Urbane Expressions in Aristotle and Anaximenes

Urbane Expressions in Aristotle and Anaximenes

David Mirhady

Abstract: A series of descriptions of “urbane” stylistic elements and expressions (ἀστεῖα) is traced back from Aristotle (Rhet. 3.10-11) and Anaximenes (Rhet. Alex. 22) to the rhetoricians Polus and Licymnius (first cited in Plato’s Phaedrus), through Isocrates and the account of metaphor in Aristotle, Rhetoric 3.2.13, with further reference to Aristotle, Poetics 17 and Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen. The development reflects debates over thought vs. style, the role of the enthymeme, metaphor, maxims, antithesis, and visual imagery, what Aristotle refers to both as “making (images appear) before the eyes” and as “activity” ( ἐνέργεια). Keywords: urbanities, metaphor, antithesis, energeia, visualization

At the beginning of Plato’s Gorgias (447a), Socrates and Chaerephon

arrive at Callicles’ house to hear that Gorgias has just treated Callicles’

guests to an “urbane feast” (ἀστείας ἑορτῆς) in which he has “displayed”

(ἐπεδείξατο) “many and beautiful” things (πολλὰ καλὰ)1. That is, Gorgias

has been speaking epideictically and displaying many “urbane”, “beautiful”

features of oratory. Previous scholars have overlooked the connection, but

in the last book of his Rhetoric, Aristotle himself seeks to delineate what he

calls “urbane” (ἀστεῖα) and “well reputed” (εὐδοκιµοῦντα) sayings2, what

1 Plato, Gorgias 447a. Sansone 2009: 131-133 emphasizes the use of the adjective

asteios in both rhetoric and cooking. 2 Aristotle uses “urbane” (ἀστεῖα) and “well reputed” (εὐδοκιµοῦντα) inter-

changeably in Rhetoric 3.10-11, ἀστεῖα twelve times and εὐδοκιµοῦντα eight times. The latter is often used, more broadly, elsewhere in the text. My translation of εὐδοκιµοῦντα varies: “popular sayings” seems the most comfortable. Aristo-tle’s identification of the term with urbanities may be due, indirectly, to its having been used of the poets and, particularly, of Gorgias (cf. Rhet. 1404a24-28 and Paus. 10.18.8). The adjective ἀστεῖος seems to need an accompanying synonym because, as Isocrates says, “those who desire to be ἀστεῖος appear to lower them-

258 David Mirhady

we might understand as the snippets of the elevated prose style that we

identify with Gorgias, at a theoretical appreciation of which Gorgias him-

self hints in his Encomium of Helen. In his understanding of urbanities,

however, Aristotle uses a triadic structure that includes “metaphor, antithe-

sis, and activity” (ἐνέργεια)3. He seems partly to be responding to compet-

ing accounts that are mentioned in Anaximenes’ Rhetoric to Alexander

(22), where enthymemes and maxims are identified with urbane speaking

instead, as well as other accounts, including one suggested by Isocrates

(12.2) and another from the little known teachers Licymnius and Polus (ap.

Plat. Phaedr. 267b-c). The projection of differing cultural characteristics,

whether urbane, dignified, or otherwise, seems to have been an interest

both within the Peripatetic School and elsewhere in 4th -century Greek rhet-

oric4. I want to concentrate here on Aristotle’s account of urbanities in an

attempt to delineate its intellectual background in these competing ac-

counts.

1. Rhet. 3.10.1-6

µεταφοράν | ἀντικειµένως | πρὸ ὀµµάτων ποιεῖ

µεταφορᾶς ἀντιθέσεως ἐνεργείας

selves” (Isoc. 2.34). Socrates also suggests vulgar connotations in the Phaedrus (see below). 3 Arist. Rhet. 1410b35-6 δεῖ ἄρα τούτων στοχάζεσθαι τριῶν, µεταφορᾶς ἀντι-θέσεως ἐνεργείας. The discussion is not limited to metaphor. Antithesis occurs out-side metaphor, as in the various types of sayings that Aristotle reviews in Rhet. 3.11.6. “Before-the-eyes” also occurs without metaphor, for instance when we lis-ten to a radio broadcast of a sports event. Cf. also Rhet. 2.8.14 and 3.16.10 (1417a37-b3), where Aristotle discusses injecting emotional effects into narration by mentioning scowling, hissing, and shaking of hands, which are visual but not verbal. 4 Aristotle’s colleague Theophrastus has his own triad of characteristics that create

not urbanity, but “magnitude, dignity, and eminence”, namely, word choice, har-monization, and figures. See Theophrastus 691 FHS&G = Dion. Hal., Isoc. 3.

Urbane Expressions in Aristotle and Anaximenes 259

Aristotle begins his account of urbanities by noting that they can be achiev-

ed through natural talent or practice (Rhet. 3.10.1); he then goes back to

first principles to argue that people naturally take pleasure in learning easily

or quickly (3.10.2)5, and that metaphor, rather than simile, accomplishes

this goal most effectively (3.10.2-3)6. That sets simile aside

7. Implicitly, I

would argue, it also sets aside the term εἰκονολογία, which is associated

with the rhetoricians Polus and Licymnius (Plat., Phaedr. 267c; 269a), the

latter of whom seems to be the originator of this line of thinking. Then Ar-

istotle points out that while enthymemes can be urbane, they are urbane in

terms of thought (διάνοια), not style (3.10.4; cf. 2.26.5). That allows him to

put aside enthymemes as well, though they are found in the parallel ac-

counts of Anaximenes (Rhet. Alex. 22.1) and Isocrates (Isoc. 12.2). In terms

of style (λέξις), Aristotle says, a saying is urbane if the form (σχῆµα) is an-

tithetical and the words have metaphor8. Going on (Rhet. 3.10.6), he adds

“before-the-eyes”– a concept he has apparently adopted from Licymnius 5 Easy or quick learning is naturally pleasant for all (µανθάνειν ῥᾳδίως ἡδὺ φύσει πᾶσιν Rhet. 1410b10). The idea recurs repeatedly: ἐποίησεν µάθησιν καὶ γνῶσιν b14-15; µάθησιν ταχεῖαν b21; µηδὲν δεῖ ζητῆσαι b23; ἅµα λεγοµένων ἡ γνῶσις γίνεται b24-25; γίγνεται γὰρ οἷον µάθησις b26. Cf. Arist. Met. 980a1 πάντες ἄν-θρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει, “All men naturally desire to know”. 6 Rhet. 3.10.2 ἡ δὲ µεταφορὰ ποιεῖ τοῦτο µάλιστα. The simile is less pleasant be-

cause it is longer (1410b18-19 διὸ ἧττον ἡδύ, ὅτι µακροτέρως). Aristotle’s discus-sion of metaphor under the heading “urbanities” is independent of that in Rhet. 3.2; he makes no cross-reference to it and starts from first principles. 7 He will return to it. Aristotle says here and elsewhere (Rhet. 3,4), including the

next chapter (3.11.11-13), that similes are a form of metaphor. 8 Rhet. 1410b27-32 κατὰ µὲν οὖν τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ λεγοµένου τὰ τοιαῦτα εὐδο-κιµεῖ τῶν ἐνθυµηµάτων, κατὰ δὲ τὴν λέξιν τῷ µὲν σχήµατι, ἐὰν ἀντικειµένως λέγηται ... τοῖς δ’ ὀνόµασιν, ἐὰν ἔχῃ µεταφοράν. Anaximenes’ principal notion of enthymeme (Rhet. Alex. 10) is based on contraries (ἐναντιούµενα). Aristotle’s own notion of enthymemes is very different (Rhet. 1.2.8-22). Note that while metaphor promotes learning, in distinguishing what is urbane style, Aristotle paradoxically steers such learning clear of thought (διάνοια).

260 David Mirhady

and Gorgias – before summarizing that urbanity consists in aiming at meta-

phor, antithesis, and activity9. Though aspects are implicit, his method

seems clear: as well as delineating his own account, Aristotle is also argu-

ing against its alternatives by referring to and usually rejecting the ideas of

others.

The triad is stated again in the next chapter (Rhet. 3.11.10), with pari-

sosis there combined with antithesis, which seems to reveal another line

back to Isocrates, since he likewise combines them10

. In fact, Dionysius of

Halicarnassus criticizes Isocrates for juvenile overuse of them (Isoc. 13)11

,

noting in particular that Gorgias, Polus, and Licymnius used these “theatri-

cal schemata” excessively (Thuc. 24 = Ep. ad Ammaeum 2.2)12

. There are

thus several indications that the teachings go back to these early rhetori-

cians.

