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A Pragmatist Theory of Social MechanismsAuthor(s): Neil GrossSource: American Sociological Review, Vol. 74, No. 3 (Jun., 2009), pp. 358-379Published by: American Sociological AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27736068.
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A PRAGMATIST THEORY OF SOCIAL
MECHANISMS
359
social
control is
a
key
mechanism
mediating
between
structure
and
crime
rates.
Empirical
work
in
thisvein
is
often
distinguished
not
only
from
positivism
sensu
stricto,
but also from the
sociological
tradition f "correlational
analysis,"
which examines
associations
among
variables
but
pursues
explanation
at
a
high
level of
gen
erality
(see
Bunge
1997;
Mahoney
2001;
Steel
2004).
Both
approaches,
it
s
argued,
treat
ausal
mechanisms
as
black boxes
(Elster
1989;
Hedstr?m and
Swedberg
1998)
and
so
fail
to
provide
comprehensive
explanations.
As
more
sociologists
have
adopted
a
mech
anism-centered
focus,
theoretical
formulations
of themechanisms
concept
have
proliferated
(e.g.,
Hedstr?m
and
Swedberg
1998;
Reskin
2003;
Stinchcombe
2005;
Tilly
2001).
There
is,however,
something
paradoxical
about
many
of these formulations:
they
owe
their
attrac
tiveness
to
a
context
inwhich
sociological
the
orists,
applying
and
extending
the
ideas
of
philosophers,
have
helped
to
undermine
posi
tivism. et
they
ften
proceed
from substantive
assumptions
that
many
in the
heterogeneous
theory ommunity
do not considerviable. More
specifically,
many
prominent
theoretical
accounts
of social mechanisms
are
either
beholden
to
some
version
of rational
choice
theory
or
essentially
agnostic
about the
nature
of social
action.1
However,
a
majority
of
theorists
today
doubt
that
ction
typically
takes
the form of
a
ration
al calculation
of
means
to
ends,
and also insist
that
action-theoretical
assumptions
necessarily
factor into
every
account of social order and
change
and
should therefore
e
fully
specified.
From
a
variety
of
viewpoints,
contemporary
theorists
instead
conceptualize
social
action
as
a
creative
enactment
over
time of social
prac
tices.
Social
practices
are
ways
of
doing
and
thinking
that
are
often
tacit,
acquire
meaning
from
widely
shared
presuppositions
and under
lying
semiotic
codes,
and
are
tied
to
particular
locations
in the social
structure
and
to
the col
lectivehistoryofgroups. Collective enactment
of such
practices
produces
and
reproduces
those
structures
and
groups
(e.g.,
Archer
2000;
1
I
discuss
below
an
exception
to
this
generaliza
tion
in
Tilly's
work,
which
overlaps
in
certain
respects
with the
perspective
I
develop
here.
Bourdieu
1990;
de Certeau
1984;
Giddens
1984;
Ortner
1984;
Swidler
2001;
see
also
Chaiklin
and Lave
1996;
Pickering
1992;
Schatzki
1996,
2002;
Schatzki,
Knorr
Cetina,
and
von
Savigny
2001).
In
this
article,
I
show
how
a
sophisticated
theory
of
social
action,
broadly
in the
practice
theory
family?developed
by
the
American
pragmatist philosophers
Charles S.
Peirce,
William
James,
George
Herbert
Mead,
and John
Dewey
and elaborated
most
recently by
Joas
(1996)?can
be extended
into
a
robust
theory
of social mechanisms.
I
do
not
argue
directly
for
themerits of
a
pragmatist theory of action;
strong
arguments
to
this
effect
have been
advanced
by
others
(e.g.,
Joas
1993,
1996;
Whitford
2002).
Nor
do
I
demonstrate
that
my
approach necessarily
increases the
explanatory
power
of
every
account
of
the
operation
of
par
ticular
mechanisms,
although
I
identify
three
common
analytical
problems
with which
the
theory
could be
especially
helpful.
Rather,
I
make
a
prima
facie
case
that
a
great
many
social
mechanisms, regardless of the level of analysis
at
which
they
operate,
can
be
understood
as
resting
on a more
solid action-theoretical
foun
dation than
existing
approaches
recognize.
In
doing
so,
I
offer
a
way
to
connect
important
strandsof
sociological theory
with the research
enterprise
of "mainstream"
sociology
(see
Calhoun and
VanAntwerpen
2007) and?taking
a
different tack from the
symbolic
interaction
ists?show how the tradition fAmerican
prag
matism
can
provide
intellectual coherence
to a
discipline
looking
to
find its
way
in
a
postpos
itivist
ge.
WHAT
IS
A
SOCIAL
MECHANISM?
Confusion
abounds
as
to
what
exactly
a
mech
anism is.
A
clear definition is
an
essential
first
step
toward
a
sociological theory
of mecha
nisms. To
distill such
a
definition,
I
consider
five
varied
conceptualizations
thathave
appeared
in recent
years.2
2
For
a
more
exhaustive review of the literature
on
mechanisms,
see
Hedstr?m
(2005);
Hedstr?m
and
Swedberg
(1998);
Johnson
2002);
and
Mahoney
(2001).
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AMERICAN
SOCIOLOGICAL
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Mechanisms
as
Not Necessarily
Observable
Structures
or
Processes
According
to
the
first
conceptualization?
advanced byHedstr?m and Swedberg (1998)?
a
social
mechanism
is the
structure
or
process
S
by
which
some
event
or
variable
/
leads
to
or
causes a
change
in
the
state
of variable
or
event
O.
Where
some
sociologists
would be
content
to
"blackbox"
S,
or
significant
components
of
it,
Hedstr?m and
Swedberg
insist that
true
explanation
demands
fuller
specification
of
its internal
content.
Such
specification,
in
their
view,
should
have three
features.
First,
it
should
follow the principle ofmethodological indi
vidualism,
explaining
meso-
and macro-level
social
phenomena by
reference
to
the actions
of
the
individuals
involved.
Second,
it
should
give
primacy
to
analytical
models
to
be
judged
by
their
explanatory utility
and
parsimony,
as
much
as
by
their
realism.3
Third,
the
specifi
cation of S
must
not
require
that
be
directly
observable;
many
social
mechanisms,
they
argue,
cannot
be
observed.
Although
Hedstr?m
and Swedberg point appreciatively towork
done
by
Coleman,
Granovetter,
and
others,
their
paradigm
case
of
an
adequately specified
social mechanism is
Merton's
(1968) theory
of
the
self-fulfilling
prophesy,
by
which
a
false
definition
of
a
situation
leads individuals
to
act
so
as
to
bring
that
situation
about,
as
when
belief
in
the
insolvency
of
a
bank leads
to
a run
that
causes
insolvency.
