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EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
MICHAEL J. MALBIN
CHAIRPERSON
ANTHONY CORRADO
TRUSTEES
F. CHRISTOPHER ARTERTON
BETSEY BAYLESS
JEFFREY BELL
RONDA BYBEE
DAVID COHEN
VIC FAZIO
DONALD J. FOLEY
GEORGE B. GOULD
KENNETH A. GROSS
RUTH S. JONES
RON MICHAELSON
ROSS CLAYTON MULFORD
PHIL NOBLE
JEANNE OLSON
ACADEMIC ADVISORS
JAMES E. CAMPBELL
ANTHONY CORRADO
DIANA DWYRE
DONALD GREEN
JOHN C. GREEN
KEITH HAMM
GARY C. JACOBSON
ROBIN KOLODNY
RAY LA RAJA
THOMAS E. MANN
MARK J. ROZELL
KAY SCHLOZMAN
CLYDE WILCOX
ForReleaseApril1,2013
Contact:MichaelMalbin(202)969-8890ext.221
Updated CFI Research on State and Local Elections:
New 2012 Data Reinforces Previous Findings
Public Matching Funds in NY State, Reversing the Financial
Influence of Small & Large Donors, Would Leave the Candidates
Whole While Costing New Yorkers only $2/year
New York States candidates for the legislature in 2012 raised 74% of their money from donors
who gave them $1,000 or more, and from interest groups. Only 8% came from donors who gave
$250 or less. The balance between the states small versus large donors was almost the same in
2012 as in 2010 and 2008.
Until now, big donors have dominated the Empire States politics, said CFIs Executive Director
Michael J. Malbin, who is also a professor of political science at the University at Albany (SUNY).
This study shows that making small donors the linchpins of candidate financing would come at
a very low cost when compared to the benefits.
Gov. Andrew Cuomo of New York has recommended that the state reduce candidates
dependence on big donors by adopting a system of small-donor matching funds similar to New
York Citys. The city provides $6 in matching funds for each of the first $175 that a donor gives
to a candidate participating in its voluntary system. (Gov. Cuomo also proposed lower
contribution limits, improved disclosure, and strengthened enforcement.) Assembly Speaker
Sheldon Silver has reintroduced a bill from previous years that would provide six-for-one
matching funds for a donors first $250, with lower contribution limits. While the details of this
proposal may change, and the Senate and Governor may put forward their own proposals, this
one is a sound basis for analysis.
CFIs previous studies of New York have shown that matching funds could have a profound
effect on the states election financing. The first was a broad peer-reviewed policy analysis in
Election Law Journal(link). The second showed that small donors would likely be responsible for
a majority of the candidates funds under a small donor matching system [link]. A third [link],
published jointly with the Brennan Center, showed that New York Citys system brings a far
more diverse pool of donors into the system than traditional fundraising. A fourth showed that
the percentage of New York population giving a contribution in any amount is among the
nations lowest (link). Finally, this study is a revision of one previously published that was based
only on data from 2010 (link). The results based on 2012 data are virtually unchanged.
