!!!!!!

Why Sweden banned its Spanish volunteers!

!Investigating the political and public debates regarding the voluntary conscription to the

Spanish Civil War in March 1937!!!!!!Bjorn Johnsen!

Submitted for MA (Hon)!

Department of History!

University of Glasgow!

February 2014

Table of Content!

Chapter 1 Introduction 1Background 1

This Investigation 3

Chapter 2 Debates in the Riksdag 9Sympathy with the Republican side 11

Protecting the peace 13

Independence or international responsibility 14

Democratic restrictions of the law 16

Chapter 3 Newspapers 18Reporting on the parliamentary procedure 18

Newspapers taking up the fight 22

Chapter 4 Digging more and deeper 28Complementing Social-Democratic press 28

Investigating the sources employed 29

Chapter 5 Conclusion 34Summary 34

Answering the research question 35

Reliability of the sources employed 37

Limitations and possible remedies 39

Bibliography 40Primary Sources 40

Secondary Sources 42

Appendix 1 The Law translated 45

CHAPTER 1!INTRODUCTION!!Background!

The Spanish Civil War and non-intervention

As a prelude to the Second World War, the War over Spain was fought. The civil war raging

between 1936 and 1939 caused enormous international debate and controversy. Concerns

regarding fascism spreading through Europe, disturbances to the international balance of power,

democratic states’ attitudes towards the fascist powers and the role of the League of Nations

were all in question. The debate on how to approach the civil war was raging both on a national

and international level.  The immediate response by the European powers, with France and 1

Great Britain as the initiators, was the signing of the non-intervention pact, in which all

participants agreed not to intervene either directly or indirectly on either of the fighting forces’

side. This was arguably the result of a paralysing fear that the conflict in Spain would spill over

to the continent, resulting in a new World War,  but historians have identified British fear of a 2

republican victory resulting in a Bolshevik Spain, and an ideological challenge to liberal

capitalism in Western Europe.  When discussing the non-intervention committee that was 3

established, the emphasis by historians is usually on the relationship and interactions that Great

Britain and France experienced with Nazi Germany and fascist Italy. What is often left

unmentioned is the role of the smaller states in the non-intervention pact, perhaps for justifiable

reasons. Foreign policy in the smaller European democracies was inevitably tied to the bigger

European powers, and the policy of the non-intervention committee was in effect merely an

extension of British and French foreign policy.

!As the non-intervention pact was signed in August 1936, it conflicted with a wave of public

opinion across the European workers movement. The agreement between the European powers

�1

� E. Moradiellos, ‘The international dimensions of the Spanish Civil War’, F. McDonough (ed.) The Origins 1

of the Second World War: An International Perspective (London: Continuum, 2011), p.312

� S. Balfour, ‘Spain from 1931 to the present’, R. Carr (ed.) Spain: A History (Oxford: Oxford University 2

Press, 2000), p.258

� D. Little, Malevolent Neutrality: The United States, Great Britain, and the Origins of the Spanish Civil War 3

(London: Cornell University Press, 1985), p.225

not only to refrain from military intervention, but also from indirect involvement in the form of

weapons trade, was seen as an insult to the democratic, legal regime in Spain. It was argued that

they were denied their right to buy military equipment to defend themselves from the militant

insurgents.  It soon became clear that both Germany and Italy, despite having signed the non-4

intervention pact, were aiding the rebells by providing them not only with material equipment

and monetary support, but also contributing with troop deployments to Spain.  This prompted 5

the non-intervention committee to expand the scope of the agreement, as well as implementing a

series of control measures to ensure that the agreement was respected by all participants. An

unconventional step in this was taken in February 1937, as the committee urged the states of the

pact to implement laws with the purpose to prevent volunteers from joining either side in the

Spanish Civil War. The reasons for this approach were two-fold; the enormous number of

volunteers for the republican regime of the Popular Front meant that state’s interests of looking

after their citizens ran the risk of becoming intertwined in the internal conflict in Spain, which

could result in the conflict becoming international. The other reason was to stop the flow of

German and Italian regular troops being deployed to Spain disguised as volunteers. From

originally dictating states’ foreign policies towards Spain and limiting exports of war material to

the opposing sides, this was in practice an extension of the non-intervention pact, to

encompassing dictations for states’ internal affairs and legislations against its own citizens.  6

!The situation in Sweden

Sweden, as a very small country in the European community, enjoyed understandably a very

small voice in the non-intervention committee, but was also, as a large weapons manufacturer,

an essential member of the pact in the eyes of Great Britain and France. The Swedish parliament

consisted at this time of two chambers; the upper (first) and the lower (second) chambers. These

were equal in status, but differed in terms of election and composition, as the 2nd chamber was

chosen by democratic elections every 4 years, while the 1st chamber was indirectly elected, and

subject to partial renewal annually, by provincial councils. In 1937, the non-socialists were in

minority in the 2nd chamber and in majority in the 1st, but the margins were very narrow, and

�2

� P. Preston, The Spanish Civil War 1936-39 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1990), p.744

� A. Beevor, Spanska Inbördeskriget (translated by Kjell Waltman) (Lund: Historiska Media, 2008), p.1685

� N. Padelford, ‘The International Non-Intervention Agreement and the Spanish Civil War’, The American 6

Journal of International Law, Vol. 31, No. 4 (1937), p.588

there was rarely any tension between the chambers.  After experiencing a politically turbulent 7

summer in 1936, in which the Social-Democrats had been temporarily removed from power, the

Swedish government in early 1937 was composed of a coalition between the Social-Democrats

(SAP) and Bondeförbundet (BF; trans: the Farmers Union). This coalition government was the

first, after almost two problematic decades of weak minority governments, to receive a majority

support in the Riksdag, resulting in a change in the political practices.  The Riksdag committees 8

lost their central role as most major issues were solved within the government. Essentially, the

role of the Riksdag ‘became one of giving the government a stable foundation.’  In terms of 9

foreign policy, the traditional line of neutrality had in some regards been abandoned when

Sweden joined the League of Nations. In the light of its limitations in 1936, Sweden declared a

return to neutrality, which, however, did not mean abandoning the LoN.  When faced with this 10

appeal from the European community to outlaw voluntary conscription, the government was

quick to draft a proposition. The introduction of the law banning Swedish citizens from

participation in the Spanish Civil War, was passed on the 3 March 1937 by both chambers of the

Swedish Riksdag, is a relevant topic to study for many reasons. The proposition puts the

question of state affairs and the international community in direct conflict with the individual

freedom of the citizens of the state. It’s implementation can also tell us about the power

dynamics within the European community and the relationship between the larger powers to the

smaller states, as well as the smaller states’ perception of themselves within this community.

!This Investigation!

Research Question

The aims of this dissertation are to investigate the debate in Sweden regarding the

implementation of the law banning Swedish citizens from participation in the Spanish Civil

War, analyse how the debate on the political arena differed from the public debate and assess

�3

� E. Håstad, The Parliament of Sweden, translated by N.C.M. Elder (New Southgate: Chiswick Press, 7

1957), p.51; p.61

� O. Nyman, Parlamentarismen i Sverige: Huvuddragen av Utvecklingen efter 1917, 6th edition 8

(Stockholm: Rydahls Boktryckeri AB, 1996), p.88

� S. Hadenius, The Riksdag in Focus: Swedish History in a Parliamentary Perspective, translated by Marie 9

Clark Nelson (Arlöv: Berlings, 1997), p.181

� N. Andrén, Power-Balance and Non-Alignment: A perspective on Swedish Foreign Policy (Uppsala: 10

Almqvist & Wiksells Boktryckeri, 1967), p.24

what this can tell historians about Sweden’s perception of itself in the context of the League of

Nations, the European community and the Spanish Civil War. Thus, the investigation will put

the control measures simultaneously implemented aside, focusing primarily on the issue of

banning voluntary conscription, i.e. the debate regarding the first 3 paragraphs of the law, found

translated in Appendix 1. Although similar laws were passed in most of the European states

within the non-intervention pact, the law passed in Sweden is, despite its international origins,

effectively an internal law passed within a sovereign state and applying only to the citizens of

that state. Therefore, the debate and implementation of it is unique, and a study of it could

convey a sense of Swedish identity in relation to the international community and to its own

citizens.

This investigation will, out of necessity, move away from simple party analysis. The debates

regarding the implementation of the law were not characterised by strict inter-party

argumentation. The Social-Democrats, heading a coalition government, battled with their

responsibility as legislators, with their international commitment and with their working class

sympathy for the republican government of Spain. Both the Prime Minister Per-Albin Hansson

and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Richard Sandler had openly expressed their support for the

republican side in Spain. It is thus relevant to discuss the debate within the Social-Democrats in

order to try to assess how their ideological sympathies might have conflicted with their

responsibility as decision makers. The debates regarding the introduction of the law were thus

partly inter-party based and partly and internal conflict within the Social-Democrats. In short,

besides trying to detect the underlying reasons for the law, this dissertation aims to provide an

answer to how the ban on volunteers was justified, given its controversial and repressive nature

that conflicts with notions of modern day democracy. It will also investigate whether any

discrepancies can be found in the argumentation for the law when comparing the political

debate with the public.

!Historiography

Sweden’s relationship to the Spanish Civil War has been widely studied, and there are several

accounts dealing with topics like the public support for the republican side in Sweden, the

humanitarian campaigns to aid victims of war, government actions from the outbreak to the end

and biographies of the volunteers who went to fight in Spain. However, the studies been

�4

somewhat limited to idealistic accounts of heroic Swedes who fought for Spain, or judgemental

analyses on how the Swedish government conformed to the big European powers’ political

agendas. What is missing is an analysis of what the Swedish public opinion and political actions

towards Spain can tell us about the Swedish perception of itself in regards to the Spanish Civil

War, as well as attempts to understand how Swedish identity influenced the polices taken.

The government has been described as sympathising with the legal Spanish regime, however

somewhat sceptic to the Popular Front ideology, due to communist participation, which resulted

in both Hansson and foreign minister Sandler preferring non-involvement. The somewhat

hesitant agreement to the non-intervention pact was a result of them feeling compelled due to

agreements in the League of Nations as well as internal conditions.  The extension of the non-11

intervention to include banning Swedish volunteers is only touched on briefly by most writers,

who provide short accounts of the process and rather direct analyses on the reasons for passing

the law. Kaj Björk describes the secrecy of the preparation for the law in Sweden, due to its

controversy. He argues that all parties in the Riksdag considered themselves forced to pass the

law when it was presented, even the communists, after being instructed by Moscow. The debate

within SAP whether denying the republican side in Spain weapons was against international law

is brought up, with Georg Branting and Östen Undén representing opposing sides. The conflict

within SAP is further investigated, focusing particularly on the support for the republican side in

the youth section of the party, and he concludes that there was a clear distinction between

official stance and opinion, quoting Dagens Nyheter in its analysis that the deputies who passed

the law experienced a deep ideological conflict when doing so.  Göte Nilsson describes how 12

the socialists were the only ones to move the negative in the Riksdag, as well as how the call by

a small minority in SAP not to imprison volunteers was abandoned for party loyalty. He derives

rather quickly at the conclusion that ‘there never existed any doubt whether the Riksdag would

approve the proposed law,’ without actually accounting for why that was the case.  Claes-13

Göran Jönsson contributes with some more insight into the intended platonic character of the

�5

� K. Björk, Spanien i Svenska Hjärtan (Stockholm: Bäckströms Förlag, 2001), p.17; M.C. Carlomagno, 11

Sverige och Spanska Inbördeskriget (Lund: Historiska Media, 1999), p.42; L. Lundberg, Svenskarna i Spanska Inbördeskriget 1936-1939 (Göteborg: Tre Bröders Förlag, 2001), p.37; R. Jändel, Kämpande Solidaritet: Möten med Svenska Spanienfrivilliga (Stockholm: Arbetarrörelsens Arkiv och Bibliotek, 1996), p.20

� Björk, Spanien i Svenska Hjärtan, pp. 53; 57; 59; 64; 69; 7312

� G. Nilsson, Svenskar i Spanska Inbördeskriget (Stockholm: Nordstedt och Söners Förlag, 1972), pp. 13

150-151

law, as Sandler expected it to provide enough obstacles for possible volunteers to make

travelling to Spain virtually impossible, thus not resulting in any convictions. He further

demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the law, by pointing to the fact that 350 of the around 500

Swedish volunteers signed up after the law was implemented, and that it was only used in one

single trial, where the accused were acquitted.  14

Questions need to be asked whether Sweden could in fact act differently when prompted to pass

the law, given its perception of itself in the international arena. An analysis of the internal

conditions of Sweden and how this resonated internationally is needed.

