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THE RISE OF ISIS

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Amanda BerntsenJanuary 17th, 2015

POL 386: Professor ShapiroFinal Research Paper

Since the 9/11 terror attacks, many have viewed the al-

Qaeda terrorist group as the face of global terror. However,

the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has

shocked the world, and it has become the new face of global

terror and fear. From the ashes of al-Qaeda, ISIS has built

enough strength to become the dominating terrorist group

that it is today. This research paper focuses on and

explores this violent terrorist group – a group so vicious,

so brutal, and so potent that even al-Qaeda disowned them –

given the US’ renewed military involvement in the Middle

East, the decision to broadcast ISIS’ violent actions

against Westerners, and ISIS’ continued rise of power and

popularity. I will look at the major events that shaped the

militant group since the 2003 war in Iraq, how its leader –

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi – came into power, the group’s

relationship with al-Qaeda, why people choose to fight for

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it, the goals that they express, and the dangers they pose

to the United States.

While the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq

began in December 2007, the last of the American troops

finally left Baghdad four years later, ending almost nine

years of war. Iraq’s leaders confidently declared that they

were ready to rule the country without assistance from the

United States, and the majority of Iraqis, both Sunnis and

Shias, responded positively to the removal of troops.

Michael Gordon of The New York Times said that both sides

considered this withdrawal a victory: Prime Minister Maliki

signified that it was a great accomplishment, as Iraq would

now stand on its own two feet,1 and with the pullout,

President Obama was able to fulfill his election promise of

bringing troops home from the most unpopular war since

Vietnam. Obama also talked of a new Iraq, exclaiming, “what

we’ve achieved now is an Iraq that is self-governing and

inclusive, and that has enormous potential.”2 Yet, the

United States was, in fact, leaving a country that was 1 Frontline, The Rise of ISIS.2 Ibid.

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grappling with political uncertainty and that was also

facing fears of renewed sectarian violence. As American

soldiers left, Iraq’s power-sharing agreement, which aimed

to distribute political equality to the three major

government positions (the Shiites, the Kurds, and the Sunni

Arabs), was under major pressure. In response to President

Obama’s statement regarding the newly self-governing Iraq,

Ali Khedery, who, from 2003 to 2009 worked as the longest

continuously serving American official in Iraq, was deeply

disappointed, because he knew “that those words were going

to go back and haunt him.”3 Indeed, they did, and it didn’t

take long.

While Prime Minister Maliki was still in Washington, he

received a phone call from his home country informing him

that there was a terrorist plot connected to his Vice

President, Tariq al-Hashimi, the most senior Sunni official

in Maliki’s Shia-led government. It suspected al-Hashimi’s

bodyguards of planning an attack on Shia targets. Maliki

shared the news with President Obama, but Obama’s response,

3 Ibid.

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according to Vali Nasr, a Dean in the Advanced International

Studies Department at Johns Hopkins University, was that

because it was an internal Iraqi affair, the United States

had no place of getting involved. Maliki took this response

and ran with it. Because the United States was no longer

there to stand in his way, he had the power of deciding what

action to take. Upon returning to Baghdad, he immediately

ordered that al-Hashimi be arrested – just one day after the

last American soldiers left Iraq. “It took a lot of people

by surprise,” said Laith Kubba, a former Iraqi government

spokesperson. “I think that was a departure point. It showed

that Maliki [was] really independent from the Americans.”4

Hashimi and his bodyguards were Maliki’s first targets, and

following the departure of American troops, hundreds more

Sunnis were arrested. Many didn’t even make it to jail –

most were killed beforehand: “The Shia militia were very,

very violent,” said Richard Barrett, a former British

intelligence officer. “There were many instances in Baghdad

and in other parts of Iraq of Sunnis showing up with a

4 Ibid.

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bullet in the back of their head and their hands tied behind

their back. This was common – this was a daily occurrence.”5

And this was only the beginning.

