This article was downloaded by: [Moshe Behar] On: 20 July 2011, At: 23:07 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Global Society Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cgsj20 Unparallel Universes: Iran and Israel's One-state Solution Moshe Behar Available online: 11 Jul 2011 To cite this article: Moshe Behar (2011): Unparallel Universes: Iran and Israel's One-state Solution, Global Society, 25:3, 353-376 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2011.577031 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and- conditions This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
Transcript
This article was downloaded by: [Moshe Behar]On: 20 July 2011, At: 23:07Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Global SocietyPublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cgsj20
Unparallel Universes: Iran and Israel'sOne-state SolutionMoshe Behar
Available online: 11 Jul 2011
To cite this article: Moshe Behar (2011): Unparallel Universes: Iran and Israel's One-state Solution,Global Society, 25:3, 353-376
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2011.577031
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.
The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representationthat the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of anyinstructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primarysources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings,demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly orindirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
Unparallel Universes: Iran and Israel’s One-stateSolution
MOSHE BEHAR
Sceptical of the ideational and non-regional terms ruling the post-1993 one-state/two-state (1S2S) exchange about the Palestine/Israel question, this article is in two parts.Part I demonstrates that no Israeli-Jewish constituency exists to support a viable two-state solution while concurrently arguing that the breathtaking one-state vision—in theform of a secular-democratic or bi-national state—is equally unlikely to materialise. Thesole empirical/material process taking place in the territory comprising mandatory Pales-tine is Israel’s one-state solution, i.e. the ceaseless consolidation of Israeli-Jewish domina-tion over the entire territory. Part II posits that—contrary to the prevailing case—thestudy of the 1S2S conundrum cannot take place in a universe parallel to the broaderstudy of regional dynamics. I argue that confrontation involving Israel, Iran and theirGazan/Lebanese/American allies/proxies is likely to pre-date/supersede any substantiveconsideration of a resolution in the territory conceptualised as a secluded island in 1S2Sscholarship. It is erroneous to dismiss the possibility that—as happened in 1948 and1967—an intense Israeli/Iranian regional confrontation can manufacture a Nakbaic con-juncture (resulting in fewer Arabs present in the already fully Israeli-controlled territoryof Mandatory Palestine). Such a development could defer far enough the possibility for so-called real solutions to emerge—foremost those prescribed by liberal 1S2S scholars—andsimultaneously advance the Israeli version of a one-state solution. It is hoped thatcolleagues will identify paths to arrive at the utter demolition of this article.
Context
The socio-political debacle typifying the post-1993 Oslo peace process era gaverise to many studies weighing the one-state/two-state (hereinafter 1S2S) solutionsto the Palestine/Israel question. Such discussions on the conundrum have
!I am grateful to the Journal’s anonymous reviewers for their critique and input. The outline argumentof this article was first presented on 17 February 2009 at St. Anthony’s College, Oxford University, in aroundtable discussion entitled “Elections in Israel: Domestic and Regional Implications”. I thank Raf-faella Del Sarto and Avi Shlaim for their hospitality, concurrence and dissent. Sections of this textwere then presented at the international conference “The Arab Peace Initiative: Political and Environ-mental Dimensions”, The Chaim Herzog Center for Middle East Studies & Diplomacy, Ben Gurion Uni-versity, Israel (22–24 June 2010). This paper was submitted toGlobal Society on 12 July 2010 and acceptedfor publication on 22 December 2010. The text was therefore concluded prior to the publication of theWikiLeaks documents; the leaked Palestine Papers; Israel’s Labour party split (17 January 2011); andthe mass Egyptian revolt. Relying solely on publically available, non-leaked material, many argumentsincluded here have been further supported by these momentous later developments.
Global Society, Vol. 25, No. 3, July, 2011
ISSN 1360-0826 print/ISSN 1469-798X online/11/030353–24 # 2011 University of Kent
DOI: 10.1080/13600826.2011.577031
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involved leading scholarly and/or activist minds. They have appeared in suchforums as Race & Class (1995), Middle East Report (1996), News from Within(1997/98), Journal of Palestine Studies (1998–2000), New York Times (1999), BostonReview (2001/02), New York Review of Books (2003), London Review of Books (2003),KEDMA (2004), The Arab Geographer (2005), New Left Review (2006), (the Israeli)Left Bank (2007) and the Palestine-Israel Journal (2007), amongst others.Cities/municipalities have hosted conferences that have discussed the 1S2S
puzzle, including Jaffa–Tel Aviv (1996, 2008, 2009), Basel (1997), Bethlehem(2003), Bilbao (2003, 2004), Nazareth (2005), Geneva (2006), Bil’in (2007), Madrid(2007), London (2007), Haifa (2008, 2009), Toronto (2009), Boston (2009, 2010),Dimona (2010), and other locations. While many types of texts have beenwritten on the 1S2S question—including books, articles, essays, manifestos, op-eds, pamphlets, statements and blogs—some are of notable scholarly rigour.1
Other compositions have illuminated additional important dimensions surround-ing the 1S2S quandary, including advocacy, lobbying and collective action.2 Longis the list of comparatively better known scholars who have felt compelled to addtheir perspective to the steadily expanding 1S2S fray, or who may have simplybeen dragged in somehow, including Noam Chomsky, Edward Said, JohnMearsheimer and Stephen Walt, Tony Judt, Judith Butler and Michael Walzer.3
This brief contextual chronicle of texts, locations and individuals linked to the1S2S exchange might earn me criticism in some quarters since other equallyimpressive texts/individuals/locations remain unmentioned here, as unfair asthis is.
1. Don Peretz, “A Binational Approach to the Palestine Conflict”, Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol.33, No. 1 (1968), pp. 32–43 and “Israelis, Palestinians and Multinationalism”, Journal of InternationalAffairs, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1973), pp. 90–104 (two early rigorous articles regretfully unmentioned in the1S2S exchange); Irene L. Gendzier, “Palestine and Israel: The Binational Idea”, Journal of PalestineStudies, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1975), pp. 12–35; Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, “Exile amidst Sovereignty: A Critiqueof ‘Negation of the Exile’ in Israeli Culture” (part i), Theory and Criticism, Vol. 4 (1993), pp. 23–55 (andpart ii) Theory and Criticism, Vol. 5 (1994), pp. 113–132 (in Hebrew); Meron Benvenisti, Intimate Enemies:Jews and Arabs in a Shared Land (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); Jenab Tutunji and KamalKhaldi, “A Binational State in Palestine: The Rational Choice for Palestinians and the Moral Choice forIsraelis”, International Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 1 (1997), pp. 31–58; Ghada Karmi, “After Oslo: A Single Statein Israel/Palestine?”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1998), pp. 212–226; Ghazi-Walid Falah, “The Geopolitics of ‘Enclavisation’ and the Demise of a Two-state Solution to the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 8 (2005), pp. 1341–1372; Virginia Q. Tilley, TheOne-state Solution: A Breakthrough for Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Deadlock (Detroit: University ofMichi-gan Press, 2005); Yosef Gorni, From Binational Society to Jewish State: Federal Concepts in Zionist PoliticalThought, 1920–1990, and the Jewish People (Leiden: Brill, 2006); Jamil Hilal (ed.),Where Now for Palestine?The Demise of the Two State Solution (London: Zed, 2007); George E. Bisharat, “Maximizing Rights: TheOne State solution to the Palestinian–Israeli Conflict”, Global Jurist, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2008), pp. 1–36; Alex-ander Yakobson and Amnon Rubinstein, Israel and the Family of Nations: The Jewish Nation-state andHuman Rights (New York: Routledge, 2009); BennyMorris,One State, Two States (NewHaven: Yale Uni-versity Press, 2009).2. Gary Sussman, “Is the Two-state Solution Dead?”, Current History, Vol. 103, No. 669 (2004), pp. 37–
43; Daniel Gavron, The Other Side of Despair: Jews and Arabs in the Promised Land (New York: Rowman &Littlefield, 2004); Ali Abunimah, One Country: A Bold Proposal to End the Israeli–Palestinian Impasse(New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006); David C. Unger, “The Inevitable Two-state Solution”, WorldPolicy Journal, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2008), pp. 59–67.3. In addition to Meron Benvenisti, Uri Avnery, Azmi Bishara, Tikva Honig-Parnass, Jamil Hilal,
Moshe Machover, Amnon Raz-Krakotskin, Salim Tamari, Oren Yiftachel, Ilan Pappe, Benny Morris,Rashid Khalidi, As’ad Ghanem, Sammy Smooha and Michael Neumann.
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I: Israel/Palestine’s 1S2S Debate
Organising Delineations
It is safe to say that 1S2S exchanges have collectively been successful in setting outboundaries that distinguish between “acceptable” and “unacceptable” discursivecontentions that protagonists debating the matter can add to its otherwisespacious continuum. Accordingly, a “one-stater” principally denotes a scholar(and/or an activist) who advocates for some configuration of a single, secular-demo-cratic state encompassing the whole territory of Mandatory Palestine. This refers tothe Lilliputian 26,320 km2 of land4 stretching from the Jordan River to the Medi-terranean Sea as it was ultimately demarcated—as recently as 1922—under theauspices of British Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill (days before hisousting—for a brief two years—as an exclusive consequence of British domesticpolitics concerning his rabid anti-socialist positions).
