KOSOVO: ENTITY WITHOUT IDENTITY?
ALBANIANS AND SERBS LOCKED IN CONFRONTATION
© Ivan Miljojkovíc
M.C.J. van der Wilk MA Thesis European Studies
First reader: Dr. E. van Ree
Second reader: Drs. N. Tromp –Vrkić
KOSOVO: ENTITY WITHOUT IDENTITY?
ALBANIANS AND SERBS LOCKED IN CONFRONTATION
Author: M.C.J. van der Wilk
MA Thesis European Studies
East European studies
University of Amsterdam
First reader: Dr. E. van Ree
Second reader: Drs. N. Tromp –Vrkić
August 2007
Table of Contents
PREFACE.................................................................................................................................................. III ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................................................................................................. III MAP OF KOSOVO .......................................................................................................................................V ACRONYMS...............................................................................................................................................VI INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................VIII
1 HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL FRAMEWORK OF KOSOVO ...................................................................... 10 1.1 Colliding Myths from 1389 till present ................................................................................... 10 1.2 Tito’s Yugoslavia 1945-1980 ................................................................................................. 14 1.3 Milošević’ Greater Serbia 1987 - 1997 .................................................................................. 17 1.4 The Kosovo war 1998-1999 .................................................................................................. 21 1.5 United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) 1999 – present................................................. 23
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ............................................................................................................. 29
2.1 What is a nation?................................................................................................................... 29 2.2 Modernism versus Primordialism .......................................................................................... 30 2.3 Imagined community versus Invented tradition ..................................................................... 31 2.4 Civic versus Ethnic nationalism............................................................................................. 33
3 THE IDENTITY QUESTION IN KOSOVO................................................................................................. 35
3.1 Supra-ethnic identity versus Ethnic identity........................................................................... 35 3.2 The current situation of the Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs ....................................... 38 3.3 Kosovo Albanians versus Kosovo Serbs............................................................................... 42 3.4 A common symbol for Kosovo............................................................................................... 47 3.5 Cutting the umbilical cord ...................................................................................................... 54
3.5.1 Kosovo Serbs versus Serbian Serbs............................................................................. 55 3.5.2 Kosovo Albanians versus Albanian Albanians .............................................................. 56
4. CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................................. 65
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................................................ 68 APPENDICES ........................................................................................................................................... 76
I. UN Resolution 1244 (10 June 1999) ......................................................................................... 76 II. Standards before Status (10 December 2003).......................................................................... 76 III. Composition Negotiation Teams............................................................................................... 76 IV. Comprehensive Proposal Marti Athisaari (10 February 2007) .................................................. 76
II
Preface Since March 2006, the disputed territory of Kosovo has completely occupied my mind. The people
living in Kosovo, regardless of whether they are past, present or future residents of the region, intrigue
me. Kosovo became close to me personally due to its absorbing and complex history and its recent
turbulent past.
I enjoyed travelling through Kosovo and experiencing its rich and beautiful natural and cultural
heritage. At the same time I became frustrated and saddened by the neglect and ignorance of this
heritage due to enormous industrial pollution and damage done by individuals. Past national conflicts
and the resulting inflicted damage, as well as the negative consequences of economic growth and
vandalism have all had a degrading influence on Kosovo. While attending the course “Cultural
heritage and living together” during the Mitrovica Summer Courses 2007 organised by SPARK, I
became aware that all people should take responsibility for our common world heritage and I hope that
in the near future all residents of Kosovo will do the same.
Much has been said and written on the political and historical situation of Kosovo, but sources
available on the identity issue are scarce. This is somewhat remarkable, as the acknowledgement of
one’s ethnicity and/or identity can be perceived as the root of the current problems in Kosovo. This
thesis is a discussion of the search for a new identity in Kosovo which desperately needs to become a
more peaceful and stable entity than it currently is.
This thesis should be regarded as an academic discussion paper. Academic values of
objectivity, transparency and accuracy have been strived for. Notwithstanding, I am aware of the fact
that by writing about the identity question in Kosovo, I have touched upon sensitive and disputable
issues concerning Kosovo’s history, politics and society. Due to these topics, I can understand that
some people might be offended by some aspects of this research. Nonetheless, please note that
academic principles have always been my guideline.
Acknowledgements There are many people and organisations that I would like to thank for their support and guidance
during the seemingly endless process of writing this thesis. Without their support, this thesis would not
have been possible.
First of all, I owe much respect, recognition and gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Erik van Ree,
who had the patience and enthusiasm to guide me through the academic process of (re) structuring,
specifying and analysing and who has taught me to be comprehensible, critical and punctual.
I would like to thank the Dutch organisation IKV Pax Christi and their Serbian and Kosovo
counterpart NGO’s Fractal and Integra, by giving me the opportunity to participate in Our Future
Network (OFN), which supports dialogue between youngsters of Serbia and Kosovo. Besides the
inspiration for this thesis, the Our Future Network gave me the opportunity to feel, see and to explore
the Kosovo experience. Thanks to OFN, I have enriched myself with priceless memories and many
new, precious ‘Balkan engaged’ friends from the Netherlands, Serbia and Kosovo. The staff on South
III
Eastern Europe of IKV Pax Christi have always been very helpful, interested and supportive of my
thesis. I would like to thank Ewa Oosterwegel, Dion van den Berg, Gregor Niessen and Johan te Velde
for their valuable contributions, perspectives and shared experiences in the region. Especially I would
like to thank Linda Schevers for her continuous support, academic insight and valuable involvement
during the whole thesis process.
I am greatly indebted to my class and professors of the course Cultural Heritage and living
together during the Mitrovica Summer Courses. They gave me the final inspiration and
acknowledgements for this thesis. Especially I would like to thank Neda Kurjacki, Ivan Miljojkovíc and
Ivan Krstic for their fascinating contributions. Furthermore I would like to thank Annelies van den Berg
of SPARK for her continuing interest and valuable assistance.
Additionally, I would like to express my gratitude to Huub Alberse, Secondee for the OSCE in
the region of Peć/Peja, for his valuable contributions, his close eye for objectivity and detail.
Moreover, I am gratefully indebted to Jon Warne for getting my English to flow more fluently.
Likewise I would like to thank Steve Meyer and Catríona Rush for their editorial work.
Doutzen Wierda your help during emergent situations, your swift and sharp reactions were of
enormous value. Additionally, Dima Peteva it was great to join you on the final road of our Master and
to share the thesis process together.
Additionally, I would like to thank my parents, Herman and Drieneke van der Wilk, for giving
me the opportunity to study and their support during my study time through which I became able to
broaden my general knowledge, my perspectives on variety of cultures, languages and countries.
I also would like to thank all my friends and family who gave me the mental support of
continuing my thesis by listening to my struggling stories and by showing their interest in my thesis
efforts and study.
Last, but certainly not least, I want to stress the continuous support of Rutger Smit, who
provided me with his enduring confidence in me, his inspiration and his endless care and support for
me. He gave me the priceless energy to continue to reach my goals, taught me to believe in myself
and to be confident on my work.
I invested more than one year in this thesis on the identity question in Kosovo. It has been a
challenge to put all my skills and knowledge into the academic learning process. Indeed it became my
life work so far. So please, read and enjoy, and become as well inspired and moved by the multi-faced
entity of Kosovo!
Marieke van der Wilk
The Hague, August 2007
IV
Map of Kosovo
1
1 ICG, 2007 (14th of May): 39
V
Acronyms
AAK Aleanca për Ardhmërinë e Kosovës (Alliance for the Future of Kosovo) (Prime Minister
Agim Ceku)
AI Amnesty International
Ashkali Albanian speaking ethnic minority
B92 Independent Serbian TV, radio channel and website
BIRN Balkan Investigative Reporting Network
DS Demokratska stranka (Democratic Party) (Boris Tadić)
DSE Deputy to the Special Envoy
DSS Demokratska stranka Srbije (Democratic Party of Serbia) (Prime Minister Vojislav
Koštunica’s party)
EU European Union
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy
ESI European Stability Initiative, a think tank.
FARK ‘National Army of Kosova’
FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Gorani Muslim Slavs
IC International Community, the United Nations member states.
ICG International Crisis Group, a think tank.