For Aristotle things seen “before the eyes” are to be seen “being done

and not going to be done” (πραττόµενα µᾶλλον ἢ µέλλοντα (1410b34-35).

In the Rhetoric to Alexander the maxim (γνώµη), a statement that is true in

general, takes the second position; in Licymnius’ list it appears as gno-

9 Rhet. 1410b33-35 ἔτι εἰ πρὸ ὀµµάτων ποιεῖ· ὁρᾶν γὰρ δεῖ [τὰ] πραττόµενα µᾶλλον ἢ µέλλοντα. δεῖ ἄρα τούτων στοχάζεσθαι τριῶν, µεταφορᾶς ἀντιθέσεως ἐνεργείας. 10

Rhet. 1412b32-33 τὰ ὀνόµατα µεταφορὰ εἴη καὶ µεταφορὰ τοιαδὶ καὶ ἀντίθεσις καὶ παρίσωσις, καὶ ἔχοι ἐνέργειαν. Aristotle treats them under the heading τῆς ἐν κώλοις λέξεως ἡ ἀντικειµένη (“the opposed style in clauses”) in Rhet. 3.9.7-10. 11

Dion. Hal. Isoc. 13 ἐξ αὐτῆς γὰρ ἔσται τῆς Ἰσοκράτους λέξεως τεθείσης κατα-φανὴς ὅ τε τῶν περιόδων ῥυθµὸς ἐκ παντὸς διώκων τὸ γλαφυρὸν καὶ τῶν σχηµά-των τὸ µειρακιῶδες περὶ τὰς ἀντιθέσεις καὶ παρισώσεις καὶ παροµοιώσεις κατα-τριβόµενον. 12

Dion. Hal. Thuc. 24 εὕροι δ᾽ ἄν τις οὐκ ὀλίγα καὶ τῶν θεατρικῶν σχηµάτων κείµενα παρ᾽ αὐτῷ, τὰς παρισώσεις λέγω καὶ παροµοιώσεις καὶ παρονοµασίας καὶ ἀντιθέσεις, ἐν αἷς ἐπλεόνασε Γοργίας ὁ Λεοντῖνος καὶ οἱ περὶ Πῶλον καὶ Λικύµ-νιον καὶ πολλοὶ ἄλλοι τῶν κατ᾽ αὐτὸν ἀκµασάντων.


mologia13

, Aristotle’s shorthand is elliptical, but it appears that he wants to

emphasize the immediate, specific aspect of urbanities, again implicitly ar-

guing against the generality of maxims. In his own treatment of maxims

(Rhet. 2.21.2), Aristotle confirms that they deal with what is general, and

earlier he identifies the general with what happens in the future (Rhet.

1.1.7)14

. In Rhet. 2.21.9, he also says that country folk (ἀγροῖκοι) coin max-

ims the most, another clear suggestion that maxims are not urbane.

2. Rhet. 3.10.7

τῶν δὲ µεταφορῶν . . . εὐδοκιµοῦσι µάλιστα αἱ κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν

In 3.10.7, the single, longest section of the Rhetoric, Aristotle concentrates

on “before-the-eyes”, giving twenty-five examples from no fewer than nine

orators, as well as a comic playwright and a cynic philosopher, most of

them from close to his own time15

. They are all visual metaphors. Aristotle

seems at first here to be aiming at a trifecta, a single statement that includes

metaphor, antithesis, and “before-the-eyes” all in one, and he seems to find

one in Lysias’ funeral oration for those who had died at Salamis, when

“freedom was buried with their valor” (συγκαταθαπτοµένης τῇ ἀρετῇ

αὐτῶν τῆς ἐλευθερίας Rhet. 1411a33 = Lys. 2,60). There is clearly some-

13

Rhet. Alex. 22.2 δεῖ δὲ καὶ γνώµας συµπαραλαµβάνειν. Cf. 11.1 γνώµη δέ ἐστι µὲν ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ καθ” ὅλων τῶν πραγµάτων δόγµατος ἰδίου δήλωσις. For Licymnius cf. Plat. Phaedr. 267b. 14

Rhet. 2.21.2 ἔστι δὴ γνώµη ἀπόφανσις, οὐ µέντοι οὔτε περὶ τῶν καθ” ἕκαστον, οἷον ποῖός τις Ἰφικράτης, ἀλλὰ καθόλου. Cf. 1.1.7 περὶ µελλόντων τε καὶ καθόλου ἐστίν. At Philebus 39b-d Socrates describes images that result from words, but in that passage the images are furture-oriented. 15

Pericles, Leptines, Cephisodotus, Iphicrates, Peitholaus, Moerocles, Aesion, Isocrates, and Lycoleon. There are references also to the Middle Comedy of An-axandrides and to Diogenes the Cynic. Newman 2002: 10-11 catalogues Aristotle’s examples of metaphors by their types.

262 David Mirhady

thing visual and a metaphor in the “burial of freedom”, and there is also an-

tithesis when “valor” is substituted for the expected “their bodies”.

This section reveals a remarkable collection, and how Aristotle came to

have access to the quotations is also remarkable. Jeremy Trevett has argued

compellingly that Aristotle does not utilize written copies of deliberative or

judicial speeches; he uses only written copies of epideictic speeches, as

well as other, literary works16

. If Trevett is right, then Aristotle cited many

of his quotations either from memory or from lists of quotations that he and

his Peripatetic colleagues assembled. Although Gorgias is probably the au-

thor most readily identified with urbane, popular style, Aristotle surprising-

ly does not cite him here, or any other authors from the sophistic tradition17

,

opting instead for memorable expressions mostly from a tradition of practi-

cal statesmen.

Although in some ways it does seem that Aristotle is seeking a stylistic

trifecta, that may actually be almost accidental within a pattern that does

not prioritize such quotations. It seems rather that Aristotle was using part

of a database of metaphors. He announces at the outset, “of the four kinds

of metaphor [which he otherwise only discusses in the Poetics rather than

the Rhetoric18

] the most popular [i.e. urbane] are those based on analogy”

(Rhet. 1411a1-2). The database of metaphors must have served for both the

Poetics and the Rhetoric, as well as other works by the Peripatetics19

. His

method for moving through them actually seems largely associative, either

in terms of the author, the occasion, the metaphor, or some other quality.

His pointing out which metaphors are “popular” is a dodge; he is not think- 16

Trevett 1996: 371-379. 17

He does cite Lysias’ Funeral Oration 2.60 (Rhet. 1411a30-33), but names the speech, not the logographer/sophist. 18

Kraus 2009 delineates the differing accounts of metaphors in the two works. 19

Most of the orators mentioned in 3.11.7 appear only there, but a similar database seems to be used also in Rhet. 2.23 (Iphicrates and Isocrates) and 3.17 (Isocrates).


ing primarily of urbane expressions here, but only of visual metaphors

based on analogy.

He starts with Pericles: “the youth that perished in the war disappeared

from the city as if someone removed spring from the year” (1411a2-4). It is

a famous quotation though it does not appear in Thucydides20

. It clearly

does use metaphor by analogy–youth corresponds to spring as the city does

to the year–and it seems to put Aristotle in a funereal mood, so he contem-

plates the possibility that Sparta, Pericles’ opponent, might have been de-

stroyed sixty years later, in 370, after the battle of Leuctra: Leptines would

not stand by and see Greece become one-eyed (a5-6). The metaphor is not

given in full, but clearly Greece corresponds to a person and Sparta to an

eye. The idea now seems to be that Leptines stands up against a wrong-

headed view, so Aristotle goes on to Cephisodotus, who likewise stands up

against Chares’ bullying of the demos when he forced through his euthynai

while choking the people (a6-9). It seems likely that Chares still had ships

under his command, so with the danger of Philip imminent from the Athe-

nian point of view Chares could not be found at fault for his failure in the

Olynthian war (347 BC). The use of Cephisodotus seems to lead to the next

quotation, in which Cephisodotus is again quoted, apparently saying that

the Athenians should provision themselves with “the decree of Miltiades”

(a9-11), that is, they should move very quickly against the threat of Chalcis

and the Thebans in Euboea, who were thought to be conspiring with Philip

(357 BC)21

. The metaphorical casting of Philip as the threat coming over

Euboea paints him as an analogue to the Persian king Darius in 490. Chal-

cis is not far from Marathon.

The idea of provisioning from the last quotation appears to make Aristo-

tle think of provisioning again and Iphicrates’ comment that by making

20

Cf. Rhet. 1.7.34. 21

Cf. Dem. 22.14; Aeschin. 3.85.

