The viability of enforcementmechanisms under money

laundering and anti-terrorismoffences in Malaysia

An overview

Guru DhillonFaculty of Law, Multimedia University, Melaka, Malaysia

Rusniah Ahmad and Aspalela RahmanCollege of Law, Government & International Studies, Faculty of Law,

Northern University of Malaysia, Sintok, Malaysia, and

Ng Yih MiinFaculty of Law, Multimedia University, Melaka, Malaysia

Abstract

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to give a better insight to the legal society, practitioners andlegislators of the working mechanisms of money laundering activities, as well as the functionalities ofthe Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-terrorism Financing Act 2003 (AMLATFA) in Malaysia, incurbing money laundering and terrorism funding activities. At the same time, the paper provides anoverview on the applicability and practicability of the enforcement mechanisms in Malaysia byexploring legislations from different jurisdictions that are more developed.

Design/methodology/approach – The paper achieves this by having a cross-sectional analysisonto the legislation in Malaysia such as AMLATFA and also similar legislations found in countriessuch as the UK. A complete insight is further gained by having interviews with experts in thejudiciary, Bank Negara, as well as the experts from the Attorney General’s Chamber in Malaysiaregarding their insight into the subject matter. Last but not least, the authors also surveyed into thedifferent points of view from journal articles in Malaysia and globally.

Findings – Malaysia has a legal framework for curbing money laundering but the currentAMLATFA provisions are considered to have failed to be effectively enforced. A more comprehensive,specific and well elaborated legal framework will have to be laid down in order to create a betterplatform for the prosecutors to bring a good case against these money launderers.

Practical implications – This paper will give a deeper insight to the legal society of the capabilityof AMLATFA and the lack of it, in curbing money laundering in Malaysia and, at the same time,creating awareness among policy makers of the difficulties faced by the enforcement bureaus inprosecuting these money launderers due to the lacunas in the current law.

Originality/value – This paper could be useful source of information for practitioners, academics,policymakers and students and a guide for any possible future amendments to the currentinsufficiency.

Keywords Malaysia, Legislation, Money laundering, Anti-terrorism, Enforcement mechanisms

Paper type Research paper

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at

www.emeraldinsight.com/1368-5201.htm

Journal of Money Laundering ControlVol. 16 No. 2, 2013

pp. 171-192q Emerald Group Publishing Limited

1368-5201DOI 10.1108/13685201311318511

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IntroductionThe shockwave of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 has entirely merged thetwo distinct processes – money laundering and terrorist financing (Munshani, 2008).The FATF at the time of the incident with massive support from 130 states andinternational organizations formulated a system of voluntary regulatory structureswhich includes amongst others, the obligations to report any suspicious financialactivities and transformed such obligations into a mandatory procedure[1]. The effortscould then be seen in the October 2001 issue of “Anti-Money Laundering of NineSpecial Recommendations on Terrorist Finance”[2].

The changes that have changed the entire system of the international world haveconcurrently caused the changes to the Malaysian legislation. In July 2001, thegovernment gazetted the Anti Money Laundering Act (AMLA)[3] as it was then referredto. The Government of Malaysia did not just stop there but continued makingamendments[4] as an effort to curb with the uprising money laundering by terrorist cellgroups. Subsequently this Act was then amended with special Recommendations onTerrorist Financing and the Act is now commonly referred to the Anti-MoneyLaundering and Anti Terrorism Financing Act 2001.

Money laundering has been criminalised by the AMLATFA. The provisions in thisAct also bridged the boundaries set by the bank secrecy[5] provisions that previouslyhave impeded many criminal investigations involving clients of financial institution.Such changes have been absolutely necessary in order to ensure that money launderersbe brought to justice by effective enforcement carried out with the co-operation of thebanking and financial institutions in reporting any forms of suspicious activities to theBank Negara.

In general, the AMLATFA contains the offences involving money laundering whichinclude amongst others the procedures of investigations, the mandatory obligation ofreporting and recording of evidence as well as the forfeiture of properties and assets ofthe suspected individuals corporate bodies. The AMLATFA provides the power tofreeze and seize any property when there is existence of a reasonable ground to suspectany gains or any involvement in the money laundering activities[6].

Money launderingThis paper will first focus in the discussion involving money laundering activities asthis will provide the milieu understanding of how money laundering is associated withfinancing of terrorism (Morais, 2002). In this context, money laundering activities areconsidered as the most adequate and probably most exploited form of activity in therole for financing terrorism. It was once being viewed that money laundering andterrorism funding were two different legal, financial and political issues but since late2001 then has evolved into a merged system in our current modern society[7].

Definition of money launderingAccording to the FATF[8], money laundering could be best defined as “The processingof the proceeds of crime so as to disguise their illegal origin”. Money laundering is alsofound to have its own definition in the 1988 Vienna Convention which states as any formof activities that involve conversion or transfer of property at the state of mind ofknowing or aware of such property is derived illegal activities as stated in thesub-paragraph (a)[9] of the said document also stated for the same convention that

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money laundering involves any individuals or bodies participating in the act ofconcealing the origin of any property or asset.

Generally, organised crime groups, drug syndicates as well as corrupted politiciansare involved in the activities of money laundering. It is due to the need to transfer largesum of money which are “dirty” or illegal to another place to avoid detection, andtransformation of such monies into clean funds is being carried out.

Why launder money?The next question arises: why would they do so? The answer to it is simple. The moneythat was transformed was initially from illegally illicit means monies would be primefor the law enforcing to first, detect and reveal of illegal activities and second, to the courtwhen charging these individuals of the illegal dealings. Other reasons to be used withevidence bolstering money laundering activities are to protect such assets and fundsfrom seizure and forfeiture by the law enforcement authorities as well as avoiding largethe payments.

It is worthy to have an awareness that national and international legislations in curbingmoney laundering are not simply to put a halt to money laundering. The true nature of theselegislations are to end illegal activities associated with money laundering which includesamongst others fraud, illegal prostitution as well as narcotic drug trafficking.

Money laundering is the livelihood of the criminal activities because of theeffectiveness of the act to have concealed the criminals and their activities which providethem with a safe haven to have use and invest the “ill-gotten” money to expand theirempire and dominance of crimes globally. Without a doubt, money laundering is a periland if it is left legislated and enforced against, paralyse the financial system of a countryas well as being detriment to the national and international security globally and hence,it would indeed very important to have established counter measures which are flexibleto curb with the ever-evolving money laundering activities and arm the law enforcementauthorities with effective tools to detect these illegal illicit activities and proceed towhereas prosecution of the said crime well in theory anyway.