ICR International Civilian Representative
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTY International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia
ISG International Steering Group
IEV Inter – ethnic violence
IDP Internally displaced person
IOM International Organization for Migration
INGO International Non – Governmental Organisation
ISG International Steering Group
KiM Serbian News Agency for the Serbian Orthodox Church and Serbian community in
Kosovo and Methoija
KISP Kosovo Standards Implementations Plan
KFOR The Kosovo Force
KLA Kosova Liberation Army (also UCK)
KPC Kosovo Protection Corps
KPS Kosovo Police Service
KSIP Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan
LDK Lidjah Demokratike e Kosoves (Democratic League of Kosovo) (President Fatmir
Sedjiu)
VI
Metohija South – Western plain of Kosovo including the districts of Peć/Peja, Dakovica and
Prizren. Serbs refer to Metohija as the monastery estate and Serbian church-owned
land. In Albanian referred to as Rrafsh I Dukgjinit. NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO Non-governmental Organisation
NLA National Liberation Army of Macedonia
OIK Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo
OMIK OSCE Mission in Kosovo
ORA Partia Reformiste ORA (Reformist Party ORA) (Veton Surroi)
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PDK Partia Demokratikee Kosoves (Democratic Party of Kosovo)
(Main political successor of the KLA and largest opposition party, led by Hashim
Thaqi)
PISG Provisional Institutions of Self Government
RAE Roma, Ashkali, Egyptians
RFL/RL Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty; private international communications service to
Eastern and South-eastern Europe, Russia, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle
East, and South-western Asia.
Roma Gypsies
SAJ Serbian anti – terrorist units
SAP The Stabilisation and Association Process
SE Special Envoy
Shqiptar Albanian
SNC Serbian National Council
SPO Srpski pokret obnove (Serbian Renewal Movement)
SPS Socialist Party of Serbia, formerly led by Slobodan Milošević.
SRS Srpska radikalna stranka (Serbian Radical Party) (Currently led by Tomislav Nikolić as
Vojislav Šešelj is awaiting his trial at the ICTY in The Hague.)
SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary General
UDB Yugoslav Security Services
UCK Ushtria Climitare e Kosoves (the KLA)
UNOSEK United Nations Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the future
status process for Kosovo
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNHCR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIK United Nations Mission in Kosovo
VII
Introduction
Kosovo: entity without identity?
The significance of Kosovo, a crucial geographic entity in the heart of South Eastern Europe, has
increased to a remarkable extent.2 It has been said that Kosovo comprises two national histories; the
rise of the medieval Serbian state and the making of modern Albania, in addition to a rich legacy that
has been left behind by the Ottomans.3 Kosovo became the most explosive danger zone in Europe
due to aggravated claims of Albanians and Serbs over a history that dwells between myth and reality.
Kosovo was at the beginning of one of the main and earliest conflicts in former Yugoslavia, but has as
well the key to ending it.
The Kosovo conflict that emerged in 1981 and reached its climax in 1999 is described as the
most intractable, the most dangerous and the most intense of all the political conflicts in the Western
Balkans. Currently, however, a process of transition is taking place. Nonetheless, due to the shared
history of nationalism and devastating wars, lasting effects remain visible in the economic, geographic,
demographic, cultural and political structures of the Western Balkans. Significant differences exist
between the various countries in the region and within this region Kosovo should be considered a
unique case.4 Kosovo remains one of the most demanding challenges for the Western Balkans and
especially after 1999 also for the international community. Because ever since the NATO
bombardments in 1999, Kosovo has been governed and controlled under UNSC resolution 1244
which established the UN interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, better known as the abbreviation
UNMIK.5 Kosovo is referred to internationally as UNMIK Kosovo or Kosovo (UNMIK).
Eight years later, the status of Kosovo is still undefined. On the 21st of February 2006 the
negotiations on the status of Kosovo between Serbian and Kosovo leaders started.6 These
negotiations had to define the final status of Kosovo, a very difficult task since both parties are
seemingly irreconcilable. Serbia wants to keep Kosovo as its province and the Kosovo Albanians
strive for an independent Kosovo. Moreover, the Kosovo conflict remains a delicate equilibrium,7 as
the riots that took place in the city of Mitrovica in 2004 illustrated.8 Just one event can trigger a new
chain of violence in the region and therefore it is of extreme importance that a solution for Kosovo is to
2 The author refers to the notion of Kosovo as a geographic area, it does not indicate a position on the larger issue of the
political status of Kosovo today or in the future. The author refers to the international notion of ‘Kosovo’ instead of the Serbian
reference of Kosovo I Metohija or Kosmet, or the Albanian reference of Kosova or Kosovë without any judgment intended. The
form of ‘Kosovo’ is currently used the most in English language publications.
3 Malcolm, 1998: Introduction 4 The Serbian and Albanian communities in Kosovo will be referred to as respectively Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians.
Kosovo will be used for every concept, in order to avoid distinctions and to incorporate all residents of Kosovo. Originally, a
resident of Kosovo used to be named a Kosovar. At present the notion is more often used to refer to the Kosovo Albanians and
can therefore not be used as a neutral notion. 5 UNMIK, 2001 – 2006: UNMIK At a Glance
6 UNOSEK, 2006: February 21
7 Meurs, Weiss, 2004: 2
8 Hirs, 2004
VIII
be found in the near future because reverberations of this debated region are felt throughout the
Balkans.9
The Kosovo puzzle has the impression of an unsolvable one. The possible solution of one of
the communities fulfilling the minority position is a non- starter, as the Serbian community would not
like to be a minority within an independent Kosovo any more than the Albanian community would want
to be a minority within Serbia. Moreover the solution of a ‘neutral’ Kosovo nation seems impossible
because a shared Kosovo identity does not appear to exist. Crucially, identity in a national state is of
great importance since the feeling of solidarity and belonging within a community is an essential part
of creating the concept of citizenship. Elements such as a shared past or a sense of similarity bind
people to form a nation. The views of Gellner on nationalism and Smith’s theories on identity can be
used for a better understanding of this matter: Gellner believes that nations are a modern
phenomenon created by themselves in historically recent times. Smith believes that nations have
historical ethnic roots that draw on the pre-existing history of ethnic groups. It seems that the society of
Kosovo lacks these constituents of a nation and thus it will be very difficult to work on a unified Kosovo
nation.
Hence, the main hypothesis of this thesis will be:
The Kosovo problem is hard to solve because there is no such thing as a Kosovo identity.
The present day situation in Kosovo cannot fully be understood without knowing the intriguing
history and the complex political situation of the past decades. As the journalist James Pettifer
summarised; journalism and writing about Kosova is a journey – into a complex reality, a part of the
world where great historical forces, religions and peoples collide…”10 History shows the strong
colliding identities of the Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo, so would there be any room left for a Kosovo
identity in the near future?
In order to cover all concepts, the thesis will be structured as follows. The first chapter
describes the historical and political outline of Kosovo. The theoretical framework on the notions of
nationalism and ethnicity will be discussed in the second chapter. This framework will be used as the
basis for the analysis of the research on the identity question in Kosovo, which will be the focus of the
third chapter. To conclude, an answer will be given to the hypothesis in the conclusion.
9 Curri, 2005: 48
10 Pettifer, 2005: 4
IX
- Kosovo: Entity without Identity? -
1 Historical and political framework of Kosovo
1.1 Colliding Myths from 1389 till present The title of Julie Mertus’ book Kosovo; how myths and truths started a war illustrates perfectly the role
of mythology in the Kosovo conflict as the histories and myths of the Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo
Albanians are central to understand the problems in Kosovo.11 During the 19th century the
development of myths and national symbols became important elements in the nationalisation of
European cultures. The territory of Kosovo can be seen as the puppet of two colliding national myths.
On the one hand Serbia, with the myth of Kosovo Polje as the ‘cradle’of Serbia as it was the centre of
the Serbian Orthodox Church and Serbian medieval civilisation. While on the other hand, Albanian
heroes and movements contributed to the development of an Albanian identity and their
‘autochthonous’ claim on Kosovo. Throughout history both nations have competed and conflicted
numerous times, eventually resulting in the Greater Serbian idea versus the Greater Albanian idea.
These developments can be compared to a pendulum of power that has swung back and forth
between these two ideas; between Serbia and Albania. From time to time the Serbian- or the Albanian
nation-states became reality and history and myths accordingly converged in favour of the respective
nation. Mertus argues that the tension between these communities have intensified due to the
competing and conflicting ‘truths’ of interpretations and histories.12 As a result of the violent ethnic
separation of the two communities in the nineties, both sides became even more assured of the justice
of their own claims.13
Ever since it’s early history, Kosovo has been the subject of discussions over territory and
demography. One of the historical allegations concerning the settlement of territory is the debate
concerning the question: Who was in Kosovo first? The issue is whether the Albanians are descended
from the Illyrians or from the Thracians, the former having occupied the western Balkans and the latter
its eastern half in pre-Roman and Roman times. Albanian scholars support Illyrian origins of the nation
and claim to be the primordial ancient nation of the Balkans as they have always felt a strong
attachment to Kosovo as their Albanian motherland. Moreover Albanians maintain that Kosova’s
ancient predecessors were the Dardanians, who they claim were an Illyrian tribe that later enjoyed a
special status in the Roman Empire. However some Serbian authors reject this argument and say that
they distinguish Thracian elements in the Dardanians. Furthermore they claim that the South Slav
community has dominated the Kosovo region since the 6th century continuously, and that the
Albanians arrived a century afterwards.14 Despite the counter arguments of the Serbs, the Albanians
will always claim to being the ancient residents of the Balkans and therefore of Kosovo.
