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British Journal of Social Psychology (2012), 51, 330–345C© 2010 The British Psychological Society

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Using implementation intentions to overcomethe effect of mood on risky behaviour

Thomas L. Webb1∗, Paschal Sheeran1, Peter Totterdell1, EleanorMiles1, Warren Mansell2 and Shyam Baker2

1University of Sheffield, UK2University of Manchester, UK

Two experiments investigated whether forming an if–then plan or implementation intentioncould break the link between mood and risky behaviour. In Expt 1, participants plannedhow to deal with unpleasant moods. Next, as part of an ostensibly unrelated experiment,participants underwent a disguised mood induction before rating their willingness toperform a series of risky behaviours. Unpleasant mood increased subsequent riskwillingness among participants who did not form a plan but did not influence riskwillingness among participants who formed an implementation intention. In Expt 2,mood arousal was manipulated and participants then undertook a gambling task. One-half of the sample formed implementation intentions that focused attention on theodds of winning. Greater arousal led to more risky betting among control participants.However, forming an implementation intention promoted good risk awareness and,consequently, shielded participants’ task performance from the effects of arousal. Takentogether, the findings suggest that people can strategically avoid the detrimental effectof unpleasant mood and arousal on risk by forming implementation intentions directedat controlling either the experience of mood or the risky behaviour.

Risky behaviours are those that could lead to more than one outcome, some of whichare undesirable or even dangerous (Furby & Beyth-Marom, 1992). For example, sharing aconfidential problem with a colleague is risky in the sense that they might not be trustednot to divulge the information to others. In other words, risky behaviours are those withthe potential for negative consequences (Byrnes, Miller, & Shafer, 1999). A number oflines of research suggest that particular mood states can promote risk. For example,MacDonald and Martineau (2002) exposed female undergraduates to a mood inductionprocedure that involved reading 60 positive or 60 negative statements (Velten, 1968).Following the mood induction, participants viewed a video in which two characters arefaced with a dilemma about whether or not to have unprotected sex. Consistent withthe idea that mood influences risk taking, participants with low self-esteem indicated a

∗Correspondence should be addressed to Dr Thomas L. Webb, Department of Psychology, University of Sheffield, WesternBank, Sheffield S10 2TP, UK (e-mail: t.webb@sheffield.ac.uk).

DOI:10.1348/014466610X533623

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greater willingness to have unprotected sex if they were in the place of the characterwhen they were exposed to the negative, rather than to the positive, mood induction.

Tice, Bratslavsky, and Baumeister (2001) showed that unpleasant mood can haveimplications for behaviour as well as for decision making. Specifically, Tice et al. (Expt 1)found that participants who read a distressing story ate more fatty snacks in an ostensiblyunrelated taste test than did participants who read a control story. Taken together withMacDonald and Martineau’s (2002) findings, it seems fair to conclude that there isreasonable evidence that unpleasant mood can promote risky decisions and actions, atleast for some individuals (see also Gibbons, Gerrard, Reimer, & Pomery, 2006; Heilman,Crisan, Houser, Miclea, & Miu, 2010; Hockey, Maule, Clough, & Bdzola, 2000); althoughit should be noted that the relationship between mood and risk is complex (for reviews,see Blanchette & Richards, 2010; Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000, or Forgas,1995).

Mood states differ not only in valence (pleasantness or hedonic value) but also inlevels of arousal (level of bodily activation, Reisenzein, 1994). For example, feeling calmand feeling excited are both positively valenced mood states, but clearly differ on anarousal dimension. This is important for understanding the relationship between moodand risk because there is also some evidence to suggest a link between high levels ofarousal and risky behaviour. For example, Ariely and Lowenstein (2006) found that malestudents rated themselves as being less likely to use a condom when they were in anaroused as compared to a neutral state.

Strategic control of mood effectsRecent research has, however, suggested that there may be an effective way to strate-gically control affective states – by forming if–then plans or implementation intentions(Gollwitzer, 1993, 1999; Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006). Implementation intentions derivefrom the Rubicon Model of Action Phases (Heckhausen, 1987; Heckhausen & Gollwitzer,1986, 1987), which suggests that motivation is just the starting-point for regulatingunwanted responses. The model suggests that effective self-control requires that theperson decide when, where, and how to act in advance. Thus, implementation intentionsspecify both a good opportunity in which to act (in the if-part of the plan) and a suitableresponse to that opportunity (in the then-part of the plan), and have the format, ‘Ifopportunity Y is encountered, then I will perform goal-directed response Z!’

