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ARTICLES 774/776
Union Bank v. Santibanez
452 SCRA 228 |Abu
FACTS:On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and
Efraim Santibaez entered into a loan agreement in the amount of P128,000.00.
The amount was intended for the payment of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural
Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in
favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations. On
Dec. 1980, FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement for the payment
of another unit of Ford 6600 and one unit of a Rotamotor. Again, Efraim and
Edmund executed a promissory note and a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the
later loan. In 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Testate proceedings
commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City. Edmund was appointed as the special
administrator of the estate. During the pendency of the testate proceedings, thesurviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence, executed a Joint Agreement,
wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the
three (3) tractors: (2) tractors for Edmund and (1) for Florence. Each of them was to
assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor
respectively taken by them. In the meantime, a Deed of Assignment with
Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and between FCCC and Union Bank,
wherein the FCCC assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Bank.
Demand letters were sent by Union Bank to Edmund, but the latter refused
to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, Union Bank filed a Complaint for sum of money
against the heirs of Efraim Santibaez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of
Makati City. Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended for
Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there was no
information on his address or the date of his return to the Philippines. Florence filed
her Answer and alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not
a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother
Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and void; hence, she
was not liable to Union Bank under the joint agreement.
Union Bank asserts that the obligation of the deceased had passed to his
legitimate heirs (Edmund and Florence) as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code;
and that the unconditional signing of the joint agreement estopped Florence, and
that she cannot deny her liability under the said document.
In her comment to the petition, Florence maintains that Union Bank is
trying to recover a sum of money from the deceased Efraim Santibaez; thus the
claim should have been filed with the probate court. She points out that at the time
of the execution of the joint agreement there was already an existing probate
proceedings. She asserts that even if the agreement was voluntarily executed by
her and her brother Edmund, it should still have been subjected to the approval ofthe court as it may prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties.
ISSUE:
W/N the claim of Union Bank should have been filed with the probate court before
which the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibaez was pending. W/N the
agreement between Edmund and Florence (which was in effect, a partition of hte
estate) was void considering that it had not been approved by the probate court.
W/N there can be a valid partition among the heirs before the will is probated.
HELD:
Well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction todetermine all the properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or
should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered. The
said court is primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and
distribution of the estate.
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among
the heirs until after the will has been probated. In the present case, Efraim left a
holographic will which contained the provision which reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be
discovered later after my demise, shall be distributed in the proportion
indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund and
Florence, my children.
The above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision embracing all the
properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his mind at that time he
was making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included
therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the
said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement executed by Edmund
and Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so
since at the time of its execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the
probate of their late fathers holographic will covering the said tractors.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The bank,
purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibaez, should have thus filed its
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money claim with the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate
court is mandatory. This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of
the deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it,
thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a properone which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy
settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to
the distributees, legatees, or heirs.
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold Florence
accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence
presented, particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty
agreement, were executed and signed only by the late Efraim Santibaez and his
son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court,
at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said
promissory notes and continuing guaranty.
ARTICLE 77
Uson v. Del Rosario
92:530|Andres
FACTS:
This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5)
parcels of land in Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario and her
four illegit children. Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon
his death in 1945 left the lands involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no
other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However, plaintiff claims that when
Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario took
possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and
enjoyment. Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that Uson and her
husband, executed a public document whereby they agreed to separate as husband
and wife and, in consideration of which Uson was given a parcel of land and in
return she renounced her right to inherit any other property that may be left by her
husband upon his death. CFI found for Uson. Defendants appealed.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Uson has a right over the lands from the moment of death of herhusband.
2. W/N the illegit children of deceased and his common-law wife havesuccessional rights.
HELD:
1. Yes. There is no dispute that Maria Uson, is the lawful wife of FaustinoNebreda, former owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the present case.
There is likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario, was merely a common-law
wife with whom she had four illegitimate children with the deceased. It
likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the
effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background, it is evident that when
Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the
time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria
Uson (Art 777 NCC).As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs
at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestorhad executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death".
From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the
lands in question became vested.
The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right
over the lands in question because she expressly renounced to inherit any
future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the
deed of separation, cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future
inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced.
2. No. The provisions of the NCC shall be given retroactive effect even though theevent which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation
only if no vested rights are impaired. Hence, since the right of ownership of
Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death
of her late husband, the new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of
the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the
impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.
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Borja v. Borja
46 SCRA 577 |Ang
FACTS:
Francisco de Borja filed a petition for probate of the will of his wife who
died, Josefa Tangco, with the CFI of Rizal. He was appointed executor andadministrator, until he died; his son Jose became the sole administrator. Francisco
had taken a 2nd
wife Tasiana before he died; she instituted testate proceedings with
the CFI of Nueva Ecija upon his death and was appointed special administatrix. Jose
and Tasiana entered upon a compromise agreement, but Tasiana opposed the
approval of the compromise agreement. She argues that it was no valid, because
the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will
of Francisco, and at the time the agreement was made, the will was still being
probated with the CFI of Nueva Ecija.
ISSUE:
W/N the compromise agreement is valid, even if the will of Francisco has not yetbeen probated.
HELD:
YES, the compromise agreement is valid.
The agreement stipulated that Tasiana will receive P800,000 as full
payment for her hereditary share in the estate of Francisco and Josefa.
There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco
de Borja among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of
the contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her
individual share and interest, actual or eventual, in the estate of Francisco
de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any other claimant,
creditor or legatee.
And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested
immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in
interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777) there is no legal bar to a successor
(with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share
immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not
determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.
Bonilla v. Barcena
71 SCRA 491 |Angliongto
FACTS:
On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla
and Salvacion Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the CFIof Abra, to quiet title over certain parcels of land located in Abra. The defendants
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Fortunata Barcena is
dead and, therefore, has no legal capacity to sue. In the hearing for the motion to
dismiss, counsel for the plaintiff confirmed the death of Fortunata Barcena, and
asked for substitution by her minor children and her husband; but the court after
the hearing immediately dismissed the case on the ground that a dead person
cannot be a real party in interest and has no legal personality to sue.
ISSUE:
W/N the CFI erred in dismissing the complaint.
HELD:
While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can
be substituted by his heirs in pursuing the case up to its completion. The records of
this case show that the death of Fortunata Barcena took place on July 9, 1975 while
the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975. This means that when the complaint
was filed on March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena was still alive, and therefore, the
court had acquired jurisdiction over her person. Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court "whenever a party to a pending case dies ... it shall be the duty of his
attorney to inform the court promptly of such death ... and to give the name and
residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representatives."
This duty was complied with by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff when he
manifested before the respondent Court that Fortunata Barcena died on July 9,
1975 and asked for the proper substitution of parties in the case. The respondent
Court, however, instead of allowing the substitution, dismissed the complaint on
the ground that a dead person has no legal personality to sue. This is a grave error.
Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." From the moment of
the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his property,
subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived
of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. The moment of
death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the
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inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. The right of the heirs to the
property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their
being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings. When Fortunata Barcena,
therefore, died, her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No.
856, was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her
death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation andbecame parties in interest in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the
respondent Court not to allow their substitution as parties in interest for the
deceased plaintiff.
The claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an action to quiet title over the
parcels of land in litigation affects primarily and principally property and property
rights and therefore is one that survives even after her death. It is, therefore, the
duty of the respondent Court to order the legal representative of the deceased
plaintiff to appear and to be substituted for her. But what the respondent Court did,
upon being informed by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff that the latter was
dead, was to dismiss the complaint. This should not have been done for under
Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it is even the duty of the court, if the legalrepresentative fails to appear, to order the opposing party to procure the
appointment of a legal representative of the deceased. Unquestionably, the
respondent Court has gravely abused its discretion in not complying with the clear
provision of the Rules of Court in dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff in Civil
Case No. 856 and refusing the substitution of parties in the case.
ARTICLE 783
Vitug v. CA
183 SCRA 755 |JEN SUCCESSION REVIEWER
FACTS:
Romarico Vitug and Nenita Alonte were co-administrators of Dolores
Vitugs (deceased) estate. Rowena Corona was the executrix. Romarico, the
deceaseds husband, filed a motion with the probate court asking for authority to
sell certain shares of stock and real properties belonging to the estate to cover
alleged advances to the estate, which he claimed as personal funds. The advances
were used to pay estate taxes.
Corona opposed the motion on ground that the advances came from a
savings account which formed part of the conjugal partnership properties and is
part of the estate. Thus, there was no ground for reimbursement. Romarico claims
that the funds are his exclusive property, having been acquired through a
survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank.
The agreement stated that after the death of either one of the spouses,
the savings account shall belong to and be the sole property of the survivor, and
shall be payable to and collectible or withdrawable by such survivor.
The lower court upheld the validity of the agreement and granted themotion to sell. CA reversed stating that the survivorship agreement constitutes a
conveyance mortis causa which did not comply with the formalities of a valid will.
Assuming that it was a donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation (donation
between spouses).
ISSUE:
W/N the survivorship agreement was valid.
HELD:
YES. The conveyance is not mortis causa, which should be embodied in a
will. A will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitatedperson disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies with duties to
take effect after his death. The bequest or devise must pertain to the testator.
In this case, the savings account involved was in the nature of conjugal
funds. Since it was not shown that the funds belonged exclusively to one party, it is
presumed to be conjugal.
It is also not a donation inter vivos because it was to take effect after the
death of one party. It is also not a donation between spouses because it involved no
conveyance of a spouses own properties to the other.
It was an error to include the savings account in the inventory of the
deceaseds assets because it is the separate property of Romarico.
Thus, Romarico had the right to claim reimbursement.
A will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated
person disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies with duties to
take effect after his death.
Survivorship agreements are permitted by the NCC. However, its operation
or effect must not be violative of the law (i.e. used as a cloak to hide an inofficious
donation or to transfer property in fraud of creditors or to defeat the legitime of a
forced heir).
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ARTICLE 804
Suroza v. Honrado
110 SCRA 388 |Atcheco
FACTS:Spouses Mauro Suroza and Marcelina Salvador, who were childless, reared
a boy named Agapito. Agapito and his wife Nenita de Vera had a daughter named
Lilia. Nenita became Agapitos guardian when he became disabled. A certain
Arsenia de la Cruz also wanted to be his guardian in another proceeding but it was
dismissed. Arsenia then delivered a child named Marilyn Sy to Marcelina who
brought her up as a supposed daughter of Agapito. Marilyn used the surname
Suroza although not legally adopted by Agapito. When Marcelina (who was an
illiterate) was 73 years old, she supposedly executed a notarial will which was in
English and thumbmarked by her. In the will, she allegedly bequeathed all her
properties to Marilyn. She also named as executrix her laundrywoman, Marina Paje.
Paje filed a petition for probate of Marcelinas will. Judge Honrado appointed Pajeas administratrix and issued orders allowing the latter to withdraw money from the
savings account of Marcelina and Marilyn, and instructing the sheriff to eject the
occupants of testatrixs house, among whom was Nenita. She and the other
occupants filed a motion to set aside the order ejecting them, alleging that Agapito
was the sole heir of the deceased, and that Marilyn was not the decedents
granddaughter. Despite this, Judge Honrado issued an order probating Marcelinas
will.
Nenita filed an omnibus petition to set aside proceedings, admit
opposition with counter-petition for administration and preliminary injunction, and
an opposition to the probate of the will and a counter-petition for letters of
administration, which were dismissed by Judge Honrado. Instead of appealing,
Nenita filed a case to annul the probate proceedings but Judge Honrado dismissed
it. The judge then closed the testamentary proceeding after noting that the
executrix had delivered the estate to Marilyn, and that the estate tax had been
paid.
Ten months later, Nenita filed a complaint before the SC, charging Judge
Honrado with having probated the fraudulent will of Marcelina. She reiterated her
contention that the testatrix was illiterate as shown by the fact that she affixed her
thumbmark to the will and that she did not know English, the language in which the
will was written. She further alleged that Judge Honrado did not take into account
the consequences of the preterition of testatrixs son, Agapito. Judge Honrado in his
comment did not deal specifically with the allegations but merely pointed to the
fact that Nenita did not appeal from the decree of probate and that in a motion, she
asked for a thirty day period within which to vacate the house of the testatrix.
Nenita subsequently filed in the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition against
Judge Honrado wherein she prayed that the will, the decree of probate and all the
proceedings in the probate case be declared void. The CA dismissed the petitionbecause Nenitas remedy was an appeal and her failure to do so did not entitle her
to resort to the special civil action of certiorari. Relying on that decision, Judge
Honrado filed a MTD the administrative case for having allegedly become moot and
academic.
ISSUE:
W/N disciplinary action be taken against respondent judge for having admitted to
probate a will, which on its face is void because it is written in English, a language
not known to the illiterate testatrix, and which is probably a forged will because she
and the attesting witnesses did not appear before the notary as admitted by the
notary himself.
HELD:
YES. Respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it was written
in English and was thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, could have
readily perceived that the will is void. In the opening paragraph of the will, it was
stated that English was a language understood and known to the testatrix. But in
its concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to the testatrix and
translated into Filipino language. That could only mean that the will was written in
a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is void because of
the mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be
executed in a language or dialect known to the testator.
The hasty preparation of the will is shown in the attestation clause and
notarial acknowledgment where Marcelina Salvador Suroza is repeatedly referred
to as the testator instead of testatrix. Had respondent judge been careful and
observant, he could have noted not only the anomaly as to the language of the will
but also that there was something wrong in instituting the supposed granddaughter
as sole heiress and giving nothing at all to her supposed father who was still alive.