Around the time of the departure of the Americans, the

intensity of violence and suicide bombings between two of

the country’s three dominating religious sects, the Sunnis

and Shiites, had subsided, but the problems surrounding

these bombings had not been resolved.6 It didn’t take long

for things to go astray, and quickly after troops left,

things took a turn for the worse for the Sunni population as

more and more turned up dead in the streets of Baghdad. “The

thing to understand about Maliki is that when he looks at

Iraq’s Sunni minority, he sees al-Qaeda, he sees the

Ba’athists, he sees military coups, he sees plots against

him, he sees a population which despises him and wants to

get back into power,” says Dexter Filkins, the author of The

Forever War.7 Maliki, who began his role as Prime Minister of

Iraq in 2006, was a man who was deeply affected by Saddam

5 Ibid.6 Filkins, “What We Left Behind.”7 Frontline, The Rise of ISIS.

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Hussein’s brutal Ba’athist regime.8 Under Hussein, the Sunni

minority dominated the Shia population, and many of Maliki’s

family members were secretly arrested and tortured by the

government. This caused Maliki to mistrust, fear, and

suspect his political rivals, and these feelings persisted

as he gained power and as the Shia population regained

control of the government. “He had a deep fear that

ultimately the Ba’athists were going to go after him, and

that he was going to be targeted and stripped of power,”

said Leon Panetta, who served as the Secretary of Defense

from 2011-2013. Ultimately, Maliki was so drenched with

paranoia that to calm his nerves, he used his power to

ostracize the Sunni population, which he easily

accomplished, as the United States was no longer standing in

his way.9

Maliki’s actions surrounding the condemnations of the

Iraqi Sunni population continued, as Sunni leaders across

the army and police were demoted and replaced by leaders

with a strong Shia sectarian alignment. These actions 8 “Profile: Nouri Maliki.”9 Frontline, The Rise of ISIS.

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enraged Sunnis across the county, but they especially

infuriated the tribesmen of the Sunni Awakening. These were

the men that helped the United States defeat al-Qaeda in

Iraq years earlier. However, contrary to their promises of

political inclusion in return for helping the United States,

many felt like they were still being excluded, and for more

than a year following the removal of US troops, thousands of

Iraqis, mainly members of the Sunni population, began to

assemble into mostly peaceful protests to denounce Maliki’s

Shiite-dominated government. However, the government’s

response was harsh, as Maliki ordered the Iraqi government

to detain thousands of Sunni protesters without charges. In

many cases, violent bursts would result in thousands of

Sunnis left dead in the streets. This enraged protestors,

causing the animosity towards the government to become more

extreme: “In Ramadi, protestors raised black jihadi flags,

representing the extremist Al Qaeda offshoot that had

dominated the city during the American occupation.”10 Thus

10 Filkins, “What We Left Behind.”

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began the renewal of the civil war between the Sunnis and

Shias that had previously plagued Iraq.

While Iraqi cities were harboring Sunni protests, the

western deserts of the country became home to al-Qaeda in

Iraq (AQI), the group that would eventually become ISIS. The

group was not much of a force, as the US military surge and

Sunni Awakening had severely reduced it.11 “By the time the

Americans left Iraq, the Sunni insurgency was broken,” says

Filkins. “It was on its last legs. Al-Qaeda had been

decimated.” What remained of the reduced group, however,

were tough militants seeking revenge, resentful tribesmen,

and some remnants of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist military who

hoped to regain control of the government again. “[It was] a

collection of very hardened killers – these [were] the guys

that the United States didn’t manage to kill during the

(2003) war,” Filkins continues.12 Most of the men were

previous delinquents, serving time under Maliki or in

American prisons. One of these men, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,

was released from Bucca Prison in 2009, and following his 11 Barrett, The Islamic State, 12.12 Frontline, The Rise of ISIS.