Put differently, those advocating for a single non-secular—let alone non-demo-cratic—unitary state in the present-day territory of Mandatory Palestine wouldordinarily not be considered a party to the proverbial 1S2S debate. As presently con-ceptualised in its hegemonic terms, the standard 1S2S discussion therefore opts tobypass bodies or individuals who advocate/act for—say—a single “Jewish anddemocratic” state across Mandatory Palestine (ignore momentarily whether thisamounts to a contradiction in terms). Similarly, 1S2S exchanges usually circumventindividuals or movements that advocate for a single Muslim/Islamic state (eitherdemocratic or not and irrespective of whether the former is logically or politicallypossible). Accordingly, a Muslim-Brotherhood-inspired unitary Caliphate state inMandatory Palestine is largely disregarded as a fruitful party for 1S2S exchanges.Still, as far as the 1S2S debate is concerned, little serious ambiguity exists withregard to the principal terms of reference of the notion of a single state (secular-democratic or binational). In contrast, matters are considerably muddier concep-tually and politically when attempting to make sense of who is a “two-stater”.Chiefly as an outgrowth of Ariel Sharon’s 2005 implementation of the “Disengage-ment Plan” from the (still Israeli-occupied) Gaza Strip—the riddle of “who is a two-stater” became nearly as elusive as some older quandaries such as “who is a Jew”and “who is an Arab”. A brief background seems useful.
The original (and hitherto standard) post-1967 conception of “Two States for TwoPeoples” was chiefly formulated by Israel’s non-Zionist left—foremost the Commu-nist Party—in concert with (far) left Zionist constituents and political parties(including HaOlam Hazeh-Choach Hadash, Ratz and Sheli). The two-state notionthat originated from these leftist (Zionist and non-Zionist) quarters consisted oftwin Siamese ingredients: Israel’s recognition of the Palestinian right for nationalself-determination—in the form of a sovereign, independent Palestinian state inthe 1967 Occupied Territories—in exchange for peace. Back then the idea wassimple, brief and general—if only because hardly any Israeli (Jew) endorsed it.Back in the 1970smany Israelis subscribed to the (GoldaMeiric) view that the Pales-tinian people did not really constitute a separate national collectivity—let alone onedeserving an independent state. As recently as during the 1987–1990 Intifada, Israelisoldiers were instructed by both Likud and Labour defence ministers (foremost
4. United States: 9,629,091; Egypt: 1,002,000; United Kingdom: 242,900; Syria: 185,180; Jordan: 89,342;Lebanon: 10,452.
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Yitzhak Rabin) to remove Palestinian flags put up by Palestinian protestors (leadingto the electrocution of some children forced to remove such symbols of nationalsovereignty from electricity poles). Similarly, Israel outlawed peaceful meetingsbetween Israeli citizens and PLO members (punishable even if they took placeoutside Israeli jurisdiction in Europe or elsewhere).Up until September 1993, when the Oslo Accords were signed in Washington,
the very notion of an independent Palestinian state remained anathema to theoverwhelming majority of Israeli-Jews and their elected representatives. UnderLabour and Likud governments alike, Jewish expansion into the West Bank andthe Gaza Strip continued unabated. The process of colonisation, appropriationof Palestinian land (including privately owned) and construction of settlementsnever ceased, notwithstanding its contravention of article 49 of the 4th GenevaConvention. These policies continued uninterrupted throughout the Osloprocess and—recently—also during the 2010 settlement “freeze” that never was.As the single most authoritative study put it (together with aerial photographs),“on the ground, there is almost no freeze or even a visible slowdown, despitethe fact that legal construction starts have been frozen for eight months. It alsomeans that the Government of Israel is not enforcing the moratorium.”5
Modifications (in the conceptual realm alone) to Israel’s hitherto marginal leftistnotion of “Two States for Two Peoples” accompanied the 2005 Gaza Disengage-ment and the formation of the (Likud-light) Kadima Party by Ariel Sharon.Since that juncture, more Israelis—and this would nowadays include BenjaminNetanyahu and Israel’s foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman—have embracedthe two-state conception (however heuristically). Accordingly, Netanyahu grud-gingly verbalised for the first time the idiom “Palestinian state” as recently as14 June 2009 during his speech at Israel’s Bar Ilan University (responding to theaddress Barack Hussein Obama delivered a week earlier at Cairo University):
If we get a guarantee of demilitarisation, and if the Palestinians recogniseIsrael as the Jewish state, we are ready to agree to a real peace agreement[and] a demilitarised Palestinian state [. . .] Whenever we discuss a perma-nent arrangement, Israel needs defensible borders with [West and East]Jerusalem remaining the united capital of Israel. (Emphasis added)
Three weeks later—on the occasion of his government’s 100th day in office—Netanyahu declared: “we have managed to form national agreement on ‘TwoStates for Two Peoples’”.6
Israel’s post-2005 development—i.e. “We’re (nearly) all two-staters now”—hadtwo outcomes. The first, which manifested itself during Israel’s latest elections (10February 2009), was the de facto redundancy—hence demolition—of the Zionistleft’s traditional party, Meretz, which was the prime Israeli organ that promotedthe two-state notion between 1993 and 2005. The second outcome was the toxiccomplication of the hitherto standard discussion of the “two-state solution”.
5. Peace Now, “Eight Months into the Settlement Freeze” (August 2010), available: ,http://www.peacenow.org.il/site/en/peace.asp?pi=61&docid=4747&pos=0.. All the websites referenced in thisarticle were accessed on 20 November 2010.6. Maya Bengal, “Netanyahu: ‘We Managed to Bring National Agreement on ‘Two States for Two
Peoples’”, Maariv (5 July 2009) (in Hebrew), available: ,http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART1/912/102.html..
To sense this transformation, picture a well-groomed Israeli (or Euro-American)diplomat randomly picking up a Coca-Cola can from his nearest recycling bin andwith all the seriousness he can muster declares that the Coca-Cola can he isholding can—and should—be conceptualised/regarded as a sovereign state (aPalestinian one that is); a state that in the not-so-distant future could even begranted a seat in the UN General Assembly (possibly next to such state-entitiesas Nauru, Tuvalu, Micronesia or the Marshall Islands that side with (the USand) Israel in the General Assembly’s votes)). Granted, few scholars would sub-scribe to the view that a can of Coca-Cola can—let alone should—be considereda state. Yet the empirical fact of the matter remains: even if this analogy maystrike some as distasteful and populist, it nonetheless factually captures the over-riding conception typifying the vast majority of those in both Israel and Euro-America who nowadays advocate for a “two-state solution” to the Palestine/Israel discord. Beyond its sheer discursive title, the presently dominant conceptionof “Two States for Two Peoples” is devoid of any meaningful socio-political sub-stance. Owing to space constraints it should suffice to cite here the official, openpositions held by (i) Israel’s largest party, i.e. the leading opposition party,Kadima, and (ii) the Labour Party. Methodologically, it makes most sense tofocus on these two leading Israeli parties precisely because they are situated tothe left of Netanyahu’s ruling Likud (allied with openly rejectionist anti-“two-state” parties to the right of it).
Conceptions of “Two States”: Kadima, Labour and Bush/Obama
Kadima’s 2009 election manifesto, which surprisingly was never made availablein English, stipulates:
Departure Point for the Political Program: the Jewish people have anational right to the whole Eretz Yisrael [i.e. the whole territory of Manda-tory Palestine].Guiding Principles for Negotiations: maintaining Israel’s existence as anational Jewish state necessitates that [Israeli Jews] accept the principlethat the end of conflict will assume the form of two states living side byside in peace and security based on the existing demographic reality [. . .]Any future Palestinian state must (i) be free from terror, (ii) exist peace-fully and amicably next to Israel and (iii) be disarmed. The Palestiniansmust be completely and wholly free from terror before the eventual estab-lishment of their state. [Author’s note: how, and who is, to determine when thePalestinians reach this heavenly bar? These conditionalities strike me as Kadima’scarte blanche for perpetually deferring possible resolutions involving Israeli“concessions”.]Israel’s borders will be decided in final negotiations based on the follow-ing principles: (i) inclusion of areas [in the occupied West Bank] requiredfor Israel’s security; (ii) inclusion of places considered holy in Judaismand important as national symbols, foremost Jerusalem; (iii) maximuminclusion of Jewish settlers with an emphasis on settlement blocks.7
7. Full text available: ,http://kadima.org.il/upload/file/medinit.pdf.. (emphasis added; trans-lations from Hebrew are mine).