Furthermore, after the hearing conducted by the deputy clerk of court, respondent
judge could have noticed that the notary was not presented as a witness. In spite of
the absence of an opposition, respondent judge should have personally conducted
the hearing on the probate of the will so that he could have ascertained whether
the will was validly executed.
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Noble v. Abaja
450 SCRA 265 | Bautista
FACTS:
The case is about the probate of the will of Alipio Abada (Not respondent
Abaja). Petitioner Belinda Noble is the administratrix of the estate of Abada.Respondent Alipio Abaja filed a petition for the probate of Abadas will. Petitioner
Noble moved for dismissal of the petition for probate.
Caponong-Noble points out that nowhere in the will can one discern that
Abada knew the Spanish language. She alleges that such defect is fatal and must
result in the disallowance of the will.
ISSUE:
Should it be expressly stated in the will that it (the will) was in a language known by
the testator?
HELD:No. There is no statutory requirement to state in the will itself that the
testator knew the language or dialect used in the will.[25] This is a matter that a
party may establish by proof aliunde. In this case, Alipio testified that Abada used to
gather Spanish-speaking people in their place. In these gatherings, Abada and his
companions would talk in the Spanish language. This sufficiently proves that Abada
speaks the Spanish language.
ARTICLES 805-806
Matias v. Salud
L-10751, 23 June 1958 |JEN SUCCESSION REVIEWER
FACTS:
The CFI denied probate of the will of Gabina Raquel. It must be noted that
Gabina Raquel was suffering from herpes zoster that afflicted the right arm and
shoulder of the testatrix, which made writing difficult and a painful act. Thus, upon
the insistence of the attorney, Gabina attempted to sign, but since it was so painful
she just managed to thumbmarked the foot of the document and the left margin at
each page. The parties opposing the probate of the will contended that the will was
void due to the irregularities in the execution thereof.
One of the points raised by the oppositors was that the finger mark can not
be regarded as the decedents valid signature as it does not show disti nct
identifying ridgelines. And since the finger mark was an invalid signature, there
must appear in the attestation clause that another person wrote the testators
name at his request.
ISSUE:
W/N the will was valid.
HELD:
YES. As to the clarity of the ridge impressions, it is so dependent on
aleatory requirements as to require dexterity that can be expected of very few
persons; testators should not be required to possess the skill of trained officers.
And as to the validity of the thumbprints as signature, the SC held that it has been
held in a long line of cases that a thumbprint is always a valid and sufficient
signature for the purpose of complying with the requirement of the article.
Furthermore, the validity of thumbprints should not be limited in cases of illness orinfirmity. A thumbprint is considered as a valid and sufficient signature in
complying with the requirements of the article.
Garcia v. Lacuesta
90:489 | Castillo
FACTS:
This case involves the will of Antero Mercado, which among other defects
was signed by the testator through a cross mark (an X). The will was signed by
Atty. Javier who wrote the name of Mercado as testator and the latter allegedly
wrote a cross mark after his name. The CFI allowed the will but the CA disallowed it
because its attestation clause was defective for failing to certify 1) that the will was
signed by Atty. Javier at the express direction of the testator, 2) that the testator
wrote a cross at the end of his name after Atty. Javier signed for him, and 3) that
the 3 witnesses signed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.
ISSUE:
Whether the will should be allowed despite the defect of the attestation clause
since the testator had placed a cross mark himself as his signature.
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HELD:
The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Mercado
directed Javier to write the testators name under his express direction. Petitioners
argument that such recital is unnecessary because the testator signed the will
himself using a cross mark which should be considered the same as a thumb-mark
(which has been held sufficient in past cases) is not acceptable. A cross mark is notthe same as a thumb mark, because the cross mark does not have the same
trustworthiness of a thumb mark.
Barut v. Cabacungan
21:461 | Casuela
FACTS:
Barut applied for the probate of the will of deceased, Maria Salomon. The
testatrix stated in the will that being unable to read or write, the will was read to
her by Ciriaco Concepcion and Timotea Inoselda and that she had instructed Severo
Agayan to sign her name to it as testatrix. The probate was contested by a numberof the relatives of the deceased on various grounds.
The probate court found that the will was not entitled to probate because
the handwriting of the person who it is alleged signed the name of the testatrix to
the will for and on her behalf looked more like the handwriting of one of the other
witnesses to the will than to the person whose handwriting it was alleged to be
(i.e. The probate court denied probate because the signature seemed to not have
been by Severo Agayan but by another witness).
ISSUE:
Was the dissimilarity in handwriting sufficient to deny probate of the will?
HELD:
No. The SC found that the mere dissimilarity in writing is sufficient to
overcome the uncontradicted testimony of all the witnesses that the signature of
the testatrix was written by Severo Agayan. It is also immaterial who writes the
name of the testatrix provided it is written at her request and in her presence and
in the presence of all the witnesses to the execution of the will.
Based on Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is clear that with
respect to the validityof the will, it is unimportant whether the person who writes
the name of the testatrix signs his own or not. The important thing is that it clearly
appears that the name of the testatrix was signed at her express direction in the
presence of 3 witnesses and that they attested and subscribed it in her presence
and in the presence of each other. It may be wise that the one who signs the
testators name signs also his own; but that is not essential to the validity of the
will.
The court also held that the 3 cases cited by the lower court was not
applicable. In those cases, the person who signed the will for the testator wrote hisown name instead of the testators, so that the testators name nowhere appeared
in the will, and were thus wills not duly executed.
Nera v. Rimando
18:450 | Cukingnan
FACTS:
The only question raised by the evidence in this case as to the due
execution of the instrument propounded as a will in the court below, is whether
one of the subscribing witnesses was present in the small room where it was
executed at the time when the testator and the other subscribing witnessesattached their signatures; or whether at that time he was outside, some eight or
ten feet away, in a large room connecting with the smaller room by a doorway,
across which was hung a curtain which made it impossible for one in the outside
room to see the testator and the other subscribing witnesses in the act of attaching
their signatures to the instrument.
HELD:
Citing Jaboneta v. Gustilo, the court held that The true test of presence of
the testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will is not whether they actually
saw each other sign, but whether they might have been seen each other sign, had
they chosen to do so, considering their mental and physical condition and position
with relation to each other at the moment of inscription of each signature.
But it is especially to be noted that the position of the parties with relation
to each other at the moment of the subscription of each signature, must be such
that they may see each other sign if they choose to do so.
The question is whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an
alleged will signed the instrument in the presence of each other does not depend
upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually cast upon the paper at the
moment of its subscription by each of them, but that at that moment existing
conditions and their position with relation to each other were such that by merely
casting the eyes in the proper direction they could have seen each other sign. To
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extend the doctrine further would open the door to the possibility of all manner of
fraud, substitution, and the like, and would defeat the purpose for which this
particular condition is prescribed in the code as one of the requisites in the
execution of a will.