!Methodology

In International Relations theory, constructivist thinking emphasises the actions of the states that

make up the international community in trying to explain the nature of the it, summarised

clearly in the phrase ‘international anarchy is what states make of it.’ By taking this further, state

actions can be more properly explained by looking at the nature of the state through a

constructivist approach.  In this respect, in order to understand the foreign policy of smaller 15

states like Sweden in the late 1930’s and the international environment in which it operated, it is

crucial to analyse the Swedish state itself, and especially its perceptions of its own role in the

international community. This investigation will use a constructivist approach in trying to

determine why Sweden acted the way it did when passing the law against volunteers, and what

the debates regarding this law can tell us about Swedish identity in early 1937. By examining

the different identities those arguing for the law attempted to create, and how these influenced

the the decision taken, a greater understanding about Swedish foreign politics can perhaps be

obtained.

!This investigation will encompass the debates raged in both the political and public arena,

calling upon a range of sources. The parliamentary documents from the two Riksdag chambers,

containing the minutes from the deliveries made by the deputies, will be studied, with an

analysis of the discussions that followed the proposition by the government. In the first

�6

� C-G. Jönsson, Den Svenska Arbetarradikalismen och Spanska Inbördeskriget (Lund: Arkiv för studier i 14

arbetarrörelsens historia, 1977), p.13

� K. M. Fierke ‘Constructivism’, T. Dunne, M. Kurki, S. Smith (eds.) International Relations Theories: 15

Discipline and Diversity, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p.185

chamber, the issue was debated on three separate occasions: on 22 February, when the

proposition was presented, on 24 February and on 3 March, when it was passed. In the second

chamber, it was debated on 22 February and 3 March. These five records will be the basis for

determining partly how party belonging influenced the arguments used either for or against the

proposition, but also how argumentation in different aspects varied with the different

approaches a deputy could take.

!Newspapers will make up the core of the analysis of the public debate. These will be studied by

looking particularly at the editorial pages, the letters to the editors and the inter-newspaper

debates, but also by the tone of the reports regarding the non-intervention pact, the volunteers

and the process of implementation of the law. The restrained scope and extent of the dissertation

necessitates a rather limited sample of newspapers studied, and the selection of newspapers

chosen must be justified. The two largest daily newspapers will be used, which are Aftonbladet

and Dagens Nyheter, both classified as liberal, along with four of the largest opinion-forming

newspapers, who all had political ties. These are Ny Dag, a communist newspaper tied to the

SKP (Swedish Communist Party), Social-Demokraten, the party press of the SAP (Swedish

Social-Democratic Party), Svenska Dagbladet, with close ties to Högerpartiet (conservatives)

and Arbetaren, a syndicalist newspaper published by the trade union organisation SAC.  As the 16

range of newspapers studied is very limited, a quantitative approach of analysing the findings

would result in impossibly unreliable conclusions. Instead, the study will be strictly qualitative,

by presenting and analysing the nature of the arguments used and the attitude of the reports

regarding the law. This will enable the investigation to, first of all, assess whether arguments for

or against the law differed with party belonging and ideology in the same manner as in the

political debates. It will also be used as an indicator on how public opinion differed from the

views expressed in the two chambers of parliament. Given the complexity surrounding SAP in

this issue, the deeper analysis of Social-Democratic press will be conducted in chapter 4, by

complementing with the weekly magazine Fackföreningsrörelsen.

!

�7

� S. Hadenius, Concentration of ownership in the Swedish Newspaper Market, translated by Victor 16

Kayfetz (Dusseldorf: The European Institute for the Media, 1993), p.4; Lundberg, Svenskarna i Spanska inbördeskriget, p.37

The methodology adopted in this dissertation requires some reflection. There is a danger in

employing newspapers to determine public opinion. As a historian, one is forced to question the

purpose of producing the article studied. One must also reflect on whether views expressed and

arguments used in editorial pages and letters to the editors are effective indicators of a more

general public opinion, or if they simply are the expressed views of the author. Additionally, the

aim of a newspaper edition is ultimately to sell copies, and one must perhaps reflect on whether

that could influence the views expressed and arguments used, along with the very fact that many

newspapers had political ties either to a party or an ideology. Both these issues present

limitations, but also advantages to the study of public opinion. The later issue can neutralise the

former, and vice versa. If a liberal newspaper wants to sell copies, its editorial board will most

likely reflect the views popular to people with a liberal ideological belonging. Thus, the very

fact that the article is written to please a liberal public can, if it is successful, give us an

indication of liberal popular sentiments. In the case of newspapers having political ties to parties

or, as with Social-Demokraten to the government, this may, however, not be the case. Then, the

newspaper is not only obliged to please the great masses of people with the same ideological

belonging, but also has an initiative to submit to a set party line. These issues, along with the

political role of newspapers in Sweden, will be investigated in chapter 4, before an

understanding of the sources reliability can be obtained in the conclusion.

Parliamentary documents also include some underlying limitations. The views expressed by the

chambers’ deputies and their arguments used are, in effect, simply attempts to persuade an

opposition. The underlying reasons for an expressed view may in fact be very different from the

ones expressed in a delivery. Loyalty either to the party, the government or ideology may force

one to employ a certain line of policy, and then use notions of e.g. national security,

international commitment or democratic principles to persuade the opposition. However, as

fragile as parliamentary argumentation can be to scrutiny, it can also be rather informative. The

very employment of an argument, irregardless of it being the underlying reason for the position

taken or not, can give an indication of what the “best-selling arguments” in a political debate

are.

�8

CHAPTER 2!DEBATES IN THE RIKSDAG!!There were 5 Riksdag debates regarding the law to ban volunteers, three taking place in the First

Chamber and two in the Second, in which 22 deputies voiced their opinions. This chapter will

closely analyse these protocols in order to get a clear insight into the argumentation used, and

how these can help us identify a notion of Swedish identity in regards to the Spanish Civil War,

and in particular this law against voluntary conscription. Table 1 below lists the parties that were

represented in the two chambers of the Riksdag, showing the number of deputies representing

each party, and how many of these made addresses in the five debates regarding the new law.

From it, it is possible to

conclude two things.

There were far more

s o c i a l - d e m o c r a t s

addressing the Riksdag

than any other party.

Given the fact that SAP

lead the coalition under

Per Albin Hansson, one

could perhaps expect a

number more resembling

that of BF, where the only speaker was the Minister of Justice Karl Gustaf Westman. Instead

there is a wide range of social-democratic speakers, giving the impression that the party did not

enjoy the same unity regarding this question compared to other parties. The other conclusion to

be drawn from the table is that around 40% of the SP and SKP deputies took to the podium,

giving an indication that the Spanish Civil War and its volunteers was of great importance to the

socialist and communists. It is, to some extent, possible to make some connection between party

belonging and pleadings either for or against the proposed law. Deputies belonging to the right-

wing parties H, FP and BF were, with the exception the liberal deputy Gustav Mosesson,

positive towards the proposition. The communists were also all in agreement on passing the law,

while the socialists in SP argued against it. In the end, the socialists were the only ones who

�9

PARTY NAME DESCRIPTION DEP. SPEAK.

Socialdemokratiska Arbetarpartiet* (SAP) Social-Democratic 178 10

Socialistiska Partiet (SP) Socialist 7 3

Sveriges Kommunistiska Parti (SKP) Communist 5 2

Bondeförbundet* (BF) Centrist 58 1

Folkpartiet (FP) Liberal 43 2

Högerpartiet (H) Conservative 89 4

* part of coalition government under Hansson 380 22

Table 1 - Party distr. of seats to the Swedish Riksdag in March

Source: Hadenius, The Riksdag in Focus, p.209

voted against the law in both chambers. Discrepancies between party belonging and opinions

raised regarding the law and non-intervention in general are only present in SAP. Although no

one voted against the law, many SAP deputies argued against it, employing a wide range of

arguments.

!From these debates, it is possible to distinguish some main issues that tended to be addressed in

arguing either for or against the law. While it was generally agreed that non-intervention had

failed, the deputies differed on whether prohibiting volunteers would make it effective or if it

was an extension of a faulty policy. The first is the perceived danger of another large-scale

European war and the non-intervention pact’s prospects of preventing one.. The second is the

future of Spain, its democratic state and the freedom of its people, and whether a continuation of

non-intervention would benefit the republicans or the royalists. The third is the notion of

whether Sweden can refuse to pass this law, due to its commitment to the non-intervention pact

and its dependency on larger European powers in foreign policy. The last issue is the

undemocratic element of the law, where the possible benefits of it were weighed against the

infringements it contained on personal liberty. These issues received various attention by the

deputies within the ideological spectrum. The liberals and conservatives tended to emphasise

the threat of a new large-scale war and the Swedish dependency on France and Great Britain in

foreign policy, while neglecting the outcome of the conflict in Spain. This issue received instead

much attention from the socialists and communists, who, although recognising the threat of war,

gave it much less attention, as their arguments tended to be based on a strong solidarity towards

the legal regime in Spain. The SAP deputies touched extensively on both these issues, although

their addresses varied enormously, with some putting emphasis similar to the radical leftists and

others choosing a more right-wing approach. Swedish dependency or responsibility towards the

international community, and the international aspect of the new law, were questions that all

deputies treated, although they differed in how much influence it should have on internal affairs

in Sweden, with the social-democratic elite discussing Swedish international responsibility the

most. Likewise the democratic dilemma was given varying importance in the question of this

new law, with the left-wing social-democrats, the socialists and the liberals being the most

concerned about it. There were generally three main approaches to the proposition to ban

voluntary conscription. Deputies could show support for the new law on the basis that it was

�10

needed to strengthen the faulty non-intervention policy, i.e. that the law was essentially a

welcomed extension. This school encompasses both right-wing deputies, the SAP elite (like

Allan Vougt, Östen Undén and Harald Åkerberg) and in some respects the communists in SKP

under Hagberg, all, however, with somewhat different views on non-intervention in general. The

second school also advocates an approval of the law, but because it is argued that Sweden has

no choice but to follow the directions from the non-intervention committee. These include the

SAP deputies Georg Branting, Charles Lindley and Carl Lindhagen, who are amongst those

most involved in the debate regarding punishment. The third school is the one urging the

Riksdag to reject the law, in which the socialists Karl Kilbom and Nils Flyg were the most

outspoken. Naturally, the last two schools were essentially critical towards introducing the law,

and can largely be studied together. However, these deputies differ in the very crucial aspect of

Swedish independence, which is the reason for their separation into two groupings. In the

speeches that were made during the Riksdag debate regarding this law, the majority expresses

doubts regarding the non-intervention policy’s ability (or even intent) to defend the Spanish

democracy and ensure the preservation of peace. But the majority also describes Sweden to be

in a forced position, compelled to follow its allies. Thus, despite arguments that a ban on

voluntary conscription to the civil war in Spain would help the Spanish cause and ensure the

peace, it seems that what united the deputies who voted for passing the law was the notion of

them essentially being incapable of doing otherwise.

!Sympathy with the Republican side!

Sympathy for the people of Spain was widely outspoken by most addresses, and sympathy for

the legal regime was, although not present in all, then at least in the large majority of speeches.