Understanding the different stages of money launderingIn common practise, there will be three distinct stages of money laundering:

(1) Placement. This is the first stage of money laundering when the criminalphysically disposes or deposits the illegal gains normally in the form of cash intolocal financial institutions[10] such as investing in unit trusts, fixed deposit as wellas banking accounts. The usual practise of the money launderers is that they willseparate these illicit gains into smaller fragments or portions before the money isbeing deposited into a bank account in order to prevent the “red flag” or triggerdetection by the financial enforcement. The cash proceeds normally will bedeposited into the off-shore institutions such as in Labuan as well as Isle of Man, orwill be used it to purchase things or products normally tagged as high price. Theitems placement stage is considered as the most important focus of moneylaundering detection for two reasons. First, it is considered as the weak link in themoney laundering process (Sandhu, 2000). Second, the placement stage is when theproceeds are the most proximate to the so-called perpetrator and therefore, it wouldbe the most effective and successful in identifying and tracking down the“perpetrator” at this stage (Sahamid, 2008).

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(2) Layering. The second stage is layering after the funds have entered the financialsystem. There will be a series of transactions involving conversion, movementor transfer being carried out at this stage.This stage is to ensure that the linkbetween the original source of fund (normally illegal) will be concealed anddisguised by forming complicated layers of transactions which is well-designedto prevent any traces in terms of “audit trails” (Security Commission ofMalaysia, 2004). These funds will normally be transferred among variousaccounts of different name holders domestically as well as globally whichincrease the complexity and difficulty of detecting them.

Each transaction could be undergoing dilution in amount or in another wordsbeing reduced into smaller proportions in order to destroy the audit trail.Activities such as trading in the financial markets or through investment couldaccomplish such objectives of the perpetrator. The difficulty and complexity aremulti-folded when these funds are transferred across transnational bordersespecially to countries with low-compliance and weak enforcement of moneylaundering laws, or countries with heavily adhered banking secrecy provisions.The other limitation arises when these countries involved in the transactionsof money laundering do not comply to the international conventions andFATF recommendation have do not co-operate to share information whichdisallowing authorities the link to the audit trail is of have many launderers willbe halt right there.

(3) Integration. It is the final part of money laundering where the illegal funding isthen transformed into a legalised fund without leaving a trace to the illegalsource of the said income. These illegal funding will make its path to legitimateor legal organisations by investing in legalised areas of the economy. Forinstance, this money could be invested into real estate as well as purchase ofjewellery and business investment. Hence, the process of converting “dirtymoney” to “clean and legitimate fund” is completed.

Due to the surreptitious nature of the money laundering, it is very complex anddifficult to have a well grasp of the exact amount of funds involve annually. It isestimated that RM25 millions argued in non-legitimate money leaves the country everyweek through money laundering[11].

The term terrorismIt is no longer uncommon among the Malaysians but does one actually understand themeaning of terrorism? What is the pre-requisite for a reason to be flagged as terrorism?This issue is very important to address in this paper as it will give a better insight to thereaders of the significance of money laundering in the area of combating terrorism.The term terrorism came to awareness among the majority of the population of theworld since the 11 September 2001 incident as well as subsequent bombings onterrorist attacks around the globe.

However, terrorism has marked a deep impression in the history of Malaysia waybefore the World Trade Centre incident. This dated back to the communist insurgencyera in Malaya when the communists carried out various attacks in the entire Malaya.Although terrorism is not a first instance phenomenon, it is worth to note that terrorismhad changed its form from the localised guerrilla attack to a transnational issue where

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terrorism attacks could happen anywhere and anytime in the world. The typologies ofthe terrorism have also undergone evolution and transformed into more refined andsophisticated types.

From the authors’ point of view, it is important to know and understand themechanism of terrorism modern warfare in order to be able to correlate and understandthe criminal mind involving money laundering activities as a vehicle to obtainsufficient funding for the execution of the terrorist attacks.

What is terrorismThe definition of terrorism is truly controversial as it would attract an effect on thelegal, political and even religious drawbacks[12]. The historical events such as theMunich Massacre to 9/11 had moulded the public’s perception as to what amounts toterrorism attacks and how an individual could be classified as terrorist.

There is an old quotation by Supt Shahbudin Bin Abdul Wahab[13]:

One man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter.

The reason behind the non-ending contention of the standard to define a terrorist isdue to the national interest and background of the people. One good example isMichael Collins, who is famous for fighting for the independence of Ireland from 1916to 1922, is well considered as national hero by the Irish but the English Governmentsees him as a terrorist who kills and assassinate indiscriminately to achieve the aimsof an independent Ireland. Question is whether Michael Collins is a terrorist or aliberator?

The present definition is found in the Terrorism Act 2000 in the UK[14]:

Terrorism: interpretation

(1) In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of action where:

(a) the action falls within subsection (2),

(b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or an internationalgovernmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and

(c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious orideological cause.

(2) Action falls within this subsection if it:

(a) involves serious violence against a person,

(b) involves serious damage to property,

(c) endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the action,

(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or

(e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.

(3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use of firearmsor explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1)(b) is satisfied.

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(4) In this section:

(a) “action” includes action outside the United Kingdom,

(b) a reference to any person or to property is a reference to any person, or to property,wherever situated,

(c) a reference to the public includes a reference to the public of a country other than theUnited Kingdom, and

(d) “the government” means the government of the United Kingdom, of Part of the UnitedKingdom or of a country other than the United Kingdom.

(5) In this Act a reference to action taken for the purposes of terrorism includes a reference toaction taken for the benefit of a proscribed organisation.

In the Inquiry into Legislation against Terrorism[15], Lord Lloyd of Berwick hasstrongly suggested at referring to a better definition for terrorism which is adopted bythe Federal Bureau of Investigation in the USA:

The use of serious violence against persons or property, or threat to use such violence, tointimidate or coerce a government, the public or any section of the public, in order to promotepolitical, social or ideological objectives.

It is also important to note the definition provided in the International Convention forthe Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism [1999] as:

[. . .] any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to anyother person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, whenthe purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel agovernment or an international organisation to do or abstain from doing any act[16].