In an illustrative experiment, Schweiger-Gallo, Keil, McCulloch, Rochstroh, andGollwitzer (2009, Expt 2) presented spider-fearful participants with pictures of spiders.Prior to presentation of the pictures, one-half of the participants formed either a response-focused implementation intention (‘And if I see a spider, then I will remain calm andrelaxed!’) or an antecedent-focused implementation intention (‘And if I see a spider, thenI will ignore it!’). Participants in the control conditions were either given no instructionsor were asked simply to try ‘not to get frightened’. Consistent with the idea that if–thenplanning can help to control affective reactions, spider-fearful participants who formedimplementation intentions (of either type) reported less negative affect in response topictures of spiders than did spider-fearful participants in the control conditions. In fact,forming implementation intentions enabled spider-fearful participants to down-regulatetheir fear to the same level as that observed in participants who did not suffer fromspider fear.

Although implementation intentions have proven effective in the domain of emotionregulation, the research to date has focused on how planning can promote the regulation

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of chronic feelings (e.g., fear of spiders; Schweiger-Gallo et al., 2009; social anxiety;Webb, Ononaiye, Sheeran, Reidy, & Lavda, 2010), overcome the impact of certainfeelings on behaviour (i.e., the impact of worry on attendance for psychotherapy,Sheeran, Aubrey, & Kellett, 2007; and the impact of nervousness on performance inan tennis competition, Achziger, Gollwitzer, & Sheeran, 2008), or control the effectof positive mood on stereotyping (Bayer, Gollwitzer, & Achtziger, 2010, Study 1; fora review, see Gollwitzer, Bayer, & McCulloch, 2005). Despite evidence that mood hasa particularly influential effect on risky behaviours, these behaviours have not beenassessed in research to date. In addition, previous studies have either assumed that affectinfluences behaviour (Achtziger et al., 2008) or merely measured the impact of affecton behaviour (Sheeran et al., 2007), thereby limiting the causal conclusions that canbe drawn. Research that simultaneously manipulates both mood and implementationintention formation is needed in order to draw firm conclusions about whether if–thenplans can break the link between mood and risky behaviour.

Implementation intentions could be used to overcome the effect of mood on risk intwo ways; either by directly managing moods as they arise or by controlling behaviourin such a manner that performance is no longer influenced by mood. The former routeinvolves forming an implementation intention that specifies the mood state in the if–part of the plan and a response that is suited to dealing with that mood in the plan’sthen-part. This type of implementation intention can be designated a mood controlplan. The latter route involves forming an implementation intention that specifies task-related opportunities and responses (task-focused plan). The idea in this latter case isthat behaviour comes under the control of cues specified in the if-part of the plan andis therefore shielded from the potential negative effects of mood on performance. Thisdistinction parallels that between distraction-inhibiting and task-facilitating plans in themanagement of distractions (Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998). The impact of both a moodcontrol plan and a task-focused plan is tested in the present studies.

The present researchThe present research investigates whether forming implementation intentions canprevent mood from influencing risky behaviour. Expt 1 examined the impact of inducingunpleasant mood on willingness to engage in risky behaviours. As part of an ostensiblyunrelated experiment, and prior to the mood induction, one-half of the participantsformed implementation intentions specifying how to deal with unpleasant moods. Expt2 was a conceptual replication of the first experiment except that a state of arousal wasinduced, behaviour was measured using a gambling task, and implementation intentionswere directed towards task performance rather than mood control.

EXPERIMENT 1: OVERCOMING THE EFFECT OF UNPLEASANTMOOD ON RISK WILLINGNESSExpt 1 investigated whether implementation intentions could overcome the effect of anunpleasant mood on risk. All participants were asked to try to stay in a positive moodover the next week. One-half of the sample then formed an implementation intentionspecifying how to deal with unpleasant moods in an effort to support this goal (‘If I am ina negative mood, then I will . . . ’). Next, as part of an ostensibly unrelated experiment,participants were asked to work on a series of unsolvable anagrams that were described

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as very easy (unpleasant mood condition) or very difficult (neutral mood condition).Participants then indicated their willingness to engage in a series of risky behaviours.

MethodParticipants and designN = 78 undergraduate students from the University of Manchester, took part in theexperiment in return for course credit and were randomly assigned to conditions. Allparticipants spoke English as their first language. The experiment adopted a 2-between(induced mood: unpleasant vs. neutral) × 2-between (instruction: goal intention vs.implementation intention) design.

ProcedureOn arrival in the laboratory, each participant was given a small diary and asked to recordtheir moods each day for 7 days and to note any strategies that they used to controlunpleasant moods (‘If you felt in a bad mood, how did you try and overcome this?’) Inactual fact, this diary simply served to manipulate the use of mood regulation strategies(see below) and was taken back from participants when they were debriefed.