The most famous Serbian struggle in the territory of Kosovo is certainly the battle of the 28th of
June 1389 on the Field of Blackbirds, Kosovo Polje, which has been made into the national chronicle
11 Mertus, 1999: 1 12 Ibid.: 1, 13 13 Kostovicova, 2005: 213 14 Vickers, 1998 : 1-4
10
- Kosovo: Entity without Identity? -
of Serbia. The legend of Kosovo Polje describes the power struggle between the Serbian King Lazar
with the Turkish Sultan Murad, as part of the Ottoman invasion. Many facts about the battle are
doubtful, however the fighting was intense and both armies suffered heavy losses. Furthermore, both
Murad and Lazar were killed.15 The Serbian army lost the battle but it did not yet mean the end of the
Serbian kingdom, only in 1459 did the medieval Serbian state become extinct as it was to be
incorporated into the Ottoman Empire.16 Despite the defeat, the battle and the cult of King Lazar
became the symbol of the moral victory of good over evil: a symbol for Serbian martyrdom but also a
new beginning for the Serbian ‘heavenly’ nation.17
The battle is seen as the early precursor of the start of Serbian nationalism and Serbian
statehood as it has been presented in many traditional songs and folk poetry. A new epic tradition of
the militant but suffering nation came into existence. Investigative research on this tradition has been
done by Vuk Karadžić (1787-1864), a collector of Serbian epics and reformer of the Serbian language
who promoted Serbian nationalism to the rest of Europe.18 Kosovo Polje became the source of
inspiration for the Serbian historian Spiridon Gopĉević (1855-1928), it grasped the inspiration of the
German philosopher Goethe (1749-1832) and contributed to the idea of creating a ‘Greater Serbian
state’.19 This idea finds its origins in the draft Načertanije by Ilija Garasanin who encouraged Serbia in
1844 to take over the occupied Ottoman lands and to reinforce the strong medieval Serbian state of
King Stefan Dušan. Kosovo and Albania needed to be recaptured before proclaiming any form of
independence as the Ottoman Empire was weakening during that time.20 This nationalistic ideology
which incorporates Serbian territorial claims, better known as ‘the Greater Serbian idea’, became a
key factor in the development of Serbian nationalism in the nineteenth and twentieth century.21
The earliest Albanian nationalist expression dates as well back from the 15th century. One of
the legendary Albanian national heroes is Gjergj Kastrioti, better known as Skënderbeg or
Skanderbeg. After having fought many wars under the supervision of the Ottoman army, he later
renounced the Ottoman Sultan in 1443. With his own Albanian army assembled, he struggled to
regain autonomy and to do away with the Islamic conversion brought by the Ottomans.22 Despite
strong resistance, Albania remained part of the Ottoman Empire until 1912. Nevertheless Skënderbeg
became the symbol of national unity and strength for the Albanian community and later became of
crucial importance in the development of an Albanian national identity during the 19th century. For
example, the black double-headed eagle on a red background that was depicted on the emblem of
Skënderbeg became the source of inspiration for the Albanian national flag when proclaiming
independence in 1912.23
15 Malcolm, 1998: 58 – 80 16 Ibid.: 92 17 Vickers, 1998: 14 - 15 18 Kola, 2003: 4 19 Detrez, 1999: 20, 28, 33 20 Kola, 2003: 11 21 Detrez 1999: 28, 33 22 Kola, 2003: 5 23 Vickers, 1999: 8,9,46
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- Kosovo: Entity without Identity? -
However, contrary to the swift development of Serbian nationalism from the early beginning of the 19th
century, the Albanian consciousness and the Albanian national movement was very slowly awakening
as it was curtailed by the Ottoman occupation and its own backward economic situation.24 The
Ottoman rule can be seen as a threat to the Albanian political, social and cultural identity as the
Ottomans refused to recognise the Albanians as distinctive from the Turks, although sharing the same
Islamic faith.25 With no alphabet and thus no development of the Albanian language, the Ottoman
Empire ensured that Albania was the last Balkan nation to achieve independence from its Ottoman
supremacy.26 The first effect of Albanian nation building was to be seen in the end of the 19th century,
when the Russian – Ottoman war ended in the beginning of 1878 and resulted in the Treaty of San
Stefano in March 1878. As a result new empires were created in the formation of a Greater Bulgaria
and Greater Serbia which took advantage of their power and as a result slowly invaded the Albanian
territories, including Kosovo. In order to curb the expansion of a Greater Bulgaria, the Treaty of San
Stefano was revised by the Treaty of Berlin in June 1878 which gave rise to the independence of
Serbia and Montenegro and autonomy for Bulgaria under Ottoman rule.27
Thus the territory of Kosovo became divided between the Ottomans and the Montenegrins.
However, giving Albanian inhabited land to a Slav kingdom caused sufficient resentment to start the
first Albanian resistance movement which was based on the nationalist ideology of Sami Frashëri.28
Accordingly, on the 10th of June 1878, the League of Prizren was set up to defend the Albanian
territories and to fight for an autonomous republic within the Ottoman Empire until the creation of an
independent Albanian republic.29 However League’s fight for territorial integrity was soon to be
crushed by the Ottoman army as the growing Albanian movement was a threat to the Ottoman rule.30
In 1908, another attempt for more autonomy was undertaken by supporting the revolution of the
radical Young Turks who wanted to create a Turkish national state. However, this attempt failed as
well, as the empowered Young Turks imagined a strong centralised state which eventually clashed
with the autonomy ideals of the Albanians.31
The ‘Albanian question’ was finally determined during the first Balkan War in which the Balkan
League, consisting of Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro and Serbia took the lead in liberating their
countries from the Ottoman oppressor. They wanted to keep Austria out and take position against the
rise of the Albanian identity and the eventual formation of an autonomous Albanian state.32 The
declaration of the war created excitement amongst the Serbian militaries as the prospect of
recapturing Kosovo after five centuries and taking revenge for the Battle of Kosovo became a reality.33
24 Vickers, 1999: 14 25 Ibid.: 27 26 Ibid.: 27, 30 –31 27 Malcolm, 1998: 200 28 Vickers, 1999: 30, 31 29 Detrez, 1999: 33 30 Vickers, 1998: 48 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid.: 75 33 Vickers, 1998: 76
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After the Ottomans had been defeated, Serbia celebrated their victory over Kosovo Polje and brutally
invaded Kosovo and the surrounding Albanian territories.34 Atrocities were committed on a large scale
with the goal of transforming the ethnic character of the Albanian regions entirely and civilising the
region according to Serbian standards, also known as Serbianisation.35
As Kosovo was to be ruled by Serbia, the North of Albania was divided between Serbia and
Montenegro. Despite the oppression, the Albanians in South Albania declared their national
independence on the 28th of November 1912 which was due to be internationally acknowledged on the
29th of July 1913. During the First World War in 1914, the whole of Serbia (Kosovo and Methoija
included) was taken over by the Austrian – Hungarian empire and Bulgaria. The Kosovo Albanians
fought with the Austrian – Hungarian forces against the Serbs, however in 1918 they were defeated by
the Serbian četniks, the rebel of the Serbian nationalists, who invaded Kosovo. Serbia regained its
victory and Kosovo was to be reoccupied by Serbia.36 The Serbs living in Serbia, Bosnia, Kosovo,
Croatia and the Montenegrin Kingdom, became one Slav state; the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes. The Greater Serbian dream became a reality whereas the Albanian quest for independence
was to be totally neglected. The pendulum of power over Kosovo swung towards the Greater Serbian
idea.