One can see some disparity between the three different approaches. The deputies arguing against

passing the law, along with those arguing that the law was unavoidable all expressed a sympathy

for the socialist cause in Spain and its legal government. The deputies arguing for the law were

more likely to extend their sympathies to the legal government, but not so much to the

proletarian movement, especially not the right-wing deputies. The Vougt school, displaying only

tepid support for the Spanish legal regime compared to the other two, instead insistent on the

�11

irrelevance of sympathy for either side in this matter.  Vought and Undén attempt to move focus 1

in the debate away from the possible outcomes of the conflict for Spain, by arguing that the non-

intervention policy is an old and recognised principle, and that it should be pursued despite

possibly devastating effects for Spain. This is defended by the perceived domestic nature of the

conflict, and, given that the League of Nations only guarantees protection from outside force,

that the right to self-determination should not be broken by intervention.  It is, however, argued 2

by some of these deputies that a strictly followed non-intervention in fact is the best way to

protect the Spanish democracy against the forces supported by Germany and Italy, and that the

new law has to be introduced in Sweden in order to prevent further fascist intervention.  This is 3

a somewhat weak argument, finding support in rather naive perceptions that a strict adherence

to non-intervention by democracies has had a positive influence on Germany and Italy.  Thus, 4

whether there are genuine concerns for the Spanish people and its democracy is hard to

determine. It is obvious that it is of secondary importance, with Vought stating that ‘the reasons

to participate outweigh feelings about injustice and terror in Spain.’  5

The group dominated by the socialists, arguing consistently against the law, as well as the

Branting school, differ from the Vougt school in a very important aspect, namely in their

insistence that the conflict in Spain is not a civil war between two sides of equal status, but a

war of conquest conducted by foreign powers with the use of a military revolt against a legal

regime.  Non-intervention is thus a breech of international law, as the Spanish legal regime is 6

being denied their rights.  The deputies are convinced that non-intervention in practice benefits 7

the Spanish fascists, as Germany and Italy, despite signing the pact, continues to send troops to

Spain. Since it is stationed soldiers that are being sent, it is argued that a ban on voluntary

conscription only targets the true volunteers fighting for the republican side. Thus, the new law

is suspected to continue to support fascist advances and passing it is described as giving these

�12

� Riksdag Documents, First Chamber (FC), no.16, 3 March 1937, B 260-289, p.251

� FC, no.16, p.14; Riksdag Documents, Second Chamber (SC), no.12, 22 February 1937, B 290-301, p.152

� FC, no.16, p.263

� SC, no.12, p.164

� SC, no.12, p.155

� SC, no.12, p.86

� FC, no.16, p.107

advances moral support.  The evidence to support this approach is the fact that the German and 8

Italian troops already stationed will remain in Spain, something that should be a priority, and

that the fascist countries will partake in controlling this new agreement. With the very high

numbers of foreign soldiers fighting for the fascists, it is argued to be rather unrealistic to punish

the relatively few true volunteers.  This leads some deputies to argue that a ban on voluntary 9

conscription might not necessarily be unjustified, as long as it only prevents volunteers for the

fascists.  Given admissions even from the deputies arguing for the law that the outcome of this 10

experiment is rather uncertain, it is argued that there exists no valid reasons for pursuing it.  11

Instead, the continuation and extension of non-intervention is seen as a deliberate smokescreen

by the democracies, and especially the UK, in an attempt to undermine a potentially socialist

regime in Spain, by not interfering with German and Italian intervention. This is explained to be

the reason behind the argument concerning Spain’s self-determination, as the European

democracies are accused of favouring a revolt against a workers’ regime over a workers’

revolt.  The same accusation is uttered against the Swedish bourgeoisie, as it is argued that it 12

was positive towards voluntary conscription in the Finnish Civil War.  13

!Protecting the peace!

The Vougt school’s major concern was the imminent threat to the European peace that the civil

war in Spain presented. The deputies argue that priority should be the prevention of the Spanish

fire spreading to the rest of Europe,  and it is seen as given that Sweden should participate in 14

these common efforts to preserve the peace.  The policy of non-intervention is described as a 15

collective safety measure to accomplish this, and is compared to the use of economic

sanctions.  In the light of the failure of intervention in the Abyssinian conflict, non-intervention 16

�13

� FC, no.16, p.10; SC, no.12, p.108

� SC, no.12, p.9; Riksdag Documents, Second Chamber (SC), no.15, 3 March 1937, p.439

� Riksdag Documents, First Chamber (FC), no.13, 22 February 1937, B 261-263, p.910

� SC, no.15, p.3011

� SC, no.12, p.1112

� FC, no.16, p.24; SC, no.12, p.1113

� SC, no.12, p.1414

� FC, no.13, p.1015

� SC, no.12, p.1516

is described as a new tactic to ensure that domestic or regional conflicts do not escalate into

international conflicts. Thus, it is seen by the Vougt school not as passivity, but as ‘a way of

effectively organising the peace,’ and the law is described as a positive measure to ensure this.  17

The Branting and Kilbom schools were united also in this issue, as the non-intervention policy’s

ability to prevent a large-scale European war is questioned.  It is argued that the Spanish Civil 18

War is a new type of warfare, which will, unless prevented, lead to a domino effect of small

wars of conquest disguised as civil wars.  Furthermore, the fascist states are seen as the biggest 19

threat to the peace, and giving in to their policies is essentially giving in to policies that

ultimately lead to war, as ‘arms race and war cannot be prevented by the means causing them.’  20

The August agreement, in its present state, is actually argued to have prolonged the threat of

war, since it has prolonged the Spanish conflict, and banning volunteers, contrary to introducing

control measures, does not change this, but is merely the participation in an international

pantomime.  The socialists of the Kilbom school offer an even harsher criticism, stating that 21

the law has nothing at all to do with protecting the peace, but is a product of the non-

intervention pact’s self-preservation, only introduced to protect its existence.  22

It is evident that the threat of another world war was an ever present issue amongst the Swedish

deputies. However, the non-intervention policy was not agreed by all to be the best solution to

this threat, and even if it was seen as something possibly beneficial, it was hard for many

deputies to understand how punishing Swedish citizens for voluntarily joining a fighting side in

the Spanish Civil War would save the peace.

!Swedish independence and international responsibility!

The law to make voluntary conscription in the Spanish Civil War illegal was not a result of

internal problems, but essentially something forced on Sweden by the international

circumstances. The issue of Swedish responsibility towards the international community and

�14

� SC, no.12, p.3217

� FC, no.16, p.27; SC, no.12, p.1718

� FC, no.16, p.1819

� SC, no.12, p.17; FC, no.16, p.2120

� FC, no.16, p.27; p.2421

� SC, no.12, p.10; SC, no.12, p.922

independence in foreign policy was what divided the Branting school and the Kilbom school.

The law is seen by both as a result of international deals in the League of Nations and a

European adoption of English foreign policy.  However, the Kilbom school argues that 23

Sweden, despite its size, can voice its opinion instead of silently conforming to the English

controlled non-intervention committee, and in some regards construct its own foreign policy.  24

Even despite a continuation of this conformity, the non-existence of a separate foreign policy is

not enough reason to pass this law, especially since it is a result of fascist countries breaking

their promises.  Along with the critique of the law being forced on Sweden from abroad, the 25

deputies of the Kilbom school also offer a critique against it being forced on the Riksdag

deputies. The passport restrictions put in place before the law being passed by the Riksdag is

critiqued, and a comment by Flyg regarding the unanimity of the committee of foreign affairs,

when SAP is clearly rather divided, suggests a critique of an SAP party whip.  The deputies of 26

the Branting school, while recognising that a foreign policy conducted by simply looking up to

the major European powers is problematic,  argue that it is impossible not to follow the big 27

powers and that this law is ‘the fruit of an international situation we cannot control.’  Even 28

though the deputies, critical as they are of the non-intervention policy, would prefer another

course of action in regards to the Spanish Civil War, they argue that a change must come from

the whole of the League of Nations, and that Sweden cannot act independently of it.  29

The Vougt school argues that Sweden has an international responsibility to introduce the new

law, given its participation in the non-intervention pact.  The deputies stress that it is 30

impossible for Sweden to be seen as conducting its own foreign policy, and that they therefore

are in a forced position.  It is even argued that Sweden should adhere to the new agreement 31

even if it turns out that other countries do not, since they would not want to risk antagonising

�15

� FC, no.16, p.12; SC, no.12, p.3123

� SC, no.12, p.10; SC, no.12, p.3124

� SC, no.12, p.1125

� SC, no.12, p.926

� FC, no.16, p.2127

� Riksdag Documents, First Chamber (FC), no.14, 24 February 1937, B 264-265, p.228

� FC, no.16, p.1829

� FC, no.16, p.2530

� FC, no.16, p.25; SC, no.12, p.3231

France and Great Britain.  This dependency, however, is not seen as problematic, since non-32

intervention is seen as an essentially positive policy, and Sweden’s participation in the peace

protecting initiative is given. Not participating would be an enormous responsibility, as it would

increase the risk for war.  There is also a greater trust towards the government to be found in 33

this school, as the deputies consistently argue that the Riksdag should trust the government to do

what is necessary, dismissing any criticism regarding the premature passport restrictions.  34

!The democratic restrictions of the law!

That the law violated what was usually regarded individual citizen’s personal liberty to fight and

risk their lives for Spain’s cause was agreed by everyone, although it was given more or less

significance by the different approaches. The Branting school, believing that the law has to be

introduced, mostly comments on the fact that voluntary conscription has never before been seen

as criminal, as well as expressing concerns about the new law creating a precedence.  The 35

Kilbom school is somewhat more critical, arguing that the law is a violation of one of the most

elementary democratic rights, as well as damaging to the international workers’ solidarity

against fascism.  Even if the punishment would be limited to fines or if the law would take on a 36

platonic character, it is still an infringement on democracy that cannot be justified.  The Vougt 37

school does not go that far, but merely concludes that it is an unusual method, but it is still

argued that it has been used before. It is a step that, uncomfortable as it may be, is crucial to

take in order to complement the non-intervention agreement.  It is argued that the restrictions 38

put on those few individuals’ lives, who want to go and fight in Spain, is not enough of a reason

to discard the proposal, and that ‘preserving the peace is worth every price.’  The law, it is 39

�16

� FC, no.16, p.26; SC, no.12, p.3232

� SC, no.12, p.1533

� FC, no.16, p.2634

� FC, no.16, p.2735

� SC, no.12, p.11; SC, no.12, p.3236

� SC, no.12, p.3037

� FC, no.16, p.15; p.2638

� FC, no.16, p.16; SC, no.12, p.2539

stated, is only temporary and only concerns the conflict in Spain, resulting in a small, if any,

damage to the democratic system.  40

!Concluding points!

From the debates in the Riksdag, it is clear that there is a shared view amongst the deputies that

the proposal that has been presented to the Riksdag is a result of an international situation that

has been outside of Swedish control. There is little unity regarding the prospects of this new law

enabling the non-intervention policy to effectively secure the peace or put an end to the fascist

upheaval in Spain. However, there is, amongst most deputies, a consensus that Sweden cannot

act separately from the major powers in Europe, notably France and Great Britain, and thus has

no other option but to introduce the law making voluntary conscription to Spain illegal. This

notion of dependency is present even in the most critical addresses, and a clear indicator of

Swedish identity amongst the Riksdag deputies. The proponents of the law try to enforce a

Swedish identity as peace keeper, protector of the Spanish democracy and international team

player. By articulating the threat to peace and democracy that intervention in the Spanish Civil

War represents, and by trying to link the ability of Swedish volunteers to conscript with the

German and Italian troop deployments, the new law is justified. However, it seems that for

many Riksdag deputies, the one identity that was adopted was the notion of Sweden as an

international team player. From studying the Riksdag protocols, the law was adopted not

because it was believed that an extension of the non-intervention policy to include individual

citizens would protect the peace or allow the Spanish conflict to come to an end, even though

they were used as arguments, but because of a sense of international responsibility. This

responsibility did, however, in some respect more resemble dependency and contingency

towards the other European powers. Considering the adoption of an identity of Sweden being

virtually unable to construct a foreign policy of its own, it is not particularly strange that the

Swedish deputies introduced this law, despite the apparent unease regarding it.

