IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
JANE DOE A.K.A. LISA PHELPS CASE NO. 0 0 4 ^
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
WILLIAM BARLOCK, Jr.
Defendant- Appellee
On Appeal from the CuyahogaCounty Court of Appeals ofOhio, Eighth District,Case Nos. CA-08-091698and CA-08-091706 andCuyahoga County Common PleasCase No. CV-06-606140
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT JANE DOE A.K.A. LISA PHELPS'MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF JURISDICTION
JOHN F. BURKE, III (0059974)Mansour, Gavin, Gerlack & Manos Co., LPA55 Public Square, Suite 2150Cleveland, OH 44113-1994Phone 216-523-1500; Fax 216-523-1705Email: [email protected] for Plaintiff-Appellant Jane Doe a.k.a. Lisa Phelps
DANIEL F. LINDNER (0063918)Lindner & Jordan LLP55 Public Square, Suite 1800Cleveland, OH 44113216-737-8888; FAX 216-737-9999Email: [email protected] S. SIDOTI (0077476)Sidoti & Sidoti Co., LPA55 Public Square, Suite 1800Cleveland, OH 44113Phone 216-357-3350; Fax 216-737-9999Email: [email protected] for Defendant-Appellee William Barlock, Jr.
MAli `! Mf;;1
CLERK OF COURTSUPREME COURT OF OHIO
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Paee
EXPLANATION OF WHY THIS IS A CASE OF PUBLIC OR GREAT GENERALINTEREST OR INVOLVES A SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION.........1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS ........................................................3
LAW AND ARGUMENT . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. 8
Proposition of Law No. I: The granting of a motion for a new trial on onecause of action is a final appealable order ...................................................8
CONCLUS ION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ........................................................................1 I
APPENDIX Anpx. Page
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Decision ....................................... I
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Journal Entry denyingAppellant's Motion for Reconsideration .......................................................2
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EXPLANATION OF WHY THIS IS A CASE OF PUBLIC OR GREAT GENERALINTEREST OR INVOLVES A SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
This cause presents an issue critical to the appellate process and a party's legislatively
granted right to appellate review of a trial court's taking away of a jury's verdict via the granting
of a motion for new trial.
In this case, the court of appeals dismissed Plaintiff-Appellant Jane Doe a.k.a. Lisa
Phelps' appeal of the trial court's granting Defendant-Appellee William Barlock's motion for
new trial on her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Cuyahoga County
Eighth District Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed, sua sponte, Plaintiff-Appellant's
appeal erroneously claiming a lack of a final appealable order. Subsequently, Plaintiff-Appellant
filed an application requesting that the appellate court correct its error as such appeal is
specifically authorized by O.R.C. §2505(B)(3) which affirmatively states that an order granting a
new trial is a final appealable order. Nonetheless, the appellate court denied Plaintiff-
Appellant's Application for Reconsideration of that order without analyzing its error.
The implication of the decision of the court of appeals is to fundamentally eliminate
Plaintiff-Appellant's legal right to review of the trial court's granting of a motion for new trial.
Implications of this decision affect every party to litigation in the State of Ohio. Such a process
sabotages the entirety of government regulations and undermines the fundamental legal principle
that the rule of law constrains the courts as well as citizens. Similarly, the public interest is
affected if an appellate court is allowed to defy to rules of procedures and dismiss Plaintiff-
Appellant's appeal.
Apart from the aforementioned considerations which makes this case one of great public
interest, the decision of the court of appeals also has broad general significance. Thousands and
thousands of litigants rely on the court on appeals to review decisions made by the trial courts.
1
The General Assembly has specifically recognized the right to immediate appellate review of the
grant or denial of a motion for new trial.
The decision of the court of appeals sets a dangerous precedent that would exclude from
review the trial court's grant of a motion for new trial. If allowed to stand, the decision of the
court of appeals would destroy a fundamental tenet of the American legal system which is
appellate review of lower court's decisions.
In sum, this case puts in issue the essence of appellate review and the legislature's
specific requirements that appellate courts be able to immediately review the grant of a motion
for new trial. To promote the purposes and preserve the integrity of the courts, this Court must
grant jurisdiction to hear this case and review and reverse the erroneous and dangerous decision
of the court of appeals dismissing Plaintiff-Appellant's appeal.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
On October 24, 2006, Plaintiff-Appellant Jane Doe a.k.a. Lisa Phelps ("Plaintiff-
Appellant" or "Ms. Phelps") was awoken by a phone call indicating that nude photographs of her
had been emailed to over 100 employees at her place of employment. She immediately knew
who had perpetrated such a heinous act, it was her ex-boyfriend Defendant-Appellee William
Barlock ("Defendant-Appellee" or "Barlock").