The time period between the end of the Russian – Ottoman war in 1878 and the Albanian
independence of 1912 is known in Albanian history as the Rilindje Kombëtare, the national rebirth or
national renaissance.37 During this time cultural, national and political movements among the Albanian
communities started to grow. Although the ideals of the League of Prizren were not realised, their
legacy of national awareness continued to live on amongst Albanian intellectuals. In the decades
afterwards, they had a powerful influence on the Albanian movements such as the kaçak movement
who fought for the establishment of a unified state of all Albanian inhabited lands, as more than half of
the Albanian population lived outside the borders of the Albanian region. However, these Albanian
freedom fighters had been defeated by King Zog in 1924.38
Until the beginning of the Second World War in 1941, the Kosovo Albanians were neglected
as an existing national minority as they were suppressed in their language in schools and cultural
activities. Furthermore, a strategy of Serbian colonisation was set in motion in order to change the
ethnic composition of Kosovo. By expropriating the Albanians of their lands and property, they were
officially encouraged to emigrate, or sometimes even deported, to Albania or Turkey.39 Yet this
strategy could not be implemented thoroughly as the scattered Albanian communities were to be
united in April 1941, after the Nazis had invaded Yugoslavia. A German - Italian accord was made in
Vienna to create an ethnic Albanian state in order to curb Serbia’s influence in the region. This Greater
Albanian idea consisted of Albania, Kosovo, and other Albanian inhabited regions in Greece,
Macedonia and Montenegro. Thanks to the Italian ‘liberators’ the Albanian dream became true even 34 Malcolm, 1998: 252 -253 35 Ibid.: 252- 254 36 Detrez, 1999: 35-37 37 Malcolm, 1998: 217 38 ICG, 2004 (February 25): 3,4 39 Malcolm, 1998: 269
13
- Kosovo: Entity without Identity? -
though under Italian supervision.40 The Serbian policies were reversed; lands and property were given
back to the previous owners and Serbian colonists were imprisoned or expelled from Kosovo. The
pendulum of power over Kosovo swung back to the Albanian side.
1.2 Tito’s Yugoslavia 1945-1980
Due to Italy’s capitulation in 1943, a disordered situation was created. The Albanian resistance
movement took advantage of the situation and started to fight for an ethnically pure and independent
Albania within the structures of a second League of Prizren. These nationalists were the previous
collaborators with the Italians and in favour of the extreme right Albanian resistance, also known as
the Balli Kombëtar or National Front. For their own benefit, the Nazis supported an independent and
neutral Albania, and therefore the Balli Kombëtar and the Nazis fought together against the Serbian
nationalistic resistance movement, the četniks.41 In time, Yugoslav communist partisans formed the
Yugoslav National Liberation army and initiated a guerrilla campaign against the invasion of the
German Nazis and Italian fascists and freed Yugoslavia from the Axis in 1945. After the takeover, the
Yugoslav communist partisans retaliated with the collaborators of the enemies and members of non –
communist resistance movements such as the četniks and the Balli Kombëtar. Throughout the
Yugoslav time period, the Kosovo Albanians were regarded as collaborators of Fascist Italy and Nazi
Germany.42
The leader of the Liberation Front was Joseph Broz Tito who became the head of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The FRY established six socialist republics of which Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia and Serbia. Within the boundaries of Serbia,
the two autonomous socialist provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo – Metohija were recognised.43 The
Albanians in Kosovo were seen as a nationality and not as a nation, as the ‘nation’ of Albanians had
its own state in Albania. The same applied to the Hungarians of Vojvodina.44 Tito adopted the Soviet
economic policies of the rapid promotion of heavy industry and the collectivisation of agriculture.
However, relations between Stalin and Tito deteriorated due to the long term ‘Balkan Federation’
project, in which Albania and Bulgaria would be merged into communist Yugoslavia. Although the
project was first initiated by Moscow, Stalin started to see Tito as its rival and did not want Communist
Yugoslavia to expand.45 Tito preferred to unite with Albania rather than with Bulgaria. Hence Tito
discussed with Hoxha a Yugoslav – Albanian unification, in order to solve the Kosovo question.
However, this unification never came as on the 28th of June 1948 the Yugoslav Communist party was
expelled from Cominform, the international Communist board, due to counter revolutionary practices.
After the break with Moscow, Tito decided to follow his own Yugoslav way of self-government, which is
described as an obstinate combination of mild socialism, totalitarian politics, and a mixed construction 40 Kola, 2003: 22 - 23 41 Detrez, 1999: 45 - 47 42 Ibid.: 50 43 Crampton, 1997: 217 44 Ibid.: 276 45 Ree, 2005: 170
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of nationalism and federalism.46 Hoxha decided to align with Stalin instead of Tito and as a
consequence the borders between Yugoslavia and Albania were sealed off. As Kosovo was seen as a
potential region of influence of Hoxha, it became the victim of the hostile Yugoslav Security Services
(UDB) which were hunting for traitors. Nevertheless, the early fifties was a period of relative stability
between the major ethnic groups of Yugoslavia, as they were bound together by facing the Soviet
threat.47
After the war, Serbia remained the largest and most powerful republic within the Yugoslav
framework as the Yugoslav state bank and other central governmental institutions were located in the
capital of Yugoslavia, Belgrade. Moreover, the existence of the Serbian Communist party gave the
Serbian nationalists large influence on the future of their fatherland.48 In the non – Serb republics, the
most important positions in the governmental administration, the banks, the army and the party, were
disproportionately performed by Serbs and other nationalities were therefore underrepresented.49 The
pendulum of power had swung back again in favour of Serbia as Kosovo was integrated under the
Yugoslav framework and thus the Albanians in Albania and Kosovo were dominated by Yugoslav
rulers. However, a shift in the dominant Serbian rule on Yugoslavia was made when the chief of the
Security Services, Aleksandar Ranković, was purged in 1966.50 He was seen by non - Serbs as the
personification of the Serbian domination and underhand development of Serbian nationalism. This
event had a great impact on the political developments in Yugoslavia as it was taken by the non –
Serbs and minorities as a victory. After the Ranković incident, the Albanians became aware of their
numerical superiority in Kosovo and organised large demonstrations in 1968 calling for a greater
recognition of Albanian rights in Kosovo. As the Kosovo Albanians still had very strong feelings
towards their homeland, demonstrators would carry pictures of Hoxha and call for an Albanian
republic.51
Brown notes that an aggressive form of Albanian nationalism rose in the end of the sixties and
the beginning of the seventies. At the same time, Serbian power diminished as Tito inaugurated more
extensive rights for all the republics by means of decentralisation measures and making concessions
to the minority nationalities for example to allow the Kosovo Albanians to fly the Albanian flag.52 The
zenith of Albanian national interest was the change of the Yugoslav constitution in 1974, which gave
the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina a higher status on the Yugoslav federal level.53
However Kosovo was not granted a republican status and residents could thus not apply for Kosovar
or Albanian citizenship because of the fear that Kosovo would request more than being only a
republic.54 Nevertheless, the status of Kosovo was gradually and carefully upgraded by Tito’s policies
46 van Hengel, 2006: 12 47 Malcom, 1998: 320 48 Lebor, 2002: 29 49 Crampton, 1997: 338 50 Detrez, 1999: 50 51 Crampton, 1997: 310 52 Brown, 2002: 163 53 Ibid.: 164 54 Detrez, 1999: 67
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in favour of the Kosovo Albanians. The pendulum of power over Kosovo slowly had swung back to the
Albanian side.
One can conclude that Yugoslav politics became very complicated by the issue of the ‘national
questions’ which Tito tried to solve through his multi - ethnic balanced model of ‘Brotherhood and
Unity’ in his federation of six republics. This equilibrium might have appeared to be stable but it proved
to be false with the sudden death of Tito in 1980. The Kosovo Albanians lost their protector,
uncertainty and fear took the lead as the Serbs wanted to take revenge for their disgraced nation.55 A
year later, Kosovo once again determined the future of the political framework of the Balkans as
Yugoslavia collapsed due to serious ethnic rioting that broke out when the Albanians called for a
Kosovo republic. This revolt was perceived by the Yugoslav authorities as nationalistic and
counterrevolutionary and they were worried that the Kosovo Albanians wanted to secede from
Yugoslavia and eventually join Albania.56 According to Tromp – Vrkić these concerns were not
reasonable as the depressing political and economical circumstances in Albania surpassed the
situation in Yugoslavia.57 Moreover, the Albanian sentiment had diminished due to the isolation of
Albanian communism, the underdeveloped status of Albanian-inhabited regions in Yugoslavia and a
lack of hope for a ‘Greater Albania’.58
So, not the Albanian question but rather the Serbian question was triggered, as the Serbs felt
threatened in their stable and privileged position in Yugoslavia it was easy to demonstrate against the
alleged discriminations of Serbs in a minority position.59 This feeling was instigated by a strong
nationalistic document that set the Serbian agenda for the next ten years, namely the SANU
Memorandum of 1986 which relinquished a restart of a dangerous form of Serbian nationalism during
the 1980s. In the publication of the memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences,
twenty intellectuals urged for far reaching changes in the Yugoslav economic and political system as
they felt subjugated in their Yugoslav status.60 They blamed the 1974 Constitution for weakening
Serbia’s position in Yugoslavia and depriving it from its right to form their own Serbian state that was
fought for throughout history.61 Moreover, they made resentful and polarised statements claiming to be
suffering from physical, political, legal and cultural genocide by the “Albanian aggressors”62 and
warned that the ‘Great Albanian racists’ were striving after an ‘ethnically pure’ Kosovo.63 The
Memorandum can be seen as an important catalyst in the development of Serbian nationalism, even
though the stated facts appeared to be both false and wrongly defined.64 One person would exploit his
55 Brown, 2001: 164 56 Duijzings, Janijć et al., 1996: xvii 57 Tromp – Vrkić in ibid.: 49 -50 58 ICG, 2004 (February 25): 4 59 Crampton, 1997: 388 60 Mihailovic, Krestic, 1995: 95 - 120 61 Ibid.: 126 62 Ibid.: 127 63 Ibid.: 128 - 129 64 ICTY, 2004: November 17
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power to the utmost as he would use these nationalistic demands as a propaganda tool for his own
party program. His name was Slobodan Milošević.
