Yalta: 1945

Sean T. Flaherty

December 17, 2014

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The Yalta Agreement in 1945 is often cited as the cause of the Cold War. It was at this

meeting with the three most powerful leaders that the fate of millions was addressed. Winston

Churchill, Joseph Stalin and Franklin Delano Roosevelt all met in February 1945 to finalize

significant deliberations on the future of Europe and the Post war world. Sixty years later, in a

2005 speech at Riga, Latvia President Bush told an audience that the Yalta agreement caused

“one of the greatest wrongs in history.” This speech ignited a firestorm in the United States 1

between liberals and conservatives. In unusual fashion, both viewpoints were able to agree that

Eastern Europe was given away to Stalin, but they disagreed over how Eastern Europe became

the possession of the Russians. The Yalta Conference did complete the transition of Eastern 2

Europe to Russia. What lacks from the discussion is the agreements that preceded Yalta, the

letters of correspondence between FDR, Stalin and Churchill that discussed the future of Europe.

This essay will utilize documents between the leaders of the Big Three, and texts from previous

conferences to demonstrate that while Yalta is upheld as the event that defined the future of

Europe, it is not the cataclysmic event that many would like it to be. It was the single point in

time that formalized previous agreements. The agreement at the Yalta Conference in February

1945, which was promoted as a means to peace for the future, was the last time the three leaders

of the world met, and within one year, all the potential for peace was gone, ushering in the Cold

War.

1 Bumiller, Elisabeth. Bumiller, Elisabeth. "60 Years After the Fact, Debating Yalta All Over Again." The New York Times. The New York Times, 15 May 2005. Web. 13 Dec. 2014. <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/16/politics/16letter.html?_r=0&pagewanted=print>. 2 Ibid. “In the view of many conservatives, the dying Roosevelt did nothing less at Yalta than sell out Eastern Europe to

Soviet control for the next 50 years. In the view of liberals, including major historians, Roosevelt ceded Poland and parts of Eastern Europe to Stalin because the Red Army controlled the territory anyway, and Yalta changed no realities on the ground. Yalta also called for free elections in Poland, a call that Stalin later ignored.” Conservatives believed FDR gave Eastern Europe away to an oppressive Russia.

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Edward Reilly Stettinius, the Secretary of State under FDR wrote “Either through

diplomatic channels or at the Tehran Conference, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin had already

raised most of the questions that were to be discussed at Yalta.” Why then, did President Bush 3

declare Yalta “one of the greatest wrongs in history”? What brought about the new perspective

on Yalta? The simple answer is it is easier to blame the singular event then to address the

evolution of the discussions and ideas that occurred. Stettinius felt the need to defend the actions

taken at Yalta in his memoir on the event. He suggests that Yalta was important because it was

the first time the three leaders and their top lieutenants, along with foreign secretaries, all met

and finalized ideas that had been discussed for the previous few years. Stettinius was accurate

that Yalta was a key moment, but historians overlook the documents showing that Yalta was

really a signatory event in many ways, with verbal agreements for the future of Europe.

The Yalta Conference was a key event in history, that is not debatable. But it was only

one meeting in the midst of many between three leaders of the world. What must also be

addressed is that this meeting was built upon a solid foundation of work and discussion. Leaders

from across the world first needed to create a common language to discuss the issues of the day

and they also needed to develop a level of trust between the leaders and their respective

governments. Churchill and Roosevelt met aboard the U.S.S. Augusta in Placentia Bay,

Newfoundland where they talked, drank, and became friendly with each other. The two leaders

signed the Atlantic Charter in August 1941. This Atlantic Charter was a guiding document for

the two leaders, and in this document, eight points were determined to be the key aspects of the

3 Stettinius, Edward R. Roosevelt and the Russians; the Yalta Conference. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1949. 8.

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future of Europe, but it must be stated, this was an agreement only between the two

governments.

“Both countries agreed not to seek territorial expansion; to seek the

liberalization of international trade; to establish freedom of the

seas, and international labor, economic, and welfare standards.

Most importantly, both the United States and Great Britain were

committed to supporting the restoration of self­governments for all

countries that had been occupied during the war and allowing all

peoples to choose their own form of government” . 4

The Charter was non­binding, and was viewed as a guiding document. The meeting did allow

the leaders to prod each other over the future of Europe and to determine the future of the war.

