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Urgently Needed :

Scientific Revolution in Social Work

by

Ibrahim A. Ragab Ph.D.

Professor & Chairman, Dept. of Social Work

Imam M.I.S. Islamic University, Riyadh

Saudi Arabia

__________________________________

Paper submitted to the Seventh International Conference, Inter-University Consortium

for International Social Development, Washington D.C., July 12-16,1992.

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Urgently Needed : Scientific Revolution in Social Work

I. INTRODUCTION

Social work has since its early beginnings been keenly interested in "what

works". Practice considerations are, understandably, given priority over broader

contextual and "philosophical" assumptions upon which professional

conceptualizations are built (Imre,1984). A sense of impatience with anything

that maybe dubbed "idle philosophizing" runs high among many practitioners;

who would feel more comfortable with "practice wisdom" prescriptions, or may

be the satisfied consumers of social "science" theories- no questions asked! All

this may be benignly tolerated to the extent that professional practices are

deemed highly effective. Trouble begins, however, when practice effectiveness

is seriously questioned by the profession or by significant others.

Unfortunately, that seems to be exactly what is happening in social work (and

other helping professions) today. Evaluative studies of practice effectiveness in

the past have generally produced discouraging results (Fischer, 1973), despite

some alleged "grounds for optimism" (Reid & Hanrahan, 1982) or declarations

that "something works" (Thomlinson, 1984). Some consolation indeed!

According to Fisher (1981): "this series of consistently negative findings [up to

the seventies] constituted, in Kuhn's terms a clear set of anomalies or deviations

from the superordinate model...these anomalies led to a crisis...The crisis [led

to] increased examination and investigation...of new models of practice...The

final step in Kuhn's model of scientific and professional revolutions...the

paradigm shift...appears to be taking place in social work (p.200).

However, Fisher's reading of the direction of the scientific revolution in social

work, or rather his own prescription as to where we should go, seems to be

grossly misguided. He was severely taken to task by Gordon (1983) for his

"bias toward raw empiricism" and for his emphasis on "empirically

demonstrated techniques" (p.p. 181-182). Gordon , however, instead makes a

plea for a better vocabulary that captures the practitioners' insights; coupled

with a call for a better sharpening of the traditional focus of the profession on

the concept of the "person-environment interface". Fischer and Gordon seem to

represent the two dominant views in American social work literature today as

to where the profession should be heading - aside from dissidents who are

calling for an "alternative paradigm". These same conceptions are echoed in

developing countries, which follow on the heels of the American model, and

with the same results! Social work has reportedly failed to take roots (Ragab,

1990). In the Middle East, a powerful movement towards a new paradigm, that

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is, the Islamic reorientation of social work, is coming to question the basic

ontological and epistemological assumptions upon which our professional

practice is based. All this clearly point to the pressing need for a true "paradigm

shift", albeit in a different direction than the one Fischer suggests. We can

readily subscribe to Gordon's call for a sharper focus on the time-honored "core

concept" of the profession. The nature and extent of the "crisis" situation facing

us today, however, calls for much more than mere evolutionary change as he

suggests. These are not the times when the theoretician (or even the reluctant

practitioner) can afford to avoid or evade seriously examining the broader

contextual factors and the deeper basic assumption underlying practice and

research, including those of science and the scientific method.

In fact, even the cursory investigation of these broader issues uncovers

astonishing facts that should help us understand the roots of the current malaise

in the social sciences and the helping professions. The "scientific method" with

its seemingly pure and ethereal emphasis on objectivity and on the sincere

search for the truth turns out ,under investigation, to rest on questionable

philosophical assumptions and on blatantly ideological, rather than on verified

factual, grounds. The social sciences, under scrutiny, turn out to be

complacently anchoring their theories and research methods in outmoded

worldviews borrowed from nineteenth century physics; and in research methods

which were then in vogue. The helping professions turn out to be blindly

following these flawed social science theories and utilizing these misguided

research methods, inflicting upon themselves a heavy toll taken out of their

effectiveness. The detrimental effects of all of the above on society could thus

be very easily seen. Just consider the way in which the general public looks

"up" to the Freuds, the Mertons, the Spocks, and even the early Maslows of

these sciences and professions for guidance as to how to conduct themselves,

rear their own children and fashion their societies. The flawed, warped advice

they get should explain, at least in part, the persistence of the myriad social

problems and rampant human suffering plaguing our societies today (Capra,

1982).

The purpose of this paper is to elaborate on the issues alluded to above, and to

show that the "traditional" view of science and of the scientific method , which

the social sciences inherited from the natural sciences, did in fact thwart our

efforts to understand man, or to improve the human condition. We will show

that the positivist/empiricist tradition had contributed to this deplorable state of

affairs by intentionally excluding as non- scientific any reference to the

spiritual/ religious aspects of human beings. All sorts of religious belief systems

- undoubtedly having significant causal effects on human behavior, whether we

like it or not - were also arrogantly dismissed as "nonsense". And not for the

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sake of disinterested search for the truth - but for historical/political nuances!

An alternative paradigm that aims at integrating the empirical and the non-

empirical into a unified system of interpretation of human behavior is

suggested. Theory building, from that vantage point, is explored, with an

emphasis on the utilization of "true" revelation- as far as that goes - as an

additional source for plausible hypotheses. This is not meant as a naive or

simplistic attempt to reconcile religion with the science of man, but an attempt

to use what "proves" usable of religious insights. The new model does not in

any way allow for a relapse into unwanted dogmatism, or for submission to

arrogant pseudo-religious accretions to revelation. This is achieved through the

good old mechanisms for self-correction of the traditional model of science i.e.

testing and falsification, however with a different twist !