264 David Mirhady

peace with Epidaurus (394 BC), with its coastline advantageously accessi-

ble for plunder by Athens’ navy, the Athenians deprived themselves of

traveling supplies for a war against Sparta (a11-13). All the talk of euthynai

and the accountability of generals then makes Aristotle think of the Paralos,

the Athenian flagship, which was sent out, among other things, to summon

Athenian generals back to Athens to stand trial before the people for failure

in the field. It was thus called the “bludgeon of the people” (a13-14). The

coining of such a term, and perhaps the talk of provisions make Aristotle

think of Sestos, the town on the Thracian Chersonese from which Athens’

port, the Piraeus, was supplied with grain from the Black Sea (a14-15). Pi-

raeus in turn provokes thought of its “eyesore”, Aegina (a15-16).

I do not wish to review all of the quotations or to continue my admitted-

ly speculative thinking about how Aristotle moves from one to the next. He

does eventually remember his three criteria and points out that statements

by Demosthenes’ contemporary Aesion, that in the Peloponnesian War the

Athenians “drained the city into Sicily” (a25) (415-413 BC) and that

“Greece cried aloud” (a26-7), both involve metaphor and “before the eyes”.

He comments this way six times in all22

. Many of Aristotle’s quotations

were perhaps slogans that were associated in popular memory with particu-

lar military campaigns. But if so, their absence from the narratives of Thu-

cydides, Xenophon, and Diodorus Siculus would be noteworthy. Neverthe-

less, the presence of them, or of very similar metaphors, in the works of

Demosthenes and Isocrates23

, suggests that they were typical of political

oratory in the mid-4th -century. With almost all them Aristotle is concerned

to record both the quotations and their authors; often he also adds some-

thing about the political context24

.

22

Rhet. 1411a15; a26-7; a35-b1; b3-4; b5-6; b8-9. 23

Noted in the commentary of Cope and Sandys. 24

Similar methods are apparent on the website Wikiquote.


3. Rhet. 3.11.1-4

πρὸ ὀµµάτων . . . ἐνεργοῦντα σηµαίνει

At several points in Rhet. 3.10 Aristotle conflates “before-the-eyes” with

“activity” ( ἐνέργεια). In 3.10.6 he moves from one to the other without

comment. It seems that the term “before the eyes” was appropriated from

Licymnius (cf. Rhet. 3.2.13), apparently as a synonym for eikonologia

(Plat., Phaedr. 267b); “activity” (ἐνέργεια), which is also suggested by

Gorgias (Hel. 13), seems the more Aristotelian term, and in 3.11 he concen-

trates instead on it, explaining that those things that make images appear

before the eyes “indicate” (σηµαίνει) that they “are active” (ἐνεργοῦντα),

which suggests that Aristotle actually sees the former as a means to the lat-

ter25

. It seems he has appropriated this Licymnian / Gorgianic concept and

terminology and pressed it into the service of a deeper conceptualization. In

3.11, after giving a couple Isocratean examples, without citing their source

(3.11.2), he touches on Euripides and then Homer (3.11.3-4). The 4th -

century statesmen, the quest for trifectas, even “before-the-eyes” do not re-

appear in this chapter.

I do not wish to delve too far into the psychology of energeia. But it

seems that Aristotle has in mind certain complementary psychological af-

fects. The energeia perceived through speech creates – “ignites” is the

comparison he makes in De anima – complementary psychological ener-

geia26

. Aristotle moves on from mere activity to include under it Homeric

animation of inanimate objects and movement (κίνησις) (3,11,4). The

κίνησις might suggest movement before the eyes, but Aristotle stresses that

the animated inanimate things that he mentions have human motivations,

such as being unabashed (ἀναιδής), desirous (µενεαίνων), eager (µαιµᾶν),

25

Rhet. 1411b24-25 λέγω δὴ πρὸ ὀµµάτων ταῦτα ποιεῖν ὅσα ἐνεργοῦντα σηµαίνει. 26

Arist. An. 417a6-9. For further discussion, see Newman 2002: 12-17.

266 David Mirhady

and shameless (ἀναισχυντῶν) (3.11.3). How exactly such motivations are

to be “before the eyes” seems no longer relevant, which again suggests that

“before-the-eyes” is only one possibility for energeia. The ethical and af-

fective aspects seem more important for Aristotle. How the audience is

“complementarily” affected or their emotions are “energized” by talk of

such human motivations belongs to a broader discussion of rhetoric and

emotions.

4. Anaximenes, Rhet. Alex. 22.1-2,8

τὰ ἐνθυµήµατα … καὶ γνώµας … τὰ ἤθη τῶν λόγων ὁµοιοῦν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις

Before going on with the account in Aristotle, I wish to turn to Anaxi-

menes, who is the first (and only) author before Aristotle, to recommend a

set of elements explicitly as “urbanities” (ἀστεῖα λέγειν 22.1)27

. The en-

thymeme takes a first position in his account, which likewise includes three

elements altogether (Rhet. Alex. 22.1-2 and 8)28

, although it is interrupted

27

The common origins of various parts of Aristotle’s Rhetoric and the Rhetoric to Alexander, which we now attribute to Anaximenes, are clear from their remarkably similar structures, and on various issues in rhetoric they share common wording (see Mirhady 2007). The passages on style, however, are a great exception. Anaximenes has no discussion of metaphor (cf. Rhet. 3.2) or other areas that domi-nate Aristotle’s discussion of style. That they both treat “urbanities” is the great exception to this exception. 28

Anaximenes, Rhet. Alex. 22.1-2;8 (1.) τὰ ἐνθυµήµατα λέγοντας ὅλα ἢ ἡµίση ὥστε τὸ ἥµισυ αὐτοὺς ὑπολαµβάνειν τοὺς ἀκούοντας. (2.) δεῖ δὲ καὶ γνώµας συµπαραλαµβάνειν. ... (8.) ἂν δὲ ἀστεῖον γράφειν θέλῃς λόγον, παραφύλαττε ὡς µάλιστα, ὅπως τὰ ἤθη τῶν λόγων ὁµοιοῦν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δυνήσῃ, “speak enthy-memes in wholes or in halves, so that the audience itself assumes the (other) half. ... And if you want to write an urbane speech, watch out most especially that you are able to liken the characters of the words to the people”. In 22.1 Anaximenes twice uses the term ἀστεῖα λέγειν. In his summary of stylistic devices in 28.3, he uses the term ἀστειολογία, which is reminiscent of Licymnius’ terminology that is mocked in Phaedrus 267b-c and Rhet. 3.13.5.


by a description of how to vary the length of speeches (22.3-7), and so it is

unclear und even unlikely that Anaximenes intends a set of three, as Aristo-

tle does. Varying the length of speeches is also a virtuoso oratorical skill

attributed to Gorgias (Plat., Gorg. 449c). Plato also associates it with

eikonologia, which seems his general term for Licymnius’ elaborate stylis-

tic features29

.

Anaximenes adds other information about his enthymemes: they may be

given only in part, so that the audience fills in the rest (22.1). This enthy-

meme has more in common with an Aristotelian enthymeme than the one

Anaximenes introduces among his pisteis, which is devoted to pointing out

contradictions (Rhet. Alex. 10.1). It is also like Aristotle’s metaphor, which

advances the audience’s learning by having it likewise fill in information

(Rhet. 3.10.2). But Anaximenes seems to have inherited enthymemes in this

position from the rhetorical thinking in which Isocrates also collected his

elements (see below).

In Anaximenes’ treatment of arrangement (Rhet. Alex. 29-37), he seems

to face a tension between seeing his pairing “enthymemes and maxims”,

which occurs no fewer than eleven times altogether, as parts of the proof

(18.4; 8; 34.11; 35.12; 15; 36.18; 34) and seeing it as stylistic decoration

(32.3; 6; 8; 35.16). In the latter cases he adds some interesting details. In

one passage, figures (σχήµατα) are added as an alternative to enthymemes

and maxims (µετὰ ἐνθυµηµάτων καὶ γνωµῶν ἢ σχηµάτων δείκνυε 32.8)

and the whole effort to include such language is referred to as “doing

gnomologia” (ὅταν δὲ ἱκανῶς ἤδη ᾖς ἐγνωµολογηκώς 32.9), the term of Li-

cymnius in a verbal form. In another passage, enthymemes and maxims

seem to be connected with “using many words for each thing to make the

style impressive” (πολλοῖς ὀνόµασι περὶ ἕκαστον χρησάµενον µεγαλοπρε-

29

See also Plat. Phaedr. 269a, where brachylogiai are mentioned alongside eiko-nologiai.

268 David Mirhady

πῆ τὴν λέξιν ποιῆσαι 35.16). The “many words for each thing” seem a way

of inviting metaphor; “impressive” seems an equivalent to “urbane”. In his

discussion of witness testimony (Rhet. Alex. 15), Anaximenes also says that

it needs no comment, “unless you wish briefly to say a maxim or enthy-

meme for the sake of urbanity”30

.