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release, he would build his way up to become the head of al-

Qaeda in Iraq.13 However, while Baghdadi is credited with

the renewed power and strength of The Islamic State, the

group claims that the Jordanian terrorist, Abu Musab

Zarqawi, is the founder and inspiration of the group.14

“[ISIS’s] seizure of broad swaths of territory was not a

random or lucky development,” says Craig Whiteside of War on

the Rocks. “Rather, it was a carefully planned and coordinated

offensive preceded by years of preparation by unconventional

warfare.”15 The origins of ISIS, in fact, date all the way

back to 2003.16

As Bush prepared to invade Iraq in 2002, a Jordanian

petty criminal moved from Afghanistan, where he had been

working with Osama bin Laden, to Iraq, where he would join

al-Qaeda, establish a following, and create the beginnings

of what we now call ISIS.17 This terrorist, Abu Musab

Zarqawi, realized early on from his release that he had the 13 Ibid.14 Barrett, The Islamic State.15 Whiteside, “War, Interrupted, Part II: From Prisoners to Rulers.”16 Barrett, The Islamic State.17 Robins-Early, The Rise of ISIS Explained In Less Than 3 Minutes.

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ability to inspire a following of people through the violent

pursuit of an anti-Shia state. In May of 2003, Zarqawi-led

groups began operations in Iraq, and they carried out their

first attack in August of 2003 when the group exploded UN

Headquarters in Baghdad.18 In 2004, he joined al-Qaeda, and

then proceeded to create an al-Qaeda franchise in Iraq

(AQI), as he believed that the association would not only

attract recruits but also bring in funds. Osama bin Laden

publically urged jihadists from around the world to join and

fight with the group for multiple reasons. He not only

needed a presence in Iraq, but he also wanted to limit

Zarqawi’s challenge as al-Qaeda’s leading role, and he

believed the way to do this was by accepting him as a junior

leader. While bin Laden was always distrustful of Zarqawi

and thought his extreme sectarian methods against the Shia

population were very dangerous, he valued his effectiveness

and proficiency. The leader used tactics ranging from

beheadings to car bombings; whatever the approach, though,

ruthless violence was always a component. United States

18 Barrett, The Islamic State, 12.

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forces were finally able to kill him in an air strike in

2006 and then were successful in taking down his

successor.19

Following the deaths of Zarqawi and his predecessor,

Al-Qaeda in Iraq proceeded to go deep underground. After

joining with other terror groups in the area in October

2006, it renamed itself The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).

However, its influence began to decline in 2007,20 as United

State military surges and the Sunni Awakening diminished the

group’s efficiency. Beginning in January 2009, Prime

Minister Maliki began to target Sunni leaders as well as

Awakening leaders. This increased sectarian tensions in the

country, and despite ISI’s previous waning power, latent

support began to build for the group in Sunni tribal areas.

As a result, ISI was able to ward off disaster and gain

momentum. When Abu Bakr al Baghdadi was announced as the new

leader of the group in 2010, the group drastically regained

lost ground.21

19 Robins-Early, The Rise of ISIS Explained In Less Than 3 Minutes.20 Sprusansky, “Understanding ISIS: Frequently Asked Questions.”21 Barrett, The Islamic State.

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When Baghdadi was declared the new head of al-Qaeda in

Iraq, ISI, he began to direct ambushes and suicide bombings

on the Iraqi forces. But Baghdadi had greater goals and

objectives in his fight against the Shias. In the summer of

2011, he sent Syrian members of ISI into Syria to join the

rebels in their fight against Bashar al-Assad’s Shia-led

government.22 For Baghdadi, the Syrian war was a major

breakthrough for the group: when the government in northern

and eastern Syria collapsed, ISIS was able to expand across

the border and gain traction. The complete breakdown of the

state in Syria and the chaos and the lack of control that

ensued resulted in a large open space between the countries,

which allowed the fighters to find life in their cause:

“ISIS didn’t become the group it is today until they went to

Syria,” says Ali Soufan, an FBI special agent from 1997 to

2005. “Syria is what made ISIS, ISIS.”23 Once the group

moved into Syria is when they were really able to start up

operations and begin recruitment again. Their message

attracted the Sunnis in Syria, who, like the Sunnis in Iraq,22 Frontline, The Rise of ISIS.23 Ibid.

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were willing to support any group that had the potential to

wage a civil war against the Shia-dominated government.