�17� SC, no.12, p.2540

!CHAPTER 3!NEWSPAPERS!!This chapter will attempt to analyse two aspects of the newspapers printed during this process of

outlawing volunteered conscription to Spain. First of all an attempt will be made to compare the

different papers’ covers on the parliamentary process, looking at their reports from the debates

in the Riksdag and assessing how these could have affected the readership’s notion of the law

and the deputies debating it. Secondly, a deeper analysis of the columns and editorial notes will

be conducted, partly comparing the different newspapers to each other, but also comparing the

arguments employed to those raised in the Riksdag debates. An assessment of the papers

ideological or party sympathies will be scrutinised more closely in Chapter 4, where ownership

and readership will also be brought up. When scrutinising the newspapers sampled, it is hard to

determine a coherent public opinion regarding the law. It is evident that newspapers where

highly influenced by their ideological belonging, both in regard to how they reported on the law

process, but also in the opinion pieces, putting emphasis on similar issues and generally coming

to the same conclusions. What is striking is the relative absence of Swedish dependency and

inability to conduct a foreign policy of its own in the arguments presented to the public

compared to the arguments in the Riksdag. It is thus clear that to the public, unlike the Riksdag

deputies, this was not necessarily a winning argument for passing the law, giving somewhat

conflicting images of Swedish identity.

!Reporting on the parliamentary procedure!

Presentation of the proposed law

At the very onset, there is already substantial judgements regarding the ban on volunteers

passed in newspapers’ reports. Svenska Dagbladet (SvD) describes on the 16 February the new

agreements reached in the non-intervention committee as a ‘positive turn’ after a previously

hopeless situation.  Dagens Nyheter (DN) does not give the same early praise, but merely 1

�18� ‘Plötsligt omslag i Londonkommittén vid måndagsmötet’, Svenska Dagbladet (SvD), 16 February 1937, p.61

reports on the new agreements as a product of French initiatives and the Swedish support for it,  2

while commenting on the punishment being ‘very harsh.’  Aftonbladet, while being remarkably 3

silent on the issue, writes on 20 February that a Swedish ban is to be expected, taking a clear

stance against Swedish voluntary participation when arguing that this is welcomed,  as well as 4

reporting on 22 February about the Law Council’s approval of the proposal.  Social-5

Demokraten (SD) is, in its report on 16 February surprised at the unity in the non-intervention

committee.  Ny Dag (ND) reports on 22 February that a law against voluntary conscription is 6

presented, accusing it of being a ‘“smoke screen” after 6 months of conscious delays’ by

Germany, Italy and Portugal, aided by England.  Arbetaren reports on 20 February that the 7

agreement was made without passing any deeper judgement on it.  On 22 February, its report on 8

the finished proposal is strikingly brief compared to DN, SvD, ND and SD, merely stating its

submission in accordance with the agreement in the non-intervention committee.  9

!Riksdag debates 22 Feb - 24 Feb

The presentation of the proposed law to the Riksdag on 22 February and the debates in the 2

chambers received attention from all newspapers, save Aftonbladet. DN, SvD, SD, ND and

Arbetaren all wrote about the debate, quoting the different deliveries. The reports by DN, SD

and Arbetaren regarding the 22 February debate are all very similar. They all quote the speeches

made in both chambers, and in a similar fashion, but do pass somewhat different judgements.

DN writes in its headline that ‘the communists ferociously attacks and prevents rushed

treatment,’ and in the lead paragraph that ‘spirited debates arose’ when the suggestion came to

commit the bill for fast treatment, resulting in it being deferred.  Arbetaren, on the other hand, 10

writes in its lead paragraph that ‘no speaker consistently denounced the non-intervention

�19

� ‘Frivilliga skola hejdas vid gränsen’, Dagens Nyheter (DN), 16 February 1937, p.62

� ‘Proposition om ny lag på måndag’ DN, 21 February 1937, front page & back page3

� ‘Svenskt förbud väntas’, Aftonbladet, 20 February 1937, front page4

� ‘Straff even för försök till Spanienvärvning’ Aftonbladet 22 February 1937, p.95

� ‘Frivilligförbud nästa lördag’ Social-Demokraten (SD), 16 February 1937, p.66

� ‘Förbudslag mot frivilligas resa till Spanien’, Ny Dag (ND), 22 February 1937, front page7

� ‘Dynamiteros slå tyskarna på flykten’, Arbetaren, 20 February 1937, front page & back page8

� ‘Förbud mot frivilliga till Spanien’, Arbetaren, 22 February 1937, p.49

� ‘Förslaget om Spanien bordlagt av kamrarna’, DN, 23 February 1937, p.910

hoax.’  SD, in its lead paragraph regarding the Riksdag debates, describes it as ‘a short, albeit 11

spirited debate,’ noting that socialists and communists took up most of it. The lead paragraph

also mentions that minsters Sandler and Westman provided ‘short, informative speeches’, also

recognising Vougt.  Thus, some political views are already apparent, as the liberal DN refers to 12

members of both the SP and the SKP as ‘communists’, SD gives praise to the social-democratic

led government and the syndicalist Arbetaren condemns all speakers for not opposing non-

intervention consistently. When it comes to the actual reporting, DN and SD give remarkably

similar accounts, summarising the speakers’ different arguments, putting particular weight on

Westman’s address,  while Arbetaren, although also quoting all speakers in the same fashion, 13

gives more space for the views of the socialists and communists, and in particular the deputies

from SP.  The last two newspapers differ more distinctly. SvD, while writing about the approval 14

by the Law Council, mentions the Riksdag debate only briefly, with short summaries of the

main arguments by the SP and SKP deputies, but focusing on Sandler’s counter arguments.  15

ND is clearly very selective in its reporting. The debate in the 1st chamber is not mentioned at

all, whereas the debate in the 2nd chamber is thoroughly scrutinised. Hagberg of the SKP is not

only given the most attention, but his arguments are expanded and defended by the report, while

other deputies are only briefly mentioned.  DN writes on 24 February about the fact that the 16

passing of the law will not be as quick as the government expected, due to socialist opposition,

resulting in Sweden falling behind the other European states instead of setting an example.  17

Aftonbladet and Arbetaren, the only ones reporting on the short debate in the 1st chamber on 24

February, publish the same official summary. What differs is the judgements passed. Arbetaren

quotes Ström’s formulation ‘a new hoax in the Spanish question’ in its headline,  while 18

�20

� ‘Propositionen om Spanien bordlagd’, Arbetaren, 23 February 1937, front page11

� ‘Remissdebatt om frivilligförbudet’, SD, 23 February 1937, p.512

� ‘Förslaget om Spanien bordlagt av kamrarna’, DN, 23 February 1937, p.9; ‘Remissdebatt om 13

frivilligförbudet’, Socialdemokraten, 23 February 1937, p.5

� ‘Propositionen om Spanien bordlagd’, Arbetaren, 23 February 1937, front page & p.514

� ‘Lagförslaget mot frivilliga till Spanien’, SvD, 23 February 1937, p.1215

� ‘Remissdebatt om de frivilliga till Spanien’, ND, 23 February, front page & p.316

� ‘Riksdagsbehandlingen av förbudet’, DN, 24 February 1937, p.317

� ‘Nytt bluffspel i spanska frågan’, Arbetaren, 25 February 1937, front page18

Aftonbladet merely concludes that the social-democrats Branting and Ström are sceptics of the

law, and instead writes ‘a new “hoax” in the Spanish question,’ ridiculing this interpretation.  19

!Riksdag debate 3 March & approval of the law

DN, SvD, SD and Arbetaren reported on 28 February that the committee of foreign affairs in its

entirety supports the proposal, and all, except Arbetaren published the same official press

release.  In accounts of the final debate and passing of the proposition, Aftonbladet is a 20

particularly poor source, since the Riksdag was still in session at the time of printing, which,

however, does not stop it from passing judgement on the first speakers. It describes Branting’s

address as ‘chanting,’ and how people gave little notice of him compared to the speech in

defence of the proposal by Undén. Aftonbladet gives extra space to the speakers addressing

issues shipping companies will face with the new control measures, with the title ‘hard to

prevent people from disembarking in Spain,’ and the description of the article reading ‘shipping

interests and the Spanish law.’  The only newspaper that mentions all speakers in the Riksdag 21

debate on 3 March is SD. The others are somewhat selective. DN does not account for a single

communist address, giving the appearance that everyone to the left of the SAP opposes the law.

Mosesson’s address, as the only liberal expressing his discontent with the proposal, is

conveniently left out in both DN and SvD. SvD portrays the Riksdag debates as long, diffusive

and unnecessarily drawn-out, criticising the socialists and communists of competing in voicing

their opinions. Bagge and Sandler are praised for their addresses that ‘effectively reduced the

question to its rightful status’ when they argued that sympathies for either side is irrelevant, and

quoted extensively.  There are differences when looking at DN, as it does not describe the 22

question as clear-cut as SvD. The debates are described as long in the lead paragraph, but not

criticised for it. Instead, the question is given a complexity, as even the dissident positions of

SAP deputies, like Lindley and Branting are represented.  SD also recognises that there were 23

elements of disunity within SAP, but stresses that the proposition received almost unanimous

�21

� ‘Dagens huvudnummer i riksdagen: Ström och Branting skeptiska mot Spanien-lagen’, Aftonbladet, 24 19

February 1937, front page

� ‘Spärren för frivilliga till Spanien’, SvD, 2 March 1937, p.4; ‘Spanjorer och sjuka sjöfarande få passera’, 20

SD, 2 March 1937, p.4; ‘Spanska lagen tillstyrkes i utskott’, Arbetaren, 2 March 1937, front & back page

� ‘Svårt att hindra folk landstiga i Spanien’, Aftonbladet, 3 March 1937, p.821

� ‘Lagen mot frivilliga till spanska kriget antagen av riksdagen’, SvD, 4 March 1937, p.1222

� ‘Lagen om frivilliga antogs av riksdagen’, DN, 4 March 1937, p.1123

support, writing in its lead paragraph that ‘only the decimated Socialist Party raised a few

voices against the controlled non-intervention.’ Praise is given to Sandler for reprimanding

socialist criticism of the law, and, like in SvD, for him convincingly reducing the question. The

disunity within SAP, though briefly discussed, is regarded as differences of opinions among

those supportive of the law. It is described as being overshadowed by the importance of

protecting the peace, and the theme of the report is that ‘peace became the uniting aspect,’  and 24

that in this regard ‘the adoption of the law was given.’  Arbetaren does, in its report of the 25

debates, not pass any overt judgement. One can, however, detect an tone of irony in its sub-

headline which reads ‘the Riksdag adopted the proposal after declarations of dedication to

democracy.’ The quotes by the deputies also display some sympathy for those arguing against

the law, as these are more often, and more extensively quoted.  ND, while presenting most 26

deputies’ arguments, published the SKP deputy Hagberg’s declaration in its entirety, with focus

on criticising the socialists. It reads after the headline ‘the socialist leaders voted […] against the

attempts to stop the German-Italian intervention.’  Thus, in the representation of this debate, as 27

well, there are tendencies to omit, condemn or ridicule arguments by deputies, that correlate

rather well with the newspapers’ respective ideological or party belongings, resulting in very

different interpretations of the parliamentary process amongst the readership. Besides the direct

questions concerning the law’s necessity or usefulness, a reader’s interpretation in other aspects,

such as understanding the opposition to it, where it comes from and why it is unable to make its

case, is highly dependent on the newspaper read.

!Newspapers taking up the fight!

Aftonbladet

Aftonbladet did not print much regarding the law in general, and certainly not many opinion

pieces. Only one article was printed, as the control measures were to come into effect, where it

cited numerous French newspapers’ rather dismal expectations regarding future fascist

intervention in Spain. Aftonbladet shares this scepticism regarding the new measures’ effect.