As have been discussed above, there is no global definition of terrorism. However, forthe purpose of understanding in this paper, the authors would like to apply thedefinition recognised by National Security Council of Malaysia[17] as:

An act to take control by using force and endangering the security of any premise, building,vehicle/aircraft, installation and/or human as hostage, and followed by specific demands forpolitical interest of certain groups or individuals.

Terrorist fundingThe apex issue that attracted the attention of financial intelligence units (FIUs)around the world after the 11 September attacks is the wide and complex channel offunding that these terrorist organizations had set up.

There are long lists of ways and initiatives taken by terrorist cell groups to obtainenough funding for the attacks over the years. This section of the paper will berevealing the descriptions of various different techniques such as state sponsorshipand donations of the charity. The typography usage of charity fund will likely to haveopened the eyes of the readers of the unknown nature of the ingenuity of some of thesefund raising activities and this will help the readers to understand better andapprehend the difficulty and challenges faced by government agencies.

In the past years, terrorist organisations have been depending on support fromcharitable contributions as well as criminal proceeds to fund the cell. Funding is very

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important to ensure that the missions of these organisations are achieved. As most ofthe countries around the world including Malaysia are taking strict surveillance overterrorism acts, these illegal groups are under consistent pressure and in order tosucceed they will carry out such unconventional attack (Raphaeli, 2003).

Another method that has been used by the terrorist to fund their organizations is byobtaining money from the donations that was provided by the public to certainso-called “charitable associations”. A lot of times the government agencies globallyover-look area. Charity associations or bodies normally do not have clear accounts ofthe recipient of the money. For instance, the donors wish to remain amongst others andthe recipient’s contributions many different poor families in a particular war torncountries such as Iraq and Afghanistan.

Even where there are records of donors, it is very difficult to check and authentic thecredibility of the information. There might be a list of “phantom” recipients whoactually does not exist in actual fact the money has been channelled to variousrecipients appointed by the terrorist cells. There is no check and balance of the flow ofthe money from these charitable associations or bodies. The loophole in this area hasgiven a new boon for the terrorist cells to obtain funding without a trace.

Terrorist cell groups such as IRA, the insert and note adopt a unique approach byputting up a political front with the intention to legitimize their cause. By putting up apolitical veil, people will be attracted to support the causes of the IRA. Other terroristcells such as Hamas and Hezbollah received the funding from state support from Syriaand Iran. Illegal activities by terrorist cells are not uncommon in order to obtain thefunding needed. IRA had used kidnapping for ransom as well as robbery, extortion andillegal drugs sales (Taylor and Horgan, 1999).

Another important point to be taken here is that not all terrorist cells only carry outcrimes such as kidnapping and bank robbery. General Accounting Office (GAO, 2005)reported that:

Terrorists use an assortment of alternative financing mechanisms to earn, move, and storetheir assets [. . .] to earn assets, they focus on profitable crimes or scams involvingcommodities such as stolen cigarettes, counterfeit goods, and illicit drugs and the use ofsystems such as charitable organizations that collect largye sums of money, not to mentionprecious jewels [. . .]. Terrorists use a variety of alternative financing mechanisms to earn,move and store their assets based on common factors that make these mechanisms attractiveto terrorist and criminal groups alike.

More often than not, these organizations will fund their activities via low profile crimessuch as insurance and credit card fraud, auto theft and CD/DVD counterfeiting in orderto “fly below the radar” of the enforcement authorities (US Department of Justice, 2005).

Without a doubt, these terrorists will need to finance their position and continue toveil their accounts to ensure that they appear to be legitimate and lawful. Commonmethods used being to clandestinely shift the money without suspicion includeamongst others:

. debit cards;

. e-money;

. hawala;

. money remitters;

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. bank currency smuggling; and

. money laundering.

These terrorists will take the advantage of the nature of bank services to provide“convenience” to the customer in formulating methods of money laundering toclandestinely move the money also known as “smurfing”. In normal circumstances, theterrorists will make several cash deposits in the bank below the threshold amount thatis made by the bank institution to prevent any reporting by the bank to FIU[18]. Whenthe deposits are received, the terrorists will send out blank cheques with endorsementto their counterparts globally (US Department of Justice, 2005).

Stages of terrorist financingIn order to penetrate the criminal mind of these terrorists, it is important to understandthe different development stages of a terrorist group. According to Professor Naylor,there are three different stages – zone of contention, expansion and control[19]. Zone ofcontention is when the terrorist cells seldom develop and the nature connectionbetween the organization and funding is predatory. Zone of expansion is when theorganization forms a parasitical relationship with the funding. Last but not least, whena terrorist cell is at the stage of control, there will be a symbiotic relationship betweenthe terrorist group and the funding. The distinct features of each of the stage are thedistinct forms of fund-raising.

Categories of terrorism fundingFATF has simplified the categorization of terrorism funding in two main sourceswhich are first, state sponsorship and second “revenue generating activities”[20]. Therevenue generating activities could further be divided into three categories which are:

(1) legal activities;

(2) criminal proceeds; and

(3) individual/institutional sponsorship.

State sponsorship. This form of funding is the most desirable by most terroristorganizations. However, there are many controversies on the extent of the funding. Somescholars have contended that the trend is at the uprising side[21]. FATF on the otherhand contends the opposite that “and in some instances, ha[s] disappearedaltogether”[22].

Some examples of state sponsorship include the French Government that providedfinancial support to guerrilla groups in Indo China during the end of 1940s and theUSA’s funding to anti-communist guerrillas in countries such as Latin America, Africaand Asia. Currently, countries such as Libya, Iran and Saudi Arabia have been foundsponsoring international terrorist activities[23]. In troubled areas of the previouslycolonies of Soviet Union such as Georgia and Moldova, Russian has been supportingfinancial in abetting their insurgencies against the ruling governments[24].

Individual sponsorship. Under the limb of individual sponsorship, there will be twocategories which is individual contribution to terrorist groups usually include a selectgroup of contributors who contribute to these groups from a personal basis. The mainproblem from the perspective of anti money laundering enforcement is thatself-financing normally involves a very nominal amount for each transaction but in

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accumulations of all individuals involve, the amount might be significant. This is theweakness of the current financial regulation.

