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Concluding Remarks
Mark Solms (London) and
Edward Nersessian (New York)
When embarking on a journey into unchartered terri
tory, curiosity tinged with apprehension is to
be
ex
pected. This first endeavor to bring neuroscientists and
psychoanalysts into closer dialogue has evoked mixed
feelings. Clearly psychoanalysts are as much in the
dark and affected by misconceptions about neurosci
ence as are neuroscientists about psychoanalysis, and
the lack of reciprocal knowledge is inevitably compli
cated by an unshared vocabulary. Under the circum
stances, therefore, it is most encouraging to see that
the initial phase of what is hoped will become an ever
increasing and deepening dialogue is already
so
rich
and fertile. In this regard, Damasio s warning against
premature closure is very pertinent. Much remains
tentative in both fields, and much more remains to be
learned at the interface between them. Unprejudiced
and open-ended research, sharing
of
data, discussion,
and debate, seem the only viable paths to take forward.
Psychoanalysis and neuroscience provide two
different perspectives (subjective and objective, re
spectively) on the functions of the mental apparatus.
Although we may be studying the same underlying
entity, these two complementary observational per
spectives are irreducible to one another. This
is abun
dantly illustrated by the problem of affect, where, even
at the basic level of taxonomic classification, the nat
ural kinds of subjective feelings and their associated
neurochemical circuitry can only be clearly discerned
when viewed together, with each casting light on the
other.
Panksepp has eloquently argued for consilience
between these different perspectives within the new
Mark
Solms, Ph.D., is Hon. Lecturer, Academic Department of Neu
rosurgery, St. Bartholomew s and Royal London School of Medicine; and
Associate Member of the British Psycho-Analytical Society.
Edward Nersessian, M.D., is Training and Supervising Psychoanalyst,
New York Psychoanalytic Institute; and Clinical Associate Professor, Cor
nell University Medical College.
field that he calls affective neuroscience In our view
this requires,
as
a first step, an effort to reconcile the
theoretical yields
of
the different
approaches-to
cor
relate the different functional maps that each per
spective has produced. In the process
of
attempting
this correlation, it will of course be found that the
elements of the one map do not correspond isomorphi
cally with those of the other. That should come as no
surprise. It is precisely the lack of correspondence that
acts as a mutual corrective of viewpoint-dependent er
rors, and thereby helps us to gradually draft a more
accurate, unified map. Once the disparities between
the theoretical models are exposed, the only way to
reconcile them is to return once more to the observa
tional data, both psychoanalytic and neuroscientific,
with these new questions in mind, in order to see
where we might previously have been led astray.
Nothing else can determine whether and to what ex
tent a century
of
psychoanalytic inquiry into emotional
life might contribute to the scientific elucidation
of
the
emotional brain. Likewise, nothing else can de
termine whether and to what extent the mass of knowl
edge currently emanating from neuroscience might
contribute to psychoanalytic understanding of affect.
Naturally, one of the tempting goals of this type
of interdisciplinary endeavor is to test aspects of psy
choanalytic metapsychology against the newly emerg
ing neuroscientific findings. However, it is important
to emphasize that psychoanalytic theories cannot be
tested against neuroscientific data (or vice versa) un
less we have validly and definitively identified the neu
ral correlates of the psychological component
functions in question. psychological model only be-
comes accessible physical methods
investigation
once the neural correlates
the components
the
model have been identified To do otherwise is to risk
testing apples by measuring pears. But as the neural
correlates are incrementally determined, a host of
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9
powerful new research tools for testing and refining
the original model become available. To this end, then,
it seems appropriate to round off this preliminary in
terchange with some provisional conclusions in re
spect of the goal that we set for ourselves at the
outset-which was to begin to clarify the neural corre
lates of the basic ideas and most general concepts of
psychoanalysis.