Anaximenes’ frequent pairing of enthymemes and maxims, mostly

without a third element, suggests that Anaximenes, like Isocrates, is basi-

cally using just a dyad and not a triad, as Aristotle does. While it may seem

unlikely that Anaximenes is suggesting “likening the characters of the

speeches to the people” (Rhet. Alex. 22.8) as a third element, in one version

of his triad Aristotle also says that “there must always be in addition (con-

sideration) either of the person who is being spoken to or that what is said

is correct, if what is said is true and not superficial” (3.11.8)31

. Anaximenes

explains similarly that greater and more precise and moderate aspects of

character should be observed (22.8)32

. The wording does not match entire-

ly, but the passages do seem to cover similar ground, which might be ex-

pected if handbook material is shuffled around. What it has to do with pas-

sages of elevated prose is not clear, but Isocrates also suggests that urbanity

is connected to such social intercourse (Isoc. 2.34 ἀστεῖος εἶναι ... πρὸς τὰς

συνουσίας ἁρµόττει). Both Aristotle and Anaximenes seem to fit in this

ethical material very awkwardly. But Aristotle goes on to offer a complex

30

Rhet. Alex. 15.2 οὐδὲν δέονται αἱ µαρτυρίαι ἐπιλόγων, ἐὰν µὴ βούλῃ γνώµην ἢ ἐνθύµηµα συντόµως εἰπεῖν τοῦ ἀστείου ἕνεκεν· 31

Rhet. 1412b24-27 δεῖ δ’ ἀεὶ προσεῖναι ἢ τὸ πρὸς ὃν λέγεται ἢ τὸ ὀρθῶς λέγε-σθαι εἰ τὸ λεγόµενον ἀληθὲς καὶ µὴ ἐπιπόλαιον. 32

Rhet. Alex. 22.8 τοῦτο δὲ ποιήσεις, ἂν ἐπιθεωρῇς τὰ µεγάλα τῶν ἠθῶν καὶ τὰ ἀκριβῆ καὶ τὰ µέτρια. In fact, we might see further correspondences in the two ac-counts as follows: προσεῖναι – παραφύλαττε, πρὸς ὃν – τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὀρθῶς – ὡς µάλιστα, λέγεσθαι – τὰ ἤθη τῶν λόγων, ἀληθὲς καὶ µὴ ἐπιπόλαιον – τὰ µεγάλα τῶν ἠθῶν καὶ τὰ ἀκριβῆ καὶ τὰ µέτρια.


illustration. He cites two sentences: “one should die faultless,” and “a wor-

thy man should marry a worthy woman” (3.11.10). Neither statement is, he

says, urbane on its own. The combination, however, a version of Anaxan-

drides’ epigram of several lines earlier (3.11.8), is urbane: “it is worthy to

die even if one is not worthy of death”33

. If we consider Anaximenes’ inter-

est in character (ἤθη), it may be that Aristotle’s interest here is in the ethi-

cal aspects of the word “worthy” (ἄξιον) and its intriguingly different

meanings in the combined sentence. I shall pursue another aspect of this

passage below.

5. Isocrates 12.2

ἐνθυµηµάτων . . . ἀντιθέσεων καὶ παρισώσεων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἰδεῶν

At least two elements that occur among the urbane characteristics in Aristo-

tle and Anaximenes also occur at the beginning of Isocrates’ Panathenaicus

(c. 340 BC), where he describes his own speeches:

Isoc. 12,2 ⟨λόγους⟩ πολλῶν µὲν ἐνθυµηµάτων γέµοντας, οὐκ ὀλίγων δ’ ἀντιθέ-

σεων καὶ παρισώσεων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἰδεῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς ῥητορείαις διαλαµ-

πουσῶν καὶ τοὺς ἀκούοντας ἐπισηµαίνεσθαι καὶ θορυβεῖν ἀναγκαζουσῶν.

“laden with enthymemes, lots of antithesis and parisosis, and the other images of

speech that give brilliance in rhetorical displays and compel the approbation and

applause of the audience”34

.

Isocrates does not call these features “urbanities”. Nevertheless, his flam-

boyant characterization of these apparently stock rhetorical features proba-

bly indicates that he has little intellectual commitment to them. For him the

33

Quint. Inst. 6.3.109 cites a similar passage from Cicero (Cat. 4.3), in an account of urbanities by Domitius Marsus: “Death can never be grievous to the brave nor premature for one who has been consul nor a calamity to one who is truly wise.” 34

Kirby 1997 545 n. 94 puts particular emphasis on this passage. Cf. Isoc. 5.27-28 and 15.195, where he describes his elevated style differently.

270 David Mirhady

term “rhetorical display” (ῥητορεία) suggests technical skill in oratorical

delivery devoid of morality (cf. Isoc. 5.26; 13.21). His second pairing of

elements, antithesis and parisosis, is certainly apparent in Aristotle (Rhet.

3.11.10) and in Rhet. Alex. (26-27)35

.

Why this pairing would take the place of gnomai, if it does, is an inter-

esting question. Aristotle likewise includes antithesis where Anaximenes

puts gnome. Certainly Isocrates does not make an explicit point that he is

using maxims in his speeches36

. Given his lack of overt intellectual com-

mitment to such technical issues, it seems likely that the substitution from

maxims to antithesis (and parisosis) took place in the handbook tradition

before Isocrates’ remark here, even though they remain in Anaximenes37

.

Antithesis and parisosis are both elements of style in a way that maxims are

not, the former in syntax and the latter in sound. A stronger division be-

tween urbane content, such as maxims, and urbane style seems to take hold

in Isocrates and Aristotle. The appearance of enthymemes in both Isocrates

and Rhet. Alex. likewise seems based on a then still current idea of the en-

thymeme as a stylistic device. In Isocrates’ usage it is far from being a rhe-

torical syllogism in the Aristotelian sense, as is clear in several of his

works38

. But why would it take the place of Aristotle’s metaphor (or

35

Parisosis itself employs antithesis, so it is easily subsumed under that term. 36

The word gnome appears quite often in Isocrates, but it never, so far as I can tell, refers to a maxim. 37

Chiron 2011 discusses the overlapping dates of composition of Aristotle’s Rhet-oric and the Rhetoric to Alexander. Isocrates’ work stems from the same time and may likewise overlap. 38

Cf. Isoc. 13.16 τοῖς ἐνθυµήµασι πρεπόντως ὅλον τὸν λόγον καταποικῖλαι, “to decorate the entire speech appropriately with enthymemes”; 15.47 τῇ λέξει ποιητ-ικωτέρᾳ καὶ ποικιλωτέρᾳ τὰς πράξεις δηλοῦσιν, καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυµήµασιν ὀγκω-δεστέροις καὶ καινοτέροις χρῆσθαι ζητοῦσιν, ἔτι δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἰδέαις ἐπιφα-νεστέραις καὶ πλείοσιν ὅλον τὸν λόγον διοικοῦσιν, “they make the subjects clear with the more poetic and decorative style, seek to use weightier and more innova-tive enthymemes, and in addition handle the whole speech with many other showy


Licymnius’ diplasiologia)? In the Rhetoric to Alexander enthymemes are

closely linked with maxims. There is a sense in which a maxim, as a gen-

eral statement, may also provide a major premise for an enthymeme as rhe-

torical syllogism (cf. Rhet. 2.21.2). Licymnius’ idiosyncratic technical lan-

guage, such as diplasiologiai, will likely have confounded Isocrates, so en-

thymemes as decorative devices may replace what seemed a purely decora-

tive form of expression. If Isocrates thought of maxims as already playing a

role within enthymemes, for instance as major premises, they might have

seemed already accounted for. Antitheses would then seem a contrastive

complement to enthymemes.

The appearance of ideai – a very generic word39

– is clearly less obvi-

ously associated with visualization than the eikonologia in Phaedrus (267c)

or “bringing before the eyes” in Rhet. 3,10,6-7, despite the word’s obvious

etymological association with vision (ϝιδέα). It should be noted, however,

that Isocrates also joins enthymemes and ideai at Isocrates 15.47 in a pas-

sage where Too translates ἰδέαις ἐπιφανεστέραις as “eye-catching figures

of speech”40

.

