt
Payment of Foreign Liabilities.” Maintaining the necessity of martial law “in order to
enable the Dominican Government to pay the interest on its foreign debt in accordance
with the treaty of 1907 between this country and Santo Domingo,” the Times article
pointed to revolution and defaulted loan payments as the reason for American
intervention. Moreover, the Times hoped American supervision would end revolutions
that had “rendered the island a source of menace to the international relations of the
United States because of the foreign capital invested there.”21 In its publication of the
same article, the Washington Post added that military rule would not “destroy the
21 “Put Santo Domingo Under Military Law,” New York Times, 1 December 1916, 1.
109
independence of the republic” and that American supervision was part of a larger “desire
to assist the country to establish internal order and to enable it to comply with the
provisions of its conventions and to fulfill its obligations as a member of the family of
nations.”22 From the outset of the occupation, the language used to discuss the
Dominican Republic, whether from the American government or the media, relied on a
discourse that had existed for decades depicting the Dominican Republic as a land of
revolution, misrule, and ultimately, underdevelopment. Additionally, this rhetoric
implied that the American conceptualization of underdevelopment in and its assistance in
combatting that was not motivated by imperialistic aims or self-interest.
The Theory of Underdevelopment
One of the imperial narratives concerning the Dominican Republic with the most
longevity was that of an underdeveloped land, people, and government. This was not a
unique American perspective as writers like the French Médéric Elie Moreau de Saint-
Méry and the British Charles Mackenzie postulated on the roots of backwardness in the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, arguing that Spanish heritage or Haitian
influence, respectively, caused the damage.23 As American interest grew in the
22 “Domingo Rule Secure: No Infringement of Sovereignty,” Washington Post, 2
December 1916, 2.
23 Médéric Louis Elie Moreau de Saint-Méry, A Topographical and Political Description of the Spanish Part of Saint-Domingo, Containing, General Observations on the Climate, Population and Productions; on the Character and Manners of the Inhabitants; with an Account of the Several Branches of Government, trans. William Cobbett, Vol. I (Philadelphia: Philosophical Society of Philadelphia, 1798). Charles Mackenzie, Notes on Haiti Made during a Residence in that Republic, Vol. 1 (London: Colburn and Bentley, 1830).
110
Dominican Republic, writers in the mid-1800s located the origin of underdevelopment in
the lack of Anglo-Saxon industriousness and the constant wars with Haiti. In his
examination of US perceptions of Latin America, historian James William Park argued
that, for over a century, Americans built and sustained enduring conceptualizations of
Latin America based on the idea of underdevelopment. Though Park noted that the term
“underdevelopment” became most popular after World War II, antecedents of this notion
existed since the 1830s. The United States portrayed itself as “forward, progressive, and
advanced” while it viewed Latin American states as “backward or retarded.”24 Over
time, this view crystalized as underdevelopment, a term used to indicate shortcomings
like the absence of political stability or a democratic framework as well as scant
economic growth and a lack of social integration. This contrasted with the term
undeveloped. According to Park, undeveloped was the base line at which every country
started, whereas underdevelopment meant the “willful failure to meet potential.”25
Locating the Source of Backwardness: Spanish Colonialism
In identifying the basis for the backwardness of Dominicans, American sources
postulated on a number of causes. For some, like Samuel Guy Inman, it was the product
of Spanish colonialism. As executive secretary of the Committee on Co-operation in
Latin America, Inman traveled to Hispaniola in January 1919 to “make a survey of
religious, social, and educational conditions.” The findings of Inman’s trip were
24 James William Park, Latin American Underdevelopment: A History of
Perspectives in the United States, 1870-1965 (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 2.
25 Park, Latin American Underdevelopment, 2.
111
published in 1919 in his book, Through Santo Domingo and Haiti: A Cruise with the
Marines. Inman also emphasized the stagnancy of the Dominican Republic
characterizing it as “The Island Where Time Has Stood Still, for, with all its beauties and
the richness of its natural resources, much of it is as primitive and crude as in the days of
the first Spanish settlement 400 years ago.” Inman attributed this “neglected and arrested
development” to “Spain’s abuse of the oldest of her American colonies.” Maintaining
that “little progress” had been made since “the glory days” of the Spanish conquest,
Inman was not surprised to find that the capital, Santo Domingo, lacked automobiles,
paved roads, and sewers as well as water and telephone lines. Illiteracy rates hovered
between ninety and ninety-five percent, as “many of the country people are unable to
count above four or five.” Additionally, he related that, “disease is widespread with
practically no medical attention for the poor, and, in general, the blessings of Christian
civilization are lacking.”26 As a Christian missionary devoted to improving the country,
Inman saw the solution to the Dominican Republic’s backwardness in Christian
humanitarianism that would increase infrastructure and combat illiteracy and disease.
Though avoiding any outright statements blaming the Spanish colonial legacy as
the source of backwardness, journalist Frederic J. Haskin who wrote a series of articles
on American actions in the Caribbean that appeared in newspapers from New York to the
Midwest highlighted the lack of civilization. In a 1917 article published in the Omaha
Bee, Haskin characterized the interior of the country as “half wilderness and without
roads, [it] is in somewhat the condition of Europe in the middle ages.” Though citizens
26 Samuel Guy Inman, Through Santo Domingo and Haiti: A Cruise with the
Marines (New York, Committee on Co-Operation in Latin America, 1919), 4, 15, 4, 14.
112
technically constituted the government, in reality, “feudal barons, acknowledging no law
or government,” ran everything.27 In another article appearing in the Great Falls Daily
Tribune in June 1919, Haskin explained the situation on the eastern part of the island:
You must know that Santo Domingo is a mass of mountains and along the coast is a sort of civilization, but the interior mountains are wilderness without roads, bridges or even good trails, in parts still unexplored. The people of this wilderness live in a state of barbarism. They have leaders, who are much like the robber barons of early medieval Europe. They pray on travelers and raid sugar plantations and if there is a revolution they sell their services to the highest bidder.28
One can surmise from his writing, that this stagnancy he illustrated was one present since
the beginning of Spanish rule.
Even after the establishment of the occupation, American sources continued to
utilize the narrative of underdevelopment. In a large spread published in October 1920 in
the New York Times, reporter Sara MacDougall sketched an illuminating picture of the
republic for readers:
In the heart of some of the scenic valleys . . . there are luxurious hillsides of coffee and cacao and tobacco, where the most delicious mangoes and alligator pears and pineapples in the world are grown, people have been living for centuries in such dense ignorance that there are many men who have no sense of numbers above five. As we passed along country roads naked children would come running out of thatched huts similar to those occupied by Indians at the time of the conquest.29
27 Frederic J. Haskin, “The Trail of Horse Marines,” Omaha Bee, 31 March 1917,
16.
28 Frederic J. Haskin, “The Bandit-Hawks,” Great Falls Daily Tribune, 2 June 1919, 6.
29 Sara MacDougall, “Santo Domingo’s Second Dawn,” New York Times, 10 October 1920 12.
113
MacDougall credited this underdevelopment to years of misrule and mismanagement,
starting with centuries of “backwards” Spanish rule and subsequent years of revolutions
and political “instability” that had left the country in a state of despair. She wrote that
Dominican appeals to the United States for annexation in the nineteenth century were an
indicator that “from the early days of the Republic its most progressive men believed that
the prosperity and happiness of the land depended on securing the protection of a stronger
power capable of maintaining order.”30
Underdevelopment and Revolution: A Game of Child’s Play
By the occupation period, most American sources claimed that constant
revolution was the source of underdevelopment in the Dominican Republic. In the
journal The South American, a New York publication solely devoted to current Latin
American topics, Yale professor Fred Roger Fairchild explained the numerous defects of
the Dominican Republic. Fairchild repeatedly used the word primitive to describe the
Dominican economy, its business organizations, and its schools.31 Other pieces stressed
the political and social failings of the Dominican Republic. Appearing in the pages of the
Sun, one of New York’s most popular dailies among the working class of the city, one
article emphasized the backward state of the country. Referring to the Dominican
Republic as “the republic of revolutions,” the article maintained that underdevelopment
30 MacDougall, “Santo Domingo’s Second Dawn,” 12.
31 Fred Rogers Fairchild, “The Problem of the Dominican Republic,” The South
American, 9 no. 1 (November 1920), 16.
114
there was the “byproduct of a lack of free and stable Government capable of maintaining
law and order.”32
A well-traveled author, A. Hyatt Verrill published books on multiple locales
including one on Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic in 1914 that took on the topic
of revolution and misrule as its main theme. Three years later, his work, The Book of the
West Indies, referred to the Dominican Republic as “The Isle of Misrule,” “The Land of
Revolutions,” and, in Verrill’s opinion, the most apt moniker, “The Island where Time
has Stood Still.” Verrill mourned that the beauty and resources of the island were
overshadowed “by revolutions, drenched with blood,” maintaining that, “much of Santo
Domingo is as primitive, as backward, [and] as crude, as four centuries ago.” Constant
revolution resulted in a chaotic political environment. Verrill described Dominicans as
“walking arsenals” carrying two machetes, “a heavy revolver, a wicked, dagger-like
knife, and, for good measure, a rifle or shotgun.” Though he maintained that these armed
men caused the revolutions that led to so many political setbacks, he likened these
altercations to mere child’s play. According to Verrill, most of the “blood-letting is
confined to sporadic revolutions, and even these seem more in the nature of games, for
relieving the tedium of uneventful lives, than serious conflicts.” During these brawls,
men often “pause to have cigarettes and chat” and then “resume their pot-shooting as
nonchalantly as possible.” He even claimed he had seen them stop, mid-fight, for photo
opportunities. Given this immaturity and the treatment of war as some sort of game,
Verrill argued that advancement would occur only when
32 “Our Protectorate in the West Indies,” Sun, 7 July 1918, 2.
115
The inhabitants of the island discard their guns and take up the hoe, when they learn how to handle the machete as an agricultural implement with the same dexterity as they now wield it as a sword, then, and not until then, will dawn an era of prosperity and progress which will lift Santo Domingo to the place it merits.33
The Book of the West Indies emphasized Dominicans’ own shortcomings and relied
heavily on the narrative of underdevelopment. According to Verrill, these were people
who actively chose revolution over progress.
The idea of continuous revolution as the source of underdevelopment appeared
time and again in the works of American authors. A prolific author and professor of
political science, H. H. Powers published America Among the Nations in 1918. The book
explored a wide array of topics associated with the expansion of US control over the
continental United States and in areas like the Pacific and Caribbean. Throughout the
book, Powers referenced the Dominican Republic’s perpetual state of revolution, which
he characterized as “perilous” and demoralizing. Powers regrettably related to readers
that the United States had rejected President Grant’s request to annex the Dominican
Republic in the mid-nineteenth century resulting in a country that had devolved into a
position that was “hopelessly bankrupt, while petty revolutions continually robbed the
industry of its fruits.” To demonstrate this sorry state of affairs, Powers included an
explanation given by one of his acquaintances who had lived in the Dominican Republic
for quite some time:
33 A. Hyatt Verrill, The Book of the West Indies (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1917),
174, 176, 194, 195, 195-196.
116
I have lived through five of these revolutions and have never heard a shot fired. I knew the leader of one of them. He confided in me that he had gotten three thousand dollars and was going to start a revolution. Later he and his army made me a call. There were thirty-one of them, five of them being generals. I treated them all to coffee, and after that, when they robbed the mails, they always sent me letters.34
Powers referred to this account as “burlesque,” a caricature of a potentially serious
military event that was nothing more than a comical mimicry with Dominicans seemingly
acting like children playing a game of war. “In a country whose military defenses were
on much the same scale, and where the soldiers of the realm were likely to join the
revolution if it promised excitement, such disturbances were a fatal obstacle to industrial
and political development.” Noting that the establishment of the receivership ended most
of the infighting, Powers blamed the resurgence of civil war in 1912 on Dominicans
themselves because, with “the elimination of revolutions and plunder, life seemed to have
lost its zest for Dominicans of a certain type.”35 According to Powers, Dominicans were
a people that could not resist their natural inclination toward revolution.
Hailed as one of the most comprehensive books on the Dominican Republic, Otto
Schoenrich’s Santo Domingo: A Country with a Future focused on portraying an
underdeveloped country with much potential. Schoenrich’s observations were based on
his time in the Dominican Republic as secretary of a commission to investigate
Dominican finances as well as his position as secretary and advisor to the Dominican
government’s finance minister.36 Since Schoenrich argued that the occupation had finally
34 H. H. Powers, America Among the Nations (New York: Macmillan, 1918), 126. 35 Powers, America Among the Nations, 127.
36 “Otto Schoenrich, 100, Dies at His Home in Baltimore,” New York Times, 9
February 1977, 20.
117
ended revolutions, balanced the budget, and put the country on the path of development,
his observations in this 1918 publication likely stemmed from observations made shortly
after the establishment of the occupation in late 1916 or 1917. In Schoenrich’s opinion,
the Dominican Republic’s impoverishment stemmed from “periodic revolutions” which
had “prevented proper development.” As a result, cities lacked essential services, the
towns were “badly neglected,” and sanitation was practically non-existent. Schoenrich
blamed the depressing state of the country on constant revolutions that had caused “the
paralyzation [sic] of agriculture, arrest of development and loss of credit” as well as the
diversion of public funds to fight unrest. To underscore this point, Schoenrich noted that
in 1903, the country’s military expenditures accounted for over seventy percent of the
national budget. This had all led to a backward state of affairs:
At such times the government was reduced to a desperate struggle for existence; the loss of the customs houses in power of the insurgents made its position still more precarious; it contracted loans on ruinous terms; it neglected its foreign obligations and paid its employees in promissory notes and even in postage stamps, which they would then peddle about the streets. Under such conditions it is natural that nothing was left for public improvements.37
Schoenrich maintained that the only way out of such desperate times was through the
help of the United States.
Harry A. Franck’s travel experiences came out both as a book and a series of
articles in The Century Magazine that also emphasized the prominent themes of
instability and underdevelopment.38 An accomplished travel writer, Franck trekked
37 Otto Schoenrich, Santo Domingo: A Country with a Future (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1918), 242, 334, 335. 38 Franck’s trip to Hispaniola was paid for by The Century Company, a publishing
house that was interested in capitalizing on the growing demand for travel narratives about tropical locales. For more on this topic see Steven Driever, “Beyond the Narrative:
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across the globe from Patagonia to China and Hawaii to the Caribbean. Based on an
eight-month trip that took him to many islands, Roaming Through the West Indies came
out in 1920 and Franck fittingly titled his chapter on the Dominican Republic “The Land
of Bullet-Holes.” As Franck traveled from town to town, he made sure to mention the
pock-marked buildings he saw everywhere claiming that “bullet-holes are as universal in
Santo Domingo as fighting cocks” and that these products of the many revolutions were
one of the “chief setbacks” to political progress. Franck claimed that banditry appealed
more to the average Dominican than hard work. This further hampered development and
led to constant revolutions because “many of its men preferred taking to the hills at 50
cents a day with rations and the possibility of loot to doing honest work at a dollar a day.”
According to Franck, this hostility toward work led not only to political instability, but
also a lack of civilization. In the town of Santiago, Franck observed that the average
person,
reaches the dignity of clothes somewhat late in life. Naked black or brown babies adorn every block, the sight of a plump boy of five taking his constitutional dressed in a pair of sandals, a bright red hat, and a magnificent expression of unconcern attracts the attention of no one except strangers.39
Here were a people missing one of the key visible markers of civilization, clothing.
Furthermore, Franck noted that children in the Dominican Republic began smoking
cigarettes long before they began to wear clothes. Adults were not much better. Though
clothed, they tended to be lazy: “A large percentage of the males are too proud or too
An Intertextual Reading of Harry Franck’s Travel Writing on Haiti, 1919-1938,” Literary Georgraphies 2, no. 2 (2016): 164-181.
39 Harry A. Franck, Roaming Through the West Indies. Ebook (New York: Century Company, 1920), loc. 4117.
119
habitually fatigued to indulge in manual labor, which is the most crying need of the
country.”
Writing for the monthly magazine, The World’s Work, journalist George Marvin,
provided a detailed description of the revolutionary chaos present before the American
occupation. Marvin relayed the story of bandit leader, “Cha-Cha” who could, with the
“blow on a policeman’s whistle” summon about 200 armed men in under ten minutes.
Once his call went out, within two hours Cha-Cha “could muster about 750 warriors, all
armed and nearly all of them, technically, bad.” Equipped with a variety of rifles
including Mausers, Krags, Winchesters, long-barreled revolvers, and shotguns, Cha-Cha
and his men had, for several years, “helped to keep the peace thoroughly disturbed and to
kick up revolution.” Marvin described Cha-Cha as “a little man physically, big
otherwise,” who could “jerk his thumb, nod his head, outstretch his hand and command
peons.” Seeing himself as the leader of his province, Cha-Cha became the “little man
with the big whistle [who] prospered and became Augustan, entertain[ing] gubernatorial
and presidential ambitions.” For Marvin, this local leader was precisely what was wrong
with the Dominican Republic, “if you can see Cha-Cha you can see Santo Domingo and
get a preliminary glimpse of why the country is now under military law.”40 Marvin’s
description literally belittled the bandit leader, continuously referring to him as small.
Furthermore, according to Marvin, Cha-Cha and his armed lackeys were all “bad” for
disturbing the peace. The actual person Marvin was referring to in the article was
40 George Marvin, “Watchful Acting in Santo Domingo,” The World’s Work, Vol.
34 (May-October 1917), 205, 206, 208, 209, 213.
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Salustiano “Chachá” Goicochea, who eventually surrendered to US forces in January
1917.41
A Land of Disease
The topic of health was also an essential area targeted for improvement because
of the equation of poor sanitation and disease with primitiveness and a lack of
development. The emphasis on public health, like the narrative of bankruptcy or anarchy,
provided a perfect topic with which to discuss the deplorable conditions of the island.
Additionally, narrowing in on health allowed the United States to have an objective with
clear parameters that could be measured, treated, and ultimately cured offering yet
another example of success and uplift.
In their reports about the state of health on the island, American sources
contended that Dominicans suffered from poor sanitation, curable diseases, and a dearth
of medical knowledge. Writer Harry Franck witnessed many cases in which sickly
Dominicans appealed to American forces for medical attention. According to Franck,
most Dominicans would rather become “revolutionists” than study to become doctors.
The result was a primitive understanding of disease in which the majority of remedies
consisted of “sticking … a green leaf on the temples” or smearing the body with “holy
dirt in the ardent hope of improvement.”42
Interested in assessing the conditions of health in the Caribbean, Dr. John Swan
traveled to the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and the Virgin Islands in the winter of 1919-
41 Alan McPherson, The Invaded: How Latin Americans and Their Allies Fought
and Ended US Occupations, 48.
42 Franck, Roaming Through the West Indies, loc., 253.
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1920 on behalf of the American Red Cross to conduct health surveys. The purpose of
Swan’s trip was to collect information and make recommendations on how to improve
conditions on the islands. During his two-month tour of the Dominican Republic, Swan
not only visited all of the provinces of the country but also met with Commander
Reynolds Hayden, Secretary of State for the Department of Sanitation and Beneficence
(an arm of the occupation government established to regulate health and sanitation on the
island), and then military governor Admiral Thomas Snowden.
Swan found the standards of medical education at the University of Santo
Domingo subpar. He argued that even among those who claimed to practice medicine,
skills were “extremely rudimentary.”43 Swan cited the fact that the university possessed
neither a dissecting room nor a laboratory as clear evidence that all of the medical
instruction was theoretical. Students had little if any clinical instruction, lacking even
something as basic as a decent medical library. In his assessment, Swan thought the
university, “from the medical point of view, is little better than a quiz class.” As an
example of the lack of medical knowledge in practice, Swan visited the city prison in the
northern town of Moca and met a man with an alveolar abscess that had ruptured in his
mouth. This simple condition characterized by an accumulation of pus around the root of
the tooth and localized swelling could have been easily cured with antibiotics and a
procedure to drain the abscess. However, as Swan appallingly noted, “the patient has
been absolutely uncared for and the municipal physician apparently did not know he was
sick.” Swan stated that many people with illnesses received no medical attention other
43 Dr. John Swan, “Report of the Field Representative to the American Red Cross
Appointed to Take a Medical Survey of the Dominican Republic, the Virgin Islands, and Haiti,” Record Group 52, Box 445, Folder 126039 (62), Records of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, National Archives and Records Administration.
122
than that “given by neighbors as ignorant as themselves.” The Dominican Republic
suffered from not only a shortage of doctors in general, but according to Swan, those
possessing medical degrees were not in fact knowledgeable in the slightest.
In his assessment of sanitation, Swan found the republic woefully lacking in all
areas, which was evident through his observation of living conditions. During his visit to
Santo Domingo, Swan commented in his entry for 10 December 1919, “the conditions
under which these people live are quite unsanitary. Many persons, men, women, and
children, [live] in small rooms with dirt or cement floors and very little furniture.” Swan
noted that the houses were unkempt and dirty, animals “polluted” the yards, and
“cobwebs and dirt” covered the interior of many homes. Remarking upon the other
towns he visited, Swan stated that there was garbage everywhere and little if any
sanitation as some of the villages were the dirtiest he had ever seen.44 In all, Swan’s
report for the Red Cross depicted Dominicans as possessing rudimentary medical training
and as completely uncivilized in every aspect of their living conditions. His final
recommendation was that if the country were ever to be modernized and sanitary, then it
would only come with the help of outside organizations, like the Red Cross or the US
military. Though Swan’s report was not published in the mainstream American media,
his observations demonstrated that even those with specialized knowledge subscribed to
the dominant imperial narratives already employed about the Dominican Republic.
US military personnel deployed to the Dominican Republic had a similar
understanding of the primitive state of health and sanitation there. In a three-part series
for the Marine Corps magazine, Leatherneck, Wes Ley recalled his impressions of the
44 Swan, “Report of the Field Representative of the American Red Cross.”
123
abject state of health on the island noting that he saw Dominicans “with deformed feet
and legs – the worst cases I ever saw and then some. Swollen to a sickening degree; I did
not think humans existed in such a condition.”45 Searching for material to help him start
his writing career, Arthur J. Brooks joined the Marine Corps and served for two years in
the Dominican Republic during the occupation. Part of Brooks’s duties included a survey
of the island during which he and his men encountered many hardships and setbacks in
terms of health. “All of us were rotten with malaria, dengue and occasional touches of
dysentery. Our faces were scratched from brambles and our bodies covered in welts from
the stings and bites of insects.” Attempting to map the wild landscape, Brooks’s men
suffered from “fiery red” rashes and eye inflammation traveling along jungle trails,
“sleep[ing] in leprosy-rotten shacks, eat[ing] native food filled with ants.”46 Based on
Brooks’s account, it was clear that the insalubrious conditions in the Dominican Republic
were not only a danger to Dominicans, but American troops serving there as well.
Beyond managing minor conditions like edema and other common ailments, the
focus of many health campaigns zeroed in on preventing the spread of communicable
diseases, particularly sexually transmitted ones that stood out as yet another example of
the underdeveloped healthcare system. The threat of venereal disease prompted
commanding officers and medical personnel to train marines prior to their deployment,
encouraging abstinence or at the very least, full disclosure to health professionals if a
46 Arthur J. Brooks, The Land of Checkerboard Families (New York: Coward-
McCann, Inc, 1932), 98, 99, 104.
124
soldier engaged in sexual relations.47 On the ground, education efforts continued as well.
For example, field hospitals showed films produced by the USMC to instruct the men on
the dangers of sexual diseases. Military medical personnel believed that men serving in
the Dominican Republic were “exposed to the dangers of venereal disease to a far greater
degree than are men of the military forces serving in other states.”48 William Arthur
Worton recalled a clear example of the dangers of venereal disease in the Dominican
Republic. Worton joined the USMC Reserves in 1917, served in France in 1918, and
after recuperating from a near-deadly gas attack, shipped out to the Dominican Republic
shortly after his recovery. Once he arrived in Santo Domingo, Worton reported to
Colonel Cyrus Thorpe, a man he described as quite unusual and always dressed in a crisp
white uniform with matching gloves. At their meeting, Worton and Thorpe shook hands,
and Thorpe explained: “I wear these gloves. There’s so much syphilis in this part of the
world.”49 Worton understood Thorpe’s meaning. Thorpe was “insinuating that I might
have had syphilis,” apparently acquired in the few days since Worton had landed.50
Instances such as this exchange between Worton and Thorpe indicated the common
47 Memo to Medical Officer, Norfolk Navy Yard, April 6, 1918. Memo from
Surgeon General USN to Dr. Rossiter, USN, Training Station San Francisco, February 8, 1918. “Syllabus Accredited for Use in Official Lectures on SEX HYGIENE and VENEREAL DISEASES,” April 1917. Record Group 52, Box 419, Records of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, National Archives and Records Administration.
48 Memo, Field Hospital 4th Regiment USMC, Santiago, Dominican Republic, November 3, 1921. Record Group 52, Box 413A, Records of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, National Archives Records Administration.
49 William Arthur Worton (USMC), interviewed by Benis M. Frank, La Jolla, CA, 1967, Marine Corps Project, Columbia University Archives, 71.
50 Worton, 71.
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understanding among those deployed that this was a land of both sexual and physical
danger.