Freud s conceptualization of affect as an internally
directed perceptual modality is relatively easy to rec
oncile with current neuroscientific views. Although
LeDoux questions this conceptualization at one point
in his commentary, his reservations evidently apply
equally to all perceptual modalities. Accordingly, he
states that the conscious experience of being in dan
ger (the feeling
of
being afraid) is mediated in the
same way as the conscious experience that an apple
is red. He states in addition that affect can be subdi
vided into a number of
distinct submodalities
(SEEKING, RAGE, FEAR, PANIC, etc.) which, inci
dentally, applies equally to some exteroceptive modal
ities. LeDoux s conclusion in this respect, then, is
simply that the multiple overlapping networks under
lying all the perceptual modalities (including affect)
are ultimately represented in the global workspace
of
working memory. This conclusion, in itself, will
not attract much controversy.
However, there is sharp disagreement between
LeDoux and Panksepp over the question as to whether
each of the subcortical systems serving the various
affective submodalities is imbued with a primary con
sciousness of its own. In Panksepp s view, all
of
these
systems discharge into a core brain-stem system, and
this generates the different varieties of primary af
fective consciousness; working memory merely
blends, modifies, complexifies, and (perhaps above all)
inhibits these background states, which are fundamen
tally generated elsewhere.
2
In LeDoux s view, on the
other hand, the entire subcortical process is fundamen
tally unconscious. Using the FEAR system as an ex
ample, he argues that:
Similar considerations apply to Damasio s remarks about affect be
ing not only a perceptual modality but also an action modality. As
Panksepp mentions
at
one point, all perceptual systems presumably
evolved for purposes of modulating motor output. Indeed, this might be a
useful way of conceptualizing the causal efficacy
of
emotions.
2 A similar proposal regarding multiple levels
of
consciousness arose,
from a different point of view, in Shevrin s interesting commentary.
Solms-Nersessian
When working memory becomes occupied with the
fact that the amygdala is active (either by way
of
direct connections from the amygdala to cortical ar
eas, by way
of
connections from the amygdala to
brain stem areas that then flood the cortex with non
specific neurochemical messages, or by way
of
con
nections from the amygdala to areas controlling
peripheral responses that then feedback to the brain),
then
we
have some
of
the ingredients that turn an
experience into a fearful experience
the various
networks that the amygdala activates ultimately pro
vide working memory with inputs that are labeled
as
fear.
LeDoux goes on to point out that this is all compati
ble with the Freudian notion that conscious emotion
is the awareness
of
something that is basically uncon
scious.
The anatomical distribution, and chemical coding
of the subcortical command systems, together with
their generalized efferent connections, as set out in
detail by our neuroscientific correspondents, therefore
go some way toward clarifying the anatomical corre
lates of the unconscious mechanisms that generate af
fect. This speaks directly to a question that Freud
posed in one of his last discussions of this problem:
i t
is
hard
to
say, to be sure, by what means and
with the help of what sensory terminal organs these
perceptions [affective feelings] come about (Freud,
1940, p 198). However, in our attempt to delineate
in broad outline the anatomical correlates of Freud s
functional topographic concepts, we are still left with
a question as to whether the perceptual system which
registers primary affective consciousness is to be lo
cated in deep subcortical structures (principally in the
region of the PAG) or in neocortical forebrain struc
tures (principally the prefrontal lobes). LeDoux ac
cepts that core brainstem structures play a crucial
quantitative role in sustaining every form
of
con
sciousness (see quotations above and below), but he
attributes the generation of conscious quality itself to
working memory alone. A different
solution-which
Panksepp seems to
accept-is
suggested by Damasio s
distinction between animals having feelings (gener
ated subcortically) and knowing that they have feel
ings (which requires additional forebrain processing).
The distinction between subcortical and cortical
consciousness-generating systems leads Panksepp to
make the further proposal that consciousness should
be divided into two broad types- cognitive
and
affect ive (or
somatic
and visceral )-which
are generated by distinct dorsal/neocortical and ven-
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Concluding Remarks
tral/limbic systems. This comes closest to Freud s own
conclusion to the effect that consciousness is regis
tered by two perceptual surfaces, one oriented outward
toward the external object world, and the other inward
toward the interior
of
the body (cf. the statement,
quoted by both Yorke and Panksepp, to the effect that
the
id, cut off from the external world, has a world
of perception
of
its
own ).