�22

� ‘Spanska kontrollen klar i riksdagen’, SD, 4 March 1937, front page24

� ‘Förbud mot frivilliga beslutat av riksdagen’, SD, 4 March 1937, p.425

� ‘Frivilligspärren nu ett faktum’, Arbetaren, 4 March 1937, front page & p.426

� ‘Kontrollplanen mot interventionen i Spanien har antagits’, ND, 4 March 1937, front & back page; p.427

However, they are described as sound in theory, and expected to be successful if they are

respected by all states. That respect, however, is what is deemed unlikely, even though the

conclusion cited is that volunteers and war material will probably find it harder to cross into

Spain.  28

!Svenska Dagbladet

SvD consistently argues for the introduction of a ban on volunteered conscription to Spain. They

are of the opinion that the two fighting sides in Spain are equally reprehensible. Quoting a

Norwegian right-wing politician, it is stated that sympathies are extended towards the Spanish

population, but that sympathising with either side is impossible. SvD adds to this quote that this

view is ‘representative for a right-wing outlook across the Nordic countries.’  This correlates 29

well with the views expressed by the right-wing deputies in the Riksdag debate. SvD is thus not

arguing for the law on a basis of non-intervention providing a victory for either side, or a

pacification for that matter, which is deemed hopeless. Instead, focus is on the need to prevent

international complications between the European powers. The international agreement

regarding this is described as a good sign, and Sweden has a responsibility to follow this foreign

directive. SvD does recognise that the law is an extension of non-intervention that interferes on

individuals’ traditional freedom, like the economic sanctions against Italy in the Abyssinian

conflict was a deviation from a policy of neutrality. This episode is referenced to in an attempt

to legitimise the new law, pointing to the fact that the new law is, like the economic sanctions

were, necessary, stressing that a very small number of Swedes use this right to fight for Spain

anyways.  30

!Dagens Nyheter

DN published quite a few argumentative pieces regarding the new law and the control measures.

Quoting SAP deputy Allan Vougt, it is argued that Sweden is not forced to continue the non-

intervention if it is not deemed desirable, and that Swedish participation is a result of the

positive effects of non-intervention and not a drive to please superpowers. However, DN also

�23

� ‘Fransk misstro mot Italiens neutralitet’ Aftonbladet, 7 March 1937, p.328

� ‘Inbördeskriget i Spanien’, SvD, 22 February 1937, p.429

� ‘Oklart i Öster’, SvD, 23 February 1937, p.430

offers a critique against the impotence of the Riksdag in such matters, referring to the unusually

strong government.  It is also argued that even the new committee of foreign affairs has no real 31

say in big international questions, and that the Riksdag will approve the new law, because it is

instructed by the government to do so.  The passport restrictions issued by the government 32

prior to a decision being made in the Riksdag are, in this sense, seen as somewhat problematic.

Quoting Folkets Dagblad, it is argued that this action was done to preserve some Swedish

prestige internationally in the light of the socialist opposition and effectively makes the Riksdag

decision a mere formality. DN agrees with this, although they recognise that the SP opposition

could never offer anything more than a delay and that approval of the law was for certain

anyways.  Participation in this ‘international peace work aimed at preventing the civil war from 33

developing into a European conflict’ is seen as given from a moral standpoint.  The democratic 34

aspect is a problem for DN, quoting the liberal Svenska Morgonbladet writing that this law

would never be introduced had all the states in the non-intervention pact been democracies.

State power is forced on the population in order to fight fascism, and violates individual’s

freedom. Despite this, there is no question regarding whether the law should be implemented, as

an unwillingness to implement small restraints on democratic rights can have enormous

damages to democracy itself. It is argued that this is supported by not just a majority of the

Riksdag parties, but by a large popular majority.  In terms of allegiance to the republican side 35

in the civil war, the ban on volunteers is seen merely as a ‘betrayal on paper,’ with the

arguments that the law will be highly platonic in character and that preserving peace is more

important than ‘Spain’s cause.’  The pacification of Spain and a victory for its democratic 36

elements is seen as hopeless. DN argues that the non-intervention pact’s two main purposes

were protecting democracy in Spain and preservation of the peace and that the ban on

volunteers forsakes the first in order to secure the second, a priority that is, although

unfortunate, crucial.  However, that it is a principally difficult question is not disputed, and DN 37

�24

� ‘Pressgrannar’, DN, 19 February 1937, p.331

� ‘Utrikesfrågorna’, DN, 21 February 1937, p.232

� ‘Pressgrannar’, DN, 28 February 1937, p.333

� ‘Fredsverket kring Spanien’, DN, 22 February 1937, p.334

� ‘Pressgrannar’, DN, 23 February 1937, p.335

� ‘Pressgrannar’ DN, 3 March 1937, p.336

� ‘Fredsverket kring Spanien’, DN, 22 February 1937, p.337

describes the law as a ‘product of compromise, a temporary arrangement in a state of

exception,’ that puts the deputies in a ‘difficult conflict of conscience.’  The necessity of the 38

law, but also the apparent discomfort with the limitations to individual freedom are views

consistent with the liberal deputies’ argumentation in the Riksdag.

!Social-Demokraten

The views expressed by SD are somewhat inconsistent. Non-intervention is seen as a major

failure and a betrayal against Spain, but at the same time as the only possible way to preserve

the European peace. The law against volunteers is described as possibly just being a new

deception and at the same time the only way to prevent fascist intervention. The conflict in

Spain is seen as an invasion by Germany and Italy, and their involvement is accused of

‘violating public law.’ Non-intervention was, however, a legitimate attempt to prevent war, and

had it been effective it would have resulted in a democratic victory in Spain.  It is the fascist 39

participation and duplicity that makes non-intervention impossible to defend, and fascist

participation in the new controls means that banning volunteers will probably have little effect.  40

On 22 February a translation of French socialist Jean Zyromski is published, where the new ban

on volunteers is discussed as a new possible deception, pointing to the fact that troops already

present in Spain will remain, and thus continuing to benefit fascism. He argues that the new

laws are directly targeting volunteers for the republicans, and that English and French policy of

surrendering Spain to the fascists is a ‘knock-down on the organic perception of peace.’  41

However, Swedish adoption of the law is not disputed by SD, as it is argued by the editor Zeth

Höglund to be the most acceptable policy in trying to preserve the peace. This legitimises the

absurd paradox in punishing volunteers, as individual right has to be pushed aside.  On 26 42

February SD publishes a speech by Georg Branting, where he points out the flaws of the new

agreements, arguing that it originates from a situation too contrarious, and that the war is too

vigorous for a real agreement. He argues that a ban on volunteers should be unnecessary, since

Germans and Italians in Spain are regular troops ordered there, in breech of the first agreement,

�25

� ‘Frivilligförbudet för spanska kriget’, DN, 4 March 1937, p.338

� Z. Höglund, ’Ett stort försöks misslyckande’, SD, 14 February 1937, p.339

� Z. Höglund, ’Frankrike har talat’, SD, 19 February 1937, p.340

� ‘“Frivillig”-förbudet ett nytt bedrägeri?’, SD, 22 February 1937, p.441

� Z. Höglund, ’Sverige och Spanien’, SD, 23 February 1937, p.342

and that the new law thus only targets the ‘true’ volunteers. He describes the imprisonment of

volunteers as ‘something monstrous and damaging to the justice system,’ but is still of the

opinion that Sweden does not have a choice but following the directives of the great European

powers.  Generally, SD agrees with the government and the committee of foreign affairs, in that 43

the new law has to be implemented to effectively prevent fascist intervention in Spain, and that

this will secure the peace in Europe and hopefully also result in a republican victory in Spain.

For this cause, ‘the rights of the individual are of inferior importance.’  44

!Arbetaren

Arbetaren consistently argues against the new law and any Swedish participation in the non-

intervention pact. The non-intervention pact is seen as a betrayal against the Spanish democracy

and especially the Spanish working class, and a result of English imperialist ambitions and fear

of socialism.  The blockade by England and France in the light of German and Italian aid to the 45

fascists is harshly described as ‘a political farce.’  European Social-Democracy is blamed for 46

betraying the socialist cause and the Spanish workers by succumbing to this policy,  and 47

Sweden is branded as an ‘English lackey.’  Thus, while other argue that Sweden cannot 48

conduct a foreign policy independent of the English, Arbetaren merely concludes that this is the

foreign policy of today, but maintains that Sweden can be independent, should it choose to

discard English imperialist ambitions.  The preservation of peace as a reason for the non-49

intervention pact is disputed,  seen merely as a way of justifying this attack against the Spanish 50

socialist proletariat, and argued to be a policy promoting war, not preventing it.  Arbetaren thus 51

opposes the new law vigorously, arguing that it will not only be ineffective, but also a

�26

� ‘Fascisternas falskspel med Spanien måste bringas att upphöra’, SD, 26 February 1937, p.843

� Z. Höglund, ‘Spanien inför riksdagen’, SD, 4 March 1937, p.344

� ’Skojet kring noninterventionen’, Arbetaren, 24 February 1937, p.445

� ‘Demokratins ynkedom och falskspel’, Arbetaren, 20 February 1937, p.346

� ‘Demokratins ynkedom och falskspel’, Arbetaren, 20 February 1937, p.3; ’Lysande socialdemokratisk 47

seger’, Arbetaren, 23 February 1937, p.3; ‘Utrikesutskottets officiella hyckleri’, Arbetaren, 3 March 1937, p.3

� ‘Svensk lag bestraffar kampen mot fascismen’, Arbetaren, 5 March 1937, p.348

� Ibid.49

� ‘Utrikesutskottets officiella hyckleri’, Arbetaren, 3 March 1937, p.350

� ’Lysande socialdemokratisk seger’, Arbetaren, 23 February 1937, p.351

continuation of a policy benefitting fascism.  Legal actions against volunteers in Spain are 52

described as ‘democracies criminalising the defence of democracy,’ leading to a ‘fascistisation’

of society.  53

!Ny Dag

ND is critical of the way the non-intervention policy has resulted in fascist advances in Spain.

There is not much argumentation regarding the law, except for the published Riksdag addresses

by Hagberg. On 23 February, however, the paper joins the discussion with DN with the quote by

Svenska Morgonbladet and DN’s remark that German and Italian participation in the new

agreement means that Franco has received enough material aid to win. ND adds to these quotes

that Germany and Italy have possibly underestimated Spanish resistance.  The paper seems to 54

be convinced that as long as fascist intervention is stopped, the legal regime in Spain will be

victorious, using this as argument for their support of the new law. This is the underlying

message in Hagberg’s speeches published in ND.  The argumentation by ND thus rests almost 55

completely on the argumentation by the SKP in the Riksdag, making the communist

contributions to the public and political political debates virtually identical.

�27

� ‘Utrikesutskottets officiella hyckleri’, Arbetaren, 3 March 1937, p.352

� ’Demokratin kriminaliserar försvaret för demokratin’, Arbetaren, 27 February 1937, p.353

� ‘Pressfronten’, ND, 23 February 1937, p.254

� ‘Remissdebatt om de frivilliga till Spanien’, ND, 23 February 1937, front page & p.3; ‘Hilding Hagbergs 55

deklaration om kommunisternas ställning’, ND, 4 March 1937, front page, p.4 & back page

CHAPTER 4!DIGGING MORE, DIGGING DEEPER!!Complementing Social-Democratic press!