Instruction manipulationOn the first page of the diary, participants were given a brief introduction to mood andwere informed that the study investigated how people control unpleasant moods. At thispoint, the instructions for the two conditions differed. Participants in the goal intentioncondition were told that one way to reduce the impact of unpleasant moods is to changethem into good moods. As such, participants were asked to tell themselves ‘I will tryand stay in a positive mood’. Participants were asked to verbally repeat this goal threetimes and to fully commit themselves to carrying it out in the next week. Participants inthe implementation intention condition were asked to form a plan by completing thestem ‘If I am in a negative mood, then I will . . . ’ with a response from a list of moodregulation strategies. The strategies provided were (a) breathe deeply! (b) think onlypositive thoughts! (c) think ‘it is only a mood’ and I will not let it bother me!, and (d)think how I have successfully dealt with other situations! Like the goal intention group,participants were asked to verbally repeat their plan three times and to fully committhemselves to carrying it out in the next week.

Baseline measure of moodFollowing the instruction manipulation, participants were asked to turn to the backpage of the diary and complete a modified version of the Affect-Arousal Scale (Salovey& Birnbaum, 1989). The stem ‘Please tick the appropriate box to indicate how youfeel at the present moment’ was responded to on 6 seven-point semantic differentialscales divided into mood valence: ‘bad–good’, ‘sad–happy’, and ‘displeased–pleased’(Cronbach’s � = .90) and mood arousal: ‘calm–excited’, ‘tired–energetic’, and ‘sedate–aroused’ (Cronbach’s � = .64).

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Mood induction procedureThe mood induction procedure was based on a paradigm developed by Carver, Blaney,and Scheier (1979). Under the auspices of an ostensibly unrelated experiment aboutlanguage, participants were asked to try to solve 6 anagrams. In fact, the first, second, andfourth anagrams were solvable (tisrnp, wderra, iuftr, respectively) and the remainingthree were unsolvable (datgi, padus, tohcass). For participants in the unpleasant moodcondition, the instructions suggested that the task would be very easy. Participants weretold: ‘These anagrams are relatively easy and most people complete all the puzzles inabout 5 minutes. You will have ten minutes to solve all 6 anagrams presented to you soyou should have plenty of time to do well’. As such, when these participants completedjust three of the six puzzles, we expected them to feel unhappy. In contrast, participantsin the neutral mood condition were told: ‘These anagrams are very difficult, and it isvery rare that people complete all of them. Typically, people manage to solve just oneor two within the ten minute time frame. Thus, please just try as hard as you can’. Forthese participants, completing three of the six puzzles could be considered a successand should not induce unpleasant mood.

Reviews of the effects of perceived poor performance support its use as a moodinduction procedure (Gerrards-Hesse, Spies, & Hesse, 1994; Westerman, Spies, Stahl,& Hesse, 1996). However, we conducted a pilot study to confirm the efficacy of thespecific instructions employed in the present research. Participants (N = 18) wererandomly assigned to either the unpleasant or neutral mood induction conditions andthen completed the Affect-Arousal Scale as described above. Two 2-between (inducedmood: unpleasant vs. neutral) ANOVAs with mood valence and arousal as the dependentvariables revealed that participants who expected to do well on the task (unpleasantmood induction) reported more unpleasant mood following their performance (M =3.33, SD = 1.00) than did participants in the neutral condition (M = 4.41, SD = 0.91),F(1,16) = 5.68, p = .03, �2 = .26 (MSE = 5.19). There were no differences between theconditions in mood arousal, F(1,16) = 0.94, p = .35, �2 = .06 (MSE = 0.89; Ms = 3.67and 4.11, SDs = 1.19 and 0.69, respectively). Thus, the mood induction procedure waseffective at inculcating unpleasant (vs. neutral) mood.

Measure of willingness to engage in risky behaviourFinally, participants were asked to read and imagine themselves in three hypotheticalscenarios adapted from Pietromonaco and Rook (1987). Each scenario provided partic-ipants with an opportunity to behave in a risky manner. The first concerned makingrepairs to a potentially dangerous vehicle:

‘You have an old car that basically runs pretty well but has begun to have brake andtransmission problems. A mechanic explained that you can probably get by for a whilelonger but that either the brakes or transmission could fail suddenly and might cause anaccident. Repairing the car will cost more than £500, and you do not have such money.Your only real choice is either keep driving until you can save money for the repairs or sellthe car now and start taking the bus. How willing would you be to keep driving the car untilyou can save money for the repairs?’

The second scenario concerned disclosing a sensitive matter to a new roommate:

‘There is a personal matter that has been troubling you quite a bit recently. You arewondering what would happen if you discussed this problem with your new roommate,who you are just getting to know. How willing would you be to share your problem withyour new roommate?’