Icasiano v. Icasiano11 SCRA 422 | Dela Cuesta
FACTS:
Celso Icasiano filed a petition for the allowance and admission to probate
of the alleged will of Josefa Villacorte, and for his appointment as executor thereof.
Natividad and Enrique Icasiano, a daughter and son of the testatrix, filed their
opposition thereto. During the course of the trial, on 19 March 1959, Celso, started
to present his evidence. But later, on 1 June 1959, he then filed an amended and
supplemental petition, alleging that the decedent had left a will executed in
duplicate and with all the legal requirements, and that he was submitting the
duplicate to the court, which he found only on 26 May 1959. Natividad and Enriquefiled their opposition, but the will and its duplicate was admitted to probate by the
trial court. Hence, this appeal by the oppositors.
Oppositors-appellants (Natividad and Enrique) in turn introduced expert
testimony to the effect that the signatures of the testatrix in the duplicate are not
genuine, nor were they written or affixed on the same occasion as the original, and
further aver that granting that the documents were genuine, they were executed
through mistake and with undue influence and pressure because the testatrix was
deceived into adopting as her last will and testament the wishes of those who will
stand to benefit from the provisions of the will, as may be inferred from the facts
and circumstances surrounding the execution of the will and the provisions and
dispositions thereof, whereby proponents- appellees stand to profit from
properties held by them as attorneys- in-fact of the deceased and not enumerated
or mentioned therein, while oppositors-appellants are enjoined not to look for
other properties not mentioned in the will, and not to oppose the probate of it, on
penalty of forfeiting their share in the portion of free disposal.
ISSUE:
Was the trial court correct in admitting the will and its duplicate to probate given
the allegations of forgery of the testators signature, or that the will was executed
under circumstances constituting fraud and undue influence and pressure?
(Not raised by the appellants in the case but discussed by the Court and in Sirs
book) Is the failure of one of the witnesses to sign a page of the will fatal to its
validity?
HELD:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that both the will and itsduplicate are valid in all respects.
On the allegations of forgery, fraud and undue influence:
The Court is satisfied that all the requisites for the validity of a will have
been complied with. The opinion of a handwriting expert trying to prove forgery of
the testatrix's signature failed to convince the Court, not only because it is directly
contradicted by another expert but principally because of the paucity of the
standards used by him (only three other signatures), considering the advanced age
of the testatrix, the evident variability of her signature, and the effect of writing
fatigue.
Similarly, the alleged slight variance in blueness of the ink in the admittedand questioned signatures does not appear reliable, considering that standard and
challenged writings were affixed to different kinds of paper, with different surfaces
and reflecting power. On the whole, the testimony of the oppositor's expert is
insufficient to overcome that of the notary and the two instrumental witnesses as
to the wills execution, which were presented by Celso during the trial.
Nor is there adequate evidence of fraud or undue influence. The fact that
some heirs are more favored than others is proof of neither. Diversity of
apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent
might as well die intestate. The testamentary disposition that the heirs should not
inquire into other property and that they should respect the distribution made in
the will, under penalty of forfeiture of their shares in the free part, do not suffice to
prove fraud or undue influence. They appear motivated by the desire to prevent
prolonged litigation which, as shown by ordinary experience, often results in a
sizeable portion of the estate being diverted into the hands of non- heirs and
speculators. Whether these clauses are valid or not is a matter to be litigated on
another occasion. It is also well to note that fraud and undue influence are
mutually repugnant and exclude each other; their joining as grounds for opposing
probate shows absence of definite evidence against the validity of the will.
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On the failure of a witness to sign a page in the original, but signed all pages in the
duplicate:
The records show that the original of the will consists of five pages, and
while signed at the end and in every page, it does not contain the signature of one
of the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose V. Natividad, on page 3 thereof; but the
duplicate copy attached to the amended and supplemental petition is signed by thetestatrix and her three attesting witnesses in each and every page.
Witness Atty. Natividad, who testified on his failure to sign page 3 of the
original, admits that he may have lifted two pages instead of one when he signed
the same, but affirmed that page 3 was signed in his presence.
The failure Atty. Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure
oversight is shown by his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will,
which bears a complete set of signatures in every page. The text of the attestation
clause and the acknowledgment before the Notary Public likewise evidence that no
one was aware of the defect at the time. Therefore, Atty. Natividads failure to sign
page 3 of the original through mere inadvertence does not affect the wills validity.
Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact thatthe testatrix and two other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its
bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom the
testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law should not be
so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the
inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had no control, where the
purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component
pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the
evidence on record attests to the full observance of the statutory requisites.
This would not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and
literal application of the statutory requirements, where the purposes of the law are
otherwise satisfied. Thus, despite the literal tenor of the law, this Court has held
that a testament, with the only page signed at its foot by testator and witnesses,
but not in the left margin, could nevertheless be probated (Abangan vs. Abangan,
41 Phil. 476); and that despite the requirement for the correlative lettering of the
pages of a will, the failure to mark the first page either by letters or numbers is not
a fatal defect (Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429). These precedents exemplify the
Court's policy to require satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to guard
against fraud and bad faith but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of the
testamentary privilege.
The appellants also argue that since the original of the will is in existence
and available, the duplicate is not entitled to probate. Since they opposed probate
of the original because it lacked one signature in its third page, it is easily discerned
that oppositors-appellants run here into a dilemma: if the original is defective and
invalid, then in law there is no other will but the duly signed carbon duplicate, and
the same is probatable. If the original is valid and can be probated, then the
objection to the signed duplicate need not be considered, being superfluous and
irrelevant. At any rate, said duplicate serves to prove that the omission of onesignature in the third page of the original testament was inadvertent and not
intentional.
Cagro v. Cagro
92:1032 | Dina
FACTS:
Vicente Cagro died on Feb. 14, 1949 in Samar. Since the decedent allegedly
made a will prior to his death, the will was probated before the CFI of Samar.
However, the oppositors-appellant objected the probate proceeding alleging that
the will is fatally defective because its attestation clause is not signed by theattesting witnesses. It is undisputed that the signatures of the three witnesses to
the will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page
containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin.
ISSUE:
W/N the will may be probated even if the signatures of the witnesses do not appear
at the bottom of the attestation clause, and instead, they were placed on the left-
hand margin of the page containing the same.
HELD:
No. The position taken by the oppositor-appellant is correct. The
attestation clause is 'a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the
will' required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily
bear their signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act
of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof
negatives their participation.
The petitioner-appellee contends that signatures of the three witnesses on
the left-hand margin conform substantially to the law and may be deemed as their
signatures to the attestation clause. This is untenable, because said signatures are
in compliance with the legal mandate that the will be signed on the left-hand
margin of all its pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the three witnesses at
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the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such clause
to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all
of the witnesses.