This
theory
meets
their
criteria
because
it
postulates
the
existence
of
a "general belief-formation mechanism which
states
that
the number of
individuals who
per
form
a
certain
act
signals
to
others the
likely
value
or
necessity
of the
act,
and this
signal
will
influence
other
individuals' choice of action"
(p.
21,
emphasis
in
original).
Mechanisms
as
Observable Processes
that
Do Not
Require
the
Positing
of
Motives
For Reskin
(2003),
the
specification
of
a
social
mechanism
need
not
have all
the
properties
demanded
by
Hedstr?m
and
Swedberg. Laying
out
an
agenda
for
research
on
ascriptive
inequality,
she
urges
scholars
to
stop
being
concerned with
models that
posit
motives for
unequal
allocations
and
focus instead
on
uncovering
mechanisms
by
which "ascribed
characteristics"
are
linked
"to
outcomes
of
varying
desirability" (p.
7).
For
Reskin,
as
for
Hedstr?m and
Swedberg,
mechanisms
are
what
happen
inside
the
black
box
of social causal
ity?they
are
"processes
that
convert
inputs
or
independent
variables)
into
outputs
(or
depen
dent
variables)"
(p.
7).
She
glosses
mecha
nisms-based
approaches
to
inequality
as
those
concerned with
the
question
of
how
inequali
ties arise inallocation.4 Unlike Hedstr?m and
Swedberg,
however,
Reskin
argues
that
how
questions
must
be
answerable
in
terms
of
observable
processes;
in
her
view,
this feature
commends them
over
why questions
from the
standpoint
of
realism,
for
themotives of indi
viduals
and
groups
typically
cannot
be
seen.
The
only
exception
concerns
mechanisms
pos
tulated
to
operate
at
the
intrapsychic
level;
interpersonal,
societal,
and
organizational
mechanisms must meet the observability
requirement.
Mechanisms
as
Lower-Order
Social
Processes
Stinchcombe
(1998:267),
building
on
Coleman,
offers
an
alternative
by suggesting
that
mechanisms
are
"bits of
'sometimes
true
theory'
or
'models' that
represent
a
causal
process, that have some actual or possible
empirical
support
separate
from the
larger
the
ory
in
which it
is
a
mechanism,
and
that
gen
erate
increased
precision,
power,
or
elegance
in
the
large-scale
theories."
Although
not
a
methodological
individualist,
he
argues
that
all
social mechanisms involve
processes
affect
ing
lower-order units of
analysis?processes
that in
aggregate
bring
about
the
relationship
X?>Y
for
higher-order
units
under
considera
tion.
Stinchcombe, however, insists
that
we
may
be able
to
show
that
causes
Y without
knowing
much
about
the
underlying,
lower
order
mechanisms:
only
when
such
knowledge
3
As
noted
below,
Hedstr?m
(2005)
objects
to
"instrumentalist"
versions of rational
choice
theory
that
ignore
realism
altogether.
4
Much
recent
empirical
work
on
mechanisms of
inequality
can
be
seen
as
carrying
out
Reskin's
pro
gram
(e.g.,
Rivera
2008;
Stevens
2007).
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A
PRAGMATIST
THEORY OF
SOCIAL MECHANISMS
361
gives
us a
better
understanding
of the
higher
order
relationship?for
example,
of
the
con
texts
in which the
relationship
is
likely
to
obtain?will
it
be
helpful
to
have
a
grasp
of the
relevant mechanisms.
Mechanisms
as
Triggerable
Causal
Powers
"Critical realism"
provides
a
fourth
approach
to
mechanisms.
For critical
realists
like
Bhaskar
and
Collier,
the
search
for
mechanisms is
the
sine
qua
non
of
science.
In
their
view,
the iden
tification
of
mechanisms
involves
analytic
movement across three ontological domains:
from
the
empirical,
where scientists
access
expe
rience;
to
the
actual,
where
they identify
the
events
that
generate
that
experience;
to
the
real,
wherein lie the
causal
mechanisms?usually
unseen?by
virtue
of which
one
event
causes
another.
Key
to
critical
realism's
understanding
of this
process
is the claim
that
movement
from
the
empirical
to
the real
involves
movement
along
a
continuum
from
an
"open"
toward
a
"closed" system. A mechanism is "that aspect
of the
structure
f
a
thingby
virtue
of
which
it
has
a
certain
[causal]
power" (Collier
1994:62).
Mechanisms, however,
"operate
[only]
when
suitably
triggered"
(p.
62),
and
outside the lab
oratory
mechanisms
almost
always
coexist with
a
host of
other
mechanisms,
processes,
and fac
tors
that
inhibit
that
triggering
or
otherwise
interfere
ith the
causal
relationship.
"Under
non-experimental
conditions,"
in
other
words,
"we can see only what [a] mechanism in con
junction
with
other
actors
makes
it
do"
(p.
33,
emphasis
in
original)?that
is,
we can see
it
operate
only
in
an
open
system.
Experi
mentation,
by
contrast,
creates
a
closed
system
"to
isolate
one
mechanism
of
nature
from the
effects of
others,
to
see
what that
mechanism
does
on
its
own"
(p.
33).
Science
proceeds
by
generating
such
isolation and
thus involves nei
ther
a
search
for
covering
laws
nor a
simple
accumulation of findings. Rather, science
searches for
an
increasingly
comprehensive
and
deep
understanding
of
causal
mechanisms,
the
mechanisms that
underlie
mechanisms,
and
how
the
configuration
of
particular
open
systems
affects the
functioning
ofmechanisms.
Bhaskar
and
other
critical
realists
devote
par
ticular attention
to
the social
sciences,
which
they
see as
studying
systems
especially
resist
ant
tomovement in
the direction of
closure,
not
least because
of what
they postulate
to
be
the
intrinsic
capacity
of human
beings
to
work
at
transforming
social relations. This
resistance
has
methodological implications
(see
Ekstr?m
1992).
In the social
sciences,
explanation
can
only
take
the form of
breaking
events down
into
their
omponent parts,
identifying?by
the
elaboration of
analytic
models?the mecha
nisms that could have
helped
generate
them,
and
determining,
through
empirically
ground
ed reflection
on
the conditions of
historical
pos
sibility,
whether
and
how those
mechanisms,
with others
and
given contingent
circumstances,
actually broughtabout theevents (see Steinmetz
2004).