Primitivism: An Endless Source of Entertainment
By some accounts, Dominican underdevelopment extended to a complete
unawareness of the modern world and provided American writers with an opportunity to
poke fun at a people whose primitiveness could be entertaining for white audiences. In a
1917 article, Haskin relayed the story of one feudal baron who was “one of the most
formidable native leaders” in the country, “Olivario or Hombre de Dios,” as the locals
knew him.51 American forces, led by a Swiss soldier of fortune, Lieutenant Fuerlein,
were able to easily disarm the bandit and obtain his surrender by awing him with a
compass, which they told him was a “magical instrument” that “had pointed out the
stronghold of Hombre de Dios with its little iron hand.”52 In an article from August 1919
entitled, “‘Evil Birds’ Kill Bandits,” the Washington Post recounted a report to USMC
headquarters by Captain Walter E. McCaughtry. McCaughtry oversaw six airplanes in
the aviation force and claimed that these machines completely confused Dominicans. He
reported: “The natives, though, are thoroughly alarmed by the birdmen. They refuse to
51 Haskin referred to him as Olivario though his actual name was Dios Olivorio
Mateo. Considered a bandit leader by occupation forces, Mateo led a messianic movement until his death by the marines in 1922. On Mateo see Alan McPherson, The Invaded: How Latin Americans and Their Allies Fought and Ended US Occupations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 125-126. For an in-depth look into the topic including the influence of Olivorismo during the Trujillo regime see Mats Lundahl and Jan Lundius, Peasants and Religion: A Socioeconomic Study of Dios Olivorio and the Palma Sola Region in the Dominican Republic (New York: Routledge, 1999).
52 Haskin, “The Trail of Horse Marines,” 16.
126
go near the machines, and as a result they do not believe men fly them. They call the
planes ‘evil birds’ and the bombs which they drop are ‘eggs.’”53 McCaughtry claimed
Dominicans were fearful of these “evil birds,” and that superstition overcame them when
“gazing in fear at a passing airplane” and they had no other recourse but to run to “the
nearest cemetery,” dig “up the bones of their ancestors,” and boil them into a “broth as a
charm against the ‘evil birds.’”54 In most accounts, superstitious behavior such as this
was typically credited to Haitians with stories of voodoo ceremonies, cannibalism, and
magical transformations; however, applying this trope to Dominicans served as an
example of both their backwardness and their ignorance.55
Writing in 1923 about training Dominicans in the Guardia Nacional, Edward A.
Fellowes explained that teaching his recruits modern hygiene practices provided an
endless source of jokes for American officers at the training camp.56 Familiarizing
recruits with the basic elements of cleanliness initially proved to be a major challenge,
53 “‘Evil Birds’ Kill Bandit,” Washington Post, 26 August 1919, 6.
54 “‘Evil Birds,’” 6.
55 See Brooks, Land of Checkerboard. On the differences claimed to exist
between Haitians and Dominicans see Pedro L. San Miguel Ramírez, The Imagined Island: History, Identity, and Utopia in Hispaniola (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 38-45. Men deployed to Haiti often relayed stories of voodoo rituals and cannibals. For example, Julian Constable Smith recalled stories of bubbling human flesh in cauldrons and claims that one man could turn into a cat as large as a lion. See Interview of Julian Constable Smith, 1968. Marine Corps Project, Columbia University Archives, 34-36.
56 Teaching natives to adopt American standards of hygiene was not unique to the Dominican Republic and constituted a key area of concern in other US possessions. For the Philippines see Warwick Anderson, Colonial Pathologies: American Tropical Medicine, Race, and Hygiene in the Philippines (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006). For Guam see Anne Pérez Hattori, Colonial Dis-Ease: US Navy Health Policies and the Chamorros of Guam, 1898-1941 (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 2004).
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“Our greatest troubles arose at first from the natural aversion for soap and razor.” To
ensure that recruits began to adopt American standards of hygiene, Fellowes and his men
conducted numerous “inspections and musters for the purpose of getting the men out of
the habits of laxity in regard to personal cleanliness and neatness.” According to
Fellowes, Dominican resistance stemmed from the scarcity of water in the country and
the “backward” belief that bathing led to disease. However, Dominican attitudes quickly
changed once they were supplied with American “toilet waters and scented soaps and
face powders.” Fellowes stated that the Dominican fondness for American bath products
provided unending entertainment for officers:
It was amusing to see how these natives, who are dandies at heart, went after these commodities, and at our first inspection after pay-day, every bunk included among its equipment laid out for inspection a bottle of Eau de Passion, or some other equally pungent concoction.57 To further emphasize this point, some sources likened Dominicans to Gallic
barbarians. Commenting on the division of the island into two countries, an article in the
Sun likened this partition to the three areas of Gaul “in the time of Julius Caesar,” a
comment intended to imply the barbarity of the entire island.58 In a piece published for
American schoolteachers in 1917, the journal School and Home Education quoted
extensively from the annual report of the US Secretary of the Navy. The author noted
that the information was reminiscent “of the style Caesar used in his Commentaries on
57 Edward A. Fellowes, “Training Native Troops in Santo Domingo,” Marine
the Gallic War.”59 In this comparison, just as Caesar had brought Roman civilization to
the barbaric Gauls in his war of conquest, so too was the United States fighting on the
front lines to deliver civilization to backward Dominicans. Additionally, this association
with the Romans cast American actions in the Dominican Republic as a humanitarian
endeavor. After years of misrule, revolution, and backwardness, the sources agreed that
Dominicans, much like Caesar’s Gauls, could only become civilized (by American
standards) if they were taught to be. This narrative provided justification for the
occupation and provided the United States with measurable goals in terms of balancing
the budget, building roads, improving education, and training a new military force. At
the same time that articles appeared in magazines and newspapers across America
describing underdevelopment, those same pieces sought to convey that the solution to
problems on the island were the improvements occupation forces made. This was not
only an indication of progress being made in the Dominican Republic but also a sign of
the benevolent intentions of the United States.
Conclusion
The narrative of underdevelopment was a crucial component of American
intervention in the Dominican Republic. Though it had been a common theme since the
1800s, it took on new meaning during the occupation, becoming the primary justification
for the intervention. While underdevelopment provided the reason for America’s
presence in the Dominican Republic, humanitarian projects, framed as such in the
59 W.C. Bagley, ed., “Marines: Their Record in Haiti and Santo Domingo,”
School and Home Education, Volume XXXV (September 1915 – June 1916), 173.
129
American media, including the building of infrastructure, the development of public
health, and the erection of new schools not only assisted the country on the road to
progress but also made the United States seem like a purely altruistic authority on the
eastern portion of the island that could combat centuries of backwardness.
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CHAPTER 5:
HUMANITARIANISM, “THE MASTER NARRATIVE”
Reviewing Otto Schoenrich’s Santo Domingo: A Country with a Future, the New
York Sun recalled the many advances made in the country as a result of American
intervention. Lamenting the fact that the United States had not annexed the Dominican
Republic during President Grant’s tenure, the anonymous author of the article quoted
from Schoenrich’s book:
The power of the United States would have maintained peace; salutary laws would have educated the people in self-government; liberal tariff concessions would have stimulated agriculture and industry . . . honest administration would have provided roads and schools; and soon the country would have attained a high degree of development and prosperity.1
However, without American guidance, the republic floundered for decades and, as the
author noted, it was not until recently that major changes initiated by the United States
had resulted in a transformation. Though the Dominican Republic was formerly referred
to as the “republic of revolutions,” The Sun claimed this label was becoming “less
appropriate” as American oversight through the customs receivership initiated an era of
financial solvency and the ability to repay foreign debt. According to the article,
American interference in the Dominican Republic and other Caribbean locales
represented a new era in the United States:
1 Otto Schoenrich quoted in the Sun.
131
By its treatment of Spain after the war of 1898 the United States had shown that a great nation was capable of acting unselfishly and in accordance with altruistic ideals. . . . The relations established by such a fiscal treaty as ours with Santo Domingo are so delicate as to require very careful handling. The purpose of the United States is, or should be, to serve the Dominicans without dominating their Government or wounding their susceptibilities. The revolutionary tendencies of the people render this an exceedingly difficult task.2
This interpretation of US actions abroad represented a new perspective in American
foreign policy for the Dominican Republic, one that viewed intervention and occupation
as examples of an altruistic desire to make the world a better a place.
This chapter examines the narrative of humanitarianism, which validated the
American occupation of the Dominican Republic. Added to the traditional account of the
country as a land of perpetual political ineptitude and insolvency was a new humanitarian
component that revealed more about what the United States thought about itself than how
it viewed Dominicans. Although the American media had employed language noting the
altruism and benevolent sacrifice of the United States in areas like Cuba, Puerto Rico,
and the Philippines since 1898, this rhetoric did not enter the discussion about the
Dominican Republic until 1916. The paucity of this discourse prior to 1916 suggests that
in this period, only in cases of direct occupation did the United States employ this
rationale. The concept of underdevelopment (explored in chapter 4) and humanitarianism
worked together to create a problem and a solution; underdevelopment provided the
cause of the Dominican Republic’s problems and American humanitarianism solved key
issues as the United States could point to specific projects as evidence of its success.
This chapter explores the ideology of humanitarianism in which a strong belief in the
power of the occupation to transform the island under the guise of selfless sacrifice and in
2 “Our Protectorate in the West Indies,” The Sun, 7 July 1918, 2.
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the name of civilization eclipsed previous conversations about race. By focusing on
projects like ending discord, public health, infrastructural development, education, and
the creation of the national constabulary, the United States claimed that it had conquered
underdevelopment in the Dominican Republic. The occupation period was unique for
two key reasons. First, images of the Dominican Republic in the US media remained
stagnant precisely because American sources had already identified underdevelopment,
and its associated consequences, as the main setback in the country. Thus, there was no
need to change the imagery. Second, and related to the first, these two narratives of
underdevelopment and humanitarianism facilitated occupation policy at the same time
providing a problem and a solution. This chapter argues that American sources did not
shift their representations of Dominicans because they did not alter their goals during the
occupation. This further demonstrates the intimate connection between policy and
imagery – without a major shift in policy, a shift in imagery was not necessary.
Furthermore, this supports the converse argument presented in part I: only when the goals
of the United States changed was there a corresponding shift in the representation of
Dominicans in American sources.
Humanitarianism: The “Master Narrative”
The narrative of misrule employed by the United States exposed the various ways
in which the American media conceptualized the Dominican Republic and its people.
The narrative of humanitarianism, however, revealed much more about the ways in which
the United States viewed its place in the world. Curiously, though this viewpoint
emerged about the Caribbean in 1898, Americans did not employ this language in their
133
discussions of the Dominican Republic until 1916, suggesting that this rhetoric was only
utilized when the United States desired or achieved direct occupation. As discussed in
chapter two, the majority of discussions about the Dominican Republic prior to 1916
centered on financial problems, race, and revolution rather than benevolent uplift. Once
marines arrived and the occupation began, the American media deployed the narrative of
humanitarianism.3
As many scholars have noted, the Spanish American War fundamentally altered
United States policy, transforming Americans’ beliefs about their international role as the
upholders of liberty and the altruistic purveyors of material progress.4 In Cuba and the
American Imagination: Metaphor and the Imperial Ethos, historian Louis A. Pérez
explored the various ways in which the war in Cuba transformed American
conceptualizations of Cubans as well as themselves. Pérez contended that the war
changed the American consciousness, charging it “with salvation of the world,” creating
a “master narrative” in which Americans were “given to selfless service to mankind,
3 On humanitarianism see Merle Curti, American Philanthropy Abroad (Rutgers,
NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1963); Emily Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982); Gary Bass, Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention (New York: Knopf, 2008); Ian Tyrrell, Reforming the World: The Creation of America’s Moral Empire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).
4 On the importance of the Spanish-American War in altering US perceptions see Gerald F. Linderman, The Mirror of War: American Society and the Spanish-American War (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1974); James C. Bradford, Crucible of Empire: The Spanish-American War and Its Aftermath (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993); Kristin L. Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998); Stephen Kinzer, The True Flag: Theodore Roosevelt, Mark Twain, and the Birth of American Empire (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2007).
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without ulterior motive, without selfish intent.”5 This selfless viewpoint colored
American media interpretations of the United States’ global role, captured in articles
praising the arrival of infrastructure, upgraded sanitation, disease eradication, and
improved government in places like Cuba and the Philippines.6 This “master narrative”
would be employed time and again in possessions gained after the Spanish American
War.7
Sources dating to 1898 and after outlined the new humanitarianism American
observers believed was at the core of the country’s actions around the globe. American
politician John J. Ingalls, in his 1898 work, America’s War for Humanity, claimed that
American actions in Cuba were motivated by a “lofty moral impulse, which has inspired
the heroes of every history, and the martyrs of every religion.”8 Writing about the
5 Louis A. Pérez, Cuba in the American Imagination: Metaphor and the Imperial
Ethos (Durham, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 7.
6 On the Philippines see “The Conquest of Bubonic Plague in the Philippines,” National Geographic, Vol. XIV no. 5 (May 1903), 185-195; “Improvements in the City of Manila,” National Geographic, Vol. XIV no. 5 (May 1903), 195-197; “American Development in the Philippines,” National Geographic, Vol. XIV no. 5 (May 1903), 197-203; “Ten Years in the Philippines,” National Geographic, Vol. XIX no. 2 (February 1908), 141-148. On Cuba see Estel R. Carr, “Great Improvement,” The News-Herald, 26 July 1900, 5; “A Brilliant Success,” The Hawaiian Star, 30 December 1903, 4; “Stamping Out of Yellow Fever,” San Antonio Express, 16 November 1903, 10.
7 Studies have examined US aims in other imperial projects of the time. On Veracruz, Mexico see Frederick S. Calhoun, Power and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1986), 34-68; Robert E. Quirk, An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of Veracruz (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1967). For Haiti see Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1995).
8 John J. Ingalls, America’s War for Humanity (New York: N.D. Thompson Publishing Company, 1898), 177.
135
American victory over Spain, Ingalls contended: “Our victory will be the triumph of the
Nineteenth Century over the Middle Ages; of democracy over absolutism; of self-
government over tyranny; of faith over bigotry; of civilization over barbarism.”9
Rudyard Kipling’s infamous 1899 poem, “The White Man’s Burden,” brilliantly captured
these sentiments by explaining the taxing nature of imperialism in which “the best ye
breed” would be sent “to serve your captives’ need.” Kipling drew a clear dichotomy
between the primitive, “new-caught, sullen peoples, Half-Devil and half-child” and the
developed colonizers who were to take up the “savage wars of peace” and “fill full the
mouth of Famine / And bid the sickness cease.”10 Almost a decade later, a similar
attitude pervaded Secretary of War William Howard Taft’s words in National
Geographic. Taft noted that there had never been “a greater exhibition of pure altruism”
than American actions in the Caribbean and the Philippines during and after the Spanish
American War. Much like what would be discussed in another decade about the
Dominican Republic, Taft lauded American efforts in Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the
Philippines. He praised the establishment of schools, the building of roads, and efforts to
combat epidemic diseases. Taft outlined US goals as,
to stimulate business, to elevate and educate the people, to maintain and preserve order, to introduce internal improvements of all sorts into the islands, to build roads and bridges and harbors, and gradually to enlarge as far as possible the control which the natives shall have over their own local governments.11
9 Ingalls, America’s War for Humanity, 177-178.
10 Rudyard Kipling, “The White Man’s Burden,” Internet History Sourcebook,
11 William Howard Taft, “Some Recent Instances of National Altruism,” National Geographic, Vol. 18 no. 7 (July 1907), 434-435.
136
According to Taft, though there had been some cases of abuse on the part of civil and
military personnel, the overall account was that of an “unblemished record of generous,
earnest effort to uplift these people, to help them on the way to self-government, and to
teach them a higher and a better civilization.”12
The argument that the occupation of the Dominican Republic was a humanitarian
undertaking, unique in its selflessness, emerged in 1916 and sustained itself throughout
the occupation. National Geographic ran a piece in August 1916 discussing American
intervention in Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic. The magazine assured its
readers that American actions were different than those of other colonial or imperial
nations:
Wherever the United States has gone the welfare of the people has been her first concern; and while all colonial history shows that the tares of evil are absent from the wheat of good, our nation’s record of help given where most needed is one that well may challenge our admiration, and quicken our patriotism.13
In September 1916, the New York Times echoed these sentiments, reminding its readers
that the United States did not covet land but instead only offered assistance. “Our
purpose has been to aid these neighbors, not to take any of their possessions, to exercise a
controlling influence in their elections, or in any way to subject them to the domination of
the United States.”14 In June 1919, the New York Times interviewed Reverend Arthur R.
Gray for a piece entitled, “The Missionary Marines.” As secretary for the Latin
12 William Howard Taft, “Some Recent Instances of National Altruism,” National
13 “Wards of the United States: Notes on What Our Country is Doing for Santo Domingo, Nicaragua, and Haiti,” National Geographic (August 1916), 151.
14 “Help for Our Neighbors,” New York Times, 1 September 1916, 6.
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American division of the Board of Missions of the Protestant Episcopal Church, Gray
believed that the marines were a beneficent force on the island, “teaching the people how
to manage their finances, how to build roads, how to establish schools, how to fight
disease – as well as how to preserve law and order so that the national habit of revolution
may be overcome.”15 Gray had expressed similar sentiments in an article published
earlier that year. Despite all the positive effects American forces had in Haiti and the
Dominican Republic, Gray warned his readers that “some people, whose narrowness has
made them skeptical as to the possibility of a nation’s being unselfish” believed that the
United States was “playing a deep game and seeking under a cloak of altruism to increase
its material possessions.”16 According to Gray, this could not be farther from the truth
because the United States would only stay in these countries until they could “paddle
their own ship of state.”17 The only feeling Americans should have about these actions,
according to Gray was, “to be proud” of the “missionary job” of the US government.18
American sources were careful to qualify the United States’s actions in the
Dominican Republic as completely altruistic. Relaying the timeworn narrative of
revolution and financial problems, National Geographic added that American actions
came with great effort, expense, and the “actual sacrifice of blood and life” in an attempt
to “play the role of Good Samaritan to the peoples of Santo Domingo, Haiti, and
15 “The Missionary Marines,” New York Times, 8 June 1919, 38.
16 Arthur R. Gray, “Haiti in Transition,” The Spirit of Missions 34, no. 1 (January
1919), 432.
17 Gray, “Haiti in Transition,” 432.
18 Gray, “Haiti in Transition,” 434.
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Nicaragua.”19 Otto Schoenrich noted that some Dominicans might “feel sad at passing
under the government of a foreign power” but that over time they would recognize the
immense benefits American control imparted:
But those with a clearer vision recognize that there is no alternative, that real freedom is only now beginning to dawn, and that American assistance will give the greatest impetus to prosperity. . . . These relations between the two countries impose at least a moral duty upon the United States. They make it incumbent upon the United States, as far as is in its power, to foster the development of Santo Domingo and promote the happiness of the Dominican people.20 Many articles that followed in the American media similarly focused on
benevolence and sacrifice. In December 1916, the New York Times explained American
military actions in the Dominican Republic in an article entitled “Unselfish Intervention.”
The piece explained for Times readers that the United States had been active in the West
Indies since 1906, motivated “almost exclusively by a desire to give the benefits of peace
to people tormented by repeated revolutions.” Utilizing the proclamation of occupation
as the basis for its claims, the article further explained that the institution of military rule
was necessary according to the 1907 treaty. Furthermore, the establishment of the
military government was purely for the “restoration of order and [to] insure fair voting at
the approaching election.” Additionally, American forces had not intervened in the local
courts or civil matters and after the elections the United States would be providing
economic oversight and a constabulary like in Haiti. Though “the United States could
easily conquer and annex” the Dominican Republic, this would not occur because “our
Government does not seek to acquire territory, nor does it ask for preferential
19 “Wards of the United States,” 147.
20 Schoenrich, Santo Domingo: A Country with a Future, 392, 393.
139
advantaged, commercial or otherwise. The people of the island should realize that it is
their best friend.”21 An article published in February 1917 in the Oregonian reiterated
that the work of the marines in the Dominican Republic had been undertaken “to the best
interests of humanity.”22 In another report, “They Make Peace,” extensive quotes from
Reverend Charles Blayney Colmore, Bishop of Puerto Rico and Haiti, commended the
work of the US military. Colmore highlighted the difficult task marines had on the
island: “I want the American people to realize what big work is being done. It isn’t a
pleasant task to teach a people how to ‘govern straight,’ and the marine officers and men
realize this and yet go at it with stout hearts and high courage. They laugh at the
hardships of life.”23
Travel narratives also confirmed the humanitarian angle. For example, Franck
characterized the Dominican Republic as an unruly child that the United States would
have to guide on the path to progress:
Like a wayward boy who was never taught to govern himself, but was merely exploited by a heartless stepfather, from who he finally ran away, Santo Domingo has no real conception of how to conduct itself in political matters, and up to the present occupation no one has ever attempted to teach it what it never learned from Spain or experience. Santo Domingo has always run more or less wild; she needs a complete new standard of honor and morals. Among other things this will require at least 25 years of good elementary schooling … the text-books adopted should contain much pertinent queries as: “What are the chief faults of Dominicans (of Latin-Americans in general) which it is necessary to correct before they can take their proper place in the modern world?”24
21 “Unselfish Intervention,” New York Times, 5 December 1916, 10.
22 “Order in Santo Domingo,” Oregonian, 19 February 1917, 10.
23 Quartermaster Sergeant C.B. Proctor, “They Make Peace,” Charlevoix County
Herald, 29 June 1917, 6. This article also appeared in the Washington Bee on 16 June 1917. 7.
24 Franck, Roaming Through the West Indies, loc. 5090.
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Franck firmly believed in the redeeming power of the intervention, insisting that, in just
four years, the island had already improved under American guidance. For Franck this
demonstrated that “Santo Domingo could be a success so long as some overwhelming
power holds it steady by appointing the better class of officials and keeping an exacting
eye constantly upon them.” The best course of action on the island, he stated, was for
occupation forces to remain there for at least fifty years or until the present generation,
with all of their faults, had passed on, a claim reiterated by Americans time and again.25
If underdevelopment was the core problem in the Dominican Republic, then the
key to combating it was a humanitarian project that centered on tangible goals. From the
outset, occupation forces identified four areas of improvement: public health and
sanitation, public works, education, and the creation of a constabulary.26 These projects
remained the focus of the occupation government for the next seven years – highlighted
in official reports and publicized by the American media. These particular endeavors
were undertakings that the occupation forces could point to as examples of selfless
service in their attempt to improve the Dominican Republic. Additionally, they were all
projects with measurable outcomes – numbers of vaccinations, miles of roads, literacy
rates, and more. Largely ignoring public health initiatives in the Dominican Republic,
the American media concentrated their attention on reporting about financial
improvement and end to revolution as well as progress in building infrastructure,
25 Franck, Roaming Through the West Indies, loc. 4178, 5090.
26 For a deeper discussion of these goals and their outcomes see Calder, The
Impact of Intervention.
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education, and the constabulary as a way of communicating success in the Dominican
Republic.
An End to Revolution and the Makings of Prosperity
After the arrival of troops, reports flooded the American press praising the
profitable effect tranquility was having on the island. In September 1916 the Washington
Post claimed that, with US forces in control and an end to political chaos in sight,
representatives from American companies were sailing to the Dominican Republic to
explore investment opportunities. According to the Post, this initial outburst likely
“represents only a beginning of commerce with Santo Domingo and investment of
American capital in the natural resources of the island.”27 In another article from
November of that year, the Post discussed the previous revolts that had raged throughout
the country stating that, since the arrival of the marines, the process of pacification had
begun.28 In a special report for the Post in March 1917, the reporter detailed the visit of
General George Barnett to Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Barnett claimed that the
Dominican Republic now “had the appearance of prosperity.”29 Official reports mirrored
this sentiment as military governor, Harry S. Knapp, affirmed in 1918, “the country is
27 “‘Holland’ Writes of Opportunities for US Capital in San Domingo,”
Washington Post, 16 September 1916, 7.
28 “Fear Revolt in Domingo,” Washington Post, 21 November 1916, 2.
29 “What Uncle Sam’s Marines Have Done for Haiti: Gen. Barnett Tells of Vast American Influence on the Island,” Washington Post, 4 March 1917, SM7.
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now in a period of constructive work after pacification.”30 For both the press and the
military government, peace in the Dominican Republic was the key to economic
prosperity.
The US intervention had brought an end to revolution and American sources
declared that this had produced a profound effect on the island and its people. Just days
before the official proclamation of occupation, the Washington Post claimed that
American supervision had already transformed Dominicans: “Many already are changed
into useful citizens and are clearing lands for cultivation. The farmers are working
enthusiastically to increase their crops, now that their property is protected.”31 Five
months later, Frederic J. Haskin wrote for readers of his syndicated columns on the
Caribbean that US intervention allowed occupation forces to move forward with
improvements. Management of all funding allowed occupation forces to “provide
Dominicans with those fundamentals of a civilized state, such as roads, schools and an
orderly system of land tenure, which at present they lack. Santo Domingo is a land with
a future of splendid possibilities, and this future is now largely within our control.”32
Haskin, and many Americans, believed this would transform the people and the country:
But give these people roads so that they may travel and trade, give them schools so that they may learn to read, give them a system of land tenure so that they may own property securely and acquire conservatism and self-respect, and you have abolished the material of which revolutions are made.33
30 The Military Governor of Santo Domingo (Knapp) to the Secretary of the Navy
(Daniels), July 1, 1918, FRUS 1918, 364.
31 “Fear Revolt,” Washington Post, 2.
32 Frederic J. Haskin, “Uncle Sam in the Caribbean: How We Rule Santo Domingo,” Omaha Sunday Bee, 8 April 1917, 6.
33 Haskin, “Uncle Sam in the Caribbean,” 6.
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Stories that emphasized the beneficial effect of peace on the Dominican Republic
continued throughout the occupation as a testament to American success. Otto
Schoenrich’s 1918 Santo Domingo: A Country with a Future claimed that the situation in
the country had radically changed owing to the presence of the United States. Schoenrich
stated, “Revolutions have become a matter of history. Ballots will hereafter take the
place of bullets, and politics will be conducted in the same manner as in other orderly
countries. Evolution, not revolution, will be the characteristic of the future.”34 Running
on the same day in August 1920, both the New York Times and the Washington Post
confirmed this viewpoint. The Times insisted that Dominican financial woes had
ultimately been solved and political advances had multiple positive effects. “The alleged
graft, dishonesty and inefficiency with which the old Santo Domingo Treasury was said
to be honeycombed have been eliminated.”35 Quoting from a report by military governor
of the Dominican Republic, Rear Admiral Thomas Snowden, the Post described
improvements in the republic. “The military government has set the country an
unassailable example of good government, free from graft, giving a square deal to all, an
administration absolutely above reproach.”36 The report stated that internal revenue
collection was up from $700,000 annually to an astounding $3.5 million, taxes that had
34 Schoenrich, Santo Domingo: A Country with a Future, 335.
35 “Dominica Thrives Under Our Control: Daniels Makes Public Admiral
Snowden’s Report Forecasting $4,500,000 Revenue This Year Near Sevenfold Increase Republic’s Customs Loan to be Paid Thirty-three Years Before Due – 110,000 Children in Schools,” New York Times, 16 August 1920, 22.