So much for the “two-state” notion of Israel’s principal left opposition party, ledby Ms Tzipi Livni, much adored by world leaders. And effectively identically,the relevant verbatim segment from the (also untranslated) manifesto ofKadima’s arch-rival Labour Party, headed by Ehud Barak, stipulates:
[Labour’s aim is] to secure two states for two peoples living peacefullyside by side. The border will be determined in bi-lateral negotiations.Settlement blocks [in the occupied West Bank—M.B.] will remain underIsraeli sovereignty while settlements outside them will be evacuatedaccording to the accord agreed. Jerusalem—including all its existingJewish neighbourhoods [in its West and East sides]—is the eternalcapital of Israel and will remain so. Special arrangements will be con-cluded to govern both the Old City and the Holy Basin to express theirimportance and uniqueness to the three religions. Jewish holy sites willremain under Israeli sovereignty. The Labour Party will work to secureinternational recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital.8
The Kadima–Labour “two-state” conception prevails among US administrationsas well (with zero European—and little Arab—opposition, certainly at the statelevel). For example, on 11 April 2004, George W. Bush’s administration assuredIsrael:
in light of new realities on the ground, including already existing majorIsraeli population centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome offinal status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armisticelines of 1949, and all previous efforts to negotiate a two-state solution havereached the same conclusion. It is realistic to expect that any final statusagreement will only be achieved on the basis of mutually agreedchanges that reflect these realities.
Similarly, on 4 June 2009 Obama declared in Cairo:
The US does not accept the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlements. Thisconstruction violates previous agreements and undermines efforts toachieve peace. It is time for these settlements to stop. (Emphasis added)
In his cautiously crafted 30 words, spineless Obama mirrored Bush’s formulation:Obama consciously chose to call only for a freeze on further settlement construc-tion while remaining mute on (i) Israel’s existing illegal settlements let alone (ii)any settlement dismantling. (Further settlement building was obviously neverstopped by Obama.9)These globally floating “two-state” notions leave no choice other than to
outline—even if telegraphically—what kind of a “two-state” notion scholarscan regard as minimally meaningful for a non-trivial (read: non-deceitful) 1S2Sdiscussion. I would suggest the following modest ingredients for a basic two-
8.Full text available: ,http://www.archavoda.org.il/avodaarch/matza/pdf/knesset18.pdf..(emphasis added).9. Peace Now, op. cit.
state notion: (i) willingness to remove the (economically suffocating and sociallycaging) West Bank Wall in accordance with the 2004 advisory opinion on thematter by the International Court of Justice (ICJ); (ii) formation of a Palestinianstate comprising a politically united Gaza Strip and West Bank (amounting to23% of mandatory Palestine) along the 1949 armistice line with most of East Jer-usalem as its capital; and (iii) minor adjustments/land-swaps, possible in prin-ciple, provided they are agreed upon by a representative Palestinian body,elected democratically and fully transparently by, at the very minimum, Palesti-nians in the 1967 Occupied Territories. Note that for the sake of analytical sim-plicity, clarity and minimalism I have deliberately chosen to exclude from thistwo-state notion all issues pertaining to (i) Palestinian refugees residingoutside the territory comprising Mandatory Palestine and (ii) Israel’s 20% Pales-tinian Arab citizens. My contention: any individual, organised body or politicalparty worldwide unable to subscribe to this minimalist set of ingredientscannot—and must not—be taken seriously as a productive party for non-trivial1S2S exchanges.
Knesset and Partition
Given the global two-state cacophony, my contention is best stated in the plainestpossible terms: Israel’s democratically elected decisionmakers are simply uninter-ested in any modestly viable partition plan for a two-state arrangement. Theirrejection of two-state schemes includes the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative; the 2002Nusseibeh-Ayalon Plan; the detailed plan jointly drafted by the Israelis and Pales-tinians who concluded the 2004 Geneva Accord; or the scheme I telegraphicallydelineated above.10 Israel’s rejection of any modestly viable “two-state” proposalis material—rather than solely discursive, or merely present in party manifestos. Itis evident and empirically visible to see for every person who is not willingly blindin the tangible actions Israeli governments have continued to undertake since 1993in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
Accordingly, examination of the tangible actions of Israeli political parties (vis-a-vis such subjects as settlement/“outpost” construction; appropriation of privatePalestinian land; or the 2005 Talia Sasson Report on Israel’s governmental policiesvis-a-vis the settlements) reveals the following: out of the 120 Members of theKnesset (MKs) elected in 2009—precisely 14 (12%) support minimally substantivetwo-state frameworks. Israel’s remaining 106 MKs (88%) all reject any modestlyviable two-state solution.
The 14 MKs who support minimally viable two-state arrangements belong tothe al-Qa’ima al-’Arabiyya al-Muwahhada (United Arab list—Ta’al, 4 MKs); al-Jabhah al-Dimuqratiyyah lil-Salam wa’al-Musawah (Hadash, 4); al-Tajamu’ al-Watanial-Dımuqrati (Balad, 3); and the New Movement–Meretz (3). Out of these, thereare precisely four Jewish MKs (3% of the Knesset) who support modestly viabletwo-state schemes.
Israel’s remaining 106MKscanbedividedas follows socio-politically: Labour (13MKs), Kadima (28),United Torah Judaism (5), atmost one-third of the Likud (9/27),perhaps one-quarter of Yisrael Beytenu (4/15) and perhaps one-quarter of Shas(3/11)—i.e. 62 MKs (under the best-case scenario)—support rhetorically (read,
10. Texts of these initiatives are accessible online.
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deceitfully) a two-state framework; in actual terms, however, theseMKs support theestablishment of a (demilitarised) municipal Palestinian reservation/Bantustan/enclave—what I prefer to call a Coca-Cola can state—largely or fully encircled bya greater Israel that will ultimately control some 85% of Mandatory Palestine.The problem: there are few human beings (Palestinians included) who can live ina Coca-Cola can and who simultaneously would adopt the view that they live ina sovereign state.
Israel’s One-state Reality (and Solution)
We are left with Israel’s remaining 44 MKs. They are more candid and, as such,probably better mirror Israel’s electorate at large. Thirty-nine of them are affiliatedofficiallywith the Knesset’s Eretz Yisrael Lobby that rejects any two-state solution.11
These MKs are members of seven different political parties including Kadima(out of a total of 12 represented in the Knesset) and oppose publicly any two-state scheme in Mandatory Palestine (a Palestinian reservation/Bantustanincluded). These MKs openly advance what I term Israel’s one-state solution, thatis, further consolidation of Israeli-Jewish domination over the whole territorycomprising Mandatory Palestine. Other MKs—including Gilad Ardan, GideonSher, Israel Katz and Benjamin Netanyahu—remain officially unaffiliated withthe Lobby because of varying tactical reasons, yet not because they substantivelydisagree with their affiliated colleagues. Ultimately they are all located quitenear the openly annexationist (secular and religious) analyses sampled inAppendix B.A related matter is the countless statistical/positivist polls indicating that most
Israeli-Jews support a “two-state solution”. Scholars interested in material socio-politics should doubt these “scientific” polls: they rarely detail clearly to theirinterviewees the features of the (theoretically abstract) Palestinian “state”, nordo they detail what such a state would require in terms of territorial size that—from the perspective of the most “moderate”/“conciliatory” Palestinians—Israelwould need to surrender. I posit that even the faintest whispering by thepollsters—to their otherwise statistically sound sample of Israeli-Jewish intervie-wees—of the words “East Jerusalem” as part of a future Palestinian state is certainto alter significantly the standard discursive outcomes of such polls. Existing pollsare predictably flattering and conducive to the image that the Israeli leadershipwishes to project globally, i.e. an enlightened Israeli state/society eager for apeaceful “two-state” settlement. Existing (yet dubious) polls are regularly utilisedby Israel’s brand-makers responsible for its globalHasbara front (since 2009, underthe unified command of settler Avigdor Lieberman, leader of the fundamentalistfar-right Yisrael Beytenu Party).If my delineations thus far are even partially correct, then one conclusion
emerges: as critical, engaging and stimulating as the 1S2S exchange is—in practi-cal terms it remains utterly esoteric once juxtaposedwith ongoingmaterial politicsfree from doses of wishful thinking. Let me first address the exchange’s one-state
11. For the full list and activities of these MKs see ,http://www.myesha.org.il/?CategoryID=251&ArticleID=3753.. see also “The Lobby against Two States”, YNET (2 February 2010), available:,http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3843257,00.html.. See Appendix B for Israeli bodies andparties that voice in clearer terms Israeli pro-settlement views and anti-two-state arrangements.
scholars (whether in the form of a secular-democratic or bi-national state) beforeassessing its two-state advocates.
First, there are effectively no Israeli-Jews willing to entertain, even theoretically,schemes for a singular (de-Zionised/anti-Zionist) secular-democratic statebetween the River and the Sea. In the coming decades this (obviously Zionist)state of affairs (and mind) is unlikely to change as much as all one-state argumentsrequire—be it implicitly and explicitly—as one of the necessary conditions fortheir own tangible realisation. As the rigorous one-state scholar Virginia Tilley cor-rectly observes, “the UN partition plan of 1947 [. . .] by no means precludes Israelisand Palestinians to form one-state if they wish to do so”.12 Yet love or detest it,Israelis—factually—do not “wish to do so”. Be it wisely or foolishly or morallyor abhorrently on their part—Israeli-Jews deem the possibility of their (forcedor voluntary) re-minoritisation too risky for their individual and national futureand collective standing in Mandatory Palestine, the Middle East or the world.