Unlike
methodological
individualists,
critical realists
are
also
emergentists
who
argue
that
higher-order
strata
of social
reality
emerge
out
of lower-order
ones,
and that
events
within
those
emergent
strata
are
caused
by
mecha
nisms
unique
to
them nd
not
reducible
to
lower
order
mechanisms.5
Mechanisms
as
Transforming
Events
A
final
framework is
outlined
by
Tilly
(2001),
who,
like
most
students
of
mechanisms,
con
trasts
mechanisms-based
accounts
with those
centering
on
the search for
covering
laws. He
also
counterposes
them
with
"propensity
accounts" that "consider
explanation
to
consist
of
reconstructing
a
given
actor's
state
at
the
threshold of
action,
with that
state
variously
stipulated
as
motivation,
consciousness, need,
organization,
or
momentum" and
to
"systems
explanations"
that "consist of
specifying
the
place
of
some
event, structure,
or
process
with
in
a
larger
...
set
of
interdependent
elements"
(p.
569).
Mechanisms-based
approaches,
by
contrast,
"select
salient features
of
[historical]
episodes
...
and
explain
them
by identifying
robustmechanisms of
relatively
general
scope"
(p.
569).
Tilly
has
a
distinct
understanding,
how
ever,
of what mechanisms
consist
of.
They
"are
events
that
alter relations
among
some
specified
set
of
elements,"
and
they
come
in three
vari
eties:
"cognitive
mechanisms
operate
through
alterations
of
individual and collective
percep
tion";
"relational
mechanisms
alter
connections
5
For
a
discussion of social
emergence,
see
Sawyer
(2005).
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AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL
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among
people,
groups,
and
interpersonal
net
works";
and "environmental mechanisms
exert
external influences
on
the conditions
affecting
[social]
processes"
(p.
572).
In
Tilly's
view,
consequently,
social
expla
nation should involve
"pursuing]
particular
mechanisms
across
different
settings"
and
examining
the
role of those
mechanisms,
includ
ing
how
they
"concatenate"
into "social
process
es,"
in
bringing
about
puzzling
historical
episodes.
In
describing
mechanisms
as
events,
Tilly
refers
first
and
foremost
to
the different
kinds of
practices
actors
can
enact
together,
such
as
pursuing
"certification"
of their
politi
cal
identities,
as numerous would-be states did
vis-?-vis theUnited
Nations
afterWorld War
II,
or
"brokerage"
involving
actors
"establishing,
severing,
or
realigning
connections
among
social sites"
(p. 575),
which
Tilly
describes
as
a
defining
feature
of
social
life
in
the Soviet
Union.
Tilly
recognizes
thatmechanisms
thus
understood,
while
relatively
general
in
nature,
may
be instantiated
differently
n
differenthis
torical
periods.
For
example,
he
notes
thatmech
anisms of competition, involving "striving
among
several
actors
within
a
reward-allocat
ing
arena"
(p.
575),
are
key
features
of
the
con
tentious
politics waged
by
social
movement
activists,
but that
politics
of this
sort,
with
its
unique phenomenology, emerged
only
in the
nineteenth
century.
Analysts
of
mechanisms
must
thereforebe attentive
to
time and
place?
in
particular,
to
ways
in
which social mecha
nisms
may
"incorporate
institutions,
understandings, and
practices
that have accu
mulated
historically"
(p.
570).
Tilly's
(1995a:
1602)
program
for social research
thus
involves
"the
historically
embedded search
for
deep
causes
operating
in
variable
combinations,
circumstances,
and
sequences
with
consequently
variable
outcomes."
Toward
a
Definition
To extractaworking definition of social mech
anisms from these
conceptualizations,
I
consider
the
major
points
on
which
the
authors
agree
and
disagree.
First
the
points
of
explicit
and
tacit
agreement:
1. Social mechanisms
are
causal
in that
they
mediate between
cause
and
effect.
In the
sequence
X-^Y,
neither Xnor 7nor
the
causal
relationship
itself
is
a
social
mechanism. The
mechanism
is
rather the
process
or
means
by
which
X
causes
Y This
process
must
have
a
significant
social
component
if
themechanism
is
to
be
considered
a
social
one.
A volcanic
eruption
leveling
a
village
and
destroying
a
community
is
an
environmental mechanism
(not
in
Tilly's sense),
not
a
social
one,
although
it
might help
establish the conditions
under
which social
mechanisms
could
unfold.6
It
might
also be connectedwith other
social
mech
anisms that
incorporate
and mediate environ
mental
factors,
such
as
those
that
help explain
the
geographic
positioning
of the
village
or
the
nature
of its
housing
stock.
2. Social mechanisms unfold in time.Social
mechanisms
bring
about
causal
effects
through
a
temporal
sequence
of events
or
processes
occurring
in
the
social
world
at
the
micro-,
meso-,
or
macro-level
or
across
levels.
A
social
fact
or
phenomenon
that
causes
another
social
fact
or
phenomenon
instantaneously,
with
no
intervening
processes,
is
unimaginable;
such
processes
make
up
mechanisms
and
are
always
temporally
embedded. The duration of
the
sequences involved may vary greatly. The
sequence
may
be
short?a
matter
of
a
few
inter
actions and
cognitive-affective
processes?for
example,
when
an
individual
in
a
small-group
judges
another
with low
external
status
char
acteristics
more
positively
after that
person
demonstrates
commitment
to
the
group
(Ridgeway
1982).
The
duration of
a
mecha
nism
may
extend
over
years,
as
for
individuals
in
occupations
involving high
levels
of work
place autonomy who
come
to value indepen
dence
and
self-direction
(Kohn
et
al.
1990).
Or
the
mechanism
may
unfold
over
centuries,
as
in
the
sequence
of
events
by
which
the
Protestant
Reformation
instilled social
discipline
in
pop
ulations,
laying
the
microfoundations
for the
rise of
strong
nation-states
(Gorski 2003).
3.
Social mechanisms
are
general,
although
in
varying
degrees.
If
a
person
grows
up
in
a
neighborhood
with
a
high degree
of
social dis
organization,
has
no
one
exerting
informal
social
control
over
her,
and
turns to
a
life
of crime
(Wilson
1996),
a
social mechanism
can
be
said
to
be
at
play
only
if the
process
is
more or
less
6
For
example,
mechanisms
relating
to
the result
ing high
levels
of
anomie,
as
in
Erikson's
(1978)
classic
study
of Buffalo
Creek,
West
Virginia.
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A
PRAGMATIST
THEORY OF SOCIAL
MECHANISMS
363
typical
of
actors in
similar circumstances.
Every
such
person
need
not
be
subject
to
themecha
nism,
or
affected
by
it in the
same
way,
but
a
social
mechanism
is
a
causal
process
with
some
minimum level of
generality.