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The final scenario concerned returning intentionally damaged shoes in order to obtain arefund:

‘You recently purchased a pair of shoes. You wear the shoes once but then decide you don’tlike them. You cannot return them as they have been worn, so you purposefully undo someof the stitching in the hope of a refund. How willing would you be to take the shoes backfor a refund?’

Participants were asked to indicate their willingness to perform each of the focalbehaviours on a seven-point scale anchored by ‘not at all willing’ and ‘very willing’.

ResultsRandomization checkIn order to ensure that the mood of participants in the goal intention and implementationintention conditions did not differ prior to the mood induction, we conducted two 2-between (instruction: goal intention vs. implementation intention) ANOVAs with moodvalence and arousal as the dependent variables. As expected, before the mood induction,participants in the goal intention and implementation intention conditions did not differin either mood valence (Ms = 3.77 vs. 3.65, SDs = 0.86 and 0.77, respectively), F(1,76) =0.45, p = .51, �2 = .01 (MSE = 0.30), or levels of arousal (Ms = 2.62 vs. 2.53, SDs =0.66 and 0.64, respectively), F(1,76) = 0.38, p = .54, �2 = .01 (MSE = 0.16).

Willingness to engage in risky behaviourA 2-between (induced mood: unpleasant vs. neutral) × 2-between (instruction: goalintention vs. implementation intention) × 3-within (scenario: dangerous vehicle,personal matter, returning intentionally damaged shoes) repeated measures ANOVA wasconducted using willingness to engage in risky behaviour as the dependent variable (seeTable 1). The main effects of induced mood, F(1,73) = 0.76, p = .39, �2 = .01 (MSE =2.64), and instruction, F(1,73) = 1.95, p = .17, �2 = .03 (MSE = 6.77), were both non-significant. However, there was a significant main effect of scenario, F(2,146) = 8.20,p < .001, �2 = .10 (MSE = 22.11). Across conditions, participants reported being morewilling to disclose a personal matter (M = 4.30, SD = 1.62) than to return intentionallydamaged shoes (M = 3.64, SD = 1.86) or drive a dangerous vehicle (M = 3.23, SD =1.69). However, the main effect of scenario did not interact with either induced mood,F(2,146) = 0.56, p = .57, �2 = .01 (MSE = 1.52), instruction, F(2,146) = 0.02, p = .98,�2 = .00 (MSE = 0.05), or their interaction, F(2,146) = 0.01, p = .99, �2 = .00 (MSE =

Table 1. Willingness to engage in risky behaviour by induced mood, instruction, and scenario (Expt 1)

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0.03), suggesting that the effects of induced mood and instruction were consistent acrossthe three scenarios.

Consistent with our hypotheses, there was a significant interaction between inducedmood and instruction, F(1,73) = 5.94, p = .02, �2 = .08 (MSE = 20.62). Simple maineffects revealed that, across scenarios, induced mood influenced risk willingness in thegoal intention condition, F(1,42) = 5.35, p = .03, �2 = .11 (MSE = 22.25), but not in theimplementation intention condition, F(1, 31) = 1.46, p = .24, �2 = .05 (MSE = 3.71).Participants in the goal intention condition indicated greater risk willingness followingthe unpleasant mood induction (M = 4.29, SD = 1.41) than following the neutral moodinduction (M = 3.46, SD = 0.92). However, the mood induction did not influence riskwillingness when participants formed implementation intentions (Ms = 3.33 and 3.72,SDs = 1.04 and 0.80, respectively). We also examined the effect of instruction withininduced mood conditions. Instruction had a significant effect on risk in the unpleasantmood condition, F(1,34) = 4.91, p = .03, �2 = .13 (MSE = 23.81), but no effect on riskin the neutral mood condition, F(1,39) = 0.89, p = .35, �2 = .02 (MSE = 2.02).

DiscussionIn Expt 1, participants were asked to try and stay in a positive mood over the forthcomingweek. One-half of the participants also formed an implementation intention specifyinghow they would deal with unpleasant moods if they arose. Next, as part of an ostensiblyunrelated experiment, participants were induced into an unpleasant mood (or not) andthen were asked to indicate their willingness to engage in a series of risky behaviours.As expected, without implementation intentions, participants who were induced intoan unpleasant mood indicated greater willingness to engage in risky behaviours than didparticipants exposed to a neutral mood induction. However, when participants formedif–then plans specifying how to deal with unpleasant moods, willingness to engage inrisky behaviours was not influenced by the mood induction procedure. In summary,Expt 1 provides initial evidence that forming implementation intentions can overcomethe effect of unpleasant mood on willingness to engage in risky behaviour.