However, it should be re
membered that the
inner
surface of consciousness
in Freud s model is further divisible into two subcom
ponents, only one
of
which registers primary affective
qualia (the perceptual world
of
the id). The other part
involves internal activation
of
the external sur
face-generating
inner speech (thinking) and other
forms
of
mental imagery, including hallucinations (see
Solms, 1997). Only the former subcomponent would
correspond to what Panksepp calls the emotional (or
visceral) type
of
consciousness.
It cannot be emphasized enough that Freud s
two
perceptual surfaces model
of
consciousness,
like all his topographical constructs, is a functional
model, which need not map onto anatomical structures
in a simple, isomorphic fashion (cf. Damasio s warn
ing concerning neophrenology ). More important
from the functional standpoint than the question
of
localization, is the idea, which found general agree
ment from both Panksepp and LeDoux, that affect is
generated by global state (mass-action) control sys
tems, whereas external object perceptions (and the
cognitive processes derived from them) involve rela
tively discrete information transfer systems. Pank
sepp endorsed this aspect
of
Freudian affect theory
explicitly, but the idea seemed to be implicit also in
LeDoux s remarks to the effect that working memory
becomes occupied with feeling states by way of con
nections to brainstem areas and peripheral response
loops which flood the cortex with nonspecific neuro
chemical messages. It was also implicit in his conclu
sion that emotions feel different from nonemotions
because the former involve more brain and body sys
tems, which adds intensity and duration to warking
memory systems (see also footnote 4 below). These
distinctions coincide quite closely with Freud s funda
mental distinction between ideas and quotas
of
affect, and with his inferences about the very differ
ent mechanisms underlying them.
3
3
Green r igh tly po inted out that in our introductory summary
of
Freud s affect theory we conftated this distinction with the (closely related)
quality/quantity distinction, which, properly speaking, cannot
applied
to unconscious mental processes.
This leads directly to the crucial question: What are
affects perceptions of? and therefore to a consider
ation
of
Freud s claim that emotions are perceptions of
oscillations in the tension
of
instinctual needs (drives).
Damasio answered this question unequivocally:
, the answer to the question
is that they are percep
tions
of
body states along a number of biological di
mensions, chemical as well as macrostructural. The
state
of
the flesh, real and as-if, as determined in part
by the very process of emotion, is the thing repre
sented in feelings. Bearing in mind Freud s (1915a)
definition
of drive
( the psychical representative
of
the stimuli originating from within the organism
and reaching the mind, as a measure
of
the demand
made upon the mind for work by virtue
of
its connec
tion with the
body ),
Damasio s view approximates
very closely indeed to Freud s understanding
of
the
essential mechanism
of
affect. It is therefore not sur
prising that Damasio considered Freud s general
model to be consonant with the most advanced con
temporary neuroscience views.
Damasio went on to explain that:
The
body,
real, and as represented in the brain, is the theater for
the emotions and that feelings are read-outs of
body changes really enacted in the body and really
constructed in an as-if mode in body mapping struc
tures. The body mapping structures begin in spinal
cord but coalesce most dramatically in the brain stem
and hypothalamus before arriving in the telen
cephalon. ,
A similar view was elaborated in more detail in
Panksepp s theory
of
a body-mapping neurosymbolic
SELF system, and his suggestion that
t he
resting
level
of
reverberation within this system is an epicen
ter (homeostatic settling point) upon which the various
basic pleasures and unpleasures
of
life may be predi
cated. LeDoux did not offer a general theory of emo
tion, but his remarks on the neuroanatomy of the
FEAR system at least did not contradict Damasio s
and Panksepp s models in this respect.
Both Panksepp and Damasio emphasize that the
body-mapping homeostatic control system operates
above all through discharge mechanisms, and that it
is a stable motor representation
of
the body (a basic
Once the amygdala responds, it broadcasts to the cortex, to brain
stem areas that control bodily responses, and to brain stem reticular forma
tion arousal areas that then activate the forebrain
the sensory systems
and their representations in the thalamus and cortex provide the amygdala
with qual ity and the amygdala, by way
of
triggering the brain stem,
participates in the generation
of
quantity .