As
Tilly's analy
sis makes
clear,
however,
mechanisms
may
sometimes be
invoked
to
explain
particular
events
(e.g.,
historical
ones).
However much
the
events
typically
studied
by
historical
soci
ologists
involve
dramatic breaks
from
estab
lished social routines
(Sewell
1996),
they
are
explicable
in termsofmechanisms
to
the
extent
that
they
are
instances
of
a
more
general
phe
nomenon,
such
as
revolution
(Skocpol
1979),
or
result from combinations ofmore
general
mech
anisms
(see
Steinmetz
2005;
Tilly
1995a).
4. Because
a
social
mechanism
is
an
inter
mediary
process,
it is
necessarily
composed
of
elements
analyzed
at
a
lower
order
of
com
plexity
or
aggregation
than
the
phenomenon
it
helps explain.
The
nature
of
this hierarchical
relationship
will
vary
by
case,
but
Stinchcombe
speaks
for
most
writers
on
social
mechanisms
when
he
argues
that
identifying
them
means
peering intoa layerof social reality thatserves
as a
substratum
for the
phenomenon
under
investigation.
All work
on
social
mechanisms
assumes
that
mechanisms
are
the
gears
in
some
social
machinery
and
thus
stand
in
a
relation
ship
of lesser
to
greater
vis-?-vis the
causal
effect
they
ring
about
(see
Johnson
2002:230).
If
we
let
theoretical
consensus
be
our
guide,
these
points
of
agreement
should be
incorpo
rated into
any
adequate
definition
of
social
mechanisms. But such a definition should also
be
sufficiently
broad
to
accommodate
points
of
significant
epistemological
and
method
ological disagreement:
1.
Methodological
individualism
versus
social
ontologism.
Those
like
Hedstr?m
and
Swedberg,
who believe that
individual
persons
must
be
the
point
of
departure
for
social
analysis,
take
a
different
approach
to
mechanisms
than
do
critical
realists,
who
recognize
the nonreductive
reality of emergent social entities. In fact,
Hedstr?m
and
Swedberg
(1998:12)
make
a
case
only
for
a
"weak
version"
of
methodological
individualism.
In
many
instances,
they
rgue,
it
may
be
impossible
for
explanation
to trace
all
the
steps
by
which
the actions
of individuals
aggregate
to
compose
a
supra-individual
enti
ty?the
demand
of
methodological
individual
ism in
its
"strong
version."
Insofar
as
this is
so,
parsimony
not
only
allows but
requires
"taking
certain macro-level
states
as
given
and
incor
porating
them into the
explanation"
(p.
13).
Generally,
however,
Hedstr?m and
Swedberg
believe that the
analysis
ofmechanisms should
focus
on
processes
centered
on
individual-level
action. For critical
realists,
who
are
committed
to
a
social
ontologist position,
by
contrast,
it is
acceptable?the point
about
analytic
hierarchy
notwithstanding?to study
social
mechanisms
without much
concern
for the
individual-level
phenomena by
which
they
come
about
(e.g.,
Steinmetz
2005;
see
also Burris
2007).
2. Formal
versus
substantive
mechanisms.
Beyond therequirementthat ocialmechanisms
have
a
minimum level of
generality,
some
schol
ars are
concerned
with
causal
relationships
that
obtain because of the form of the
sociological
case
at
hand,
in
roughly
Simmel's
(1971)
sense
of the
term
"formal."What
matters
here
is that
an
X?> Y
relationship
comes
about
because
of
the
formal,
structural haracteristics
f the
social
relations
involved,
as
in
Burt's
(2001)
argument
that social
capital advantages
accrue
to actors
whose network ties span the "structural holes"
other
actors encounter.
The
content
of the situ
ation
in
which
actors
accrue
or
fail
to
accrue
such
an
advantage,
where
content
is either
the
actor's
subjective
understanding
of
it
or
the
ana
lyst's categorization
in
terms
of social
domain
or
manifest
or
latent
function,
matters
only
indi
rectly
to
Burt's
argument.
By
contrast,
Reskin's
call for the
study
of
mechanisms
generative
of
ascriptive inequality
aims
to
isolate
mecha
nisms operative specifically in situations of
allocation. Those who take Reskin's
view
that
the
key
mechanisms
to
study
are
substantive
rather than formal
typically
focus
on
domains
rich with
the relevant
mechanisms,
whereas
advocates of
more
formal
approaches
seek
to
identify
mechanisms
so
abstract that
they
oper
ate
across
virtually
all
domains.
The closer
to
the formal end of the
continuum
a
conceptual
ization ofmechanisms
is,
the less attentive
t ill
be to variation in theworking ofmechanisms
across
time and
space.
Nearly
all
approaches,
however,
proceed
from the
recognition
that
in
social
life
contingent
circumstances
cannot
be
completely explained
away.
3.
Analytical
versus
realist
models.
A
final
point
of contention
among
those who
offer
con
ceptualizations
of
social mechanisms
is
episte
mol?gica :
Is the
goal
to
produce
models
that
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AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL
REVIEW
allow
for
elegant
and
robust
predictions,
whether
or
not
the
postulated
mechanisms
can
be shown
to
be
present
and
operative
in
reality?
Or
should
one
seek
to
identify
echanisms
that
re
empir
ically
observable? Hernes
(1998:78),
con
tributing
to
Hedstr?m and
Swedberg's
volume
on
social
mechanisms,
takes
the former view:
"A
mechanism is
an
intellectual
construct
that
is
part
of
a
phantom
world
which
may
mimic
real lifewith abstract
actors
that
impersonate
humans and
cast
them in
conceptual
conditions
that mulate
actual
circumstances"
(emphasis
in
original).
Reskin takes
the latter iew?without
giving
up
a concern
for robustness?as
she
would reject postulated mechanisms that are
either
unobservable
or
diverge
from
processes
and
sequences
of
events
that
can
be observed.
Taken
together,
hese
considerations
suggest
the
following
definition:
A
social mechanism
is
a more or
less
general
sequence
or
set
of
social
events
or
processes
analyzed
at
a
lower order
of complexity
or
aggregation
by
which?in
cer
tain circumstances?some
cause
X
tends
to
bring
about
some
effect
in
the
realm
of
human
social relations. This sequence or set may or
may
not
be
analytically
reducible
to
the
ctions
of
individuals who
enact
it,
may
underwrite
for
mal
or
substantive causal
processes,
and
may
be
observed,
unobserved,
or
in
principle
unob
servable.
THE
PROBLEM WITH
CURRENT
FORMULATIONS
Recent scholarship, although helpful in shed
ding light
on
the
term
"social
mechanism,"
is
less
satisfactory
when
it
comes
to
offering
soci
ological
theories
of
mechanisms?that
is,
gen
eral
accounts,
not
of social
causality
as
a
philosophical
concept,
but
of causal
processes
in the
realm of
the
social.
