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The Role of Philanthrōpia in Diogenes of Sinope’s Cosmopolitanism
By Joshua Cutts
Abstract: Recent scholarship has argued that Diogenes of Sinope’s statements about world-
citizenship indicate that he believed that all human beings belong to one universal community.
John Moles has even claimed that Diogenes’ cosmopolitan statements reveal his profound,
universal love for all human beings without exception, and has suggested that Diogenes ought to
be recognized as the figure who inspired the later rise of Stoic cosmopolitanism. I contest these
claims in this paper, and show that there is insufficient evidence to conclude that Diogenes held a
philanthropic cosmopolitan view. The evidence indicates instead that Diogenes did not recognize
all human beings as being human, and thus I argue that his cosmopolitanism and philanthrōpia
both lack an essential component: universality.
Introduction.
Inspired by the example of Diogenes of Sinope, the Cynics of antiquity rejected society
and its “dehumanizing” effects, and sought to undermine traditional values. While many ancient
writers were concerned with politics and the affairs which pertain to active citizenship within a
particular city, many Cynics were instead concerned with a form of world citizenship, a
citizenship of a world without borders. These cosmopolitan inclinations may be traced back to
the earliest days of Cynicism, to Diogenes’ alleged claim that he was a “kosmopolitēs,” a “citizen
of the world.”1 This claim is supplemented by an additional statement in which Diogenes
reportedly suggests that “the only true commonwealth is as wide as the universe.”2
While cosmopolitanism today remains an idea in process, one that has thus far defied
reduction to one exhaustive definition, Pauline Kleingeld and Eric Brown suggest that all
1 DL 6.63 in Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Vol. II, trans. R. D. Hicks (New York: G. P.
Putnam’s Sons, 1925), 65.
2 DL 6.72, Lives, 75.
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cosmopolitan views have a common core: cosmopolitanism generally holds that “all human
beings, regardless of their political affiliation, are (or can and should be) citizens in a single
community.”3 The cosmopolitan of our time is someone who values all people equally,
regardless of their location on the Earth, cultural affiliations, etc. But is this baseline
understanding of cosmopolitanism today that expressed in Diogenes’ statements? Taken at face-
value, the confirmation of difference in this matter seems but of trivial value; it should not
surprise us to discover that a concept has changed over thousands of years. However, with
additional context the question reveals its historical importance: though Diogenes’ is credited
with coining the word “cosmopolitan,” it is the Stoics rather than the Cynics who are generally
credited with the invention of a cosmopolitanism that resembles our modern understanding.
Thus, scholars have disagreed as to what we are to make of this early Cynic endorsement
of “cosmopolitanism”: in recent years, a handful of commentators have argued that Diogenes’
statements reveal his positive, humanist inclinations, his allegiance to the community of
humanity-at-large, and that he is the true founder of cosmopolitanism, even in a modern sense.
The traditional view, on the other hand, holds that these statements are negative expressions that
simply describe a man without a country.4 This traditional view is perhaps best summarized by
H. C. Baldry, who claims that Diogenes’ statements ought to be understood in light of the value
that the Cynic places on autarkeia, or self-sufficiency. According to Baldry, the true Cynic
desires such a strong degree of independence from humanity that it is wrong to see a notion of
brotherhood operating in the background of Diogenes’ remarks about cosmopolitanism:
3 Pauline Kleingeld & Eric Brown, “Cosmopolitanism,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta,
2014: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/cosmopolitanism/>.
4 William Desmond, Cynics (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2008), 202.
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These phrases…do not contain any idea of a world-state or of the brotherhood of
all men. Kosmos means the universe, the whole of nature, not mankind, and
kosmopolitēs is a long way from ‘cosmopolitan’: far from suggesting that the
Cynic is at home in every city, it implies that he is indifferent to them all.
Independent of all the local affiliations of ordinary men, the wise man admits
allegiance only to the universe. He is a vagabond with no fixed abode, and Nature
is his only address.5
Here, Baldry succinctly summarizes the so-called “negative” view of Cynic
cosmopolitanism, which holds that Diogenes (and perhaps other Cynics following in his
footsteps) did not see humanity as a universal family. According to this line of interpretation,
Diogenes is not saying that he identifies with all humankind instead of with the citizens of
Athens, or Sparta, for instance; he is saying that human collectives are not the primary focus of
his allegiance at all. Instead, he thinks of himself as a citizen of the universe, the world outside
human terms of categorization, such as the polis.
There have been a few scholars, however, who have called this negative reading of Cynic
cosmopolitanism into question: in “Cynic Cosmopolitanism,” for example, John Moles argues
that Cynic rejection of the polis and social convention does not mean that Cynic
cosmopolitanism is “purely negative.”6 Moles believes that he can show that Cynics expressed a
sense of “belonging-to,” or “camaraderie-with” any number of different entities within the
cosmos - including animals, the wise, the gods, and humankind at large – and that these attitudes
5 H. C. Baldry, The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 108-109.
6 John L. Moles, “Cynic Cosmopolitanism,” In The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and its Legacy, ed. R.
Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press,
1996), 109. For other accounts that defend the “positive” view of Cynic cosmopolitanism, see M. H. Fisch,
“Alexander and the Stoics,” American Journal of Philology 58, no. 4 (1937): 129-151; R. Höistad, Cynic Hero and
Cynic King (Uppsala, Sweden: B. H. Blackwell, Ltd., 1948): 138-152; M. Buora, “L’incontro tra Alessandro e
Diogene: Tradizione e Significato,” AIV 132 (1973-1974): 243-264; R. Giannattasio Andria, “Diogene Cinico nei
Papiri Ercolanesi,” Bolletino del Centro Internazionale per lo Studio dei Papiri Ercolanesi 10 (1980): 129-151.
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indicate that their cosmopolitanism is indeed positive. Controversially, Moles leaps from these
positive attitudes to the conclusion that Cynic cosmopolitanism entails the existence of a
universal “brotherhood” of humanity.7 It is this alleged cosmopolitan brotherhood that leads
Moles to conclude that Cynicism is a form of humanism, and that the Cynic is a “missionary”
who seeks to show the folly of social convention out of her or his love for humanity
(philanthrōpia).8
Moles attempts to root this philanthropic cosmopolitanism in the reported sayings and
doings of Diogenes, given his place in history as the most prominent of Cynics; however, I
believe that this step is problematic. By bringing Diogenes into the conversation, Moles must
show that philanthrōpia motivated Diogenes’ radical behavior, and that this philanthrōpia played
a role in his conception of cosmopolitanism. These are not easy claims to defend, though
commentators past and present have certainly tried to make a saint of Diogenes over the ages.9 I
do not believe that there is sufficient evidence to conclude that Diogenes was a philanthropic
cosmopolitan thinker; in fact, given the character of Diogenes that has been preserved by ancient
writers, it seems more likely that he did not expect or even desire that all other human beings
become members of his own higher community of “the wise.”
7 Moles, “Cynic Cosmopolitanism,” 109; 115.
8 Ibid., 114-115.
9 Epictetus, The Discourses of Epictetus, trans. P.E. Matheson (London: Dover Publications, 2004), iii.24.64: “Did
Diogenes love no one, he who was so gentle and kind-hearted that he cheerfully took upon him all those troubles
and distresses of body for the general good of men? But how did he love? As the servant of Zeus should love, caring
for his friends, but submitting himself to God. That was why he alone made the whole world his country, and no
special land…”
For further discussion of the idealization of Diogenes in writers such as Epictetus, Dio Chrysostom, and Julian,
among others: see M. Billerbeck, “The Ideal Cynic from Epictetus to Julian,” In The Cynics: The Cynic Movement
in Antiquity and its Legacy, ed. R. Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA:
University of California Press, 1996), 205-221.
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In this paper, I contend that Moles has overstated the role that philanthrōpia plays in the
cosmopolitanism of Diogenes, and that as a result, he has misunderstood the nature of this
cosmopolitanism. I claim that Diogenes did not hold a philanthropic cosmopolitan view because:
It does not appear that Diogenes valued all human beings equally, unless we limit
the scope of who counts as human in the same manner that it seems he did (this
seems to violate the spirit of cosmopolitanism from the get-go);
It is even clearer that Diogenes did not endorse a love of humanity-at-large, but
that his care and concern was solely reserved for the wise.
While philanthrōpia may been a factor in the cosmopolitan views of later Cynics, there
simply is not evidence enough to show that this is the case for Diogenes. Though reports of later
Cynics seem to indicate that philanthrōpia may have eventually become an emphasized Cynic
virtue, this does not mean that we are entitled to squeeze Diogenes into this late mold if he does
not fit.
A Word on Philanthrōpia.
Before we turn to the texts concerning Diogenes of Sinope, I will lay out conceptual
clarifications useful for the following discussion. As I have stated, I oppose the view that
Diogenes’ conception of cosmopolitanism was both positive and philanthropic: I reject the claim
that he believed all of mankind ought to be considered a single community, and I especially
reject the belief that he claimed to have love for all human beings. Thus I oppose John Moles’
position on two related, yet distinct, fronts. While the positivity or negativity of Cynic
cosmopolitanism has been a previous matter of debate in the literature, Moles expands the debate
into new territory with his suggestion that Cynics were philanthropic. But what is this
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philanthropy, and how does it support the positive cosmopolitan thesis? Let us address these
questions.
Moles does not explicitly define philanthrōpia in “Cynic Cosmpolitanism”; however, in
another article, it appears that Moles believes that philanthrōpia is a psychological state of
concern for others that manifests in behaviors aimed at the improvement of their wellbeing.10
Moles implies that philanthrōpia is a concept universal in scope: in several instances, he
describes philanthrōpia as a “concern for all men.”11
Though Moles does not provide an explicit
definition of the term, he does at least provide us with enough context to construct a provisional
working definition: philanthrōpia is a love for all human beings understood as profound concern
for the wellbeing of all others. It should be noted, however, that this definition does seem to
differ from the usage of the word when it first rose to a place of prominence in Ancient Greek
vernacular; according to John Ferguson, philanthrōpia was once generally associated with
kindness and friendliness - “soft” qualities that Moles wants to exclude from his more
“profound” definition.12
Moles wants to suggest that one does not need to be kind and friendly to
be philanthropic.