At this meeting, the British pushed the U.S. to enter the war, and were disappointed when FDR

did not promise anything. On the other side, FDR wanted the British to guarantee that there

were no secret agreements altering borders in Europe as there had been in World War I. Years

later, on his return trip from Yalta, President Roosevelt was being interviewed and when asked

about a comment Churchill made that the Atlantic Charter “was not a rule, just a guide” FDR

responded : “The Atlantic Charter is a beautiful idea. When it was drawn up, the situation was

that England was about to lose the war. They needed hope, and it gave it to them. We have

improved the military situation since then at every chance, so that really you might say we have a

4 "The Atlantic Conference & Charter, 1941 ­ 1937–1945 ­ Milestones ­ Office of the Historian." The Atlantic Conference & Charter, 1941 ­ 1937–1945 ­ Milestones ­ Office of the Historian. Accessed December 12, 2014. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937­1945/atlantic­conf.

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much better chance of winning the war now than ever before.” The Atlantic Charter appears to 5

be a document designed to show Roosevelt and Churchill desired values to the world. The

document is quoted by each leader in nearly every conference regarding post war Europe. At the

Yalta Conference, Churchill would argue over the merits of the Atlantic Charter, (while not

attacking the Charter itself) when challenged over the British role of in the Empire or the British

role in Greece.

Roosevelt and Churchill met on other occasions along with meetings with Stalin and

Chiang Kai­Shek. These meetings were useful both to discuss significant realities in Europe and

the war, but also to develop a level of trust and respect that would enable a future where western

capitalist powers could work more closely. Churchill enjoyed studying FDR and his respect of

FDR was significant. Eighteen months after the Atlantic Charter, in January 1943, FDR and

Churchill met again at Casablanca where they agreed not to stop fighting until Germany

unconditionally surrendered. This meeting provided the “finalization of Allied strategic plans

against the Axis powers.” What was new at this meeting was the invitation sent to Stalin, but he 6

was unable to attend due to heavy fighting. The only time FDR met with Stalin was at Tehran

and Yalta, but Churchill visited Russia at least two more times, and dined with Stalin in his

private apartment. The meeting at Tehran in 1943 is when the U.S. finally gave the date to the 7

Soviets of the opening of the Second Front, something the Soviets had been requesting for some

5 Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Excerpts from the Press Conference Aboard the U.S.S. Quincy En Route From Yalta," February 23, 1945. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16589 6 "The Casablanca Conference, 1943 ­ 1937–1945 ­ Milestones ­ Office of the Historian." The Casablanca Conference, 1943 ­ 1937–1945 ­ Milestones ­ Office of the Historian. Accessed December 13, 2014. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937­1945/casablanca. 7 Dobbs, Michael. Six Months in 1945: FDR, Stalin, Churchill and Truman­­from World War to

Cold War. New York: Vintage, 2013, 47.

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time. Later in November 1943, FDR and Churchill met Chinese leader Chiang Kai­Shek at what

was called the Cairo Conference. This meeting did little more than agree to the role China would

have in post­war Asia. From the summer of 1943 on, the documentation between Chang Kai

Shek and FDR revolve around military supplies and supply lines through the region.

Each meeting addressed the post­war world. Whether it was about how to address

repatriation of soldiers and civilians, reparations due to victors, the borders of nations, or

creating a system for international cooperation in the post war world, the meetings were focused

on a wide variety of issues. Most meetings ended however with the agreements on principals,

with the promise to continue working and discussing.

While it appeared that neither Stalin nor Churchill cared about Eastern Europe, Stalin had

already determined that he was going to gain these lands. As early as 1941, former Secretary of

State Edward R. Stettinius reports, “Russian demands in the Balkans and elsewhere were

known.” When Anthony Eden, a confidant of Churchill and a member of the Foreign Office 8

visited Stalin in 1941 to determine what aid the Russians needed, Stalin “indicated that he was

less interested in military assistance than in a political alliance and in a territorial settlement

affecting Russia’s borders.” It should seem perplexing that Stalin, in 1941, before any Russian 9

gains had been made in the war, was already planning on a land grab at the conclusion of the

war.