How
should such
processes
be understood?What
are
their
build
ing
blocks? How
do
theyvary?
With
respect
to
such
questions, conceptual
work on social mechanisms tends to take one of
two
forms. Some
work seeks
to
identify
rela
tively
bstract features ofmechanisms but
stops
short of
laying
out
a
fully
developed
theory
of
them.
Stinchcombe's
and
Reskin's
contribu
tions fall into this
camp.
Although
Stinchcombe's work
clarifies
thatmechanisms
bridge
levels of
analysis,
and offers
suggestions
about the
circumstances
in
which the
specifi
cation
of
mechanisms
may
be
helpful,
it
oes
lit
tle
to
delimit the
scope
of
possible
mechanisms
and
provides
no
general
account
of their
nature.
Reskin
offers
a
categorization
of the mecha
nisms relevant
to
the maintenance of
inequali
ty,
but
provides
neither
a
reason
to thinkher
typology
exhaustive
nor
much detail
as
to
the
workings
of
themechanisms
said
to
fallwith
in each
class.
These
omissions
might
stem
from
skepticism
about the
explanatory
gain
from
general
theories.
They
might
also,
however,
stem
from
a
hesitation
on
the
part
of
scholars
to
both make
strong
assumptions
about
social
action
of the kind
that
contemporary
theorists
insiston and to
grapple
with
their
implications
for the
understanding
of causal
processes.
A
different
problem
besets another
strain
of
work.
Perhaps
because the
idea
of
opening
up
theblack box of
causality
to
develop
fully
pec
ified
models
appeals
to
sociologists
who value
a
certain
kind
of
analytical
rigor,
there
is often
an
affinity
between work
on
mechanisms
and
theorization
proceeding
from
assumptions
about
action
thought
to
be
highly rigorous?namely,
scholarship
in the
rational choice
theory
tradi
tion.
Hedstr?m's
work
provides
an
example:
formerly champion
of
rational
choice
theory
proper,
he
now
argues
that
social
mechanisms
should be understood
through
the
lens
ofwhat
he
calls "DBO
theory."
In this
theory,
social
action results when intentional
agents
have
something they
desire
(D),
have
a
belief
(B)
about
theworld
pertaining
to
that
desire,
and
confront
opportunities (O)
that
give
them
options
for
ction from
which
they
must
choose.
Where rational choice
theory posits
"an
atom
ized
actor
equipped
with unlimited
cognitive
abilities that
llow
'him'
to
consistently
choose
the
optimal
course
of action"
(Hedstr?m
2005:36),
DBO
theory
assumes
only
that
"the
cause
of
an
action is
a
constellation
of
desires,
beliefs and
opportunities
in
light
of
which the
action
appears
reasonable"
(p.
39).
Moreover,
while
at
least
some
rational choice approaches
treat
desires and beliefs
as
exogenous
to
the
explanatory
model,
DBO
theory
takes serious
ly
the notion that
"individuals'
attitudes and
beliefs
are
molded
in
interactions
with others"
(p.
43).
Such
a
molding
is
at
the
core
of
Hedstr?m's
conception
of
social mechanisms.
In his
view,
three
types
of
interactional
mech
anisms?belief-,
desire-,
and
opporrunity-medi
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A
PRAGMATIST THEORY
OF
SOCIAL MECHANISMS
365
ated?are the
building
blocks
for
more
complex
social
processes.
The
problem
with
this strain of
work is that
relatively
few
in the
theory
community
agree
that
rational choice
theory
or variants such as
DBO
theory
offer
empirically
or
theoretically
adequate descriptions
of social action.
Several
objections
are
widely
shared
among
theorists
(see
Archer and
Tritter
2000;
Green
and
Shapiro
1994;
Somers
1998).
Rational choice
theory
typically
conceptualizes
rationality
s
an
innate
and
more
or
less
equally
distributed
cognitive
capacity,
whereas
sociological
theorists attend
to
ways
inwhich different
forms of
rationality
appear atdifferent istoricalmoments and come
to
be
differentially
distributed
across
social
space.
Rational choice
approaches?especially
outside
the
"bounded
rationality"
framework?
assume
that,
in
most
circumstances,
individu
als
act
rationally
or
at
least
reasonably
in the
light
of their clear
and coherent
beliefs and
desires.
Leaving
aside
the
question
of whether
most
people
act
rationally
or
reasonably
most
of
the
time,
many
sociological
theorists
would
fol
low Smelser (1998:4) inholding the "psycho
logical postulate"
of
ambiguity
to
have "wide
applicability"
in
social
life,
nd Swidler
(2001)
in
maintaining
that the
logical
coherence
of
individuals'
beliefs about
the
world
is the
excep
tion
rather
than the rule.
Furthermore,
the
tem
poral
phenomenology
of
much social action
departs
from that
implied
by
rational choice
approaches.
While these
approaches
suggest
an
individual armed with beliefs
and desires
who
steps out of theflow of action toface and eval
uate
a
choice between
competing
means,
theo
rists
note
that
such
moments
are
empirically
rare,
tend
to
come
about
in
a
socially
structured
fashion,
and
often
involve
an
inverse
temporal
ordering
inwhich
goals
emerge
and
are
clari
fied
only
after
individuals
tentatively
mbark
on
one
means or
another.
Finally,
whereas
rational
choice
approach
es?like those
emphasizing
the norm-directed
nature of action?assume that most action is
motivated,
many
sociological
theorists
argue
that
socially
learned habit
is
a
major
proximate
cause
of behavior
(Camic
1986).
While
recog
nizing
that
lines of habitual
activity might
accord with individuals'
strategic
or
expressive
interests,
theorists view
most
separate
acts
com
posing
those
lines
as
not
directly
motivated
and
see
individuals'
retrospective
accounts
of
why
they
did
something
as
post
hoc rationalizations
that,
beyond
being
restricted
to
a
prescientific
"vocabulary
of
motives"
(Mills
1940),
often
obscure thefact that
o
realmotivation
or
choice
was involved.7Because these criticisms
apply
as
much
to
DBO
theory
as
to
more
conven
tional
rational
choice
models,
no
sociologist
who
finds them
convincing
is
likely
to
think
Hedstr?m's
theory
of social
mechanisms?or
cognate
theories offered
by
Elster and
others?
promising.8
In
response
to
these
concerns;
in
reaction
to
other
developments
in
the
human sciences such
as
existentialism,
structural
Marxism,
and
anthropological
structuralism;
and
building
on
other
developments including
phenomenology,
ethnomethodology,
and work
on
"rule
follow
ing" inspiredby
the later
Wittgenstein,
theorists
in
recent
decades
have
argued
that social
prac
tices?not
discrete actions?should
be
the
focus
of
social research
at
the level
of the
individual
or
group.