Fackföreningsrörelsen (transl: The Trade Union Movement) was published by the trade union

umbrella organisation LO, which at the time consisted of 840 000 members,  making up over 1

20% of the around 4 million citizens.  This, along with the very close ties between LO and SAP 2

in organisation, membership and economic support, makes the magazine relevant for study, as

LO was essentially an extension of SAP in the industrial sector.  Fackföreningsrörelsen 3

published around the time of this new law, on 12 March, one piece regarding the international

situation in Spain and Sweden’s part in it, with the translated title ‘Sweden and the non-

intervention.’ It offers a hindsight explanation of the international situation and the adoption of

the law. There is a clear sympathy expressed towards the republican side in Spain, but also for

the new law. It is argued that, since the non-intervention policy has been a failure, rigorous

controls are needed in order to ‘save the peace,’ but also that controls cannot be implemented

without national bans on volunteers. The control measures are described as receiving all-out

public support, while the ban on volunteered conscription is recognised as a contentious issue. It

is admitted that it violates international law praxis and and that imprisoning volunteers is

unsympathetic, sentiments that the government, the committee of foreign affairs and the

Riksdag are described to share. However, it is still argued to be the ‘least evil option,’ and

unavoidable in the quest to preserve a state of peace. It is also argued to be a rather harmless law

in Sweden, since the small number of Swedish volunteers cannot be compared to the masked

intervention conducted by Germany and Italy, which is now believed to end. The article ends

with the analysis that ‘against the current international background the approved law can now be

greeted with satisfaction as part of a big collective peace action.’  4

�28

� ‘Medlemmar LO åren 1899 - 2012, LO <http://www.lo.se/start/lo_fakta/medlemmar_lo_aren_1899_2012> 1

[accessed 3 January 2014]

� ‘Historical statistics of Sweden, part 1: population 1720-1967’, 2nd edition (Stockholm: National Central 2

Bureau of Statistics, 1969), p.47

� ‘LO’, Nationalencyklopedien <http://www.ne.se/lang/lo/243827> [accessed 3 January 2014] (para.3)3

� O. Wangson, ‘Sverige och noninterventionen’, Fackföreningsrörelsen, no.10, 12 March 1937, published 4

collection, pp. 269-271

!Fackföreningsrörelsen’s article thus reinforces the notion of a Swedish identity as a responsible

peace keeper, ready to make uncomfortable sacrifices in order to prevent a war. It is notable that

nothing regarding the issue of the law being virtually forced on a Sweden unable to do anything

but comply is mentioned. This gives further insight into the problem that Swedish Social-

Democracy faced, as it was forced to justify to its members the introduction of a policy that

conflicted with its own supposedly ideological standpoints.

!Investigating the sources employed!

Structure and ownership of the newspapers studied

Sven Tollin provides, in his work Svensk Dagspress 1900-1967, circulation figures for the

newspapers studied. There are no figures presented for the year 1937, with the closest years

being 1935 or 1940. Dagens Nyheter was the largest newspaper of the ones studied, with a daily

circulation of 144.200 in 1940, closely followed by Aftonbladet with 135.000 the same year.

The other newspapers, chosen more for their ideological representation and importance in

formation of opinion, are significantly smaller. Svenska Dagbladet counted 72.100 in 1935.

Social-Demokraten, as a party newspaper, reached in 1940 the circulation figure 45.000,

followed by Ny Dag with 26.400 and Arbetaren with 11.000 in 1935.  The sample of 5

newspapers used can therefore be seen as fairly representative. With a total circulation figure of

almost 500.000, these papers are the biggest representatives of their respective ideologies. The

newspapers are very similar in structure, irregardless of size or party allegiances. Even party

papers strove to not only provide a voice in political debates, but also to be ‘all-round organs of

news, commentary, culture and entertainment.’   Thus, there is, despite the enormous differences 6

in terms of size, no structural difference between e.g. Dagens Nyheter and Arbetaren.

Aftonbladet, the exception in terms of structure, was the first, and at this point only, evening

newspaper in Sweden, apparent in the reporting on the 3 March debate in the Riksdag, which is

not as extensive as in the other newspapers. Another factor is the complete restructure of the

�29

� S. Tollin, Svensk Dagspress 1900-1967: en systematisk och kommenterad kartläggning (Stockholm: TU’s 5

förlag, 1967), pp.9, 11, 23, 77, 95, 101

� K.E. Gustafsson & S. Hadenius, Swedish Press Policy, translated by: Charly Hultén (Stockholm: Stellan 6

Stål Tryck, 1976), p.34

paper in a more commercial direction. In 1932, the magnate Torsten Kreuger’s new ownership

made Aftonbladet change its profile, which resulted in a drastic reduce in political reporting and

argumentative pieces.  There was no ambition to cover the entire news field, but instead to 7

specialise in certain features, and news coverage was what Gustafsson and Hadenius describe as

‘highly selective, sensational and “human-interest” stories taking priority.’  Politically, 8

Aftonbladet was at this time liberal, having made a journey back to a more liberal stance since

1932 after being highly conservative, supporting the liberals and acting like a party newspaper

in the 1936 Riksdag election.  Conservative traits remained, however, with it being particularly 9

German-friendly compared to other liberal newspapers,  and Hadenius concludes that it was 10

firmly against any Swedes volunteering for the republican side in Spain.  Dagens Nyheter was 11

the largest morning paper in Sweden, enjoying rapid expansion during the inter-war period. It

maintained a distinctly liberal stance, and was, at least during World War 2, very government

orientated.  Considering the liberal element in the Hansson government, it might be fair to 12

conclude that the paper was reservedly positive towards it in some aspects, something the

sources employed in this investigation would support. In terms of political alignment, Svenska

Dagbladet has, since its founding, been openly supportive of the conservatives, and in particular

Högerpartiet.  It was founded out of political reasons, to provide a non-compromising 13

conservative voice to the public debate.  Owned in 1937 by the magnate family Trygger, there 14

were many calls within SvD and amongst the conservatives to make the newspaper an official

party paper.  Arbetaren’s political alignment can hardly be questioned, as the newspaper is 15

owned by the syndicalist trade union organisation SAC, and has since its founding been a

�30

� ‘Aftonbladet’, Nationalencyklopedien <http://www.ne.se/lang/aftonbladet> [accessed 7 January 2014] 7

(para.2)

� Gustafsson & Hadenius, Swedish Press Policy, p.378

� S. Hadenius, ‘Medelsvenssons tidning’, G. Fredriksson, D. Strand, S. Hadenius, K.E. Gustafsson (eds.) 9

Aftonbladet- en svensk historia (Stockholm: Tidens Förlag, 1980), p.297

� ‘Aftonbladet’, Nationalencyklopedien <http://www.ne.se/lang/aftonbladet> [accessed 7 January 2014] 10

(para.2)

� Hadenius, ‘Medelsvenssons tidning’, p.30611

� ‘Dagens Nyheter’, Nationalencyklopedien <http://www.ne.se/lang/dagens-nyheter> [accessed 9 January 12

2014] (para.3)

� Gustafsson & Hadenius, Swedish Press Policy, p.3413

� L. Furhoff & H. Hederberg, Dagspressen i Sverige, 2nd edition (Stockholm: Aldus/Bonniers, 1968), p.8514

� ‘Svenska Dagbladet’, Nationalencyklopedien <http://www.ne.se/lang/svenska-dagbladet> [accessed 3 15

February 2014] (para.3)

particularly strong voice in issues regarding totalitarian regimes.  There is thus not a close 16

connection between Arbetaren and any party in the Riksdag, but the somewhat close ideological

bond with SP and their shared role as left-wing opposition to the Social-Democratic regime

make them, in this investigation, comparable. An obvious political alignment is also the case for

Social-Demokraten. With previous big names, like August Palm and former Prime Minister

Hjalmar Branting as chief editors, the paper enjoyed substantial influence on the development

of the Swedish labour movement, which continued under the editorship of Zeth Höglund, a

deputy for the SAP in the Riksdag himself.  Ny Dag, as the party paper for SKP, was highly 17

influenced not only by the party, but in extension also by the Soviet Union,  18

!The political role of newspapers in Sweden

After having become ‘mass’ media after the turn of the century, newspapers in Sweden kept

playing an important role in the pre-WW2 era. Their political role had increased greatly during

the first world war, and the inter-war period saw little change in this. From a party point of view,

not only the argumentative opinion pieces in the newspapers were important, but also the

selection and the presentation of news. Gustafsson and Hadenius conclude that it was seemingly

‘impossible for a party to exist without the support of a press in the form of news coverage and

concurring editorial opinion,’  making it evident that the press was very important in domestic 19

policies. These ties between a party and the press differed somewhat in the political spectrum.

There were strong political, organisational and economic ties between the SAP and its press,

making the social-democratic newspapers essentially an extension of the movement, whereas

the bourgeois press was usually more independent, being not only political tools, but also

commercial ventures by individual entrepreneurs.  It has thus often been argued that left-wing 20

newspapers were more politicised than the non-socialist press. However, it seems evident that,

despite the perhaps closer organisational and economic ties, the degree of party loyalty amongst

�31

� ‘Arbetaren’, Nationalencyklopedien <http://www.ne.se/lang/arbetaren> [accessed 3 February 2014] 16

(para.1-2)

� ‘Social-Demokraten’, Nationalencyklopedien <http://www.ne.se/lang/social-demokraten> [accessed 3 17

February 2014] (para.1)

� ‘Ny Dag’, Nationalencyklopedien <http://www.ne.se/ny-dag> [accessed 3 February 2014] (para.1)18

� Gustafsson & Hadenius, Swedish Press Policy, p.3519

� Gustafsson & Hadenius, Swedish Press Policy, p.3420

the left-wing press was not any greater than that of the right-wing press, be it to a party or a

political outlook.  21

!Newspapers and parties

Hadenius argues that the strong links between the political system and the press in Sweden is

unique, and that ties between newspapers and political parties are closer than in any other

democracies.  This political allegiance of the newspapers is evident in this investigation, as the 22

arguments employed by the newspapers strongly correlate to the arguments employed by

deputies in the Riksdag sharing the papers’ ideological views. The communists in the Riksdag

put emphasis on the positive results of the law for Spain, as this would prevent further fascist

intervention, as did ND. In fact, considering the extremely judgemental tone in ND’s reporting

on the debates (especially regarding SP deputies’ addresses), as well as the fact that Hagberg’s

address was published in its entirety and expanded on, one can rather easily conclude that the

bond between Ny Dag and SKP was so strong that they were for all intense and purposes

inseparable, i.e. in the case of the communists, there is very little, if any, distinction between the

public and the political in the debate regarding the law. The socialist deputies, as well as the

syndicalist Arbetaren argued that the law shouldn’t be passed, first of all because it was believed

not to be an effective tool in preserving the peace, but above all because it constituted a betrayal

against the legal Spanish workers’ regime. SD employed the arguments by the SAP in the

Riksdag (or, considering the high status of the chief editor Zeth Höglund, perhaps it influenced

the deputies more than they influenced the paper) in that the law, unfortunately, has to be

passed, despite the uncertainty regarding its effect, both in securing the peace and in helping the

legal Spanish regime. DN put, with the liberal deputies in the Riksdag, the greatest emphasis on

the need for Sweden to participate in this international initiative to preserve the peace. The fate

of Spain is given a smaller role, argued to be a lost cause and subordinated to the interest of

peace. Aftonbladet, despite its liberal stance, acts in this question more like a conservative

paper, and its reporting and argumentation is more similar to SvD and the conservative deputies

than to DN and the liberals. SvD and Aftonbladet did, like the conservatives in the Riksdag, not

participate as frequently as the representatives of the other ideologies, but when they did they

�32

� Ibid. p.3621

� Hadenius, Concentration of ownership, p.1122

were positive towards a ban on volunteers, not only for preserving the peace, but also because

Swedish voluntary conscription was seen as problematic, due to the analysis of the conflict as

one between two equally horrible adversaries.

!Difference between political and public debates

There are differences in the public and the political debates. The most apparent one is the issue

of Swedish independence. In the Riksdag debates, most deputies arguing for the approval of the

law did so on a basis of, or at least touched upon, Sweden being incapable of conducting its own

foreign policy independent of the larger European states, and that not adopting the law would be

an expression of this. This was not as commonly mentioned in the press, but instead the positive

aspects of international cooperation was emphasised in the opinion pieces. There can be some

speculation into why that was the case. Either the emphasis on Swedish dependence

internationally and its ‘tied hands’ was just an argument adopted in order to persuade the

Riksdag to pass the law. Or it was a direct reason for supporting it, and thus expressed in the

Riksdag, but an argument that would be rather unpopular with the public, and thus toned down

in favour of the speculated benefits for Spain and especially the need to protect the peace. It is

notable that declarations of Swedish inability to act independently came not only from those

positive towards the law, but also from the socialist opposition and the SAP dissidents. Thus, it

can easily be assumed that this inconsistency regarding Swedish dependency in the political and

the public debates was a result of the unpopularity of that argument amongst the public. It is not

a illogical assumption to make, that Riksdag deputies are more susceptible to unpopular, but still

valid, arguments than the general public, which is unburdened by the responsibilities of

rulership. Thus, there are different Swedish identities being constructed in the political and the

public arena by those arguing for the introduction of a ban on volunteers. On the one hand, the

role of Sweden as an international team player, protecting the peace and supporting a Spanish

pacification is in somewhat contrast to the role of Sweden as a lap dog to its European allies.