The Task force also agreed to the above statement by saying:

[. . .] financial institutions will probably be unable to detect terrorist financing as such. Indeed,the only time that financial institutions might clearly identify terrorist financing as distinctfrom other criminal misuse of the financial system is when a known terrorist or terroristorganisation has opened an account[25].

One good example is Osama bin Laden. The American Government associated Osamaas the main financial support of the Al-Qaeda in the 11 September attacks. Theestimations by some of the countries are as below (Kiser, 2005):

Swiss intelligence officials, who would presumably have access to high quality financialinformation, make estimates ranging from US$250-500 million. The Australian governmentplaces the total aboveUS$250 million. The British approximate the figure to be betweenUS$280 to 300 million (Greenberg et al., 2002, 2004).

One twist of event occurred when the National Commission on Terrorist Attack on theUSA (2004) stated that:

[. . .] contrary to common belief, Bin Laden did not have access to any significant amounts ofpersonal wealth (particularly after his move from Sudan to Afghanistan) and did notpersonally fund al Qaeda, either through an inheritance or businesses he was said to haveowned in Sudan[26].

However, despite the inconsistencies of the claim from different parties, it is important tonote that this form of financing is very difficult to be detected and traced. The securityunit should not take chances and should take necessary steps in order to carefullymonitor individuals’ transactions. The difficulty of detecting the petty amount ofindividual contributions to the terrorist cells would have become the avenue taken by theterrorists to fund them. Thus, more refined structure of financial intelligence should beset up to handle difficulties of detection from these individuals’ accounts.

Legal activities. Charitable organization and the NGOs could have financed theterrorist cells directly and indirectly as have been briefly discussed earlier in thisarticle. In the International Best Practices, the Task force said that:

Numerous instances have come to light in which the mechanism of charitable fundraising –,i.e. the collection of resources from donors and its redistribution for charitable purposes – hasbeen used to provide a cover for the financing of terror. In certain cases, the organisation itselfwas a mere sham that existed simply to funnel money to terronists. However, often the abuse ofnon-profit organisations occurred without the knowledge of donors, or even of members of themanagement and staff of the organisation itself, due to malfeasance by employees and/ormanagers diverting funding on their own. Besides financial support, some non-profitorganisations have also provided cover and logistical support for the movement of Terroristsand illicit arms.

The Task Force commented in the Nine Terrorist Finance Recommendation that:

Countries should review the adequacy of laws and regulations that relate to entities that canbe abused for the financing of terrorism. Non-profit organisations are particularly vulnerable,and countries should ensure that they cannot be misused by terrorist organisations posing aslegitimate entities; to exploit legitimate entities as conduits for terrorist financing, including

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for the purpose of escaping asset freezing measures; and to conceal or obscure the clandestinediversion of funds intended for legitimate purposes to terrorist organizations[27].

Scenarios such as the conflict in Bosnia and Chechnya, some scholars contended thatIslamic Charities had continued giving financial support to the Mujahedeen fighting inthe war[28]. Some examples scenarios are the misuse of charities by the IRA and thePalestine Liberation Organization (House Committee on Financial Services, 2003;Mason, 2003).

Once again the Task Forces commented as support to the above that:

Charities or non-profit organisations and other legal entities have been cited as playing animportant role in the financing of some terrorist groups. The apparent legal source of thisfunding may mean that there are few, if any, indicators that would make an individualfinancial transaction or series of transactions stand out as linked to terrorist activities[29].

The limitation that existed here is that it is close to impossible to distinguish between alegal donation or donation for the purpose of terrorism funding. An example of an NGOsaid to have helped the Al Qaeda’ is the Al Khidmat Foundation and BenevolenceInternational Foundation[30].

Criminal proceed of financing terroristThe criminal financing and terrorism financing have a very close relationship andsome scholars consider it as a “symbiosis” relationship between an organized crimegroup and insurgent groups (US Drug Enforeement Administration, 2003).

The Task Force in 1998 explained the nexus between the two obnoxious activities:

Drug Trafficking is an attractive source of funds for terrorist groups, enabling them to raiselarge sums of money. The degree of reliance on drug trafficking as a source of terrorist fundinghas grown with the decline in state sponsorship of terror groups. This trend has increasinglyblurred the distinction between terrorist and drug trafficking organisations. Both criminalorganisations and terrorist groups continue to develop international networks and establishalliances of convenience. Globalisation has enabled both terror and crime organisations toexpand and diversify their activities, taking advantage of the internationalisation ofcommunications and banking systems, as well as the opening of borders to facilitate theiractivities. Investigations and intelligence have revealed direct links between various terroristand drug trafficking organisations that frequently work together out of necessity orconvenience and mutual benefit[31].

As a statistic, it is found that:

Illicit narcotics generate a turnover of about $400 billion a year; another $100 billion isproduced by the smuggling of people, weapons and other goods, such as oil and diamonds[32].

In the United Nation Resolution 1373 on the 28 September 2011, the UN found that:

[. . .] with concern the close connection between international terrorism and transnationalorganized crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms trafficking, and illegalmovement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials[33].

The International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism in 1999mentioned that:

Recalling General Assembly resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996, paragraph 3,subparagraph (f), in which the Assembly called upon all States to take steps to prevent and

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counteract, through appropriate domestic measures, the financing of terrorists arid terroristorganizations, whether such financing is direct or indirect through organizations which alsohave or claim to have charitable, social or cultural goals or which are also engaged inunlawful activities such as illicit arms trafficking, drug dealing [. . .] for purposes of fundingterrorist activities[34].

The further support of the nexus between criminal proceed and terrorism fundingcould be found in the International Monetary Fund suggestion:

Terrorist activities may also be funded with funds that represent the proceeds of illegalactivities. Perpetrators of these activities constantly seek new ways to launder the funds inorder to use them without drawing the attention of authorities to the source of the funds and thelinks with the underlying crime(s). In 2000, the Fund responded to calls from the internationalcommunity to expand its work in the area of anti-money laundering. After the tragic events ofSeptember11, 2001, the Fund intensified its activities in this area and extended them to the areaof combating the financing of terrorism (International Monetary Fund, 2001, 2008).