36 “Santo Domingo is Prosperous,” Washington Post, 16 August 1920, 6. For the original report see The Military Governor of Santo Domingo (Snowden) to the Secretary of the Navy (Daniels), June 30, 1920, FRUS 1920, Vol. II, 126-131.
144
fallen too heavily on the poor had been eliminated, loans were being paid quicker than
ever before, graft and inefficiency had been eliminated, and the focus had now turned to
improving the state of affairs on the island with projects in health, sanitation, and
education.37
Public Health Efforts
Though the topic of public health initiatives in the Dominican Republic did not
generate much interest in the American media as noted by the absence of newspaper and
magazine articles on the subject, this area was an important component of the
occupation’s reforms. Whether for their own purposes of protecting American lives or as
a way to demonstrate the superiority of their medical knowledge, building a modern
public health system and imposing sanitary restrictions on the Dominican Republic was a
crucial project of the intervention. Historian Rebecca Ann Lord contended that the focus
on health and sanitation reflected American goals to control the environment and the
spread of vector-born diseases in an effort to “transform the nation into a stable client
state.” According to Lord, for “American military officials, the Dominican Republic was
a ‘sick’ nation, with high rates of chronic and epidemic diseases. This sickness could
only be cured with American scientific and organizational expertise.” Whereas the
United States viewed their public health efforts as an example of their altruism and self-
sacrifice, Lord argued that the focus on epidemic diseases like smallpox, typhus, yellow
fever, and malaria revealed that occupation forces were self-serving because these were
the illnesses that most threatened “American soldiers and commercial and political
37 “Santo Domingo is Prosperous,” 6.
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interests” rather than average Dominicans.38 Other scholars, such as José G. Amador
argued that in the Cuban case, public health campaigns were not only a way for the
United States to assert its superiority and authority in terms of science and politics but
also as a way to justify their occupation. According to Amador, “promoting sanitation
signaled the beginning of a new war, a battle against a disease that provided a means to
justify and implement US imperialism.”39 Elements of both of these interpretations
explain the objectives of the military government in the Dominican Republic.
Tackling public health afforded the military government an issue with a
measurable outcome that was also a matter of grave interest for the United States. A
1917 report by the Department of Sanitation and Beneficence outlined the justification
for the intervention and the benefits it provided Dominicans. Confirming the benevolent
and philanthropic spirit US forces claimed to be acting under, the report stated that the
American interest in public health was aimed at benefitting the Dominican people and
improving their quality of life by protecting them from preventable diseases. This, in
turn, would lead to greater benefits in their “industrial, social, and commercial life.”
Beyond this “altruistic attitude,” the report stated that the United States had a “broader
and more imperative obligation” to Americans at home and the wider Latin American
community to make sure that disease did not spread. Because the Dominican Republic
had a “central position in the West Indies,” it could not “harbor infectious diseases” that
38 Rebecca Ann Lord, “An ‘Imperative Obligation’: Public Health and the United
States Military Occupation of the Dominican Republic, 1916-1924,” (PhD diss., College Park University of Maryland, 2002), 3, 4, 8, 3, 12.
39 José G. Amador, “‘Redeeming the Tropics’: Public Health and National Identity in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Brazil, 1890-1940,” (PhD Diss, University of Michigan, 2008), 72.
146
would make it a “menace” to “its many neighbors.” The United States took this
responsibility seriously and stated in the report that maintaining public health,
“constitute[d] an international obligation surely comparable to those of financial integrity
and internal order.” Taking on this necessary burden as yet another piece of molding the
Dominican Republic into a modern nation, American officials saw it as their duty to
intervene in the name of public health. Like debt and political instability, the only way to
redeem the Dominican Republic from the danger of disease was “direct, immediate and
very complete control of the Dominican public health service.”40
Because of the threat of epidemic disease, the United States embarked upon
vaccination campaigns like the one veteran Omar Titus Pfeiffer recalled in a small town
south of Higüey when and he and his men were ordered to vaccinate everyone after an
outbreak of smallpox.41 Smallpox vaccination campaigns were popular throughout the
period of the occupation, as the military government believed that the “greatest danger”
in the republic “was the possibility of a virulent epidemic” that could not be contained.
In fact, from the beginning, the military government initiated a smallpox vaccination
program, but according to reports in 1918, this had only led to the vaccination of a large
number of schoolchildren while the vast majority of the population remained highly
susceptible to contracting and spreading the disease. According to the military
government, “[t]his fact, taken together with the constant occurrence of small outbreaks
40 “A Study of the Problems of Dominican Public Health and Sanitation from the
Viewpoint of the United States Government in its Relation to Santo Domingo,” 1, Record Group 52, Box 559, Folder 129626, Records of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, National Archives and Records Administration.
41 Omar Titus Pfeiffer (USMC), interviewed by L.E. Tatem, San Jacinto, CA, 1968, Marine Corps Project, Columbia University Archives, 36.
147
of smallpox in Puerto Rico, only a few hours distant, made anti-smallpox vaccination
perhaps the most urgent single public health need in Santo Domingo.”42 By 1921, the
military government was still trying to combat smallpox through a “vicious propaganda”
campaign, which enlisted the help of local newspapers as well as prominent citizens to
spread the word of the necessity of vaccination. However, despite these efforts, the
military government reported that there were strong anti-vaccination sentiments,
especially in the Cibao region and that the “anti-vaccination propaganda has been and is
largely political and virtually amounts to anti-American propaganda.” The only remedy
to this situation was to blame Dominicans if smallpox were ever to reach epidemic
proportions. Thus, the Department of Sanitation and Beneficence issued a statement
declaring that if there were an epidemic, “the fault would be with the Dominican leaders
of the people, not with the Military Government, this department, or the people as a
whole.”43
The difficulties surrounding the success of the smallpox eradication campaign
were not singular as managing venereal disease and the prostitutes that were thought to
be the source of it proved a difficult task for the occupation government as well. In her
work on prostitution, Melissa Madera contended that the focus on efforts to abolish
prostitution in the Dominican Republic became imperative for US officials because many
42“Statement of the Dominican Public Health Situation: June 1918,” June 15,
1918, From Surgeon P.E. Garrison USN Chief Sanitary Officer To Head of Military Government, Record Group 52, Box 559, Folder 129626, Records of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, National Archives and Records Administration.
43 Department of Sanitation and Beneficence, Quarterly Report, First Quarter, 1921, Legajo 106, Exp. 38, Ano 9999, Archivo Nacional General, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic.
148
believed that “prostitution spread venereal disease, contaminated honorable citizens, and
weakened the national body.”44 In the case of Cuba, Tiffany Sippial argued that the
control of prostitution was based on the American idea that moral negligence hindered
modernity and progress.45 Efforts by the occupation government to control venereal
disease in the Dominican Republic ranged from creating red-light districts and enforcing
the mandatory medical inspection of prostitutes to attempts at abolishing prostitution
outright.46 Military officials arrested women suspected of prostitution and incarcerated
them in special facilities documenting not only their names but also the diseases they
harbored. Officials listed many of the women as having multiple diseases at the same
time, typically gonorrhea and syphilis, though some were jailed with the note “no
disease.”47 These women were presumably held based on the idea that their tests had
given false negatives or that their behavior was enough to warrant their detainment.
Frustrated by prostitutes who evaded capture because they were “trained to conceal
themselves, thus making it more difficult to find them,” the military government
44 Melissa Madera, “‘Zones of Scandal’: Gender, Public Health, and Social
Hygiene in the Dominican Republic,1916-1961,” (PhD diss., Binghamton University, 2001), 13.
45 Tiffany Sippial, Prostitution, Modernity, and the Making of the Cuban Republic, 1840-1920 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013), 113.
46 See Madera, “‘Zones of Scandal.’”
47 Memo from Medical Officer Carcel Publica to Secretary of State of Sanitation and Beneficence, Sick Bay, M.B. Barracks Fort Ozama, Santo Domingo, June 3, 1924, Record Group 38, Box 71, Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, National Archives and Records Administration.
149
attempted time and again to root out what they believed to be an immoral practice, but
continually failed.48
Both the campaigns against smallpox and prostitution constituted complications
for the occupation government. Although these were projects with measurable goals,
those goals were not met. Additionally, they demonstrated two clear instances of
resistance to American reforms. The lack of reporting any significant details about these
two endeavors in magazines and newspapers likely was a conscious decision to ignore a
narrative that could not easily be explained. Answering questions as to why Dominicans
would resist smallpox vaccinations or continue to practice prostitution called into
question the ability of the occupation government to transform the people and the
physical health of the island.49
48 Memo, Sick Bay 44th Company Marine Barracks San Pedro de Macorís,
January 15, 1924, From Post Medical Officer to Regimental Commander, 1st Regiment USMC, Santo Domingo, Record Group 38, Box 71, Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, National Archives and Records Administration.
49 The literature on resistance to smallpox inoculation and vaccination covers various areas around the globe. For more on this topic see Claudia Huerkamp, “The History of Smallpox Vaccination in Germany: A First Step in the Medicalization of the General Public,” Journal of Contemporary History 20 (October 1985): 617-635; José G. Rigau-Pérez, “The Introduction of Smallpox Vaccine in 1803 and the Adoption of Immunization as a Government Function in Puerto Rico,” Hispanic American Historical Review 69 (August 1989): 393-423; Angela T. Thompson, “To Save the Children: Smallpox, Vaccination, and Public Health in Guanajuato, Mexico, 1797-1840,” The Americas 49 (April 1993): 439-440; Nadia Durbach, Bodily Matters: The Anti-Vaccination Movement in England, 1853-1907 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005); Stanley Williamson, The Vaccination Controversy: The Rise, Reign, and Fall of Compulsory Vaccination for Smallpox (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2007); Niklas Thode Jensen, “Safeguarding Slaves: Smallpox, Vaccination, and Government Health Policies Among the Enslaved Population in the Danish West Indies, 1803-1848,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 83 (Spring 2009): 95-124.
150
Roads to Progress
American sources focused on the accomplishments of the occupation that
presented measurable material progress, in particular roads. For generations, travel
writers had commented on the deplorable state of transportation in the Dominican
Republic, noting that this was a barrier to economic development. The construction of
roadways, particularly a highway to connect the north and the south, was an essential
component of the military government’s plan. This was praised as the key to increasing
commerce and trade within the country as well as opening up new rural areas for
agricultural development.50 Additionally, occupation forces viewed the building of roads
as a crucial means of preventing revolution in the country because they would provide
military forces with easy access to problematic areas.51 In late 1920, the journal The
South American reported that over 141 kilometers of macadam roads had been built to
date.52 In a lengthy piece on the advancements made by occupation forces for the New
York Times, journalist Sara MacDougall recalled that roadways before the arrival of the
US marines had been so horrendous that travel between the northern and southern parts
of the country took longer than the passage between New York and London.53 However,
following the improvements made by the United States, this trip now only took three
50 Quarterly Report of the Military Governor of Santo Domingo (Snowden), July
1, 1920, FRUS 1920, Vol. II, 123.
51 Robert C. Kilmartin, “Indoctrination in Santo Domingo,” Leatherneck, (December 1922), 382. 52 “Santo Domingo Under American Rule,” The South American IX, no. 2 (December 1920), 25.
53 MacDougall, “Santo Domingo’s Second Dawn,” 12.
151
days, and with the completion of the national highway set for 1921, the journey would
take just one. An article for the Evening Star in 1922 reported that these new roads were
also of interest to tourists who would now be able to travel around the country with ease,
allowing them to see many more interesting sites than before when they had to rely on
“irregular steamships.”54 On the completion of the highway that connected the north with
the south, the South Carolina newspaper the Keowee Courier maintained that this was the
first time since Columbus that a new road had been opened. The paper credited this
accomplishment to the marines who had built something that “holds rich promise for the
future development of the island.”55 Praising the accomplishments of American
intervention, Robert C. Kilmartin agreed that roads had unified the Dominican people and
would “stand as a monument to the American occupation.”56
Americans fond of statistical and visual proof of progress could look to George
Marvin’s article in October 1917 for the monthly magazine World’s Work. The piece
included a series of photographs that impressed upon readers the positive effect of the
American presence. The top of the page showed a road seemingly carved out of the
surrounding jungle. Though wide, the road was muddy and difficult to navigate given the
many ruts that marred its surface. A man was riding a loaded down horse and the caption
read, “Under the Old Régime: A ‘road’ in the interior before the advent of the United
States Marine Corps.” Beneath was another picture with the caption, “Under the New
54 Roger Batchelder, “Santo Domingo Invites Tourists to Inspect Its New Auto
Roads,” Evening Star, 24 March 1922, 16.
55 “Great Highway Improvement,” Keowee Courier, 22 November 1922, 3.
56 Kilmartin, “Indoctrination in Santo Domingo,” 382.
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Régime: A modern macadam road built and maintained by the Marine Corps in their
work of setting the Republic’s house in order.” This picture revealed a more orderly
landscape, with a flat, smooth paved road. In comparing the two photographs, Marvin’s
readers would be able to see that the occupation brought with it order, modernity, and
future economic prosperity. To further emphasize this point, Marvin included yet another
photograph with the title, “Two Kinds of Transportation.” The photograph displayed
women wading across a river with baskets on their heads and their skirts hiked up to their
waists. Marvin described the scene: “The tireless women of Santo Domingo have been
the burden bearers, but now are giving way to the railroads and other civilized means of
carriage under the stable rule of the Americans.” These pictures depicted the Dominican
Republic in desperate need of development in order to succeed as a modern, financially
stable nation. This infrastructure could only be possible with the help of the United
States, which generously provided assistance. According to Marvin, America’s attitude
in the Dominican Republic was, “Millions for development, if you will, but not one cent
for exploitation!”57
Educational Advancements
In American sources, combatting illiteracy and building schools was also a sign of
the United States’s humanitarian intentions. Throughout the occupation, quarterly reports
by the military government highlighted educational accomplishments. Stating that in
1917 alone, 250 rural schools had been erected, by July 1918 the military governor
57 George Marvin, “Watchful Acting in Santo Domingo,” World’s Work, Vol. 34
(May-October 1917), 211. 212, 218.
153
reported that school attendance was up by 120%. Moreover, American forces had begun
standardizing curriculum, establishing a system of school inspection and discipline, and
constructing new buildings complete with an order for $50,000 in school furniture.58 In a
report from 1920, the military governor stated that the construction of eighteen modern
school buildings was underway at a cost of about $800,000. Additionally, he recalled
that in 1917 only 12,000 students were enrolled in school, but by the year of the report
that number had increased to 110,000.59
In a large piece for the New York Times, journalist Sara MacDougall related the
advances made in the Dominican education system as a result of American occupation.
Reporting on the paternalistic role of the United States in the Dominican Republic,
MacDougall characterized it as “taking a backward little country by the hand and helping
it across a chasm of centuries.” MacDougall informed her readers that, before the
occupation, illiteracy rates in the country hovered around ninety percent and, out of
200,000 children, only 12,000 went to school on a regular basis. Because this same
figure appeared in the military governor’s report earlier that year, this was likely
MacDougall’s source of information. As evidence of the transformative power of the
United States, MacDougall cited two interviews, one with the superintendent of schools
and the other with the military governor. The occupation government appointed Julio C.
Ortegas Frier as superintendent of public education and MacDougall toured a number of
58 The Military Governor of Santo Domingo (Knapp) to the Secretary of the Navy
(Daniels), July 1, 1918, FRUS 1918, 360.
59 The Military Governor of Santo Domingo (Snowden) to the Secretary of the Navy (Daniels), June 30, 1920, FRUS 1920, Vol. II, 130.
154
urban and rural schools with him during her visit. Educated in the United States at the
Ohio State University, Ortegas spoke of the need for American guidance:
Some of my people accuse me of partiality toward the Americans. … But they do not understand. They are short-sighted. I love my own people so much that I am glad the American occupation is compelling us to do the things we ought to have done long ago. I wish we were strong enough to get along without the Military Government. But when we get restless we should read our own history.60
Including Ortegas’s opinion here certainly was a strategic attempt to show that
Dominicans consented to the presence of American forces. MacDougall’s other
interviewee, the military governor, Admiral Thomas Snowden, concurred with Ortegas’s
evaluation of the necessity of American assistance and the positive effect it had had on
the republic. Snowden claimed that “the country had gone to sleep and we are waking it
up.” With improvements in education, public health, and infrastructure, Snowden noted
that though this was a heavy burden for the United States, Dominicans desperately
needed this in order to make progress as a nation:
We are doing our stunt here in as idealistic and humane way as we know how. It isn’t any particular fun for us, aside from the satisfaction we get from seeing a big and constructive job being pushed through for a people that needed a helping hand. No other country in the world would do what the United States is doing for Santo Domingo.61
Snowden’s choice of words made it clear that America’s undertaking in the Dominican
Republic came at a great expense, but that such a sacrifice was a worthy cause for a
country that saw its role in the world as a force of selfless humanitarianism.
For American forces, increasing school attendance was not just a benevolent
undertaking but also a means of creating responsible citizens. Commenting about the
60 MacDougall, “Santo Domingo’s Second Dawn,” 12 61 MacDougall, “Santo Domingo’s Second Dawn,” 21.
155
possibility of withdrawal in June 1920, Snowden related to the charge d’ affaires that the
United States would need to stay in the country “for some years” because the people are
“not yet educated to the value of the vote.” He continued, stating that most Dominicans
were used to the old “personalismo” system of voting “for a certain man no matter what
were his principles.” This, he claimed, was “a relic of the old feudal system,” and could
only be remedied with American-guided education that would teach “the people the value
and power of the vote and to separate the principle from the man.”62 In a report to the
Secretary of the Navy later that month, Snowden elaborated on this idea: “It is most vital
to the future good government of the country that the people should be taught to
understand their civil duties and the value and power of the vote, to fulfill these duties in
a patriotic manner.” Stating that a large proportion of the population was still illiterate,
Snowden argued that education was the key to transforming Dominicans and
indoctrinating them on the intricacies of democracy.63
Policing the People
In the opinion of occupation forces, another crucial element to building a stable,
democratic society was the creation of a police force that would function above political
influence. Established by Executive Order No. 47 in April 1917, the Guardia Nacional
Dominicana replaced all previous branches of the Dominican military and was expressly
62 The Military Governor of Santo Domingo (Snowden) to the Chargé de Affaires
in the Dominican Republic (Brewer), June 20, 1920, FRUS 1920, Vol. II, 116.
63 The Military Governor of Santo Domingo (Snowden) to the Secretary of the Navy (Daniels), June 30 1920, FRUS 1920, Vol. II, 130.
156
trained by Marine Corps officers.64 Historian Ellen D. Tillman argued that the creation of
the constabulary was an “experiment” intended to create a military force that would
maintain peace and protect American interests.65 Deployed to the Dominican Republic in
1917, Charles Noxon served as a company commander for the marines. In a piece for the
New York Times published in late 1919, Noxon explained to readers that the American
presence on the island was “to stabilize, to establish law and order, to teach a weaker
nation what to do and then later on to expect them to take their place with other nations as
an example of American training and of the application of the Monroe Doctrine.”
Working toward those goals, the Guardia would teach Dominicans to “manage their own
affairs” by learning “the American method of policing one’s own country so as to make it
safe for all.”66 Writing for the Marine Corps Gazette in 1923 about his role in
establishing and maintaining a training school at Haina, Lieutenant Edward A. Fellowes
explained that American officials saw the Guardia as a force that would be the “lawful
guardian of law and order on the island.” After completing their training, these men
would be deployed throughout the country to validate the American presence, and,
hopefully pique the interest of other Dominicans to enlist. According to Fellowes,
Dominicans trained at Haina would serve as a model of order, discipline, and modernity –
the very embodiment of occupation objectives. Apart from military training, recruits
64 Calder, The Impact of Intervention, 55. Ellen D. Tillman, Dollar Diplomacy by
Force: Nation-Building and Resistance in the Dominican Republic (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2016), 80-84.
65 Tillman, Dollar Diplomacy, 78-79.
66 Charles H. Noxon, “Santo Domingo – Ward of the Marines,” New York Times, 30 November 1919, SM11.
157
were also instructed in “agriculture, hygiene, and sanitation” with the understanding that
“it was to be used by them in the betterment of conditions in the provinces in which their
posts were located.”67
The task of training Dominicans in the Guardia to be the upholders of law and
order, however, was a constant struggle according to Fellowes. One of the major
obstacles he encountered was a high illiteracy rate, upwards of ninety percent by
Fellowes’s own account, owing to the fact that most of his recruits came from the lower
class of peons and very few from the “‘gente decente.’”68 Indeed, many of the first
recruits were from the lower class as the temptation of free room and board as well as
medical care and a stipend of fifteen dollars per month attracted them to the Guardia.69
Fellowes recalled: “Our first enlisted men were the most ignorant and crude specimens
possible, as far as intelligence was concerned.” While marine officers struggled at the
beginning with their Dominican charges who Fellowes referred to as the “scum of the
island,” over time the quality of people increased as it became more popular to join.
Though Fellowes believed that Dominicans could be a “dignified people,” he carefully
qualified this statement: “Their dignified bearing is that it appears to be the dignity of a
child playing grown-up, and is soon discarded for some childish squabble, or youthful
frivolity.” The apparent immaturity of his recruits sometimes made Fellowes feel as if he
were losing a hold on his men, but with the assistance of Major Joseph M. Feeley,
Fellowes was able to instill discipline. Fellowes described Feeley as an assertive man
67 Fellowes, “Training Native Troops,” 216, 222.
68 Fellowes, “Training Native Troops,” 229.
69 Calder, The Impact of Intervention, 56. A prime example of this was Rafael
Leonidas Trujillo who enlisted in 1919.
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with the ability to “still a native in one of his frequent ‘tantrums’ with a few well turned
syllables, and [he] knew secrets about handling sensitive and high-strung Dominicans.”70
Representing Dominicans as unruly children was certainly not unique as demonstrated in
chapter two. However, this depiction during the occupation was limited to military
personnel. Deployed to the Dominican Republic in January 1917, Henry C. Davis
believed the employment of assertiveness was the only way Dominicans would learn to
change. As he explained in an issue of the Marine Corps Gazette, the only thing a
Dominican had respect for was “FORCE” and to gain his respect one “must have and
exert the strong hand in dealing with him.” Davis insisted that since the Dominican “had
a master his entire life; he recognizes the necessity of a master, and he wants a master.”71
Fellowes’s direct and intimate contact with Dominicans as well as his own
frustration and preconceptions led him to comment on the subject of race at a time when
many American sources avoided commentary on this topic.72 Among his recruits,
Fellowes equated light skin with intelligence. Those with dark skin were, according to
Fellowes, difficult to train. “As a general rule, the degree of intelligence increased with
the decreased ebony tinge. The blacker recruits were generally simple-minded giants
71 Henry C. Davis, “Indoctrination of Latin American Service,” Marine Corps
Gazette 5, issue 2 (June 1920), 154.
72 Tillman noted that one of the major obstacles to successfully building the Guardia was the mindset of marine officers and their racial and paternalistic prejudices. See Tillman, Dollar Diplomacy, 80. Mary Renda discusses this in detail for Haiti as she argued that many of the Americans deployed to Haiti were from the American South and thus brought with them their ideas of racial superiority. See Mary Renda, Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of US Imperialism, 1915-1940 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).
159
who did what they were told simply from the habits of discipline, and lacked a sense of
responsibility and initiative.” Conversely, “those with a clearer complexion usually were
more intelligent, and could be trusted with responsible jobs.” Fellowes contended that
those with a larger proportion of Spanish blood rather than “negro blood in their veins,”
tended to be the best men in the force. All of them, however, required constant
supervision because “when ‘out on their own’ [they] are inclined to slack, and loaf away
the time.”73 Although American forces believed that they were able to make Dominicans
into civilized people, like no other project, the case of the Guardia revealed the
paternalistic attitude employed to achieve this. Furthermore, Fellowes’ anecdotes
demonstrated that, even seven years into the occupation, the United States still had a lot
of work to do in terms of transforming Dominicans into who they wanted them to be – a
point not lost on military officials on the island who would resist withdrawal plans
claiming that their work was far from complete.
Conclusion
Both underdevelopment and humanitarianism were crucial components of
American intervention in the Dominican Republic. While the narrative of
underdevelopment had been a common theme since the 1800s, it took on new meaning
during the occupation, as it became a primary justification for the intervention. Working
in tandem with the theme of underdevelopment was the narrative of humanitarianism.
While underdevelopment provided the reason for America’s presence in the Dominican
Republic, humanitarian projects such as the building of infrastructure, the development of
73 Fellowes, “Training Native Troops,” 231, 232.
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public health, and the erection of new schools not only assisted the country on the road to
progress but also made the United States seem like a purely altruistic authority on the
eastern portion of the island with its goals centered around objects such as roads,
hospitals, and schools. Concentrating their efforts on these measurable goals allowed the
United States to largely forgo conversations about the race of Dominicans and its role in
their underdevelopment with a new focus on tangible advances. Additionally, the
media’s focus on such selfless endeavors allowed the United States to shape its image in
the Dominican Republic and the larger global community. However, once a critical
discussion of this so-called benevolent mission emerged, American sources began to
question the very objectives and the means of obtaining these that the United States had
employed.