�33

CHAPTER 5!CONCLUSION!!Summary!

The sources employed in this investigation have presented a large number of arguments

regarding the law to ban Swedish voluntary conscription to the civil war in Spain, as well as

views concerning the policy of non-intervention in general. Although previous historiography

has touched briefly on the introduction of the law, a deeper understanding of this contentious

issue was lacking. It was described as yet another step in the, often sharply criticised, non-

intervention, whereas the basis of this dissertation is that it is distinctly different from the other

initiatives regarding the Spanish civil war, as it was a legislation that only concerned Swedish

citizens, resulting in an indisputable restriction on Swedes’ democratic rights. The parliamentary

debates regarding the law were highly influenced by perceptions regarding the non-intervention

pact in general, the fate of Spain and the international tensions. Several arguments for passing

this law were in put forward, but the main arguments can be summed up in three points. Firstly,

it was argued that this was a necessary step to prevent the Spanish conflict to turn into a

European conflict. Secondly, the fate of Spain was argued to be dependent on ending German

and Italian disguised intervention, which could only be obtained through full participation.

These are derived from a perspective that the non-intervention had to be continued, and that its

failure so far, instead of being just cause for an abandonment, necessitates an extension as well

as control measures to ensure its implementation. The third, and perhaps most crucial, reason

for adopting the law is the issue of Swedish independence in foreign policy. It is argued that it is

impossible for Sweden to conduct a successful foreign policy independent from especially Great

Britain and France, and that these powers’ determination to continue a policy of non-

intervention leaves Sweden with little choice but to follow suit. The law would arguably not

create a precedent for future conflicts, as it directly addressed the civil war in Spain, and even if

it did, the democratic rights of Swedish citizens to volunteer was a small price to pay for to

preserve the peace. Although the three main arguments were contested, in some cases even by

deputies who in the end voted for the law, the issue of Swedish independence seems the the

most convincing to many of them. The arguments regarding the Spanish people benefitting from

�34

a ban on voluntary conscription and the protection that this law would provide to the peace were

rather easily countered by the fact that there were already enough regular troops on the rebels’

side to win the war for Franco and the justified concern that fascist duplicity regarding Spain

would continue. The issue of Swedish independence, however, was an argument not as easily

discarded. Thus, many critical of the law due to its uncertain effects for Spain and the peace,

with some even arguing that it was directly damaging to the Spanish democratic regime and

threatening the peace, still described it as an inevitable measure to take. And although some

calls were made for Sweden to, while participating, attempt to influence the non-intervention

policy from inside the committee, even these prospects were lowered.

!The newspaper reporting of the passing of the law, and the opinion pieces regarding it, were

highly influenced by the newspapers’ different ideology or party belonging. There was a strong

similarity between the arguments employed by the Riksdag deputies and the newspapers sharing

their ideologies. Any distinction between the level of conformity amongst the newspapers to the

parties in the Riksdag hard to distinguish, all having strong political ties. However, the most

bearing argument in the Riksdag, the issue of Swedish dependency and international

responsibility, did not find the same resonance in the public debate. It was rather toned down in

favour of other arguments, and especially the need to preserve the peace and the non-

intervention pact as the only means of doing so.

!Answering the question!

From the sources employed, it is very hard to determine the one single, bearing argument for

why the Riksdag should pass the law banning voluntary conscription to the civil war in Spain.

Surely, the fear of another world war forced some deputies to put their faith in the policy of non-

intervention, thus surrendering to the extension of it in the light of its failure. This seems a more

plausible reason than the argued benefits for the Spanish legal regime. The calls for an end to

fascist intervention were widespread, but many were sceptic towards the argument that

preventing Swedish volunteers from conscription would prevent German and Italian troops from

being deployed to Spain. It seems evident that the future of Spain was of secondary importance

compared to the protection of peace. The most coherent argument employed in the Riksdag for

�35

passing the law was simply that there existed no other viable option for Sweden. The French

and British dedication to non-intervention seemed to the Swedish Riksdag deputies as evidence

that they could not deviate from that policy without setting out on a foreign policy of their own.

In terms of international affairs, the power dynamics in Europe and how it was expressed during

the Spanish Civil War, there was a collective self-perception regarding Sweden that it was too

small of a country to shape its own foreign policy. This was agreed on by deputies arguing for

the positive aspects of the proposed law, as well as many deputies arguing for the law’s

damaging effect in Spain and inability to preserve peace. If there was a political consensus in

the Riksdag that Sweden had to pass the law in order to follow Britain and France, there does

not seem to be a public consensus. That particular argument was not as frequently used by those

arguing for the law in the newspapers studied, but instead more frequently used to slander the

government in the opinion pieces arguing against it. This seems to suggest that the newspapers

studied are perhaps not reflecting public opinion in Sweden, but should be seen more as an

extension of Swedish party politics. In the public arena, it was recognised that arguing for the

law on the basis of dependency would not provide any widespread public support. Instead, the

need to stop fascist intervention, and in particular protecting the peace, was used to persuade the

public.

This gives rather conflicting accounts on the issue of Swedish identity. On the one hand, the

Riksdag deputies’ addresses support the notion of Sweden as an international team player, who

should not, or even cannot, deviate from the internationally agreed on course of action. This

identity is adopted in two different aspects; Sweden as a responsible actor in foreign affairs,

conscious of the fact that a deviation from the agreed policy of non-intervention could cause

international unrest, and Sweden as such an insignificant voice in the international community,

unable to stand on its own, and therefore dependent on adopting a given set of foreign policies.

On the other hand, the newspapers studied paint a different image of Swedish identity. It varies

with the newspapers’ ideological belonging, but there is still some coherency. The identity of

Sweden as internationally very dependent on Great Britain and France is toned down, in favour

of the image of Sweden as an ardent defender of democracy and peace. The introduction of the

law is described as a result of this, and especially as a result of Sweden being ready to make

sacrifices for the sake of peace. But there is also a stronger emphasis on the Swedish will to aid

the Spanish people against fascism than there is in the Riksdag debates. A somewhat crass

�36

analysis may argue that the diminished role of the Riksdag would be enough to explain why it

ultimately passed the law proposed by the government, as it seems fairly evident that it was not,

like Social-Demokraten wrote, because the preservation of peace united the deputies. It is, from

the sources employed in this investigation, difficult to ascertain why the government agreed to

propose the law. However, the investigation successfully manages to paint a picture of the

means employed to justified it. The main arguments used, especially in the public debate, were

the appeal to the population’s sympathy towards the Spanish legal regime and especially the

articulation of the threat of a new world war escalating from the Spanish conflict. The

discrepancies between the public and the political were apparent, in that the Riksdag deputies

were more exposed to arguments of Swedish dependency in foreign policy and inability to act

on its own initiative. The constructivist approach employed in this investigation, then,

successfully identifies different notions of Swedish identity, even if the sources fail to fully shed

light on the reasoning behind the government’s proposal.

!Reliability of the sources employed!

The Riksdag debates studied need perhaps be touched upon in terms of their value as a

historical source. There are several limitations to studying the minutes. The most apparent one is

that the deputies in the Riksdag’s two chambers, numbering at a total of 380, are only

represented in the records by a mere 22 deputies making addresses. We do not know how the

358 silent deputies justified their votes, or if they shared the views expressed in the chambers.

However, considering it is the nature of the debate and the arguments employed in it that are the

focus of this investigation, that need not be completely discrediting. These silent deputies were,

despite the fact that they voted, not participants in the political debate, and can, in their

passivity, be regarded as represented by those who did participate. In terms of the addresses

delivered, there is naturally an element of uncertainty as to the honesty of the speakers. Since

opposing the party line too radically could lead to expulsion, and considering the news coverage

of the debates, one must perhaps take into account that not all deputies felt comfortable

speaking their mind. The deputies who opted for passing of the law had a very clear agenda in

making their addresses, namely to convince the Riksdag to approve of an international initiative

to which the government had already pledged itself. As an example, it is, in the issue of Spain’s

�37

future striking that deputies arguing both for and against this new law employ the argument of a

Spanish defeat over fascism. One must then ask the question whether members of the Vougt

school on the one hand, and the Branting and Kilbom schools on the other, all believe that their

proposals will benefit Spain. Given the apparent agreement among the Branting and Kilbom

schools that non-intervention in practice is beneficial to the fascist cause, along with the

admission from some Vougt school deputies that the future of Spain is of secondary importance,

the arguments made in favour of the law relating to the expected benefits it will provide Spain

must be seen as somewhat questionable in terms of honesty. This recognised problem

necessarily has to be taken into consideration in any conclusion. The investigation has, because

of this, sought to analyse which issues that stood out as the most important to the different

schools, and in this way trying to assert some degree of honesty around those. Thus, the

arguments employed by those deputies regarding the benefit for Spain, the preservation of

peace, the continuity of neutrality and the Swedish international responsibility lose some

credibility over the arguments against the law, in that they might not be genuine expectations.

One might expect that without the directive from the non-intervention committee and the

premature pledge by the Swedish government, the law proposal might not have received the

same amount of support.

The tendencies of the newspapers studied in this investigation to conform to party opinion and

ideology does constitute a problem. These very close ties, along with the important political role

assigned to newspapers, force a questioning of their reliability as indicators of popular opinion.

Was the general public as concerned with a possible international escalation of the Spanish

conflict as the Riksdag deputies and newspaper editors? Did it believe that the European peace

was dependent on this extension of the non-intervention, despite it frequently being denounced

as ineffective? While it is, through this investigation, impossible to tell, it seems fairly evident

that the newspaper editors were close to the political representatives of their ideology, perhaps

closer than they were to their readership, thus writing from an inside perspective rather than

from that of the general public. The most apparent case of this would be the chief editor of

Social-Demokraten Zeth Höglund, who was also a deputy in the Second Chamber of the

Riksdag. If this is the case, one might argue that it discredits the use of newspapers in this

investigation entirely. However, if the newspapers studied are not suitable representatives of the

sentiments of the Swedish public, then they are still valuable sources as extensions of the parties

�38

or ideologies in the public arena. Moreover, it is not unrealistic to assume that the newspapers

balanced these two roles simultaneously, speaking on behalf of the movement to the public as

creators of public opinion while also representing the public in its relationship to its

representatives. Differentiating between actual opinion and justification in the arguments drawn

up in chapters 2 and 3 is possible to some extent, by looking at the discrepancies between the

public and the political, which gives insight into especially the issue of Swedish international

responsibility and dependency.

!Limitations and possible remedies!

As some deputies in the Riksdag brought up, there might be reason to suspect an element of

inconsistency in Swedish public and political opinion regarding voluntary conscription. Further

studies on the attitudes towards volunteers could be conducted by comparing the Spanish Civil

War with the civil war in Finland, or for that matter, the Finnish Winter War. In both of these

conflicts, the number of volunteers greatly exceeded those who left to fight for Spain.

Comparing the attitude towards volunteers in Sweden across time and in different conflicts

could perhaps bring clarity into several issues, e.g. to what extent arguments against volunteers

were based on ideologic sympathies, or to what extent superpower politics affected Swedish

attitudes to volunteers. However, further investigations confined to the specific conflict in Spain

would also be needed. Besides covering wider aspects, using more newspapers in order to

identify possible deviations within ideological labels, studies regarding the internal conflict

within SAP, and how attempts were made to reconcile political sympathies with international

responsibility would be especially useful. The failure of this investigation to conclude why the

Riksdag ultimately passed the law, and especially why the government chose to present it to the

riksdag, justifies a deeper analysis of these parliamentary bodies. This would perhaps

necessitate studying material that do not suffer the same limitations as documents that are

argumentative in nature, as newspapers and parliamentary documents. Correspondence between

the main actors, meeting minutes, and to some extent also journals, could perhaps shed a light

on the underlying reasons behind the proposal, answering the question whether the government

proposed it simply because it felt obliged to, because it believed in it benefitting the peace cause

and Spain’s legal regime, or because of an ideological fear of the communist elements in Spain.