Second, mass Palestinian support for a secular-democratic state likewise seemslagging—let alone sufficiently organised socio-political support capable of affect-ing the present reality materially (rather than verbally/ideationally).13 It alsoremains unclear in this context whether supporters of the formidable Hamaswill engage as systematically as needed in the ensemble of necessary bottom-upefforts to actualise any one of the existing plans for a secular-democratic state. Itlikewise seems doubtful whether Israeli and Palestinian societies embody a suffi-cient number of (substantive) democrats, let alone (substantive) seculars, who cancollectively generate a secular-democratic setting into the present-day MiddleEast (let alone sustain it over time). In this respect, Israel/Palestine is merely anintegral part of the non-democratic Middle East.
Third, there are reliable data indicating that most secularly oriented Palestiniansin the Occupied Palestinian Territories continue to adhere to the (otherwise far-flung) vision they apparently still consider more probable, i.e. realisation of aminimal Palestinian state on nearly all the 1967 Occupied Territories alongside aneighbouring Israel. Owing to space constraints the reasons behind this tendencycannot be discussed here as they deserve.14 Granted, amongst the PalestinianDiaspora—and to a lesser extent Israel’s 1948 Palestinian citizens—many doubt-lessly support the notion of a Palestinian return to a single secular-democraticor bi-national state. Still, the de facto socio-political power of these constituenciesto execute tangibly these ideational visions remains frail.
Lastly so far as the one-state scholarship is concerned: global society—includingthe overwhelming majority within the passive and activist civil societies in Europeand (North and South) America—continues to respect and support vigorously (i)the United Nations as an authoritative institution (including its former andpresent resolutions); (ii) existing international law; and (iii) the ICJ’s status, auth-ority and rulings. These are merely a few representative global/internationalbodies that accept, support and promote legally and unconditionally the 1947notion of partition and—by logical and political extension—the foundational
12. Tilley, op. cit., p. 206.13. Not a single poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) during the last
decade indicated otherwise; see ,http://www.pcpsr.org/index.html..14. Yet see Salim Tamari, “The Dubious Lure of Binationalism”, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 30, No.
1 (2000), pp. 83–87; Uri Avnery, “A Binational State? God Forbid!”, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 28,No. 4 (1999), pp. 55–61.
idea/existential legitimacy of a Jewish state (particularly after the European gen-ocide of Jews and others). To sum up, love or detest these four weighty variableswith which all one-state notions are inevitably entangled—no scholarly obser-vation (perhaps unlike a purely political one) can brush them aside withoutrisking crossover into the auto-destruct zone.Turning to the endangered species of non-trivial two-state schemes, equally for-
midable barriers arise. First, the combined net-weight of Israeli-Jews who supporta one-state, a bi-national-state or a viable two-state solution is miniscule. It followsthat if the world continues to leave Israel to its own unilateral (and even bilateral)devices (i.e. with or without the Arabs)—as has been the case continuously sinceDwight D. Eisenhower’s determined 1956 intervention to roll Israel back fromthe Sinai—then little tangible prospect exists for the emergence of a Palestinianstate capable of satisfying socio-politically even the most “moderate/generous”Palestinians.Furthermore, fantasise the (otherwise unlikely) case of a vigorous American
and/or international involvement—including one led by a charismatic and pro-gressive (half-Caucasian) American president possessing near-complete powerover both the Senate and the House of Representatives (as was the case withObama between 2008 and 2010). It still remains highly doubtful whether a Pales-tinian state capable of meeting even so-called “minimalist” Palestinian demandscould (or, I would add, would) emerge. Thus far, the post-1956 empirical-historicalrecord simply lends zero support to a scenario whereby Euro-America, Asia andAfrica force, alone or together, an Israeli government to dismantle enough settle-ments and withdraw enough settlers to meet the requirements of even the most“moderate” Palestinian leadership (including for face-saving reasons alone).The fact of the matter is that thus far the global community has even failed to
deliver a full settlement freeze in the West Bank—let alone in East Jerusalemannexed by Israel unilaterally, although unlawfully, in July 1980. It is worth recal-ling that also back then, a Likud-led Knesset (under Menchem Begin’s premier-ship) passed the “Jerusalem Law” by an overwhelming majority of 99–15(against the will—and vote—of the UN Security Council); a law that was curiouslyproposed by a small opposition party located to the right of Begin’s Likud. So what,then, explained the unprecedented numerical outcome of that crucial 1980 vote?“Each of the two major parties, the Likud and the [oppositional Labour-included]Alignment, had its reasons for adhering to the [Israeli] national consensus.”15
Three decades later, the colonisation of East Jerusalem is profoundly deeperand the Israeli “national consensus” around it has only deepened and strength-ened. No legitimate Palestine state can, or will, emerge if (occupied) East Jerusalemis left out of it.
II: The Total Regional Void Governing the 1S2S Debate
If one secular-democratic state, a bi-national state or a modestly viable two-statescheme seem equally unlikely to emerge in the foreseeable future—what then is(at least somewhat more) likely? To reflect as thoughtfully as possible on such ahazardously speculative end, it would first be sensible to identify tangible socio-
15. Yael Yishai, “Israeli Annexation of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights: Factors and Processes”,Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1985), pp. 45–60.
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political trends that are taking place concretely onMiddle Eastern ground and onlythen further hypothesise—by logical extension and political extrapolation—onwhat would seem more likely to occur in the not-too-distant future than the rosyhost of options as prescribed by a heterogeneous range of well-intentioned 1S2Sliberals.
To begin with, many scholars of Israeli society earnestly think that it is highlypolarised, embodying many diverse opinions advanced competitively by itsantagonistic social constituencies. (As the popular cliche goes, “two conversingIsraeli-Jews mean six opinions expressed”.) To support this naıve view observerscan marshal (for example) the indeed high number of organised political parties—33—that overcame the bureaucratic hurdles to compete in Israel’s 2009 elections,or the (comparatively large) number of parties—12—that passed the 2% thresholdto earn Knesset seats. I suggest that as far as the single most defining thrust ofIsraeli politics is concerned, this seemingly impressive number of parties,coupled with Israel’s much-celebrated societal diversity, are misleading at bestand illusionary at worst.
Zionist/Israeli politics before and after 1993 have remained astoundinglysimple, focused and continuous: “another goat, another dunam”; or in morecandid terms—“Maximum-Territory, Minimum-Arabs” (and minimum non-Jews generally). This remains the driving force underlying Israeli politics(rather than the 1S2S conundrum for example). Accordingly, during the Labour-ruled Oslo years from 1992 to 1996, the number of illegal Jewish settlers increasedfrom 246,400 to 308,700 (25% growth).16 In 2007, settlers numbered 461,169; pre-sently (2010) some half a million Israeli Jews live beyond the Green Line.17 It isat this critical juncture that it becomes vital to widen the typically narrow 1S2Sscholarship by linking tightly Israel’s domestic politics to its regional contextand dynamics.
Is Palestine an Island?
Nearly all post-1993 books, articles and essays comprising the 1S2S discussiongloss over regional dimensions surrounding the Palestine/Israel matrix both his-torically and in terms of the region’s ongoing ethno-politics. This lapse leads scho-lars of the 1S2S question to debate (and devise) solutions that rest on what I term“mandated imaginations”, that is, scholarly imaginations that ultimately conceiveof the (post-1922) British-mandated territory of Palestine/Israel as if it was—andremains—an island in both historical and contemporary terms. The problem isthat this neither was nor is the case. The Palestine/Israel question acquired apotent regional dimension from at least the time of the Palestinian anti-colonialuprising of 1936–1939 and the historic 1937 pan-Arab gathering in Bludan(that—to begin with—convened to overturn the first two-state plan as formulatedby the British Peel royal commission). It follows logically that if prevailing
16. (Israel’s) Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1992–2006 and List of Localities,the Populations, and Symbols, 1995–2005; Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institutefor Israel Studies, 1991–2004). See also Moshe Behar, “The Peace Process and Israeli Domestic Politicsin the 1990s”, Socialism and Democracy, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2002), pp. 34–48.17. B’TSELEM—The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, By
Hook and By Crook: Israel’s Settlement Policy in the West Bank (Jerusalem: B’TSELEM, 2010), available:,http://www.btselem.org/english/publications/summaries/201007_by_hook_and_by_crook.asp..
diagnoses of the very question itself are incorrect or partial—due to their “man-dated imaginations” and neglect of historical/contemporary regional vari-ables—then the corresponding host of socio-political prognoses (one state, twostates, bi-national state) may also be flawed in all terms other than rhetorical-idea-tional. Existing 1S2S studies are simply devoid of anything taking place beyondthe Lilliputian borders of their otherwise hopeful projection, i.e. a secular-demo-cratic or bi-national state in a territorially united Israel/Palestine or two states onthe same territory.
Nakbaic Conjuncture?