1.3 Milošević’ Greater Serbia 1987 - 1997
Milošević, born in 1941, became the decisive protector of Serbs living in Kosovo through exploiting the
Kosovo issue for his own benefit. In 1987, Milošević was sent to Kosovo, as a member of the Serbian
Central Committee, with the task of soothing the rising ethnic tensions and solving the problems with
the local communist party in Kosovo, which consisted of mostly ethnic Albanians.65 He did not intend
to meet Serbian nationalists however on the streets a group of Kosovo Serbs demanded a dialogue
with the communist party as they felt disregarded by them. As a response to the Kosovo Serbs,
Milošević returned on the 24th of April to Kosovo and listened to their speeches which were blaming
the Albanians for striving for an ethnically pure Kosovo. Moreover they argued that a Serbian exodus
was taking place.66 In his speech, Milošević reacted to these outcries and convinced the crowd that
this situation could not be tolerated any longer. He stood up as their decisive protector and promised
to safeguard the rights of the Kosovo Serbs under the Yugoslav communist regime. During his
speeches other Serbian nationalists had gathered outside the building and got into a fight with the
Albanian police. When Milošević came out of the building he was told by the crowd that they were
beaten up by the Albanian police and that they hit women and children as well. Then Milošević replied
with the famous words:” You will not be beaten again.”67 As a consequence of this remark, the crowd
started to cheer for Milošević as he was the first communist leader who took a public stance for the
Serbs.68 By doing this, Milošević violated the core Titoist principles of unity and brotherhood of the
multi – ethnic federation of Yugoslavia. The career of the ‘Protector of Serbia’ was set in motion.
As the battle for a ‘Greater Serbia was restarted, Milošević deplored the Serbs living in Kosovo
to never give up the cradle of Serbia by saying: “This is your country, these are your houses, your
fields and gardens, your memories. You are not going to abandon your lands because life is hard,
because you are oppressed by injustice and humiliation. It has never been a characteristic of the
Serbian and Montenegrin people to retreat in the face of obstacles, to demobilize when they should
fight, to become demoralized when things are difficult. You should stay here, both for your ancestors
and your descendants…Yugoslavia does not exist without Kosovo! Yugoslavia would disintegrate
without Kosovo! Yugoslavia and Serbia are not going to give up Kosovo! [sic].69
After the incidents in Kosovo, Milošević’s popularity rose rapidly thanks to the nationalistic
path for Serbia he chose to follow accompanied by an extensive media campaign.70 Furthermore, he
created a solid and powerful political position by voting his former friend and anchor President of
65 LeBor, 2002: 113 66 Percy, Macqueen, 1995c Part 1 67 ibid.
68 Vickers, 1998: 228
69 Speech held on 20 April 1987( Documentary ‘Death of Yugoslavia) , Percy, Macqueen, 1995c Part 1 70 Malcolm, 1998: 342
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Serbia, Ivan Stambolić out, followed by purging the most important leaders in Kosovo and Vojvodina71
which he replaced by loyal supporters such as the radical nationalist Vojislav Šešelj. During 1988 and
the beginning of 1989 demonstrations in Serbia were being held that rallied for ‘the truth’. The
demonstrators wanted unity for Serbia, support for Serbs in Kosovo and the abolition of the autonomy
of Kosovo.72 On the 23rd of March 1989, Milošević withdrew Tito’s decentralisation policies and
abolished the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina by amending the constitution of the Socialist
Republic of Serbia. Protests by Kosovo Albanians were violently suppressed by a military intervention
resulting in twenty-four causalities. Simultaneously, the Serbs were celebrating their victory.73 Serbia
was re-united again and Kosovo’s autonomy was abolished. Subsequently the myth of a ‘Greater
Serbia’, the aim to unite all the Serbs in one nation that needed to expand its territory, was restarted
by Milošević. The pendulum of power over Kosovo swung back again in favour of the Serbs.
The celebration of the reunification of Serbia reached a climax on St. Vitus Day; a day on
which the Serbs traditionally remember their defeat at the Battle of Kosovo Polje and honour the
Serbian heroes and victims that fought for the Serbian nation. On the 600th anniversary of the battle,
on the 28th of June 1989, Milošević stirred nationalism to its zenith as he closed his speech at Kosovo
Polje to a crowd of half a million people: “Six centuries later, now, we are being again engaged in
battles and are facing battles. They are not armed battles, although such things cannot be excluded
yet”74 The speech and statements that were made are seen as very controversial by various analysts.
According to Erik Nijsten, Milošević has always denied that the speech for Serbian reunification at
Gazimestan was intended to stir up violent conflicts involving Serbs in other parts of the Yugoslav
republic. However, as the Nijsten cynically notes: “civilian conflicts originated in Slovenia, Croatia and
Bosnia Herzegovina afterwards.”75
As a result of Milošević’s actions, the situation in Kosovo and Serbia changed radically
between 1988 and 1989. After the abolishment of the autonomous principles in the Yugoslav
constitution, the strategy of Serbianisation restarted. The aim was that Kosovo Serbs would begin to
reclaim their republic in all the societal structures. They demanded the most important positions back
in trade, political, industrial and educational areas; the positions which they filled when Serbs held a
majority position during the Yugoslav era. The total societal restructuring by the Serbs is compared by
Detrez as a coup d’etat in the federal departments of Kosovo as measures were taken unilaterally and
without agreement.76 Contact between the Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians became problematic
due to the mass removal of Kosovo Albanians from the Kosovo state institutions and enterprises.
Albanian civil servants were being fired or arrested and their positions were replaced with Serbs that
supported Milošević.77 Demonstrations by Kosovo Albanians turned into violent clashes with the
71 Northern part of Serbia. Similar to Kosovo: Autonomous status from 1974 – 1989 within Serbia. 72 LeBor, 2002: 119 - 133 73 Detrez, 1999: 109 - 110 74 Milošević, 1989: Speech Kosovo Polje 75 Nijsten, 2006: 8 76 Detrez, 1999: 113 77 Vickers, 1988: 248 - 249
18
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Serbian military and the protestors were put in jail, charged with counterrevolutionary activities.78 Even
the media came under strict control of the state and was used to discriminate on an ethnic basis.79
Although it was not an official legal policy, the government turned a blind eye to violence committed by
the Serbian police. As a consequence, public life was made almost impossible for the Kosovo
Albanians as human and civil rights were disfigured.80 It seems that the Serbian government tended to
pursue a policy of ethnic segregation.
Another result of the segregation policies of Serbia, was the ‘school battle’ in Kosovo, as the
Serbian school system only utilised the Serbian school curricula which included the use of the Serbian
language, the teaching of Serbian history and the Orthodox religion. Serbs perceived the Albanian
education as a hotbed for Albanian nationalism and therefore severely restricted or denied the access
of Albanian youngsters.81 As a protest against the Serbian discriminatory policies, the Albanians
boycotted the Serbian school system who from their perspective taught an alien ideology. Instead of
being educated at school or university, the Albanian youngsters were taught in private houses,
garages, shops and cellars all around Kosovo from 1992 until 1999. According to Kostovicova, the
parallel education set up for the Kosovo Albanians, was a symbol of Albanian nationhood and a
defence against Serbia’s political control over Kosovo.82 According to Kostovica: “…the reality of
ethnic segregation between Serbs and Albanians in a Serb – ruled Kosovo during the period of
Milošević’s rule had a profound impact on the future coexistence in the territory, precisely by creating a
context in which an exclusive and divisive nationhood thrived.”83 Cleary, the pendulum of power over
Kosovo continued to be on the Serbian side as the Albanians became disempowered by the Serbian
policies of ethnic isolation and separation which were needed to fulfil the notion of the Serbian nation.