Last but not least, the US Treasury Secretary also explained the assumption of nexusbetween the two activities:

As a result of US leadership, in 2004 the IMF and World Bank Boards endorsed a commonassessment methodology drafted by the FATF that provides a consistent framework forassessing compliance with FATF anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financerecommendations. The Hoards reaffirmed this decision this May and have agreed thatcomprehensive anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism assessments willbe included as a regular part of all financial sectors assessments and on-going surveillance.By the end of 2005, the IMF and World Bank conducted over 50 country assessments (UTS,Department of Treasury, 2006; US Department of Treasury, 2006).

Nexus between terrorism funding and money launderingInvestigations made in the aftermath of 9/11 incidents have revealed the significance ofmoney laundering in the process of terrorism funding. Many reports published alsosupport the result of the investigations[35]. The convergence of terrorism funding andmoney laundering is largely due to the similarity of the two activities in masking andcamouflaging the financial resources from the radar of the enforcement authority(Financial Action Task Force, FATE, 2008).

Since most scholars and government authorities are of the opinion that the connectionsamong the three elements which are: terrorism, organized crimes and money launderingare strong, the approach used in combating this unified threat[36] is by detecting anddeterring financial foundations and avenues associated to any of these parties.

Present legislations in Malaysia in curbing money laundering andterrorism fundingAs the techniques of the terrorist financier have changed over the time, the MalaysianGovernment law also had taken steps in evolving to curb the every changing activity.In the past ten years, legislators in Malaysia have come up with new laws. Thebanking industries are also working hand in hand with the mission of the governmentby issuing of directive orders in curbing specifically terrorist financing.

As it is the common saying that money is the machinery of everything. Hence, it isnot a surprise by the finding that financing terrorism has become an utmost concern

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for authorities. There is a long list of efforts by the Malaysian Government incombating terrorist funding including co-operation of intelligence with foreigncounterparts as well as training of to the employees in companies relevant to this area incurbing with the problems.

The Malaysian Government defined money laundering in AMLATFA[37] as:

(a) engages, directly or indirectly, in a transaction that involves proceeds of any unlawfulactivity;

(b) acquires, receives, possesses, disguises, transfers, converts, exchanges, carries, disposes,uses, removes from or brings into Malaysia proceeds of any unlawful activity; or

(c) conceals, disguises or impedes the establishment of the true nature, origin, location,movement, disposition, title of, rights with respect to, or ownership of, proceeds of anyunlawful activity;

where:

(aa) as may be inferred from objective factual circumstance, the person knows or has reasonto believe, that the property is proceeds from any unlawful activity; or

(bb) in respect of the conduct of a natural person, the person without reasonable excuse failsto take reasonable steps to ascertain whether or not the property is proceeds from anyunlawful activity[38].

The definition is very comprehensive as by words in the statute it has clearlydefined the activities that will be considered. As the AMLATFA was being drafted out,Malaysian legislator had reviewed into various different documents such as theCommonwealth Model Law For The Prohibition of Money Laundering (1990, revised1996).

Clearly, as stated in the statute, there are three types of money laundering asstated in paragraph (a), (b), and (c). These three limbs could be considered as threeseparate offences. As for the sub-paragraph (aa), it means that anyone who has theknowledge or has reason to have known that the money or transaction is source frommoney laundering activities will be liable and if he did not report to the relevantauthority such as the Bank Negara, he will be liable for the offence of moneylaundering.

Sub-paragraph (bb) actually refer to the situation where a person did not takereasonable steps and failed in due diligence in reporting the money launderingactivities. For instance, bank employees as well as insurance company employees aregiven a directive orders as well as instructions as to the procedures to detect and reportany suspicious transactions of the clients. However, if any of these employees failed inreporting and was found to have not followed the procedures, then they will have toface the legal consequences under this provision.

One good judgment in the case of Lloyds Bank Ltd v. EB Savory & Co[39] states thefollowing:

The standard by which the absence, or otherwise of negligence is to be determined must beascertained by reference to the practice of reasonable men carrying on the business ofbankers, and endeavouring to do so in such a manner as may be calculated to protectthemselves and others against fraud [. . .]

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Coverage of AMLATFA with other Malaysian legislationsPrior to AMLATFA the provisions in Malaysia to regulate assets in curbing organizedcrime is the Dangerous Drugs (Forfeiture of Property)Act 1988 and then followed byAnti-Corruption Act 1997(ACA).

Then, AMLATFA became the law. AMLATFA is very much a big leap in theMalaysian Legislation history as it provides a larger scope as compared to other previousstatutes. It has the coverage of 195 different offences and specific offences. AMLATFAis drafted in the way to have a great link between the different statutes governing a wideareas including terrorist funding, corruptions and also drug trafficking. There are a totalof eight offences covered by AMLATFA in the Anti-Corruption Act 1997, seven offencesin Banking and Financial Institutions Act (BAFIA) 1989, three offences in Customs Act1967, six offences in Offensive Weapons Act 1958, one offence in the Copyright Act 1987,one offence in the Corrosive and Explosive Substances and Offensive WeaponsAct 1958, five offences in the Explosives Act 1957, two offences in the Internal SecurityAct 1960, two in the Securities Commission Act 1993. It is indeed having covered a widerange of crimes and activities involving money laundering activities.

As for the issue of terrorism financing, AMLATFA has defined terrorism financingas: “‘terrorism financing offence’ means any offence under section 130N, 130O, 130P or130Q of the Penal Code”. In addition, AMLATFA also covered Part VI a specificallyentitled “Suppression of terrorism financing offences and freezing, seizure andforfeiture of terrorist property”.

Prime features of AMLATFA and other provisionsFirst, AMLATFA has extraterritorial application. This means that AMLATFA could beapplicable to property located in Malaysia or overseas[40]. It is very important to have theextraterritorial application as the fast paced development in communication will simplifyand encourage cross border transfer in order to prevent detection and prosecution.According to Section 2(1), of the Act, this AMLATFA provisions are applicable forretrospective offences[41]. This means that any commission of money laundering before orafter the commencement date will be equally be enforced by AMLATFA. This raise a veryimportant issue as it is against the Federal Constitution of Malaysia. Under Article 7(1) ofthe Federal Constitution, “it expressively prohibits any person from being tried underretrospective criminal laws.” Thus, it is a very important question to be raised whether thisprovision under AMLATFA of retrospective law will be considered as inconsistent with theConstitution and is contrary to Article 4(1) of the Federal Constitution? Under establishedlaws of practice, the Federal Constitution should prevail, so this is a grey area as well.