In a universe parallel to the 1S2S debate, an ongoing “mainstreaming” process thataims to “normalise” the possibility of an American and/or Israeli attack on (apotentially nuclear) Iran is evident in journalist, scholarly, military and diplomaticcircles. Appendix A gathers six verbatim samples. As Stephen Walt observedlucidly, this process vis-a-vis Iran is highly reminiscent of the developmentwhich occurred in Euro-America over Iraq from the mid-1990s until the 2003invasion:
what at first seemed like the far-fetched dream of a handful of out-of-power neoconservatives in 1998 had become a serious option by 2001.By 2003, aided in no small part by the efforts of journalists [. . .] the ideahad been embraced by liberals and others who should have knownbetter.18
It presently seems logical to posit that an Israeli and/or American attack on Iran isconsiderablymore likely to erupt before any serious Israeli (or, for that matter, inter-national) consideration of a modestly viable two-state scheme in Israel/Palestineoccurs, if it occurs. (Pause momentarily the longue duree projects of a unitarysecular or bi-national singular state.) At the considerable risk of coming acrossas a non-scholarly alarmist/futurist, I nonetheless posit that it would be scholarlyerroneous to dismiss hastily the possibility that an intense regional confrontationbetween Israel, Iran (and their respective Lebanese, Gazan or American allies/proxies) has the potential to involve, amongst other things, some configuration ofa Nakba (Arabic for “Catastrophe”) involving some elements of cleansing. I con-sciously opt here to shrink the definition of Nakba to its utmost bare minimum,i.e. simply “Fewer Arabs” present on the (already fully Israel-controlled) territoryof Mandatory Palestine.19
Put differently, I suggest that scholarly discussions about the 1S2S conundrumcannot be divorced from a discussion of Israel’s politics vis-a-vis the region at
18. StephenWalt, “Will Israel Bomb Iran?”, Foreign Policy (November 2010), available: ,http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/08/11/mainstreaming_war_with_iran..19. It must be added that, since 1967, Israel has ceaselessly attempted to minimise the number of
Palestinians in Jerusalem/West Bank by a rainbow of legal, bureaucratic and other (so-called)non-violent/velvet means: Palestinian misery is not coincidental but aims to produce emigration.For a particularly brazen attempt scrutinise military orders 1649 and 1650 (13 October 2009) thatlegally define—however remarkably—all West Bank residents as “infiltrators” who may be jailedand deported. English versions in HAMOKED, Center for the Defence of the Individual, available:,http://www.hamoked.org.il/news_main_en.asp?id=904..
large (as is the present case). If that is so, then under what appears to be theimpending haze of a dreadful regional war—as routinely lobbied for by anexpanding group of scholars, journalists, army personnel and technocraticpundits (see Appendix A)—the likelihood of some form of Nakbaic conjuncturecannot be easily dismissed. Following (i) an Israeli and/or American attack onIran and (ii) an Iranian response—the likelihood for such a scenario will increasethe more Israeli civilians and populated areas experience harm that Israel(quickly and merrily) deems “greater than can be tolerated” (in such terms asnumber of casualties or extent of property destruction). As it happens, that is pre-cisely what defence specialists in Israel, the United States and the United Kingdomanticipate in the case of an eruption of a regional confrontation following an initialattack on Iran, i.e. greater Israeli harm and casualties are bound to occur.20 AsWashington-based international strategists Toukan and Cordesman put it:
Iranian response against [possible] Israeli attack [would] include immedi-ate retaliation using its ballistic missiles on Israel; multiple launches ofShahab-3 including the possibility of CBR warheads against Tel Aviv,Israeli military and civilian centers, and Israeli suspected nuclearweapons sites; using proxy groups such as Hezbollah or Hamas toattack Israel proper with suicide bombings, covert CBR attacks, androcket attacks from southern Lebanon.21
Similarly, the Oxford Research Group envisions an Iranian response as follows:
A series of actions aimed at Israel as well as targeting the United Statesand its Western partners including missile attacks on Israel; actions tocause a sharp rise in oil prices by closing the Straits of Hormuz; parami-litary and/or missile attacks on Western Gulf oil production, processingand transportation facilities; strong support for paramilitary groups inIraq and Afghanistan opposing Western involvement.22
Parallel scholarly universes are presently evident: whereas the word “Iran” is hard to comeby in studies of the 1S2S conundrum—the word “Palestine” and/or “Palestinians” ismanifestly absent in studies of the Israel/Iran/US complex. This is short-sighted: thedomestic and regional realms cannot be discussed separately.
In attempting to defend my dour proposition that some element of cleansingappears more probable than the emergence of any viable two-state arrangement,I recall what I have been yearly learning from my students: that most young (andolder) observers of the Middle East—perhaps especially those yearning for one- ortwo-state solutions—find it easier and less daunting to comprehend 1948 and
20. Amos Harel, “Kol Haaretz Tilim Tilim” [Missiles across All Israeli Skies], Haaretz (16 April 2010),available: ,http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/spages/1163365.html.. I do not mention (possible)non-Israeli (Arab/Iranian) casualties/harm exclusively due to their irrelevancy vis-a-vis the argumentadvanced. Of course, Arab/Iranian lives are as precious as Israeli/Palestinian lives.21. Abdullah Toukan andAnthony Cordesman, Study on a Possible Israeli Strike on Iran’s Nuclear Devel-
opment Facilities (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009), available:,http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090316_israelistrikeiran.pdf..22. Paul Rogers,Military Action against Iran: Impact and Effects (Oxford: Oxford Research Group, 2010),
1967 in “historical” terms—as sections/chapters in “history” modules. Many indi-viduals (scholars included) find it analytically overwhelming to conceptualise theNakba as an ongoing process (rather than as a big, singular, finite historical event—no matter how defining it certainly was for shaping the subsequent conflict).Evidently, the Nakba’s pinnacle 1947–48 chapter materialised amidst a steadily
intensifying regional confrontation, even if largely asymmetric militarily;23 so wasthe 1967 Naksa (“setback”) which unsurprisingly resulted in further displacementof Palestinians (and Syrians).24 It seems to me far from fanciful to suggest thatshould a heightened Israeli/Iranian regional confrontation erupt—a largeenough number of Palestinians may find themselves displaced in a manner/conjuncture resembling that which materialised during previous regional confron-tations (1948/1967). Little global attention was paid when Israeli police openlyexercised a massive transfer scenario (7 October 2010);25 or when Israelbombed the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor (June 1981) and a Syrian nuclear facility(6 September 2007).Such a (possible) development need not necessarily constitute a full-blown
cleansing as commonly understood by maximalist—excessively literal—imagin-aries of a forced expulsion;26 such a development would still be capable of affect-ing in a sufficiently consequential manner the conflict’s present demography,geography and socio-politics in a way that ultimately would be favourable to,as well as advance, the Israeli version of a one-state solution (defined above)—rather than advance, say, the version of a “one secular-democratic state”—thecustomary party in the proverbial 1S2S debate.Whether a mini-Nakba, semi-cleansing or wholesale displacement takes place
amidst the guise of a regional war, it is certain to meet little non-symbolic opposi-tion from within Israel or from pro-Israel Christians and Jews in the United Statesor Europe. That will undoubtedly be the case if a Nakbaic scenario materialisesamidst a regional war with a (comparatively) sizeable number of Israeli victimsand harm (although, as has been the historical case, these in all likelihood willconstitute a fraction of the parallel harm/causalities that would be inflicted byIsrael). Major General Gadi Eizenkot, IDF Northern Command Chief, echoedthe Israeli mood:
What happened in [Beirut’s] Dahiya quarter in 2006 will happen in everyvillage from which Israel is fired on [. . .] We will apply disproportionateforce on it and cause great damage and destruction there. From our stand-point, these are not civilian villages, they are military bases [. . .] This is nota recommendation. This is a plan. And it has been approved.27
23. Avi Shlaim, “The Debate about 1948”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3(1995), pp. 287–304.24. Tom Segev, 1967: Israel, the War and the Year that Transformed the Middle East (New York: Metropo-
litan Books, 2007); R. Bowker, Palestinian Refugees: Mythology, Identity, and the Search for Peace (Boulder:Lynne Rienner, 2003); BADIL, From the 1948 Nakba to the 1967 Naksa, Occasional Bulletin No. 18 (June2004).25. See full report by Israel Broadcasting Company, available: ,http://www.iba.org.il/bet/?type=
1&entity=680286..26. See Tilley, op. cit., pp. 6–7 and Israel’s leading military historian Martin Van-Creveld, “Sharon’s
Plan is to Drive Palestinians across the Jordan”, Sunday Telegraph (28 April 2002).27.Report of the United Nations Fact FindingMission on the Gaza Conflict (UnitedNationsHuman Rights
Council, September 2009, A/HRC/12/48), p. 254 (i.e. the “Goldstone Report”).
Lastly, many do-gooders and students of the Middle East generally prefer to post-pone, or avoid altogether, thinking the (so-called) unthinkable. More often thannot 1S2S scholars exhibit an optimist propensity in thinking, obviously wishfully,that “this cannot happen” or—better yet—that the post-20th-century “civilisedworld” would not allow a Nakbaic scenario/development/cleansing to materia-lise. It is evidently easier—certainly more gratifying—to entertain a (viable)two-state solution or a secular or bi-national state. Accordingly, in suggestingthat “the time has come to think the unthinkable”, Tony Judt drafted an optimisticbi-national thesis that was certainly uplifting to many.28 Yet, at least analytically, itshould be equally critical for scholars to additionally think the (so-called) unthink-able in Judt’s opposite direction (and, as a by-product, be as suspicious as theyshould be of meta-historical—possibly metaphysical—beliefs that scenariossomewhat more intense than “usual” ones “cannot (presumably) happen”).
