A Dangerous Delay:The cost of late response to the
drought in the Horn of Africa
Benedict Dempsey, Save the Children
The Warnings
Aug: All seasonal forecasts indicate poor rains due to La Niña. FEWSNET
Nov: Pre-emptive action needed now to protect livelihoods and avoid later costly lifesaving emergency interventions FSNWG
Jan: Extreme food insecurity in the eastern Horn of Africa is likely FEWSNET
Mar: Below-average Mar-May rains forecast: crisis likely to worsen. Localized famine conditions possible Joint agency
Jun: Food security emergency: humanitarian response inadequate. Joint agency
20 July: UN declares famine. FSNAU
TimelineTimeline2010 20112010 2011Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct
More than 70% of funding, and almost 90% of mainstream US and UK media coverage came
after UN famine declaration in July 2011
Early warnings – inadequate response
Aug: Clear forecast of poor rains
Nov: A call for pre-emptive action now
Jan: Extreme food insecurity predicted
Mar: “Localized famine conditions possible”
July: UN declares famine
GAM rates in South Central Somalia
Early warnings – inadequate response
• Early warnings were correct, accessible and well disseminated • Humanitarian agencies relied on information from
intermediaries, like FEWSNET, not direct use of climate/weather information
• There was some response, but not at scale• The inevitable impact was increased suffering, loss of life and
livelihood, development gains reversed, and increased cost of response
The opportunity to avert a crisis was missed.
why was the response inadequate?
• Fear of getting it wrong? – both financial and reputational risk; an inability to act in uncertainty
• Fear of being too interventionist? – risk of undermining local communities
• Fatigue? – resignation to high levels of chronic malnutrition
• Critically, the warnings themselves were not considered the main problem – the problem lay in the response of the aid system
The international (humanitarian) system
NGOs
UN Agencies
Private Sector
?Military?
National Governments Communities
National Civil SocietyDonor Governments
Strengthening monitoring surveillance
systems
Transition to long term and recovery
programming
Long term development /
resilience building programming
Early response/interventions
Rapid assessment of the situation
Emergency response
Situation Returns to
normal
Shock
Slow Onset Food Crisis Response Framework
DRR
CCA
Preparedness
Capacity Building
Humanitarian Development
Resilience
Approaches to Aid
Social Protection
What is needed for improvement?
Humanitarian response must shift more into prevention and early action. This requires:1. Managing the risk – dealing with
uncertainty2. Developing triggers for earlier response3. Institutionalising ‘no regrets’ measures
Long term development work must be the first response. This requires:4. Embedding DRR into long term work5. Making programmes flexible and building
crisis response out of development work
Implications for weather and climate science
• Levels of risk and uncertainty need to be integrated into developing response frameworks
• Responders need to accept a level of uncertainty in their triggers for action
• Information needs to be meaningful and accessible to a diverse group of actors – particularly communities themselves
• Climate information must be combined with other indicators of oncoming crisis (e.g. food prices, nutrition)