Bautista Angelo, J. dissenting:
I dissent. In my opinion the will in question has substantially complied withthe formalities of the law and, therefore, should be admitted to probate. It appears
that the will was signed by the testator and was attested by three instrumental
witnesses, not only at the bottom, but also on the left-hand margin. The witnesses
testified not only that the will was signed by the testator in their presence and in
the presence of each other but also that when they did so, the attestation clause
was already written thereon. Their testimony has not been contradicted. The only
objection set up by the oppositors to the validity of the will is the fact that the
signatures of the instrumental witnesses do not appear immediately after the
attestation clause.
This objection is too technical to be entertained. In the case of Abangan vs.
Abangan, (40 Phil. 476), this court said that when the testamentary dispositions"are wholly written on only one sheet signed at the bottom by the testator and
three witnesses (as the instant case),their signatures on the left margin of said
sheet would be completely purposeless." In such a case, the court said, the
requirement of the signatures on the left hand margin was not necessary because
the purpose of the law which is to avoid the substitution of any of the sheets of
the will, thereby changing the testator's dispositions has already been
accomplished. We may say the same thing in connection with the will under
consideration because while the three instrumental witnesses did not sign
immediately by the majority that it may have been only added on a subsequent
occasion and not at the uncontradicted testimony of said witnesses to the effect
that such attestation clause was already written in the will when the same was
signed.
TUASON, J., dissenting:
I concur in Mr. Justice Bautista's dissenting opinion and may add that the
majority decision erroneously sets down as a fact that the attestation clause was
not signed when the witnesses signatures appear on the left margin and the real
and only question is whether such signatures are legally sufficient. The law on wills
does not provide that the attesting witness should sign the clause at the bottom. In
the absence of such provision, there is no reason why the signatures on the margin
are not acceptable
Cruz v. Villasor
54 SCRA 752 | Dizon
FACTS:
The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of Valente Z. Cruzs last will and
testament. His surviving spouse, Agapita Cruz, opposed the allowance of the willalleging it was executed through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and undue
influence; that the said instrument was execute without the testator having been
fully informed of the content thereof, particularly as to what properties he was
disposing and that the supposed last will and testament was not executed in
accordance with law. Agapita appealed the allowance of the will by certiorari.
ISSUE:
W/N the will was executed in accordance with law (particularly Articles 805 and 806
of the NCC, the first requiring at least three credible witnesses to attest and
subscribe to the will, and the second requiring the testator and the witnesses to
acknowledge the will before a notary public.).
HELD:
NO. Of the three instrumental witnesses to the will, one of them (Atty.
Teves) is at the same time the Notary Public before whom the will was supposed to
have been acknowledged. The notary public before whom the will was
acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he
cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. To acknowledge
before means to avow (Javellana v. Ledesma; Castro v. Castro); to own as genuine,
to assent, to admit; and "before" means in front or preceding in space or ahead of.
Consequently, if the third witness were the notary public himself, he would have to
avow assent, or admit his having signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be
done because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before
the other to acknowledge his participation in the making of the will. To permit such
a situation to obtain would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity. Furthermore, the
function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangement (Balinon v. De Leon). That function would defeated if the notary public
were one of the attesting instrumental witnesses. It would place him in inconsistent
position and the very purpose of acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud,
would be thwarted.
Admittedly, there are American precedents holding that notary public may,
in addition, act as a witness to the executive of the document he has notarized.
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There are others holding that his signing merely as notary in a will nonetheless
makes him a witness thereon. But these authorities do not serve the purpose of the
law in this jurisdiction or are not decisive of the issue herein because the notaries
public and witnesses referred to in these cases merely acted as instrumental,
subscribing attesting witnesses, and not as acknowledging witnesses. Here, the
notary public acted not only as attesting witness but also acknowledging witness, asituation not envisaged by Article 805-06. Probate of will set aside.
Javellana v. Ledesma
97:258 | Enriquez
FACTS:
The Court of First Instance of Iloilo admitted to probate the documents in
the Visayan dialectas the testament and codicil duly executed by the deceased Da.
Apolinaria Ledesma Vda. de Javellana, on March 30, 1950, and May 29, 1952,
respectively, with Ramon Tabiana, Gloria Montinola de Tabiana and Vicente Yap as
witnesses. The contestant, Matea Ledesma, sister and nearest surviving relative ofsaid deceased, appealed from the decision, insisting that the said exhibits were not
executed in conformity with law. Ledesma is questioning the validity of the codicil
contending that the fact that the notary did not sign the instrument in the presence
of the testator and the witness made the codicil was not executed in conformity
with the law
ISSUE:
W/N the codicil was validly executed.
HELD:
The instrumental witnesses (who happen to be the same ones who
attested the will of 1950) asserted that after the codicil had been signed by the
testatrix and the witnesses at the San Pablo Hospital, the same was signed and
sealed by notary public Gimotea on the same occasion. On the other hand, Gimotea
affirmed that he did not do so, but brought the codicil to his office, and signed and
sealed it there. The variance does not necessarily imply conscious perversion of
truth on the part of the witnesses, but appears rather due to a well-established
phenomenon, the tendency of the mind, in recalling past events, to substitute the
usual and habitual for what differs slightly from it.
Whether or not the notary signed the certification of acknowledgment in
the presence of the testatrix and the witnesses, does not affect the validity of the
codicil. The new Civil Code does not require that the signing of the testator,
witnesses and notary should be accomplished in one single act. A comparison of
Articles 805 and 806 of the new Civil Code reveals that while testator and witnesses
sign in the presence of each other, all that is thereafter required is that "every will
must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses"
(Art. 806); i.e., that the latter should avow to the certifying officer the authenticityof their signatures and the voluntariness of their actions in executing the
testamentary disposition. This was done in this case. The subsequent signing and
sealing by the notary of his certification that the testament was duly acknowledged
by the participants therein is no part of the acknowledgment itself nor of the
testamentary act. Hence their separate execution out of the presence of the
testatrix and her witnesses cannot be said to violate the rule that testaments
should be completed without interruption. It is noteworthy that Article 806 of the
new Civil Code does not contain words requiring that the testator and the witnesses
should acknowledge the testament on the same day or occasion that it was
executed.
Ortega v. Valmonte
478 SCRA 247 | Escosia
FACTS:
Two years after the arrival of Placido from the United States and at the age
of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old. But in a little more than two years
of wedded bliss, Placido died. Placido executed a notarial last will and testament
written in English and consisting of 2 pages, and dated 15 June 1983but
acknowledged only on 9 August 1983. The allowance to probate of this will was
opposed by Leticia, Placidos sister. According to the notary public who notarized
the testators will, after the testator instructed him on the terms and dispositions
he wanted on the will, the notary public told them to come back on 15 August 1983
to give him time to prepare. The testator and his witnesses returned on the
appointed date but the notary public was out of town so they were instructed by
his wife to come back on 9 August 1983. The formal execution was actually on 9
August 1983. He reasoned he no longer changed the typewritten date of 15 June
1983 because he did not like the document to appear dirty.