Thus, ISIS quickly became a dominant force in Syria, and it

grew like fire.24

Opposition from the United States and those in Sunni

cities grew when Maliki’s purges of his political rival

continued in Iraq. He received further opposition when, in

December 2012, he ordered his police to capture the

bodyguards of an extremely respected and revered official,

Rafi al-Issawi. “When his bodyguards were arrested is when

the real blow to the Sunni community occurred,” said

Filkins.25 Demonstrations erupted, with protestors yelling,

“Enough injustice! Release the prisoners!”26 The Sunnis were

not fully integrated into the Iraqi government as they were

promised, and Maliki’s recent actions made them feel

completely marginalized. Back in Washington, officials were

aware of the situation, and Obama’s ambassador to Iraq

warned that Maliki had to be controlled. “The Obama

24 Barrett, The Islamic State.25 Frontline, The Rise of ISIS.26 Ibid.

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administration certainly did tell Prime Minister Maliki and

other officials that they wanted to see them play by the

democratic rules and thought it was a mistake to go after

their political rivals in this fashion. But they did it in

private, not in public, and they certainly never imposed any

type of cost.” While arguments differ regarding what exactly

the Obama administration did in terms of dealing with Iraq,

one thing was certain: demonstrations were growing. In

Ramadi, protestors camped out on the main road between

Baghdad and Jordan. In other Sunni cities and towns,

continued protests delayed commerce and interrupted traffic.

With youth unemployment reaching levels as high as 40%,

young men used their time to gather at the demonstrations,

and Sunnis from around the world showed their support by

providing money to pay for the tents and transportation.27

In Baghdad, Iraq’s Shia were organizing their own

demonstrations. At these protests, major support for Maliki

emerged, and he was only getting more popular among the

Shias with every move he made against the Sunnis. Thus,

27 Ibid.

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there was no incentive for Maliki to stop what he was doing,

and he didn’t.28

Back in Syria, al-Qaeda was continuing to make

advancements. The group relied on donations from wealthy

Sunnis in the region, as donors would support a whole

variety of Sunni opposition groups; soon, however, al-Qaeda

needed fewer and fewer contributions. As they gained

territory, they became more self-sustaining: they supported

themselves in a whole variety of ways, including bank

robberies and over-taking Syrian oil fields. US ambassador

to Syria, Robert Ford, urged the administration to quickly

provide aid to pro-Western Syrian rebels and warned that if

support wasn’t given, al-Qaeda would dominate. The

president’s concern, however, was that if weapons were

given, it would be unclear whose hands they would ultimately

fall in. He eventually decided not to send arms, as his

belief was that any military action would lead to ground

troops – a road similar to the Vietnam and Iraq War that he

was not willing take again. Throughout 2012, the president

28 Ibid.

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held off in sending aid. However, without US arms, the anti-

ISIS Syrian rebels struggled to keep up. Al-Qaeda,

meanwhile, with enough momentum and growth, was ready to

move back into Iraq.29

In July 2012, ISI announced a new campaign called

“Breaking the Walls,” a movement aimed at refueling the

group by breaking prisoners free.30 Members launched a

series of attacks on Iraqi prisons, allowing inmates to be

freed. The newly freed prisoners increased al-Qaeda’s ranks,

and the group was quickly able to regain lost ground.31 In

March of 2013, black flags – the trade mark of al-Qaeda’s

group – began to appear in the center of the protests in

Ramadi, and just one month later, the group announced its

new name, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS.

Their rising presence and influence fueled Maliki’s worst

fears. “That was a turning point really. That was a turning

point in the government attitude toward these

demonstrations,” said Hoshyar Zebari, the Iraq Foreign

29 Ibid.30 Ibid.31 Barrett, The Islamic State.

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Minister from 2003-2004. “This was the black flag of al-

Qaeda.”32 And things would only get worse.