II. SCIENTIFIC METHOD AND THE POSITIVIST/EMPIRICIST LEGACY

Contrary to what is widely believed, contemporary reevaluations of the history

of science have shown that the "idea of science... [as we know it today] is only

one of many, and that it is a product of temporary circumstances" (Ravetz,1975:

366). Historians of science, according to Ravetz, are also coming to view

present conceptions of science as "one phase in a continuing evolution, and that

modern science as we know it is an integral part of European civilization (and

Western way of life), reflecting "its faults as well as its virtues" (p.375). In the

same vein, Johan Galtung (1977) adds that any discussion of scientific

methodology "without reference to the underlying social structure is misleading.

That kind of discussion will only lead to pretenses of universalism and

absolutism..." (p.13).

Tudor (1982) completes the demystification process by stating that "science is

a social activity like any other and thus subject to similar `irrational' constraints

and virtues". (p.31). So, far from being the certain, unbiased, immutable, and

almost heavenly activity that we think, the scientific method was, and is in fact

shaped through its development by such mundane things as culture, ideology,

politics, self interest, and even hatreds. These and similar eye-opening insights

teach us how fallible we all are, and that we cannot grant, even to science, the

kind of respect and trust that only religion did one day muster, which science

valiantly fought to dispossess it of!

Bergin (1980) sums up the situation beautifully when he states: "Science has

lost its authority as the dominating source of truth it once was. This change is

both reflected in and stimulated by analyses that reveal science to be an

intuitive and value-laden cultural form...Although a belief in the value of the

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scientific method appropriately persists, there is a widespread disillusionment

with the way it has been used and a loss of faith in it as the cure for human

ills" (p.95).

We have a moral, or in fact a "scientific", obligation and responsibility to look

very closely into our conceptions of the scientific method to see where it went

wrong, particularly in the study of man. This takes us directly to the positivist/

empiricist legacy.

Any standard definition of the traditional scientific method immediately reveals

its positivist/empiricist biases. Theodorson and Theodorson (1969) define the

scientific method as "the building of a body of scientific knowledge through

observation, experimentation, generalization, and verification." To this they

add that it is based on "the assumption that knowledge is based on what is

experienced through the senses...must be empirically verifiable" (p.375).

The same dictionary defines "positivism" as "the philosophical position

holding that knowledge can be derived only from sensory experience" (p.306).

A variant of positivism, "logical positivism", only concedes that "logical

analysis is needed to clarify meanings that have been verified or falsified

through sense experience, but such analyses should be closely associated with

empirical observation..." (p.307). Logical positivists at the same time

condemn"...as nonsense (really non-sense; i.e.., complete absence of factual

meaning)...all moral, aesthetic, and metaphysical assertions". (Feigl, 1975:

879).

"Logical empiricism", a modified version of the above, developed in the mid

third of this century, relinquished the designation "positivism" because of the

negative attitude it carries toward the existence of any "theoretical" entities.

Empiricism" is, however, retained as it insists on "the requirement that

hypotheses and theories be empirically testable". (p.881). Logical empiricism,

which is the dominant philosophy guiding scientific inquiry today, also insists

that "all statements about moral ...or religious values are scientifically

unverifiable and meaningless" (Levi, 1975: 273)

But how can we explain that messianic zeal the empiricist tradition reveals in

defense of the senses as the only source of acceptable "scientific" knowledge?

And why that vehement insistence on the complete exclusion of all other

sources for attaining knowledge, especially revelation? It would have been

interesting if we could trace here the historical development of science and the

scientific method to be able to give detailed answers to these two questions.

That, however, goes beyond the scope of this paper. Fortunately, there exists a

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vast literature on the subject, some of which is fairly accessible, to which the

reader may be referred (Levi, 1975; Ravetz, 1975; Sperry, 1988).

Suffice it at this point to conclude with Polkinghorne (1984) that:

"In Western philosophy, there has been an ongoing search for a foundation

or ground upon which to secure true knowledge. After scriptural authority and

Descartes' clear and indubitable ideas...were found wanting, there was a

general acceptance of sense experience as the base for certainty". (p.418)

[emphasis added]. There seems to be general agreement today that the

emergence of that biased positivist/empiricist tradition, with its single-minded

emphasis on human sense experiences was only the bitter harvest of the

unfortunate conflict between church and science during the

Renaissance and the Enlightenment eras. While scientists were decidedly bent

on breaking loose from church authority at any price, it seems that they threw

the baby with the bathwater.

We are told by historians that "Western philosophy in the Middle Ages was

primarily a Christian philosophy, clarifying the divine revelation...[but] the

Renaissance mounted its revolt against the reign of religion and therefore

reacted against the church, against authority, against Scholasticism, and against

Aristotle." (Levi, 1975: 261). Toulmin (1975) adds that "Francis Bacon, author

of the method of exhaustive induction...reacted against the Scholastic reliance

on Aristotle's authority by calling for a return to firsthand experience...was

preoccupied with empirically observed facts as the starting point for all

science..." (p.378) To clear away from Aristotle, whose ideas were adopted as

official doctrine by the church, an independent source for gaining true

knowledge had to be found and to be consecrated! Sense experience, available

to everybody and not monopolized by the clergy was the answer. However, to

free science-forever-from the grip of the church or from any other arbitrary

authority for that matter, sense experiences were to be seen as the "sole source"

of scientific knowledge. This was meant to completely exclude revelation - true

or false - from consideration anywhere in the scientific enterprise.