Petitioners argument:
1. At the time of the execution of the notarial will Placido was already 83 yearsold and was no longer of sound mind.
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2. Josefina conspired with the notary public and the 3 attesting witnesses indeceiving Placido to sign it. Deception is allegedly reflected in the varying dates
of the execution and the attestation of the will.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Placido has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly executed thewill.
2. W/N the signature of Placido in the will was procured by fraud or trickery.HELD:
1. YES. Despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kindsof property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their location.
As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified
his wife as sole beneficiary. The omission of some relatives from the will did not
affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution,
intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.
2. NO. Fraud is a trick, secret devise, false statement, or pretense, by which thesubject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled
or deceived as to the nature or contents of the document which he executes,
or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception
regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will which, but for fraud,
he would not have made.
The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of
fraud at the time of its execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the
proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud.
Omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a will.
Moreover, the conflict between the dates appearing on the will does not
invalidate the document, because the law does not even require that a
notarial will be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion. The
variance in the dates of the will as to its supposed execution and attestation
was satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary public and
instrumental witnesses.
Guerrero v. Bihis
521 SCRA 394 | Estorninos
FACTS:
Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, mother of petitioner Bella A. Guerrero and
respondent Resurreccion A. Bihis, died. Guerrero filed for probate in the RTC QC.Respondent Bihis opposed her elder sister's petition on the following grounds: the
will was not executed and attested as required by law; its attestation clause and
acknowledgment did not comply with the requirements of the law; the signature of
the testatrix was procured by fraud and petitioner and her children procured the
will through undue and improper pressure and influence. Petitioner Guerrero was
appointes special administratrix. Respondent opposed petitioner's appointment but
subsequently withdrew her opposition. The trial court denied the probate of the
will ruling that Article 806 of the Civil Code was not complied with because the will
was "acknowledged" by the testatrix and the witnesses at the testatrix's residence
at No. 40 Kanlaon Street, Quezon City before Atty. Macario O. Directo who was a
commissioned notary public for and in Caloocan City.
ISSUE:
Did the will "acknowledged" by the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses before
a notary public acting outside the place of his commission satisfy the requirement
under Article 806 of the Civil Code?
HELD:
No. One of the formalities required by law in connection with the
execution of a notarial will is that it must be acknowledged before a notary public
by the testator and the witnesses. 6 This formal requirement is one of the
indispensable requisites for the validity of a will. 7 In other words, a notarial will
that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
instrumental witnesses is void and cannot be accepted for probate. cDICaS
The Notarial law provides: SECTION 240.Territorial jurisdiction. The
jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall be co-extensive with the province.
The jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of Manila shall be co-extensive with
said city. No notary shall possess authority to do any notarial act beyond the limits
of his jurisdiction.
The compulsory language of Article 806 of the Civil Code was not complied
with and the interdiction of Article 240 of the Notarial Law was breached.
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Ineluctably, the acts of the testatrix, her witnesses and Atty. Directo were all
completely void.
Lee v. Tambago
544 SCRA 393 | Fortea
FACTS:
Complainant, Manuel L. Lee, charged respondent, Atty. Regino B.
Tambago, with violation of Notarial Law and the Ethics of the legal profession for
notarizing a will that is alleged to be spurious in nature in containing forged
signatures of his father, the decedent, Vicente Lee Sr. and two other witnesses. In
the said will, the decedent supposedly bequeathed his entire estate to his wife Lim
Hock Lee, save for a parcel of land which he devised to Vicente Lee, Jr. and Elena
Lee, half-siblings of complainant.
The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before respondent
on June 30, 1965.Complainant, however, pointed out that the residence certificate
of the testator noted in the acknowledgment of the will was dated January 5, 1962.
Furthermore, the signature of the testator was not the same as his signature as
donor in a deed of donationwhich supposedly contained his purported signature.
Complainant averred that the signatures of his deceased father in the will and in the
deed of donation were "in any way entirely and diametrically opposed from one
another in all angle[s]."
Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of the residence
certificates of the purported witnesses Noynay and Grajo. He alleged that their
signatures had likewise been forged and merely copied from their respective voters
affidavits.
Complainant further asserted that no copy of such purported will was on
file in the archives division of the Records Management and Archives Office of the
National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA).
ISSUE:
Was the will spurious?
HELD:
Yes, thus Tambago violated the Notarial Law and the ethics of legal
profession.
The law provides for certain formalities that must be followed in the
execution of wills. The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to
close the door on bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments
and to guarantee their truth and authenticity.
A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law to be
subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself. In addition, it should be
attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of one another. The will in question was attested by only twowitnesses. On this circumstance alone, the will must be considered void. This is in
consonance with the rule that acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or
prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.
The Civil Code likewise requires that a will must be acknowledged before a notary
public by the testator and the witnesses. An acknowledgment is the act of one who
has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring
it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signatory
actually declares to the notary public that the same is his or her own free act and
deed. The acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold purpose: (1) to
safeguard the testators wishes long after his demise and (2) to assure that his
estate is administered in the manner that he intends it to be done.A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question
shows that this particular requirement was neither strictly nor substantially
complied with. For one, there was the conspicuous absence of a notation of the
residence certificates of the notarial witnesses Noynay and Grajo in the
acknowledgment. Similarly, the notation of the testators old residence certificate
in the same acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These omissions by
respondent invalidated the will.
As the acknowledging officer of the contested will, respondent was
required to faithfully observe the formalities of a will and those of notarization.
These formalities are mandatory and cannot be disregarded.
ARTICLE 808
Garcia v. Vasquez
32 SCRA 489 | Grapilon
FACTS:
This is a petition for appeal from the CFI of Manila admitting to probate
the will of Gliceria Avelino del Rosario (Gliceria) executed in 1960. Likewise, this is
also an appeal to remove the current administrator, Consuelo Gonzales-Precilla(
Consuelo) as special administratrix of the estate on the ground of Consuelo
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possesses interest adverse to the estate and to order the RD of Manila to annotate
on the registered lands a notice of Lis Pendens.
When Gliceria died she had no descendants, ascendants, bros or sisses
and 90 yrs old. After which, her niece, Consuelo petitioned the court to be the
administratrix of the properties. The court approved this because Consuelo has
been was already managing the properties of the deceased during her lifetime.What the respondents allege is that in the last years of the deceased, Consuelo
sought the transfer of certain parcels of land valued at 300k for a sale price of 30k
to her husband Alfonso through fraud and intimidation. In addition, the oppositors
presented evidence that Consuelo asked the court to issue new Certificates of Titles
to certain parcels of land for the purpose of preparing the inventory to be used in
the probate. Also shown was that NEW TCTs were issued by the RD for certain lands
of the deceased after Consuelo asked for the old TCTs.