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PART III
QUESTIONING THE HUMANITARIAN ANGLE, 1916-1921
Part III of this dissertation traces the change in American media coverage of the
Dominican Republic, as articles appeared that began to question the United States’s
humanitarian efforts during the occupation. Though from the outset Dominican
intellectuals, politicians, and writers along with sympathetic parties throughout Latin
America and the United States confronted the imperialist impulse head on, it was not
until the end of World War I that a critical look into the occupation appeared in the
American media. The process of publicizing criticism of the military occupation in the
United States began slowly, increasing in intensity as the year 1920 unfolded. As
journalists began reporting on the loss of individual liberties, accusations of abuse and
false imprisonment, and most importantly the hypocrisy behind the very ideologies that
American foreign policy was based on, the occupation of the island finally received the
attention that those championing the Dominican cause had long hoped to achieve. While
some sources argued that America’s actions were suspect in the wake of allegations of
mismanagement and cruelty, others upheld the long-standing narrative that America only
acted in the Dominican Republic out of selfless altruism. This section argues that the
crucial element in explaining the change in American media coverage and the subsequent
alteration of US foreign policy in the Dominican Republic were stories that called into
question America’s reputation as a humanitarian force. As chapter three demonstrated,
fluctuations in US objectives generated a change in images in the American media about
the Dominican Republic; this chapter builds upon that claim by exploring the ways in
162
which the United States altered its own image in the wake of charges that disputed the
altruistic spirit of American actions in the Dominican Republic.
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CHAPTER 6
SEEING BEYOND THE HUMANITARIAN NARRATIVE
In his 1918 piece for Metropolitan Magazine, journalist William Hard critiqued
President Wilson’s foreign policy decisions in places such as the Dominican Republic.
Picking up on a topic uncommon in most American media sources, Hard provided a
scathing examination of Wilson’s actions via a fictional conversation between the
president, Kaiser Wilhelm II, Greek Prime Minister Elefterios Venizelos, and the
deceased Dominican bandit Vicente Evangelista. In the article, entitled “Is America
Honest?” the bandit “Evangelista” quoted a speech Wilson gave on 22 January 1917 in
which the president claimed he was an internationalist dedicated to the freedom of other
nations who should be able to determine their own polities “unhindered, unthreatened,
and unafraid.” “Evangelista” countered this claim, providing contrary examples, noting
US intervention in places such as Mexico and the Dominican Republic. Greek Prime
Minister “Venizelos” supported “Evangelista’s” claims, arguing that Wilson’s
“professions” and “practices” contradicted one another: “You profess a pure anti-
Imperialism, but you have an Empire.” To further demonstrate this fact, “Wilhelm”
produced a report from “data” collected by his ministers to indicate the compromised
sovereignty of the Dominican Republic. His report read as follows:
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Santo Domingo. Governed by American Navy Department. No other government. First inkling we Germans had of it was when we tried to communicate with the sovereign and independent state of Santo Domingo. Found the Dominican Minister for Foreign Affairs was a man named Rufus H. Lane. Strange name for Dominican. Found he was Colonel Rufus H. Lane of the United States Marines. No Dominican President. No Dominican Congress. President exiled. Congress disbanded. Colonel Lane appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs by Admiral Knapp. International status of Santo Domingo? Difficult to define. Perhaps as independent as Bureau of Navigation in Navy Department. A sub-vassal state of the 2nd order.1
Hard’s commentary on the Dominican situation revealed that in the months prior to the
end of World War I, criticism of the occupation was finally emerging in the American
press. Though most of the mainstream media did not question America’s intent or
actions in the Dominican Republic, this article from March 1918 foreshadowed a deeper
conversation that emerged in the press after the end of the war that approached the
occupation from a critical angle seeing beyond the humanitarian narrative to argue that
American actions were imperialist and that they subverted native political institutions.
This chapter traces the change in American media coverage of the Dominican
Republic, as articles appeared that began to question the United States’s humanitarian
efforts during the occupation. Though from the outset Dominican intellectuals,
politicians, and writers along with sympathetic parties throughout Latin America and the
United States confronted the imperialist impulse head on, it was not until the end of
World War I that a critical look into the occupation appeared in the American media.
The process of publicizing criticism of the military occupation in the United States began
slowly, increasing in fervor as the year 1920 unfolded. As journalists began reporting on
the loss of personal freedoms, the abuse of native people, and most importantly a
1 William Hard, “Is America Honest?” Metropolitan Magazine 47, no. 4
(March 1918), 69, 67.
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perceived duplicity underlying the very ideologies of American foreign policy, the
occupation of the island finally received the attention that those championing the
Dominican cause had long hoped to achieve. While some sources argued that America’s
actions were suspect in the wake of allegations of mismanagement and cruelty, others
upheld the long-standing narrative that America only acted in the Dominican Republic
out of altruism. This chapter argues that the ideology of the American media was, in fact,
very difficult to change. Though more stories began to call into question America’s
reputation as a humanitarian force, most media sources refused to deviate from the
benevolent idea behind American actions demonstrating how entrenched this concept was
in the United States at this time. As part II demonstrated, fluctuations in US objectives
generated a change in images in the American media about the Dominican Republic; this
chapter builds upon that claim by exploring the ways in which the United States media
refuted charges that disputed the altruistic spirit of American actions in the Dominican
Republic.
The first segment of this chapter reviews contention in the American media
between 1916 and the end of World War I, noting early criticism made in publications
such as The Nation and the few pieces that appeared in major newspapers such as the
New York Times. In particular, this section demonstrates that critical discussions about
America’s actions abroad emerged prior to the end of the war ignited by President
Woodrow Wilson’s speeches about respecting the sovereignty of all nations. Many
questioned America’s intervention in the Dominican Republic because it seemed to be in
direct opposition to Wilson’s concept of self-determination. The next part of the chapter
examines two events in 1920 that caught the attention of the press because they called
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into question America’s intent in the Dominican Republic. The first was a conference on
Mexico and the Caribbean held at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts, which
garnered the attention of the press, who reprinted lengthy quotations from one of the
presenters who vociferously denounced America’s actions in Haiti and the Dominican
Republic. The second event was the arrest and trial of Dominican poet Fabio Fiallo. As
press associations across Latin America pressured the Wilson administration to dismiss
the charges, many began to question the legitimacy and fairness of the occupation
government abroad though American newspapers failed to weigh in on the debate. In
both cases, America’s benevolent reputation was called into question, but it would take
much more than academic conferences and one jailed poet to overturn the narrative
behind American foreign intervention.
Contention in the Media, 1916-1920
Though the articles that appeared in the The Nation in 1916 were not as cutting as
ones that would appear in later years, the key points they brought up would ultimately
prove contentious in the American media as discussions about censorship, legitimacy,
and intent became more frequent. The majority of media coverage in the United States
throughout 1916 and 1917 remained focused on the success of the occupation
government, but The Nation was one of the few American publications that consistently
questioned military rule in the Dominican Republic.2 Just days after Captain Harry S.
2 The Nation also consistently criticized US actions in Haiti. For a brief overview
of the work of James Weldon Johnson on the topic of the US occupation of Haiti see Rayford W. Logan, “James Weldon Johnson and Haiti,” Phylon 32, no. 4 (1971): 396-402.
167
Knapp gave the proclamation of the occupation, The Nation referred to it as a “military
dictatorship” set up by “un-American” procedure. The magazine contended that, if the
temporary governing of the island was necessary, then it must be done without the strict
censorship regulations enforced by the navy so that “the whole world, and particularly the
Pan-American world, may judge of the benevolence of our acts and intentions.” The
Nation warned that, without full public disclosure, the situation in the Dominican
Republic could potentially lead to abuses like had happened in the Philippines.
Additionally, The Nation had reservations about Knapp’s decision to only preserve
Dominican laws that did not conflict with the objectives of the occupation. The article
asked readers to consider the question of who would determine if the laws were fit given
that severe censorship barred both Congress and the American public from obtaining
comprehensive information.3
In the next issue of the magazine, The Nation commended the end of censorship
in the Dominican Republic but questioned why the United States was there in the first
place. Noting President Wilson’s refusal to intervene in the Mexican Revolution, the
piece inquired as to why this was the opposite approach in the case of the Dominican
Republic. The article added, “The islanders may even have a prima facie case in
asserting that the downfall of their Government has been due to our refusal to let them
conduct their affairs in their own way.”4 Calling for a congressional investigation of both
Haiti and the Dominican Republic, the magazine doubted whether the United States had a
right to occupy either country. Although Dominicans objected to the occupation, many
3 “The Week,” The Nation, 7 December 1916, 528
4 “The Week,” The Nation, 14 December 1916, 551.
168
based on the same reasons noted in The Nation, little news of this reached most American
readers.
In the early months of the occupation, short articles indicated discontent over the
Dominican situation, but coverage was never comprehensive enough to provide a
meaningful understanding of the Dominican point of view for American readers. The
New York Times reported on the actions of Dominican minister Armando Pérez Perdomo
in late December 1916. Addressing other members of the “diplomatic corps,” Perdomo
opposed the occupation and the Times stated that, “according to precedent,” this was
“sufficient cause” for his removal.5 Interestingly, when the topic appeared again in mid-
January of the following year, the Times did not remind its readers of Perdomo’s protest
activities. Keeping the article short, the piece stated that Perdomo’s removal was the
result of cost-cutting measures.6 The Washington Post also reported that according to the
American military government, Perdomo’s removal was due to the need to reduce
expenses. However, the article suspected that Perdomo might have been dismissed for
other reasons. The Post speculated that Perdomo could have “proved an embarrassment,
because he is said to have circulated among Latin-American diplomats a protest against
the action of the American government in assuming charge in the island republic.”7 Both
the Times and the Post relayed the sacking of another Dominican official, Manuel
Morillo, the Dominican chargé d’affaires in Cuba. Dismissed from his post by Captain
Chandler of the US marines for his refusal to recognize the authority of the military
5 “Dominicans Made Protest,” New York Times, 23 December 1916, 6.
6 “Ousts Dominican Envoy,” New York Times, 19 January 1917, 18.
7 “Ousts Dominican Envoy,” Washington Post, 19 January 1917, 2.
169
government, both pieces noted that Morillo was the representative of the Dominican
press association in Havana. In this capacity, Morillo would “carry on a program of
publicity against the actions of the American government in Santo Domingo.”8 The
articles also mentioned that, on 16 December of the previous year, Morillo presided over
a meeting of “prominent Dominicans” in Havana “at which resolutions condemning the
American government, and accusing the American forces in Santo Domingo of
assassination, arson and other illegal acts, were adopted.”9 Rather than explaining for
readers why men like Morillo or Perdomo protested the occupation of their country, these
articles focused on the damage their actions could potentially cause in questioning
America’s altruistic actions.10
In the first years of the occupation, reports on Dominican sentiments about the
military government in the New York Times remained sparse. The Times printed the
words of former Dominican president Francisco Henríquez y Carvajal on 23 January
1917. In keeping with America’s humanitarian narrative, the Times indicated that
Henríquez y Carvajal spoke optimistically about the occupation believing that it would
result in similar strides as had occurred in Cuba.11 Henríquez y Carvajal did not expect
the occupation to last long because Latin American countries would not acquiesce to this
8 “Removes Dominican Envoy,” Washington Post, 18 January 1917, 1. “Ousts
Dominican Agent,” New York Times, 18 January 1917, 7.
10 Alan McPherson notes the early protest of the occupation by men like Perdomo and Morillo served as an early transnational resistance to American intervention. See Alan McPherson, The Invaded: How Latin Americans and Their Allies Fought and Ended US Occupations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 47-48.
11 “Santo Domingo Has Faith,” New York Times, 23 January 1917, 5.
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nor would the American public stand behind “injustices which would dishonor any nation
and which would arouse rancor among the sister peoples of Spanish America, [and]
asphyxiate the aspirations of brotherhood and commerce, which is stated so emphatically
by the United States as being desired.”12 Here, Henríquez y Carvajal implied that
wrongdoing would never taint America’s humanitarian efforts. Though another article by
the Times noted that there was criticism of the occupation by prominent Dominicans who
wanted an investigation into fair treatment, the pieced stated that officials in Washington
determined that these claims were “without real foundation or justification.”13
Furthermore, the Times insisted that American actions were:
wholly defensible and the natural result of chaotic conditions of government, finance, and social order that inevitably forced this Government to land marines, set up a temporary military government, protect foreign interests, and administer Dominican affairs until the deadlock between local factions has been broken, and a stable government and financial conditions re-established.14
In all, articles that appeared in the Times tended to uphold the belief in America’s
goodwill, dismissing any claims counter to it.
Unlike the New York Times, the Washington Post tended to print more critical
reports. However, at this early date, even the Post resisted questioning American policy
decisions in the Dominican Republic. Reporting on the closing session of the American
Academy of Political and Social Sciences, the Post printed a few quotes from Oswald
Garrison Villard, co-founder of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP), founder of the American Anti-Imperialist League, and eventual editor
12 “Santo Domingo Has Faith,” 5.
13 “Marines to Stay in Santo Domingo,” New York Times, 26 January 1917, 15.
14 “Marines to Stay in Santo Domingo,” 15.
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of The Nation. Garrison directly condemned American actions in Central America and
referred to intervention in Haiti and the Dominican Republic as a “polite conquest” in
which freedom of speech and the press had been abolished. The majority of the article,
however, focused on the words of Theodore Marburg, former US minister to Belgium.
Marburg claimed that policies pursued in Latin America were the same ones that had
“rendered unquestionable service in the Philippine Islands and given the people there
better government than if they had been allowed to drift away from us, or to have become
the wards of other nations.” The Post continued to quote Marburg’s remarks: “The
spread of British dominion of the brown men has made for justice, liberty, freedom and
their betterment and so does the United States policy along the same lines make for a
larger measure of popular liberty and better government for those who are our
subjects.”15 Upholding the sentiment that like Britain, America’s actions abroad
stemmed from a benevolent desire to improve the lot of “brown men,” at this early stage
of the occupation the Post avoided any critical assessment of the Dominican situation.
Furthermore, Marburg’s commentary rested on the idea that the role of the United States
was to promote development and improvement in areas it viewed as underdeveloped.
This goal was not only worthy but also in Marburg’s estimation, necessary. The rest of
1917 and 1918 remained relatively quiet on the issue of American actions in the
Caribbean as most newspapers, the Post included, focused on the war in Europe.
As many scholars have noted, the end of World War I opened a space for a
critical discussion of America’s role and actions abroad. However, the initial spark for
these critical dialogues occurred before the war’s conclusion, ignited by President
15 “Clash on US Policy,” Washington Post, 22 April 1917, 2.
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Wilson’s own remarks.16 On 8 January 1918, Wilson delivered his famous “Fourteen
Points” in an effort to establish an outline for peace. Points six and thirteen guaranteed
sovereignty for Russia and Poland, respectively, while other points included broader
statements about the fate of nation-states in general. The fourteenth point proposed the
establishment of a “general association of nations” that would guarantee “political
independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.”17 Many interpreted
this to mean that even smaller states had a right to their own sovereignty and would be
guaranteed it. 18 In an address to congress the next month, Wilson confirmed this idea
and added the notion of self-determination: “National aspirations must be respected;
peoples may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. ‘Self-
determination’ is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of actions which
16 On Wilson’s strategy and policy see Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars:
Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992). Robert David Johnson, The Peace Progressives and American Foreign Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). Lloyd Ambrosius, Wilsonianism: Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002). Ross Kennedy, The Will to Believe: Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and America’s Strategy of Peace and Security (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 2009).
17 Woodrow Wilson, “Fourteen Points,” (speech, Washington, DC, January 8, 1918). World War I Document Archive, https:// wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/President_Wilson%27s_Fourteen_Points.
18 On the contention over self-determination, anti-colonialism, and Wilson’s ideology see Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); John Milton Cooper, Jr., ed., Reconsidering Woodrow Wilson: Progressivism, Internationalism, War, and Peace (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008); Susan Pederson, The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).
173
statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril.”19 The concept of self-determination
caused some to question American actions in the Caribbean where the United States
appeared to be violating the very ideals Wilson proposed. However, as noted by scholar
Richard Seymour in American Insurgents, Wilson’s conceptualization of self-
determination was never applicable to all equally – those that Wilson deemed “politically
undeveloped” that had never learned “the rudiments of order and self-control” were not
eligible for determining their own futures.20 This discussion over which people were
entitled to guide their own countries was at the heart of the debate on the matter.
Early discussions on self-determination in the American media differed on their
interpretation of the policy, a debate that continued after the war. On the one hand, some
argued that self-determination did not apply to all equally. One resident of Highland
Park, a community north of Dallas, Texas, wrote in to the Dallas Morning News in
February 1918 expressing his belief that not all were fit for self-rule. The author claimed
that the truth behind this doctrine was that “people who are temperamentally or habitually
or prenatally indisposed to lead industrious, orderly, constructive lives are unfit to
determine for themselves what sort of political State they shall erect.”21 In his opinion,
this caveat not only applied to Haiti and the Dominican Republic but would also be
applied to post-war Europe when officials would “have to take these facts rather than
19 Woodrow Wilson, “Address to Congress,” (speech, Washington, DC, February
11, 1918), World War I Document Archive, https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/President_Wilson%27s_Address_to_Congress,_Analyzing_German_and_Austrian_Peace_Utterances.
20 Richard Seymour, American Insurgents: A Brief History of American Anti-Imperialism (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2012), 62.
21 “Self-Determination,” Dallas Morning News, 9 February 1918, 10.
174
doctrinaire fancies into the forefront of their consideration.”22 Six months later, former
president Theodore Roosevelt echoed similar sentiments in his editorial “Sound
Nationalism and Sound Internationalism,” originally printed in the Kansas City Star and
reprinted in newspapers across the nation. In this piece, Roosevelt questioned Wilson’s
proposal on a League of Nations and his concept of self-determination. Roosevelt
debated if the United States could even make claims about self-determination given its
actions in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, which he referred to as “hypocritical.” He
explained that it was hard to judge these two cases since much had occurred with little
publicity or transparency. However, “the fact remains that we have with armed force
invaded, made war upon, and conquered the two small republics, have upset their
governments, have denied them the right of self-determination, and have made
democracy within their limits not merely unsafe but non-existent.” If anything, according
to Roosevelt, these two examples showed that “we are committed to the principle that
some nations are not fit for self-determination, that democracy within their limits is a
sham, and that their offenses against justice and right are such as to render interference by
their more powerful and more civilized neighbors imperative.”23 Both Roosevelt and the
anonymous resident of Highland Park agreed that Wilson’s policy could not possibly
apply to all nations equally. Furthermore, these two pieces demonstrated that
adjustments would have to be made to Wilson’s ideas in order to address the
discrepancies between his anti-imperialism and the reality of America’s imperial actions.
22 “Self-Determination,” 10. 23 “Roosevelt Flouts League of Nations,” Washington Post, 4 August 1918, 3.
175
A critical look into the inconsistencies of President Wilson’s foreign policy
appeared in the previously mentioned New York publication Metropolitan Magazine in
March 1918. A monthly periodical that mostly focused on politics and literature,
Metropolitan Magazine often ran pieces expressing disapproval of Wilson’s decisions.
The article “Is America Honest?” by William Hard critiqued Wilson’s foreign policy
through a fictional conversation between the president, Kaiser Wilhelm II, Greek Prime
Minister Elefterios Venizelos, and the deceased Dominican bandit Vicente Evangelista.
In the piece, Hard’s characters utilized quotes from Wilson’s own speeches to discuss
discrepancies between his ideals and actions. Quoting from a speech Wilson gave in
January 1915 on the topic of the Mexican Revolution, “Evangelista” noted that “Wilson”
opposed intervention, claiming that infighting should be left to the Mexicans to sort out
on their own. However, as “Evangelista” pointed out, this was the exact opposite policy
pursued in the Dominican Republic. In his defense, “Wilson” argued that Mexico was a
distinctive case because it was a revolution based on “principles,” not on the whims of
greedy politicians. He continued: “The Haitians and the Dominicans were different.
Their revolutions, on the facts, were not really for principles. And they were not working
them out.”24
The most caustic accusations in the article likened the president to the Kaiser,
who continually praised Wilson’s policies. “Wilhelm” congratulated “Wilson” on stating
that governments derived their power from the consent of the governed. “Wilhelm”
contended that this was “wise” to express in public though the reality of the situation was
that “Wilson” had no intention of letting some areas govern themselves. The irony was
24 Hard, “Is America Honest?” 69.
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not lost on “Wilhelm,” who recognized the incongruity between policy and practice:
“You hold Porto Rico by war, by conquest, by blessing of the God of the Battles, by
supreme biological survival and justice; and you intend to continue to hold it.”
“Wilhelm” maintained that he could overlook such “romantic idealisms,” conveyed in
speeches because, after all, “I am a statesman too.” At one point, “Wilhelm” stated, “I
begin to admire these Americans, really.” “Wilhelm” even went so far in his acclaim for
“Wilson’s” diplomatic skills to add, “I am going to have to have an American for
Chancellor.”25 “Kaiser Wilhelm’s” repeated expressions of respect and admiration for
“Wilson” indicated Hard’s opinion that there was not much difference between the two
leaders – a dangerous charge during wartime which no doubt contributed to the US
government’s decision to ban this issue of the magazine from the mail.26
Two articles responding to Hard’s critiques demonstrated the denial to see
American actions in the Caribbean as anything but positive. Republished from the
Chicago Tribune, the Colorado Springs Gazette argued that Hard’s article was audacious
and would “outrage enthusiasts in whose opinion the administration is sacrosanct, and
will give pain to many Americans whose conceptions of patriotism do not admit
criticism.” Though the piece acknowledged that there had been inconsistencies in
Wilson’s policies, the paper maintained that “the administration has acted quietly, but
wisely” behaving like an “absolute dictator, benevolent yes, but absolute.” Though these
discrepancies could make America seem “hypocritical,” the article upheld the idea that in
25 Hard, “Is America Honest?” 15, 16, 68. 26 “Ill-Disguised German Propaganda,” Oregonian, 9 March 1918, 10.
177
end, “America is honest. It must be known as honest.”27 In another response published
in the Oregonian, there was less willingness to accept any ill intentions on the part of the
United States. The paper referred to Hard’s piece as “ill-disguised German propaganda,”
stating that it “could not have lied more outrageously about the United States, or have
better served the purpose of the Kaiser, if it had been written by the chief of the German
propaganda in Berlin.” Though Hard had attempted to establish a parallel between
German actions and the events in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, the Oregonian
argued that there was no comparison because the Germans had destroyed Belgium,
massacring and enslaving its men while ravaging its women. Conversely, in the case of
Haiti and the Dominican Republic, the United States intervened because they “were in a
state of chronic civil war, their people were murdering each other wholesale, and were
also murdering Americans.” Furthermore, according to the article, the United States was
simply following its long-standing policy of aiding other countries like it had in the
Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Cuba, places where the “justification of American intrusion
is to be found in the liberty, peace and prosperity which reign wherever American troops
have gone.” The Oregonian emphatically stated that Germany did not have a Cuba and
that the difference was one of motive: “Germany sends out armies to make men slaves,
American marines go forth to make men free. German occupation makes a prostrate,
starving, impoverished Belgium; American occupation made a free, prosperous, happy
Cuba.”28 Unlike Hard’s allegations, the Oregonian upheld that the United States was
nothing like Germany because its intentions were always selfless. The inability to accept
27 “America is Honest,” Colorado Springs Gazette, 9 March 1918, 4, 5.
28 “Ill-Disguised German Propaganda,” 10.
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criticism of US actions in both of these articles represented the intransigency on the part
of American media sources at this time. Precisely because areas like Cuba, Puerto Rico,
or the Dominican Republic were supposedly unable to be industrious, stable, or orderly,
on other words, their underdevelopment justified American intervention.
Sustained critiques of American policies toward the Dominican Republic did not
appear in the US media immediately after the end of the war. Instead, most major and
minor newspapers in the United States avoided the topic completely, filling their pages
with updates on the Paris Peace Conference that left out the complicated status of places
such as the Dominican Republic. On 31 January 1919, the New York Times briefly
mentioned Haiti and the Dominican Republic, questioning whether entry into the League
of Nations would change the way the United States administered affairs in the two
countries and what this could mean for the Monroe Doctrine.29 Though former
Dominican President Henríquez y Carvajal traveled to Paris in the hopes of meeting with
President Wilson to discuss the occupation of the Dominican Republic, the American
press failed to report on this topic. In a letter written to Jordan H. Stabler, Chief of the
Latin American Division of the State Department, dated 19 April 1919, Henríquez y
Carvajal extolled the position of the Dominican Republic in light of Wilson’s claims and
the goals of the Peace Conference stating that no country was “in a better position than
the Dominican Republic to claim the restitution of her sovereignty as a state and nation,
which she has lost neither by war nor by any international agreement, voluntary or
29 Richard V. Oulahan, “Council Has Long Debate,” New York Times, 31 January
1919, 1.
179
otherwise.”30 Henríquez y Carvajal noted the irony of the peace talks that had managed
to resurrect “nations which appeared dead” while the Dominican Republic remained
“with her sovereignty sequestered and crippled.”31 As passionate as his argument was,
Henríquez y Carvajal’s words went unheeded by the State Department and more
importantly unheard by conference delegates. Dominican poet Fabio Fiallo likened this
to a deep betrayal as Dominicans were “deceived” by “the word of a just man,” clearly
referring to President Wilson.32
Another article on the Dominican occupation would not appear in the Times until
September, noting that Henríquez y Carvajal had gone to Paris. The article did not
discuss what the deposed president did or did not accomplish but instead published
portions of a statement he had issued on behalf of the Junta Nacionalista Dominicana or
Dominican Nationalist Commission founded in July 1919. Henríquez y Carvajal
testified that the military government had greatly reduced individual liberties, amounting
to a complete loss of the freedom of the press and the freedom of assembly with no
possibility to modify the situation since the national government had ceased in 1916.33
As stated in the proclamation of military rule, the occupation was meant to be temporary
30 Enclosure, Doctor Henriquez y Carvajal to the Chief of the Division of Latin
American Affairs of the Department of State (Stabler), April 19, 1919, FRUS, 1919, Vol. II, 107-108.