6. Licymnius and Polus in Plat. Phaedr. 267b-c

διπλασιολογίαν καὶ γνωµολογίαν καὶ εἰκονολογίαν

In the Gorgias the term “urbane” does not appear again after the first few

lines; that dialogue focuses instead on the morality of rhetoric, as well as

other issues, rather than style. But as we trace the line of thinking about

asteia back from Aristotle and Anaximenes and past what appears to be an

instance in Isocrates, we do come to the term in Plato’s Phaedrus. Early on

forms”. Cf. Isoc. 9.10. These passages are the only instances of the word ἐνθυµή-µατα, singular or plural, in Isocrates’ speeches. Cf. Kirby 1997, 526-527. 39

“Images” is clearly a strained translation, but “forms” seems not to acknowledge the visual element adequately. 40

Too 2008: 42.

272 David Mirhady

(227d), Socrates teases Phaedrus over the young man’s enthusiasm for

Lysias’ speech by saying that if such speeches could make poor old men

into attractive lovers, they would be “urbane and useful to the demos”41

.

Like Plato, Demosthenes also indicates that the term “urbane” was applied

to speeches, or elements of speeches, which, while not directed to making

poor old men sexually attractive, were nevertheless, as Plato suggests, un-

helpful distractions in civic discourse42

. Aristotle seems determined here to

offer a correction to Plato – as well as the technical handbook tradition –

portraying urbanities as intellectually edifying as well as pleasing.

Later in the Phaedrus Socrates reveals what I take to be the first evi-

dence for teachings on urbane speech, although the term asteia is again

missing. Socrates playfully applies the term mouseia instead43

, but again it

is a triad of rhetorical features that is attributed to the sophist Polus and his

teacher Licymnius:

Plat. Phaedr. 267b-c Τὰ δὲ Πώλου πῶς φράσωµεν αὖ µουσεῖα λόγων – ὡς (c.)

διπλασιολογίαν καὶ γνωµολογίαν καὶ εἰκονολογίαν – ὀνοµάτων τε Λικυµνίων ἃ

ἐκείνῳ ἐδωρήσατο πρὸς ποίησιν εὐεπείας.

41

Plat. Phaedr. 227d ἦ γὰρ ἂν ἀστεῖοι καὶ δηµωφελεῖς εἶεν οἱ λόγοι. Aristotle does not describe entire speeches as urbane, but only particular expressions, such as the many examples he supplies in Rhet. 3.10-11. Anaximenes, however, suggests that such expressions will make the entire speech urbane (Rhet. Alex. 22.8). 42

Dem. 23.206; 56.2, and Prooem. 32. That seems Isocrates’ view also (see above). It seems that ἀστεῖος is often combined with another term for clarification of its sense (as in Rhet. 3,10 and Phaedr. 227d with εὐδοκιµῶν or δηµωφελής). Cf. Aristoph. Nub. 204-5 ἀστεῖον λέγεις· τὸ γὰρ σόφισµα δηµοτικὸν καὶ χρήσιµον, “you’re saying something asteion; for the invention is popular and useful”. See note 2, above. 43

Licymnius’ own term appears to have been καλά (καὶ ἀπὸ καλῶν: κάλλος δὲ ὀνόµατος τὸ µὲν ὥσπερ Λικύµνιος λέγει . . . Arist., Rhet.1405b5). Plato appears to ridicule Licymnius’ terminology as πάγκαλα τεχνήµατα (see below, on Phaedr. 269a).


“And how shall we speak then of Polus’ mouseia of speeches – such as dipla-

siologia and gnomologia and eikonologia – and of Licymnian terms that he

(Licymnius) gave him (Polus) to create good diction?”.

We do not have much evidence for Licymnius. Aristotle describes him as a

dithyrambic poet (Rhet. 1413b14) and as author of a techne that included

silly, useless categories (Rhet. 1414b17), some of the terminology of which

Plato must be ridiculing here. But Aristotle also cites him with regard to a

triadic discussion of metaphor, which Aristotle actually likes (Rhet. 3.2.13)

and which I shall discuss below.

Socrates has been drawing connections in the Phaedrus between rhetoric

and music, so it should be no surprise that the term mouseia appears instead

of asteia. Several other terms, such as “beautiful” (καλά) and “impressive”

(µεγαλοπρεπῆ)44

, also arise for sayings that Aristotle calls “urbane and well

reputed” in Rhet. 3.10-11. Does the strange sequence of terms used by Plato

really denote a rhetorical apparatus that evolves into Aristotle’s “metaphor,

antithesis, and activity”? Clearly Socrates is mocking the terminology, so it

would be difficult to know how much we could trust him, but the terms,

their broad triadic structure, and their association with Licymnius seem to

recur in other authors, which gives us some confidence.

To a modern Greek as to the commentator Hermias, who wrote almost a

thousand years after Plato, diplasiologia – significantly a hapax in classical

literature – means saying something twice: the “pheu, pheu” in tragedy is

the example Hermias cites45

. But it certainly could mean saying two things

44

Rhet. Alex. 35.16 µεγαλοπρεπῆ. Cf. Isoc. 2.34 ἀστεῖος εἶναι πειρῶ καὶ σεµνός. Aristotle also distinguishes elevated style without the triad in Poet. 1458a17-b1 (cf. Rhet. 3.2.2). Aristotle’s usage of terms such as “ornate” (κεκοσµηµένην) and “more dignified” (σεµνοτέραν) may suggest poetic rather than urbane prose style there. 45

In Plat. Phaedr. schol. ad 267c. Cf. e.g. Soph. Phil. 428. It is of course entirely possible that the term does refer to repeated sounds, or double words, what Ana-

274 David Mirhady

at once, which is what Aristotle’s metaphor does, though Aristotle admit-

tedly never quite puts it that way (cf. Rhet. 3.11.11 and Poet. 21). “Dipla-

sologia” is after all not his term at all. As we shall see below, the terminol-

ogy for metaphor was not yet decided before Aristotle. Repetition (“pheu,

pheu”) hardly rates as good diction (εὐέπεια), however, or even as kalon

(cf. Phaedr. 267c ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ καλά)46

. Anaximenes talks not about re-

peating words but about “using many words for each thing to make the

style impressive” (35.16), where he may also be referring to metaphorical

language.

The second element, gnomologia, clearly refers to using maxims

(γνῶµαι), which recur explicitly in Anaximenes. Aside from this occur-

rence, however, the noun gnomologia only ever appears in Greek classical

literature in Aristotle (Rhet. 2.21.1), who has clearly – I would say inten-

tionally – moved maxims out of his discussion of style. As we shall see,

however, he cites other forms of sayings, proverbs and so on, which in-

volve his second term, “antithesis”, and he implicitly uses them to replace

maxims (Rhet. 3.11.6-10). Anaximenes uses a verbal form of the same

word (ἐγνωµολογηκώς 32.9), which strongly suggests that he, like Aristo-

tle, was working from Licymnius’ terminology.

The third term from Licymnius, eikonologia, clearly refers to creating

imagery through speech. As we have seen, Aristotle in his triad in Rhet.

3.10-11 actually conflates his “activity” (ἐνέργεια) with “making (things

ximenes calls a τρόπος ὀνοµάτων σύνθετος (Rhet. Alex. 23.1). But if so, it would refer to the sound quality of words whereas the other terms seem pretty clearly to refer to what the words mean. Wolfsdorf 2011: 131-2 discusses the passage in Hermias with regard to Prodicus. 46

Aristotle (Rhet. 3.11.6) suggests that Theodorus referred to something like para-doxical metaphors as τὰ καῖνα λέγειν. The terminology for metaphor seems to have been not yet fixed among the Sophists. Cf. Isoc. 9,9 and Arist. Poet. 1457b. Cf. al-so Kirby 1997: 525-526; 530, where he notes that εἰκῶν is Plato’s word for meta-phor.


appear) before the eyes” (πρὸ ὀµµάτων ποιεῖ), which is likewise clearly a

way to refer to creating imagery and which Aristotle attributes to Licym-

nius in Rhet. 3.2,13. Or is that so clear? Eikon (εἰκῶν) is not just the word

for image, but also comes to be Aristotle’s word for simile, which also has

a role in Aristotle’s account of urbanities: he first compares it unfavorably

with metaphor (Rhet. 3.10.3), but later subsumes it under metaphor

(3.11.11; cf. 3.5.1-2). In the latter passage particularly, which appears to-

ward the end of his account of urbanities, he may be responding to

Licymnius’ account, or to a later version of it, in an order that stems from

the handbook Aristotle was using.