International Responses
Let us ask: what type of an international response would a mini-Nakba or semi-cleansing be likely to elicit from what is commonly termed “the civilisedworld”? Will such a development lead to, say, an American boycott of—or mean-ingful sanctions on—Israel? This strikes me as doubtful given the existing balanceof domestic American forces (both societal and statist) vis-a-vis the question ofPalestine/Israel. (Even if some American measures were to be adopted, they arelikely to be symbolic and in any event would only be a post-fait accompli action.)
Similarly, bearing inmind Israel’s 2010 admission (qua democracy, that is) to theOECD—voted unanimously by the organisation’s 31 members states (includingTurkey, Mexico, Chile, Ireland, Spain and Korea) precisely eight brief months fol-lowing the publication of the UN’s Goldstone Report (on Israel’s 2009 onslaught inGaza)—one may wonder: would (pro-Israel) France, the United Kingdom, Italy,Holland, Denmark, (post-Holocaust) Germany, East European states—or, forthat matter, the entire European Union—be likely to do significantly more thanthe Americans (yet without them) in response to the fait accompli of cleansing—for example suspend Israel’s (uninterrupted/ongoing) preferential trade statusunder the EU–Israel Association Agreement? That is possible. Would the Euro-pean Union generally “do more” than the United States perhaps by utilising itsleverage as Israel’s major trading partner? Again, this could happen.
It is plausible to agree that such a development as a Nakbaic cleansing wouldmeet a stronger-than-usual European response at the level of mainstream statistpowerbrokers—notwithstanding that since 2001 many have evidently becomemore Islamophobic, right-wing, anti-immigrant, anti-Arab and anti-Semitic—although the latter are often (so-called) pro-Israel as well.29 While pro-Palestinianforces within both Western and Southern civil societies are undoubtedly highlycommitted to their cause—the fact of the matter remains empirically simple
28. Tony Judt, “Israel: The Alternative”, New York Review of Books, Vol. 60, No. 16 (23 October 2003).29. For example Michal Kaminski and Roberts Zile (of the Polish Justice and Freedom Party), Gian-
franco Fini (of the Italian Allianza Nazionale), Filip Dewinter (of the Flemish nationalist Vlaams Blok),Pia Kjærsgaard and Peter Skaarup (of the Danish People’s Party) and Geert Wilders (of the Dutch Partyfor Freedom). As the leader of the third largest Dutch party since 2006, Wilders called (already in 2006)for the name of Jordan to be changed to Palestine and to enable Israeli to annex the West Bank. Wildersis adored by many Israeli Jews who deem his anti-Muslim politics correct and courageous.
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(and this is irrespective of whether or not one likes it): such pro-Palestinian forces arenot that powerful and factually have achieved little since the 1960s activism of the NewLeft. It therefore seems reasonable to hypothesise that a year or two following a(possible) Nakbaic development, the number of (still-stateless) Palestinianswould remain sufficiently lower in Mandatory Palestine than it has hithertobeen and that the world (including—or perhaps especially—authoritarian Arabstates) would ultimately move on quicker than one thinks, hopes or believes toits own mundane, ordinary (non-Palestinian) matters.Ponder this: how many states worldwide continued to remember in—say—
2006 the 230,000 who perished in the 2004 Asian tsunami? Not that many. Andis there right now—just months after the mega-calamitous Haiti earthquake—astate that remains particularly moved by the 150,000–200,000 who perishedthere? It does not seem so. Granted, these are not political Nakbas—not tomention that the Israel/Palestine matrix routinely receives a radically differentmagnitude of consistent world attention. Be that as it may, once new (Israeli)facts on the ground are evident and complete demographically and otherwise itwill be difficult to reverse them unless sufficiently vigorous international actiontakes place (such as the sole one that thus far did take place back in 1956). Alas,we have completed a full circle here, even if indeed vicious: such sufficiently vig-orous international action may indeed follow the (possible) emergence of someNakbaic development/cleansing; yet it remains as unlikely (as explained above)to precede a development such as the dire consequences resulting from an outbreakof a regional war (just more brutal than standard ones).And this, in essence, is the point that matters most in the context of the prover-
bial 1S2S debate. Complications and distractions are unwarranted since the ulti-mate argument made here is simple: as things presently stand, it is not onlyunlikely that the breathtaking unicorn in the form of a secular-democratic or bi-national state will somehowmaterialise out of thin air during our grandchildren’slifetime; the emergence of a viable (let alone stable) two-states scheme is (nearly) asremote. In sharp contrast, Israel’s one-state reality/project is effectively the solematerial process that is taking place concretely right now—in the very samemanner it never ceased metastasising since 1967.30 Placed and examined next toit, the proverbial 1S2S exchange—notwithstanding its astounding volume andintellectual rigour/stimulus—remains hypothetical and abstract. There appearsto be much ado about nothing: the 1S2S exchange mostly takes place intellectuallyon a non-materialist (speculative or verbal) level of ideas, doctrines, ideology,journalism, blogs, academic conferences, hollow shuttle-diplomacy and hopes.Conversely, Israel’s methodic advancement of its own one-state version is con-
crete, calm, empirical, more imaginable—hence more possible relative to itsalternatives. Refraining dryly from wishful thinking, this one-state project stead-fastly involves a drive to minimise the number of Palestinians on the ground byviolent, forceful or velvet-bureaucratic means.31 As such, Israel’s one-stateproject (including its possible countering) seems to be the sole issue—better yet,
30. The best sources on Israel’s settlement expansion are Peace Now, available: ,http://www.peacenow.org.il/site/en/homepage.asp.. and Foundation for Middle East Peace, available:,http://www.fmep.org/..31. See footnotes 15–17. Readers who honestly (rather than kneejerkingly) find the concept “Nakba by
velvet-means” unsettling have an obligation to gather and read all the articles/essays written by Israelijournalist Amira Hass since the late 1980s.
process—that merits meaningful focus by scholars otherwise immersed in the 1S2Sdebate, be they committed/honest liberal Zionists or (democratic) non-/anti-Zionists.
Rare as it may be in the scholarly world, I can merrily conclude my assessmentwith the great hope that future developments will somehow render it obsolete,null and void.32 Colleagues may hopefully be successful in identifying paths toarrive at the utter demolition of my argument, firstly empirically-materially butthen intellectually as well. Yet laying bare Israel’s one-state solution/project is anecessary first step for the possibility of its thwarting.
III: Problems, Solutions and Yearnings for Peaceful Finality
Critics have counter-argued that the word “solution” in the heading Israel’s one-state solution cannot be considered analogous to the word “solution” engrainedin the colloquialisms “two-state Solution” and “one-state Solution” prescribed by1S2S scholars. To test this proposition I start with a definition of “solution”: “thestate of being dissolved; the method or process of solving a problem; or theanswer to, or disposition of, a problem”.33
Granted, Israel’s one-state solution is not a solution that can—or will—deliver ahappy, peaceful conclusion to the century-old conflict. Yet analytically open-minded scholars have little choice other than to ponder critically: what exactlyis “the problem” that global society collectively faces in the territory comprisingMandatory Palestine and that—as such—apparently necessitates either this orthat “solution” (one-state, two-states, etc)? While the rainbow of confident scholarsI know all possess in their respective arsenals a brilliant (still subjective) answer tothis question—not a single non-arrogant individual can contest the empirical factthat there is no consensus on what this problem is.
We are therefore obliged to explore: is the problem necessitating solution in thecontemporary territory comprising Mandatory Palestine rooted in 1917 (theBalfour Declaration), as the old PLO enshrined in its pre-1967 Charter (andsome radical Islamic and secular groups continue to maintain today)? Is theproblem necessitating solution rooted in 1948, as apparently suggested by (i) thepost-1967 PLO until 1988, (ii) many contemporary Palestinians, (iii) global “one-staters” and (iv) a few dozen middle-class Israeli Jews? Is the problem necessitatingsolution in the territory comprising Mandatory Palestine rooted principally in1967, as contemporary “two-staters”, together with much of the world, maintain?Is it possible that the problem necessitating solution by now springs primarily from areligious (Jewish–Muslim) friction, rather than from events that took place in1917, 1948 or 1967?
Is the problem necessitating solution in the territory comprising Mandatory Pales-tine rooted in otherwise standard settler/European colonialism that continues todisguise itself—or discursively call itself—as “Zionism”? Is the problem necessitat-ing solution a straightforward conflict between competing national movementswith evaporating relevance to mid-20th-century anachronistic colonialism? Doesthe problem necessitating solution actually mirror by now simple/standard First
32. For a less pessimistic and rigorous reading consult Oren Yiftachel, “‘Creeping Apartheid’ inIsrael–Palestine”, Middle East Report, Vol. 39, No. 253 (2009), pp. 7–37.33. Farlex’s theFreeDictionary online (emphasis added).