Before the Yalta Agreement, the ideals of the Atlantic Charter had begun to fade in the

Prime Ministers memory. By 1944, the Russian soldiers were rapidly advancing across eastern

Europe altering the realities on the ground which called for the big three leaders to make

8 Stettinius, 9. 9 Stettinius, 9.

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decisions. In one of the faithful meetings between Churchill and Stalin in Moscow, in October

1944, Churchill described how he slid a piece of paper across the table with a list of countries

and percentages for the future of Eastern Europe. (Appendix A) This event strengthened the 10

relationship between the two leaders. They addressed a potentially significant issue in a

pragmatic way. Churchill wrote in his own memoirs “we had disposed of these issues, so fateful

to millions of people, in such an offhand manner” but Stalin was unmoved about the decision

and saw the usefulness in the agreement. While this event occurred before the Yalta 11

Conference, it goes to show the relationship between Stalin and Churchill and their views for the

future of Eastern Europe. The desires of the people whose lives were being altered were not

addressed, there was no vote or reflection of the principle of self­determination. It is a meeting

such as this that should be seen as the granting of permission by the west, for the Russians to do

as they wanted in Eastern Europe.

The United States take on Eastern Europe was announced on June 10, 1944, “the

government responsible for military actions in any country would make decisions which the

military situation required. This suggested that the United States was willing to accept certain 12

political arrangements, or governments, in any occupied nation in Europe, that was currently

controlled by a military of the Big Three. Some could see this statement of FDR as accepting

Soviet backed governments in certain Eastern European nations where the Soviets already had

control via their military. With these three opinions shared, it is easy to conclude that the fate of

Eastern Europe was determined prior to Yalta.

10 Dobbs, 48. 11 Dobbs, 48. 12 Stettinius, 11.

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While Yalta is where we believe many of the most important decisions about Eastern

Europe were determined, the decisions that arouse the greatest controversy were made prior to

the Yalta Conference. With the time that passed between each conference or discussion, the

decisions and discussions had time to percolate in the leaders minds and in to be analyzed by

each governments bureaucracy. With this time then, why is that at Yalta, there was not an

overhauling of ideas? Time had passed to reconsider and to place previous discussion into the

grand design for the future, but the leaders continued to move ahead. One reason was the

alteration of the relationships between the leaders. When the three leaders met for the Tehran

Conference, they lived together in the Soviet Embassy and they shared much more time together.

At Yalta however, the living quarters were miles apart, and meetings between the three leaders

rarely occured without an entourage which limited the personal connections found in earlier

gatherings. It was the third day when FDR and Churchill finally had a private meeting.

Churchill was bothered by the limited interactions, while FDR needed the space to allow himself

rest.

Actions and words of Roosevelt suggest that he grew tired of his British counterpart.

Churchills concern about the British Empire or British sovereignty arose on several occasions

irritating President Roosevelt and adding promise to Stalin's plans for Eastern Europe. On the

6th day of the Yalta Conference, Secretary of State Edward Stettinius was briefing the world

leaders about negotiations between the foreign ministers on the topic of the United Nations and

voting power. Churchill cut off Stettinius, stating “Under no circumstances, , . would he ever

consent to the fumbling fingers of forty or fifty nations prying into the life’s existence of the

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British Empire.” In another scenario addressing the French Indo­China, Roosevelt was seeking 13

plans from other leaders about the future leadership of the nation. Roosevelt had asked if the

Chinese were interested to which they replied in the negative, “because its people and the

country as a whole were completely different from their own.” Churchill was dumbfounded, as

he could not understand how China would not take up the offer to expand its reach, to which

Roosevelt replied, “Winston, this is something which you are just not able to understand. You

have 400 years of acquisitive instinct in your blood and you just don’t understand how a country

might not want to acquire land somewhere if they can get it. A new period has opened in the the

world’s history, and you will have to adjust yourself to it.” Even after Churchill had pledged 14

when writing the Atlantic Charter not to seek boundary changes and to allow the restoration of

self­government, it was evident from this discussion that FDR did not trust Churchill and the

British imperial views of the world. But Churchill was intent on maintaining the Empire and in

creating a role that would allow British influence back onto the European Continent. To gain

this influence, Churchill was often on a mission to praise the two other leaders, and in case

Churchill stated about Stalin “I like him the more I see him.” Churchill also stated regarding 15

FDR: “I love that Man”…”No lover ever studied every whim of his mistress as I did those of

President Roosevelt.” Churchill offered little but hoped to keep a lot: In one letter to President 16

Roosevelt Churchill stated: “Our friendship is the rock on which I build for the future of the

13 Stettinius, 236. 14 Stettinius, 237. 15 Dobbs, 49 16 Dobbs, 55

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world so long as I am one of the builders.” Churchill badly wanted to have have power and 17

influence, but the world had changed and he seemed lost.