These conceptions served their purposes very well when the physical scientists

studied natural phenomena. The subject matter, by its nature, was amenable to

observation through the senses and through equipment designed to extend their

reach. Verification of the findings was guaranteed through replication of

experiments. Certainty was easier to achieve, or so it seemed - up to a point.

This explains the exemplary success of the "traditional" scientific method in the

study of natural phenomena.

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Hoping to achieve a comparable degree of success in the study of man,

scientists (or rather philosophers) vehemently called for the application of the

same methods used in the natural sciences in the social sciences. But this was

not the only motive behind the call for emulating physical science. Scientists

were also keen to seal out any influence the church may still claim on the

"scientific" study of man. This is where Auguste Compte's positivism fits in,

with its insistence that "The methods of physical sciences are regarded as the

only accurate means of obtaining knowledge, and therefore the social sciences

should be limited to the use of these methods and modeled after the physical

sciences". (Theodorson & Theodorson, 1969: 306). Feigl (1975) points out the

antichurch motive behind this call when he states that "In its basic ideological

posture, positivism is thus worldly, secular, antitheological, and

antimetaphysical" (p.877). But what did all that mean for the social sciences,

and to the helping professions? How did nineteenth century views on the world

and the methods of knowing about it held by the physical scientists affect the

study of man? How did it even affect human societies since then?

III. IMPACT ON THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND THE HELPING

PROFESSIONS

IN 1843 John Stuart Mill wrote: "The backward state of the moral (human)

sciences can be remedied by applying to them the methods of physical science,

duly extended and generalized." (Polkinghorne, 1984: 416). This advice was

very seriously heeded by social scientists since then. The consequences of

emulating the physical sciences were dire indeed. To appreciate the extent of

the damage done by using these same methods let us examine the character of

science and its methods which were applied in the physical sciences at that time

and which still drag on up to this day. Authorities on the subject would tell us

that nineteenth century science could be described as materialistic, mechanistic,

and reductionist, reflecting conceptions of reality prevalent in that era.

In physics, Newton's formulations have since the seventeenth century been

successfully applied to explain much of the physical world on the basis of the

existence of "matter" alone. As a result, scientists came to view "materialism"

as part and parcel of the scientific method itself (Augros & Stanciu, 1984). This

was, according to Capra (1982), coupled with a "mechanical" view of the

cosmos:

"For two and a half centuries physicists have used a mechanistic view of the

world to develop and refine...classical physics...Matter was thought to be the

basis of all existence, and the material world was seen as a multitude of objects

assembled into a huge machine...[that] consist of elementary parts...complex

phenomena could be always understood by reducing them to their building

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blocks and by looking for the mechanisms through which these interacted.

This attitude, known as reductionism, ... has often been identified with the

scientific method." (p.p.31- 32).

There is general agreement that the traditional scientific method applied in the

social sciences reflected these same characteristics. Man was understood and

has been studied in the same mechanical, reductionist, and materialist terms.

Research methods and research designs reflecting these same ontological and

epistemological assumptions were used (Ford, 1984). All this was done without

serious reflection on how the subject matter of the social sciences differed in

very significant ways from that of the physical sciences. This type of confusing

very different phenomena is sometimes called a "category error" or a "category

mistake" , which "occurs when very different categories of phenomena are

treated alike" (Weick, 1987:222) . The effects were debilitating indeed.

We do not need to go to great lengths documenting the failure of the behavioral

and social sciences in their efforts to understand man and to account for his

behavior. This is well documented and all too familiar. And many critics are

even coming to see the connection between these failures and the utilization of

that outdated view of the world and of science which still dominate the social

sciences even today.

Critics of psychological research and practice for example, are coming to say in

different words something like the following: "Psychology has an identity

problem. After more than a century of official existence...there is even debate of

our subject matter... Staats and Kosh agree that psychology's splintered

condition results, at least in part, and probably most importantly, from the

existence of sharply polarized opinion about the epistemological underpinnings

of psychology". (Kimble, 1984:833). Similar assessments of the situation in

psychology abound. (Howard, 1985; Augros & Stanciu, 1984; Bergin, 1980;

Polkinghorne, 1984). The same applies to sociology (Dixon, 1973; Gouldner,

1970). Echoes of the above could be also heard in the other social sciences.

(Moten, 1990). In social work, a heated debate has been going on for a decade

to the same effect. (see references to such works in, Peile, 1988).

The basic themes which run through most of these critical reviews revolve

around the fact that human beings are different in many ways from things,

machines or other living organisms. This fact should, accordingly, entail

corresponding modifications in the theoretical models and research methods

used to study human beings. Howard (1985) puts it nicely when he says that

"...if humans possess characteristics that are unlike the characteristics of subject

matter studied by other sciences, then an appropriate science of human behavior

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might need to be somewhat different from other extant sciences". (p.p.259-260).

Polkinghorne (1984) goes one step further identifying five areas in which the

"human realm" is different, and suggesting the appropriate research stance

corresponding to each. The human realm is different in terms of :

a) its systemic character; hence, contextual relations are more important than

those among parts.

b) its unclear boundaries is the rule not the exception; hence, the

inappropriateness of deductive-numeric operations.

c) unfinished quality; the human realm is in flux, and has a history; hence,

correlations between elements may hold at one time but not at another.

d) composition, knowing humans is a "human" activity; hence, there is no

absolute point outside ourselves from which to investigate.

e) difficulty of access, the human realm is not directly observable from the

outside, is saturated with meaning, hence, we have to accept evidence with a

different nature other than observation.