In April of 2013, a confrontation occurred at a Sunni

protest camp in the town of Hawijah in which Iraqi police

officers were killed. While verifiable facts remain unclear

regarding who carried out the killings, Maliki responded

with massive force. “Nobody thought that the Iraqi army

could attack demonstrators in Hawijah. They were

demonstrating for months at that time and were peaceful,

calling for their rights. And then [Maliki] brought tanks

and heavy vehicles in and attacked and killed the people in

a very criminal model,” said Rafi al-Essawi, the Iraq

Finance Minister from 2010 to 2012.33 While it’s unclear how

many people were killed, estimates range around several

hundred bodies. At that point, ISIS made an argument to the

demonstrators: the Iraqi government would hear no message

through peaceful protests; rather, some measure of violence

would have to be used, and this new argument started to feel

more and more persuasive.32 Frontline, The Rise of ISIS.33 Ibid.

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The men that became members of ISIS were previously a

part of the peaceful demonstrations. They were men who voted

for a new government in Baghdad in 2010, but their

representatives were removed and shamed. They tried to form

their own region and defy the Shia-led government, but they

were attacked by Maliki’s forces. Therefore, tired of being

continuously marginalized, they decided to take up arms.34

In addition, most men who decide to fight for ISIS are not

particularly religious. Recent studies show that those with

stronger religious affiliations and identities are less

inclined towards radicalism. “Rather than religion,”

Professor Esposito says, “it is social and political

grievances that radicalize the individuals”.35 There is also

an economic incentive to join ISIS: it has been reported

that they are the highest paying militia in Syria, paying

$400 a month.36 In contrast to the beliefs and visions held

by the radical ISIS fighters, the general Sunni population

of Iraq is very different: for the most part, they are 34 Ibid.35 Sprusansky, “Understanding ISIS: Frequently Asked Questions.”36 Ibid.

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reasonable and very moderate people.37 However, Brookings

Institution Saban Center fellow Shadi Maid noted that “ISIS

has been more effective than the Iraqi and Syrian

governments in administering and providing basic services.

While most disapprove of their strict laws, people at least

appreciate that ISIS makes its red lines clear and offers

consistent punishments.”38 Thus, as tensions rose and as the

Sunnis continued to be ostracized by the Shia-led

government, they had nowhere to turn. The only ones that

proved that they were able to protect them were the violent

men of ISIS, and although the majority of Sunni population

didn’t necessarily like them, they needed them. Otherwise,

with the United States gone, no one was going to protect

them.39

American officials had previously been given warnings

from Sunni leadership of what would happen if Maliki broke

his promises of political inclusion. “The message was: if we

are backed into a corner again, we will rise up and this 37 Frontline, The Rise of ISIS.38 Sprusansky, “Understanding ISIS: Frequently Asked Questions.”39 Frontline, The Rise of ISIS.

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time, we will not stop. We will take Baghdad, we will burn

it, or we will die trying,” said Ali Khedery. This warning

became reality: three months after the confrontation in

Hawijah, ISIS led an enormous attack just outside of

Baghdad, releasing 500 prisoners from the Abu Ghraib prison.

This advancement showed that ISIS was encroaching towards

the country’s capital and making major gains in the Anbar

province. “It was a huge propaganda win for the Islamic

State of Iraq; the prison bust-out was a statement of

purpose that ‘we’re here, what started after Hawijah in

terms of the bombings, the spike in violence – we’re

orchestrating this, and hell is coming,’” said Ned Parker, a

Baghdad Bureau Chief for Reuters.40 Parker was right;

following the attack, ISIS started to bring more

reinforcement into Iraq from Syria. With ISIS gaining more

power and popularity, it became obvious that the Iraqi army

could not stop its advancements. Unsurprisingly, leaders in

Baghdad became extremely worried.

40 Ibid.

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In late October of 2013, Maliki returned to Washington;

this time, he was seeking help from President Obama. “The

message was that ‘we are under threat, we don’t have control

of our border with Syria; in terms of weapons, we’ve run out

of them.’ And we warned about the seriousness of the

situation and the existential threat that Iraq was facing,”

said Hoshyar Zebari, the Iraq Foreign Minister from 2003 to

2014.41 However, getting American aid beyond small missiles

proved to be difficult for the Iraqi Prime Minister, despite

the fact that US defense officials warned of the gravity of

the situation and of the dangers of ISIS: “The American

Intelligence Committee was saying that this group, ISIS, was

becoming increasingly potent, that they were expanding their

footprint in Syria, and they were expanding their operations

in Iraq. There were months of these types of warning signals

about the growth and expansion of ISIS,” said Gordon of The

New York Times.42 Ultimately, the United States agreed to

minimal increases in military aid, but regardless of his

council’s warnings, the President was not willing to give 41 Ibid.42 Ibid.