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World/Third World divides? Is the problem necessitating solution in the territorycomprising Mandatory Palestine principally over land and material real-estatealone? And when push comes to shove and all is said and done—is the problemnecessitating solution simply a part of global-horizontal class conflict (while therest—including national identity, unique culture, authenticity or religion—ismerely epiphenomenal angel-dust sedating the subaltern Jewish and Arabminds in the material service and political interests of its own culturally national-ist petit-bourgeois)?Is the problem necessitating solution in the territory comprisingMandatory Pales-
tine rooted in a long-lasting clash between “Eastern” and “Western” cultures?Between “civilisations”? Is the problem necessitating solution merely the exist-ence—in the Middle East—of an American military base that for geopolitical con-venience assumed the form of a “Jewish state”? Does the problem necessitatingsolution in the territory comprising Mandatory Palestine remain the principalpost-1937 Arab disdain for an independent Jewish nation-state on any part ofEretz Yisrael/Palestine?Scholars should ponder further: is it possible that the problem necessitating sol-
ution in the territory comprising Mandatory Palestine was one of the above, atone point in time—but became another one of the above at a later stage? Arethere (or can there ever be) respective Palestinian or Israeli representativebodies capable of answering this question authoritatively without unleashingcivil war within their respective national collectivities? Is the problem necessitatingsolution a combination of two, three (or all) of the thorny problems above? Supposethat it is—what then is the internal balance and priorities between the depressingweb of two, three (or all) constituents coalescing to produce the problem in the ter-ritory comprising Mandatory Palestine? Does every problem hitherto detailedequally necessitate—or really have—a solution? And lastly (and presumablymost importantly) is the problem’s possible solution a two-state solution or a one-state solution? Which is the best and/or probable solution? And can scholars trusttheological-like propositions such as “the one-state-solution would resolve theentire conflict in one magisterial gesture and is already an impending realty”?34
What kind of a “one state”? Is it prudent to leave such principal contention freeof qualifiers such as “democratic” and/or “secular”? Is the possibility of Israel’sone-state solution sufficiently taken into account (particularly given its exclusivematerial presence compared to everything else)?The above quandaries notwithstanding, participants in the proverbial 1S2S dis-
cussion entertain and have in mind a final peaceful (or just) solution—precisely asthe solution is defined above!—to the whatever-problem they deem to underpin theclash in Palestine/Israel. I have already pleaded guilty above to reduce anyone’ssentence: Israel’s one-state solution—presumably also a solution for somethingdeemed a problem by all-too-many Israelis—will in all likelihood be a non-final sol-ution. The otherwise perfectly understandable human and/or scholarly yearningfor the conflict’s peaceful finality notwithstanding—the non-peaceful non-finalityenshrined in what I term Israel’s one-state solution cannot, and does not, diminishthe importance and necessity of its critical consideration.Each material inching in the direction of Israel’s one-state solution seems to make
it less probable for the standard 1S2S solutions to emerge. Furthermore, the
34. Tilley, op. cit., p. 9.
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discussions of those advocating for a two-state solution and for a one-statesolution mushroom equally from their shared tacit consent conceptualising Man-datory Palestine’s existing demographic composition as given and as overall aconstant. As explained, given the great demographic changes that have typifiedthe conflict thus far—changes that become visible solely once the observer stepsbackwards from the snaky 1S2S-tail to view the whole historical elephant standingin the room—I am not sure that this assumption is permissible from a scholarlypoint of view. From at least one very dominant Israeli vantage-point, it is believedthat a so-called “demographically corrective” Nakbaic cleansing would be capableof deferring far enough into the future the possibility for “real” solutions (read:more peacefully final solutions) to emerge—foremost those prescribed by 1S2Sscholars.
Conclusion
This article has tied seven main propositions rooted in domestic, regional andglobal realms: (i) to date, no societal or state-based Israeli constituency exists toconclude a modestly viable two-state solution; (ii) a singular (democratic or bi-national) state is breathtaking yet unlikely to materialise during the lifetime ofour grandchildren; (iii) the sole material process that does tangibly unfold onIsraeli/Palestinian ground is Israel’s one-state solution, that is, steady/ceaseless con-solidation of Israeli–Jewish domination over the whole territory comprising post-1922 Mandatory Palestine; (iv) a sufficiently vigorous international intervention inIsrael/Palestine seems unlikely to emerge in the not-so-near future; (v) a potentialIsraeli–Iranian regional confrontation seems likely to erupt before any meaningfulconsideration of a viable two-state-scheme takes place (if it takes place); (vi) itwould be scholarly erroneous to hastily dismiss the possibility that—as was thecase in 1948 and 1967—a regional confrontation involving Israel, Iran (and theirrespective proxies) has the potential to involve some configuration of a Nakbaicdevelopment effectively resulting in the actual presence of fewer Arabs on the(already fully Israeli-controlled) territory of Mandatory Palestine; and (vii) if aso-called “demographically corrective” Nakbaic development is to take placeamidst the haze of a regional war, it will be capable of deferring far enough intothe future the possibility for so-called real solutions to emerge—foremost thoseprescribed by 1S2S scholars; such possible Nakbaic development will advanceconcurrently the presently existing Israeli one-state reality (while possiblyfurther “Palestinianising” Jordan; see Appendix B for what enough Israelis havein mind).
In substantiating these themes conjointly, one conclusion emerges: the entire(left-Zionist/anti-Zionist) scholarly spectrum constituting the post-1993 1S2S dis-cussion is found esoteric and hypothetical once juxtaposed non-ideationally vis-a-vis material politics (domestic, regional, global). In the more foreseeable term itprobably makes more sense to exercise the professional eye-work of avid ping-pong enthusiasts to follow meticulously the back-and-forth Tel Aviv–Teheraninteraction (while resisting its destabilising vertigo). This potential interaction islikely to pre-date—possibly supersede—any solution to whatever problem is atstake in the (otherwise artificial) Palestine/Israel island as it has been constructedsince the mid-1990s by 1S2S scholarship.
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Appendix A
Normalisation and “Mainstreaming”—by military, scholarly and liberal-journalistcircles—of (possible) American and/or Israeli attack on Iran. (These are publiclyavailable sources pre-dating the Wikileaks documents.)
1. Admiral Michael Mullen, US Army Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(i) Iran Attack Option on the Table (February 2010)Politically, it is prohibited in any way that Iran will have nuclear weapons. Rightnow, diplomatic efforts continue [yet] the option to attack Iran is still on the table[. . .] I worry about the unintended consequences of an attack [. . .] The diplomaticefforts must be exhausted [. . .] We have appreciation for Israel [. . .] This importantrelationship with Israel grows stronger every day. We are close partners, since theestablishment of the state [. . .] We will operate all our forces to have a stable andsecure Israel and for the people of Israel. [Asked about the possibility that Israel wouldattack Iran, Mullen answered]: Israel’s sovereignty is important to us. We would nothurt Israel’s sovereignty or any other country’s. We worked hard in recent years toimprove our abilities in different areas, here in Israel and elsewhere [. . .] includingthe Persian Gulf.35
(ii) Meet the Press transcript (August 2010)MR. GREGORY: The consequences of Iran developing a nuclear weapon are vast,and something that the [Obama] administration certainly wants to prevent. Yousaid back in April [. . .]: “Iran having a nuclear weapon would be incredibly destabiliz-ing. I think attacking them would also create the same kind of outcome” [. . .] Which isworse?
ADM. MULLEN:When I speak to that I talk to unintended consequences [. . .] thatare difficult to predict in what is an incredibly unstable part of the world that Iworry about the most. What I try to do [. . .] is identify the space between thosetwo outcomes [. . .] I recognize that there isn’t that much space there. But, quitefrankly, I am extremely concerned about both of those outcomes.
GREGORY: But leaders have to make a decision [. . .] Which is worse, Iran with anuclear weapon or what could happen if the US attacks?
ADM. MULLEN: [. . .] both have great downside, potentially.
GREGORY: The president has said he is determined to stop Iran from developinga nuclear weapon [. . .] Is force against Iran on the table in a way that it has not beeneven in our recent history?
ADM. MULLEN: Military actions have been on the table and remain [. . .] and cer-tainly [. . .] one of the options that the president has. I hope we don’t get to that. Butit’s an important option, and it’s one that’s well understood.
GREGORY: There was a concern among Israelis, among Americans, that thereweren’t very many good options when it came to attacking Iran, should it cometo that [. . .]
ADM. MULLEN: [. . .] None of them are good in a sense that it’s certainly anoutcome that [. . .] we wouldn’t seek. [It] is not just the consequences of theaction itself, but the things that could result after the fact.
GREGORY: But the military has a plan, should it come to that?