http://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/12-03-08/%E2%80%9CSmall_Donors_Big_Democracy_New_York_City%E2%80%99s_Matching_Funds_as_a_Model_for_the_Nation_and_States%E2%80%9D_published_in_Election_Law_Journal.aspxhttp://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/12-03-08/%E2%80%9CSmall_Donors_Big_Democracy_New_York_City%E2%80%99s_Matching_Funds_as_a_Model_for_the_Nation_and_States%E2%80%9D_published_in_Election_Law_Journal.aspxhttp://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/12-03-08/%E2%80%9CSmall_Donors_Big_Democracy_New_York_City%E2%80%99s_Matching_Funds_as_a_Model_for_the_Nation_and_States%E2%80%9D_published_in_Election_Law_Journal.aspxhttp://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/12-04-17/Public_Matching_Fund_System_Would_Reverse_the_Importance_of_Small_and_Large_Donors_in_New_York_State_Elections.aspxhttp://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/12-04-17/Public_Matching_Fund_System_Would_Reverse_the_Importance_of_Small_and_Large_Donors_in_New_York_State_Elections.aspxhttp://cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/12-05-14/Study_Public_Financing_Contributes_to_Greater_Diversity_of_Participation_in_NYC_Elections.aspxhttp://cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/12-05-14/Study_Public_Financing_Contributes_to_Greater_Diversity_of_Participation_in_NYC_Elections.aspxhttp://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/12-12-20/VT_and_RI_Had_the_Highest_Percentages_of_Adults_Contributing_in_2010_and_2006_State_Elections_NY_UT_CA_and_FL_the_Lowest.aspxhttp://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/12-12-03/CFI_Study_on_Public_Financing_in_New_York_State.aspxhttp://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/12-12-03/CFI_Study_on_Public_Financing_in_New_York_State.aspxhttp://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/12-12-03/CFI_Study_on_Public_Financing_in_New_York_State.aspxhttp://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/12-12-20/VT_and_RI_Had_the_Highest_Percentages_of_Adults_Contributing_in_2010_and_2006_State_Elections_NY_UT_CA_and_FL_the_Lowest.aspxhttp://cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/12-05-14/Study_Public_Financing_Contributes_to_Greater_Diversity_of_Participation_in_NYC_Elections.aspxhttp://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/12-04-17/Public_Matching_Fund_System_Would_Reverse_the_Importance_of_Small_and_Large_Donors_in_New_York_State_Elections.aspxhttp://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/12-03-08/%E2%80%9CSmall_Donors_Big_Democracy_New_York_City%E2%80%99s_Matching_Funds_as_a_Model_for_the_Nation_and_States%E2%80%9D_published_in_Election_Law_Journal.aspx7/28/2019 20130401 NYState 2012 Impact Matching wTables
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being $200 million per election or $100 million per year. In contrast, the Campaign Finance
Institutes recently completed analysis suggests the cost would be more like $26-$41 million per
year. To arrive at these estimates, CFI assumed the matching fund formulae and contributionlimits of the Silver bill and applied them to the actual donors in the elections of 2010 and 2012.
The CFI analysis assumed that all donors who gave in each election would continue to give the
same amounts under the new system but only up to the new contribution limit. To average
the cost between a gubernatorial and midterm election, the analysis includes one election for
statewide officials (2010) and two elections for the legislature (2010 and 2012). It then assumed
four different scenarios, represented in the table below. The two variables producing the four
scenarios have to do with the rules for contested primaries, and the presence or absence of newdonors in the system.
The Silver bill would allow higher contribution limits and more public funding for a candidate
who is challenged in a primary election than for one who is not. This results in two pairs of
scenarios. For one, we assume a status quo in which only the few candidates who were actually
challenged in 2010 and 2012 would continue to be challenged under the new system. Under
the other scenarios, we assume a substantial increase in primary challenges. By definition, this
assumption would mean that the rules were bringing new candidates into the system.Obviously, we have no idea how many these might be. (Many incumbents presumably would
still be unchallenged.) If we assume arbitrarily and generously that half of the current
candidates would face a primary challenge under the new rules, we can estimate the cost by
treating all of the existing general election candidates as if they would be covered the under
rules for contested primaries. This should produce overly high estimates of the new programs
cost.
Second, any estimate will be sensitive to the number of donors assumed. The table includestwo estimates of the number of donors. Under one, we calculate that only the donors who gave
in 2010 and 2012 will continue to give under the new system. This produces a low estimate for
the cost of public matching funds. The second assumes the programs incentives successfully
bring new donors into the system. To put a dollar figure on this, we make the optimistic
assumption that each candidate doubles the number of his/her donors, with each new donor
giving $50.