Expt 1 had two limitations, however, that we wanted to address in a secondexperiment. First, although there is good evidence for a strong relationship betweenwillingness and action, especially for risk-related behaviours (e.g., Gibbons, Gerrard,Blanton, & Russell, 1998; Hukkelberg & Dykstra, 2009; Spijkerman, van den Eijnden, &Engels, 2005; van Empelen & Kok, 2006) it would be advantageous to use a behaviouralmeasure of risk – particularly because some authors have argued that hypothetical risktaking is less influenced by mood than overt behaviour (Isen & Patrick, 1983). Second, inorder to disguise the true nature of the anagram task, we did not measure participants’mood following the task (instead, we validated the procedure on a different sampleof participants). Expt 2, therefore, included a different mood induction procedure thatpermitted a manipulation check.

EXPERIMENT 2: OVERCOMING THE EFFECT OF AROUSAL ONRISKY BEHAVIOURExpt 2 was a conceptual replication of Expt 1 except that (a) risky behaviour (rather thanwillingness) was measured using a gambling task, (b) we included a measure of mood

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valence and arousal following the mood induction, (c) the mood induction was designedto heighten arousal rather than induce unpleasant mood, and (d) the implementationintention manipulation involved a task-focused plan whereas Expt 1 tested the effects ofa mood control plan.

MethodParticipants and designN = 81 students from the University of Manchester, took part in the experiment in returnfor course credit and were randomly assigned to conditions. None of the participantsfrom Expt 1 took part in Expt 2. Participants were typically in their early 20s (M =24.25, SD = 5.57) and female (56%). The experiment adopted a 2-between (inducedmood: aroused vs. neutral) × 2-between (instruction: goal intention vs. implementationintention) design.

ProcedureOn arrival at the laboratory, participants completed the Affect-Arousal Scale as usedin Expt 1. The only difference was that nine-point (rather than seven-point) semanticdifferential scales were used. Cronbach’s � were .86 (valence) and .64 (arousal).

Mood induction procedureParticipants in the aroused mood condition spent 5 min listening to Bach’s Brandenburgconcerto no. 3, while participants in the neutral mood condition listened to Beethoven’smoonlight sonata. When participants had finished listening to the music they completedthe Affect–Arousal Scale (with nine-point response options) a second time (Cronbach’s� valence = .87, Cronbach’s � arousal = .76).

Measure of risk behaviourNext, participants undertook the computerized decision-making task designed by Rogerset al. (1999). Participants began the task with 100 points and were told that their aimwas to score as many points as possible. Ten boxes were presented on the computerscreen, some of which were blue while the rest were red. The ratio of red to blue boxesvaried on each trial from 9:1 to 1:9 in a random order. Participants were told that thecomputer had hidden, at random, a token inside one of the boxes and that their taskwas to guess whether the token was behind a blue or a red box. Once participantshad made their decision they were asked to bet a proportion of their points on thelikelihood that they were correct. The computer presented participants with a series of‘bets’ in either an ascending sequence (5, 25, 50, 75, or 95% of total points score) ora descending sequence (95, 75, 50, 25, or 5%). Each bet was presented for 5 s. Whenparticipants correctly guessed the location of the token a message ‘You Win!’ appearedon the screen and participants were awarded additional points to the value of theirbet. When the participant’s guess was incorrect, the message ‘You Lose!’ was presentedand points equivalent to the value of their bet were deducted from the total. The gamecontinued for 36 trials or until participants ran out of points. Good performance on thetask requires that the participant bets more of their total points when there is a highprobability of winning (e.g., when presented with 9 blue and 1 red box) than when theodds of winning are lower (e.g., 6 blue and 4 red boxes).

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Manipulation of implementation intentionsPrior to the task, participants in the goal intention condition were simply told to try tomaximize the number of points that they had at the end of the game. Participants in theimplementation intention condition also formed a plan; ‘If I am asked to make a bet,then I will pay close attention to the number of red versus blue boxes!’

ResultsManipulation checkTo confirm the effect of our mood induction procedure on arousal, we conducted a 2-within (time: before induction vs. after induction) × 2-between (induced mood: arousedvs. neutral) repeated measures ANOVA with arousal as the dependent variable. The (non-significant) main effect of time, F(1,78) = 0.54, p = .47, �2 = .01 (MSE = 0.31), and the(significant) main effect of induced mood, F(1,78) = 4.49, p = .04, �2 = .05 (MSE =17.12), were qualified by the expected interaction between time and induced mood,F(1,78) = 15.57, p < .001, �2 = .17 (MSE = 8.87). Simple main effects revealed that,although there were no differences in arousal at baseline, F(1,78) = 0.33, p = .57, �2 =.00 (MSE = 0.67; Ms = 5.03 and 4.85, SDs = 1.32 and 1.54, for the aroused and neutralmood conditions, respectively), there were significant differences in arousal followingthe induction; participants who listened to Bach’s concerto were more aroused (M =5.59, SD = 1.38) than were participants who listened to Beethoven’s sonata (M = 4.47,SD = 1.66), F(1,78) = 10.88, p < .001, �2 = .12 (MSE = 25.31).