ADM. MULLEN: We do.36
2. Brigadier General (Res.) Oded Tira, former IDF chief artillery officer
(i) What to do with Iran? (Israel’s leading daily, 2006)[. . .] we [Israelis] must coordinate independent strike with US, prepare for Iranianresponse [. . .] President Bush lacks the political power to attack Iran. As an Amer-ican strike in Iran is essential for our existence, we must help him pave the way bylobbying the Democratic Party [. . .] and US newspaper editors. We need to do thisin order to turn the Iranian issue to a bipartisan one unrelated to the Iraq failure[. . .] we must prepare an independent military strike by coordinating flights inIraqi airspace with the US. We should also coordinate with Azerbaijan the useof airbases [. . .] and also enlist the support of the Azeri minority in Iran. Inaddition, we must immediately start preparing for an Iranian response. TheAmericans must act. Yet if they don’t, we’ll do it ourselves, because [. . .] our exist-ence isn’t guaranteed. Addressing Iran would have positive implications for us interms of the strategic balance in our region [. . .] If we act in the face of these chal-lenges soberly [. . .] we’ll be able to win and bring about comprehensive peace.Peace is pursued from a position of power.37
(ii) Attack in October 2010 (August 2010)[. . .] The necessary conclusion is that Israel needs to attack Iran. The best timewould be October 2010 before the elections to the American congress. Americanpenalties to Israel—if at all—will be limited. After November 2010 Israel willhopefully get a Republican congress that will back-up our attack and facilitateits continuation.38
3. Pulitzer winner and America’s leading liberal-columnist David S. Broder
The war recovery? (Washington Post, October 2010)[. . .] What else might affect the economy? The answer is obvious, but its impli-cations are frightening. War and peace influence the economy. Look back atFDR and the Great Depression. What finally resolved that economic crisis?WWII. Here is where Obama is likely to prevail. With strong Republicansupport in Congress for challenging Iran’s ambition to become a nuclear power,he can spend much of 2011 and 2012 orchestrating a showdown with themullahs. This will help him politically because the opposition party will beurging him on. And as tensions rise and we accelerate preparations for war, theeconomy will improve. I am not suggesting, of course, that the president incitea war to get reelected. [Author’s remark: of course not.] But the nation will rallyaround Obama because Iran is the greatest threat to the world. If he can confront
this threat and contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions, he will have made the world saferand may be regarded as one of the most successful presidents in history.39
4. Jeffery Goldberg (The Atlantic, September 2010)
The Point of No Return (9,000 word article)In the gap between Washington’s and Jerusalem’s views of Iran lies the question:who [. . .] will stop Iran before it goes nuclear, and how? As Washington and Jer-usalem study each other intensely, here’s an inside look at the strategic calcu-lations on both sides—and at how [. . .] an Israeli air strike will unfold. [. . .] TheIsraelis will tell their American counterparts that they are taking this drasticstep because a nuclear Iran poses the gravest threat since Hitler to the physicalsurvival of the Jewish people [. . .]; that Israel was left with no choice. They willnot be asking for permission, because it will be too late to ask for permission.40
5. Professor Benny MorrisUsing Bombs to Stave Off War (New York Times, 18 July 2008)Israel will almost surely attack Iran’s nuclear sites in the next four to sevenmonths—and the leaders in Washington and even Tehran should hope that theattack will be successful enough to cause at least a significant delay in theIranian production schedule, if not complete destruction, of that country’snuclear program. Because if the attack fails, the Middle East will almost certainlyface a nuclear war—either through a subsequent pre-emptive Israeli nuclear strikeor a nuclear exchange shortly after Iran gets the bomb.41
6. Professor Alan Kuperman (Director, Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Program,University of Texas)
There’s Only One Way to Stop Iran (New York Times, 23 December 2009)[. . .] Eschewing force is tantamount to appeasement. We have reached the pointwhere air strikes are the only plausible option with any prospect of preventingIran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. Postponing military action merely providesIran a window to expand, disperse and harden its nuclear facilities against attack.The sooner the US takes action, the better.
Appendix B
Positions mirroring more candidly thinking underlying Israel’s majority against amodestly viable two-state partition
1. Hatikva Party’s platform: Two states for two peoples on two sides of the Jordan (13 pp.)
[The plan is based] on the fact that the Palestinians have their own state already inJordan, a kingdom—in which the Palestinians are at least 75% of the residents [. . .]Setting up Jordan as a Hashemite-Palestinian country will enable all the Arabsliving in Judea and Samaria [. . .] to become citizens of Jordan, turn Amman’s par-liament into a parliament that represents the Palestinian people [. . .]. Any Arabswho do not take advantage of the opportunity to move to Jordan within the
39.,http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/29/AR2010102907404.html..40. ,http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1969/12/the-point-of-no-return/8186/..41. While immodest Morris failed in his projected timeline, the circumstances endure and cannot
framework of refugee resettlement can be residents (as opposed to citizens) of theState of Israel. They would be able to manage civilian affairs in their urban andrural areas, without land contiguity. Such authority could include managingtheir economy, health, education, transportation, religion, agriculture and munici-pal areas. Israel would exercise sovereignty over all territory west of the Jordan,receive exclusive authority over security issues [. . .] since Israel could neveraccept the existence of an army from another country west of the Jordan [. . .]It is a dangerous illusion to believe that it is possible to establish a “demilitarized”Palestinian state, as suggested by Netanyahu [. . .] there is no way to impose“demilitarization” upon an independent state, if it decides to do otherwise [. . .]Israel cannot agree to pave the way to a contiguous Palestine (the West Bankand Gaza) that would slice the State of Israel in two [. . .] The Plan “Jordan is Pales-tine” is the only approach that can handle conflict without endangering the veryexistence of Israel [. . .] The key is making impossible a plan to build a Palestinianstate west of the Jordan River, as well as the formulation of alternatives. This isentirely in the hands of Israel.42
2. The Israeli Initiative, The Right Road to Peace [led by former MK Benny Alon of the“voluntary transfer” Party) [16 pp.]
The Israeli Initiative assumes that the most effective and correct way to preservestability of the region is to guarantee Israeli sovereignty over Judea and Samaria,and bring to an end the long-existing vagueness regarding the status of theseareas. Only Israeli sovereignty from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean canprevent Shiite penetration into the heart of the western Middle East and guarantee[. . .] Israel’s existence as a Jewish State. Judea and Samaria form the geographicaland historical heart of western Eretz-Israel and there is no reason—moral, legal,demographic or geographic—to abandon those parts [. . .] that provide vital stra-tegic depth and land reserves.
The Israeli Initiative proposes an implementable, regional, humane and just sol-ution that responds to the real needs of all parties. Overall and full rehabilitationof all the refugees and a new and simple map in which Israeli sovereignty extendsto the Jordan River, and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is recognized as thenational home of the Palestinians [. . .] In the following pages the basic principlesof the initiative are presented, accompanied by maps and explanations [. . .]
Independent polls, commissioned over the years by both Palestinian and Israelipolling agencies, clearly indicate that Palestinians are becoming increasingly con-vinced that living under Palestinian Authority control will not solve their pro-blems. There are growing signs that the Palestinian population would be opento a true humanitarian solution that would enable them to rebuild their lives inother countries.
A survey that was conducted in 2004 showed that half (50%) of Palestinian societydoes not rule out the option of permanently moving to another country if they hadthe ability andmeans to relocate [. . .] 71% of those polled namedmajor factors thatwould lead them to make a permanent move to another country: Assurance of ajob abroad (16%), a substantial financial incentive (19%), promise of a place to liveand a high level of education (14%). Only 15% replied that nothing would
convince them to relocate. This poll was conducted by Ma’agar Mochot—aleading Israeli polling agency—in cooperation with the Palestinian Center forPublic Opinion under [. . .] Dr. Nabil Kukali. A survey that was conducted in2006 by An-Najah University in Nablus showed that 31.4% of Palestinians are con-sidering rebuilding their lives in another country, assuming they could achieve agood standard of living. A survey conducted in September 2007 by the Center forPalestinian Policy and Research headed by Dr. Khalil Shikaki, showed that 32%of Palestinians want to emigrate to another country [. . .]43
3. OUR Land of Israel, World Headquarters to Save the People and Land of Israel
SOS-Israel was founded [. . .] to oppose and fight the political accords with theArabs that include land or security concessions. SOS-Israel is against giving upany part of Eretz-Yisroel—the Holy Land—or compromising the security ofthose that live there. SOS-Israel makes every possible effort to [. . .] emphasizethat Eretz-Yisroel is our G-d given land and belongs to the Jews exclusively, andthat any accord or agreement that includes land concessions endanger theJewish nation and world peace. SOS-Israel [. . .] deepens the awareness that anycommand to expel Jews from settlements is absolutely illegal [. . .] The followingpersonages take part and support SOS work: Rabbi Dov Lior, Rabbi of Chevronand Chairman of Rabbonei Eretz-Yisroel, Nobel Prize Winner Prof YisroelAuman, Prof Ezra Zohar, Dr Elyakim Haetzni—Lawyer/Colonel Moshe Yogev,Rabbi Yaakov Yosef [. . .] Rabbi Menachem Porush, President of Agudas Israel[. . .] MK Prof Aryeh Eldad [. . .] SOS-Israel was founded by Rabbi Sholom DovWolpo from Kiryat Gat Israel, with Rabbi Yekutiel Rapp from New York.44