Practices
are
generally
understood
as
forms
of
doing
or
ways
of
acting
and
interact
ing
that
appear
within
particular
communities
or
groups;
depend
on shared
presuppositions
and
assumptions;
often have
a
significant
cor
poreal
or
material
dimension;
and
unfold
in
individuals' lives
as a
result of
active,
creative,
and less than
fully
conscious
puttings
into
play
of those
presuppositions
and
assumptions
in
the
context
of various and
intersecting
sociobi
ographical
and interactional
exigencies.
Conceptualized
as
such,
practices
are
at
the
heart of
Bourdieu's
(1990) theory
of social
fields,
Butler's
(1990)
analysis
of the
perfor
mativity
of
gender,
Giddens's
(1984)
theory
of
structuration,
norr-Cetina's
(1999)
investiga
tions of the
"epistemic
cultures"
of science
and
modern
society,
Ortner's
(1984)
efforts
to
reground anthropological
understandings
of
7
Not
all theorists
in
the
rational
choice
tradition
are
subject
to
these
criticisms.
Macy's (1993)
"back
ward-looking
model of social control"
posits
that
actors
learn
through experience
about
the
general
conditions under
which it
makes
sense
to
participate
in
collective
action,
eliminating
the
need for infor
mation-intensive calculation
in
every
instance.
8
However,
a
growing
literature
in the
philosophy
of social science
argues
that "false models"
may
still
be
extremely
useful
in
explanation
(e.g.,
Hindriks
2008).
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AMERICAN
SOCIOLOGICAL
REVIEW
culture,
and
Sewell's
(2005)
contributions
to
historiography,
among
many
other
contribu
tions
(for
review,
see
Schatzki
1996, 2002;
Schatzki
et
al.
2001).
Nearly
all
specific
theo
retical
programs
advanced under the rubric of
practice
theory
ave
come
in
for
criticism,
s
has
the notion
of
social
practices
itself
(Turner
1994),
but this
has
not
deterred
a
significant
amount
of
research
into the
practices
seen as
constitutive
of social
life
in
numerous
domains
and
historical
settings.
Students
of social
practices
have
by
no
means
ignored
causality.
Indeed,
as
Ortner
notes
in
a
seminal
1984
article,
the
turn
toward
practice
among
contemporary
theorists,
while
incorpo
rating
notions
of
the
active,
knowledgeable,
culturally interpretive
gent
that
can
be
found
in earlier
humanistic
approaches
such
as
sym
bolic
interactionism,
departs
from the antide
terminism
that
often
characterizes
such
approaches
by
seeing
in
patterned
iterations
of
practice
thebasis
for the
reproduction
of
social
structures,
in
particular,
structures
of
inequali
ty.
aced
with
causal
questions
such
as
"Why
is
there
not
more
intergenerational
pward
mobil
ity
in
contemporary
capitalist
societies?"
researchers
who
take
a
practice
approach
do
not
hesitate
to
point
to
practices
and their
ausal
effects,
s
in
Lareau's
(2003)
claim
that
differ
ences
in
childrearing
between
working-
and
middle-class
parents
instill
distinctive
disposi
tions
in their
offspring
that
are
differentially
rewarded
in
school and
on
the labor
market.
Yet the direct
production
and
reproduction
of
social
structuresof
inequality
by
means
of
the
iteration
f
practices
is
only
one
kind of
causal
effect
that
may
interest
ocial scientists. To
the
extent
that
it
remains
unclear
how
a
variety
of
other causal
processes
build
on
and intersect
with
social
practices?as
it
does,
given
thatfew
who
take
a
practice approach
address social
mechanisms?much
empirical
research
will
find
itself
deprived
of
sophisticated
action-the
oretical foundations.
I
argue
that
solution
to
this
problem
can
be
found
by
developing
a
theory
of
social
mecha
nisms
on
the basis
of
an
approach
to
social
action
that
has
affinities
with other strains
of
practice
theory
but is less
reductive
at
the
level
of action than
theories
like Bourdieu's.
This
approach
is the
one
taken
by
the
classical
American
pragmatists
Peirce, James,
Dewey,
and
Mead and elaborated
toward
a
sociological
theory
of action
by
Joas
(1996).
THE
PRAGMATIST THEORY OF
ACTION
The
classical
American
pragmatists
were
philosophers,
not
sociological
theorists
per
se.
Yet
as
Joas
shows,
despite
disagreement
among
them
and
significant interpretive
disputes
among
contemporary
scholars
as
to
the
mean
ing
of
pragmatism,
the classical
pragmatists
were
for the
most
part
united
in their
under
standing
of
the basic
nature
of human
activity
vis-?-vis thesocial and naturalworlds. Rejecting
theCartesian view
that
thought
nd
action,
mind
and
body,
are
ontologically
distinct,
the
prag
matists
argued
that
in
anthropological
terms,
humans
are
problem
solvers and
the
function
of
thought
s
to
guide
action
in
the service
of solv
ing
practical problems
that arise
in the
course
of life.From
this
claim,
wide
ranging
and
con
troversial
epistemological implications
followed.
More
important
in
the
present
context,
howev
er, is the corollary claim that action, as a
response
to
problem
situations,
involves
an
alternation
between
habit and
creativity.
The
main
way
humans
solve
problems,
the
prag
matists
held,
is
by enacting
habits?those
learned
through
social
experience
or
from
pre
vious
individual
efforts
t
problem
solving.
By
habits,
the
pragmatists
meant
not
rote
behavior,
but
"acquired predisposition[s]
to
ways
or
modes of
response" (Dewey
1922:42,
empha
sis inoriginal) ofwhich actors are typicallynot
conscious
in
the
moment.
Only
when
preexist
ing
habits fail
to
solve
a
problem
at
hand does
an
action-situation
rise
to
the forefront
of
con
sciousness
as
problematic.
Then,
the
pragmatists
argued,
humankind's innate
capacity
for
cre
ativity
comes
into
play
as
actors
dream
up pos
sible
solutions,
later
integrating
some
of these
into
their
stocks of
habit
for
use
on
subsequent
occasions.9
9
Space
constraints
prevent
me
from
offering
a
more
nuanced
account
of
pragmatism
or
considering
the
implications
for
sociology
of
a
pragmatist
epis
temology
or
philosophy
of science. The
one
point
1
make with
regard
to
the latter is
to
reject
the
idea that
for
pragmatists
any
action model that
"works"
to
yield
a
robust
explanation
will
suffice.