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more. Maliki was not considered a trustworthy partner to the

United States; he would commit to what the administration

told him in terms of an all-inclusive political program, but

he rarely followed-through on his words to create the

political culture that all Iraqis were seeking. Following

the visit, just like the previous visit to Washington,

things got much worse in Iraq.43

In December 2013, Maliki would attack his cabinet

again: this time, it was against a radical Sunni

parliamentary official, Ahmed al-Alwani. He was a Sunni

politician who began to give angry speeches against Maliki’s

government. “Patience has limits. All criminals, sectarian

and filthy people should understand that we will, God

willing, behead them one by one,” he once cried

enthusiastically to a crowd of protestors.44 Maliki, having

had enough of al-Alwani’s anti-government tactics, finally

ordered Iraqi forces to raid his house. His brother was

killed, while al-Alwani was taken away and hasn’t been seen

since. After the arrest, Maliki sent an army into Ramadi to 43 Ibid.44 Ibid.

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destroy the year old protest camp home to many Sunni

demonstrators. This move would backfire, however, as his

decision incited a Sunni uprising. The Sunni-Arab population

of the Anbar province rose up and objected the presence of

troops in their cities. ISIS took advantage of the dissent

that the general population was feeling and moved inside of

the cities in the province. From here, the first phase of

the Iraq war began. By excluding the Shias from the

political arena, Maliki and his government were creating the

monster that became ISIS, and this was the monster that he

and everybody else feared.45

The fighting only lasted a few days, as the Iraqi army

proved to be no match for the powerful and violent ISIS

fighters, who were already looking toward their next target.

While many would have thought that ISIS’s gains – taking

over a city just a few miles outside of Baghdad – would

create panic in Washington, top leadership continued to take

little action. Meanwhile, ISIS was focusing on another

target in the northern part of the country: Mosul, Iraq’s

45 Ibid.

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second largest city behind Baghdad. Despite being warned of

an imminent attack on Mosul months earlier by Kurdish

intelligence, Maliki essentially did nothing to prevent it.

“The White House, too was warned,” said James Jeffrey, the

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq from 2010-2013. “It announced that

it was going to intensify its support against ISIS with the

Iraqi armed forces, but it did almost nothing.”46 Washington

officials rebuked that statement, arguing that there was in

fact a steady increase in support. Either way, though, it

was not enough. On June 6th, 2014, ISIS staged several

suicide car bombs on the city, and fighters entered the city

following the attacks. Many residents enthusiastically

welcomed the column of fighters, exclaiming, “We sacrifice

our lives and blood for Iraq!”47 The Iraqi army, on the

other hand, with no local support and an unwillingness to

retaliate, deserted by June 10th. All in all, it took only

about 800 ISIS militants, along with the help of local

Baathist fighters, to over-take a city of 1.8 million

people. Not only did it surprise those that were in fear of 46 Ibid.47 Ibid.

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ISIS, but the quickness in their ability to secure Mosul

even shocked ISIS members.48

From Mosul, ISIS rapidly advanced down the Tigress and

captured Qayyarah, Hawijah, al Shirqat, and Tikrit, giving

the group the control it needed to establish a caliphate. In

their newly conquered cities, ISIS was easily able capture

hundreds of Iraqi soldiers and they recorded the gruesome

executions. Ali Soufan of The Soufan Group said in response

to the mass executions that “these guys are crazy, but there

is method to their madness. That method is control. This is

one of the first terrorist groups saying, ‘We aren’t going

to hit and run. We are never going to participate in

politics as you know it. We actually want to kill everyone

that disagrees with us, control the pieces of the land, and

whatever the cost, we are going to do it.’” What

differentiated ISIS from other terrorist groups was that

they had a plan to establish a state and Islamic emirate. On

June 29th, ISIS declared a caliphate, announcing an Islamic

nation that represented the world’s Muslim faithful and an

48 Ibid.

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entity that recognized no political borders. Phyllis Bennis,

a fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies, explained that

“ISIS is much more serious about establishing a caliphate

than other Islamist groups. They want to rule now,”49 and

Georgetown University professor John Esposito noted that

ISIS was much more willing to use violence to establish its

caliphate and to eliminate those who didn’t agree with its

vision.50

On July 4th, ISIS made another surprising move: in

their newly conquered Mosul, the leader of ISIS, al-

Baghdadi, delivered a sermon at the great mosque that

attracted many more followers. Unlike other infamous

terrorist leaders bin Laden and Zawahiri, who had never

given sermons in the sacred mosques of the Islam culture,

al-Baghdadi’s message in broad daylight was a very imposing

move that garnered support. Following the sermon, thousands

more jihadists headed to Syria and Iraq to join the lines of

ISIS. These young men and women who fled their countries to

49 Sprusansky, “Understanding ISIS: Frequently Asked Questions.”50 Ibid.

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join the group were oftentimes young, disaffected youth who

had little hope in their life and who wanted to be a part of

something not only impactful, but very successful.51 Upon

seeing the group take over large areas of Syria and Iraq at

an alarming rate and succeeding like no other group had

before, “many wished to live in the caliphate declared by

al-Baghdadi and claimed no interest in returning to their

countries of origin.”52 This was the al-Qaeda that Osama bin

Laden had sought out to create. Different from bin Laden’s

al-Qaeda, experienced military officers with keen expertise

lead ISIS. Many leadership positions are held by Baathists

from Saddam Hussein’s former army, and they have become a

key component to the structure of the group. According to

Charles Lister, an analyst at the Brookings Doha Center,

“The Islamic State relies on a Baathist sense of social

legitimacy in the Sunni areas of the country, and the

Baathists rely on the Islamic State being able to spearhead

offensive operations.”53As the Baathists provided

51 Frontline, The Rise of ISIS.52 “ISIS: The Threat to Homeland Security.”53 Lister, “Inside the Rise of ISIS.”

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administrative work and military skill, the group grew

larger and more organized, and their strength continued to

grow.54

ISIS’s military strength was manifested in their

successful trek into Kurdish territory in August of 2013, an

act that eventually led to US intervention. The Kurdish

peshmerga was reputed to be Iraq’s most competitive fighting

force. However, ISIS fighters, who were armed with American

weapons that were seized from previous conquests, easily

took them down. Thus, minorities in northern Iraq faced a

bleak choice: convert, die, or flee to Kurdistan. At the

same time, a group of ISIS fighters was approaching Erbil,

Kurdistan’s capital. This alarmed the United States as it

threatened the relationship it had with Kurdistan; trillions

of dollars worth of US global energy companies are located

in the country. Thus, the threat to US facilities in Erbil

prompted US military involvement, and airstrikes began.

Washington notified Iraqis that more assistance would come

under one condition, and that was if Maliki resigned, which

54 Frontline, The Rise of ISIS.

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occurred just one week later. As a result, US airstrikes

stepped up, but ISIS was not going to stand and watch. In

response, ISIS released the beheading video of James Foley –

just one of many horrific videos that they would proudly

share.55 This revealed that ISIS knew how to use social

media as propaganda, as “it has projected a romantic image,

making creative use of social media.”56 ISIS, through the

use of social media, proved that they knew how to promote

itself as the only reliable global jihadi movement in the

world.57

As ISIS continues to remain the catalyst for violence

in Iraq and Syria, the group also poses both a threat to the

United States, both short term and long term. “ISIS is an

immediate threat to our interests,” says General Martin

Dempsey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.58 If

ISIS achieves the Islamic State that they’ve declared, it

would unquestionably pose dangers first to Europe, and then

ultimately to the United States. In September 2014, that 55 Ibid.56 “ISIS: The Threat to Homeland Security.”57 Frontline, The Rise of ISIS.58 Ibid.