31 Enclosure, Doctor Henriquez y Carvajal to the Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs of the Department of State (Stabler), April 19, 1919, FRUS, 1919, Vol. II, 107-108.
32 Fabio Fiallo, The Crime of Wilson in Santo Domingo (Havana: Arellano y Cia Impresores, 1940), 29. 33 “Santo Domingo Pleads for Self-Government,” New York Times 12 September 1919, 7.
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and Henríquez y Carvajal insisted that the Dominican people wanted a return of their
native government.34 The Times made no commentary on the president’s claims, simply
reprinting the statement of the Commission, yet another example of the media’s
unwillingness to question American imperialism at this time.
The silence of the American press was noteworthy. It demonstrated that
discussion of the post-war world, particularly in terms of self-determination and the
rights of weaker nations was limited to Europe, a point clearly made during the Paris
Conference by American officials, who told Henríquez y Carvajal that talk of the
Dominican Republic could be addressed later in Washington.35 Neither Haiti nor the
Dominican Republic, both under US occupation, factored into the debate. It would take
much more sensational and controversial stories, particularly ones that criticized the
United States’s actions and policies, to get the cause of Dominican independence more
regularly in the press with any conviction.
Questioning America’s Intent
As 1920 wore on, the American press frequently published articles that questioned
the actions of the military government in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. In May
1920, the American media focused on a conference about Mexico and the Caribbean held
at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts. Whether newspaper editors ran the
story to sell more papers or with a general interest in revealing the contradictions in the
34 “Santo Domingo Pleads for Self-Government,” 7.
35 The Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (J. C. Grew) to
the Acting Secretary of State, April 25, 1919, FRUS 1919, Vol. II, 106.
181
Caribbean is unknown. Flashy headlines such as “Yanks Tyrants Toward Haiti
Schoenrich Says,” “Assails Our Record in Ruling Latins,” “Serious Charges,” and “Rule
in Haiti Called Tyranny,” certainly captured readers’ attention and presented more critical
pieces about American actions abroad. Though the goal of the conference was to foster
critical discussion on foreign policy issues and develop an appreciation and
understanding of the circumstances under which these events had unfolded, the focus of
the media revealed deeper questions about America’s standing as a benevolent,
humanitarian force looking beyond accomplishments like road building and education to
question the removal of political institutions and civil liberties.
Although several speakers presented their point of view on America’s actions in the
Caribbean, the majority of articles reprinted the remarks of Otto Schoenrich. A lawyer
by training, Schoenrich had worked with a commission to revise and compile laws in
Puerto Rico, later serving as a district judge there. Additionally, he had been secretary of
a commission to investigate Dominican finances as well as secretary and advisor to the
Dominican government’s finance minister. Schoenrich had also worked for the
American government in Cuba and Nicaragua.36 Two years prior, newspapers lauded
Schoenrich’s 1918 publication, Santo Domingo: A Country with a Future. Schoenrich
was viewed as an expert on the country because of his extensive trips and intimate
knowledge of the people and their government; papers hailed the book as a
comprehensive study on the politics, finances, and business of the Dominican Republic.37
36 “Otto Schoenrich, 100, Dies at His Home in Baltimore,” New York Times, 9
February 1977, 20.
37 “Our Protectorate in the West Indies,” Sun, 7 July 1918, 2. “Reviews of New Books,” Sunday Star, 16 June 1918, 14.
182
Santo Domingo: A Country with a Future praised the American occupation maintaining
that the United States’s work on infrastructure, sanitation, and political stability had all
produced “a rapid advance of the people and development of the country.”38 Two years,
later, Schoenrich focused on a very different aspect of the occupation in his speech at the
conference.
In Worcester, Schoenrich maintained that actions in the Dominican Republic did not
measure up to the positive effects of American intervention in Cuba and Puerto Rico. He
provided a long list of American accomplishments on the island: public works projects,
elimination of debt, establishment of the national guard, and improvements in education.
However, these undertakings were all enacted by a regime that had generated distrust and
hostility among Dominicans, he claimed. According to Schoenrich, these endeavors had
“been accompanied by the complete suppression of popular liberty under a drastic
censorship and the oppressive action of arbitrary military courts.” Schoenrich claimed
that the three main defects in the Dominican Republic were the character of the military
government, the provost courts, and the strict censorship laws. In his discussion of
military personnel, Schoenrich pointed out that many of these men were “apt to be
autocratic, arbitrary, intolerant and inefficient” and some had even taken this a step
further by employing methods of torture including the “water cure,” the “application of
red-hot machetes,” and allowing prisoners to escape only to shoot them in the back as
they attempted to get away. Schoenrich spoke of an administration that enacted rigid
censorship laws from its inception, allowing neither criticism of the military government
38 Otto Schoenrich, Santo Domingo: A Country with a Future (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1918), 394.
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nor of its officials, even going so far as to outlaw words such as national, revolution,
freedom of thought, and freedom of speech. To conclude his talk, Schoenrich gave his
final assessment: “When we consider the splendid achievements in Cuba and Porto Rico,
the record made in Santo Domingo must bring us deep disappointment, while the mess in
Haiti must awaken feelings of resentment and shame.” The blame, according to
Schoenrich, lay with Washington because it allowed this situation to develop and
“displayed a disregard of the rights of the inhabitants.”39 Schoenrich’s emphasis in this
speech was not on American imperialism or the ideology behind it but rather its record in
the Dominican Republic. Despite some infrastructural advancements, what worried
Schoenrich were political institutions and individual freedoms that the occupation had
removed from the Dominican Republic.
The majority of articles did not comment more on the topic beyond liberally quoting
Schoenrich, though his scathing words certainly made some uncomfortable. One attempt
to counteract Schoenrich’s claims appeared in the Chicago Daily Tribune, which printed
one statement from another presenter at the conference, Colonel George C. Thorpe of the
United States Marine Corps. Though Thorpe’s address at the conference blatantly
attacked Schoenrich’s accusations, all the Chicago Daily Tribune printed was Thorpe’s
claim that “everywhere in the island of Santo Domingo American troops make friends
with the people.”40
39 Otto Schoenrich, “The Present American Intervention in Santo Domingo and
Haiti,” in Mexico and the Caribbean: Clark University Addresses, ed. George Blakeslee (New York: GE Stechert and Company, 1920), 210, 211, 212.
40 George C. Thorpe quoted in “Yanks Tyrants Toward Haiti Schoenrich Says,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 21 May 1920, 10.
184
Schoenrich’s ultimate point, not lost on some journalists, was concern over America’s
reputation abroad. The Boston Daily Globe noted: “For the sake of our standing with the
people of South and Central America, as well as for our own honor, it is imperative that
the present charges should either be proved false or that any officer or man who has
disgraced our flag by Prussianism should be punished.”41 Similar to Hard’s article in
1918, the equation of the United States with the aggression of World War I Germany was
an affront to American goodwill and beneficence. In the coming months discussion of
the Dominican situation intensified, as the damage being done to America’s reputation
became a major cause for concern in the press. Rather than printing stories about
Dominican politicians and intellectuals trying to regain their independence, the American
media honed in on the topic of America’s reputation abroad. Behind that concern lay the
fear that the United States had not acted as the humanitarian it thought itself to be as
accusations of abuse and mismanagement garnered attention.
Though not publicized in the American press, demands for ending the American
occupation of the Dominican Republic increased in both frequency and intensity during
1919, prompting changes in occupation policy. In an attempt to foster goodwill between
US forces and the Dominican population, the military government revised Executive
Order No. 385, which had established strict censorship. In a telegram dated 25 December
1919, the US minister in the Dominican Republic informed the secretary of state that
changes had been made “practically abolishing censorship but forbidding publication of
slanderous or false statements against [the] Military and United States Governments and
41 “Serious Charges,” Boston Daily Globe, 22 May 1920, 4.
185
articles tending to disturb order by calling on [the] people to revolt.”42 The revision of
Executive Order No. 385 officially stated the abolishment of censorship but also included
a long list of exceptions to the rule including any publications or speeches, which taught
the doctrine of Bolshevism or anarchy, promoted ideas contrary to public morality, or
fostered hostility toward the United States or military government (including its policies
or personnel). The modification also forbade publications or speeches that “hold up to
scorn, obloquy or ridicule, the conduct of the United States Government, of the Military
Government, or of their officers” and those “which describe present conditions in Santo
Domingo as manifestly unfair or [in an] untruthful manner.”43 Thus, though changes
were made, the revisions made censorship more specific.44
Despite the risks, many Dominicans, including poet, writer, and politician Fabio
Fiallo, criticized the military government. Fiallo likened this relaxation in the censorship
laws to an opening of the floodgates as a “resolute phalanx of orators and journalists,
filled with war-like ardor” began to openly critique the occupation.45 In response,
American military forces imprisoned over twenty poets, journalists, editors, and
42 The Minister in the Dominican Republic (Russell) to the Secretary of State.
December 25, 1919, FRUS, 1920, Vol. II. 161.
43 The Chargé d’Affaires in the Dominican Republic (Brewer) to the Secretary of State, January 22, 1920, Enclosure, Executive Order No. 385, January 15, 1920, of the Military Government of Santo Domingo, Relaxing Censorship, FRUS, 1920, Volume II., 163.
44 “Patriot Poet Accused,” New York Times, 10 August 1920, 14. “El Consejo de Guerra Contra Fabio Fiallo y Otros,” Diario de la Marina, 10 August 1920, 1. Fiallo, The Crime of Wilson, 9.
45 Fiallo, The Crime of Wilson, 40.
186
intellectuals.46 The chargé in the Dominican Republic telegrammed Secretary of State
Bainbridge Colby on 3 August 1920, indicating that articles published by Fiallo and
writer Américo Lugo were “considered a violation of the regulations put into effect at the
time of [the] abolishment of censorship,” and had thus resulted in their arrest.
Additionally, Manuel Cabrera, a Venezuelan writer and publisher living in Santo
Domingo, awaited trial for printing the two men’s articles.47 Furthermore, the chargé
indicated that these arrests and others had taken place during Patriotic Week, “a farce”
celebrated with the express intention of “raising funds for propaganda [and the]
restoration of the national government.”48 The New York Times claimed that Fiallo and
Lugo had “attacked military officials” with the intent to circulate their message across
Latin America.49 After being detained by American occupation forces on 15 July 1920, a
military court sentenced Fiallo to five years hard labor and a fine of 5,000 pesos.50 Part
of the outrage in the international community that “caused much astonishment and
general indignation” surrounded the prospect that Fiallo might lose his life for his crime
since “one of the powers of the Military Commission” included “the right to impose the
46 Bruce Calder, The Impact of Intervention: The Dominican Republic during the
US Occupation of 1916-1924 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984), 197.
47 The Chargé d’ Affaires in the Dominican Republic (Brewer) to the Secretary of State, August 3, 1920, FRUS, 1920, Vol. II, 164.
48 The Chargé d’Affaires in the Dominican Republic (Brewer) to the Secretary of State, August 3, 1920, FRUS, 1920, Vol, II, 165, 164.
49 “Patriot Poet Accused,” New York Times, 10 August 1920, 14.
50 Editor’s Note. Fabio Fiallo, “The Evacuation of Santo Domingo,” Current History XIV (April-September 1921), 294. “Suspenden la Asentencia de Fiallo,” El Mundo, 15 September 1920.
187
death sentence.”51 With the imminent possibility of Fiallo’s death, press organizations
across Latin America not only picked up the story but also began pressuring Washington
to intervene in the situation.
Though both Lugo and Cabrera were mentioned in many of the press releases, the
focus of the Latin America media remained on Fiallo, the “patriot poet.” The campaign
for Fiallo’s release began in August in Havana and reverberated across the Western
Hemisphere as the Cuban Press Association planned to ask President Wilson to intervene
in the case and implore the press association in Washington and all of the press clubs in
South America to champion their cause.52 Numerous Latin American newspapers
published articles protesting Fiallo’s imprisonment throughout the late summer and early
autumn of 1920. The Associated Press of Havana prompted most of the media response
by issuing telegrams urging their fellow journalists to take up the cause of the patriot
poet. Though they did not have much luck with Washington, the efforts of Havana
journalists did prompt movement in South American press clubs as the associations in
Uruguay, Chile, Brazil, and Mexico all appealed to Wilson on behalf of Fiallo.53
Although US newspapers picked up the Fiallo story, they neither passed judgment nor
appealed to Wilson to intercede demonstrating the difficulty in changing the perceptions
of American intervention in the US media. Throughout the month of August, both the
51 Fiallo, The Crime of Wilson, 41.
52 “El caso de Fabio Fiallo,” El Mundo, 10 August 1920, 1. “En favor de Fiallo,”
Diario de la Marina, 11 August 1920, 1.
53 “Cuba intercede por la vida de Fabio Fiallo,” El Mundo, 8 August 1920, 1. “En favor de Fiallo,” Diario de la Marina, 11 August 1920, 1. “La solidaridad intelectual,” El Mercurio, 15 August 1920, 26. “Brasil y Mexico apoyan a Fiallo,” El Mundo, 15 August 1920.
188
Washington Post and the New York Times published information on the Fiallo situation
relaying the actions of Latin American press clubs.54 On 8 August, the New York Times
reported on the subject of Fiallo, noting that the cable the State Department had received
from the Havana Press Club “was the first information the department had that such a
trial was in progress.”55 Given the circumstances, the Times stated that the State
Department was requesting a full report on the matter directly from the Dominican
Republic. Despite the demands of Cuban journalists, neither the Times nor the Post
published any items requesting Wilson’s assistance or condemning the military
government’s actions demonstrating that there was still a desire to stand behind the
military government, and by extension, the occupation. Though the Times did include a
few quotes from the cablegrams including Havana’s plea that Wilson resolve the issue
“in accordance with the highest sentiments of justice and humanity” and Montevideo’s
entreaty for the president to rectify the matter “in accordance with his high democratic
spirit,” most pieces ignored these statements.56 In fact, most articles were short and
ended with the fact that Fiallo had violated the censorship laws.57
54 “Patriot Poet Accused,” New York Times, 10 August 1920, 14. “Wilson Asked
to Save Poet Facing Death in San Domingo,” New York Times, 11 August 1920, 1. “Plead for Santo Domingo Poet,” Washington Post, 8 August 1920, 26. “Appeal on Behalf of Poet,” Washington Post, 17 August 1920, 6.
55 “Appeal for San Domingan,” New York Times, 8 August 1920, 19.
56 “Wilson Asked to Save Poet Facing Death in San Domingo,” 1. “Appeal for San Domingan,” 19.
57 “Uruguay Asks Wilson to Aid San Domingo Poet,” Idaho Daily Statesman, 8 August 1920, 12. “Wilson Asked to Intervene in Trial,” Gulfport Daily Herald, 9 August 1920, 1. “Friends Plead for Poet,” Oregonian, 10 August 1920, 18.
189
The fiasco provoked anxiety in the State Department as the Latin American press
questioned America’s benevolent reputation. According to a telegram from Secretary of
State Colby, the arrests of Lugo, Cabrera, and Fiallo “caused deep concern throughout
Latin America.” Receiving multiple notifications from “numerous Latin American press
associations protesting against the arrest of these men,” the State Department worried
about the “unfortunate impression” these events had created. Acknowledging that the
reputation of the United States was on the line in the wake of “continued agitation,”
Secretary Colby instructed the minister in the Dominican Republic to relay to the military
governor the following:
[T]he Department hopes that it may be possible to conclude the trials at an early date and to express to him the opinion of the Department that unless the penalty imposed be light, in the event that these men are convicted, Lugo and his companions will become martyrs in the estimation of the Dominican public generally and the action of the Military Government will have an unfortunate effect in Latin American countries.58
In response to this request, the military governor reduced Fiallo’s sentence to one-year
imprisonment and a fine of $2,500. This was not pleasing in the least to Secretary Colby,
who questioned the governor’s actions in a telegram to Secretary of the Navy Josephus
Daniels:
I am taking the liberty to bring this to your attention since it was my understanding that you intended to have the Military Governor take steps to deport Flores Cabrera . . . and to have the two Dominicans themselves released after a warning had been given them by proper authorities. It may be, of course, that the Military Governor feels obliged to have this severe sentence imposed upon Fiallo, for the moral effect which it may have throughout the Republic, and later pardon him.59
58 The Secretary of State to the Minister in the Dominican Republic (Russell),
August 13, 1920, FRUS, 1920, Vol. II, 165.
59 The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Navy (Daniels), September 2, 1920, FRUS, 1920, Vol. II, 166.
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However, Colby warned Daniels that this was not an acceptable form of action as “I fear
the report of this case will be made considerable use of in propaganda directed against the
Military Occupation of Santo Domingo in other Latin American countries.”60 As a result,
Daniels ordered Military Governor Snowden to immediately suspend all proceedings
against Lugo and Fiallo.61 Content with this action, Colby telegrammed Daniels his
opinion on the situation: “I feel that the action which was taken most fully meets the
situation, and I am sure that its effect will prove most helpful to our interests throughout
Latin America.”62 Fiallo’s sentence was suspended, commuted, and then finally
dismissed on 15 October 1920.63
Though the US government intervened in the situation, the concern on the part of
the State Department was never really over Fiallo’s fate but instead over America’s
standing throughout Latin America. The Latin American press’s denunciations of
Fiallo’s imprisonment prompted a reaction by US officials, a clear indication that the
press could elicit change when America’s reputation was on the line. The Cuban
newspaper El Mundo credited Washington’s change in attitude to the efforts of the
associated press of Latin America, in particular the hard work and dedication of the
60 The Secretary of State to the Minister in the Dominican Republic (Russell),
FRUS. 1920, Volume II. 166.
61 The Secretary of the Navy (Daniels) to the Secretary of State, September 3, 1920, FRUS, 1920, Vol. II, 166.
62 The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Navy (Daniels), September 10, 1920, FRUS, 1920, Vol. II, 167.
63 Editor’s Note, “The Evacuation of Santo Domingo,” Current History, 294.
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Havana Press Club.64 After his release, Fiallo cabled the Havana Press Club on 21
October stating, “Provisional release, I will never forget how much I owe [it to] the
associated press.”65 Not only had this united effort ultimately closed the cases against
journalists, but also, according to Fiallo, this was a decisive moment in the struggle for
Dominican freedom as now “the dike [had] broken, [and] the national conscience spread
in a series of manifestations which carried the echoes of our decided opposition and
irreconcilable claims throughout the world.”66
In a biting article published in February 1921, the Philadelphia Inquirer not only
went the opposite direction of the Latin America press but also took a firm stance on the
issue unlike the previous articles on the topic in the Washington Post or the New York
Times. Claiming that Fiallo’s recent photo in which the poet appeared in a prisoner’s
garb was a complete publicity stunt aimed at tugging at the heartstrings of viewers who
were supposed to reflect on “Fiallo suffering the terrors of prison life,” the Inquirer
implied Fiallo was a would-be martyr for an unworthy cause. In fact, the article argued,
Fiallo “never wore a convict’s suit in his life, unless it was under the old regime of
Dominican dictatorships,” and instead, American forces had allowed Fiallo access to a
car for excursions and provided him with Columbus’s own suite in Fort Ozama. In
stating that “Fiallo violated a law of the American Military Government in Santo
Domingo against inciting [the public] to insurrection,” the Inquirer implied that not only
was the poet guilty but also that he had been found culpable by a legitimate authority that
64 “Suspenden la asentencia de Fiallo,” El Mundo, 15 September 1920, 3.
65 “La libertad de Fabio Fiallo,” Diario de la Marina, 22 October 1920, 1.
66 Fiallo, The Crime of Wilson, 42.
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could have sentenced him to death. Instead, US officials chose to give him just “a few
months in jail,” later reducing and then eliminating the charge altogether. The article
alluded that this stood in stark contrast to the sadistic fate Fiallo might have suffered in
the hands of a native Dominican government: “In the days of Santo Domingo’s Concho
Primo the penalty might also have carried with it the painless details of quartering and
boiling in oil.”67 Throughout this piece, the Inquirer unashamedly created a distinct
dichotomy between the rational rule of the United States and the uncivilized and barbaric
customs of native Dominican administration. Furthermore, the Inquirer vehemently
maintained that the public exposure Fiallo garnered from his arrest only served to enrich
him as “his poetry jumped in popularity, and he had to get out a fresh edition which sold
as high as $100 a copy.”68 While most American newspapers did not go to the same
lengths to discredit Fiallo as the Inquirer had, the commonality between these media
sources lay within the fact that the greatest concern was about the reputation of the
United States. In a way, the Inquirer piece hinted at this simply through the claim that
Fiallo had orchestrated the whole stunt. According to the Inquirer, this was not a case of
injustice, but rather that of a swindler looking to sully the good name of the United States
in order to sell more of his own poetry.
67 Concho Primo refers to an Uncle Sam-type character created in 1919. For more
on the origins of Concho Primo see Sydney Hutchinson, Tigers of a Different Stripe: Performing Gender in Dominican Music (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1916), 30-33.
68 “Santo Domingo Job Called Half-Baked,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 10 February 1921, 9.
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Conclusion
As articles emerged in the American media denouncing the military occupation of the
Dominican Republic whether they were taken at face value or challenged like the case of
Fiallo in the Philadelphia Inquirer, most media sources in the United States were
reluctant to condemn American actions in the Dominican Republic. However, as more
stories appeared in the press claiming that the US occupation was an example of abuse
and poor administration that all came at the expense of a loss of personal freedoms for
Dominicans, the question of what exactly were American objectives in the Caribbean and
whether or not they were worth it became more publicized in the media. Though these
claims were ones that Dominicans had made since the start of the occupation, it was not
until these articles called into question the benevolent intent of the American intervention
by noting the loss of native government and individual liberties that the subject of the
occupation garnered any critical attention in the American media. These early
discussions on American foreign policy and the role of the United States abroad
continued to intensify during the US presidential campaign of 1920, eventually
contributing to a change in the occupation.
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CHAPTER 7
INTERPRETING AMERICAN IMPERIALISM
As shown in the previous chapter, early concerns over America’s imperial actions
often times centered on a discussion of its reputation abroad. In 1918, prolific author and
professor of political science H. H. Powers wrote America Among the Nations. The book
explored the growth of US territory from the time of continental expansion and then
turned to an overview of American actions in places such as the Pacific and Caribbean.
While Powers did not provide an indictment of American imperialism, he instead urged
his readers to understand that the lack of consistent policy had led outsiders to see the
United States as aggressive and hypocritical particularly because of the dictate that every
country had the right to self-government. The irony between statement and action was
not lost on Powers:
But important as it is to see ourselves as we are, it is even more important to see ourselves as others see us. It is a peculiarity of this unintentional imperialism that we are largely unconscious of our own attitude. As we are never aggressive until circumstances suddenly coerce us, we live in constant mood of fancied deference which overshadows all else in our experience. Outsiders are quite uninfluenced by our consciousness of innocence of which they have no experience. They see only our acts which have been consistently aggressive, and from which they not unnaturally infer a consistent purpose of aggression. Their attitude seems to us one of unworthy suspicion, and ours to them one designing hypocrisy. The relation is natural and is not to be conjured away. It must be with consciousness of our character and our reputation that we confront the proposed policy.1
Though written in 1918, Powers’ concerns were similar to those appearing in the
American by the 1920s about the US occupation of the Dominican Republic.
1 H. H. Powers, America Among the Nations (New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1918), 162-163.
195
This chapter continues to examine how the American media changed in its
coverage of the occupation of the Dominican Republic. Since the end of World War I a
more critical discussion of US policies and objectives had appeared in the press. This
debate about America’s role in the Dominican Republic and Latin America as a whole
intensified during the presidential election of 1920 and continued to garner attention in
the following years.
The first part of this chapter analyzes media responses to presidential candidate
Warren G. Harding’s accusations of mistreatment and maladministration in the Caribbean
to explain how the topic of the occupation was thrust to the forefront of the press. Next,
the chapter turns to an examination of two tours of South America. The first, undertaken
by the Dominican Nationalist Commission, aimed to publicize their campaign for
independence. The second, completed by the US secretary of state, represented an effort
to rekindle positive foreign relations with countries to the south of the United States and
control the damage done by the commission’s efforts to expose the deficiencies of the US
occupation. The chapter closes with an analysis of two articles that appeared in The
Atlantic Monthly in 1924. One piece, written by Protestant missionary and secretary of
the Committee on Cooperation in Latin America Samuel Guy Inman, argued that
America’s actions abroad constituted a clear case of imperialism, while the other,
authored by Sumner Welles, chief of the Latin American division of the US State
Department, argued the opposite. Throughout this back and forth criticism that at times
defended the occupation and at others denounced it, the American media’s representation
of both the Dominican Republic and the United States continually fluctuated to meet
American needs.
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The 1920 Presidential Election
Like nothing before, the remarks of Republican presidential hopeful Warren G.
Harding pushed the topic of the American occupation of the Dominican Republic to the
forefront of the press, sometimes even on the front pages of newspapers. Though
certainly not the focus of his campaign, Harding’s criticisms of American foreign policy
under Wilson ignited the subject of intervention in the media. Since more critical pieces
appeared condemning the occupation in the context of the presidential race, the rapid
turnaround in the American press, owed in part, to partisan politics. “Nothing would
have been heard about Haiti and Santo Domingo at this time if there had not been a
presidential campaign in the United States,” wrote the Washington Post’s Albert W.