7/25/2019 11 Concluding Remarks
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action system) ; thus feelings may ultimately reflect
the various types
of
action readiness that permeate the
extended neurodynamics of the SELF. Regarding this
point, Green commented that Panksepp might be sur
prised to read here that this is probably the closest
assessment
of
what Freud meant by the cardinal role
he attributed to the drives (which, as he stated, are
always active). Drives are internalized patterns
of
un
successful attempts at motor discharge.
Notwithstanding the different emphases of the dif
ferent authors, then, what all seem to agree about is that
affectis amotivational mechanismwhich is closely tied
to changes in the state of the body-as-represented-in
the-brain; and this view is clearly consonant with
Freud s. The putative consensus view would appear to
be that emotions are g.enerated when various quasi in-
stinctual limbic ideomotor command circuits dis-
charge into a brain stem homeostatic control system
which represents the current state
the body the
form a basic action readiness matrix and which
turn influences the state the higher corticothalamic
systems a motivatedfashion.
Leaving aside the con
troversy as to whether affective consciousness itself is
generated near the beginning
of
this process, or only at
the end, all the specific empirical findings discussed by
the various authors can be systematically arranged
around this generic picture. This provides a first, rough
approximation of how the relationship between affects
and
drives-as
conceptualized by Freud-might be
represented in the tissues
of
the brain.
In this connection, the illuminating dialogue be
tween Panksepp and Yorke on the nature of drives and
their relation to affects demonstrates most clearly how
an attempt to correlate Freud s model of affect with
contemporary neuroscientific views might contribute
directly to theadvancementofpsychoanalyticmetapsy
chology. As Panksepp observed, the internal composi
tion
of
the id remains one of the most obscure and
unresolved areas
of
psychoanalytic theory. Accord
ingly, we have good reason to grasp eagerly the oppor
tunities that beckon inPanksepp s remarks to the effect
that affective neuroscience has now provided an em
pirically based set
of
neuropsychological conceptual
izations by which some of the subcomponents of the id
can be more systematically discussed We are
fi-
nally in a position to construct new and neuroscientifi
cally substantive images of the id
Panksepp has laid a useful groundwork for the de
liberations that must now follow. He accepts that
something like drive surely exists in the brain and
that drives, in theirbroadermeaning, can govern all
brain and psychological activities. However, he sug-
Solms-Nersessian
gests that in the crucible
of
neuroscience [the drive
concept] may fragment into many subsidiary pro
cesses. He concludes that it should be replaced by a
more differentiated set of functional constructs, princi
pally including, (1) his basic emotion command sys
terns, , which make sense
of
the intrinsic action
readiness that is so evident in animal and human emo
tions; (2) interoceptive homeostaticdetectors, bymeans
of which the organic forces of bodily imbalances be
come reflected in psycho-behavioral urges; and (3)
mechanisms for widely broadcasting nonspecific con
sequences
of
these urges within the brain.
Of necessity, similar considerations would apply
to Freud s pleasure-unpleasure principle, closely
linked as it is to his conception of drive. In fact, Pank
sepp points out that there are many varieties
of
plea
sure and unpleasure in the brain, each
of
which
is governed by its own command system and modu
lated by its own regulatory principle. All of these nar
rower constructs can be linked empirically with the
anatomy, physiology, and chemistry
of
various spe
cific brain systems, which is
of
crucial importance in
relation to our stated goal.
Although Panksepp makes clear that he person
ally believes that the
Freudian
drive concept incor
porates all of the subsidiary constructs he enumerates,
he leaves open the possibility that it correlates more
narrowly with (1) the SEEKING command system; (2)
the homeostatic detectors alone; or (3) the generalized
broadcasting systems. On close assessment, however,
as Panksepp himself acknowledges, none of these lat
ter possibilities seems altogether tenable.