Before leaving the Phaedrus and Plato, it is worth glancing at one more

passage, which appears to reveal traces of this line of thinking:

Plat. Phaedr. 269a τί δὲ τὸν µελίγηρυν Ἄδραστον οἰόµεθα ἢ καὶ Περικλέα, εἰ

ἀκούσειαν ὧν νυνδὴ ἡµεῖς διῇµεν τῶν παγκάλων τεχνηµάτων – βραχυλογιῶν τε

καὶ εἰκονολογιῶν καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα διελθόντες ὑπ’ αὐγὰς ἔφαµεν εἶναι σκεπτέα –

πότερον (b) χαλεπῶς ἂν αὐτούς, ὥσπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ, ὑπ’ ἀγροικίας ῥῆµά τι

εἰπεῖν ἀπαίδευτον εἰς τοὺς ταῦτα γεγραφότας τε καὶ διδάσκοντας ὡς ῥητορικὴν

τέχνην, ἢ ἅτε ἡµῶν ὄντας σοφωτέρους κἂν νῷν ἐπιπλῆξαι. “And what do we think honey-voiced Adrastus or even Pericles would say, if they

heard the “all-beautiful” technical terms we were just now discussing – brachy-

logiai and eikonologiai and all the others that we have reviewed and said that they

ought to be examined under the rays of the sun? Would they get difficult, as you

and I have, and boorishly say something uneducated to the authors and teachers of

such a, so to speak, “rhetorical” art, or would they chide us both, since they were

wiser”47

.

Plato seems again to be playing with the terminology that he is criticizing.

Here he refers ironically to technical terminology as “all beautiful”. In a

47

As in Phaedr. 267b-c it seems that Licymnius was one of the authors (γεγρα-φότας) and Polus, in a subsequent generation, one of the teachers (διδάσκοντας) who adopted his terminology.

276 David Mirhady

Platonic moment Aristotle also criticizes Licymnius’ terminology, calling it

“empty and silly” (κενὸν καὶ ληρῶδες Rhet. 3.13.5). Eikonologiai appear to

stand in here for Licymnius’ entire triad of terms for elements of elevated

speech, the mouseia of Polus (Phaedr. 267b-c). “The rays of the sun” also

suggests Aristotle’s (and Gorgias’) idea of putting images before the eyes

(Rhet. 3.10.6), since the word for “rays” (αὐγαί) can also refer to eyes. Soc-

rates’ suggestion that his own criticism smacks of boorishness (ἀγροικία)

likewise suggests its opposite, urbanity. The association of such boorish-

ness with a lack of education (ἀπαίδευτον) likewise associates urbanity

with education.

7. Rhet. 3.2.13

τοῖς ψόφοις ἢ τῷ σηµαινοµένῳ ... ἔτι δὲ τρίτον κυριώτερον καὶ ὡµοιωµένον

µᾶλλον καὶ οἰκειότερον τῷ ποιεῖν τὸ πρᾶγµα πρὸ ὀµµάτων τῇ φωνῇ ἢ τῇ δυνάµει ἢ

τῇ ὄψει ἢ ἄλλῃ τινὶ αἰσθήσει

The first occurrences of Licymnius’ triadic structure in Aristotle’s Rhetoric

do not actually appear to be in the account of urbanities (Rhet. 3.10-11), but

in the earlier account of metaphors (3.2.13), where there is explicit mention

of Licymnius, to whom Aristotle turns, this time with approval, for his in-

sistence that metaphors be “beautiful” (not ironically “all-beautiful” as in

Phaedrus 269a) in sound (ἐν τοῖς ψόφοις), in what is meant (τῷ σηµαι-

νοµένῳ), or in a third element, initially unnamed. The significance of there

being three elements should not be overlooked. He goes on to list the full

triad of criteria again as propriety (κυριώτερον), similarity (ὡµοιωµένον),

and suitability for putting the matter before the eyes (οἰκειότερον τῷ ποιεῖν

τὸ πρᾶγµα πρὸ ὀµµάτων)48

. The attribution to Licymnius and the occur-

48

Arist. Rhet. 1405b5-13 µεταφοραὶ ... καὶ ἀπὸ καλῶν· κάλλος δὲ ὀνόµατος τὸ µὲν ὥσπερ Λικύµνιος λέγει, ἐν τοῖς ψόφοις ἢ τῷ σηµαινοµένῳ, καὶ αἶσχος δὲ ὡσαύτως. ἔτι δὲ τρίτον ὃ λύει τὸν σοφιστικὸν λόγον· οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἔφη Βρύσων οὐ-θένα αἰσχρολογεῖν, εἴπερ τὸ αὐτὸ σηµαίνει τόδε ἀντὶ τοῦδε εἰπεῖν· τοῦτο γάρ


rence of “before the eyes”, which Aristotle later conflates with energeia,

strongly suggest the same three-part thought structure, though this time ap-

plied only to metaphors, with similarity taking the place of antithesis.

Aristotle claims that the third element, suitability “for making the matter

appear before the eyes”, refutes Bryson’s sophistic argument that “no one

speaks in an ugly way if saying this instead of that indicates the same

thing” (οὐθένα αἰσχρολογεῖν, εἴπερ τὸ αὐτὸ σηµαίνει τόδε ἀντὶ τοῦδε εἰπεῖν

1405b9-10). In 3.10.6 “before the eyes” refers to the immediate, specific

image created in the mind of the audience, which will be beautiful or ugly;

it cannot be both, despite what Bryson says.

The wording that connotes an ugly image before the eyes (πρὸ ὀµ-

µάτων) involves αἰσχρολογεῖν even if the sound of the word (ἐν τοῖς

ψόφοις) is innocuous and its meaning (τῷ σηµαινοµένῳ), which according

to a sophistic way of thinking could be equivalent to something else, could

likewise be innocuous, or ambiguous. Only the specific image, and its af-

fective impact, created before the mind’s eye of the audience, really refutes

Bryson’s argument. The relationship is akin to what Aristotle describes in

De interpretatione, where he suggests that written spoken words are sym-

bols of affects in the soul49

. Depending on languages spoken and written,

these can vary, but emotional effects and the facts are, in Aristotle’s view,

the same.

ἐστιν ψεῦδος· ἔστιν γὰρ ἄλλο ἄλλου κυριώτερον καὶ ὡµοιωµένον µᾶλλον καὶ οἰκειότερον τῷ ποιεῖν τὸ πρᾶγµα πρὸ ὀµµάτων. 49

Cf. Arist. Int.16a3-8 ἔστι µὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθηµάτων σύµβολα, καὶ τὰ γραφόµενα τῶν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ. καὶ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ γράµµατα πᾶσι τὰ αὐτά, οὐδὲ φωναὶ αἱ αὐταί· ὧν µέντοι ταῦτα σηµεῖα πρώτων, ταὐτὰ πᾶσι παθή-µατα τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὧν ταῦτα ὁµοιώµατα πράγµατα ἤδη ταὐτά, “There are sym-bols in sound of affects in the soul, and written symbols of sound symbols. And just as written symbols are not the same for all, neither are sounds the same; of what these are first the signs are the same affects of the soul for all, and of them the corresponding facts are also the same”.

278 David Mirhady

What again seems an echo of the Licymnian triad appears a couple lines

later, where Aristotle repeats that metaphors should be drawn from “beauti-

ful things” (καλῶν) – the Gorgianic / Licymnian term that is equivalent to

“urbane” – “in sound (φωνῇ), force (δυνάµει), or sight or some other per-

ception”50

, the last element again suggesting connection to “before-the-

eyes”.

Rhet. 3.2.13 reveals a variety of terms for each of three elements. By

combining them, we can see more clearly what Aristotle is thinking of in

each element, at least with regard to metaphors. The first element is re-

ferred to as sound (ψόφοις) or voice (φωνῇ), which has greater propriety

(κυριώτερον). The stress is on the sound of the individual word and its pri-

mary semantic equivalence with what is described, that is, that it is the

proper word. The second element, which is described as the “meaning” or

“force” (σηµαινοµένῳ or δυνάµει) that is more similar (ὡµοιωµένον µᾶλ-

λον) moves from signifier to metaphorically signified, not the word or its

proper meaning but what is understood metaphorically by the word in con-

text, the similarity between the meanings in the word’s primary semantic

field and its metaphorical field. Its relationship to the gnomologia and

gnomai in other accounts likely results from the generalizing force of the

gnome. In his discussion of urbanities, Aristotle and Isocrates (12.2) substi-

tute antithesis, which itself results from similarity, but provides a twist51

.

The third element, which has to do with the eyes (πρὸ ὀµµάτων) and sight

or some other perception, seems clearest.

In view of these passages, it seems no accident that Aristotle equates

“before-the-eyes” with energeia (activity) to complement the dunamis

50

Rhet.1405b18-19 τὰς δὲ µεταφορὰς ἐντεῦθεν οἰστέον, ἀπὸ καλῶν ἢ τῇ φωνῇ ἢ τῇ δυνάµει ἢ τῇ ὄψει ἢ ἄλλῃ τινὶ αἰσθήσει. 51

Metaphor is based on seeing similarities, which also makes them philosophically interesting. See Arist. Rhet. 1394a5; 1412a9-12, Poet. 1459a7-8, and Top. 108b5-14.