At the end of the probate proceedings, the court ruled that Counsuelo
should be made the administrator, and that the will was duly executed because of
these reasons: NO EVIDENCE HAS BEEN PRESENTED to establish that the deceased
was not of sound mind, that eventough the allegations state that the deceasedprepared another will in 1956 (12pages), the latter is not prevented from executing
another will in 1960 (1page), and that inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
witnesses prove their truthfulness.
ISSUE:
Was the will in 1960 (1 page) duly/properly executed?
HELD:
NO. Provision of Article 808 mandatory. Therefore, For all intents and
purposes of the rules on probate, the testatrix was like a blind testator, and the due
execution of her will would have required observance of Article 808. The rationale
behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable
of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate) , is to make the provisions
thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in
accordance with his wishes. Likewise, the 1970 will was done in Tagalog which the
deceased is not well versed but in Spanish. This creates doubt as to the due
execution of the will and as well as the typographical errors contain therein which
show the haste in preparing the 1 page will as compared to the 12 page will created
in 1956 written in Spanish. ALSO, as to the blindness, there was proof given by the
testimony of the doctor that the deceased could not read at near distances because
of cataracts. (Testatrixs vision was mainly for viewing distant objects and not for
reading print.) Since there is no proof that it was read to the deceased twice, the
will was NOT duly executed.
ALSO, Consuelo should be removed as administrator because she is not
expected to sue her own husband to reconvey the lands to the estate alleged to
have been transferred by the deceased to her own husband.
The notice of lis pendens is also not proper where the issue is not an actionin rem, affecting real property or the title thereto.
Alvarado v. Gaviola
226 SCRA 347 |JEN SUCCESSION REVIEWER
FACTS:
On 5 November 1977, 79-year old Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial
will entitled Huling Habilin wherein he disinherited an illegitimate son, petitioner
Cesar Alvarado, and expressly revoked a previously executed holographic will at the
time awaiting probate before the RTC of Laguna.
According to Bayani Ma. Rino, private respondent, he was present whenthe said notarial will was executed, together with three instrumental witnesses and
the notary public, where the testator did not read the will himself, suffering as he
did from glaucoma.
Rino, a lawyer, drafted the eight-page document and read the same aloud
before the testator, the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public, the
latter four following the reading with their own respective copies previously
furnished them.
Thereafter, a codicil entitled Kasulatan ng Pagbabago ng Ilang
Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na May Petsa Nobiembre 5, 1977 ni
Brigido Alvarado was executed changing some dispositions in the notarial will to
generate cash for the testators eye operation.
Said codicil was likewise not read by Brigido Alvarado and was read in the
same manner as with the previously executed will.
When the notarial will was submitted to the court for probate, Cesar
Alvarado filed his opposition as he said that the will was not executed and attested
as required by law; that the testator was insane or mentally incapacitated due to
senility and old age; that the will was executed under duress, or influence of fear or
threats; that it was procured by undue pressure and influence on the part of the
beneficiary; and that the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick.
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ISSUE:
W/N notarial will of Brigido Alvarado should be admitted to probate despite
allegations of defects in the execution and attestation thereof as testator was
allegedly blind at the time of execution and the double-reading requirement under
Art. 808 of the NCC was not complied with.
HELD:
YES. The spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not.
Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial requirements of
law in order to insure the authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should
be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into
account, may only defeat the testators will.
Cesar Alvardo was correct in asserting that his father was not totally blind
(of counting fingers at 3 feet) when the will and codicil were executed, but he can
be so considered for purposes of Art. 808.
That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond cavil.
However, in the case at bar, there was substantial compliance where thepurpose of the law has been satisfied: that of making the provisions known to the
testator who is blind or incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is
illiterate) and enabling him to object if they do not accord with his wishes.
Rino read the testators will and codicil aloud in the presence of the
testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public.
Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked,
that the contents read corresponded with his instructions.
Only then did the signing and acknowledgment take place.
There is no evidence that the contents of the will and the codicil were not
sufficiently made known and communicated to the testator.
With four persons, mostly known to the testator, following the reading
word for word with their own copies, it can be safely concluded that the testator
was reasonably assured that what was read to him were the terms actually
appearing on the typewritten documents.
The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if
he is blind or incapable of reading the will to himself (as when he is illiterate), is to
make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they
are not in accordance with his wishes.
Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial
requirements of law in order to insure the authenticity of the will, the formal
imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and
which, when taken into account, may only defeat the testators will.
ARTICLE 809
Caneda v. CA222 SCRA 781 |JEN SUCCESSION REVIEWER
FACTS:
On December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children
and already in the twilight years of his life, executed a last will and testament at his
residence before 3 witnesses.
He was assisted by his lawyer, Atty. Emilio Lumontad.
In the will, it was declared that the testator was leaving by way of legacies
and devises his real and personal properties to several people all of whom do not
appear to be related to the testator.
4 months later, Mateo Caballero himself filed a case seeking the probate ofhis last will and testament, but numerous postponements pushed back the initial
hearing of the probate court regarding the will.
On May 29, 1980, the testator passed away before his petition could finally
be heard by the probate court.
Thereafter one of the legatees, Benoni Cabrera, sought his appointment as
special administrator of the testators estate.
Thereafter, the petitioners, claiming to be nephews and nieces of the
testator, instituted a second petition for intestate proceedings. They also opposed
the probate of the testators will and the appointment of a special administrator for
his estate.
Benoni Cabrera died and was replaced by William Cabrera as special
administrator and gave an order that the testate proceedings for the probate of the
will had to be heard and resolved first.
In the course of the proceedings, petitioners opposed to the allowance of
the testators will on the ground that on the alleged date of its execution, the
testator was already in poor state of health such that he could not have possibly
executed the same. Also the genuineness of the signature of the testator is in
doubt.
On the other hand, one of the attesting witnesses and the notary public
testified that the testator executed the will in question in their presence while he
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was of sound and disposing mind and that the testator was in good health and was
not unduly influenced in any way in the execution of his will.
Probate court then rendered a decision declaring the will in question as
the last will and testament of the late Mateo Caballero.
CA affirmed the probate courts decision stating that it substantially
complies with Article 805. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
W/N the attestation clause in the will of the testator is fatally defective or can be
cured under the art. 809.
HELD:
No. It does not comply with the provisions of the law.
Ordinary or attested wills are governed by Arts. 804 to 809. The will must
be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the attesting
witnesses. The attestation clause need not be written in a language known to the
testator or even to the attesting witnesses.It is a separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the
conduct of execution and once signed by the witnesses it gives affirmation to the
fact that compliance with the essential formalities required by law has been
observed.
The attestation clause, therefore, provides strong legal guaranties for the
due execution of a will and to insure the authenticity thereof.
It is contended by petitioners that the attestation clause in the will failed
to specifically state the fact that the attesting witnesses witnessed the testator sign
the will and all its pages in their presence and that they, the witnesses, likewise
signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of each
other. And the Court agrees.
The attestation clause does not expressly state therein the circumstancethat said witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence
of the testator and of each other.