Another theme that runs through criticisms of a social science following on the

footsteps of the physical sciences is the total exclusion of the "spiritual" or

religious dimensions of the human being. Bergin (1980) for example reports

that "an examination of 30 introductory psychology texts turned up no

references to the possible reality of spiritual factors. Most did not have the

words God or religion in their indexes". He further quotes the psychologist

Robert Hogan as saying "Religion is the most important social force in the

history of man...But in psychology, anyone who...tries to talk in an analytic,

careful way about religion is immediately branded a meathead; a mystic; an

intuitive...sort of moron" (p.99).

Roger Sperry (1988) talks about a "theoretical turnabout" in psychology. He

describes the emerging "new view of reality" as one that "...accepts mental and

spiritual qualities as causal realities...Instead of excluding mind and spirit, the

new outlook puts subjective mental forces near the top of the brain's causal

control hierarchy and gives them primacy in determining what a person does"

(p.p. 608-609). But how did this turnabout come through? Was it the result of

literal "soul"-searching on the part of behavioral and social scientists

experiencing a theoretical near-breakdown? Or did it stem from helping

professionals' reevaluations of their conceptualizations as they experienced

frustrations over their lack of effectiveness? Far from it! The emerging new

paradigm was, to a large extent, a direct result of revolutionary discoveries in -

again - the physical sciences! Classical physics had, first, to fail under the

weight of new discoveries in the first three decades of this century. And then it

had to be replaced with the new paradigm in physics. Then, social science waits

for fifty more years till the new developments sink in, before it sheepishly

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follows the new paradigm in the physical sciences. We are only recently

starting to act.

IV. THE NEW PARADIGM

According to Augros & Stanciu (1984) science has, since the beginning of

this century, undergone a series of exiting revolutions in physics, in

neuroscience, in cosmology, and in psychology. Capra, a physicist, in his 1982

monumental work documented these developments in detail, followed through

with a description of their ramifications and consequences, and went on to map

out radical changes in our present culture which are clearly mandated by these

changes. He states that the "dramatic changes of concepts and ideas that has

occurred in physics...in our current theories of matter...[have brought about a

profound change in our worldview; from the mechanistic...to a holistic and

ecological view...[with]deep insights into the nature of matter and its relation to

the human mind...The worldview implied by modern physics is inconsistent

with our present society... A radically different social and economic structure

will be needed: a cultural revolution in the true sense of the word." (p.p. XVII-

XVIII).

Space would not allow a fuller appreciation of the fascinating developments

which shaped modern physics as a result of Albert Einstein's pioneering work

on relativity, and of Neils Bohr and Werner Heisenberg's work on quantum

theory. Capra's work contains sufficient details in that respect. However,

because of the centrality of the subject to our argument, we may need to use

some extensive quoting. Capra tells us that these developments "shattered all

the principal concepts of the Cartesian world view and Newtonian mechanics.

The notion of absolute space and time, the elementary solid particles, the

fundamental material substance, the strictly causal nature of physical

phenomena, and the objective description of nature-none of these concepts

could be extended to the new domains into which physics was now penetrating"

(p.62).

One of the most important consequences of the theory of relativity for example

was "the realization that mass is nothing but a form of energy...

Physicists...measure the masses of particles in the corresponding energy

units...Atoms consist of particles, and these particles are not made of any

material stuff. When we observe them we never see any substance;...[only]

dynamic patterns continually changing into one another – the continuous

dance of energy"(p.p. 81-82).

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The new discoveries in atomic and subatomic physics came as a "great shock"

to scientists. Even Einstein reportedly felt as though "the ground had been

pulled out from under one". Far from being hard, solid particles, atoms were

found to consist of vast regions of space in which electrons moved around the

nucleus, which in turn is comprised of protons and neutrons. Even those

subatomic particles "were nothing like the solid objects of classical

physics...[they] are very abstract entities which have a dual aspect. Depending

on how we look at them, they appear sometimes as particles, sometimes as

waves...The situation seemed hopelessly paradoxical until it was realized that

the 'particle' and 'wave' refer to classical concepts which are not fully adequate

to describe atomic phenomena. An electron is neither a particle nor a wave, but

it may show particle-like aspects in some situations and some wave-like aspects

in others". (Capra: 67).

The discovery of the dual aspects of matter has far-reaching consequences for

our understanding of the universe. As Neils Bohr wrote, "Isolated material

particles are abstractions, their properties being definable and observable only

through their interaction with other systems! Subatomic particles, then, are not

'things' but are interconnections between 'things', and these 'things', in turn,

are interconnections between other 'things', and so on. In quantum theory you

never end up with 'things'; you always deal with interconnections. This is how

modern physics reveal the oneness of the universe". (Capra: 69-70). Capra

comments on these insights by saying that theories of contemporary science

reveal a conception of the world which can be "in perfect harmony with [the

working scientists'] spiritual aims and religious beliefs".

New developments in neuroscience and in psychology in the last twenty years

proved to be no less revolutionary than those described above in physics. The

"traditional" model of neuroscience and psychology "had proclaimed a full

account of brain function and behavior to be possible in strictly objective

physiochemical and physiological terms, with no reference to conscious

experience...Things such as moral values, the human spirit, purpose, dignity,

and freedom to choose, if they existed at all, were supposed to be only

epiphenomena..[that] supposedly, in no way changed the course of events in

the real world...(Sperry, 1988: p.p. 607-608).

Sperry reports that the early nineteen seventies brought about, with a

remarkable suddenness, a revolution in the scientific treatment of the relation of

mind and brain. In his words, "The new mentalist thinking brings basic

revisions of causal explanation that provide scientists with a new philosophy, a

new outlook, a new way of understanding and explaining ourselves and the

world. The full range of the contents and qualities of inner experience...are not

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only given a new legitimacy in science but are also given primacy over the

more physiochemical Forces". (p. 608).