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Table 1. The Cost of a Public Matching Fund System for New York State Elections
Includes the Four-Year cost for all Statewide and Legislative Candidates
Assumption: all candidates ask for and
receive public funds up to the maximum
allowed for one contested election, usually
the general election. In addition, for
primary elections:
Same Donors as
2010-2012, Lower
Contribution Limit
Each Candidate Doubles
the Number of Donors,
with Each New Donor
Giving $50
Assume higher public funding cap only for
those who actually had two contests
Total Four-Year Cost 104,269,894 132,446,554
Average Cost per Year 26,067,474 33,111,639
Average per year per capita $1.34 $1.70
Treat every 2010-12 general election
candidate as if in a contested primary
Total Four-Year Cost 120,928,616 162,373,570
Average Cost per Year 30,232,154 40,593,393
Average per year per capita $1.55 $2.08
The above table shows the CFI estimate under each of the four scenarios. If no new donors are
brought into the system, the cost would be $26 million - $30 million per year. This would
average to $1.34 - $1.55 per person per year. With new donors, the cost would be $33 million
to $41 million per year. Under these more expensive scenarios, therefore, the average cost for
each of New Yorks 19.5 million residents would be between $1.70 and $2.08 per year, with the
higher figure including generously optimistic assumptions for both of the key variables.
HOW THE CANDIDATES WOULD FARE
Under the Silver bill, candidates would lose some of their current money because the
contribution limits would be lower. But they gain money from the new public matching funds.
Incumbents who are asked to vote for such a program obviously would want to know whether
combining the two provisions would leave them with less money to compete. As the following
summary table indicates, almost all Assembly candidates would have ended up with moremoney, not less. So would most Senate candidates, but the number for the Senate would
depend upon the final bills contribution limits.
The bill as introduced would impose $2,000 contribution limits on any candidate for any state
office, but this would be doubled for candidates facing two contested elections (a contested
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Table 2. Number of 2012 Candidates Who Would Have Had Less Money
With Public Matching Funds and Lower Contribution Limits Than They Actually Raised
$2,000 Contribution Limit $4,000 Contribution Limit
Total #
CandidatesSame Donors
More small
donorsSame Donors
More small
donors
Assembly$150,000 cap 232 4 1 0 0
$300,000 cap 232 4 0 0 0
Senate$350,000 cap 101 18 11 2 2
$700,000 cap 101 16 8 1 1
As the table shows, the bill provides adequate public funds to assure that almost every
Assembly candidate receives at least as much by substituting small donor matching funds for
large contributions. The bill is not as finely tuned for the Senate. By imposing the same
contribution limits for all offices, the bill would have left more than one-quarter of all Senate
incumbents (ten Democrats and six Republicans) with less money under the proposed systemthan under the status quo. Most challengers and candidates for open seats would be ahead;
only two would be behind.
To address this, the bills sponsors might want to vary the contribution limits across offices. The
current Silver bill has the same limit for Assembly, Senate and all statewide offices. This need
not be so. In 2011-12, thirteen states had the same limit for all offices, but nineteen had higher
limits for statewide officials and six (including New York) had different limits for statewide office
and each of the two legislative chambers. (Twelve states allowed unlimited contributions.)
New Yorks Senate districts are approximately twice as large as its Assembly districts. One
possibility might be to make the contribution limits for the Senate twice that of the Assemblys.
The Senates current limit is about 2.5 times the Assemblys. A $4,000 limit for the Senate and
$2,000 for the Assembly would still be about half of the current limit for each chamber. If the
Senates limit was $4,000 instead of $2,000, almost all Senate candidates would find it
advantageous to combine the new limits with small donor matching funds.
Attachments
Appendix 1: Candidates for NY State Senate in 2012
Appendix 2: Candidates for NY State Assembly in 2012
Appendices 1 and 2 show: (a) the amount of Money Each Candidate Raised in 2012; (b) how
much each candidate would lose as a result of the Silver Bills contribution limits; (c) how
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