10
John Moles, “’Honestius Quam Ambitiosius’? An Exploration of the Cynic’s Attitude to Moral Corruption in His
Fellow Men,” The Journal of Hellenistic Studies 103 (1983): 113-114.
11 Moles, “The Cynic’s Attitude to Moral Corruption,” 114.
12 John Ferguson, Moral Values in the Ancient World (London: Methuen & Co., 1958), 107: “The most curious stage
in the word’s history lay in the second half of the fourth century. At that time philanthrōpia, having been a
comparatively rare word with a comparatively specialized meaning, suddenly surged into prominence on the lips of
men…It is associated with dikaiosune (right social relationships), with sungnome and eleos (fellow-feeling; pity),
with metrios and demotikos (moderate; democratic), with charis (charm, grace), with aidesis (a sense of propriety).
It is used of a man who wishes to prevail among the citizens by authority. It is almost defined as meaning one who
by speech and act shows himself genial, kindly, and friendly to his fellows.”
Moles, “The Cynic’s Attitude to Moral Corruption,” 113: “Thus philanthrōpia in a profound sense (‘love of
mankind’), as opposed to a trivial sense (‘kindliness’, ‘gentleness’) is integral to Cynicism.”
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It should also be noted that this basic definition of philanthrōpia does not require any
moral commitments or activities as a consequence. We may carefully distinguish philanthrōpia
as a psychological state from instances of philanthropic behavior, or from philanthrōpia as a
moral motivation. These distinctions are especially important given the debate about moral
motivations between Hume and Kant; while the former thinks that sentiments have a significant
role to play in the area of morality, the latter claims that truly ethical actions are those
“untainted” by sentimental attitudes. In Kant’s view, my actions are only ethical if I perform
them out of duty to the universal, rational moral law; if I act out of an emotional predisposition,
even my “good” behaviors cannot be deemed “ethical.” By recognizing the potential difference
between philanthrōpia as a psychological state, and philanthrōpia as a moral attitude, we are in
better position to address the topic of this paper from either perspective.
I will now provide my working definition of philanthropic cosmopolitanism. It is the co-
presence of two beliefs, or attitudes: first, the belief that all human beings belong to a single
community; and second, a love for all of the human beings within this single community, a love
expressed as profound care, or concern. Thus, a philanthropic cosmopolitan is one who loves all
human beings, and one who correlatively believes that all human beings belong to one collective:
humanity. So, to introduce this terminology to my thesis, in this paper I will contest John Moles’
claim that Diogenes’ doings and sayings indicate the implicit operation of philanthrōpia behind
the latter’s statements concerning cosmopolitanism. I believe that the available evidence shows
us that Diogenes’ conception of cosmopolitanism did not entail a universal community of human
beings, and that his cosmopolitanism was non-philanthropic.
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A Brief Interlude on Biographical Source Material.
It is difficult to establish much certainty about the life of Diogenes, since most of the
information that we have appears in sources that date at least two centuries after his death.13
Not
only are these sources rather late, but they are also somewhat unreliable if we are hoping to
secure biographical facts about our subject. For the most part, the sources to which we have
access today depict a “literary” characterization of Diogenes, an idealized, almost mythical
figure to whom later authors would attribute certain actions or sayings in order to praise or
condemn particular behaviors.14
Some of the sources that scholars have grown to distrust when it
comes to the life of Diogenes are authored by notable figures in the ancient world; for instance,
though Epictetus, Dio Chrysostom, and Julian all write about Diogenes, scholars have suggested
that each of these writers makes Diogenes after his own image.15
It may be that these later
writers, living in a world where Stoicism had emerged as the most popular philosophy, were
attempting to smooth the transition from Cynic to Stoic doctrines in order to establish the
Socratic lineage of their school. By confirming a linkage between Zeno of Citium – Crates –
Diogenes of Sinope – Antisthenes – Socrates, Stoic writers may have hoped to anchor the
legitimacy of their movement. At any rate, there are good reasons to distrust these later accounts
of Diogenes’ life.
Somewhat ironically, our best source of information about Diogenes of Sinope is the
Lives of the Philosophers, a largely biographical/anecdotal text composed by Diogenes Laertius
13
Donald R. Dudley, A History of Cynicism: From Diogenes to the 6th
Century A.D. (London: Methuen and
Company, 1937), 18.
14 Dudley, History of Cynicism, 18-19.
15 Ibid., 19-20; see also M. Billerbeck, “The Ideal Cynic from Epictetus to Julian,” In The Cynics: The Cynic
Movement in Antiquity and its Legacy, ed. R. Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé (Berkeley and Los
Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1996), 205-221.
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sometime in the third century, C.E.16
Laertius is sometimes ridiculed by modern scholars for his
questionable skills as a historian, as the Lives is a somewhat amateurish compilation of
preexisting texts that dealt with the lives and ideas of famous Greek philosophers. Though we
have lost much (nearly all) of the original source material that Laertius used to compile his
biographies, scholars have generally determined that he was an impartial and uncritical editor,
and that his text reflects the spectrum of information that he had available to him during his
lifetime.17
It seems that he names his sources whenever possible, and he willingly provides
multiple versions of anecdotes when available; in the section about Diogenes of Sinope alone,
Laertius names over twenty of his sources in the body of the text itself.18
The problem that
scholars face when trying to evaluate Laertius’ work, however, is that nearly all of the sources he
cites no longer exist. We cannot compare his work to the source material to verify his
trustworthiness as an editor/compiler.