All aspects of life in Kosovo changed completely as walls of ethnic separation came into being
between the Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians. As a result, an ethnically divided society was
created in which both groups were no longer working and living together. From a demographic
perspective, towns and villages changed into ethnic homogeneous communities. Due to the Serbian
policy of ethnic segregation, it was almost inevitable that through an intellectual underground
resistance movement, a parallel republic came to exist. This ‘shadow’ state was led by the Democratic
League of Kosovo (LDK), and imitated governmental structures in which a president, a legislature and
civil society initiatives were included.84 Moreover, the Kosovo Albanians had proclaimed their own
constitution in September 1990, but this was condemned by the Security services as a criminal
injustice in the Republic of Yugoslavia.85 As civil institutions were made inadmissible by the Serbs, the
Kosovo Albanian community developed their own systems for health care, education and media.86
78 Malcolm, 1998: 344, 34 79 Vasilijević in Duijzings, Janijć et al., 1996: 88 80 Malcolm, 1998: 349, 350 81 Kostovicova, 2005: 214 82 Ibid: 1, 213 83 Ibid. 84 LDK in Albanian: Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës (LDK) 85 Detrez, 1999: 116 86 Brown, 2001: 172 - 173
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The pacifist resistance movement against the Serbian powers was led by the ‘Ghandi of the Kosovo’,
Ibrahim Rugova who travelled extensively all over the world to plead for the Kosovo case. Rugova and
the LDK pursued three aims which were pacifist resistance, international awareness of the problem
and the condemnation of the Serbian establishment over Kosovo.87 In 1991, the underground
assembly of the LDK held a referendum for all the Kosovo Albanians. The election campaign
proceeded through Albanian newspapers, radio and indoor meetings throughout Kosovo. The
referendum declared Kosovo to be a sovereign and independent republic on the 19th of October
1991.88 However the declaration of independence was not officially approved by Serbia and the UN as
both perceived Kosovo to be an internal Serbian problem.
According to Detrez two contradicting imaginary worlds originated. First the Serbian view of
the reintegration of Kosovo into Serbia. This truly is a fictional view since the Kosovo population in
majority consisted of Albanians (over ninety percent), whereas the only authority of the Serbs
consisted of their governmental and military powers. Furthermore, the imagined Albanian perspective
of an independent Kosovo republic shaped their reality as if there was an independent state without
any Serbian control. However this is a delusion as well. The fictional parallel republic lacked the state
instruments of a separate territory, the international recognition, their own currency, an army nor did
their inhabitants possess a passport of Kosovo.89 It is sound to conclude that, albeit via the lack of any
official state preconditions, the only true constituent of the imagined and fictional republic was the
shared Albanian identity of the ‘believed’ residents. This might explain the reason why the Serbian
authorities did not intervene to a certain extent into the Kosovo initiatives. They turned a blind eye to
these activities as it did not touched upon any legal nor official form of a governmental administration.
So officially there was nothing to be worried about or to fight against. This situation benefited both
parties, because in a sense it was delicate balance between the Kosovo Albanians desire for an own
state and the need of the Serbs to exercise their authority. Nevertheless, the Serbian authorities would
still hinder the Kosovo Albanians or intervene with violence if they felt threatened in their supremacy.
Visibly there are the two colliding myths of a Greater Serbia and a Greater Albania, although one
might defy that an independent Kosovo is not a Greater Albania. Nevertheless, the claim for an
independent Kosovo for all Albanians could possibly lead to the quest for a greater Albanian nation
whether that would be in the structure of a Greater Kosovo or Greater Albania.
Kosovo was kept in grip of fear after Kosovo’s wish for self – determination was disregarded at
the Dayton Peace agreement of 1995 in Bosnia. Support for Rugova’s peaceful resistance diminished
immediately. Feelings of disappointment and frustration dominated and the Kosovo Albanians
demanded more decisive action from their leaders. From 1995 onwards radicalism grew rapidly
among young Kosovo Albanians. Radical groups started to execute violent terrorist attacks in Kosovo
which triggered a spiral of violence.90 Victims were not only Serbs but Albanian collaborators too. The
situation became very tense as various terrorist attacks were answered with violence by the Serbian
87 Malcolm, 1998: 348 88 Detrez, 1999: 116 89 Ibid.: 130 90 Bieber, Daskalovski, 2003: xiii
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police. Numerous secretive underground organisations had been involved with the terrorist attacks but
an exact number stayed indefinable. However, at the end of 1997 one of the organisations, the Ushtria
Çlirimtare e Kosovës (UÇK), the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) made itself known to the public. They
declared that Serbia pursued a policy of massacring the Albanians and would therefore start the fight
for the freedom of Kosovo as long as it would take.91 Many jobless youngsters, frustrated by the poor
socio - economic situation in their country, were drawn to fight for the independence of Kosovo. They
were willing to uphold the historical ideal of Albanian unification of all Albanian - inhabited lands that
would conquer any Slav dominance.92 Moreover, the Albanian Diaspora, living throughout the
Balkans, wanted to fight against the humiliation and reprisals of the Serbs as well and came into
action.93 The KLA fought for the achievement of their nationalistic goal of achieving a ‘Greater Albania’
and not out of religious conviction, although they were possibly sponsored by Islamic countries.94 Thus
the myths of a ‘Greater Serbia’ and ‘Greater Albania’ were triggered again and were to violently collide
once again in history.
1.4 The Kosovo war 1998-1999
Despite the growing number of combatants, clear statistical information on the KLA is not available.
Sources state opposing facts on the structure and dimension of the Kosovo Liberation Army during
1998 and 1999. The KLA is described by one source as a guerrilla movement, others state it was an
organised army. Numbers of the militant group vary between 200095 – 10,000 core fighters.96
Presumably the KLA started off as an unplanned movement and a disorganised organisation without a
unified central command97 which over the years developed into a more structured organisation,
although it still was made up of various clans.98 Irrespective of the size, however, the KLA remained
militarily weak compared to the Serbian security forces that were built up to 18,000 soldiers.99
The rise of KLA terrorist attacks made the Kosovo Albanians fear for possible Serbian
reprisals. From February 1998, this fear became a reality as a flood of killings by the Yugoslav army
and Serbian police covered Kosovo.100 Entire villages were being destroyed as houses were burned
down, people were driven away, boys older then fifteen years were executed and women violently
abused. Whole families were murdered including the entire Jahari family, well known in Kosovo
because of its in heritage of the Kaçak movement and its leading role in the KLA. All communities that
91 Kusovac ,1998: 13 - 16 92 ICG, 2004 (February 25): 6 93 Pettifer, 2005: 153 94 Detrez, 1999: 68 95 Pettifer, 2005: 149 96 ICG, 1999 (November 2): 5 97 Pettifer , 2005: 149, 186 98 ICG, 2000: 25 99 Rezum, 2001: 45 100 HRW, 1999: January 29
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had relations with the KLA, or which were supposed to support them, were attacked by the Serbs.101
The Serbs knew that to destruct an entire family is the gravest thing one can do in Albanian culture as
it is a strong tradition that the family roots (fis) must carry on.102
The killing of 45 ethnic Albanians in Racak provoked Europe and the USA to find a diplomatic
solution for Kosovo which resulted in the Rambouillet negotiations.103 During the negotiations the
Serbian and Albanian delegations tried to find a settlement on the proposed Interim Agreement for
Peace and Self Government for Kosovo.104 The Albanians unilaterally signed the agreement but the
Serbian authorities rejected it as it would allow autonomy for Kosovo and thus threaten Serbia’s
sovereignty. Nevertheless, Milošević was urged by the UN “to limit and withdraw the Serbian army and
special police forces in Kosovo, and to bring to a halt the exorbitant, improper use of force and
violence in Kosovo”. After several official warnings of military attacks and no response from Milošević,
NATO intervened by bombing Serbian communication infrastructure and military targets on the 24th of
March.105 Yet the NATO campaign did not stop the ‘Serbian war machine’ from performing ethnic
cleansings. On the contrary, massacres by the Serbian forces against Albanian citizens became more
frequent as they hastened up the expulsion of the Albanians.106 The war was twofold, one war was
raged between the Yugoslav army and the Serbian troops against the KLA, whereas NATO started its
offensive against Yugoslav army and Serbian forces. The fully fledged war lasted 78 days and ended
on the 9th of June 1999 as the Military Technical Agreement between KFOR and the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia was signed. The withdrawal of the Serbian police and
paramilitaries and the Yugoslav forces started. A week later, NATO troops arrived in Kosovo.