Major issues that arose at the Yalta conference were Poland, the United Nations, Japan

and Germany. The topic of Poland was one that aroused the most tension at Yalta and required

the most work on the final language and borders. When negotiating over Poland, Stalin had to

address when the Nazi’s occupied Poland and the firestorm it ignited in the press. Poland had

been the centerpiece of the Molotov­Ribbentrop pact when the Germans and Russians divided

the nation. In that agreement, Germany wanted the lands lost in the Treaty of Versailles and

Russia also wanted the lands lost by Lenin in 1918.

For the British, Poland had been the reason for declaring war on the Nazi’s in 1939 and

Churchill had intended on returning Poland back to the rightful heirs. Who were the rightful

heirs is the appropriate question to ask. When Hitler violated the Molotov­Ribbentrop Pact and

attacked Russia in 1941, the Russians became concerned with the future of Poland. At the

Tehran Conference, “Churchill told Stalin that he could keep the chunk of eastern Poland he had

swallowed in 1939, and that Poland might ‘move westward, like soldiers taking two steps left

close.’” Churchill then demonstrated the move with match sticks. This would “regain territory 18

signed away under duress to Germany by Lenin in 1918 as the price for exiting World War I…in

treaty of Brest­Litovsk.” This was significant in that Poland’s future was essentially given 19

away by the British and taken by the Russians. The Americans had little to do with this scenario.

17 U.S. Military Attache, London, England, to President of the United States. NR: 914; Filed 1722552. 17 March 1945. National Archives and Records Service. Churchill to FDR, February-April 1945_mr0050. http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/archives/collections/franklin/?p=collections/findingaid&id=511 18 Applebaum, Anne. Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe, 1944­1956. New York: Doubleday, 2012. p19 19 Dobbs, 59

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Poland continued to be the centerpiece of talks at Tehran and at Yalta. Russia had just gained

permission for holding onto the land, but Stalin also witnessed the ease with which Churchill was

willing to cede land.

During the war, two separate governments of Poland developed. One was in exile in

Great Britain since the 1939 pact, and received support from the British and Americans. The

other was currently in Poland and was supported by the Russians. Negotiations over the future

of Poland revolved around which system of government was going to govern Poland, and how

was the government to be elected. One reason FDR and Churchill did not push the issues of

borders because the political system was their focus. While both the Lublin government and the

exiled government claimed to represent “30 million” poles, the British and Americans addressed

in correspondence that the Lublin government only represented a small section of Polish Society.

A compounding factor to the negotiations on Poland was the power and influence the

outside forces had on the political situation on the ground in Poland. After the 1939 partition of

Poland, the Soviets had begun training secret police and infiltrating leadership positions

throughout Poland. The networking paid off when the Soviets reclaimed Poland’s physical

territory and there was a structure to support the Lublin Poles. The United States and the British

did have a former legitimate government in exile, but they did not have the physical or military

means to reinstate the exiled government. While at the Tehran Conference, the U.S. and British

were negotiating with Stalin over the future of Poland, while at the same time, the Soviets were

building up their presence and securing the future government.

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The largest insult to the Polish people came February 7th, at the sixth plenary session of

the conference. With negotiations flirting back and forth, and FDR beginning to wear down

from the long days, Stalin sent in Molotov with a new proposal for Eastern Europe.

1. It was agreed that the line of Curzon should be the Eastern Frontier of Poland with a digression from it in some regions of 5­8 kilometers in favor of Poland.

2. It was decided that the Western frontier of Poland should be traced from the town of Stettin (Polish) and farther to the South along the River Oder and still farther along the River Neisse (western).

3. It was deemed desirable to add to the Provisional Polish Government some democratic leaders from Polish emigre circles.

4. It was regarded desirable that the enlarged Provisional Polish Government should be recognized by the Allied Governments.