A similar analysis with mood valence as the dependent variable revealed a marginallysignificant main effect of time, F(1,78) = 3.66, p = .06, �2 = .05 (MSE = 25.31); there wasa tendency for participants in both conditions to report more positive mood followingthe induction (M = 7.08, SD = 1.60) than before (M = 6.80, SD = 1.64). The main effectof induced mood, F(1,78) = 1.76, p = .19, �2 = .02 (MSE = 7.66), and the interaction be-tween time and induced mood, F(1,78) = 1.00, p = .32, �2 = .01 (MSE = 0.85), were bothnon-significant suggesting that the two pieces of music did not have differential effectson mood valence (mean valence was 6.95 and 6.66, SDs = 1.63 and 1.65, at baseline forthe aroused and neutral conditions, respectively. After the induction mean valence was7.37 and 6.79, SDs = 1.25 and 1.86, for the neutral and aroused conditions, respectively).

Randomization checkIn order to ensure that the mood of participants in the goal intention and implementationintention conditions did not differ prior to the instruction manipulation and thatparticipants in the two instruction conditions were not differentially affected by themood induction, we conducted a 2-within (time: before mood induction vs. after moodinduction) × 2-between (instruction: goal intention vs. implementation intention)repeated measures ANOVA with arousal as the dependent variable. The main effectof instruction, F(1,78) = 0.78, p = .38, �2 = .01 (MSE = 3.10), and the interactionbetween time and instruction, F(1,78) = 0.07, p = .79, �2 = .00 (MSE = 0.68), wereboth non-significant. Participants in the goal intention condition and implementationintention condition were equivalently aroused before (Ms = 5.10 and 4.79, SDs = 1.64and 1.20, respectively) and after (Ms = 5.15 and 4.91, SDs = 1.69 and 1.56, respectively)the mood induction.

A similar analysis with mood valence as the dependent variable revealed comparableeffects. The main effect of instruction, F(1,78) = 2.33, p = .13, �2 = .03 (MSE = 10.06),

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and the interaction between time and instruction, F(1,78) = 0.19, p = .66, �2 = .00(MSE = 0.16), were both non-significant. Participants in the goal intention condition andimplementation intention condition reported equivalently positive moods before (Ms =7.09 and 6.53, SDs = 1.44 and 1.78, respectively) and after (Ms = 7.31 and 6.87, SDs =1.64 and 1.56, respectively) the mood induction.

Measure of risk behaviourIn order to examine participants’ performance on the gambling task we compared theamount that participants bet in response to different ratios of red versus blue boxes. A 2-between (induced mood: aroused vs. neutral) × 2-between (instruction: goal intentionvs. implementation intention) × 2-within (direction of bet sequence: ascending vs.descending) × 4-within (ratio of boxes: 9:1, 8:2, 7:3, 6:4) repeated measures ANOVAwas conducted with percentage bet as the DV (see Table 2). There was a significantmain effect of direction, F(1,74) = 40.28, p < .001, �2 = .35 (MSE = 77,282.16).Participants bet a greater percentage of their total points when bets were presented ina descending sequence (M = 65%, SD = 20%) than when bets were presented in anascending sequence (M = 44%, SD = 23%). The main effect of ratio was also significant,F(3,222) = 74.38, p < .001, �2 = .50 (MSE = 17,952.22). Participants performed wellto the extent that they bet more when the odds of winning were higher as compared towhen the odds were lower. When the ratio was 9:1 participants bet an average of 65%(SD = 19%) of their total points, when the ratio was 8:2 the average bet was 59% (SD =17%), when the ratio was 7:3 the average bet was 51% (SD = 18%), and when the ratiowas 6:4 the average bet was 42% (SD = 17%). The main effects of direction and ratio,however, were qualified by a significant four-way interaction between direction, ratio,induced mood, and instruction, F(3,222) = 4.47, p = .01, �2 = .06 (MSE = 584.59).None of the other effects reached significance.