As
Joas
shows,
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A
PRAGMATIST
THEORY
OF
SOCIAL
MECHANISMS
367
Blumer
(1969),
formulating
the
program
of
symbolic
interactionism,
ownplayed
this lter
nation
between
habituality
and
creativity,
but
correctly
noted that
meaning
is also central
to
a pragmatistview of action. Problem situations
present
themselves
to
actors
through
the lens
es
of the
cultural environments
n
which
they
re
immersed.
Such environments
give
meaning
to
and
help
provide
the
content
of the
goals,
ori
entations,
identities,
vocabularies of
motive,
and other
understandings
of the action
situation
that
ctors
come
to
have.
They
also
provide
the
basis
for
intersubjective
judgments
about
the
adequacy
of
problem
solutions. All
habits
are
thusenacted on the basis of culturallymediat
ed
interpretations
f the situation
one
faces
(see
Alexander
1988),
not
least
interpretations
of
the
intentions
of interaction
partners.
Why
should
sociologists
take
a
pragmatist
approach
to
action
seriously?
A
full
treatment
of
this
question
goes
beyond
the
scope
of
this
article,
but
I
can
outline
some
reasons
why
one
might
prefer
pragmatism
to
both
rational
choice
theory
and
practice
theory
approaches
such
as
Bourdieu's.
Pragmatism
is often
misunderstood
as a
form
of
utilitarianism,
but there
re
at
least five
ways
in
which it
differs from?and is
superior
to?
rational
choice
theory
(for
discussion,
see
Beckert
2002;
Joas
1996;
Whitford
2002).
First,
pragmatism
does
not
equate
problem
solving
with
the
maximization of
utility.
o be
sure,
the
situations
humans
experience
as
problems
may
involve
utility
maximization?for
example,
the
need
of
businesses
to
generate
revenue.
But the
kinds of
problems
of
concern
to
pragmatists
range
much
more
widely
and
include
all the
difficulties
humans
or
collective
actors
face
in
life,
from
theneed
to
remain
healthy
to
the
need
to
find
meaning
and
purpose
in
existence. To
reduce these
to
the desire
to
maximize
on a
preference
function is
to
ignore
the
phenome
the
epistemology
of the
classical
pragmatists
was
premised
on
their
anthropology.
My
view
of
the
tra
dition draws from
many
texts,
especially
Dewey
([1910]
1978,
[1920]
1982,
1922),
James
([1907]
1975),
and Peirce
(1992, 1998).
Beside
classic
con
tributions
to
symbolic
interactionism,
previous
efforts
at
bringing pragmatist insights
into
sociology
include
Lewis
and Smith
(1980),
Maines,
Sugrue,
and
Katovich
(1983),
Mills
(1966),
Seidman
(1996),
and
Shalin
(1986).
For
discussion,
see
Gross
(2007).
nological
diversity
involved in
the
experiencing
of
problem
situations.
Second,
to
reiterate the
point
about
meaning,
pragmatists
insist that
problem
situations
are
always
interpreted
through
cultural lenses. Even in situations of
instrumental
rationality,
actors
are
enmeshed
in
webs of
meaning
that
indicate
the
significa
tion of
the
ends
they
are
trying
to
pursue,
con
strain
the
choices
they
make
by
setting
imits
n
the
thinkability
f
means,
and sustain the social
relationships
in
which
instrumentality
ust
be
embedded. Rational choice
theory
makes
little
room
for
culture
thus
understood.
Third,
prag
matists
argue?directly
against
most
utilitari
ans?that much action ishabitual and
typically
involves
no
conscious
weighing
of
means
and
ends.
Fourth,
pragmatists
maintain that instru
mental
rationality
itself,
hen it
does
appear,
is
a
kind
of
habit,
a
way
that
some
humans
can
learn
to
respond
to
certain
situations,
and that
we
should
be
as
interested
in
the historical
processes
by
which
the
habit of
rationality?in
its
various
forms?develops
and is situational
ly deployed
as
we
should be in
its effects.
Finally, pragmatists
suggest
that
means
and
ends
are
not
always
given
prior
to
action,
as
assumed in
most
rational
choice
models,
but
are
often
emergent
from
action,
as
lines
of
activity
are
initiated
that
lead
actors
to
see
themselves
in
new
ways,
to
value different
kinds
of
goods,
and
to
become
attached
to
problem
solutions
they
could
not
have
imagined
previously
(Whitford
2002).
Thus
described, pragmatism,
in
its under
standing
of social
action,
sounds similar
to
work
in
the
practice
theory
tradition.A number of
commentators
point
to
commonalities
at
the
level
of
action
theory
between
pragmatism
and
the
thought
of
Bourdieu
(Aboulafia
1999;
Dalton
2004;
Emirbayer
and
Goldberg
2005;
Shusterman
1999).
Bourdieu
himself
noted that
"the
affinities
and
convergences
are
quite
strik
ing"
and
that
his
approach,
like
Dewey's,
"grant[s]
a
central role
to
thenotion of habit,
understood
as
an
active and
creative relation
to
the
world,
and
rejectfs]
all the
conceptual
dualisms
upon
which
nearly
all
post-Cartesian
philosophies
are
based:
subject
and
object,
inter
nal
and
external,
material
and
spiritual,
indi
vidual
and
social,
and
so
on"
(Bourdieu
and
Wacquant
1992:122).
If
pragmatism
and
prac
tice
theory,
t
least of
the
Bourdieusian
variety,
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368 AMERICAN
SOCIOLOGICAL
REVIEW
are so
similar,
why
should
sociologists
prefer
the
former?
Some
might
argue
that
they
should
not.
Similar
though
the
two
approaches
may
be
in
certain
respects,
the claim could be made that
there s
one
crucial
difference.
Practice
theorists
like Bourdieu
routinely
tie their
analyses
of
practices
to
questions
of
social-structural
pro
duction and
reproduction,
which have
not
been
a
major
concern
of
scholars
working
in
a
prag
matist framework.
The
objection
here is
not
simply
that
the
work has
not
yet
been
done
to
link
pragmatist
understandings
of action
with
accounts
of
meso-
and
macro-level
phenome
na, sociology's typicalobjects of explanation.As
important,
the
lack of such
linkage
may
lead
pragmatists
to
ignore
systematic
and
conse
quential
patterns
in
the
distribution
of habitu
ality?by
social
class
position,
for
example.
To
my
mind, however,
this
argument
counts
in favor
of
pragmatism.