Fox.2 Scholars of the American occupation of the Dominican Republic agree that
Harding’s speech brought the Caribbean interventions to the attention of the press,
leading to criticisms of US foreign policy.3
On 28 August 1920 Harding gave a speech to constituents in Marion, Ohio,
disparaging the current administration for its dealings with other countries stating that
“no power on earth” could compel him to act in a similar manner. According to Harding,
Wilson and the Democrats had allowed an assistant secretary of the United States Navy
2 Albert W. Fox, “Island Issue Looms Large,” Washington Post, 6 October 1920,
1.
3 John W. Blassingame noted that some publications changed their appraisal of the occupation, condemning it only after 1920. See John W. Blassingame, “The Press and American Intervention in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, 1904-1920,” Caribbean Studies 6, no. 2 (July 1969): 27-43. For more on the press and resistance to the occupation see John R. Patton, “Intellectual and Political Resistance to the U.S. Occupation of the Dominican Republic – 1916-1924” (PhD diss, University of Maine, 2013), esp. 137-140.
197
to “draft a constitution for helpless neighbors in the West Indies and jam it down their
throats at the point of bayonets borne by the United States Marines.”4 Harding continued,
maintaining that these actions had not been made public, but instead were “cover[ed]
with a veil of secrecy.” The misuse of the Oval Office had led to “repeated acts of
unwarranted interferences in domestic affairs of the little republics of the western
hemisphere.”5 No doubt the “helpless neighbors in the West Indies” referred to Haiti and
the Dominican Republic and the constitution “jam[med] down their throats”
acknowledged statements made earlier by Franklin Roosevelt, former assistant secretary
of the Navy and current Democratic vice presidential candidate, who claimed to have
authored Haiti’s constitution. Here, Harding’s comments were not against the occupation
exactly but rather focused on the loss of individual freedom and native government.
Harding’s remarks derived from a 1920 speech to constituents in Butte, Montana, in
which Roosevelt claimed: “You know, I have had something to do with running a couple
of little republics. The facts are that I wrote Haiti’s Constitution myself and, if I do say
it, I think it’s a pretty good Constitution.”6 Although Roosevelt attempted to diffuse the
situation by claiming that he was misquoted, citizens of Butte responded that they had
4 Warren G. Harding, “A Speech by Senator Warren G. Harding to Delegation of
Indiana Citizens, Marion Ohio, August 28, 1920” (speech, Marion, OH, August 28, 1920), Internet Archive, http://www.archive.org/stream/speechesofwarren00harding/speechesofwarren00hard_djvu.txt.
5 Harding, “A Speech by Senator Warren G. Harding to Delegation of Indiana Citizens.”
6 Franklin Roosevelt, “Campaign Speech” (speech, Butte, Montana, August 18, 1920), FRANKLIN, http:// http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/_resources/images/msf/msf00145.
198
heard the politician clearly when his “cynical remark” basically “dismissed the butchery
of some three thousand Haitians by US troops of the United States and the enslavement
of Haiti’s population by the sugar-trust.”7 The Butte Daily Bulletin explained the self-
aggrandizing agenda of Roosevelt and the Wilson administration, arguing that they had
“done in Haiti and Santo Domingo exactly what Great Britain is doing in Ireland, Egypt
and India; what France is doing in Arabia, and what the imperialists of all lands since the
great war for ‘democracy’” had been doing.8 Reporting on Harding’s speech, the New
York paper the Evening World quoted liberally from Harding relaying for readers that
“1000s of native Haitians have been killed by American marines.”9 African American
newspapers from Seattle to Chicago also conveyed these same accusations to their
readers, focusing on Harding’s claim that thousands of Haitians had lost their lives.10 For
example, the Cleveland Gazette demonstrated the illegality of American forces in Haiti
and the Dominican Republic maintaining that a state of war existed “with the little
helpless republics of our own hemisphere. The wars upon our neighbors to the south
were made and are still being waged though never declared, through the usurpation by,
9 “US Making War on Helpless Haiti, Harding Charge,” Evening World, 17
September 1920, 19.
10 “The War in Hayti,” Cayton’s Weekly, 9 October 1920, 2. “The War in Hayti,” Dallas Express, 9 October 1920, 4. “’The Rape of Haiti!’ The Most Shocking Assertion Ever Made by a Responsible Government Official,” Cleveland Gazette, 25 September 1920, 1.
11 “’The Rape of Haiti!’” 1.
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Others seized upon Harding’s comments to further disparage America’s foreign
policy. Journalist W. E. Pulliam wrote a letter to the editor of the New York Tribune
questioning Wilson’s bullying tactics under the headline “Picking on Small Nations.”
Pulliam noted the discrepancies between Wilson’s words and actions, quoting a 1913
address in which Wilson stated that “one of the chief objects of my administration will be
to cultivate friendship and deserve the confidence of our sister republics of Central and
South America.” To demonstrate Wilson’s hypocrisy, Pulliam followed this with quotes
from John Barrett, former head of the Pan-American Union. Barrett claimed that almost
all newspapers in Latin America criticized the policies of the United States in Haiti and
the Dominican Republic and that this had provided “ammunition for anti-United States
agitators and critics.” Much like earlier admonishments, Pulliam likened the United
States to Germany. Although the Navy Department continually discussed the
improvements made in the two countries, Pulliam asked: “But wasn’t that the boast of the
Germans in Belgium?” He also implored his readers to contemplate whether America’s
actions “square with the promise of ‘self-determination’ for small nations” maintaining
that the “occupation of Santo Domingo is without semblance of moral right, international
law or treaty obligation.” To drive home his point, Pulliam asked, “Why pick upon
small, defenseless nations, in which natives who oppose the invaders are characterized as
bandits, where free speech is abridged and writers who criticize conditions are
imprisoned and threatened with execution?”12 Appearing in the Washington Post,
Pulliam’s editorial revealed that the topic had finally garnered the attention of major
12 W. E. Pulliam, “Picking on Small Nations,” New York Tribune, 24 October
1920, 1.
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newspapers that went beyond focusing on the material benefits of imperialism to examine
the methods with which those improvements were achieved.
Many articles that appeared in the Post supported Harding’s interpretation. Although
not reaching nearly the amount of readers as papers like the New York Times, the Post
was a valuable source of Republican sentiment given that its owner at this time was a
friend of Harding and a supporter of the Republican Party.13 In part, the turn in American
opinion against the Dominican occupation, particularly in newspapers like the republican
Post represented an example of political partisanship rather than a genuine interest in the
fate of the Dominican Republic. The Post stated that Roosevelt neither had the right to
pen Haiti’s constitution nor the authority to depose a free government in favor of “an
American dictator backed by naval guns.”14 In an article published in October 1920, the
Post condemned American policy under the Democrats, arguing that “the free and
independent nation known as the Dominican Republic has ceased to exist” as the
“government of that republic has been extinguished by the military forces of the United
States.” The article continued its bold critique:
There is no president of Santo Domingo and no congress. The public ministers have been dismissed and the people have been prohibited from holding elections. There is a rigid censorship and a military rule, exercised by an American naval officer, who makes the law hourly or daily, according to orders which he receives from the Secretary of the Navy.15
13 Aurora Wallace, Newspapers and the Making of Modern America: A History
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2005), 165. Wallace estimated the pre-WWI circulation of the New York Times at 250,000 and after at approximately 360,000. By the late 1910s the Washington Post’s circulation was 75,000 making it the second largest paper in the DC area.
14 “Misuse of the Monroe Doctrine,” Washington Post, 26 December 1920.
15 “The United States and Santo Domingo,” Washington Post, 5 October 1920, 6.
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Though the Post recalled the familiar narrative of the inability to pay off foreign debt as
the explanation for US involvement, by 1920 the details of the story had changed. Rather
than citing a violation of the 1907 treaty, the Post noted: “There is no provision in the
treaty which justifies the abolition of native government.” Furthermore, since American
forces removed the Dominican government, the article maintained that “the United
States, and not Santo Domingo, is the chief violator of that treaty,” creating a regime that
“is fully as severe as the military government of Ireland, and there is not now visible in
the Dominican Republic any government of, by or for the people.”16
The next day, the Post ran Albert Fox’s article that declared that the United States had
robbed Dominicans of their rightful government. Under the current administration, Fox
maintained, foreign policy in the Dominican Republic contradicted basic American
doctrine. He asserted that the US government along with the Navy had “wiped out the
government completely, dismissed all ministers, forbade the holding of elections,
proclaimed a sort of military dictatorship over people and has virtually kept them in a
state of subjugation in rigid military rule enforced in the name of liberty.” Fox
strengthened his argument by contending that Harding was not impressed by the progress
that had been made in the Dominican Republic but instead believed that “the end does
not justify the means if the means have been of such a tyrannical nature as to make a
mockery of the Monroe Doctrine, to arouse hatred and suspicion of America on the part
of neighborly nations and to praise liberty with fine words [and] sword at the same
16 “The United States and Santo Domingo,” 6.
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time.”17 Although Fox was clearly troubled by US actions, his concern was also over
America’s reputation, one tarnished by Harding’s commentary and certainly not justified
just for the sake of infrastructural improvement.
Though many utilized Harding’s speech to critique the current administration and its
foreign policy, other newspapers expressed disgust at the senator’s words seeing them as
an attack on the United States. The Dearborn Independent, the paper of the Ford Motor
Company, stated that the word “marine” was being “bandied about unpleasantly in the
heat of campaign” and that it was “disgraceful that politics should permit the breeding of
maliciousness such as that which has characterized some of the accusations against the
United States Marines.”18 The paper did agree that an investigation into the claims was
wise, but quoted Secretary Daniels, who argued, “a wanton attack upon their (the
Marines’) record is a wanton attack upon American civilization.”19 The District of
Columbia Evening Star reported on Roosevelt’s claim that Harding had misquoted him
and maintained Roosevelt’s assertion that Harding, as a member of Congress, was fully
aware of US actions in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Thus, according to Roosevelt,
Harding’s accusations were nothing more than “dribble” and a “deliberate attempt to
deceive” the American public. The Evening Star also related that Roosevelt believed
Harding’s “win at any cost” strategy of besmirching the marines and American actions
would “neither disturb our sister republics nor deceive intelligent Americans.”20 The
17 “Island Issue Looms Large,” 1.
18 “The Facts About It,” Dearborn Independent, 23 October 1920, 4.
New York Times relayed the State Department’s opinion on Harding’s speech
characterizing it as “cheap” and in “wanton disregard of facts.” The paper included the
response of Daniels, who was surprised that Harding would “give currency to so unjust a
reflection upon brave and patriotic members of the Marine Corps on duty in Haiti.” He
continued, “They have rendered a real service to the people of that country and with very
few exceptions have shown that they are worthy comrades of those Marines who won
imperishable glory in France.”21 The Colorado Springs Gazette countered Harding with
the response of Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby, who said that the relations of the
United States should not be “misrepresented even under the temptations that a political
campaign presents to irresponsible utterances and conscious inveracity.”22
Other papers characterized Harding’s comments as “gross exaggerations” given that
the marines were “preserving order” and “protecting [the] lives and property of foreign
citizens.”23 Furthermore, Harding had no right to accuse the marines of indiscriminately
killing people for sport because this was against their very nature. Originally published
in the Iowa newspaper the Sioux City Journal, the Chicago Daily Tribune reprinted an
editorial that argued that Haiti and Santo Domingo were among the few places where the
present administration was “acting with intelligence and purpose” in its use of
“benevolent control.” In a statement that harkened back to the racialization of the
21 “Daniels Defends Marines in Haiti,” New York Times, 19 September 1920, 18.
22 “United States Soon to Leave Haiti; Work Nearing Completion,” Colorado
Springs Gazette, 21 September 1920, 1.
23 “Former Consul Lauds Marines,” Los Angeles Times, 30 October 1920, 14. This article also appeared in the New York paper the Sun, see “Praises Marines’ Work in Dominican Republic,” Sun, 30 October 1920, 3.
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Dominican Republic prominent at the turn of the century, the piece indicated the
necessity of such actions since both countries were “nations of Negroes.”24
Newspapers that supported the occupation praised the work of the military
government to counter Harding’s allegations. The New York Times, for example, ran
articles lauding the public health, sanitation, and educational advances of occupation
forces.25 In a story discussing the Washington visit of three new ministers from Latin
America, the Times included extensive coverage of statements made by Emilio Joubert,
former chargé d’affaires in the Dominican Republic. Responding to the topic of the
current difficulties in the country, Joubert stated:
The altruistic and humanitarian spirit that has characterized your Excellency’s Administration, the noble record of the people of the United States as a chivalrous champion of justice and right, are constant proof that in the relations of our Government with the people of the Dominican Republic there could be no other sentiments than those of sympathy for the young Republic in her misfortunes, nor any other purposes than these inspired by lofty and generous intentions without a doubt, as those inspiring the best and most disinterested of our citizens.26
The Fort-Worth Star Telegram echoed similar sentiments extoling the occupation
government’s building of roads, ports, and bridges.27 Both the Tennessee Crossville
24 “Harding’s Mistake,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 5 October 1920, 8. The same
article appeared in the Chicago Defender, see “This is Rich,” Chicago Defender, 9 October 1920, 12.
25 “Tells Our Reforms in Santo Domingo,” New York Times, 4 October 1920, 9. “Helping Santo Domingo,” New York Times, 5 October 1920, 7. Sara MacDougall, “Santo Domingo’s Second Dawn,” New York Times, 10 October 1920, 12. “Our Aid to Santo Domingo,” New York Times, 10 October 1920, 23.
26 “President Receives Three New Ministers,” New York Times, 30 November 1920, 21.
27 “Santo Domingo is Rehabilitated by U.S. Military Rule,” Fort Worth Star-Telegram, 10 October 1920, 7.
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Chronicle and Nebraska’s North Platte Semi-Weekly Tribune also highlighted the
improvements being made in the Dominican Republic by American forces in the article
“Uncle Sam Puts Santo Domingo in Order.”28
Accompanying the “Uncle Sam” article was a small cartoon illustrating Uncle
him and the Dominican Republic, which relied on older stereotypical tropes. In the
cartoon, Uncle Sam sat at a desk with a paper in his hand, perhaps a treaty or set of laws.
Older and distinguished, Uncle Sam watched “S.D.,” a small, child-like figure with ink
black skin, bare feet, and engorged lips. Portrayed in the classic pickanniny caricature,
SD puffed on a cigar with his hands on his hips, seemingly without a care in the world.
In the cartoon, SD wore a military uniform, a nod to the occupation government’s
training of a native civil guard, yet another highly praised objective of US forces. Rare
for this period, the cartoon aptly captured the perspective of the article, which implied
that that the need for intervention was partly to blame on Dominicans blackness. This
racial depiction implied the underdevelopment of the country and thus the need for
American intervention. Adhering to a paternalistic theme, the article stated that Uncle
Sam had done a good job of “house cleaning” in the Dominican Republic, putting “the
republic on its feet,” with “restored order, rehabilitated finances, established public
sanitation and compulsory education.”29 This cartoon functioned much like its
predecessors popular between 1904-1907 because it provided an easily identifiable black
28 “Uncle Sam Puts Santo Domingo in Order,” Crossville Chronicle, 17
November 1920, 6. “Uncle Sam Puts Santo Domingo in Order,” North Platte Semi-Weekly Tribune, 5 November 1920, 11.
29 “Uncle Sam Puts Santo Domingo in Order,” Crossville Chronicle, 17 November 1920, 6. “Uncle Sam Puts Santo Domingo in Order,” North Platte Semi-Weekly Tribune, 5 November 1920, 11.
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figure readers could readily contextualize in terms of southern African Americans or the
darkened depictions of others under American rule who lacked development.
Given the stories being run in American newspapers, it was clear that, by the fall
of 1920, the topic of occupation of the Dominican Republic had finally become
controversial in the media with the reputation of the United States as a benevolent force
on the line. Unlike previous articles that garnered little attention on allegations of
impropriety in the Dominican Republic, the presidential election called attention to major
discrepancies in US policy. Pieces written on the Dominican Republic prior to the end of
World War I singularly praised American efforts. Conversely, press coverage
dramatically changed over the course of 1920 as criticism of the occupation became more
publicized. And yet, as the cartoon in the two papers demonstrated, there was still a
desire to defend the United States by relying on earlier narratives that justified
intervention based on racist imagery and the narrative of underdevelopment.
The Reputation of the United States
Two tours of Latin America in late 1920 sparked further critical discussions in the
US media as one sought to expose injustices committed against the Dominican people
and the other attempted to justify American actions. Utilizing the same arguments that
appeared in the media during the US presidential campaign, one side focused on the
benefits of the American occupation maintaining that political stability and economic
prosperity were worthy goals enacted by a benevolent force, while the other contended
that these so-called advancements were not worth the cost of eliminating personal
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freedoms and a sovereign, native government. Setting sail for South America on 29
December 1920, Federico Henríquez y Carvajal, Max Henríquez Ureña, and Tulio
Cestero represented the Junta Nacionalista Dominicana or the Dominican Nationalist
Commission founded the previous year. The Commission worked to restore Dominican
sovereignty by meeting with officials in Washington and publicizing their cause in the
US and Latin American press.30 The trio toured the southern continent until their return
in late May 1921, emphasizing themes of Hispanic American solidarity and fraternal
bonds forged through a common race, culture, language, and history while at the same
time protesting against the US occupation of their country.31 The Commission’s
activities overlapped with US Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby’s own journey to
South America, which also commenced in December 1920. The goodwill tour that Colby
undertook had been in the making for quite some time. Official visits by the presidents
of Uruguay and Brazil to Washington had occurred during the war, but it was not until
1920 that an American trip was possible.32
The Commission’s itinerary placed them in Rio de Janeiro, Montevideo, and
Buenos Aires right before Colby. This strategic schedule aimed to garner support for the
Dominican cause among Latin Americans prior to Colby’s appearance. The New York
Times reported that the arrival of the Commission in Montevideo just prior to Colby was
30 Fiallo, The Crime of Wilson, 46-47. Alan McPherson, The Invaded: How Latin
Americans and Their Political Allies Fought and Ended US Occupations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 162, 164.
31 McPherson, The Invaded, 164.
32 Daniel M. Smith, “Bainbridge Colby and the Good Neighbor Policy, 1920-1921,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 50, no. 1 (June 1963), 71.
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a calculated move to “initiate a campaign against [the] American occupation of Santo
Domingo.”33 The Chicago Tribune concurred, claiming that the Commission planned to
call attention to “atrocities in Haiti and Santo Domingo” perpetrated by the occupations
in an attempt to “persuade the South American republics to champion the islanders
against the United States.”34
Rather than portraying the work of the Commission as a legitimate effort to
publicize the cause for Dominican independence, most of the American media described
it as the work of troublemakers aimed at tarnishing the goodwill Colby hoped to build.
The New York Times characterized the work of the Commission as “propaganda,”
maintaining that Henríquez y Carvajal stirred up Latin American hostility toward the
United States.35 While Henríquez y Carvajal insisted that the Dominican occupation was
“brought about without the consent of the American people and against their democratic
sentiments,” the New York Tribune referred to these words as an “attack.”36 According to
the Tribune, the damage that the Commission attempted to exact was lethal because it
generated Latin American “hostility toward the United States.” Furthermore, these
claims of “oppression” at the hands of Americans were meant to serve as a warning to
“South Americans against the ‘imperialism’ of the United States.”37 Even months after
33 “Brazilian Lauds Monroe Doctrine,” New York Times, 24 December 1920, 10.
34 “Working Against Colby,” Chicago Tribune, 28 December 1920, 27.
35 “Working Against Colby,” New York Times, 28 December 1920, 27.
36 “Dominicans Attack US in South America,” New York Herald, 26 December
1920, 10.
37 “Working Against Colby,” Chicago Tribune, 27.
209
Colby’s return to the United States, the press continued to report on the damage the
Commission had done. J. W. White wrote in late January 1921 that the Commission
claimed the United States had “robbed a tiny island of its sovereignty and defenseless
people of their liberty.” White referred to the words of Ureña and Henríquez y Carvajal
who called the Dominican Republic the “cradle of America . . . crushed under the feet of
an invading military horde” as nothing more than “a flowery historical recital.”38
Additionally, White referred to allegations of torture and abuse as “absurd.” The Los
Angeles Times reported that the Commission had sowed “distrust for the United States”
during Colby’s visit and continued its work after his departure by “spreading anti-Yankee
propaganda throughout Peru and Chile.” In particular, the Los Angeles Times charged
Cestero with giving interviews accusing the United States of “all sort of cruelties,” a
common allegation tossed about during the entirety of the Commission’s time in South
America, that, in their opinion, was untrue.39
Colby’s voyage represented an important moment for US diplomatic relations in
Latin America, especially following the Commission’s tour. Looking to rekindle its ties
to South American states, Colby’s visit also aimed to assure Latin Americans that the
United States was not only being benevolent but also respected their rights. In his official
statement about the tour, President Wilson maintained that visits such as these were
important because they were “instruments of cementing the sincere attachment and
deepening the genuine intimacy between the self-governing democracies of the western
38 J.W. White, “United States is Denounced as Military Power,” Omaha Daily
Bee, 30 January 1921, 2.
39 “Sowing Seed of Distrust for America,” Los Angeles Times, 15 April 1921, 11.
210
hemisphere.”40 In telegrams from Colby to the ambassadors in Brazil and Uruguay, the
official visit was hoped to bring the two countries “closer” and expand on the
“exceptional relations of friendship” between them.41 Before even setting sail, the New
York Times described the importance of Colby’s trip emphasizing themes of friendship
and respect.42
Media coverage of Colby’s trip highlighted a softer imperialist rhetoric that
sought to emphasize a benevolent paternalism that, at its core, respected Latin American
states. Furthermore, including the remarks of Latin American statesmen that praised the
United States demonstrated for readers that despite the claims of the Commission, other
Latin Americans understood that America only had the best intentions in mind. For
example, the New York Times reported the comments of Brazilian Senator Alfredo Ellis
on the Monroe Doctrine. Senator Ellis likened the United States to an older brother who
guarded the safety and liberty of the rest of the family. He also argued that American
actions were not driven by an imperialist agenda: “No one can suppose that your
powerful nation, the most fronded tree of the republican forest, would need for its
enormous growth and development the sap of sister trees growing confidently under its
beneficial and friendly shade.” Benito de Miranda made similar statements in the
Chamber of Deputies maintaining that the two culminating moments of US policy were
40 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Morgan), November 10,
1920, FRUS 1920, Vol. I, 231.
41 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Morgan), October 21, 1920, FRUS, 1920, Vol. I, 228. The Secretary of State to the Minister of Uruguay (Jeffrey), October 23, FRUS, 1920, Volume I, 229.
42 “Secretary Colby’s Mission,” New York Times, 6 December 1920, 14.
211
the Monroe Doctrine and Wilson’s Fourteen Points.43 Reports on Colby’s stay in
Uruguay portrayed much of the same. The Boston Daily Globe reprinted highlights from
a speech given by Uruguayan President Baltasar Brum, who believed that the United
States had entered World War I neither for personal or direct offenses nor with a desire to
gain more territory but rather based on the high morals of establishing international
justice and pursuing Wilson’s goals of world peace and freedom.44 Dr. Javier Mendivil,
former minister of the interior and chairman of the foreign relations committee of the
Uruguayan Senate, expressed even more accolades. Dr. Mendivil told Colby that
Uruguay had a “thorough comprehension of the Monroe doctrine and understood that it
did not imply nor involve any right on the part of the United States to compromise or
dominate the independent sovereignty of any American state.”45
The New York Times included extensive coverage on Colby’s time in Brazil to
further drive home the point that Latin Americans understood the altruism behind
American foreign policy. Claiming that Brazilians believed Colby’s tour represented
“milestones in the highway leading to a real, vital Pan-Americanism,” the Times ensured
that their readers knew Brazilians understood the intentions behind American actions
abroad. Relating the story of Colby and his party pausing at the Monroe Palace, the
headquarters of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, the Times indicated that this stop
43 “Brazilian Lauds Monroe Doctrine,” New York Times, 24 December 1920, 10.
44 “Assures Colby Friendship to US,” Boston Daily Globe, 30 December 1920,
13. This same speech was also reported in the Chilean newspaper El Mercurio see “Los Festejos en Honor de Mr. Colby,” El Mercurio, 30 December 1920, 20.
45 “Yankee Might Upholds Right, Uruguayan Says,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 30 December 1920, 2.
212
gave Colby the opportunity to pay tribute to Brazil “because it had made such a
prominent public building a lasting monument to the Monroe Doctrine.” Colby
proclaimed that the palace was a “tribute of civilization to democracy.” So moved by the
Monroe Palace, Colby continued:
Coming from the United States, which first promulgated the doctrine of the great American President, Monroe, every citizen of the United States must be thrilled to look at this palace and see in it a vindication of the policy which has made for the advancement and protection of the republics linked together by it. It is the hope of the people of my country that the bond thus created by this doctrine shall never fail to command respect, secure the right to independence and liberty and never prove irksome or be unjustly used to impair its unity or universal value.46
For Colby and those Brazilian officials present at this moment, the thrust of this speech
was the beneficial spirit of the Monroe Doctrine, which not only protected, but also
connected, all of the Western Hemisphere together in an everlasting bond solidified by
respect and justice.
The inclusion of two journalists in Colby’s entourage allowed for a calculated
portrayal of events for the American public, particularly in the New York Times, which
underscored Washington’s goals by highlighting the deep and meaningful relationship
between the United States and Latin America. The official membership of the group
included several government officials as well as two American journalists from leading
Democratic papers, William H. Crawford from the New York Times and Louis Seibold
from the New York World.47 As an official member of Colby’s entourage, Crawford
published several articles on the topic. He emphasized the American need to maintain
46 “Liken Colby Visit to That by Root,” New York Times, 25 December 1920, 3.
47 The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Morgan), December
3, 1920, FRUS 1920, Vol. I, 233.