We were specifically interested in how the effects of instruction, ratio, and directionon risk taking differed between participants induced into an aroused versus a neutral

Table 2. Percentage of points bet by ratio of coloured boxes, instruction, induced mood, and directionof betting sequence (Expt 2)

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state. Therefore, we decomposed the four-way interaction by examining the three-way interaction between instruction, direction, and ratio separately for participantsinduced into an aroused versus a neutral state. As expected, the three-way interactionwas significant for participants induced into a state of arousal, F(3,108) = 3.71, p =.01, �2 = .09 (MSE = 439.58), but not for participants induced into a neutral state,F(3,114) = 1.71, p = .17, �2 = .04 (MSE = 243.42). Next, to decompose the three-wayinteraction among participants in a state of arousal, we examined the effect of ratioseparately by direction and instruction. Consistent with the idea that arousal promotesrisky action, the bets of participants who formed goal intentions did not appear to besensitive to the ratio of coloured blocks (i.e., relative risk) when bets were presentedin a descending order, F(3,15) = 2.42, p = .11, �2 = .33. Mean bets were 78% (SD =25%), 72% (SD = 24%), 66% (SD = 26%), and 61% (SD = 29%) for the 9:1, 8:2, 7:3,and 6:4 ratios, respectively. However, forming implementation intentions appearedto prevent arousal from influencing performance; aroused participants who formedimplementation intentions remained sensitive to relative risk even when bets werepresented in a descending order, F(3,18) = 8.09, p < .001, �2 = .57. Mean bets were77% (SD = 19%), 74% (SD = 19%), 57% (SD = 25%), and 47% (SD = 28%) for the 9:1,8:2, 7:3, and 6:4 ratios, respectively. There were no differences between the instructionconditions when bets were presented in an ascending order, F(3,15) = 4.58, p = .02,�2 = .48 (goal intention condition), F(3,18) = 8.27, p < .001, �2 = .58 (implementationintention condition).

DiscussionExpt 2 investigated whether forming implementation intentions could overcome theeffects of arousal on a gambling task. As expected, participants induced into a state ofarousal became insensitive to the relative odds of winning when bets were presented in adescending sequence (i.e., large bets first). In other words, some riskiness was apparentin participants’ gambling behaviour – participants placed large bets on relatively poorodds if large bets were presented first. When small bets were presented first (ascendingbet sequences) elevated arousal did not encourage participants to place large bets onrelatively poor odds in the same way; this may suggest that arousal only promotes risktaking if an opportunity to take a risk is salient. Expt 2 thus provides evidence thatexperimentally inducing arousal can lead to more risky behaviour. Crucially, however,Expt 2 provided support for the idea that implementation intentions can overcome thiseffect of arousal on behaviour. Forming an implementation intention designed to controltask performance – by focusing attention on the relative odds of success – preventedheightened arousal from influencing performance on the descending trials. The bettingbehaviour of participants who formed implementation intentions was less risky in thatparticipants bet lower amounts when the odds of winning were small, even if large betswere presented first.

GENERAL DISCUSSIONCertain mood states seem to be associated with increases in risky behaviours. Safeinteraction with the environment therefore requires that the person finds a way toregulate the impact of these states on their decision making and action. The presentresearch suggests that forming if–then plans or implementation intentions may be aneffective way to do so. In Expt 1, one-half of the participants formed a plan specifying

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how they would deal with unpleasant moods if they arose over the coming week. Next, aspart of an ostensibly unrelated experiment, participants were induced into an unpleasant(or neutral) mood by being led to believe that their performance on an anagram task wasworse (or better) than expected. Finally, participants were asked to imagine themselvesas the protagonist in a series of scenarios and to indicate their willingness to engagein the risky behaviour described. As expected, participants induced into an unpleasantmood who did not form a plan specifying how to deal with unpleasant moods indicatedgreater risk willingness in response to each scenario. However, consistent with the ideathat implementation intentions can help to regulate mood, the behavioural decisionsof participants who formed if–then plans were not influenced by the mood inductionprocedure. Thus, the findings from Expt 1 both support the idea that unpleasant moodcan promote risky behaviour and show that implementation intentions enable people toexert volitional control over the effects of mood on risk willingness.

Expt 2 focused on the relationship between high levels of arousal and risk, andinvestigated the effects of forming a task-facilitating implementation intention designedto shield performance from the detrimental effects of heightened arousal. One-half of theparticipants were played upbeat classical music to induce arousal before undertaking agambling task. As expected, aroused participants (relative to those in a neutral mood)showed risky gambling behaviour on key trials – that is, they appeared insensitive to theodds of winning when placing their bets. Prior to the gambling task, however, one-halfof the participants were asked to form an implementation intention designed to controltheir task performance. Once again, if–then planning overcame the effect of arousalon risk-related behaviour to the extent that participants who formed plans remainedsensitive to the odds of winning even when they had been exposed to the arousalinduction. Taken together, the findings of the two experiments suggest that people canstrategically avoid the detrimental effect of unpleasant mood and arousal on risk takingby forming implementation intentions directed at controlling either the experience ofmood or the risky behaviour.