Though it is mostly impossible for us to find outside confirmation for the many
individual details of the life of Diogenes of Sinope that Laertius provides, we nevertheless find in
the Lives a reasonably coherent portrayal of the former’s character. The biography of Diogenes
appears early in the sixth book of the Lives, which is devoted to the life accounts of some of the
more prominent Cynics. As is typical throughout this particular biography, the several accounts
given of Diogenes’ origin and death contain contradictory information, and leave us with little
16
Dudley, History of Cynicism, 20: “Little profit is to be had from the accounts of Diogenes in Epictetus, Dio
Chrysostom, or Julian…It is otherwise with Diogenes Laerius, whose literary demerits are to our advantage.”
17 Robin Hard, “Introduction,” Diogenes the Cynic: Sayings and Anecdotes, with Other Popular Moralists (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012), xvii.
18 By my count, twenty-one different writers are named in this section alone: Diocles (twice), Eubulides,
Theophrastus, Olympiodorus, Polyeuctus, Lysanius, Favorinus (twice), Sotion (twice), Menippus, Eubulus, Hecato,
Metrocles, Zolus, Dionysius, Cleomenes, Cercidas, Antisthenes, Demetrius, Sosicrates, Satyrus, Athenodorus
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clarity as far as what must have actually happened in these events; for instance, Laertius tells us
that Diocles says that Diogenes was exiled from Sinope because his father defaced the city’s
currency, while Eubulides claims that Diogenes himself was the culprit. In other cases, Laertius
tells us that certain sayings attributed to Diogenes have been attributed to other philosophers as
well, and that true authorship is unclear. Nevertheless, Laertius presents us with a character of
Diogenes whose attitudes and behaviors are more-or-less consistent; we may not know with
absolute certainty what Diogenes may have said verbatim on a given occasion, but at the very
least, we can feel relatively confident that Laertius has preserved the type of person that
Diogenes was as he was represented in the available records of the day. Though scholars may
find the quality of this account unsatisfying, we nevertheless have no other worthy alternative.
In fact, as I have previously stated, there are not very many sources that we can fully trust
outside of Laertius. It became a fairly common practice for students of rhetoric to preserve and
memorize sayings concerning Diogenes from the first century C.E., onward; so there is actually a
significant degree of discussion about Diogenes throughout the literature of the first several
centuries of the Common Era.19
However, there is reason to suspect that these other writers may
not share Laertius’ impartial perspective, and that their accounts may reveal depictions of
Diogenes through more biased philosophical filters. For instance, M. Billerbeck notes that
Epictetus goes to extremes to idealize the character of Diogenes: “Apart from purging the
anecdotes of any provocative points, [Epictetus] even gives [Diogenes] features of Crates’
19
Derek Krueger, “The Bawdy and Society: The Shamelessness of Diogenes in Roman Imperial Culture,” In The
Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and its Legacy, ed. R. Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1996), 223.
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philanthropic character.”20
Billerbeck also finds Julian guilty of similar whitewashing: “Julian,
towards the end of the movement, ascribes to Cynicism a sublime character and surrounds it with
an almost religious aura. In his eyes Diogenes is a model for a universal and divine
philosophy…”21
These two writers are certainly not the only ones to selectively cast Diogenes in
an exceptionally favorable light; in fact, Billerbeck believes that such actions were part of a
much larger trend:
This [divine] conception of Cynicism, as we shall see, represents a construction of
the later times and reflects the influence of syncretism. The tendency to idealize
the founder of the movement and to purge his portrait of any features that might
shock or keep off potential followers can in fact be traced back to a much earlier
period of Cynicism. Because their ultimate origins were to be found in Diogenes,
it remained a problem for the Stoics in particular to justify their Cynic heritage.22
A gentle evolution from Cynicism to Stoicism was of course desirable because it would
clearly place Stoicism within Socratic lineage, the ultimate “stamp of approval” when it came to
philosophical legitimacy. Thus the Stoics, eventual proponents of a philanthropic
cosmopolitanism, were on the lookout for any signs of the same from within the Cynic ranks.
Given this (at least potential) bias, I will be building my arguments concerning Diogenes’
cosmopolitanism from the account of Diogenes Laertius, as his biographical work is considered
relatively impartial in comparison with the Stoics and their ideological investments in accounts
of the life of Diogenes of Sinope. Though these biographical anecdotes found in Laertius are
20
M. Billerbeck, “The Ideal Cynic from Epictetus to Julian,” In The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and
its Legacy, ed. R. Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of
California Press, 1996), 208.
21 Billerbeck, “The Ideal Cynic,” 205.
22 Ibid., 206.
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perhaps of dubious worth, they nevertheless play a significant role in Moles’ account; hence, I
will also refer to Laertius to show that Moles’ characterization of Diogenes is implausible.
John Moles and the Cosmopolitanism of Diogenes.