He further elaborates on the causality model on which this "cognitive",

"mentalist", or "humanist" revolution is based. He explains that:

"The traditional assumption in neuroscience...implicit in...all the natural

sciences, supposes everything to be determined from below upward, following

the course of evolution. In this materialist 'microdeterministic' view of nature,

all mental and brain functions are determined by, and can be explained...[in the

last analysis] in terms of subatomic physics and quantum mechanics...[In

contrast] the new mentalist-cognitive tenets...take into account new, previously

nonexistent, emergent properties, including the mental, that interact causally

at their own higher level, and also exert causal control from above

downward...over their constituent neuronal events - at the same time that they

are determined by them. Microdeterminism is integrated with emergent

determinism". (p.609).

The new paradigm has now been reflected in a "new philosophy of science". It

seems also to be rapidly gaining momentum in all of the social sciences and the

helping professions. And the movement is manifesting itself in many different

ways. Declarations, for example, that the basic assumptions that informed the

traditional model of science are "no longer considered viable" are repeatedly

made. In 1974, Suppe wrote that "the vast majority of working philosophers of

science seem to fall on that portion of the spectrum which hold the [traditional

view of science] fundamentally inadequate and untenable". Starting from

Suppe's statement, Polkinghorne proceeds to list the indictments against the

traditional scientific method, which read like the following:

a) difficulties with using observational methods as foundational;

b) difficulties with moving from individual observations to general statements;

and,

c) difficulties in relating language to extralinguistic reality (p. 420).

He elaborates on and provides supporting evidence with bearing on each count.

Sociologists also are increasingly voicing dissatisfaction with the experimental

model, with operationalization, and with the perennial preoccupation with

statistics and numbers. Another significant aspect that reveals the extent of

dissatisfaction with the old model is the revolt against the once-popularized

"myth" of value free sociology. Alvin Gouldner (1973) strongly attacked the

dogma that 'thou shalt not commit a value judgment', which many sociologists

propagated. He analyzed Weber's position with regard to this conception of

value-free social sciences. He concluded that it was time- and place-bound. It

served, for Weber, both personal and institutional purposes. Interestingly,

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however, Gouldner relates that doctrine also to the science-religion conflict. He

puts it this way:

"...the doctrine of a value-free sociology is a modern extension of the

medieval conflict between faith and reason. It grows out of, and still dwells in,

the tendency prevalent since the thirteenth century to erect compartments

between the two as a way of keeping the peace between them".(p.20).

The advocates of value-free social science would still argue that this doctrine is

meant to guarantee the objectivity of the scientist, who might otherwise fall

victim to his own biases. However, we saw earlier how the new paradigm

replaces the idea of objectivity with that of intersubjectivity. "External reality,

as existing apart from the perceiver, simply cannot be objectively known.

Shared realities are intersubjectively valid, but their objective validity cannot be

known"(strong, 1984: 471). The exclusion of values would never solve the

problem. Instead, the cause of scientific inquiry may be better served if the

particular values on which any theoretical framework is founded were explicitly

laid out. This renders them open to criticism by others, instead of allowing

them to operate sub rosa.

Search is on for alternatives to the narrow positivist/empiricist orientation in

the social sciences, by way of reform or of revolution (Peile, 1988) Borgen

(1984), a reformist, thinks that "it is possible to study humans as active agents",

a basic requirement in the new paradigm, within the traditional view of science.

Dawis (1984) tends to concur. On the other hand, Howard; Patton; and

Polkinghorne are seen by some as calling for "a revolutionary change" (Strong,

1984: 470). However, after considering those same contributions more

carefully, Borgen (1984) concludes that these seemingly revolutionaries may be

rather looking for integration, and that the perspectives of phenomenology and

hermeneutics may help towards achieving that end. And the list could be

endlessly extended of other suggestions for new theoretical and methodological

alterations or alternative designs which sufficiently respond to the challenge of

the new paradigm. A momentous work compiled by Peter Reason and John

Rowan (1981) intended as "A Sourcebook of the New Paradigm Research" is a

valuable compendium of such new methods and techniques.

V - THE SPIRITUAL/RELIGIOUS FACTOR

The new discoveries in neuroscience referred to earlier gave a new legitimacy

to the study of inner experience - including the spiritual aspects - as causal

factors in determining human behavior. Droves of theoreticians and clinicians

are now coming to question traditional formulations that denied any legitimate

place for the spiritual or religious factors, neither in theory nor in practice. This

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was unthinkable in the past, where it took only individuals with extreme

personal and scholarly courage to venture into that realm, often shyly and only

as a side-issue treated in the shadow of more "important", broader subjects.

As far back as 1915, Charlotte Towle while treating the theme of basic human

needs, wrote that the "spiritual needs of the individual must also be recognized,

understood, and respected". (Spencer, 1956). Spencer, in an important article in

1957 discussed the fundamental needs religious faiths and practices fulfilled for

human beings. Then she asked: "If these spiritual needs and impulses are so real

a part of life for such a large number of people, and if the use of a religious faith

has actual or potential value for [them], one may well ask why social workers

are hesitant to recognize and to meet the need in this area of human welfare..."

Stroup, in a lecture delivered in 1960, did little more than express hope for

ways to be found in which religion and social work can "relate to each other"

(1962: 93). Only in 1970 could Coughlin go analytical to identify some of roots

of the problem. He identified the antireligious influences of Freud on the

profession this way : "The arteries of Freudian theory have carried blood too

long into social work not to have insinuated into the profession the belief that

God is a delusion..." (p.82) He went deeper than to blame the problem on

certain social science theories. He made a rudimentary critique of empiricism -

although not using the term. This could be noticed in his repeated questioning

of the value of limiting ourselves to the empirical world.