Evidence from other domains indicates that implementation intentions are noteffective because plans provide new information about how to achieve the goal (Bayer& Gollwitzer, 2007; Oettingen, Honig, & Gollwitzer, 2000; Webb et al., 2010), orbecause planning increases motivation or self-efficacy (Webb & Sheeran, 2008). Rather,two psychological processes underpin the effectiveness of implementation intentions(Gollwitzer, 1999; Webb & Sheeran, 2007, 2008). First, because if–then planning involvesdeliberating about a good opportunity to act, that opportunity becomes highly activated,and hence more accessible. Heightened accessibility, in turn, means that the specifiedopportunity is quickly and accurately identified (e.g., Webb & Sheeran, 2004). Forexample, implementation intention participants are likely to have been quick to spotthe experience of unpleasant mood as their opportunity for emotional control in Expt1. Second, because implementation intentions have a contingent (if–then) format, astrong link is forged between the specified opportunity and the specified response.The consequence is that the opportunity elicits the response in a relatively swift andeffortless fashion (i.e., automatically; for a review, see Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006). Forexample, participants who formed implementation intentions in Expt 2 are likely to haveautomatically taken account of the proportion of red versus blue boxes when placingtheir bets. Although the present research did not explicitly assess the mechanism bywhich implementation intentions overcame the effects of unpleasant mood and arousalon risk, the weight of evidence suggests that if–then planning effects are mediated bythe accessibility of the specified opportunity and the strength of association between

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opportunity and response (Webb & Sheeran, 2007, 2008). Future studies will needto confirm that these processes also explain how implementation intentions shieldbehaviour from the deleterious effects of mood.

The present research found that implementation intentions could be used toovercome the effects of unpleasant mood and arousal in two ways – by managingthe experience of mood and thereby allowing behaviour to proceed undisturbed (themood control plan in Expt 1) or by controlling execution of the behaviour such thatarousal no longer exerted any influence (the task-focused plan in Expt 2). However, thepresent research did not compare the effectiveness of mood control versus task-focusedimplementation intentions in a single experiment, and so an important avenue for futurestudies will be to examine whether behaviours are better shielded by specifying moodcontrol or behavioural execution in the then-part of one’s plan. A possible disadvantageof mood control plans is that the person needs to anticipate the mood that he/she islikely to experience in order to specify an effective coping response. Such anticipationmay not be easy, especially in unfamiliar contexts (e.g., interacting with customers).Task-focused plans would seem to have the advantage that the behavioural performanceshould be protected from the effects of a variety of mood states – although familiaritywith the task at hand would also seem to be a prerequisite for generating effectivetask-focused plans. Thus, important empirical questions remain about what task features(e.g., novelty) or person characteristics (e.g., skill at affective forecasting) mean that onetype of plan is more effective than the other.

There are several additional predictions that could also be tested in future exper-iments. First, effects on performance were observed over a relatively a short timeperiod in the present studies, and tests over longer periods would be desirable. Ourhypothesis would be that, so long as the goal of performing well remains activated andthe person encounters the mood or task features that are specified in the if-part of theimplementation intention, then the plan should continue to promote task performanceeven over extended time periods (Martin, Sheeran, Slade, Wright, & Dibble, 2009;Sheeran & Silverman, 2003). Second, arousal levels in Expt 2 were not especially high(M = 5.51 on a 1–9 scale). Could implementation intentions overcome the impact of veryhigh arousal levels (e.g., the effects of sexual arousal on unsafe sex decisions, as in Ariely& Loewenstein, 2006)? Our hypothesis would be that a ‘cooling’ response (Metcalfe& Mischel, 1999) in the then-part of a plan (e.g., ‘ . . . then I imagine that Grandma islooking at me!’) might prove effective under such circumstances. Finally, studies indicatethat particular emotions may facilitate rather than hinder the attainment of particulartypes of goals (e.g., excitement may aid progress with approach goals; worry may aidprogress with avoidance goals; Carver, 2001; Tamir, Chiu, & Gross, 2007). Thus, futurestudies might profitably test whether implementation intentions can be used to enhancethe experience of particular emotions and thereby promote effective goal striving. Insummary, the present experiments indicate that implementation intention formationcan overcome the effect of unpleasant mood and arousal on risky behaviour. However,there are several testable implications of this work that can and should be investigatedin future research.

AcknowledgementsThe authors are grateful to Clare Flynn and Hannah Jepson for assistance with data collectionfor Expt 1 and to Yu Li for programming the gambling task used in Expt 2. This research wassupported by ESRC grant RES-060-25-0044: ‘Emotion regulation of others and self (EROS)’.

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Received 2 October 2009; revised version received 27 July 2010