Because
approaches
to
prac
tice
theory
like Bourdieu's
aim
primarily
at
accounting
for
social
reproduction,
they
end
up
placing
far
too
much
emphasis
on
the
strategic
dimensions of action.Although Bourdieu does
not
see
every
individual
act
as
motivated,
he
does
view
most
lines of
activity
as
connected
to
actors' interests
in
leveraging
themselves
into
favorable
positions
inmultidimensional social
hierarchies,
and thus
as
tied
to
themaintenance
or
transformation
of those hierarchies.
As critics of
Bourdieu
have
pointed
out
(e.g.,
Alexander
1995),
however,
this
analytical
reduc
tion
is
as
problematic
in
its
own
way
as
ration
al choice theory is in its. In Bourdieu's
framework,
practices
tend
not to
be
seen as
sub
scribed
to
on
thebasis of
relatively
utonomous
identity
commitments,
or
ultimate values
dis
connected
from
broader
social-structural
posi
tionings,
or
by
virtue
of the
sheer force
of
tradition
or
institutionalization.
Yet
evidence
from domains
as
diverse
as
religion
(Smith
2003),
politics
(Stryker,
Owens,
and White
2000),
intellectual
life
(Gross
2008),
and
inti
macy (Gross 2005) suggest thatfactors of iden
tity,morality,
or
tradition
can
certainly
underlie
the
adoption
of
a
social
practice
by
a
group,
as
well
as
shape
individuals'
enactments
of it. uch
factors
must not
be
seen
as
residual
or
epiphe
nomenal
elements
but
as
coexisting
and
in
some
cases
intersecting
with
strategic
concerns over
social
positioning.
In
part
because
pragmatist
understandings
of action
were
not
designed
to
account
for social
reproduction?but
also
because the
habituality-creativity
continuum,
for
pragmatists,
is
meant to
encompass
rather
than
substitute for other forms of
action,
while
giving pride
of
place
tomatters of
identity
nd
meaning?pragmatism
is better able
to
accom
modate the
diversity
of action and
practice.
Although
nothing
in
a
pragmatist
approach
would
deny
that
some
practices
are
closely
bound
up
with
the
reproduction
of social
inequality,
the
very
thinness
of
the
model
at
the
meso-
and macro-levels
gives
it
a
flexibility
and
range
lacking
in
other
approaches.
A PRAGMATIST THEORY OF
MECHANISMS
The
key
claim
to
advance
in
constructing
a
the
ory
of social
mechanisms
on
these foundations
is this:
Pragmatists
would
view
social
mecha
nisms
as
composed
of
chains
or
aggregations
of
actors
confronting problem
situations and mobi
lizing
more or
less habitual
responses.
I
noted
above that alternation
between
habit and
cre
ativity is at the heart of pragmatism, and that
pragmatists
see
this
alternation
as
underlying?
not
substituting
for?other action forms
(Joas
1996).
These
characteristics
of the
approach,
combined
with the
focus
on
meaning, yield
unique leverage
over
the
notion
of
mechanisms.
To
see
why,
let
us
follow Hedstr?m
and
Swedberg
at
least
part
way
and describe
a
social
mechanism
as
the
structure
or
process
S
by
which
some
input
/leads
to
outcome
O.
A
prag
matist theoryofmechanisms would hold thatto
understand
S,
we
must
examine the
individual
and collective
actors
Ax_n
involved
in the 1-0
relationship.
For
each,
our
goal
should
be
to
understand
why
and
how,
when confronted
with
problem
situation
Pn
and endowed with
habits
of
cognition
and action
Hn,
along
with
other
resources,
response
Rn
becomes the
most
like
ly.
S will then
consist
of
all the relations
A
x_n
?P\-n ?H\_n -R\-n
that,
in
aggregate
or
sequen
tially,bring about the1-0 relationship.
For
example,
suppose
we are
interested
in
the
relationship
between
race
and
income
inequality
and
follow
Pager
(2003)
in consid
ering
African
American
men
and the effects
of
a
criminal record and
"negative
credentialing"
on
the
likelihood
of
gaining employment.
Many
kinds of
actors,
problem
situations,
and
habit
ual
responses
make
up
this
mechanism,
but
a
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A PRAGMATIST
THEORY OF SOCIAL
MECHANISMS
369
pragmatist approach
might
concentrate
on
understanding
how,
for
employers
trying
omeet
staffing
needs
with
reliable
workers,
and in the
context
of
prevailing
racial-juridical
cultural
structures, ertainhabits of
thought
and action
are
employed
according
to
which
potential
employees
are
coded in
terms
of
trustworthiness
depending
on
their
race
and
history
with
the
jus
tice
system,
giving
rise
to
discriminatory
allo
cation decisions.
Aggregated
across
employers,
such
an
A-P-H-R
chain
is
the mechanism of
negative
credentialing
in
this
case.
I
hypothesize
that
most
social mechanisms
can
be
understood
in
this
way?as
chains
or
aggregations
of actors,
problem
situations,
and
habitual
responses?always
with the
possibili
ty, greater
in
some
circumstances
than
others,
that
a
novel
way
of
responding
to
a
problem
could
emerge
for
any
of the
actors
involved,
potentially
altering
the
workings
of themech
anism.
A
pragmatist
social
science concerned
with
mechanisms
would
aim
to
uncover
the
nature
of such
chains: the
types
intowhich
they
may
be
classified,
the
actors
involved
in
their
operation, the habits employed by such actors
and their
origins,
the
circumstances
in
which the
mechanisms
operate,
their nterconnection ith
other
mechanisms,
and their causal effects.
Note the
centrality
of
meaning
in
the
Pager
example;
themechanism is
interpretive
ll the
way
down.
For
pragmatists,
humans inhabit
worlds of
meaning. Pragmatism
is
not
a
formof
methodological
individualism;
it
does
not
require
that mechanisms
operating
at
the
meso
ormacro-levels be explained exclusively in
terms
of the actions of
the individuals
involved,
meaning-interpretive
or
otherwise.
It
does
insist,
however,
that
the
potential
contribution of indi
vidual action
to
the
operation
ofmechanisms be
taken into
account.
This
requires
that
we
grasp
how the
relevant
individuals understand the sit
uations before them
and
act
on
those under
standings, helping
thereby
to enact
the
mechanism.
In this respect, pragmatism comes close to the
weak
version
of
methodological
individualism
championed by
Hedstr?m
and
Swedberg.
Hedstr?m
(2005),
in
particular,
makes
belief
central
to
his
account
of social
action,
mobiliz
ing
Weber's
stress
on
subjective meaning
to
argue
that
ctors'
beliefs
about
the
social
world
are as
important
as
their
desires
and
opportu
nities
in
explaining
their
acti