Competent authorityLaws are not effective without competent enforcement authorities. So who are thecompetent authorities in carrying out the enforcement of AMLATFA? It could befound in the Part III of the AMLATFA. Under s7 it explains the function of thecompetent authority as:

(1) The Minister of Finance may, by order published in the Gazette, appoint a person to be thecompetent authority and such person shall have all the functions conferred on the competentauthority by this Act. (2) The competent authority may authorise any of its officers or anyother person to perform any or all of its functions or render such assistance in theperformance of its functions under this Act as it may specify[42].

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The above role as the competent authority is appointed to be carried out by BankNegara. Hence, Bank Negara carried out the functions through their FIU as the integralpart of the entire operation.

Under s 8, the FIU is given the exclusive power to receive and analyse informationfrom any individual or reporting bodies regarding any transactions that is consideredas suspicious or Suspicious Transaction Report (STR) in this area. Upon analysis of thedata provided by the relevant party, if FIU has the reason to believe the funds areinvolving in terrorist funding or money laundering, the FIU will be given the right toforward every vital evidence and reports for further prosecution purposes. In thesimilar section, FIU is empowered to instruct banks to provide further information.The FIU is also responsible in providing adequate training to these banks in the area ofreporting and record keeping obligation[43].

As provided under Part V of the AMLATFA, the FIU could also exercise theirexclusive rights in executing investigations onto any person or institution as well ascarrying out search and retention of any relevant documents believed to be vital in theprocess of investigation. Banks and financial institutions are bound to the guidelines orany circular issue by the Bank Negara[44].

Record keeping of the customersCentral Bank Malaysia (CBM) has requested amendment with regards to recordkeeping[45] was extended to a period of six years as it was recommended by the FATFthat the duration must not be less than five years[46]. Hence, all accounts informationand transactions must be kept for at least six years. This effort is also conformed to theprovision in AMLATFA as it states that:

(1) A reporting institution shall keep a record of any transaction involving the domesticcurrency or any foreign currency exceeding such amount as the competent authority mayspecify[47].

The next question is what is the information required to be kept as record? The answerto the question is clearly stipulated in s 13(3) of this Act. It was said that informationregarding the identity and address of the person involving in each transaction will beneeded to be collected.

This will include the information of the beneficiary, the exact date and time, thename of the institution involved and the amount of transaction. Under s16(2), it isclearly stated that the reporting institutions are required to have the information asstated in (2) a:

(a) verify, by reliable means, the identity, representative capacity, domicile, legal capacity,occupation or business purpose of any person, as well as other identifying information on thatperson, whether he be an occasional or usual client, through the use of documents such asidentity card, passport, birth certificate, driver’s licence and constituent document, or anyother official or private document[48].

It is further stated in the final part of (2)a that:

[. . .] when establishing or conducting business relations, particularly when opening newaccounts or passbooks, entering into any fiduciary transaction, renting of a safe deposit box,or performing any cash transaction exceeding such amount as the competent authority mayspecify[48].

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So, as have been discussed above that the competent authority is the CBM or BankNegara. The above provision is also adhered by the CBM as it further stated:

In addition, the records kept must enable the reporting institution to establish the history,circumstances and reconstruction of each transaction. The records shall include at least:

. the identity of the customer;

. the identity of the beneficiary;

. the identity of the person conducting the transaction, where applicable;

. the type of transaction (e.g. deposit or withdrawal);

. the form of transaction (e.g. by cash or by cheque);

. the instruction and the origin and destination of fund transfers; and

. the amount and type of currency[49].

A great emphasis on the importance of “know your customer policy” is expresslyfound under BNM/GP9. A English case worth to be analyse in the above context is thecase of Lumdsen & Co v. London Trustee Savings Bank[50], Donaldson J found thatthe bank is negligent for failing to follow up the inquiries and there is no due diligencefound to verify the identity of the customer. Another case which is relevant isthe case ofLadbroke&Cov.Todd[51] where the bank in the case was held to be negligentfor not having adequate information of the clients when opening the bank account.

Another important element in reporting is that an individual will be liable for openingan account with fake name or incorrect name. This is found under s 18(1) of theAMLATFA as:

No person shall open, operate or authorise the opening or the operation of an account with areporting institution in a fictitious, false or incorrect name.

Reporting of STRWhat are the traits or characteristics that will be needed in order for the financialinstitution to make a report to the FIU?

S 14 of AMLATFA is in compliance with the FATF Recommendations for promptreporting of any suspicious funds. It was said under the above section that if there isanything involving the identity of the person or the transaction or even the exceedingof the threshold level will result in the compulsion of the reporting institution topromptly report to Central Bank of Malaysia.

Although there is no specific penalty provided under the said provision, but under s22 (Power to enforce compliance), a fine of up to RM100,000 and/or sentence of up to sixmonths should be imposed.

So what is considered as the threshold level? AMLATFA is silent on the criteriaqualification for the “red flag”. However, Bank Negara provides guidelines[52] asbelow, regarding the requirements for triggering the “red flag”:

. As for Bureau de Change services, any transactions RM20,000 and above willtrigger the red flag[53].

. Any bank transaction by a non-account holder or occasional transactionsinvolving RM50,000 and above[54].

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. For wire transfer, any transactions involving an amount equivalent to RM3,000and above[55].

. Any cash transaction equivalent to RM50,000 and above[56].

. Any suspicion of money laundering or financing of terrorism activities, thereporting institution has to report.

In Regina v. Hannes[57], an Australian appeal case, the issue in question was thatwhether the appellant can be liable for engaging in money laundering when he received10 banker’s cheques each for AUS$9,000 to avoid the reporting requirement. The courtheld that he had breached the Financial Transaction Report Act 1988.

Another case is in point is Stephen Arthur Leask v. The Commonwealth ofAustralia[58]. In this case the issue was whether the provision under s 31(1) of the FTRAis constitutional. The court affirmed and found that the provision was constitution. Hewas found guilty of 42 offences of structuring.

Overriding the secrecy provision of the bankThe criminals always exploit any available lacunae in the law. Without a doubt, crimesproceeds are cloaked in the veil of secrecy and hence the secrecy practise of thebanking industry has inevitably become a boundary to bring the criminal to justice.Therefore, FATF requested in FATF Recommendations 2 that secrecy laws shall nolonger be the inhibitors to any of the implementation of the recommendations.