It was only in the nineteen eighties that the echoes of the revolutionary

developments which took place in physics in the twenties and the thirties, and in

neuroscience and psychology in the seventies were really heard in social work

circles. There began a new appreciation of the role played by contextual,

ontological, and epistemological assumptions in social work research and

practice. As Imre (1984) put it: "Human beings are born into a culture...They

are taught how their culture views aspects of their existence..., they

acquire...views of how the world is, and how human beings learn about it".

(p.42). She explains that social workers who fail to recognize these broader

philosophical assumptions only allow them "to operate sub rosa, often with

unfortunate results". No one can hedge the issue by hiding behind technique

either, because techniques "represent methods and tools that serve an

underlying philosophy of some kind" (p.42). She strongly attacked the

positivist and the empiricist notions in social work and called for an "awakening

out of acceptance" of these notions.

Colin Peile (1988) reviewed the arguments made by both the critics and the

supporters of the positivist/empiricist paradigm in social work research. He

15

concluded that both parties agree about the flaws of positivist/empiricist

thinking but differ on the extent of need for change. There are those who argue

for what he called "a revolutionary response" and those who would instead

"offer pragmatic reform". He identifies, however, a common ground between

the empiricists and their critics whom he identifies as "normative". To him

every side has a grasp on the truth. After defining the "paradigmatic context of

empiricism and normativism", he calls for a "creative synthesis" which unifies

them in a way that insures - through insight - a better grasp on the truth. Peile,

however, is not very clear as to the exact meaning of creative synthesis when it

comes to the specifics. How, for example can we unify the positions taken by

the empiricists and the normativists with regard to "spiritual assumptions"? We

are told that the position of the empiricists is one of "rejection of spiritual

explanations..." while the normativists hold that spiritual beliefs "are important

in the social construction of meaning" (p.7) .

Some practitioners of psychotherapy, in comparison, do not mince the words

when they refer to the centrality of the spiritual/religious dimension for their

practice. In an effort, parallel to that of Peile's, Bergin (1980) reviewed the

prevalent value systems in psychotherapy today. He identified two dominant

schools of thought which he called "clinical pragmatism" and "humanistic

idealism". The former is basically interested in "Straight-forward

implementation of the values of the social system ...[It is]... centered on

diminishing pathologies ...as defined by the clinician as an agent of the culture".

The latter seek positive change with an accent on self-exploration, self-

actualization, independence, and active goal orientation. Bergin finds that the

two views "manifest a relative indifference to God, the relationship of human

beings to God, and the possibility that spiritual factors influence

behavior...[They] exclude what is one of the largest sub-ideologies, namely,

religious or theistic approaches espoused by people who believe in God and try

to guide their behavior in terms of their perception of his will" (p.p. 98- 99).

He puts forward an alternative paradigm he calls "theistic realism" which, to

him, should not only reform psychotherapy but also reform and rejuvenate

society. The basic values espoused by this alternative view are "that God exists,

that human beings are creations of God, and that there are unseen spiritual

processes by which the link between God and humanity is maintained" (p.99).

The late nineteen eighties witnessed a renewed interest in the spiritual and

religious dimensions of social work practice. A flurry of articles appeared in

major journals strongly calling for the reinstatement of these factors with full

compensation. This recent attention is attributed to a "renewed emphasis on

religion in society" and/or seen as a sign that "the helping professions have

16

matured enough to discuss religion openly and to elaborate its implications for

practice" (Joseph, 1987). Some of these articles report research conducted on

different aspects of the issue while some dealt with the subject theoretically. M.

Vincentia Joseph (1988) reported on a study of practitioners' perceptions of the

importance of the religious and spiritual factors for their clients. Respondents

were asked whether they actually dealt with these issues in practice. She found

a recognition of the legitimacy of religious factors for practice. However, there

was ambivalence toward intervention in this area. The need for pertinent

training was emphasized.

Dudley & Helfgott (1990), in contrast, surveyed the views of social work

educators on whether spirituality should have any place in the curriculum. They

found considerable support for a general course on the subject in schools of

social work. Canda (1988) wrote very thoughtfully on the same subject. He

suggested that a "comparative approach" should guide the development of such

courses, to cater for religious diversity.

A thoughtful paper by Ann Weick (1987) calling for a reconceptualization of

the philosophical perspective of social work is well informed by the new

paradigm. It provides a cogent criticism of the empiricist influences in social

work. She identifies the limiting and constraining effects of the experimental

method on the scope of inquiry in social work. She anticipates that "creative

ways will be found for discovering, interpreting, and validating other

approaches to knowledge building" for social work (Weick, 1987).

We may need to pause for a moment now to recapitulate. In the previous

section, we have shown that the new developments in science, reflected in a

new philosophy of science, seem to be ushering in what may be called the

postpositivist paradigm in the social sciences. The new paradigm recognizes

the important role played by cognitive and other inner, conscious phenomena in

determining human behavior. In this way "empiricism is seen in its rightful

place, that is, as only one of many approaches to knowing" ( Weick, 1987: 223).

We found that the spiritual and religious factors, after all, have an important,

rightful place in the "Scientific" enterprise (this, however, comes with a number

of issues to be attended to).

In this section we have, on the other hand, shown that the issue of the place of

the spiritual and religious factors, "the neglected dimension of social work"

(Joseph, 1987: 12) has recently generated enough interest among educators and

practitioners alike (Loewenberg, 1988). There is a feeling that something has to

be done to correct this imbalance.