Yorke is therefore surely right to point out that
the concept of drive as Freud came to understand it,
is a deep, inferential construct concerning the mental
representation of the fundamental processes of organic
life, which
is
too far removed from direct observa
tional data to be meaningfully linked with anything
as
concrete
as
a specific command system or detector
mechanism (Freud, 1920). However, by the same to
ken, one has to take very seriously Panksepp s appeal
for the parsing
of
such general concepts into a range
of
more specific constructs which lend themselves more
readily to detailed scientific research. This would spec
ify in neuroscientific terms the complex vicissitudes
that drive energies (in Freud s sense) undergo during
their phylogenetic and ontogenetic passage through
the differentiating structures
of
the mental apparatus.
A careful consideration of these issues might start
from the observation that much
of
the theoretical work
done by Freud s drive concept is done by the body
representing homeostatic control system in Pank-
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Concluding Remarks
sepp s (and Damasio s) model. A heuristic correlation
of
these two concepts would at least reproduce the
relationships that exist in Freud s model between af
fect (Panksepp s
emotion
command systems ),
drive (Panksepp s
virtual body ,
and psychical en
ergy in general (Panksepp s generalized broadcast
ing
mechanisms).
5
We will not speculate any further on these mat
ters here; we would rather invite our readers and con
tributors to take up these very difficult and extremely
important questions by submitting original theoretical
and research papers, which can be collected together
in a future issue
of
this journal devoted to the topic
of
drive. If we all approach these problems with
the spirit
of
open-mindedness, tolerance
of
doubt, ad
mission
of
ignorance, and willingness to learn from
one another that Panksepp himself has displayed, then
we cannot but make substantial progress in this ex
tremely important area.
III
One aspect
of
the present interchange aboutwhich there
seems to be no disagreement at all is the idea that affects
release innate patterns
of
ideomotor discharge, and that
these patterns reflect
the
major evolutionary pas
sages
throughwhich our ancestors progressed. In
deed, the bulk
of
Panksepp swork in this field,
as
sum
marized in his breathtaking new
(1998)
textbook, may
readily be described as a detailed account
of
the precise
anatomical, physiological, and chemical processes un
derlying just these ideomotor discharge mechanisms.
As most of the commentators note, in this respect the
degree of overlap between Freud s model and contem
porary neuroscientific perspectives is almost uncanny.
The overlap seems to extend even to the central mecha
nisms
of
affect discharge that Freud intuitively deduced
in his
1895 Project
for a Scientific Psychology
(1950, pp. 320-21).6
In this respect, one fruitful area for future neuro
psychoanalytic inquiry would be the elucidation
of
the
epigenetic developmental processes by which the in
nate discharge patterns (id predispositions) are trans
formed through experience into personal ego
5
Compare the putat ive consensus view described above with
Freud s various descriptions
of
these relationships,
as
quoted in our intro
ductory summary of his 1895 theory (1900, pp. 467-468; 1915b, p 179n;
1950, pp. 320-321).
6
That is, the experience-dependent centripetal release
of
excitation
into the interior of the body through affect innervation keys, and the
subsequent conveyance upward
of
fresh excitation in the form of endoge
nous chemical products,
of which there may be a considerable number.
acquisitions-processes around which individual dif
ferences (and varieties
of
psychopathology) coalesce.
In his commentary LeDoux barely touched on his im
portant work
on
emotional learning.
Another area
of
research which seems particu
larly promising derives from Freud s intriguing sug
gestion (neglected by almost all the commentators) to
the effect that hysterical conversion involves a mecha
nism akin to that
of
affect generation. This suggestion
has important implications, not only for a neurological
understanding of the central mechanisms underlying
conversion disorders, but also for psychosomatic med
icine as a whole.
Freud s ideas concerning the inhibition of affect
and the concept
of
signal affects also seemed to
enjoy general endorsement from all our commentators.