In compliance to the above recommendation, Section 20 of the AMLATFA stated thatthe reporting institution or individuals are not subjected to the secrecy provision whichwas previously found the governing Act (BAFIA). As for BAFIA, under s99(1)(h),disclosure of information authorised by the Federal Law to police officer shall be deemedto be legal.

In addition, s24 of the AMLATFA gives immunity to any individual from anycriminal, civil or internal disciplinary proceedings unless the disclosure is made inmalice. Internal disciplinary proceedings include disciplinary actions by the employeragainst the employee.

Furthermore, under s5, any individual will be protected under the said provisionagainst any criminal prosecution. It is added that the disclosure of the information is nobreach of contract or rules by any professional bodies. The personal information of theinformants will also be kept secret to ensure the safety of the informants.

Implementation of a compliance programEvery banking and financial institution in Malaysia are bound to the order of the BankNegara to comply with the guidelines provided under BNM/GP9. Section 19 of theAMLA empowered Bank Negara with legal rights to ensure each institution complywith the guidelines. The compliance programme must be carried out in all branches andsubsidiaries of the banking or financial institutions which include any abroad branches.

There shall be appointment of compliance officers in each of every branches as wellas their subsidiaries and all are responsible for keeping records as well as reporting ofany suspicious activities[59].

The obligations of the supervisory authorities are stipulated clearly in s 21. Theroles are to ensure that the reporting institutions adhere to the compliance programme

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as well as instructing employees with regard of the responsibilities via training such as“know you customer” programmes.

Last but not least, Bank Negara is empowered with the rights to authoriseexamination of the institution’s report and records and the system used to ensure thatthere is a check and balance of the practise of the guidelines has been stipulated[60].

The consequences of not complying with the guidelines stipulated by Bank Negaraand also the provisions in AMLATFA are that there will be a revocation of theirlicenses[61].

Feedbacks and suggestions from the experts: in the interviewsThe authors have conducted several interviews with an expert from the judiciary ofMalaysia namely a High Court Judge that continuously handles AML/CFT cases, BankNegara as well as from Attorney-General’s Chamber’s of Malaysia. Names andparticulars of these officials will not be disclosed as requested by these intervieweesdue to the sensitive nature of this are many parties have tried to invoke the AMLATFAAct into Court has a high ranking official, it has not been successful.

First, a learned judge from Malaysia’s judiciary commented that the AMLATFA dueto several insufficiencies. One of the glowing insufficiencies addressed by theinterviewee is that the lack of precision in the definition of “proceeds of unlawfulactivities” under s3 of the AMLATFA. S3 of the Act defined proceeds of unlawfulactivities as:

[. . .] any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of anyunlawful activity.

The above definition is flawed as the statute does not further define what is “directly orindirectly”. The Judge contents that the definition is too wide and it imposes difficultiesto the judiciary to determine to what extend a person should be liable for the offence.Under s3, it will cause injustice where a person accepted the “dirty money” without anyknowledge of the illegal proceeds to be used when the proceeds were obtainedindirectly of unlawful activities under s3 of this Act. He suggested that there should beamendments to make the definition more precise.

The learned judged further answered the question of whether the retrospectiveapplication of the statute as stated in s2 (1) of the AMLA as:

This Act shall apply to any serious offence, foreign serious offence or unlawful activitywhether committed before or after the commencement date.

This seriously limits the amount of cases that can be prosecuted within this area. Heexplained that the retrospective effect is maintained the provision if it is allowed to beapplied can only apply to select the charges like the “serious offence, foreign seriousoffence or unlawful activity”.

Of course, there are also the issues of retrospectiveness contravening Art 4(1)of the Federal Constitution which had been discussed in Art 4. The next feedback willbe from the official of the Anti-Money Laundering and Forfeiture Unit of theAttorney-General’s Chambers. The question forwarded to the official regarding theefficiency of AMLATFA in complying with FATF. He mentioned that Malaysia doesnot have 100 percent compliance as there are two issues namely, the environmentaloffences, piracy and sports laws.

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He further explained that the power to carry out investigation is determined by thefirst offence or the predicate offence. For instance, if the first offence is charged underthe Penal Code, the Malaysia Royal Police will be carrying out the investigation ofthe money laundering activities and if the predicate charge is on graft, then it willbe the role of Malaysia Anti-Corruption Commission to investigate. The result of theinvestigation will then be forwarded to the Deputy Public Prosecutor for further legalaction. The interview further added that the litigants could seek for Mutual LegalAssistance if it is an extra-territorial offence.

Finally, from Bank Negara (CBM) the official commented on the issue of whether thepunishments laid down in the AMLA sufficiently deter prospective money launderers.He mentioned that the punishment as provided in Section 4, punishments for moneylaundering are fine (maximum RM5 million), or five years jail, or both and propertybeing seized. In actual fact, the money involved in money laundering is exceeding RM5million and hence, the punishment will unlikely deter money launderers who operatespast this threshold. He suggested the law should impose punishments by way of ratio.For example, if the money laundered is 10k, then the fine should be 50k (10k £ 5).

He further mentioned that the current provisions for organizations to report theirfinances and any suspicious transactions are insufficient in combating moneylaundering cases. The reason to it is that these accounts can be easily manipulated. Hefurther suggested that more surprise audits should be carried out and the problemsalways lie in the enforcement of the law. The law implemented in Malaysia shouldwork hand in hand with effective enforcement mechanisms to achieve success.

ConclusionThe primary question that should be asked again is: are the current laws effectivelycurbed the money laundering and terrorist funding activities? A straight answer wouldbe, no it has not.

It is worthwhile to note that the main aim of AMLATFA is to impose acomprehensive and stringent program in limiting the money laundering activities aswell as terrorist funding activities.

The author would like to point out a very vital issue that banks’ employees aremostly educated and trained with the orientation of serving the customers as well asthe knowledge of banking and finance. In other words, they are not initially trained tobe “detectives with a detective’s trained power of observation” as stated in the case ofLloyd’s Bank Ltd v. Chartered Bank of India, Australia, China[62]. Although there areincreasing of awareness as well as trainings such as the “know your customer” andother trainings provided by the Bank Negara, their knowledge is still not sufficient. Inorder to be sufficiently inept in this area, a lot more intensive trainings are required.Perhaps, aligning with intention of curbing this problem in a long term, theparliaments should encourage specialisation courses in Money Laundering to beprovided in Malaysia.