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threat inched closer to reality when, one week after

President Obama declared to the American people that “we

will degrade, and ultimately destroy, ISIS through a

comprehensive and sustained counter-terrorism strategy,”59

ISIS sieged the Syrian town of Kobani, located right on the

Turkish border. While the United States continues to try and

organize military help from multiple countries, some are

refusing to participate. “It’s a regional issue. It comes

down to the sectarianism of the area, so it’s an issue that

Iran and Saudi Arabia have to address as well. All those

countries have to get together and say, ‘are we prepared?’

They must find a way that they can sort out the dreadful

mess that has emerged in Syria and Iraq,” says Richard

Barrett of The Soufan Group.60 In terms of United States

involvement, previous interventions in the Middle East have

not been very successful, prompting Americans to voice their

disapproval. “I’d say they’re right,” says Ben Rhodes, a

Deputy National Security Advisor. “We’re not going to do

59 “Transcript: President Obama On How U.S. Will Address Islamic State.”60 Frontline, The Rise of ISIS.

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this by ourselves and we are not going to do this for the

region, and we’re not going to send in large US forces on

the ground. The only way we are going to solve this problem

is if we get the countries and governments in the region

invested in it.”61 Currently, regional allies include Saudi

Arabia, the United Arab Emirate, Turkey (who recently

authorized the use of military support despite initially

offering only strategic support), Jordan, Egypt, Qatar,

Iraqi Kurdistan, and Bahrain. Western allies have also

committed to help the United States in their fight to

destroy ISIS.62

Today, ISIS controls large parts of Syria and Iraq, and

they continue to recruit and to train Jihadists from all

around the world. One estimate suggests that ISIS controls

nearly 33% of Iraq and 35% of Syria, and that roughly four

million Iraqis and Syrians live in ISIS-controlled cities.63

The United States is hoping that Iraq’s new Shiite Prime

61 Ibid.62 Fantz, “Who’s Doing What in the Coalition Battle Against ISIS.”63 Sprusansky, “Understanding ISIS: Frequently Asked Questions.”

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Minister, Haider al-Abadi, will be able to turn the Sunni

tribesmen against ISIS. Without their trust, and without

trust between Shiite and Sunni leaders, friction will

continue to rise between the political rivals that only the

extremists will benefit from. As ISIS continues to control

most of Iraqi’s Anbar province, American troops have begun

to wage war just outside of Baghdad.64 This doesn’t stop

ISIS, though, as al-Baghdadi’s ambitions continue to be

huge, ISIS’s danger continues to elevate, and the group’s

Jihadi influence continues to spread around the world.

This paper represents my own work in accordance with University Regulations. - Amanda Berntsen

WORKS CITED

Barrett, Richard. The Islamic State. The Soufan Group, November 2014. http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/TSG-The-Islamic-State-Nov14.pdf.

Fantz, Ashley. “Who’s Doing What in the Coalition Battle Against ISIS.” CNN, n.d. http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/06/world/meast/isis-coalition-nations/.

64 Frontline, The Rise of ISIS.

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Filkins, Dexter. “What We Left Behind.” The New Yorker, n.d. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/04/28/what-we-left-behind.

Frontline. The Rise of ISIS, 2014. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/rise-of-isis/.

“ISIS: The Threat to Homeland Security.” Routledge, November 4, 2014. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13567888.2014.983354.

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Robins-Early, Nick. The Rise of ISIS Explained In Less Than 3 Minutes, n.d. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/18/isis-origins-explainer_n_6179110.html.

Sprusansky, Dale. “Understanding ISIS: Frequently Asked Questions.” The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, October2014, 19–20.

“Transcript: President Obama On How U.S. Will Address Islamic State.” NPR (National Public Radio), n.d. http://www.npr.org/2014/09/10/347515100/transcript-president-obama-on-how-u-s-will-address-islamic-state.

Whiteside, Craig. “War, Interrupted, Part II: From Prisonersto Rulers.” War on the Rocks, n.d. http://warontherocks.com/2014/11/war-interrupted-part-ii-from-prisoners-to-rulers/.

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