17

Assuming that these two basic points are made, i.e. a) that the spiritual and

religious dimensions are now established as legitimate subjects for "scientific"

inquiry, and b)that they are increasingly recognized by the social work

profession as among the major factors that should be considered in our helping

activities; we turn our attention now to an exploration of the requirements for

the implementation of the new paradigm in theory-building.

VI- Needed Revolution in Social Work Research

Man, according to the new paradigm is not only his material being. He

combines material, observable, empirical aspects with spiritual, non-empirical

aspects, in an integrated, indivisible unity as long as he lives. Human behavior

is the resultant of the dynamic interplay between these forces. Man cannot be

understood when reduced to either of these components to the exclusion of the

other one, or when "interaction" between the two components is ignored. Let's,

however, set the "interaction" issue aside for a moment . Now we do not expect

to face serious problems when the focus of our study is on the observable, the

empirical. After all, most of our research methods and techniques in the past

have been geared to the investigation of such phenomena. Our "senses" provide

the raw material for knowledge, and "reason" is supposed to enmesh these

"logically" together in a meaningful way (we now know better than that, but this

is not the issue here). The big question is, how are we ever to study the

nonempirical aspects of our being. The soul, the spiritual aspects are by

definition not amenable to study through sense experience. This aspect of

human existence is not space - or time - bound. The vehicle for the

understanding of such phenomena cannot be the sense organs. Nor could it be

reason alone, for reason can only process bits of data - sensory or otherwise - in

accordance with its innate rules. With our human faculties exhausted, we are

left with the only other source of knowledge which can help us understand

those elusive aspects of our existence. It is here that we come face to face with

"revelation", that is "true" revelation of course. The Supreme Being who created

us did withhold for Himself knowledge regarding this innermost, most valuable

component of our being. However, he sent Messengers to provide valid insights

onto these phenomena. The "validity" issue could be decided upon through

scrutiny of evidence that those Messengers historically existed and that the

"subject matter" of revelation, i.e. scripture reached us intact.

However, as we will see now, we do not need - for the utilization of "alleged"

revelation - to go into the thorny issue of historical and substantive scrutiny to

establish the validity of alleged revelation. Theory-building since Popper gives

us a clue to a fair solution of this issue. But let's dwell for a moment on the

pivotal role played by "theory" in the scientific enterprise.

18

There is general agreement that "the goal of science is to develop theory"

(Turner, 1978:24). As Dawis puts it "theory is the end product of scientific

activity, but an end product that is never final because it is subject to revision

and eventual rejection if a better theory is found (1984:468). Kerlinger (1979)

explains the "high esteem" held by scientists for theory. He tells us that such

esteem "springs from the basic purpose of science, and theory is the vehicle for

expressing the purpose. Science, then, has no other purpose than theory, or

understanding and explanation" (p.280) .

Many people see empirical observations as the solid, building blocks of

science. However, the new paradigm has shown that observations are first made

and are later interpreted and given meaning only within a specific frame of

reference, a theory of sorts - explicit or implicit. So, observations - whatever the

degree of validity ascribed to them do not determine theory. Howard (1985)

explains the nature of the relations between observation and theories as follows:

"Because empirical 'facts' can support a multitude of incompatible theoretical

positions, and [because] observations in science are, in fact, theory dependent,

the link between theory and observation must be tentative" (p.257) .

But theories are based on certain assumptions, which "are not for testing", but

they limit the situations under which the theory applies. If a situation violates

the assumptions, "it is not legitimate to apply the theory" (Lin, 1976:16) . How

then do we appraise theories? Howard asks, "What are the criteria whereby

choices among theories are made ? McMullin held that the appraisal of theory is

in important respects closer in structure to value-judgment than it is to...rule-

governed inference"... (Howard:257). For this reason, assumptions upon which

a theory stands should be always explicitly laid out, even if they cannot be

tested. This makes it possible for others to agree or disagree with the

assumptions and to produce alternative assumptions that may prove more useful

when hypotheses based on them are tested .

And it is here that the value of Popper's idea of falsifiability is appreciated.

Theories, for Popper, are often "bold conjectures". Scientists should be

encouraged to construct theories "no matter how they deviate from the

tradition". But "all such conjectures should be subjected to the most severe and

searching criticism and experimental scrutiny of their truth claims. The growth

of knowledge thus proceeds through the elimination of error, i.e. through the

refutation of hypotheses that are logically inconsistent or entail empirically

refuted consequences" (Feigl, 1975: 880). In this way Popper destroyed the

logical positivists' theory of induction, according to Champion (1985). He

proposed a "theory of conjectural objective knowledge that grows by a process

19

of trial and error, controlled by imaginative criticism and empirical tests".

Champion adds that this is based on a realization "that there are numerous

sources of knowledge: tradition, observation, imagination, mathematical and

logical deduction...but none of these provides anything like a certain base or a

criterion of truth." (p.1415).

Informed by these insights one can hardly disapprove of Dawis's call "The

world of science should be like a classical free enterprise marketplace, with

theories as commodities. When there is a demand for theories (of one sort) it is

to the consumers' advantage to allow the largest possible supply...I find no

problem with including objectively unobservable 'internal states' in our theories,

so long as such theories can be tested" (Dawis, 1984:469).

In the same vein, Allen Bergin (1980) advocates that we examine our values,

admit that they are subjective, be clear and open. Then we state our values as

hypotheses for testing and common consideration by others, and subject them to

test, criticism, and verification (p.102). He goes on further to offer a few

testable hypotheses as examples. And, as one scholar taught "the ultimate test of

an epistemology is in the crucible of empirical or theoretical trials" (Borgen,

1984: 458) .