Let us now turn to Moles’ claims in “Cynic Cosmopolitanism,” the article in which
Moles suggests that Diogenes of Sinope should be seen as a “missionary” figure, one who
displayed a “profound philanthropy, ‘love for mankind,’ ‘benevolence.’”23
Throughout the
article, Moles claims that Cynics in the ancient world were fundamentally energized by a
philanthropic cosmopolitanism, which is to say that the Cynics commonly attempted to
“convert” all people to their way of life out of their loving desire to see them thrive. In Moles’
view, Cynics loved human beings – all human beings – to such a great extent that they would go
to extreme lengths to show them the folly of human society, and inspire them to live lives in
accordance with the dictates of nature:
The Cynic proclaims his allegiance to the cosmos. He can live a virtuous life
anywhere: the whole earth serves as his home. He maintains a positive attitude
toward the natural world and toward the animal world. He is himself godlike. He
recognizes his actual kinship with other sages and his potential kinship with
human beings in general, whom he seeks to convert. He is a mediator between
men and gods, and this mediation is an important part of his pedagogic activity.24
While Moles may succeed in his efforts to show that Cynicism in the ancient world was a
life-philosophy motivated in part by a commitment to philanthropic cosmopolitanism, it does not
23
Moles, “Cynic Cosmopolitanism,” 114-115.
24 Ibid., 118.
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follow that the same is true of its founder, Diogenes.25
Cynicism after Diogenes may have
changed in ways he did not anticipate. Thus, if we want to know if Diogenes was a philanthropic
figure, we cannot rely upon reports of what Cynicism had become several hundred years after his
death: we must restrict our inquiry to the life of Diogenes alone, as it presents Moles’ thesis with
its biggest obstacles. There are a number of anecdotes in Lives of the Philosophers that
problematize Moles’ claim that Diogenes was a philanthropic person, one who “regarded all men
as his potential philoi (“friends,” kinsmen”) and consequently potential ‘citizens of the cosmos’
like himself.26
Moles is certainly not oblivious to this fact; he recognizes that his thesis is
controversial in light of reports of Diogenes’ more abrasive behavior. Nevertheless, Moles
presses on by stating his opinion that the “difficulties” that Diogenes represents to his account
“have been exaggerated.”27
I disagree with this assessment, and believe that reference to
episodes from the biography of Diogenes will demonstrate that Moles’ story is implausible.
Since we are looking for evidence that stands in opposition to the claim that Diogenes
was a philanthropic cosmopolitan – that he was motivated to improve all human beings out of a
grand love for them – I will highlight passages in Laertius’ Lives in which Diogenes expresses
scorn for any particular subset of human beings, or passages which suggest that he believed that
some people are worth less than others. Any signs that indicate that Diogenes was not universally
philanthropic, or that he discriminated against certain groups of people, cast doubt on the claim
25
In fact, Julian informs us that the Cynicism of his day should not be thought of as that which was promoted by
Diogenes: “Oenomaeus with good reason asserts that ‘Cynicism is neither Antisthenism nor Diogenism.” Julian,
“Oration Nine,” In The Cynic Philosophers: from Diogenes to Julian, trans. Robert Dobbin (New York: Penguin
Classics, 2012), 180.
26 Ibid., 117-118.
27 Ibid., 115.
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that he was cosmopolitan in a modern sense. It could be the case that Diogenes merely coined a
term that subsequent thinkers refined.28
It may be helpful to this discussion to note a passage in which Moles suggests that there
ought to be different “senses” in which we understand the philanthrōpia of the Cynics:
It is true that attempts have been made to distinguish between early Cynicism, in
particular the Cynicism of Diogenes, and later Cynicism, which has been argued
to be a humanized, even bowdlerized, form…But this line of argument can be
taken too far…One must distinguish in this context between different aspects of
philanthrōpia. Early Cynicism is not incompatible with the general concept –
indeed, the Cynic’s missionary zeal, which is attested from the first beginnings of
Cynicism, and many of his traditional roles, the most important of which seem
also to be integral to Cynicism, logically presuppose philanthrōpia, although it is
very often not philanthrōpia in the “softer” sense. Later Cynicism, or at least some
branches of it, following the example of the humane and kindly Crates,
emphasized philanthrōpia in the “softer” sense, but this is a difference of
emphasis, and not of fundamentals. Concern for the well-being of one’s fellow
man is basic to Cynicism in all its forms, though this concern could be articulated
in contrasting ways – harshly and aggressively, à la Diogenes, or humanely and
benignly, à la Crates.29
Let us follow Moles’ lead and make a distinction here between “hard” and “soft”
philanthrōpia. It seems that in Moles’ view, soft philanthrōpia is characterized by kindness or
friendliness, while hard philanthrōpia is typified by its relative lack of the same. Nevertheless,
hard philanthrōpia is still philanthrōpia, so I will give Moles the benefit of the doubt and suppose
that Diogenes was a philanthropic person of the hard variety. Perhaps this will allow us to
tolerate accounts of his apparent disdain for particular individuals, and free us up to see the love
for humanity that ultimately generated his unorthodox didactic tactics.
28
Specifically, the Stoics, in my view.
29 Moles, “The Cynic’s Attitude to Moral Corruption,” 112-113.
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One early indication that Diogenes may have been more misanthropic than philanthropic
appears in DL 6.32, where Diogenes is said to have spat directly into the face of a wealthy host.