5. It was deemed desirable that the Provisional Polish Government, enlarged as was mentioned above in paragraph 3, should as soon as possible call the population of Poland to the polls for organization by general voting of permanent organs of the Polish Government. (Stettinius, 181)

The proposal showed the wits of the Soviets who took advantage of American and British

ignorance on European geography. The proposal to alter the border between Poland and

Germany along different tributary rivers ended up forcibly relocating “some 12 million people

inhabiting territories equivalent to Italy and Arizona.” The U.S. State Department suggested in 20

a memoranda to the President that Stalin might make such a proposal and that it would make

“Poland into a ‘full fledged Soviet satellite.” Roosevelt it is stated was too busy to read that

telegram and thus did not know to be on the lookout. According to Stettinius, Churchill and 21

Roosevelt were both concerned about the use of the word emigre, which carried connotations

from the French Revolution. The two western leaders were concerned about the appearance of

20 Dobbs. 64. 21 Dobbs, 64.

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the conference to the press and outsiders, while Stalin was concerned about the future of his

nation's borders. While discussions continued for months over the form of government, it is

evident that Stalin and Molotov exploited the west and came away with successes regarding

Poland. What could the U.S. and British do, Russia had done most of the fighting, and victory in

Europe would not come without Russian help.

Outside of the European issues, the United States sought out help with the war in Japan.

The war in the Pacific was a U.S. problem. Churchill and Britain did not have a lot of

investment in the region that would bring down the crown. Russia lost land to the Japanese

invasions, but Japan did not threaten Russian security. The U.S. faced this front of the war alone.

On February 8th, Stalin met alone with Roosevelt to discuss the Pacific theatre. The negotiations

between the two leaders brought the Soviets into the war “within two or three months of

Germany’s surrender” in return for the “Sakhalin and Kurile Islands from Japan” as well as parts

of Manchuria and the right to lease a warm water port at Port Arthur, well inside China. This 22

agreement, “at Stalin’s insistence” was kept secret from the Chinese.

Something that stands out as conspicuous about all the meetings is the promotion

liberated states “solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.” 23

All three leaders signed off on this principal, but there is no doubt that Churchill and FDR knew

that Stalin and the Soviets would never allow free elections to occur. Why then utilize wording

that would ultimately force Russia to fail? At the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, Stalin

“wanted the United States to recognize the various governments in eastern Europe before the

22 Dobbs, 67. 23 "The Avalon Project : Yalta (Crimea) Conference:Section II." The Avalon Project : Yalta

(Crimea) Conference. Accessed December 11, 2014. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/yalta.asp.

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elections provided in the Yalta agreement had been held.” Stalin was asking for permission to

undermine the Yalta Agreement principal “the right of all people to choose the form of

government under which they will live” Secretary of State Stettinius stated Stalin said when 24

referring to Eastern Europe and Poland “A freely elected government in any of these countries

would be anti­Soviet, and that we cannot allow.” With the hours taken to redefine each word 25

for the final agreements, and the attention to every detail on the choice of words in each

agreement, there is no possible way that Stalin was unaware that the United States and Great

Britain were wording the final agreements to require voting for all citizens. But can there be any

way the United States and Great Britain expected that the Soviets would follow through. Was

this portion of the Yalta Agreement used to provide an escape clause and place blame on the

other side after the war had ended?

Conclusion:

In his work on the Yalta Conference, Secretary of State Edward Stettinius asked a

poignant question: “What did the Soviet Union gain in eastern Europe which she did not already

have as a result of the smashing victories of the Red Army?” The actions of Stalin and the 26

Russians to occupy and take hold of the seats of power in Eastern Europe cannot be dismissed as

anything unanticipated by the west. Stalin made his views clear in 1941 to Anthony Eden.

Stalin knew that there was no military force to challenge his decisions, but British and

Americans also knew if Stalin did not adhere to the agreements, nothing could be done to alter it.

Roosevelt had laid out his cards that he was not interested in a long term occupation of Europe.

24 Ibid.. 25 Stettinius, 310. 26 Stettinius, 303.

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France had no military capacity, Germany was to be completely dismantled and the British

would need to focus on rebuilding their homefront and addressing their empire once the war

concluded.

The west also knew that the fate of Eastern Europe was lost. While the Atlantic Charter

was well written with principals, Churchill ignored these when the British occupied and began

fighting in Greece. The British knew they had lost their influence in the world and in the room

with the United States President and the Soviet leader. The British were simply happy they were

not forced to negotiate with the Germans in 1940, and they did not lose their territories around

the world.