And this is where "revelation" fits into the general picture of theory

development in Social Work. If theories are made possible through the creative

use of our imagination, then what do we loose if we substitute imagination with

insights gained from revelation? Homans tells us that "a leap of imagination" is

required to bring observations together in a meaningful way (Homans,

1980:19). Dubin (1978) also asserts that "a theoretical model is limited in no

way except by the imagination of the theorist in what he may use as elements in

building the model...", then it is for research tests to decide on its reality.(p.12) .

We cannot make special exemptions of these rules for the insights generated

out from our understanding of what revelation stands for. Scripture is

something, but our human understanding derived from it is another. So, the

basic strategy suggested here for the incorporation of religious insights into the

scheme of theory development for social work - without loss in external validity

- would include the following:

1- Theoretical frameworks regarding human nature, man's place in the universe,

societal arrangements, causes of individual and social problems would be

generated from religious sources i.e. scripture alongside its interpretations by

authorities. Such insights would be used in conjunction with available social

science theories to provide as integrated a theoretical framework for the

understanding of the particular area under study as possible.

20

2- Hypotheses would be generated from these frameworks for testing in the

"total reality" which includes both the empirical world and the nonempirical (as

shall be elaborated later).

3- If hypotheses are confirmed (or if they failed to be falsified) this means that:

a) we have generated valid facts, and

b) our confidence in the theoretical framework increases.

4- If hypotheses were rejected, that means either

a) that our understanding or interpretation of revelation is

incorrect. or:

b) that our research methods and our research procedures are

wanting.

5- We do not expect contradictions between "true" revelation or its correct

interpretation on the one hand, and valid facts on the other, for God created

both. The proposed strategy rests on the following assumptions:

1- To the extent that a religious idea rests upon "true" revelation we

would fail to falsify it through meticulous testing.

2- Even if ideas rest on true revelation they may fail the test of research in

"total reality" if revelation is incorrectly interpreted by men.

3- If religious personages assumed to have received revelation

(Messengers of God) were known to have historically existed, with their

special qualities assured, and their utterances (as Messengers) recorded

without distortion, this would render plausible the theoretical

frameworks generated therefrom.

4- Numbers 1,2, and 3 above would only pause a "fair" challenge to

institutional religion. It should help religion discard any accretions of

human origin, accumulated through that religion's particular

development.

5- At the same time, utilization of theoretical framework derived from

religion would take away the unfounded arrogance of scientism. Such

frameworks could be expected to have, at least, a modicum of truth. In

any case, they should be superior to dependence on mere conjecture.

6- Testing hypotheses derived from these theoretical frameworks

dictates devising methods and techniques with the ability to tap "total

reality". Siporin (1985) tells us about "the desire to gain better ways of

understanding the subjectivity and consciousness of the person, as well as

how better to relate to the person in his or her full humanity, including

the moral and religious dimensions..." (p.212)[emphasis added] .

An example of appropriate approaches geared to such phenomena is

hermeneutics ."The hermeneutic approach seeks to apprehend, interpret, and

explain the objective truth of knowledge, reality, people, and action in terms of

subjective and intersubjective human meanings and felt experience...[this]

21

understanding...takes place in transactional processes of mutual self-reflexivity

and empathic acceptance...and open dialogical relations between people".

(Siporin, 1985:212) . Ford (1984) also calls for "different research designs,

different measurement approaches, and different mathematical models for

analyzing of data...to fit the nature of the phenomena being studied" (p.p. 465-

466) . The volume edited by Reason and Rowan (1981) provides information

on a collection of such methods.

VII Conclusion

We described some of the fascinating developments in the physical sciences

which led to a revolution in the way we may see ourselves and the world around

us. This in turn, as we saw, led to a new philosophy of science. The

inadequacies of the traditional scientific method deeply ingrained in a positivist/

empiricist paradigm were pointed out. Its damaging consequences for the social

sciences and the helping professions, and in fact for our contemporary societies

were dealt with. The new philosophy of science allows for the study of the non-

empirical as well as empirical phenomena. This was shown to have far reaching

implications for social work, which is still clinging to the apron of the outdated

empiricist traditions. A real scientific revolution is badly needed in social work

where the unobservable would be given equal treatment as the observable. The

ole of spiritual and religious factors in determining the behaviors of our clients

as well as that of ourselves is stressed. The potential of "revelation" as a source

for plausible knowledge is discussed.

The important issue of how to combine insights derived from transcendental

sources with those gained through empirical observations is dealt with. The

beginnings of what may be a reasonable strategy to do that is suggested, which

target is not to throw away anything that may prove valuable, at the same time

that we preserve our freedom from unwanted dogmatism and unwarranted

authority.

Loewenberg (1988) tells us that "religion is an issue that cannot be ignored...

Few doubt that religion continues to occupy a significant role in the daily life of

large groups of the population...social workers must not close their eyes to the

possible impact of religion" (p.150). We hope that the suggested strategy for

including insights derived from religion, in a systematic and testable ways

would contribute to a better understanding and better utilization of religious

concepts. We concur with Spencer (1957) that "the problem is by no means

simple...but social work has always risen to the challenge of large and complex

22

problems" (p.526). And I cannot find better words to conclude with than to

repeat those of Bergin (1980) hoping to equal his attitude when he wrote "It is

my hope that the theses I have proposed will be contemplated with deliberation

and not emotional dismissal. They have been presented in sincerity, with

passion tempered by reason, and with a hope that our profession will become

more comprehensive and effective in its capacity to help all of the human

family" (p.103) .

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