According to the custom of the day, if one needed to spit while in a home, they would spit in the
“worst” part of the home, so as not to dishonor any of the home’s better features.30
On this
particular occasion, Diogenes made it quite clear that he thought the home’s owner was more
foul than any of its contents when he “discharged the phlegm into the man’s face, being unable,
he said, to find a meaner receptacle.”31
While one might argue that this action suggests that
Diogenes was willing to go to extreme measures to show his host that he ought to better care for
his soul, the measures are indeed so extreme that one may at least begin to question the alleged
presence of any philanthropic motives. This is an instance of hard philanthrōpia, at best.
Another anecdote tells of a time when Diogenes called out for men to gather around him.
When a number of men drew near, Diogenes began to beat them with his stick, shouting, “It was
men I called for, not scoundrels!”32
Once again, while it is possible for us to glean a positive
moral from this particular episode, to see Diogenes as a sage who hopes to see human beings
improve themselves, the means by which Diogenes teaches his lessons leaves room for doubt
regarding his intentions. Particularly revealing in this anecdote is Diogenes’ distinction between
“men” and “scoundrels”; if there are human beings that Diogenes does not recognize as being
human, this distinction potentially problematizes the claim that Diogenes saw all human beings
as equally valuable. One could argue that insulting someone by calling her or him “inhuman” is
30
Galen, “Protreptic 8,” In Diogenes the Cynic, 37.
31 DL 6.32, Lives, 35: Laertius notes that other sources attribute this incident to Diogenes’ rival, Aristippus.
Discrepancies in the record, such as this one, do indeed make the construction of a historical analysis of the life of
Diogenes much more difficult. Absolute precision in these matters is regrettably impossible.
32 Ibid., 35. (DL 6.32)
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simply a motivational technique, or a means of informing someone that they need to improve
their lives; while there may be something of value in this argument, I still find the distinction
between human and scoundrel to be significant when it is coming from a philosopher who made
a regular habit of discriminating in this way, as we shall see.
One can easily see Diogenes as a misanthrope in an anecdote in which he exacts revenge
for an insult. Laertius reports that Diogenes was present at a feast when a number of guests threw
the bones from their meals to him, as if he were a dog. Diogenes responded by urinating on the
offending guests, as if he were a dog.33
According to Laertius, it was not unusual for Diogenes to
engage in such a public display of bodily functions: in the most infamous case, Diogenes was
said to have masturbated in public, and later stated in his defense that “he wished it were as easy
to banish hunger by rubbing the belly.”34
On the one hand, there may be an educational purpose
behind these dramatic displays; on the other hand, there is room to question the alleged
philanthropic motivations that Moles claims are behind Diogenes’ pedagogical techniques. Even
Moles recognizes that in certain episodes, Diogenes’ treatment of others appears downright
abusive, though he explains that “abuse…is not incompatible with a didactic purpose.”35
Moles
believes that a didactic purpose can indicate the presence of concern for others, and that what
might seem to be abusive behavior on the surface, is actually philanthropic behavior. I will
concede the point that abuse is not incompatible with didactic purpose; however, to assume that
the presence of a “didactic purpose” indicates that philanthropic cosmopolitanism is at work is
too great of an assumption. It may be enough to suggest that Diogenes was motivated by love to
33
Ibid., 49. (DL 6.46)
34 Ibid., 71. (DL 6.69)
35 Moles, “Cynic Cosmopolitanism,” 115.
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teach others, but it is not enough to prove that Diogenes was motivated by love to teach all
others.
Several other important statements attributed to Diogenes cast yet further doubt on the
notion that he loved all humans equally, even assuming a distinction between hard/soft
philanthrōpia. In one of his most shocking statements, Diogenes appears misogynistic, or at the
very least, blatantly misanthropic: “Seeing some women hanged from an olive tree, he said,
‘Would that every tree bore similar fruit.’”36
In this anecdote, Diogenes discovers the bodies of
several women who have taken their own lives by hanging themselves from an olive tree; his
reaction to this scene is offensive by our standards, to say the least.37
But I think it is important
that we here consider the possibility that Diogenes thought that certain people were ill-suited for
life. His attitude at the sight of the women is in keeping with one expressed in Laertius’ claim
that Diogenes “would continually say that for the conduct of life we need right reason or a
halter.”38
The implication of this slogan is that if one does not live with right reason, one may as
well hang herself. This may be a figure of speech; but at the very least, it does suggest that
Diogenes may have held that the lives of those who do not order their lives in accordance with
reason are worth less than the lives of those who do – a rather anti-cosmopolitan sentiment in my
estimation. This episode seems to express an attitude that is woefully incompatible with our
operative conception of philanthropic cosmopolitanism.
36
DL 6.52, Lives, 53.
37 Susan Guettel Cole, Landscapes, Gender, and Ritual Space: The Ancient Greek Experience (Berkeley and Los
Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2004), 206: Cole claims that it was somewhat common for young
Greek women of this period to commit suicide in this manner.
38 DL 6.24, Lives, 27.
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The cosmopolitanism of Diogenes is further thrown into question by one of the most
famous anecdotes about his life. Laertius describes a time when Diogenes “lit a lamp in broad
daylight and said, as he went about, ‘I am looking for a man.’”39
In my interpretation, this
statement confirms our earlier suggestion that for Diogenes, not all people are human beings.