�39

BIBLIOGRAPHY!!Primary Sources!

• Daily Newspapers

• Aftonbladet

• ‘Dagens huvudnummer i riksdagen: Ström och Branting skeptiska mot Spanien-lagen’,

24 February 1937, front page

• ‘Fransk misstro mot Italiens neutralitet’, 7 March 1937, p.3

• ‘Straff även för försök till Spanienvärvning’, 22 February 1937, p.9

• ‘Svenskt förbud väntas’, 20 February 1937, front page

• ‘Svårt att hindra folk landstiga i Spanien’, 3 March 1937, p.8

• Arbetaren

• ‘Demokratin kriminaliserar försvaret för demokratin’, 27 February 1937, p.3

• ‘Demokratins ynkedom och falskspel’, 20 February 1937, p.3

• ‘Dynamiteros slå tyskarna på flykten’, 20 February 1937, front page & back page

• ‘Frivilligspärren nu ett faktum’, 4 March 1937, front page & p.4

• ‘Förbud mot frivilliga till Spanien’, 22 February 1937, p.4

• ‘Lysande socialdemokratisk seger’, 23 February 1937, p.3

• ‘Nytt bluffspel i Spanska frågan’, 25 February 1937, front page

• ‘Propositionen om Spanien bordlagd’, 23 February 1937, front page

• ‘Skojet kring noninterventionen’, 24 February 1937, p.4

• ‘Spanska lagen tillstyrkes i utskott’, 2 March 1937, front page & back page

• ‘Svensk lag bestraffar kampen mot fascismen’, 5 March 1937, p.3

• ‘Utrikesutskottets officiella hyckleri’, 3 March 1937, p.3

• Dagens Nyheter (DN)

• ‘Fredsverket kring Spanien’, 22 February 1937, p.3

• ‘Frivilliga skola hejdas vid gränsen’, 16 February 1937, p.6

• ‘Frivilligförbudet för spanska kriget’, 4 March 1937, p.3

• ‘Förslaget om Spanien bordlagt av kamrarna’, 23 February 1937, p.9

• ‘Lagen om frivilliga antogs av riksdagen’, 4 March 1937, p.11

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• ‘Pressgrannar’, 19 February 1937, p.3

• ‘Pressgrannar’, 23 February 1937, p.3

• ‘Pressgrannar’, 28 February 1937, p.3

• ‘Pressgrannar’, 3 March 1937, p.3

• ‘Proposition om ny lag på måndag’, 21 February 1937, front page & back page

• ‘Riksdagsbehandlingen av förbudet’, 24 February 1937, p.3

• ‘Utrikesfrågorna’, 21 February 1937, p.2

• Ny Dag (ND)

• ‘Förbudslag mot frivilligas resa till Spanien’, 22 February 1937, front page

• ‘Hilding Hagbergs deklaration om kommunisternas ställning’, 4 March 1937, front

page; p.4; back page

• ‘Kontrollplanen mot interventionen i Spanien har antagits’, 4 March 1937, front page;

p.4; back page

• ‘Pressfronten’, 23 February 1937, p.2

• ‘Remissdebatt om de frivilliga till Spanien’, 23 February 1937, front page & p.3

• Social-Demokraten (SD)

• ‘Fascisternas falskspel med Spanien måste bringas att upphöra’, 25 February 1937, p.8

• ‘“frivillig”-förbudet ett nytt bedrägeri?’, 22 February 1937, p.4

• ‘Frivilligförbud nästa lördag’, 16 February 1937, p.6

• ‘Förbud mot frivilliga beslutat av riksdagen’, 4 March 1937, p.4

• Höglund, Zeth, ‘Ett stort försöks misslyckande’, 14 February 1937, p.3

• Höglund, Zeth, ‘Frankrike har talat’, 19 February 1937, p.3

• Höglund, Zeth, ‘Spanien inför riksdagen’, 4 March 1937, p.3

• Höglund, Zeth, ‘Sverige och Spanien’, 23 February 1937, p.3

• ‘Remissdebatt om frivilligförbudet’, 23 February 1937, p.5

• ‘Spanjorer och sjuka sjöfarande få passera’, 2 March 1937, p.4

• ‘Spanska kontrollen klar i riksdagen’, 4 March 1937, front page

• Svenska Dagbladet (SvD)

• ‘Inbördeskriget i Spanien’, 22 February 1937, p.4

• ‘Lagen mot frivilliga till spanska kriget antagen av riksdagen’, 4 March 1937, p.12

• ‘Lagförslaget mot frivilliga till Spanien’, 23 February 1937, p.12

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• ‘Oklart i Öster’, 23 February 1937, p.4

• ‘Plötsligt omslag i Londonkommittén vid måndagsmötet’, 16 February 1937, p.6

• ‘Spärren för frivilliga till Spanien’, 2 March 1937, p.4

• Riksdagsprotokollen (Riksdag documents) First chamber

• no. 13, 22 February 1937, B 261-263, pp. 8-10

• no. 14, 24 February 1937, B 264-265, pp. 2-3

• no. 16, 3 March 1937, B 260-289, pp. 8-31

• Riksdagsprotokollen (Riksdag documents) Second chamber

• no. 12, 22 February 1937, B 290-301, pp. 7-18

• no. 15, 3 March 1937, B 302-337, pp. 7-44

• Svenskt Författningssamling 1937, no. 61, pp. 167-168

• Wangson, Otto, ‘Sverige och noninterventionen’, Fackföreningsrörelsen, no.10, 12 March

1937, published collection, pp. 269-271

!Secondary Sources!

Printed Sources

• Andrén, Nils, Power-Balance and Non-Alignment: A Perspective on Swedish Foreign Policy

(Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells Boktryckeri, 1967)

• Balfour, Sebastian, ‘Spain from 1931 to the present’, Carr, Raymond (ed), Spain: A History

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp.243-282

• Beevor, Antony, Spanska Inbördeskriget, trans. Kjell Waltman (Lund: Historiska Media,

2008)

• Björk, Kaj, Spanien i Svenska Hjärtan (Stockholm: Bäckströms Förlag, 2001

• Carlomagno, Marcos Cantera, Sverige och Spanska Inbördeskriget (Lund: Historiska Media,

1999)

• CSN, ‘Historical Statistics of Sweden, part 1: population 1720-1967’, 2nd edition

(Stockholm: National Central Bureau of Statistics, 1969)

• Fierke, K. M, ‘Constructivism’, Dunne, Tim; Kurki, Milja; Smith, Steve (eds.) International

Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

2010), pp. 177-194

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• Furhoff, Lars & Hederberg, Hans, Dagspressen i Sverige, 2nd edition (Stockholm: Aldus/

Bonniers, 1968)

• Gustafsson, Karl Erik & Hadenius, Stig, Swedish Press Policy, trans. Charly Hultén

(Stockholm: Stellan Stål Tryck, 1976)

• Hadenius, Stig, Concentration of Ownership in the Swedish Newspaper Market, trans: Victor

Kayfetz (Dusseldorf: The European Institute for Media, 1993)

• Hadenius, Stig, ‘Medelsvenssons tidning’, Fredriksson, Gunnar; Strand, Dieter; Hadenius,

Stig; Gustafsson, Karl Erik (eds) Aftonbladet- en svensk historia (Stockholm: Tidens Förlag,

1980), pp. 221-340

• Hadenius, Stig, The Riksdag in Focus: Swedish History in a Parliamentary Perspective,

trans: Marie Clark Nelson (Arlöv: Berlings, 1997)

• Håstad, Elis, The Parliament of Sweden, trans: N.C.M. Elder (New Southgate: Chiswick

Press, 1957)

• Jändel, Richard, Kämpande Solidaritet: Möten med Svenska Spanienfrivilliga (Stockholm:

Arbetarrörelsens Arkiv och Bibliotek, 1996)

• Jönsson, Claes-Göran, Den Svenska Arbetarradikalismen och Spanska Inbördeskriget (Lund:

Arkiv för studier i arbetarrörelsens historia, 1977)

• Little, Douglas, Malevolent Neutrality: The United States, Great Britain, and the Origins of

the Spanish Civil War (London: Cornell University Press, 1985)

• Lundberg, Lennart, Svenskarna i Spanska Inbördeskriget 1936-1939 (Göteborg: Tre Bröders

Förlag, 2001)

• Moradiellos, Enrique, ‘The International Dimensions of the Spanish Civil War’, McDonough,

Frank (ed.) The Origins of the Second World War: An International Perspective (London:

Continuum, 2011), pp. 311-326

• Nilsson, Göte, Svenskar i Spanska Inbördeskriget (Stockholm: Nordstedt & Söners Förlag,

1972)

• Nyman, Olle, Parlamentarismen i Sverige: Huvuddragen av Utvecklingen efter 1917, 6th

edition (Stockholm: Rydahls Boktryckeri AB, 1966)

• Padelford, Norman, ‘The International Non-Intervention Agreement and the Spanish Civil

War’, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 31, No. 4 (1937), pp. 578-603

• Preston, Paul, The Spanish Civil War 1936-39 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1990)

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• Tollin, Sven, Svensk Dagspress 1900-1967: en systematisk och kommenterad kartläggning

(Stockholm: TU’s förlag, 1967)

!Internet Websites

• ‘Aftonbladet’, Nationalencyklopedien <http://www.ne.se/lang/aftonbladet> [accessed 7

January 2014]

• ‘Arbetaren’, Nationalencyklopedien <http://www.ne.se/lang/arbetaren> [accessed 3 February

2014]

• ‘Dagens Nyheter’, Nationalencyklopedien <http://www.ne.se/lang/dagens-nyheter> [accessed

9 January 2014]

• ‘LO’, Nationalencyklopedien <http://www.ne.se/lang/lo/243827> [accessed 3 January 2014]

• ‘Medlemmar LO åren 1899 - 2012, LO <http://www.lo.se/start/lo_fakta/

medlemmar_lo_aren_1899_2012> [accessed 3 January 2014]

• ‘Ny Dag’, Nationalencyklopedien <http://www.ne.se/ny-dag> [accessed 3 February 2014]

• ‘Social-Demokraten’, Nationalencyklopedien <http://www.ne.se/lang/social-demokraten>

[accessed 3 February 2014]

• ‘Svenska Dagbladet’, Nationalencyklopedien <http://www.ne.se/lang/svenska-dagbladet>

[accessed 3 February 2014]

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Appendix 1: The law passed on 3 March 1937!

Law concerning measures to prevent volunteers’ participation in the civil war in Spain etc.

(First 5 paragraphs)

1 § A Swedish citizen enlisting for service of war in Spain is punished with imprisonment for

a maximum of 6 months or heavy fines.

!2 § If one through gifts, payment or promise of compensation or in other ways, or through

threat or misuse of authority, prompt someone to enlist for service of war in Spain, it is punished

with imprisonment for a maximum of 6 moths or heavy fines.

!3 § Tickets for travel destined for Spain may only be sold to those who have received special

permission by the King or by a Ministry entrusted by the King with this task, or to those

foreigners able to provide evidence for having received permission by an authorised authority of

that state. Breaching this is punishable with heavy fines or imprisonment for a maximum of 6

moths.

!4 § In the matter of Swedish ships calling at Spain, it is the responsibility of the captain to

ensure that the ship does not carry anyone designated for Spain that does not have the

permissions mentioned in 3 §. It is also the responsibility of the captain to forbid, unhindered by

stipulations in the merchant shipping act and the working hours act, any crew members from

disembarking in Spain where duty does not demand it, as well as ensuring that any additional

passengers to not disembark in Spain without the permissions mentioned in 3 §. Neglecting

what is here ordained is punishable with heavy fines.

!5 § In the matter of Swedish ships calling at Spain, they will be obliged to call at certain

ports to pick up or put ashore specially appointed controllers. These controllers will be entitled

to accompany and examine cargo and passengers. The captain must also allow warships from

certain states to examine whether controllers are onboard.. Neglecting what is here ordained is

punishable with heavy fines.

Source: SFS - Svensk Författningssamling 1937, no.61, p.167

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