The Americans knew the Russians would expand into Eastern Europe. Roosevelt failed

to read reports that would have alerted him to the forced migration of millions of Germans when

Stalin moved the tributary Rivers as the border. Did Roosevelt fail to actually read the report, or

did he make a political calculation that Eastern Europe was already lost? Roosevelt needed to

transition his focus from the European Theatre to the Pacific, on rebuilding Europe and on the

creation of the United Nations to prevent another world war.

The three leaders determined the fate of millions, but not at Yalta. In 1941, or at Tehran

by the adjustment of matchsticks. When we go beyond the Yalta Conference, the collapse of the

relationships is clearly visible and nearly unavoidable. Issues on repatriation caused great

frustration on the part of the American and British who repeatedly questioned forcing Russians

onto trains that clearly meant the death of the passengers. Stalin was incensed by the rapid cutoff

of the Lend Lease program at the conclusion of the war. Jealousy grew about the construction of

the Atomic Bomb and the secondary role offered to the British.

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Struggles began to rise to the surface before Yalta, during Yalta and afterwards. When

we look back, we can say with confidence that Roosevelt gained that was in the best interest of

the United States: the United Nations, the collapse of fascism in Europe, the destruction of the

German war machine, and support for the war in the Pacific. Russia expanded its power and

influence further into Europe, gained reparations for the war, expanded the influence of

Communism, gained support for destroying the Nazi Empire, a warm water port in the east, and

rails lines in the east. The British however, they gained little in the agreements. The U.S. and

Soviets were already going to defeat the Germans before Yalta. The British did not gain land, or

money, they did not gain influence. If anything, the war aided in the collapse of the British

Empire as those who had fought for the King and Queen demanded rights back home. But each

gain made for each of these powers came before or after the Yalta agreement.

The Cold war was already underway in February 1945, but leaders were unwilling to

yield to this conclusion. If we look at the agreement made at Yalta in regard to fair elections,

within thirteen days of the signing of the agreement, the Romanian government was dissolved

“the Russians have succeeded in establishing the rule of a communist minority by force and

misrepresentation” Issues also abounded with the United States and British over the refusal of 27

Russia to allow the exiled Polish government take a seat in the new Polish Provisional

Government, while Russia was accusing, with evidence, that the exiled government was

promoting the killing of communist members in Poland. These issues were all within thirty days

of the Yalta Agreement. Thirteen months after Yalta, Churchill would give his Iron Curtain

speech.

27 Millitary Attache, London, England. To The President of the United States. NR: 905. Filed: 061415z. 8 March, 1945. Churchill to FDR, February-April 1945_mr0050. http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/archives/collections/franklin/?p=collections/findingaid&id=511.

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Historiography:

There appears to be several camps to the Yalta Conference. Those that believe the

Western Powers abandoned Eastern Europe to the Russians and violated the Atlantic Charter.

This view is supported by individuals such as Anne Applebaum and Nikolai Tolstoy. Tony Judt

in Postwar and Michael Dobbs in Six Months in 1945, both approach Yalta fairly neutral, placing

Yalta in a the framework of the overarching Cold War. Dobbs does however allude to the

inabilities of the west in actually removing the Russians or in forcing them to recognize specifics

of the Yalta Agreement. Former Secretary of State Edward Stettinius Roosevelt and the

Russians was an attempt to save the administration from the negative views that were growing

after the Yalta agreement. As with any work on negotiations of the world leaders, it is hard to

know for certain what was or was not accurate. Several of the histories quote statements, or give

very specific ideas without any citations or supporting documentation. This situation arose

whenever secret or private meetings were held by the various factions, such as the one where

Roosevelt and Stalin addressed the Pacific theatre.

Journal Articles on the topic of Yalta cover the plethora of topics on the Yalta

Agreement. The topic of Repatriation has taken on new life in recent scholarship with the topic

of repatriation of Guantanamo detainees. Many other articles present Yalta in light of the Cold

War, or in American­Soviet relations. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet

Union, there has been newfound literature and research on the the causes of the Iron Curtain.

The release of private correspondence between the world leaders does aid in the

understanding of the discussions, but it would aid the understanding of Yalta if there was greater

focus placed upon the minutes of the Tehran and Dumbarton Oaks conference. These two

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meetings are where the foundations of the relationships and the ideas sealed at Yalta occurred. It

would also be of assistance to our understanding of Yalta if there was a further release of

documentation between the secretaries of State. In some correspondence between the world

leaders, references were made to communications between foreign secretaries that are

unavailable.

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