The situation of the country was devastating; the infrastructure was totally ruined, and whole
villages were eradicated. The economy had been set back for years. Furthermore the psychological
effect was enormous; many people had died, many children had been made orphans and many more
lives were shattered. Before the war, violence and massacres in Kosovo triggered already a mass
exodus of 250,000 refugees out of Kosovo during the summer of 1998.107 After the war, 1.8 million
people were displaced. This included 860,000 ethnic Kosovo Albanians, which is more than 80
percent of the entire population of Kosovo, who fled to neighbouring states such as Macedonia,
Albania and Bosnia or sought refuge in various other countries of Europe.108 The death toll of the
brutal war is devastating. The nightmare consisted of 6,000 Serbian military deaths and 2,000 civilian
deaths that were claimed by the Serbian government. Moreover, 8,000 KLA soldiers and more than
101 The municipalities of Glogovac (Gllogofc) and Srbica (Skenderaj) in the Drenica region, and Southwestern municipalities of
Djakovica (Gjakove), Orahovac (Rrahovec), and Suva Reka (Suhareke) 102 Pettifer, 2005: 144 - 145 103 HRW, 1999: January 29 104 UNSC, 1999: Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo 105 NATO, 1999: March 23 (040) 106 HRW, 1999: January 29 107 LeBor, 2002: 361 108 UNCHR, 1999: December 17
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10,000 Albanians were killed.109 Approximately 500 deaths were caused by the NATO bombings in
Yugoslavia.110
The legitimacy and legality of NATO’s bombing campaign in Kosovo has been disputed
thoroughly. NATO launched its military campaign to avoid a humanitarian tragedy in Kosovo, without
the agreement of the Security Council of the UN. NATO justified its humanitarian intervention by the
containment of regional stability as they suspected mass killings of the Albanian civilians through a
deliberate policy of mass deportations.111 Supporters of the NATO intervention argue that the air
strikes were successful in accelerating the downfall of Milošević and bringing the ethnic cleansings to
a halt.112 However, critics, for instance Bissett, condemned the NATO campaign as it caused a
humanitarian disaster in the Balkans which created not only more bloodshed and violence as the war
intensified, but also reprisals that were taken by the Kosovo Albanians afterwards.113
1.5 United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) 1999 – present
After the war 10,000 displaced persons from ethnic minority communities slowly returned to their
places of origin. However both ethnic groups had fear of returning to their homes in Kosovo. For the
Kosovo Albanians most of the homes and possessions had been burned by the Serbian police forces
and had to search for new places of residence and start a life elsewhere. For the Kosovo Serbs the
war was not over yet due to the insecure post war situation, not least because those who returned
faced hostility and attacks from the Kosovo Albanians. Homes and possessions were taken over by
Kosovo Albanians or damaged as well. Thus the Kosovo Serbs, afraid of the reprisals, started to move
out of Kosovo or would seek security in small urban communities or in protected enclaves. In this way
their freedom of movement has been severely restricted. Hatred between different ethnic groups
became very much a part of daily life in Kosovo and therefore much work needed to be done to
contain another violent eruption. Who would guarantee that the fragile peace settlement would hold?
After the war, Kosovo went through a gradual process of change from post-war Kosovo towards a
Kosovo in transition.
A stop to the disorder, anxiety and turmoil in Kosovo was offered by a political solution of the
Security Council of the United Nations. They adopted resolution 1244 on the 10th of June 1999. In this
resolution the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) suspended the air operations against the FRY
and demanded the end of violence and repression in Kosovo by the various military and police forces
from the FRY. The resolution mandated to establish an interim civilian administration led by the UN
peacekeeping operation under which the people in Kosovo could progressively enjoy substantial
autonomy within the FRY.114 The resolution states that Kosovo has substantial autonomy but its
degree and nature are not defined as Kosovo still is a legal part of Serbia. The international civil 109 Rezun, 2001: 68 110 Abrahams, Ward, 2001: Chapter 16 111 Solana, 1999: 114 – 117 112 Abrahams, Cartner, 1999: April 2 113 Bissett, 2001: 39 – 42 114 UNSC, 1999:Resolution 1244( Appendix 1)
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presence in Kosovo led by the United Nations is known as the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo
(UNMIK). The Kosovo Force, KFOR, assists the civilian presence and is responsible for establishing
and maintaining the security in Kosovo.115 The duties of the UN interim force handles the day-to-day
governing of Kosovo varying from promoting the self – government in Kosovo, facilitating the future
status process, maintaining civil law and order, promoting human rights to assure the safe and
unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo.116 Thus, the main
goals are to establish security and to build institutions in Kosovo where an institutionalised society
either was part of a repressive regime or existed underground. The UN is given the leading role in the
Kosovo mission, but for a better coordination the structure of UNMIK has been divided into four pillars:
Pillar I: Police and Justice, headed by the United Nations117 Pillar II: Civil Administration, headed by the United Nations and the PISG Pillar III: Democratization and Institution Building, led by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
Pillar IV: Reconstruction and Economic Development, led by the European Union (EU)118
In order to rebuild its society, Kosovo faced several difficult challenges in the peace and
stability process that is outlined by the UN, the OSCE and the European Union. As Kosovo has been
one of the poorest regions of the Balkans it faced a disastrous economic situation with a decline of old
industries and an underdeveloped rural agriculture. Socio - economic problems such as high
unemployment, low educational standards, geographic isolation and a lack of intern and foreign
investment created a negative scenario for Kosovo’s future.119 Moreover, organised crime developed
rapidly in Kosovo and became foremost in international trafficking in humans, drugs and weapons
resulting from the developing poverty, weak state institutions and corruption. Because of its weak
social structures, Kosovo is seen by many criminal networks as an easy transit country from the
Balkans into Western Europe.120 All these factors can have potentially destabilising effects which can
exacerbate the climate of tension. The unresolved status of Kosovo is seen as an obstacle to its
economic recovery. Moreover, a final status does not necessary imply a stable Kosovo.
The most pressing issue for Kosovo is security. After 1999, interethnic violence and crime
continued to rise against the Serbian minorities that are victims of Kosovo - Albanian intimidation or
harassment.121 As a consequence, the minorities need to be protected by the UN, who mainly live in
isolated enclaves throughout Kosovo.122 During UNMIK’s presence, the UN Security Council tried to
115 KFOR, 1999 116 UNSC, 1999: N9917289 117 Pillar I was first covered by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for humanitarian
assistance but ended in June 2000. In May 2001 Police and Justice was established for pillar I. 118 UNSC, 1999: N9917289 119 ICG, 2006 (February 17): 5,6 120 Blitz, Brad, 2006: 106 121 ICG, 2006 (February 17): 8 122 HRW, 2006
24
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agree upon a form of statehood appropriate for Kosovo, however no follow up plan for resolution 1244
had proven to be acceptable and thus the UNMIK presence was continuously extended. In order to
simplify the internal administration and to be able to measure the progression of Kosovo, the
‘Standards before Status’ approach was developed. In the Kosovo Standards Implementations Plan
(KSIP), UNMIK and the PISG agreed in 2003 that certain standards had to be achieved first, before
starting any political negotiations on the future status of Kosovo.123 The targets for Kosovo varied from
functioning democratic institutions, a well-established rule of law to the freedom of movement for all its
residents.124 Only by complying to the ‘Standards’ could UNMIK hope to find a compromising solution
between stable democratic institutions and the ongoing tense ethnic situation in Kosovo, before
addressing the status issue. However, the Kosovo Albanians perceived the standards procedure as an
obstruction for their ultimate goal to become independent as they hoped that UNMIK would grant them
full sovereignty and authority over the region. Moreover, the Kosovo Serbs criticised the Standards as
it could work for the Kosovo Albanians as a façade of a multi –ethnic society that could be unravelled
easily after an eventual independent Kosovo.125
Despite the positive intentions of the UN, the negative consequences of postponing the
consideration of a final settlement in an ethnically tense region became clear on the 18th of March
2004. Riots broke out between Serbian and Albanian youngsters in the ethnically divided city of
Mitrovica in Northern Kosovo due to inciting incidents that occurred on the 16th of March. The unrest
was the worst in Kosovo since the war in 1999. Ethnic Albanians frustrated by the local political
situation, the poor economic situation and the lack of attention from the international community for a
clear future perspective on Kosovo, turned against the Kosovo Serbs and UNMIK. According to a
policy paper of the IKV, indistinctiveness of the situation kept illusions alive and as a consequence the
international community gave Kosovo Albanians with independence aspirations and Serbian
extremists freedom to play on fertile ground to exploit their ethnic distinctiveness against one
another.126
The riots, described by the ICG as ‘the ethnic cleansing of entire minority villages and
neighbourhoods’, resulted in 19 causalities, 900 injured residents and more than 4,500 citizens
internally displaced. Besides physical harm, material damage was done to the 700 homes of non –
Albanian communities, 30 Serbian churches and two monasteries.127 The OSCE concluded that the
riots of March 2004 resulted in a negative blow to minority communities.128 The eruption of violence in
Mitrovica led to criticism of the presence of the international community in Kosovo. After five years of
peacekeeping, the UN was apparently not vigorous enough to grasp the dissatisfaction of the Kosovo
Albanians and the increasingly vulnerable position of Kosovo Serbs, Roma’s and other minority
communities. NATO was foremost blamed for the disastrous failure to protect minority communities.129 123 UNMIK, 2005: What are the standards? 124 UNMIK, 2003: Standards for Kosovo (Appendix 3) 125 Ibid.:10 126 Hal, Oosterwegel, 2005 127 ICG, 2004 (April 22): Executive Summary 128 OMiK, 2004: May 4: 6 129 ICG, 2004 (April 22): 3 - 6
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As a response to the Mitrovica riots, action was taken prioritising the Kosovo standards plan.