The phrase, and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the
space provided for his signature and on the left hand margin, obviously refers to
the testator and not the instrumental witnesses as it is immediately preceded by
the words as his last will and testament.
Clearly lacking is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and
every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. That the
absence of the statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which
must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought to be
probated.
Also, Art. 809 does not apply to the present case because the attestation
clause totally omits the fact that the attesting witnesses signed each and every page
of the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. The defect in this case
is not only with respect to the form or the language of the attestation clause. Thedefects must be remedied by intrinsic evidence supplied by the will itself which is
clearly lacking in this case.
Therefore, the probate of the will is set aside and the case for the intestate
proceedings shall be revived.
Article 809 cannot be used to cure the defects of the will when it does not
pertain to the form or language of the will. This is because there is not substantial
compliance with Article 805.
Azuela v. CA
487 SCRA 119 |Jalipa
ARTICLE 810
Roxas v. De Jesus
134 SCRA 245 | Lantion
FACTS:
Bibiane Roxas died. Her brother, Simeon Roxas, filed a spec. pro. for
partition of the estate of the deceased and also delivered the holographic will of the
deceased. Simeon stated that he found a notebook belonging to deceased, which
contained a letter-will entirely written and signed in deceaseds handwriting. The
will is dated "FEB./61 " and states: "This is my will which I want to be respected
although it is not written by a lawyer. Roxas relatives corroborated the fact that thesame is a holographic will of deceased, identifying her handwriting and signature.
Respondent opposed probate on the ground that it such does not comply with
Article 810 of the CC because the date contained in a holographic will must signify
the year, month, and day.
ISSUE:
W/N the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana
Roxas de Jesus is a valid compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code.
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HELD:
Valid date.
This will not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal
application of the statutory requirements regarding the due execution of Wills. The
underlying and fundamental objectives permeating the provisions of the law wills
consists in the liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in viewof giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes, but with sufficient
safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of
undue and improper pressure and influence upon the testator. If a Will has been
executed in substantial compliance with the formalities of the law, and the
possibility of bad faith and fraud in the exercise thereof is obviated, said Will should
be admitted to probate (Rey v. Cartagena 56 Phil. 282).
If the testator, in executing his Will, attempts to comply with all the
requisites, although compliance is not literal, it is sufficient if the objective or
purpose sought to be accomplished by such requisite is actually attained by the
form followed by the testator. In Abangan v. Abanga 40 Phil. 476, we ruled that:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the dooragainst bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to
guaranty their truth and authenticity. ...
In particular, a complete date is required to provide against such
contingencies as that of two competing Wills executed on the same day, or of a
testator becoming insane on the day on which a Will was executed (Velasco v.
Lopez, 1 Phil. 720). There is no such contingency in this case.
We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and found no evidence
of bad faith and fraud in its execution nor was there any substitution of Wins and
Testaments. There is no question that the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana
Roxas de Jesus was entirely written, dated, and signed by the testatrix herself and
in a language known to her. There is also no question as to its genuineness and due
execution. All the children of the testatrix agree on the genuineness of theholographic Will of their mother and that she had the testamentary capacity at the
time of the execution of said Will. The objection interposed by the oppositor-
respondent Luz Henson is that the holographic Will is fatally defective because the
date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will is not sufficient compliance with
Article 810 of the Civil Code. This objection is too technical to be entertained.
As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should include the day, month,
and year of its execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no
appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity
of the Will is established and the only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61"
appearing on the holographic Will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil
Code, probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the principle of
substantial compliance.
Labrador v. CA
184 SCRA 170 |JEN SUCCESSION REVIEWER
FACTS:
Melecio died leaving behind a parcel of land to his heirs. However, during
probate proceedings, Jesus and Gaudencio filed an opposition on the ground that
the will has been extinguished by implication of law alleging that before Melecios
death, the land was sold to them evidenced by TCT No. 21178. Jesus eventually sold
it to Navat.
Trial court admitted the will to probate and declared the TCT null and void.
However, the CA on appeal denied probate on the ground that it was undated.
ISSUE:W/N the alleged holographic will is dated, as provided for in Article 810 of CC.
HELD:
YES. The law does not specify a particular location where the date should
be placed in the will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself
and executed in the hand of the testator.
The intention to show March 17 1968 as the date of the execution is plain
from the tenor of the succeeding words of the paragraph. It states that this being
in the month of March 17th
day, in the year 1968, and this decision and or
instruction of mine is the matter to be followed. And the one who made this writing
is no other than Melecio Labrador, their father. This clearly shows that this is a
unilateral act of Melecio who plainly knew that he was executing a will.
ARTICLE 811
Gan v. Yap
104:509 | Lugtu
FACTS:
Felicidad Yap died of a heart failure, leaving properties in Pulilan, Bulacan,
and in Manila.
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Fausto E. Gan, her nephew, initiated the proceedings in the Manila CFI
with a petition for the probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by the
deceased.
The will was not presented because Felicidads husband, Ildefonso,
supposedly took it. What was presented were witness accounts of relatives who
knew of her intention to make a will and allegedly saw it as well. According to thewitnesses, Felicidad did not want her husband to know about it, but she had made
known to her other relatives that she made a will.
Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that
the deceased had not left any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime.
After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the Judge refused
to probate the alleged will on account of the discrepancies arising from the facts.
For one thing, it is strange that Felicidad made her will known to so many of her
relatives when she wanted to keep it a secret and she would not have carried it in
her purse in the hospital, knowing that her husband may have access to it. There
was also no evidence presented that her niece was her confidant.
In the face of these improbabilities, the trial judge had to accept theoppositors evidence that Felicidad did not and could not have executed such
holographic will.
ISSUE:
1. May a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who haveallegedly seen it and who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator?
2. W/N Felicidad could have executed the holographic will.HELD:
1. No. The will must be presented.The New Civil Code effective in 1950 revived holographic wills in its arts.
810-814. "A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirelywritten, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to
no other form and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be
witnessed."
This is a radical departure from the form and solemnities provided for wills
under Act 190, which for fifty years (from 1901 to 1950) required wills to be
subscribed by the testator and three credible witnesses in each and every page;
such witnesses to attest to the number of sheets used and to the fact that the
testator signed in their presence and that they signed in the presence of the
testator and of each other. Authenticity and due execution is the dominant
requirements to be fulfilled when such will is submitted to the courts for
allowance. For that purpose the testimony of one of the subscribing witnesses
would be sufficient if there is no opposition (Sec. 5, Rule 77). If there is, the
three must testify, if available. From the testimony of such witnesses (and of
other additional witnesses) the court may form its opinion as to the
genuineness and authenticity of the testament, and the circumstances its dueexecution.
With regard to holographic wills, no such guaranties of truth and veracity
are demanded, since as stated, they need no witnesses; provided however,
that they are "entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator
himself."
In the probate of a holographic will" says the New Civil Code, "it shall be
necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature
of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the