213
favorable relations with South America because it was a “natural outlet for our surplus
material and manufactures” as well as “our best, most natural and most favorable
market,” going so far as to argue that this was the ultimate objective of Colby’s tour.
Sent to South America to counteract the “insidious influences that are working to
discredit the United States in Latin America,” Crawford acknowledged that many were
critical of American policy in places such as the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Costa
Rica, yet they failed to recall the success of intervention in Cuba. Admittedly, much
damage had been done to America’s reputation in South America, where many believed
that “the United States is set on aggrandizement and filled with the European idea of the
control of minor peoples under the thin guise of spheres of influence.” However,
Crawford attributed attitudes such as these mostly to Argentinians whom he referred to as
a “proud race” that resented the protectorates established by the Monroe Doctrine and
thus harbored “a genuine dislike for America and things American.” Crawford alleged
that these sentiments likewise persisted in the United States, particularly in Republican
newspapers like the Post that suggested, “America’s aims were not based upon a high
altruistic plane.”
Throughout his articles, Crawford assured his readers that Colby’s tour had
“allayed Latin suspicions” by impressing on South Americans that the Monroe Doctrine
was not about force but was rather “a protecting arm for all of America” and that cases of
intervention only occurred “for the preservation of order and life.”48 In the end,
Crawford believed Colby’s trip was a success because it reminded Latin Americans that
48 William H. Crawford, “Colby Tour Allayed Latin Suspicions,” New York
Times, 28 January 1921, 5.
214
“there is no tincture of military intervention in the case of either Haiti or Santo Domingo,
that the landing of American forces for the preservation of order and life has the sanction
of express provisions contained in treaties freely and openly arrived at with both
republics.” Furthermore, Crawford trusted that Latin Americans “understand the
appalling conditions in the island of Santo Domingo which compelled the United States
to reluctantly and rather tardily take up the work of restoring order.”49 Relying on the
age-old rhetoric of underdevelopment provided Crawford with an argument for American
intervention that readers were familiar with.
Surely the speeches emerging from the tour and the pieces published in papers
such as the Times outraged members of the Dominican Commission. The employment of
phrases that stressed America’s altruism and beneficence while at the same time denying
any desire for territorial gain was an insult to many people living under American
occupation. Colby’s own words that assured listeners of the United States’s devotion to
independence, liberty, and the sovereignty of other nations directly contradicted what was
occurring in the Dominican Republic. Of particular importance was the interpretation of
the Monroe Doctrine on both sides. While Colby contended that the Monroe Doctrine
ensured not only peace in the Americas but also independence and liberty, Dominicans
and their supporters claimed just the opposite.
Beyond reporting on Latin Americans who believed in America’s humanitarian
intent, the American media continued to publish pieces that counteracted any negative
imagery about the occupation dredging up the narrative of underdevelopment to remind
readers of the need for American intervention. The New York Times claimed that
49 William H. Crawford, “Colby Has Dual Mission in South American Trip,”
Omaha Daily Bee, 30 January 1921, 1.
215
American rule had transformed the Dominican Republic, making it “solvent” and
providing an education for the “people in the principles of self-government.” Rather than
a case of imperialism, as the Commission argued, the occupation represented an example
of America’s humanitarianism. Lauding the work of US forces, the Times maintained
that, on his tour, Colby could point to the island as clear “proof that Wilson kept the
faith.” Recalling the words of former Secretary of State Elihu Root, Colby too could
reiterate the fact that “the United States does not covet a foot of ground in Spanish-
American countries, and is concerned only about their welfare and to maintain amicable
relations with them.”50 The Times touted a familiar trope when discussing the benefits of
the intervention in June 1921: “In the last four years its people have had lessons in
government that should not be lost upon them. They are an intelligent people, but their
politicians have preyed upon them and must now realize that the old rule of the country
by cabals will no longer be tolerated.” Recalling over a century of paternalist discourse,
the Times continued: “Santo Domingo is a country of underdeveloped resources. Under
good government it should flourish, provided the United States stands ready to lend a
helping hand in the event of reversion to government by insurrection.”51
While the Commission was not entirely a success, the publication of their efforts,
combined with the attention the Dominican cause had been gaining throughout the course
of 1920, led to a critical discussion of American actions in the Dominican Republic,
eventually resulting in a change of policy. As the Washington Post noted, Latin America
was “deeply wounded, and the United States government will have to do much in the
50 “Dominican Self-Government,” New York Times, 27 December 1920, 11.
51 “Santo Domingo’s Welfare,” New York Times, 7 June 1921, 13.
216
right direction before they will repose confidence in it again.”52 Numerous papers
reported on the results of Colby’s tour, noting that South America resented the Monroe
Doctrine and defined it as “a mantle of protection or expression of power by North
Americans.”53 Though many still relied on the old narratives of humanitarianism and
benevolence, with critical stories being published in the press, the Dominican case could
no longer be ignored. Just a month prior to his tour, Colby messaged Daniels questioning
if now was the time for withdrawal:
The increasing agitation among the Dominicans during the last two years for the right of self-government, and the anxiety expressed by the governments of other American republics as to our intentions in Santo Domingo, have caused the Department of State to give very thoughtful consideration to the question of whether the United States might not now take the first steps in returning to the Dominicans the Government of their Republic.54
Colby did not cite the press in his argument directly, but instead insisted that the
Dominican Republic had finally achieved a measure of peace and thus Dominicans “may
now be entrusted with at least partial control of their Government.”55 However, Colby’s
commentary that the announcement of withdrawal would “have a most beneficial effect
upon our relations with all the Latin American Republics” because it would “dispel the
misunderstanding and suspicions” generated by four years of occupation betrayed the
52 “Misuse of the Monroe Doctrine,” 22.
53 “South America Turning From US – Colby,” Grand Forks Daily Herald, 20
February 1921, 17. “Colby Tells of South America,” Columbus Ledger, 20 February 1921. “Colby Tells of South America,” Charlotte Observer, 20 February 1921.
54 “The Secretary of State (Colby) to the Secretary of the Navy (Daniels),” November 27, 1920, FRUS, 191, Vol. II, 136.
55 “The Secretary of State (Colby) to the Secretary of the Navy (Daniels),” November 27, 1920, FRUS, 191, Vol. II, 136.
217
power of the press.56 Misunderstanding and suspicion had come to a head in 1920 as
scandalous and controversial stories emerged on the pages of newspapers – stories that
were not present in prior years.
By 1920, the anxiety over the perception of the United States’s actions in both
Haiti and the Dominican Republic prompted an official Senate Commission of Inquiry
originally called in October of that year.57 Senator Medill McCormick, a Republican
from Illinois, chaired the committee, assisted by four other senators. Hearings were
initially held in Washington in August 1921 followed by a trip to Hispaniola in
November to listen to testimonies and gather information in Haiti and the Dominican
Republic. Cutting their trip short by five days, the senators left the Dominican Republic
on 15 December, returning to Washington where they resumed hearings from February
until June 1922.58 The official report of the committee included over a thousand pages of
witness testimony in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Washington, DC along with
accounts by outside observers, Dominican officials, and American military personnel.
Included in the printed record were tables and charts indicating the success of the
respective occupation governments detailing increased revenues and infrastructural
development among other statistics demonstrating the commitment to the narrative of
56 “The Secretary of State (Colby) to the Secretary of the Navy (Daniels),”
November 27, 1920, FRUS, 191, Vol. II, 138.
57 Alan McPherson notes the various events that contributed to the official inquiry including the activism of occupied people in Haiti and the Dominican Republic and their supporters in the United States. Additionally, reports of marine abuse in Haiti were made public earlier in October in a letter from USMC Major General Commandant George Barnett. McPherson examines investigations into abuse in the Dominican Republic as early as 1917. See McPherson, The Invaded, 174-175.
58 Calder, The Impact of Intervention, 215-216, McPherson, The Invaded, 176.
218
underdevelopment. Of particular interest was the claim many Dominicans made that the
United States had no right to intervene in Dominican affairs let alone occupy the country.
Many testified that the 1907 treaty had not been violated and some Dominicans even
argued against the long-standing American belief that the Dominican Republic was
unstable in 1916 due to revolution.59 These of course were charges that neither the
senators nor the American administration could accept. After hearing the testimony of
Jose Manuel Jimenes, son of former President Juan Isidro Jimenes, who stated that the
occupation brought with it “killing, burning,” the destruction of property, and torture,
Senator Pomerene responded in utter disbelief. 60 Maintaining that such atrocities could
never happen, the senator countered Jimenes’s accusation, stating that army and navy
personnel along with American civilians “do not believe in torturing and cruelties of any
kind, and they do not permit it when they have proof of it.”61 Dismissing most witnesses’
statements, the senators argued that additional evidence was necessary to prove such
outrageous accusations.
The inquiry made for sensational news stories with eye-catching headlines from
both supporters and opponents of the occupation. Reporting on the commencement of
the hearings, Ben McKelway of the Sunday Star reported that Americans knew very little
about either Haiti or the Dominican Republic, but that both countries had received
59 See Senate Inquiry, “Statement of Dr. Francisco J. Peynada [sic], Lawyer,
Santo Domingo City,” 946-956. “Statement of Mr. Pedro A. Perez,” 960-963. “Statement of Mr. Arturo Lagrono,” 968-970. “Statement of Mr. Moses Garcia Mella,” 1054-1069. “Statement of Dr. Enriquez Henriquez [sic], Santo Domingo City,” 1081-1083.
60 “Statement of Mr. Jose Manuel Jiminez, of Santo Domingo City,” 1096.
61 “Statement of Mr. Jose Manuel Jiminez,” 1096.
219
“considerable publicity lately, due to sensational charges of misconduct and cruelty on
the part of American occupational forces.” Much like the pronouncements made by the
American media during the Commission’s tour of South America, McKelway did not put
much faith in the accusations made by Dominicans stating that the charges were “inspired
partly by native politicians anxious for withdrawal of the Americans,” and that most had
“proved groundless” after a previous naval investigation.62 Similarly, in a letter to the
editor of the New York Times dated 28 August 1921, A. Pereira who described himself as
a “Latin American” who, knew “Dominicans well,” stated that the critiques appearing in
newspapers about the Dominican occupation were from those who did not know much
about the topic since the marines stationed there were “guided by a spirit of justice.”63
Other articles vehemently attacked American actions in the Caribbean with vivid
descriptions and catchy headlines. Oswald Villard Garrison spoke on behalf of the Union
Patriotique of Haiti, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People,
and the Santo Domingo Independence Society, critiquing the American occupation in
Haiti and the Dominican Republic in multiple newspapers in early August 1921.64
Garrison referred to the interventions as the “blackest chapter in American history in the
Caribbean,” calling for a special Senate investigation into numerous allegations of abuse
62 Ben McKelway, “Laying Down Basis of Definite Policy,” Sunday Star, 31 July
1921, 3.
63 A. Pereira, “Americans in Santo Domingo,” New York Times, 28 August 1921, 26.
64 “Assails Troops in Haiti,” New York Times, 4 August 1921, 14. “No Trouble in Haiti Until We Went There, Is Claim,” Sun, 4 August 1921, 3. “Attacks Island Occupation,” Washington Post, 4 August 1921, 6. “Denounces American Record in Caribbean,” Evening Star, 4 August 1921, 27.
220
and mismanagement. In the end, despite debates in the media and at the hearings, the
inquiry put pressure on the US government to give in to negotiations with Dominicans
about ending the occupation. In the case of the Dominican Republic, this was likely due
to the fact that by 1921 plans for ending the occupation had already been underway for
some time.65
“Is America Imperialistic?”
The back and forth arguments advanced from both sides of the issue illustrated
the tension in the American press to either condemn or commend the United States for its
actions in the Dominican Republic. On one side, overcoming underdevelopment through
humanitarianism remained the main justification for any misdeeds in the Dominican
Republic. On the other, however, was the argument that development could not be
coerced and that doing so without the consent of Dominicans through policies that
abolished native government and upended civil liberties were not only unacceptable, but
reprehensible making the United States no different than any other imperialist country.
Though published in 1924, the year the occupation officially ended, two articles from The
Atlantic Monthly aptly illustrated the controversy over America’s role as an imperialistic
power. The Atlantic Monthly, founded in 1857 advertised itself as a magazine about
literature, art, science, and politics. It regularly published political pieces by men such as
Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and Booker T. Washington. In July 1924, the
same month that the occupation officially ended with the inauguration of Dominican
65 McPherson explains the differences between the reception of Dominican and
Haitian testimony as well as the outcomes. See, The Invaded, 176-179.
221
President Horacio Vásquez, Samuel Guy Inman’s piece, “Imperialistic America,”
appeared. Inman was the executive secretary of the Committee on Cooperation in Latin
America, a Protestant missionary, and author of the 1919 work Through Santo Domingo
and Haiti: A Cruise with the Marines. His article in The Atlantic Monthly indicted US
officials for generating worldwide hostility toward the United States because of
imperialistic policies. In response, in December of that year, Sumner Welles argued
against Inman’s stance in an article entitled “Is America Imperialistic?” Welles, as chief
of the Latin American division of the US State Department, wholly disagreed with
Inman, stating that his observations were not only short-sighted but also the result of
misinformation and propaganda.
In “Imperialistic America,” Inman placed blame for America’s poor reputation on
inconsistent policy decisions that were motivated more by greed than benevolence.
According to Inman, US imperialism “bodes more evil” than any other development in
American history as the countries to the south were dominated not by righteous men of
morality, but by “oil kings,” soldiers, and bankers that turned formerly independent
countries into “our Irelands, our Egypts, and our Indias.” In his estimation, America was
no different than those imperialistic countries that had come before it. The “final test” for
American Christian civilization would ultimately rest on how it treated “our next-door
neighbours.” For Inman, the assessment was anything but positive:
222
We are piling up hatreds, suspicions, records for exploitation and destruction of sovereignty in Latin America, such as have never failed in all of history to react in war, suffering, and defeat of high moral and spiritual ideals. How can the United States expect to be the one exception to the rule? Run your eyes rapidly down the map and note the countries where the United States is now in practical control. And remember that this control always brings resentment and enmity among the people, though their officials may approve it.66
Inman’s repeated use of the pronouns “we” and “our” throughout the article indicated the
responsibility for these actions that had generated so much animosity and distrust were
for all Americans to bear.
Though Inman’s piece did not solely focus on the Dominican Republic, instead
providing an overview of Latin American countries from Mexico to Peru and Cuba to
Bolivia, he maintained that the Dominican Republic represented one of the most unique
cases.
For the first time in the history of republics, one republic, without declaring war on another, landed an army, dismissed the president and congress, and for seven years ruled entirely, without even a semblance of national government, by military decrees enforced by a foreign military governor, backed by 2500 marines. Recent promises to retire the military governor are conditioned on the Dominicans’ ratification of all the acts of the military government and agreement to allow the United States to continue to collect the customs and administer the finances of the country.67
According to Inman, these conditions forced upon Dominicans were a further testament
to America’s selfishness. Furthermore, Inman complained that the United States cared
more about military and economic control than creating programs and policies to actively
advance the state of affairs in Latin America. Though many media sources lauded the
work of America in the Dominican Republic as an example of altruism to build
66 Samuel Guy Inman, “Imperialistic America,” The Atlantic Monthly (July 1924),
107.
67 Inman, “Imperialistic America,” 108.
223
infrastructure, education, and generally bring “development” to the country, Inman did
not agree. He complained: “Will not someone kindly explain why, when we are
arranging to direct the financial and military affairs of these nations, we should not with
equal propriety arrange to direct their educational systems?” According to Inman it was
precisely the focus on economic exploitation and political control that caused the
elimination of friendships and the “fostering of suspicions” throughout Latin America. In
the end, Inman viewed American imperialism as “a departure from the ideals of our
fathers.” He maintained that any American visitor to the Caribbean “sensitive to those
ideals, often blushes with shame and suffers the deepest humiliation on beholding sights
enacted in the name of our fair America – acts which his fellow citizens at home would
deem impossible,” actions Inman characterizes as wholly “un-American.” Inman
admitted that American intervention in Latin America had led to positive outcomes such
as the construction of roads, establishment of health and sanitary codes, and an end to
revolution, but he did not believe that these improvements were worth the sacrifice of
“American principles.” Even if developments such as these helped Latin American states
by some measure, according to Inman this was not enough: “The people of the United
States cannot go on destroying with impunity the sovereignty of other peoples, however
weak, cutting across the principles for which our fathers fought, without the reaction
being shown throughout our whole body politic.”68
In an article that directly responded to Inman’s claims, Welles argued just the
opposite – that America was not imperialistic in the least. To start, Welles discounted
Inman’s observations and attacks stating that his opinions were those of the minority in
the United States. Though Welles admitted that a majority of people in Latin America
disagreed with America’s policies of intervention and economic control, their viewpoint
derived not from facts, but from propagandists. Conversely, Welles argued his own
reflections on Latin America were more valid based on the fact that he had years of
expertise and hands-on experience in the region. Explaining why opinions like Inman’s
gained credence, Welles argued that propaganda with its sensational stories always had a
ready audience in those looking to blame the United States for every problem in Latin
America. Welles admitted, “mistakes undoubtedly have been committed,” but, in
general, America’s record
has been one with which an American citizen may be well content. It has revealed a consistent effort on our part to strengthen the foundations of constitutional and stable government, to develop legitimate commercial relations, and, by demonstration and friendly advice, to further the settlement by peaceful methods of international disputes.69
According to Welles, when a country like the United States intervened “to protect the
lives and property of its citizens” in times of danger, its “friendly mediation” or in more
extreme cases its “friendly intervention” might be misunderstood especially by those “not
familiar with the perplexing problems” in Latin America, a group Welles clearly
considered Inman to be a part of. In the end, Welles considered the advancements made
worth the cost:
69 Sumner Welles, “Is America Imperialistic?” The Atlantic Monthly (December
1924), 413.
225
A careful analysis of the history of our relations with Latin America during the past twelve years will, it is believed, demonstrate conclusively, that, for every error of judgment, additional progress has been made in instilling in the hearts of our neighbors belief in the sincerity and unselfishness of our purpose. South of the Rio Grande faith is increasing, notwithstanding the occasional difficulty of the Latin to comprehend the Anglo-Saxon mentality, that our Government is responsive solely to the desire to promote good understanding and to remove discord, using its powerful influence at all times on the side of right and justice.70
Specifically addressing the Dominican situation, Welles continued to maintain
that like the rest of Latin America, the United States had done well in its handling of the
situation. Recalling the old narrative of underdevelopment, he described the history of
the Dominican Republic as a “tragic one” that alternated between periods of revolution
and dictatorship, ultimately necessitating American intervention in the name of peace.
As for the long, drawn out process of withdrawing from the country, Welles blamed the
Dominicans themselves who rejected the initial proposal made during the last months of
President Wilson’s tenure in December 1920. As for the subsequent withdrawal plan
drafted during the Harding administration, Welles stated that the excuse Dominicans gave
for rejecting the plan – that it provided a conditional withdrawal based “the ratification by
the Dominican people of all the acts of the Military Government” and the acceptance of
American financial oversight, was “entirely inaccurate.” In the end, those that were
quick to point out the errors of the occupation, in Welles’ opinion, failed to see that the
occupation was ultimately successful as evidenced by the free elections that brought to
power a constitutionally elected government proving the sincerity of the United States’s
promise to leave the country once peace and stability had been established.71
70 Welles, “Is America Imperialistic?” 412, 413, 422-423. 71 Welles, “Is America Imperialistic?” 415, 416.
226
Conclusion
The pieces by Inman and Welles articulated the debate on how to view the US
occupation of the Dominican Republic. Some articles denounced the military occupation
as abusive, poorly administered, and at the expense of a loss of personal freedoms,
journalists began to assail American objectives in the Caribbean while others maintained
that the ultimate objective of peace and stability was worth any minor errors. Those that
criticized American actions made similar claims to ones that Dominicans had maintained
since the start of the occupation. However, it was not until these articles called into
question the benevolent intent of the American intervention that the subject of the
occupation garnered any critical attention in the American media. Whether spurred by
intellectual discussions, the arrest of Dominican intellectuals, the US presidential
election, or the work of the Commission, American foreign policy in the Dominican
Republic began to change by the end of 1920 as plans for withdrawal finally emerged in
the State Department. Added to these factors was the costliness of the occupation in a
time of economic depression. Worldwide sugar prices plummeted in 1921 ruining many
Dominican merchants and causing a general economic crisis that extended to a military
government counting on sugar revenues to help foot the bill for their expansive reforms.72
Although it would take until 1924 for the withdrawal process to be complete, serious
questioning of the humanitarian narrative in the United States represented one element of
the complex reasons for a change in approach when it came to the occupation of the
Dominican Republic.
72 Frank Moya Pons, The Dominican Republic: A National History (Princeton,
NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2010), 331-332. This further supports the claim by Robinson and Gallagher that once formal empires become too costly, imperial powers tend to focus more on informal control.
227
CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION: AN ENDURING LEGACY
After four years of military rule and mounting critiques in the American media
that questioned the nature of the occupation, officials in the United States finally began
the long process of leaving the Dominican Republic. Plans for a graduated withdrawal
emerged from the State Department on 23 December 1920. Drafted by Sumner Welles,
Chief of the Latin American Division, the Wilson Plan offered Dominicans an end to the
occupation with certain stipulations. A key component of the plan was the formation of a
junta consultiva or advisory board of Dominicans who would revise the laws and create
constitutional amendments to satisfy American preconditions for withdrawal.1 Because
the announcement of withdrawal came just days before Christmas, the American media
depicted the Wilson Plan as a great gift given to the Dominican people.2 Quoting directly
from the proclamation of withdrawal, newspapers claimed the success of the occupation
in the “restoration of public order and protection of life and property.”3 Furthermore, the
press listed the accomplishments of four years of military occupation: general tranquility,
public works, sanitation projects, improved public health, and expanded education along
with increased revenues. Though hailed in the American press as an example of the
1 Rebecca Ann Lord, “An ‘Imperative Obligation’: Public Health and the United
States Military Occupation of the Dominican Republic, 1916-1924,” (PhD diss., University of Illinois at Chicago, 2000), 276; Bruce J. Calder, The Impact of Intervention: The Dominican Republic during the US Occupation of 1916-1924 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984), 204.
2 “Dominican People Get Christmas Gift,” The State, 25 December 1920, 1; “Santo Domingo Liberated by Rear Admiral Snowden, Issues Proclamation as Christmas Gift,” Salt Lake Telegram, 24 December 1920, 1.
3 “Wilson Takes Step to Give Up Control in Santo Domingo,” New York Times, 25 December 1920, 1.
228
United States making good on its desire to withdraw “when conditions improved,” the
Wilson Plan almost immediately drew ire from Dominicans. First of all, it was hard to
find Dominicans to serve on the advisory board because many viewed cooperation as
tantamount to betraying their sovereignty. Second, many held out hope that the new
Harding administration, which would take office the following year, would present more
favorable terms.
The rejection of the Wilson Plan led to a discussion between US officials and
Dominicans from March until June 1921. Announced on 14 June 1921, the Harding Plan
presented clearer terms than the Wilson Plan, but with demands many Dominicans were
still unwilling to accept. The new proposal included the ratification of all acts by the
military government, the acceptance of a $2.5 million loan to complete the occupation’s
public works projects, the continuation of the customs receivership, and the maintenance
of American marine officers over the Guardia Nacional.4 Additionally, the plan called
for elections under American supervision and the withdrawal of troops within eight
months.
In the American media, the press relayed the Dominican protest of the Harding
Plan, some sympathizing with Dominican claims and others denouncing them. At first,
the New York Times admitted that they were not even sure what grievances Dominicans
had that would prompt their complaints, a statement that revealed the unwillingness to
follow or even recognize Dominican calls for a return of their sovereignty.5 For many
4 Lord, “’An Imperative Obligation,’” 277. Calder, The Impact of Intervention,
209.
5 “Dominicans Protest Withdrawal Plan,” New York Times, 19 June 1921, 12.
229
Dominicans, including key politicians, lawyers, and intellectuals, the desire was for
unconditional withdrawal, making any plan that came with provisions unacceptable.6
Secretary of State Charles Evan Hughes blamed these objections on the “selfishness of
political malcontents” and the overall “ignorance of the real intentions of the United
States.”7 Challenging Hughes’s interpretation, the editor of The Nation, Ernest H.
Gruening, interviewed Dominican Archbishop Adolfo Nouel, describing the clergyman
as an “agitator for the spirit of ’76 in America, for liberty, for justice, for the divine right
of all peoples to control their own destinies.”8 The title of the article, “Santo Domingo’s
Cardinal Mercier,” further emphasized that Nouel was a beacon of light and hope
standing against the American occupation much like Belgium’s own Cardinal Mercier
had done against the Germans during World War I. Others similarly denounced the
withdrawal plan. Anti-imperialist journalist Oswald Villard Garrison wrote for the
Cleveland Gazette that asking Dominicans to approve of all military acts seemed to be
“part of the price for their freedom to make the record of the American occupation appear
as the driven snow.” Furthermore, it was an example of “writing history at the point of a
pistol.” According to Garrison, the Harding Plan was nothing more than the United
States’s attempt to “save face” and “perpetuate myths” rather than own up to their own
6 “Asks Complete Withdrawal,” New York Times, 21 June 1921, 3; “Santo
Domingo Wants America to Get Out Now,” Chicago Defender, 2 July 1921, 15.
7 “Hughes Reassures Santo Dominicans,” New York Times, 29 June 1921, 10.
8 Ernest H. Gruening, “Santo Domingo’s Cardinal Mercier,” The Nation, 11 January 1922, 42.
230
actions and misbehavior.9 Others, like the liberal magazine the New Republic, agreed
with Garrison’s interpretation arguing that the plan discounted Dominican consent and
basically constituted the United States saying, “sign on the dotted line, or be damned.”10
Much like its predecessor, the Harding Plan did not result in acceptance, leading
to further discussions between Dominicans and American officials that finally produced
the Hughes-Peynado Plan in July 1922. Though the announcement drew aversion from
both Dominicans and members of the occupation government, the Hughes-Peynado Plan,
named after Secretary of State Hughes and prominent Dominican lawyer and former
cabinet official Francisco Peynado, finally brought an end to the occupation.11 The plan
called for the election of a provisional government that would oversee the American
withdrawal, which was to take place in stages, as American troops would be pulled out of
major bases around the island with the final evacuation of Santo Domingo set for 1924.