Another limitation to be addressed is that in identifying the true suspicioustransactions would be very tedious like searching for a grain of sand in a deep ocean.There might have caused more false alarms than before and the efficiency of the bankwould inevitably be reduced drastically. The authors would suggest that theGovernment of Malaysia as well as Bank Negara could initiate a research that iscollaborated with foreign counterparts in compiling more specific trends and traits of

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money launderers and eventually formulate more structured procedures and controlsystems and further amendments to the current laws.

Although there are provisions making it compulsory for the reporting institutions tomake reports on any suspicious transactions, there is no check and balance on thecompliance of these reporting institutions. It is suggested that there should be a unifiedsystem where all transactions in each of every bank in Malaysia as well as thesubsidiaries overseas to be recorded. Hence, then, the FIU could identify the suspiciousactivities, on top of the reporting obligations by the banks. This initiative will help toreduce the possibility of any escape of the money launderers due to the insufficientmanpower in each financial institution.

Another problem arises is that if there are provisions making reporting obligationscompulsory, banks may fear of attracting liability and they would most probablyreport every transaction even with the slightest suspicion. The overloading of reportsto the competent authority would most like cause the inefficiency in identifying theactual “money launderer”. Hence, there should be a more narrow approach when itcomes to the guidelines in identifying suspicious activities.

In a nutshell, there are many gaps in the law that need serious addressing foreffective enforcement to take place in anti-money laundering aims and objectives.

Notes

1. Financial Action Task Force (FATF) History (Paris, FATF, 1989).

2. “Special recommendation” or “nine special recommendation”.

3. Act 613.

4. Gazetted on the 25 December 2005.

5. BAFIA 1989.

6. Sections 44 and 45.

7. Guy Stessens, Money Laundering (2000).

8. Definition used by FATF, see the FATF official web site at: www.oecd.org/fatf

9. “Criminalises the various aspect of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropicsubstance”.

10. In-depth discussion could be found in web sites: www.undcp.org and www.oecd.org/fatf11. As per Eddie Chua’s news report (Malay Mail, 2002, October).

12. As stated in IAIS web site at: www.iaisweb.org

13. Contemporary Issue on Terrorism: Royal Malaysia Police Perspective, available at: http://mpk.rmp.gov.my/jurnal/2004b/contemporaryissues.pdf

14. Section 1.

15. [1996] Cm 3420: para 5.22.

16. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism [1999].

17. NSC directive No. 18.

18. Threshold amount before the bank authority will report to the FIU.

19. Naylor, 2002 supra n.6, pp. 45-78.

20. FATF, 2002 supra n.2, p. 2.

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21. 0Ehrenfeld, 2003 supra n.10.

22. FATE, 2008 supra n.59, p. 15: PATE, 2002 supra n.2.

23. Beare and Schneider, 2007, supra n.4, pp. 269-271.

24. Byman et al., 2001, supra n.71, p. 31.

25. FATE 2002 supra n.2.

26. Terrorist Financing Monograph, 2004 supra n.41, p. 4.

27. FATE 2001 supra n.44 “Recommendation V111. Non-profit organizations”.

28. Kiser supra n1.84, p. 73; Epstein, 2003 supra n.93; Mason, 2003 supra 11.93; Napoleoni, 2004supra n.23; Ehrenfetd, 2003 supra n.l10.

29. FATF, 2002 supra n.2, p.6.

30. Council of Foreign Relations, 2002 supra 1n.84: Kiser supra n.84, p. 75; Ebrerifeld, 2003 supran.10.

31. FATF, 2008 supra n.58, p. 15.

32. Napoleoni, 2004 supra n.23.

33. UN Res. 1373 (2001) para. 4.

34. LTN Doe. AJRES/60/288, para. 5.

35. FATF Tvpologies 2004-2005 supra n.46.

36. Naylor supra n.6; Naylor supra n.3; Beare and Schneider, 2007 supra n.4.

37. In force on the 1 May 2003.

38. S3 AMLA.

39. [1933] AC 201.

40. S9 of AMLA.

41. S2(1) of AMLA.

42. s 7 of AMLA.

43. S8 (3) (d).

44. S 21(1)(c).

45. BNM/GP9, p. 7.

46. FATF Recommendation 12.

47. S 13(1) AMLA.

48. S16(2)(a) AMLA.

49. BNM/RH/GL 000-2, 6.2.2.

50. [1971] 1 Llyods Rep 114.

51. 30 TLR 433.

52. Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) SectoralGuidelines 1 for Banking and Financial Institutions.

53. 4.1.2 BNM/RH/GL 008-1.

54. 4.1.3 BNM/RH/GL 008-1.

55. 4.14 BNM/RH/GL 008-1.

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56. 4.1.5 BNM/RH/GL 008-1.

57. [2000] NSCWCCA 503.

58. [1996] 187 CLR 579.

59. S19(4) AMLA.

60. S 25 AMLA.

61. S 21(2) AMLA.

62. [1929] 1 KB 40.

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Byman, D., Chalk, P., Hoffman, B., Rosenau, W. and Brannan, D. (2001), Trends in OutsideSupport for Insurgent Movements, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, p. 31.

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Government Accounting Office (2005), Terrorist Financing: Better Strategic Planning Needed toCoordinate US Efforts to Deliver Counter-terrorism Financing Training and TechnicalAssistance, GAO Document no. 06-19, US Government Accounting Office, Washington, DC.

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Napoleoni, L. (2004), “The new economy of terror: how terrorism is financed”, Forum on Crimeand Society, Vol. 4 Nos 1/2, pp. 34-35.

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About the authorsGuru Dhillon is a Senior Lecturer in Law at Multimedia University, Melaka, Malaysia.Guru Dhillon is the corresponding author and can be contacted at: guru.dhillon@mmu.edu.my

Rusniah Ahmad is an Associate Professor in Law at Northern University of Malaysia,Sintok, Malaysia.

Aspalela Rahman is a Senior Lecturer in Law at Northern University of Malaysia,Sintok, Malaysia.

Ng Yih Miin is a Researcher in Law at Multimedia University, Melaka, Malaysia.

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