Damasio s and LeDoux s comments on the relation
between these functions and the physical maturation
(and life-long plasticity) of the frontal lobes, in partic
ular, suggests some promising avenues for future
neuro-psychoanalytic research. In this connection,
Yorke s discussion
of
the developmental line for
anxiety serves as a useful reminder that valuable pre
liminary work in this area has been conducted by child
psychoanalysts which might now prove useful to neu
roscientific investigators. Allan Schore s
(1994)
wide
ranging book, also barely mentioned in his commen
tary, demonstrates that the same applies to a number
of related developmental psychology paradigms.
IV
It seems appropriate to close with one or two remarks
about interdisciplinary neuro-psychoanalytic research
methodology. Notwithstanding. the shortcomings of
the psychoanalytic method, as Shevrin and Panksepp
note there are certain phenomena that can only be
accessed subjectively, and in the area of affective
neuroscience these include some
of
the more im
portant phenomena at issue. This is the most obvious
contribution that psychoanalysis can make to contem
porary neuroscience: It has elaborated sophisticated
methods for analyzing human subjective experience
in a controlled naturalistic setting. In this connection,
Panksepp made the proposal that the psychological
effects of various psychopharmacological agents
might be systematically explored by psychoanalytic
investigators. Yorke, in turn, pointed to some
of
the
specifically psychoanalytic difficulties that are intro
duced by research
of
this kind.
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96
We have found that the psychoanalytic method
can be usefully applied within a clinico-anatomical
paradigm, for understanding the subjective experi
ences of patients with focal brain lesions (Solms, 1995,
1998, 1999; Kaplan-Solms and Solms, 1996, 1999).
This approach has proved useful not only for clarifying
complex, hidden mechanisms that underlie some stan
dard neuropsychiatric syndromes, but also for eluci
dating the anatomical and physiological correlates of
some basic metapsychological concepts. For example,
in shedding new light on the neuropsychological
mechanisms underlying anosognosia and neglect
(Solms, 1995, 1999; Kaplan-Solms and Solms, in
press), psychoanalytic investigations
of
patients with
right perisylvian lesions simultaneously shed light on
the neural correlates of such fundamental psychoana
lytic concepts as word versus thing representation and
narcissistic cathexis versus object cathexis.
7
The neurological patients that we studied in this
way were not experimental subjects in the conven
tional sense. Their lesions w r 'experiments of na
ture, as a result of which they suffered disturbing
psychological disorders. Our psychoanalytic research
into the subjective structure of these disorders coin
cided,
as
psychoanalytic research always must, with
attempts to alleviate psychological suffering by means
of
psychoanalytical therapy.
This research program primarily involved neuro
psychological syndromes associated with cortical le
sions. Obviously the clinico-anatomical paradigm is
less suitable for research into the densely packed and
interdigitated limbic and brainstem mechanisms that
underlie central affective functions. In this respect,
as
Panksepp suggests, certain pharmacological interven
tions have more focused effects on the neural systems
in question. There is therefore good reason to accept
his suggestion that we use selected psychopharmaceu
ticals
as
experimental probes into the various emo
tional command systems that he describes. Much
could be learned by studying carefully, in a psychoan
alytically informed setting, the differential emotional
effects of the various pharmacological agents. There
is no reason not to begin doing so with the large num
bers of psychoanalytic patients who already receive
adjunctive pharmacotherapy for independent, clinical
reasons. A systematic descriptive investigation along
these lines would provide extremely valuable informa-
7 Incidentally, this body
of
research casts considerable doubt on the
equation commonly tnade (in Schore's commentary too) between right
hemisphere functioning and the special characteristics
of
Freud's system
Unconscious.
Solms-Nersessian
tion of a kind that cannot be obtained by any other
method. Just
as
we found with our clinico-anatomical
research, such an investigation is bound simultane
ously
to
elucidate the neurophysical correlates of some
basic psychoanalytic concepts. Few tasks are more im
portant at this stage in the development
of
the interdis
ciplinary field to which this new journal is dedicated.
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Mark Solms Ph.D.
Academic Department of Neurosurgery
Royal London Hospital
London E 1BB England
e mail: [email protected]
Edward Nersessian M.D.
72
East
9
st Street
New York 10128
e mail: [email protected]