The Dominican government was to pass into law certain executive orders of the military
government and see to the completion of various public works projects.12 The
announcement of withdrawal appeared in American newspapers across the country as a
simple statement of fact without reflection or criticism, a point revealing that Americans
9 Oswald Villard Garrison, “That ‘Withdrawal’! What it Really Means to the
Little Mulatto Republic,” Cleveland Gazette, 9 July 1921, 4.
10 “How We Make Enemies,” New Republic, 13 July 1921, 184.
11 Eric Roorda details the discontent of occupation government personnel including Military Governor Samuel Robison who believed a the United States needed to permanently maintain troops in the country to ensure peace, see Eric Roorda, The Dictator Next Door: The Good Neighbor Policy and the Trujillo Regime in the Dominican Republic, 1930-1945 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 19.
12 Lord, “’An Imperative Obligation,’” 277-278.
231
were no longer interested in the Dominican Republic as it seemed the saga was now
over.13
The American press interpreted the election of a provisional government as the
end of the occupation with headlines claiming as much even though American military
forces were still present on the island.14 On 21 October 1922, Juan Bautista Vicini
Burgos was elected provisional president. Over the next two years, President Burgos’s
administration focused on the completion of public works projects like the national
highway and the training of the Guardia Nacional to act as a guarantor of peace and
stability.15 In one article, the American media praised the work of President Vicini,
citing it as an example of the occupation’s success running under the headline, “Santo
Domingo is Graduate in US Discipline.”16 After two years, elections were held to
appoint a constitutional government and Horacio Vásquez won the presidency in March
1924. Four months later on 12 July 1924, President Vásquez was sworn into office
marking the official end of the occupation, although the last American troops did not
leave until September of that year.17
13 “Plan to Leave Santo Domingo,” Los Angeles Times, 12 July 1922, 11; “Plan to
Terminate Our Dominican Rule,” New York Times, 12 July 1922, 10; “US Approves Plan to Quit Santo Domingo,” Sun, 12 July 1922, 1; “Plans Evacuation of Santo Domingo,” Washington Post, 12 July 1922, 5.
14 “American Rule Ends in Santo Domingo,” Boston Daily Globe, 22 October 1922, 3; “US Control Ends in Santo Domingo,” Sun, 22 October 1922, 20.
15 Lord, “‘An Imperative Obligation,’” 278.
16 Arthur Sears Henning, “Santo Domingo is Graduate in US Discipline,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 20 April 1923, 3.
17 Lord, “‘An Imperative Obligation,’” 281.
232
The American media portrayed the election of President Vásquez as a testament
to the success of the occupation. For example, the New York Times explained in an
article published in June 1924 that the occupation had brought political order and that the
election “was a test of the Dominican education in self-government.” The Times stated
that “this was not only the first free election in Santo Domingo, but the first held without
bloodshed” marking a “new and important step” that demonstrated that Dominicans
could now govern themselves.18 Writer Frederic J. Haskin expressed similar sentiments
in an article that appeared in newspapers across America. Haskin described the election
as “one of the most peaceful in Caribbean history,” another example of American
triumph.19 The Chicago Daily Tribune noted that the United States was leaving the
Dominican Republic since they had “stabilized the country and furnished it with a
modern system of administration and public institutions.”20
The end of the occupation allowed the American media to once again call on the
old tropes of revolution and debt to remind its readers why the United States was
involved in the country in the first place. In June 1924, the Washington Post recalled that
the “intolerable” Dominican government had “plunged into foreign debt” and neglected
its treaty obligations, resulting in “domestic conditions [that] were bordering upon
anarchy,” prompting American action.21 Along with political problems, the New York
18 “Ending the Santo Domingo Occupation,” New York Times, 28 June 1924, 12.
19 Frederic J. Haskin, “Republic’s Flag Again Unfurled,” Los Angeles Times, 13
July 1924, B35. This article also appeared in the DC newspaper the Evening Star under the headline, “The Marines Leave Santo Domingo.”
20 Henning, “Santo Domingo is Graduate in US Discipline,” 3.
21 “America’s Faithful Friendship,” Washington Post, 16 June 1924, 6.
233
Times described a land with many presidents, chaotic finances, “primitive
transportation,” and a woefully neglected public education system.22 Writing for the
Marine Corps Gazette, veteran Charles J. Miller described the deplorable state of the
country prior to the arrival of American troops. Miller claimed Dominicans were
“ignorant of the first rules of sanitation: cities and towns were without sewage systems;
the streets and patios were the habitats of the domestic animals; the garbage was dumped
indiscriminately or taken to the edge of town to accumulate as a fetid decaying mass.”23
These descriptions of the underdeveloped and backward state of the country
communicated to readers why the United States was involved in the Dominican Republic
and represented the continuance of themes that had been used to define the country since
the 1800s.
Interestingly, the announcement of withdrawal plans also brought with it a return
of the discussion of race, primarily owing to the fact that occupation forces remained in
neighboring Haiti. To address this discrepancy in policy, the American media once again
stressed the racial differences between the two parts of the island. In an article published
in the Dearborn Independent in May 1921, the author speculated that withdrawal was
possible in the Dominican Republic because the people there were “civilized” unlike the
Haitians.24 Observing the Senate hearings on abuses in Haiti and the Dominican
Republic in 1922, New Republic reporter Katherine Sergeant Angell wrote that there was
22 “Ending the Santo Domingo Occupation,” New York Times, 28 June 1924, 12.
23 Charles J. Miller, “Diplomatic Spurs,” Marine Corps Gazette, August 1935, 43-
44.
24 Wilber Forrest, “Latin-America is Watching Our Handling of Hayti,” Dearborn Independent, 7 May 1921, 7.
234
a “huge” difference between the two countries. Angell claimed that Dominicans were
“less simple, less naïve, more independent and canny and self-sufficient on the whole
than Haitians,” and, in general, Dominicans were akin to Americans in their “manners.”
Angell speculated that, “the mixture of Spanish, Indian and Negro blood seems to make a
less tropical, rather hardier and more hard-headed race than the French and Negro.”25
Therefore, in her opinion, Dominicans had learned the lesson of self-government and
proper management under American tutelage granting them their freedom while the
Haitians still had not. Others seemed to agree with this pronouncement. In an article
written for the Chicago Daily Tribune in April 1923, journalist Arthur Sears Henning
noted, “Dominicans contend that they are able to govern themselves and there appears to
be no valid reason for denying them.” In part, Henning’s assessment was based on race.
He argued that Dominicans represented a “much higher type of intelligence than
Haitians,” claiming that Dominicans were eighty percent white while Haitians were
ninety-five percent black.26 These examples demonstrated that civilization and whiteness
were intimately linked with one another, but more importantly revealed the ways in
which the race of Dominicans was still being manipulated to fit American objectives. In
this case, Dominicans became white as a concrete way of explaining the end to their
occupation and the continuance of Haiti’s.
Lastly, the end of the US occupation of the Dominican Republic served as an
opportunity to justify American imperialism and define it exclusively by its noble intent,
25 Katherine Sergeant Angell, “On Trial in Santo Domingo,” New Republic, 5 July
1922, 157.
26 Henning, “Santo Domingo is Graduate in US Discipline,” 3.
235
despite its critics. Likely because the first plans for withdrawal emerged in late 1920,
even before the official end of the occupation, the American media began to reflect on the
significance of the occupation. Papers like the Washington Post reminded readers that
earlier protests against the American presence existed primarily because Dominicans did
not truly understand the intentions of the United States. “Dense ignorance of American
sentiment furnished the seedbed for the propagation of all sorts of freak ideas concerning
the true purpose of this government.” According to the Post, the United States had
always acted in “firmness and patience” in order to demonstrate their “unselfishness and
friendliness,” and the end of the occupation confirmed that the United States “is a friend
whose good offices will never be perverted into schemes of aggression.”27 The American
children’s magazine, The Youth’s Companion, taught young readers that most of the
complaints about the Dominican occupation were the work of “noisy politicians” and
“would-be revolutionists.” These selfish men had tried to “incite the ignorant masses,”
but American ideals had triumphed, teaching Dominicans “the value of a regulated,
civilized life.”28
The topic of American imperialism on Hispaniola was featured on the cover of
the May 1927 issue of the Leatherneck. As a magazine published primarily for members
of the Marine Corps, the positive interpretation of American actions on the island was no
surprise. The cover image featured a large, antique map of the island in the background,
complete with pirate ships, sea monsters, and Latin terminology. In the foreground, two
27 “America’s Faithful Friendship,” Washington Post, 16 June 1924, 6.
28 Lothrap Stoddard, “The American Empire: II, Santo Domingo: The Isle of
Unrest,” The Youth’s Companion, 30 March 1922, 182.
236
marines rested amongst cactus plants. One marine stood, taking a deep drink of water
from a canteen, presumably after a hard day’s work, while the other was seated, hands in
his lap as he thoughtfully gazed ahead perhaps reflecting on the arduous tasks he had just
completed. In addition to the cover, the magazine ran an article explaining the image.
Readers were told that, “the marines crossed the same waters as Columbus to protect
lives and property.”29 The mention of Columbus along with the old map was meant to
convey the relationship between the past and present – between the founder of western
civilization in the Americas and its protectors, the USMC. The article stated that the
marines were a key tie in the chain of history, a “golden link” of “self-sacrifice, of
patience, of self-defensive fighting, of pure Americanism,” with “no tarnish, no taint – a
gallant chain of duties loyally performed for humanity and the flag.”30 The careful
selection of words in this description aptly characterized how many Americans viewed
their imperial endeavors. Actions were undertaken in self-defense and with much
patience and sacrifice in an attempt to make the world a better place. The altruism of
these tasks was conveyed by the fact that the United States never officially took over, as
explained in the article: “The story of the island over which has flown the Flags of Spain;
France; of Great Britain, but never of the United States of America, except as a symbol of
our interest in humanity, which includes Dominicans and Haitians.”31 Thus, one of the
critical markers of American imperialism was its selflessness especially when compared
to the actions of European powers.
29 Edwin North McClellan, “The Story of the Cover,” Leatherneck, May 1927, 59.
30 McClellan, “The Story of the Cover,” 59.
31 McClellan, “The Story of the Cover,” 59.
237
Published in 1929, five years after the end of the occupation, Harry L.
Foster’s Combing the Caribbees aimed to provide a travel guide for those wishing to
explore the West Indies. Foster served in Europe during World War I after which he
spent almost a decade traveling the globe and writing of his experiences from Fiji to
Latin America.32 His chapters on Haiti and the Dominican Republic reveal not only the
adherence to the old narrative of debt and revolution but also the insistence that the US
occupation had produced tangible results. Foster recalled that only a decade before, the
overland journey between Haiti and the Dominican Republic had been unbearable as one
was forced to “wallow over a jungle-path . . . cross a wide lagoon on a raft” and struggle
along primitive routes. However, owing to the introduction of modern highways and air
travel, the process was much less cumbersome. According to Foster, the improvements
introduced by the occupation were many spanning the infrastructural success he
mentioned above to “fashionable” suburbs complete with “villas whose counterpart might
easily be found in any residential suburb from Forest Hills (New York) to Beverly Hills
(California).” These “palatial” homes included modern features such as “garages and
bath-tubs and radio sets.” These advances had all been made owing to US intervention
that, in Foster’s opinion, had finally settled a country traditionally riddled with
revolution. Foster did not give much credence to these rebels whose fighting he
described as the “comic opera variety, wherein both parties battled furiously until the
ammunition gave out and then adjourned more or less amicably to the nearest grog-
32 “Harry L. Foster, Writer, Dies at 37,” New York Times, 16 March 1932, 21.
238
shop.” However, the United States had managed to transform this revolutionary
mentality imparting to Dominicans a “passion for modernity.”33
Much like his counterparts in the American press, Foster also had to take into
account the differences between Haitians and Dominicans, in part to explain to his
readers why the occupation had ended in one country and not the other. Here, race once
again entered the discussion. According to Foster, the two countries had very little in
common. Dominicans, though they could have “complexions” that “were occasionally
dark, the majority of those one met were predominantly Castilian,” and their language
was Spanish as opposed to French. Additionally, Foster claimed that unlike the Haitians,
the Dominicans had “learned their lesson” continuing projects the Americans had begun
such as sanitation and road building. Here, Foster implied that the Haitians had not yet
passed their test of tutelage thus their country remained occupied.34
In 1944, National Geographic produced an article entitled “The Land Columbus
Loved,” that still relied on the same themes that highlighted transformation via the US
occupation. By that year, dictator Rafael Trujillo had been in power for over a decade
during which time he had brutalized his own people and massacred thousands of
Haitians. However, Oliver P. Newman, author of the piece, chose to focus on Trujillo’s
continuance of American projects. Explaining the origin of the occupation, Newman
reminded readers that US marines arrived in the Dominican Republic to “maintain law
and order” and that through American intervention the Dominican people had gained
33 Harry L. Foster, Combing through the Caribbees (New York: Dodd, Mead,
1929), 270, 278, 287, 273, 286.
34 Foster, Combing the Caribbees, 277, 275.
239
“certain material benefits.” According to Newman, “during the occupation they
[Dominicans] learned the meaning of a good water supply, a better postal service,
adequate sewer systems, public education, sanitation, roads, bridges, harbors, paving,
clean streets, agricultural development, public health.” Trujillo, who Newman described
as a man who learned quickly and rose through the ranks of the army, “has applied and
extended the policies initiated by the Marines between 1916 and 1925. Both he and his
country benefitted from close contact with American ideas.”35 The article included a
smiling picture of Trujillo, busy at work, thumbing through a stack of papers on his desk.
The caption read: “President Trujillo, the Dominican Republic’s Strong Man.” Below
was the following description:
Three times Chief Executive, he modernizes his country – paving roads, rebuilding cities, establishing schools, digging harbors, and improving agriculture – the while he cuts public debt. Under Trujillo, wasting civil war have ceased. In his honor, old Santo Domingo is now called Ciudad Trujillo. Friendly to the United States, his country was one of the first in Latin America to declare war on the Axis.36
Newman conveyed that the United States had improved life in the Dominican Republic
through infrastructure, education, and economic stability. Additionally, it had fostered
the rise of man like Trujillo who would not only continue the good work of the United
States, but was also a loyal ally as noted in the comment that the Dominican Republic
was one of the first Latin American countries to side against the Axis powers during
World War II.
35 Oliver P. Newman, “The Land that Columbus Loved,” National Geographic
(February 1944), 218.
36 Newman, “The Land that Columbus Loved,” 207.
240
The Legacy of the American Occupation
In many ways, the aim of the US occupation was to transform the Dominican
Republic from what American policy makers viewed as a primitive, underdeveloped
country into a prosperous and stable neighbor. As travel writer Harry A. Franck observed
in his 1920 book: “Santo Domingo has always run more or less wild; she needs a
complete new standard of honor and morals.”37 However, the lasting legacy of the
occupation was not necessarily what those hoping to instill democracy had anticipated.
True, the days of revolution and political chaos had been left behind, but in its place was
the iron grip of a dictator who rose through the ranks of the Guardia Nacional and ran the
country for thirty-one years. Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina joined the Guardia
Nacional in 1918, became a commissioned officer in 1921, and was appointed
commander of the Policía Nacional Dominicana (the institution the Guardia became) by
President Vásquez shortly after the end of the occupation.38 A small rebellion called the
Civic Movement challenged President Vásquez in 1930, however, in order to achieve
success, this movement, led by the young lawyer Rafael Estrella Ureña, needed the
support of the military. A secret alliance formed between Estrella and Trujillo and
though Estrella was the leader of the revolt, Trujillo forced him into a subservient
position in the coming election by taking the title of president for himself and relegating
Estrella to the ineffective post of vice president.39 From this position of power, Trujillo
37 Harry A. Franck, Roaming Through the West Indies. Ebook (New York:
Century Company, 1920), loc. 5090. 38 Roorda, The Dictator Next Door, 22.
39 Richard Lee Turits, Foundations of Despotism: Peasants, the Trujillo Regime,
and Modernity in Dominican History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 2.
241
consolidated his hold over the Dominican Republic, maintaining his status through the
use of intimidation and assassination over the course of three decades to become one of
the world’s longest-reigning dictators.
Much of the existing literature on the trujillato seeks to explain the myriad ways
in which Trujillo retained power. Many scholars have placed emphasis on coercion and
terror as the keys to the longevity of the dictatorship arguing that Trujillo had virtually no
social base or policies that gained a popular following.40 Furthermore, social scientist
Juan J. Linz based his concept of the “sultanistic” regime off of Trujillo, noting that this
type of rule thrives without “consent, legitimation, authority, desirable policies, or
credible ideology.”41 While the trujillato certainly was rife with examples of rape,
torture, and murder, scholars have also examined the ways in which Trujillo used
symbols, celebrations, and populism to achieve widespread support. For example,
Richard Lee Turits demonstrated in his investigation of the Dominican peasantry how
Trujillo successfully utilized popular agrarian policies and a personal, paternalistic
approach to gain rural support.42 Historian Lauren Derby explored the ways in which the
regime infiltrated Dominican culture and society through public rituals and
40 Catherine LeGrand, “Informal Resistance on a Dominican Sugar Plantation
during the Trujillo Dictatorship,” Hispanic American Historical Review 75, no. 4 (1995): 555-596; Timothy Wickham-Crowley, Guerillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes since 1956 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); Alain Rouquié, The Military and the State in Latin America (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987).
41 Juan J. Linz, “Totalitarianism and Authoritarian Regimes,” in Handbook of
Political Science, vol. 3, eds. Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975).
42 Turits, Foundations of Despotism.
242
celebrations.43 While others, like Eric Roorda argued that nationalizing rituals such as
massive rallies, state-sanctioned holidays, and even renaming the landscape transformed
Trujillo into a “demigod” through “hyperbolic rituals, tribute, civic ritual, geographical
reorientation, and public works.”44 Through these various methods, Trujillo built a
dictatorship spanning three decades in which the nation and the man seemed to be one in
the same entity. During his tenure, the Dominican economy rapidly grew due to post-
depression recovery and policies promoting import substitution industrialization and the
opening of thousands of acres of farmland. In addition, investment in and completion of
many public works projects increased the infrastructural development of the island.
However, these advances came with a steep price in the form of multiple human rights
abuses (most notably the 1937 massacre of thousands of Haitians on the border), a strict
sedition law making all forms of disapproval virtually illegal, and the enrichment of
Trujillo himself, who, already by 1934, was the richest man in the country thanks to
strategic monopolies and economic controls.45
Though historians have focused on various aspects of Trujillo’s regime, most
agree that it represented the most enduring legacy of the American occupation. One of
the greatest accomplishments of the occupation, according to American officials, was the
creation of the national constabulary or Guardia Nacional (later called the Polícia
Nacional Dominicana and then renamed the Ejército Nacional Dominicano). The
43 Lauren Derby, The Dictator’s Seduction: Politics and the Popular Imagination
in the Era of Trujillo (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009).
44 Eric Roorda, The Dictator Next Door, 98. 45 Frank Moya Pons, The Dominican Republic: A National History (Princeton,
NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1995), 359-369.
243
Guardia was supposed to remain an apolitical organization that would act as a stabilizing
force in the country preventing the rise of rebellions. The irony, of course, was that this
was the very institution that led to Trujillo’s rise to power.46 Roorda argued that the
American occupation laid the groundwork for dictatorship by creating the constabulary,
which under Trujillo enforced his one-party rule in a regime “sustained by violence.”47
Derby has also maintained the intimate connection between the American occupation and
Trujillo’s dictatorship. Derby argued that the occupation fragmented political space,
stymied the growth of a liberal bourgeoisie, and ultimately set a precedent in Dominican
politics of seeing the state (at first the occupation government and then Trujillo) as the
ultimate arbiter of political issues, not the people.48 Furthermore, Derby contended that
almost a century of foreign intervention followed by the US occupation left a desire
amongst Dominicans to build up a strong sense of nationalism leading them to support a
caudillo style of leadership that would prevent the United States from politically
intervening in the country again and allow Dominicans to take control of their
economy.49 In the case of Cuba, Jorge I. Domínguez demonstrated the ways in which US
intervention obstructed political growth by preventing the development of a strong, stable
central government. Domínguez showed that factions in opposition to the government
46 Most historians writing on the Dominican Republic note the importance of the
Guardia Nacional in Trujillo’s rise to power, see Calder, The Impact of Intervention, 239 and Turits, Foundations of Despotism, 80.
47 Eric Roorda, The Dictator Next Door, 2-3.
48 Lauren Derby, The Dictator’s Seduction: Politics and the Popular Imagination in the Era of Trujillo (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009), 20.
49 Derby, The Dictator’s Seduction, 27, 64-65.
244
often precipitated crises in order to garner US support for their cause, ultimately
pluralizing the political system and undermining a viable party system.50 Though beyond
the scope of this dissertation, the legacy of the United States occupation of the
Dominican Republic and elsewhere not only calls into question the accomplishments of
American rule but also warrants further investigation and comparison into how
occupations hinder the growth of democratic institutions.51
“The Land of Bullet Holes”
This dissertation explored representations of the Dominican Republic and
Dominicans in the American media between the nineteenth century and the end of the US
occupation in 1924. Part I revealed the American media’s shifting narrative about
Dominicans, especially the mutability of their race and culture from the nineteenth
century until 1916. Unbound potential, the capability of Dominicans to be transformed,
and overcoming political failures all played a prominent role in accounts of the
Dominican Republic that promoted annexation. When American policy shifted away
from this, a new narrative emerged stressing the deterioration of the island and the
complete inadequacies of Dominicans. Most notably, American writers and politicians in
this period manipulated race to fit their agendas. These sources reflected and reinforced
imperialistic goals by making Dominicans white when they desired annexation and black
50 Jorge I. Domínguez, Cuba: Order and Revolution (Cambridge, MA: The
Belknap Press, 1978), 13-18.
51 On the topic of the occupation of Haiti, The New Yorker published an interesting retrospective on the one hundredth anniversary of the US occupation, see Edwidge Danticat, “The Long Legacy of Occupation in Haiti,” The New Yorker, 28 July 2015. On the US in Iraq see Eric Herrin and Glen Rangwala, Iraq in Fragments: The Occupation and Its Legacy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).
245
when they did not. Furthermore, common themes such as financial insolvency, political
disorder, and economic potential found in the media prior to 1916 would became the
basis for an ideology of empire that would later serve as justification for the American
occupation.
Part II examined the use of underdevelopment and humanitarianism in the
American media during the occupation. While the narrative of underdevelopment had
been a common theme since the 1800s, this dissertation demonstrated that it took on new
meaning during the occupation, as it became a primary justification for the intervention.
Working in tandem with this theme was the narrative of humanitarianism. While
underdevelopment provided the reason for America’s presence in the Dominican
Republic, humanitarian projects such as the building of infrastructure, the development of
public health, and the erection of new schools not only assisted the country on the road to
progress but also made the United States seem like a purely altruistic authority on the
eastern portion of the island. Concentrating their efforts on measurable goals allowed the
United States to forgo conversations about the race of Dominicans and emphasize
tangible advances. The media’s focus on such selfless endeavors allowed the United
States to shape its image in the Dominican Republic and the larger global community
while avoiding deeper conversations about Dominican protest or marine abuses.
Part III argued that the crucial element in explaining the change in American
media coverage and the subsequent alteration of US foreign policy in the Dominican
Republic were reports that called into question America’s reputation as a humanitarian
force. As this dissertation showed, the process of publicizing criticism of the military
occupation in the United States began slowly, increasing in intensity as the year 1920
246
unfolded with journalists reporting on the loss of individual liberties, accusing the
military government of abuse and false imprisonment, and most importantly noting the
hypocrisy behind the very ideologies that American foreign policy was based on. These
critiques tarnished the reputation of the United States, especially in Latin America. As a
result, by the end of 1920, the United States finally announced its plans to withdraw from
the Dominican Republic.
As demonstrated in the previous chapters, the most persistent narratives about the
Dominican Republic portrayed the country as rife with political chaos and prone to
indebtedness. These themes of instability and insolvency proved to be the ones with the
most longevity precisely because they could reinforce any American objective whether
that was annexation, non-intervention, financial oversight, or outright occupation. This
depiction of the Dominican Republic continued even after the withdrawal to remind
Americans of why the United States intervened in the country in the first place. As
shown throughout this dissertation, the subject of race was the most malleable
characterization of Dominicans as the people themselves could literally go from black to
white depending on American goals – a common theme that emerged even during
discussions of withdrawal as the media needed a way to explain why the occupation in
the Dominican Republic was coming to a close while the one in Haiti would continue.
During the early occupation period from 1916 until 1920, American print culture focused
primarily on two aspects: American humanitarianism and Dominican underdevelopment
– two narratives that reinforced one another. Portraying the occupation as a humanitarian
endeavor not only justified the American presence on the island but also provided the
United States with measurable outcomes they could cite as evidence of their triumph over
247
Dominican backwardness. This overwhelming focus on humanitarianism, however,
ended up prompting a change in policy once America’s altruism was called into question
by articles throughout 1920 that exposed mismanagement and abuse. In all, this
dissertation has examined the role of the American media in shaping narratives about the
Dominican Republic arguing that perceptions and imagery changed as American interests
shifted. In each instance, no matter what narrative was created, Dominicans always
remained passive agents as the United States dictated their representation. In this way,
the American media created a fictive world essential for justifying intervention and then
occupation as well as maintaining American power in the Dominican Republic.
248
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