Baldry interprets this passage along this line as well:
…whereas other thinkers, such as Protagoras and Aristotle, held that such
civilized beings had a primary right to be called ‘men’, Diogenes declared that the
non-wise are not men. Hence the story of his walking through the streets of
Athens with a lantern in broad daylight saying, ‘I am looking for a man.’40
Baldry then connects this anecdote to another in which Diogenes calls a great gathering at
Olympia, “a great crowd, but few who could be called men,”41
and concludes from these sayings
that for Diogenes, “only the wise man is truly man, and truly possesses the nature of man. The
unwise are sub-human, unhuman, not human at all.”42
I take this evidence to suggest that
Diogenes did not consider himself to be a fellow citizen of the cosmos with all human beings,
but rather with “wise” human beings alone. John Moles himself admits that there are “several
factors” which suggest that the Cynic’s conception of who qualifies as an “other man” is
somewhat restricted.43
One significant factor that Moles observes is the fact that a number of
Cynics – including Diogenes – maintain that there is an absolute division between the wise few
and the foolish many.44
Another important factor that suggests the reality of a Cynic elitism is
39
Ibid., 43. (DL 6.41)
40 Baldry, Unity of Mankind, 110-111.
41 DL 6.60, Lives, 61.
42 Baldry, Unity of Mankind, 111.
43 Moles, “Honestius Quam Ambitiosius,” 111.
44 Ibid., 111.
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that fact that Cynics – Diogenes in particular – routinely described the foolish many in harsh
terms.45
Moles addresses these factors and tries to neutralize them by once again turning to the
fact that other Cynics of the ancient world often addressed the crowds, the masses, and that their
“missionary” work was frequently conducted in public forums.46
In his view, Cynics must have
cared about the welfare of other human beings for them to engage in proselytizing activity.
However, while it may be reasonable to assume that the Cynics were sharing their wisdom out of
a desire to educate and improve at least some others, this does not mean that the Cynics
expected, or desired that their message should reach all other human beings. More importantly,
the fact that other Cynics may have sought converts en masse does not qualify as evidence that
Diogenes did the same. Diogenes may have gained a few followers, but they were certainly few
compared to the numbers of those he addressed: “He described himself as a hound of the sort
which all men praise, but no one, he added, dared go out hunting along with him.”47
Diogenes
was not concerned with reaching all of humanity with his message; he was content to share his
wisdom with those able to recognize it as such, and concentrate his efforts on the maintenance of
his own life and well-being. Fouad Kalouche captures this spirit when he observes:
There is no hope as there is no despair in the Cynic outlook to life. The process of
living they were engaged in was one of refusal but not of delusion: they refused
the imposed order but they were not deluded enough to believe that what they
were doing could actually change society or the people around them. They were
resisting what has been imposed on them the only way they could: by deriding
and mocking the others – not by evangelizing and building an example as later
Stoic and Christian constructs claimed – in order to be as comfortable as they can
45
Ibid., 111.
46 Ibid., 112.
47 DL 6.33, Lives, 35.
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with the life they chose. The Cynic solitary and anti-social stand was not an
expressed war on humanity nor was it an attempt to humanize others.48
Conclusions.
At the beginning of “Cynic Cosmopolitanism,” John Moles states that the evidence to
which we have access in our attempts to form a comprehensive understanding of Cynic
philosophy is simply “defective,” and that consequently, his account of Cynic cosmopolitanism
is simply a “story” (muthos), a line of best fit.49
While Moles is right in his assessment of the
evidence – it is firstly, scarce, and secondly, often dubious – it seems that he makes a number of
missteps in the construction of the Cynic story. Whereas other scholars generally note a sharp
difference between the thought of early Cynics and that of later Cynics,50
Moles operates under
the assumption that the Cynic movement remained of one consistent mind over several centuries,
and in several instances he suggests that testimonies given by non-Cynics centuries after
Diogenes’ death permit us to makes inferences about his life.51
He concludes that Diogenes was
a cosmopolitan thinker in a philanthropic vein, though he has no compelling biographical
evidence upon which to rest his case. At best, Moles can point to the public activities of
48
Fouad Kalouche, “The Cynic Way of Living,” Ancient Philosophy 23 (2003): 192.
49 Moles, “Cynic Cosmopolitanism,” 106: “…because the evidence is so defective, there comes a point where we
must employ the principle ben trovato…Inevitably, therefore, my reconstruction of Cynic cosmopolitanism will be a
‘story’ (muthos) rather than a ‘true account’ (logos).”
50 Desmond, Cynics, 11: “Goulet-Cazé, Luis Navia and others follow Donald Dudley in marking out ‘two unequal
stages’ in the history of Cynicism: the first from Antisthenes and Diogenes to the mid-third century BCE is
exclusively Greek and contains the most creative and compelling Cynics; the second extends from approximately
250 BCE to 500 CE, and includes figures from across the Mediterranean, most of whom blend Cynic ideas with a
medley of other influences.”
51 Moles, “Cynic Cosmopolitanism,” 116: “…when Epictetus describes Diogenes as ‘dear to gods as to men,’ as
‘loving all mankind,’ this is not a late, propagandizing Stoicizing view, but a conception integral to Cynicism from
its beginnings.” I contend that this is the very definition of a “late, propandanizing Stoicizing view.”