(force or potentiality) here. In De anima 2.5 Aristotle describes how per-

ception operates potentially and in activity (ἡ αἴσθησις, ἡ µὲν ὡς δυνάµει, ἡ

δὲ ὡς ἐνεργείᾳ 417a12-13).

8. Poetics 17

τὸ πρέπον . . . τὰ ὑπεναντία . . . τοῖς σχήµασιν

A further trace of this thought structure seems to appear in Poetics:

Poet. 1455a22-26 δεῖ δὲ τοὺς µύθους συνιστάναι καὶ τῇ λέξει συναπεργάζεσθαι

ὅτι µάλιστα πρὸ ὀµµάτων τιθέµενον. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἐναργέστατα ὁρῶν ὥσπερ

παρ” αὐτοῖς γιγνόµενος τοῖς πραττοµένοις εὑρίσκοι τὸ πρέπον καὶ ἥκιστα ἂν

λανθάνοι τὰ ὑπεναντία. ... ὅσα δὲ δυνατὸν καὶ τοῖς σχήµασιν συναπεργαζόµενον·

πιθανώτατοι γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσίν εἰσιν.

“In putting together the plots and elaborating them with style (λέξις) the poet

should, as far as possible, place them before his eyes. In this way, by seeing very

vividly (ἐναργέστατα), as if he were present at the actual events, he may find what

is appropriate and observe contradictions. ... The poet should also, as far as possi-

ble, elaborate it with gestures (σχήµασιν). For, by the same nature, those who are

in the emotions are the most persuasive”52

.

The poet brings the image before his own eyes through an internal act (in

the middle voice) of visualization and by using gestures. The related but

different goal of the speaker is to create (active voice) such visualization in

another person through speech. But the poet’s exercise is similarly devoted

to winning over an audience.

Note the similarity of thought structure to Rhet. 3.10-11: plots (µύθοι)

correspond to style as enthymemes, i.e. dianoia, do to metaphor (3.10.4-5);

“before-the-eyes” is added as the fulfillment of clarity – ἐνάργεια this time

and not ἐνέργεια53

; there is discovering (i.e. learning) of what is appropriate

52

See Kraus 2009 for the connections between Poetics and Rhetoric on metaphor. 53

ἐναργέστατα refers to seeing rather than activity (ἐνέργεια) in what may or may not be visible. I am not convinced that Aristotle himself actually associates the ide-

280 David Mirhady

(such as “appropriate” metaphors 1412b11-12; cf. 1412a11-12), observing

contradictions (i.e. antitheses), and gestures (σχήµασιν) (before the eyes),

which are most persuasive through emotions. This last point needs further

reflection (below).

9. Rhet. 3.11.6-8

διὰ µεταφορᾶς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ προσεξαπατᾶν . . .

I return to Aristotle’s Rhetoric and what I take to be Aristotle’s discus-

sion of urbane antithesis54

, which he first mentions in 3.10.5 as a figure of

speech (σχῆµα) that is spoken “with contrast” (ἀντικειµένως). He returns to

it in 3.11.6 with the striking expression προσεξαπατᾶν, “added surprise”

(Kennedy) or “adding deception” (Freese)55

. The example that illustrates it

so well is his saying, “how true, and I was wrong”56

. That is, the hearer not

only learns something (up to this point the goal of the first element, meta-

phor), but also discovers that he had been deceived about it; so he is also

(by antithesis) unlearning what he might have thought before. That is what

is achieved through antithesis. Again, seemingly in response to Anaxi-

menes’ and Licymnius’ discussion of maxims, Aristotle lists various other

as here, despite the similarity of the words. See Quint. Inst. 6.3.32; 8.3.61-2; 9.2.40. 54

Antithesis is also discussed in 3.9.9, and contrastive (ἀντικειµένη) style in 3.9.7-8. Rhet. 3.9.9 corresponds to Rhet. Alex. 26-28. Rhet. 3.9.7-8, with its references to pleasure and knowledge, seems indicative of Aristotle’s own thinking, which is al-so illustrated in 3.11.6. 55

Kennedy 2006: 223; Freese 1926: 409 note c. There is disagreement in the mss. between προσεξαπατᾶν and προεξαπατᾶν. Freese actually prints the latter, but Kennedy follows Kassel in translating the former, which Freese also transmits in a footnote. The difference in meaning does not seem significant. 56

Rhet. 1412a 19-22 ἔστιν δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀστεῖα τὰ πλεῖστα διὰ µεταφορᾶς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ προσεξαπατᾶν· µᾶλλον γὰρ γίγνεται δῆλον ὅ τι ἔµαθε παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίως ἔχειν, καὶ ἔοικεν λέγειν ἡ ψυχὴ ‘ὡς ἀληθῶς, ἐγὼ δὲ ἥµαρτον’ .


types of sayings, all of which entail antithesis: apothegms (ἀποφθεγµάτων),

riddles (τὰ εὖ ᾐνιγµένα), paradox (παράδοξον), jests (γελοίοις), and jibes

(σκώµµατα)57

. Maxims (γνῶµαι) are strikingly absent from Aristotle’s ac-

count of style and here in particular58

. In concluding his discussion of an-

tithesis, in which there is always some sort of frustration of expectation or

surprise, he says that the sayings should be spoken concisely and “with

contrast” (ἀντικειµένως 3.11.9), as if to recall how he first introduced it

(3.10.5).

10. Rhet. 3.11.9-10

ἐλάττονι καὶ ἀντικειµένως . . . δεῖ δ’ ἀεὶ προσεῖναι ἢ τὸ πρὸς ὃν λέγεται ἢ ὀρθῶς

λέγεσθαι τὸ ἐν ὀλίγῳ | τὸ ἀντικεῖσθαι

When Aristotle repeats the thought structure of his triad (metaphor 1, an-

tithesis 2, energeia 3) in Rhet. 3.11.9-10, he uses obscure shorthand, substi-

tuting the brevity of metaphor for metaphor itself and apparently following

Anaximenes in the third element:

Rhet. 1412b22-26 ὅσῳ ἂν <ἐν> ἐλάττονι καὶ ἀντικειµένως λεχθῇ, τοσούτῳ εὐδο-

κιµεῖ µᾶλλον. τὸ δ’ αἴτιον ὅτι ἡ µάθησις διὰ µὲν τὸ ἀντικεῖσθαι µᾶλλον, διὰ δὲ τὸ

ἐν ὀλίγῳ θᾶττον γίνεται. δεῖ δ’ ἀεὶ προσεῖναι ἢ τὸ πρὸς ὃν λέγεται ἢ ὀρθῶς λέγε-

σθαι, εἰ τὸ λεγόµενον ἀληθὲς καὶ µὴ ἐπιπόλαιον.

“in so far as they are spoken 1) more briefly and 2) with contrast, to that extent

they are well reputed [= urbane]. The reason is that learning is greater from 2) con-

trast and 1) quicker in few words. And there must always be in addition (considera-

tion) 3 either (of) the person who is being spoken to or that it is said correctly, (that

is,) if what is said is true and not superficial”59

.

57

Proverbs (παροιµίαι) are discussed in an echo at 3.11.14. Again, the example given there has a note of contrast. 58

Aristotle discusses them in Rhet. 2.21 and notes in 2.20.1 that a maxim is part of an enthymeme. 59

Cf. Rhet. 1405a5-7.

282 David Mirhady

I have already discussed how the third element here appears a vestige of an

understanding of teaching that also occurs in Rhetoric to Alexander (22.8)

but is difficult to reconcile with the ideas of visualization and activity else-

where in Rhet. 3.10-11. The first two elements seem to focus on the con-

ciseness of urbane elements (ἐλάττονι, τὸ ἐν ὀλίγῳ), something that is

achieved by metaphor, and on the learning that comes about through both

metaphor and antithesis (ἀντικειµένως, ἀντικεῖσθαι). The identification of

the wording “(consideration of) the person who is being spoken to” (τὸ

πρὸς ὃν λέγεται) with the third element is new, but it was justified earlier

by comparison with the ethical elements in the third part of Anaximenes’

account. What is meant in the rest of the sentence should receive more at-

tention.

Earlier I suggested that “true and not superficial” loosely corresponds to

Anaximenes’ “greater and more precise and moderate” aspects of character.