Standards of main concern became the protection of minorities including freedom of movement, the
improvement of security, the establishment of the rule of law, decentralisation issues and the return of
displaced persons within or outside Kosovo.130 Moreover, international authorities and analysts urged
the international community to reconsider and reorient its strategy for dealing with Kosovo and to
speed up their progress on a future status solution. The ICG warned: “Time is running out in Kosovo.
The status quo will not hold.”131 Kai Eide, UN Ambassador for Kosovo, advised the UN Security
council to start the political talks on the status issue without loosing the commitment of implementing
the Standards. Eide stated: “the reality that the international presence is likely to decline in the coming
years and the fact that the economy is continuing to deteriorate – thereby adding to the level of
frustration and dissatisfaction – raising the final-status question sooner rather than later seems to be
the better option and is probably inevitable.”132 The UN Security council decided on the 24th of October
2005 to launch a political process that was designed to determine Kosovo’s future status according to
the UN resolution 1244.133 The UN appointed Martti Athisaari as the Special Envoy (SE)134 to lead the
newborn UN institution: the United Nations Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary – General for
the future status process for Kosovo (UNOSEK). UNOSEK is seen as a new chance for Kosovo to
change into a lasting stable and developed community. One hopes that through the negotiations
UNOSEK would able to bridge the wide gap between the desires and aspirations of Kosovo Serbs and
Kosovo Albanians concerning the future status of Kosovo. A zero-sum game of two opposites; either
immediate independence for Kosovo or a Kosovo (again) governed by Serbia.
Before starting the negotiations the members of the Contact Group, an informal grouping of
influential countries that carry out diplomatic issues in the Balkans which consists of the United States,
Russia, United Kingdom, France, Italy and Germany, set the nonnegotiable issues.135 No negotiation
was possible on the partition of Kosovo, the return of the situation before March 1999 and any form of
union of Kosovo with another country. The latter issue prevents Kosovo to unite with Albania in order
to execute the historic idea of creating a ‘greater Albania’. Furthermore they set ten guiding principles
that the negotiators had to follow of which the most important one was that the final settlement should
be in line with the wish of the people of Kosovo.136 The negotiations that were held between February
and November 2006 consisted of two negotiation teams of Kosovo and Serbia in which prime
representatives were included, UNMIK and the Contact Group.137 The primary goal of the negotiations
is to find solutions for the main obstacles or practical day-to-day problems that prevent the Kosovo
Albanians and Kosovo Serbs from living peacefully together. Before addressing the prompting status
130 UNMIK/PISG, 2004: Standards Implementation Plan 131 ICG, 2005 (January 24): 1 132 Eide, 2004 133 UNSC, 2005: S/PRST/2005/51 134 Denisov, 2005: S/2005/709 135 Niessen, Oosterwegel 2006: The EU is informally considered to be the Contact Group “plus” but as is the case with the
Contact Group they do not have an official role in the negotiations. 136 UNOSEK, 2005: Guiding principles 137 Appendix 3: Composition Negotiation teams
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issue itself, the negotiations started off with the ‘technical aspects’ of the status package with the idea
of finding the common ground between Pristina and Belgrade. Consequently, the negotiation rounds
concerned discussions on decentralisation, the protection of community rights, cultural and religious
heritage, regional security and stability, Kosovo’s multi-ethnicity, and economic issues concerning
state property and debt.138
The complexity of finding a solution to the final status of Kosovo not only came forward with
the ‘technical aspects’ of the status issue but also when the issue is addressed directly to leaders from
Serbia and Kosovo. Serbian President Boris Tadić and Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica made the
case for Serbia that essential autonomy was the only solution to the Kosovo status problem. Koštunica
said: “(Serbia) cannot accept the creation of a separate state on 15% of its territory”.139 Whereas
Kosovo President Sejdiu stated the opposite: "Independence is the alpha and omega, the beginning
and end of our position.”140 As both sides were persistent in making their own case and were not
willing to share the different views with each other, Athisaari concluded that the negotiations were
deadlocked after fifteen rounds of direct talks between the negotiation teams due to the limited
results.141 Athisaari assigned the ultimate verdict on the Kosovo Status to the Security Council by
handing in his final proposal on the 21 of January 2007.st 142 On the 2nd of February Athisaari proposed
the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement to Belgrade and Pristina.143 In this
proposal, the Kosovo Serbs will receive a lot of self-government in a sustainable Kosovo that will draw
upon a new core constitution which will represent its multi – ethnic society, which means that all the
rights of the various ethnic communities are to be complied with. The intention of the proposal is to
create a stable basis for a ‘safe and economically sustainable Kosovo’ from which all the communities
should benefit.144 Athisaari distinctively avoided mentioning the notion of independence for Kosovo or
Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo. However the proposal was perceived in generally as an incentive
for an independent Kosovo under international supervision.145
After a final chance was given to come to compromising solutions by discussing the Athisaari
proposal in Vienna, the parties failed to come to an agreement. On the 10th of March 2007, Athisaari
concluded that the yearlong negotiations ended in standstill due to the lack of compromise and
common ground to achieve an agreement.146 Thus, on the 26th of March the final Comprehensive
proposal for a Kosovo Status Settlement, as well as the Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-
General on Kosovo’s Future Status were officially handed over to the Security Council.147 Athisaari
advised the UNSC to grant Kosovo supervised independence as it is the only option for Kosovo to
138 UNOSEK, 2007: The Status Process 139 BBC, 2006: July 24 140 Sejdiu, 2006 141 RFE/RL, 2006: February 27 142 B92, 2006: October 10 143 UNOSEK, 2007: February 2: Comprehensive Proposal 144 Appendix 4: Comprehensive proposal 145 B92, 2007: February 2 146 RFE/RL, 2007: March 10 147 UNOSEK, 2007: The Status Process
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become economically viable and stable as the PISG and Serbia cannot agree on minor practical
issues. Further delay to the status decision would lead to further stagnation, violating the democratic
developments and endangering ethnic reconciliation.148 However, Athisaari’s model of granting
Kosovo semi-independence or limited sovereignty within the state borders of Belgrade is very unusual.
Athisaari wants to make a compromise between the Kosovo Albanians who are given the prospect of
independence and the Kosovo Serbs who are promised extensive rights in security and privileged
relations with Serbia. Implementation of these measures needs to go through extensive
decentralisation measures which are highly controversial as the distinction between building up a
central government and the protected Serbian majority municipalities, who keep their strong and
financial relations with Belgrade, becomes blurred. The resolution of Kosovo’s future status is
perceived as a unique political and legal process, compared to other similar conflicts.149 It seems that
Athisaari as the mouth - piece of the international community wants to accomplish the impossible by
bridging the wide gap between the desires and aspirations of the Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo
Albanians. Will the impossible be possible in Kosovo?
148 UNMIK, 2007: April 25 149 ICG, 2007(May 14): I, 7
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2 Theoretical Framework
2.1 What is a nation?
Ethnic conflict is frequently about territory. Over centuries the territory of Kosovo has been fought over
by two ethnic groups; Kosovo Serbs and the Kosovo Albanians. The Kosovo Serbs attempt to
continue the situation in which the territory of Kosovo is a part of Serbia, whereas the Kosovo
Albanians strive for an independent state of Kosovo. Yet, when do we talk about the state or country
Kosovo? What makes a country a country? What makes a state a state? In the following chapter it is
necessary to take a closer look at the theoretical concepts of state, nation, nation – state, civi