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Diogenes to suggest that he must have been somewhat interested in gaining followers; but even
then, the presence of a desire to share knowledge and gain followers does not exclude the
possibility that one is still an elitist, that one is not out to help and convert all, but only a select
few. The nature of the distinctions that Diogenes makes between the wise and crowd indicate
that he likely did not believe that people could become genuine human beings who live
according to nature. Thus, it is not clear to me that Moles’ storytelling of a philanthropic
cosmopolitan Diogenes is profitable, especially in light of counter-evidence that suggests that
Diogenes was nothing of the sort.
The evidence concerning Diogenes and his views pertaining to philanthropic
cosmopolitanism suggests:
In a number of instances in Laertius’ Lives, Diogenes expresses scorn or disdain
for particular individuals and groups;
Several statements attributed to Diogenes explicitly express his opinion that only
the wise count as human beings;
Diogenes’ harsh teaching style does not entail that his motivations were not
philanthropic in nature, but the desire to teach does not necessarily indicate the
presence of universally philanthropic motivations;
A speaker may address a crowd with the intention of reaching just a few
individuals within that crowd;
Particular expressions of loving actions are not enough to indicate that one’s
philanthrōpia extends to all human beings, that is, in cosmopolitan fashion;
Weighing the implications of these statements against the definition of philanthropic
cosmopolitanism outlined earlier in this paper – the love-inspired belief that all human beings
belong to a single community – it seems to me that Diogenes did not hold a philanthropic
cosmopolitan view because:
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It does not appear that Diogenes valued all human beings equally, unless we limit
the scope of who counts as human in the same manner that it seems he did (this
seems to violate the spirit of cosmopolitanism from the get-go);
It is even clearer that Diogenes did not endorse a love of humanity-at-large, but
that his care and concern was solely reserved for the wise.
Though Diogenes may have been first to coin the term “cosmopolitan,” he did not mean
by this term what we understand it to mean today. He believed that only a select group of people
would accept his teachings, and that the majority of people might as well not even exist if they
could not live in the manner he deemed best. While he may have been motivated to inspire the
wise out of a profound love for them, this love certainly did not extend to all human beings, but
only to those whom Diogenes believed had earned the right to be called “human”. Thus, in my
view, when Diogenes states that he is a citizen of the cosmos, he is not only saying that he is not
a member of the traditional polis, but that he has an entirely different concept of who and what
he considers to be part of his community. His community is not humanity-at-large, but rather, the
fellow-citizens of wisdom.
One might object to my argument by pointing out that Diogenes was said to have
authored a number of long-lost texts – fourteen dialogues and seven tragedies according to
Laertius’ count. Why would he have written these works if he did not mean to share his ideas
and influence others? First of all, Diogenes’ status as an author is a matter of debate. After he
lists the alleged works, Laertius also shares that two ancients disputed the claim that Diogenes
was an author: “Sosicrates in the first book of his Successions, and Satyrus in the fourth book of
his Lives, allege that Diogenes left nothing in writing, and Satyrus adds that the sorry tragedies
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are by his friend Philiscus, the Aeginetan.”52
If their testimonies are to be believed, the objection
that Diogenes wrote is at least subject to further debate.53
Even if we suppose that Diogenes was a writer, his texts could very well have been
satires that simply intended to mock the popular authors of his day. While I hesitate to base this
response to the objection on a figure other than Diogenes himself, Crates – Diogenes’ follower -
is attributed with authorship of several satirical works. It is possible that Diogenes did not write
to convert the public, but that he merely wrote to insult thinkers of public acclaim. For instance,
given Laertius’ reports of the antagonistic relationship between Diogenes and Plato, would it be
altogether surprising to discover that Diogenes’ alleged Republic dialogue was a parody of
Plato’s dialogue of the same name?
Finally, I will reiterate an earlier point: just because one shares one’s knowledge with
certain others does not necessarily indicate that the sharer is motivated to educate all others out
of any philanthropic desire. Even if Diogenes did author works, his desire to communicate his
knowledge does not necessarily mean that he thought that all human beings could, or should,
benefit from them. It may be the case that he hoped to leave wisdom for those he deemed worthy
of receiving it.
What are the implications of the determinations I have made in this paper? One
significant result of my assessment is that it can serve as complementary evidence to the thesis
that it was the Stoics who refined the term “cosmopolitan” and infused it with a meaning much
52
DL 6.80, Lives, 83.
53 William Desmond also distrusts claims that Diogenes was an author: “…if Diogenes threw away his cup and had
only his cloak, staff, and “tub,” how did he get the papyrus, ink, and reed pens (or even the cheaper wax tablets) to
write so much? And if he scorned human customs, would he not also have despised such conventional activities as
writing, as some anecdotes imply he did?” – Desmond, Cynics, 22.
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like its meaning today. According to this thesis, Diogenes may have certainly influenced the
Stoic conception of cosmopolitanism, even if he did not share this mature, developed conception
himself. Another important outcome of the present work is that it promotes the view of Diogenes
as an intrepid innovator of techniques of self-determination. If Diogenes was less concerned with
“converting” others to the Cynic way of life, it may be that he was instead primarily occupied
with the invention of this manner of living, and the effects that this lifestyle would have on his
own physical and mental being.
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