That seems part of the story. But the disjunctions, ἢ ... ἢ, have created con-

fusion; Ross athetized them60

. But the disjunctions are not exclusive. The

second disjunctive, correct expression (ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι) seems again to

cover both metaphor (that it is a “true” metaphor) and “non-superficiality”,

which is to be accomplished by some sort of antithesis. That leaves the first

disjunctive only to cover “(consideration) of the person who is being spo-

ken to”, which seems to appear in Anaximenes as an ethical focus. Aristotle

picks up the ethical aspects in his example of people who are “worthy” to

marry or to die, but death suggests that emotions are in play in this third el-

ement as well. And that seems the point: the third element engages the

emotions of the hearer, the πρὸς ὃν λέγεται.

The criteria that Aristotle sets out for his urbanities include pleasure and

quick learning, or perhaps rather, the pleasure that derives from quick

60

Ross 1959: 169.


learning (Rhet. 3.10.2)61

. That sets them above the common virtues of style

in general, which are clarity and appropriateness (3.2.1) – and correct

Greek (3.5.1) – although clarity is also mentioned as a characteristic of ur-

banities (3.11.6)62

.

Aristotle explains how the urbane pleasure from learning comes to be

through antithesis and metaphor, but he does not explain it for “before-the-

eyes” or activity. In a sense we might think of synesthesia, an auditory per-

ception of words that leads to visual images before the mind, but Aristotle

does not actually remark on the pleasure that such synesthetic perception

might entail63

.

The idea of “before-the-eyes” is that it enables immediate comprehen-

sion, and perhaps even an aide mémoire inasmuch as it is easier to remem-

ber visual images, a point Aristotle makes in De anima (427b18) but not in

the Rhetoric64

. In Rhet. 2.8.14-15 Aristotle discusses gestures, voice, dress,

and dramatic action generally in order to make pitiable things appear close

at hand and before the eyes65

. There he is clearly not talking about verbal

61

Beyond pleasure, learning, and the other virtues of style, urbanities should ap-parently also avoid being juvenile (µειρακιώδεις), which is the problem for hyper-bole since it displays impetuousness (σφοδρότητα 3.11.15). Wisdom (σοφόν) is also cited on the virtuous side (3.11.7). Humor is entirely absent. Although my dis-cussion is clearly almost entirely different from hers, Fahnestock’s 2000: 167 char-acterization of Aristotle’s urbanities seems apt: “They are, if effect, keys to creat-ing what we would call ‘sound bites’, brief trenchant phrases that are more likely to fix themselves in listeners’ minds and be repeated to others or perhaps even quoted on the evening news.” She goes on to call them “sophisticated”, “memora-ble”, and “smart”. 62

Quintilian complains that the characteristics of urbanities seem to be like those of good style in general (Inst. 6.3.106). 63

Newman 2002: 6; 13 emphasizes the non-cognitive aspect of this process. 64

Thanks to Chris Tindale, who pointed out this passage to me. 65

Rhet. 1386a32-b1 ἀνάγκη τοὺς συναπεργαζοµένους σχήµασι καὶ φωναῖς καὶ ἐσθῆσι καὶ ὅλως ὑποκρίσει ἐλεεινοτέρους εἶναι (ἐγγὺς γὰρ ποιοῦσι φαίνεσθαι τὸ

284 David Mirhady

metaphors at all, but rather actual physical gestures that the audience can

see. He also emphasizes the ability of the gestures to evoke temporal im-

mediacy, echoing language that we find in Rhet. 3,10,6. However, to be

able to create such effects verbally and not through physical gestures of de-

livery seems to elevate rhetoric and its audience above the vulgarity that

Aristotle laments in Rhet. 3.1.3-7 in his criticism of delivery. But the visual

aspect, because of its ability to create immediacy, also has an emotional

impact (τὰ γεγονότα ἄρτι ἢ µέλλοντα διὰ ταχέων ἐλεεινότερα), as we also

see in Poetics 17. It even seems an emotional impact that bypasses the in-

tellectual.

11. Gorgias, Encomium of Helen

ἐνεργασάµενοι . . . φαίνεσθαι τοῖς τῆς δόξης ὄµµασιν ἐποίησαν

Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen has several passages that relate to Rhet. 3.10-

11 and which themselves make connections between “before-the-eyes” and

energeia, which Aristotle leaves unclear. However, the Encomium is not a

technical treatise; its teaching is delivered largely through itself as a sample

speech. At first Gorgias’ attention is on the visual beauty of Helen: she her-

self, or rather her godlike (visual) beauty (ἰσόθεον κάλλος), are said to have

“activated” (ἐνειργάσατο) the most erotic desires in the most men (4).

Beauty (κάλλος) in words, of course, also appears in Aristotle’s report of

Licymnius’ teaching (Rhet. 3.2.13). Later, Gorgias’ attention shifts to Hel-

en’s analogue, speech, which can stop fear, release pain, and again “acti-

vate” (ἐνεργάσασθαι) joy and pity (8). The passage that then joins the ideas

most closely focuses on the speeches of the meteorologoi, “which by set-

ting aside one opinion and “activating” (ἐνεργασάµενοι) another in its stead

have made incredible and obscure things apparent to the eyes of opinion”

κακόν, πρὸ ὀµµάτων ποιοῦντες ἢ ὡς µέλλοντα ἢ ὡς γεγονότα καὶ τὰ γεγονότα ἄρτι ἢ µέλλοντα διὰ ταχέων ἐλεεινότερα).


(φαίνεσθαι τοῖς τῆς δόξης ὄµµασιν ἐποίησαν 13). Finally, in the climax of

the work, Gorgias first waxes on about the power of sight (ὄψις). Even the

sight of military armor, he says, evokes fear, as if future danger were pre-

sent (κινδύνου τοῦ µέλλοντος <ὡς> ὄντος 16). Note again the emphasis on

time that we see in similar wording in Rhet. 3.10.6:

“Sight engraves in thought images of things that are seen. And some are frighten-

ing, many of which are left behind; and similar are the ones that remain when they

are spoken (ὅµοια δ’ ἐστὶ τὰ παραλειπόµενα οἷάπερ <τὰ> λεγόµενα 17). ... The

making of statues and building of figures furnishes a pleasant sight to the eyes …

And many things activate love and desire for many things in many people (πολλὰ

δὲ πολλοῖς πολλῶν ἔρωτα καὶ πόθον ἐνεργάζεται 18)”.

Gorgias uses the transitive verb ἐνεργάζεσθαι rather than Aristotle’s intran-

sitive ἐνεργεῖν; but otherwise the collocation of wording, emphasizing ac-

tivity/activation and sight/eyes seems too close to deny a connection with

Aristotle’s discussion of urbane speech, or at least its third element. The

paths of influence between this speech of Gorgias and Aristotle are proba-

bly unrecoverable – the rhetorical technai, as well as Plato, have intervened

– but the passage does suggest the special connections between sight and

emotion, with activity somehow mediating. Emotion seems not just a re-

sponse to Helen’s physical beauty, but to be associated with the power of

words to create imagery in the mind. That imagery has a direct emotional

impact.

Aristotle repeatedly makes the case that metaphor and antithesis con-

tribute to learning and are pleasant on that account. But he does not make

that argument with regard to his third element, “before-the-eyes” or

energeia. Something else is going on there. In the Poetics he argues that by

286 David Mirhady

looking at a painting one learns66

. But he seems to suggest there that greater

mental effort is needed in looking at a painting and in deciphering its mime-

sis than we might experience in just looking at an object through the win-

dow, or in watching the gestures of an orator. The references to the emo-

tional effects of visual imagery in seeing the gestures in Rhet. 2.8.14-15

clearly have no logical content in the sense of resulting from verbal utter-

ances, from logoi. So it seems that any emotional effect resulting from the

visual imagery of rhetoric results not from the cognitive process of render-

ing heard words into mental images but from those images themselves,

apart from their verbal origins. The acting out of the gestures in Poetics 17

likewise seems non-verbal. It seems unlikely that Aristotle’s emphasis on

urbane learning extends to the third element, but it is no less persuasive as

a result. The history of rhetoric seems most exciting when we can observe

how succeeding generations of rhetorical theorists adapt previous concep-

tual apparatus in light of their own thinking. The line of thinking that ap-

pears to begin with Licymnius and his student Polus, as well as Gorgias,

and to have been adapted in turn by Isocrates, Anaximenes, and Aristotle

appears to offer a three-part, analytical framework for understanding par-

ticularly fine or urbane turns of phrase. Why they seemed fine or urbane

was a question to be answered by the rhetoricians, each in his own way,

depending on his own, interrelated understandings of semantics, syntax,

style, and psychology.

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Urbane Expressions in Aristotle and Anaximenes

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