On November 2, 2006, Plaintiff-Appellant, as "Jane Doe," filed a Complaint seeking a
temporary restraining order, and preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting Barlock from
further disseminating the pictures. (R. 2, 3, 4) Ms. Phelps also sought compensatory and
punitive damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy along
with attorney fees, costs and expenses. The court granted the TRO on November 2, 2006,
prohibiting Barlock from further disseminating the photographs. (R. 4) An agreed upon
permanent injunction was subsequently entered into and approved by the court. (R. 10) The
agreed injunction stated:
1. Defendant is prohibited from disseminating, copying, transferring orotherwise publishing any photographs of Plaintiff;
2. Defendant must provide to Plaintiff, through her counsel, the originalcopies of all photographs and all electronic data relating to saidphotographs or the transference of such photographs.
3. Defendant is prohibited from possessing or disseminating any photographsof Plaintiff.
4. Defendant must execute a document verifying his compliance with thisOrder.
(R. 10)
Defendant-Appellee failed to answer the Complaint and December 15, 2006, Plaintiff-
Appellant filed a motion for default judgment. (R. 11) On December 18, 2006, Barlock filed a
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motion for leave to file answer instanter (R. 12) and a brief in opposition to the motion for
default. (R. 13) Defendant-Appellee's motion contained no good cause for failing to answer the
Complaint. Nonetheless, the trial court granted Defendant-Appellee's motion for leave to
answer instanter and denied the motion for default judgment. (R. 15) Defendant-Appellee
answered the Complainti and denied the material allegations alleged therein.
On January 11, 2007, Defendant-Appellee filed a motion to dismiss attempting to force
Plaintiff-Appellant to put her legal name on the Complaint subjecting her to further public
humiliation.2 (R. 17) Plaintiff-Appellant opposed that motion arguing that she should be
allowed to maintain her anonymity due to the private and embarrassing nature of this matter. (R.
20) The trial court granted Defendant-Appellee's motion without opinion. (R. 22) Plaintiff-
Appellant filed her Amended Complaint pursuant to the trial court's order. (R. 30) Defendant-
Appellee failed to answer the Amended Complaint and on August 30, 2007, Plaintiff-Appellant
filed her second motion for default judgment due to Defendant-Appellee's failure to answer the
Amended Complaint. (R. 60) Again, Defendant-Appellee filed a brief in opposition to Plaintiff-
Appellant's motion for default and motion for leave to file answer instanter. (R. 62) Plaintiff-
Appellant opposed the motion to file answer instanter. (R. 64) Again, the trial court denied the
motion for default and granted Defendant-Appellee's motion to file answer instanter. (R. 78)
Defendant-Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that Plaintiff-
Appellant could not present a prima facie case for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction
of emotional distress. (R. 30) Plaintiff-Appellant opposed said motion. (R. 59) The trial court,
in a written opinion, denied Defendant-Appellee's motion for summary judgment. (R. 79)
'Defendant-Appellee's answer denied that he had sent the email. (R. 12, 9[4.)2 The only rationale for this motion was either an attempt to inflict further embarrassment uponPlaintiff-Appellant or to force her to dismiss the case.
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This matter was tried before a jury beginning September 19, 2007. At the close of
Plaintiff-Appellant's case in chief (R. 82, Tr. 212) and at the end of Defendant-Appellee's case
(R. 82, Tr. 321), the Defendant-Appellee moved for a directed verdict on all of Plaintiff-
Appellant's claims. Both motions were denied. (Tr. 212, 321)
On September 20, 2007, the jury entered a unanimous verdict in favor of the Plaintiff-
Appellant on her claim of invasion of privacy and awarded her $25,000 in compensatory
damages and $75,000 in punitive damages. (Tr. 318) The jury also unanimously found in favor
of Plaintiff-Appellant on her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress and awarded
$25,000 in compensatory damages and $75,000 in punitive damages. (Tr. 318-319) The jury
also found that the Defendant-Appellee should pay Plaintiff-Appellant's legal fees on both
claims. (Tr. 318-319; see also Jury Verdict Forms.)
On or about September 28, 2007, the Defendant-Appellee filed a motion for JNOV and
new trial contending that the court should overturn the jury's unanimous verdict or in the
alternative award a new trial. (R. 80) Defendant-Appellee falsely claimed that the damage
award was unsubstantiated and that Plaintiff-Appellant did not present sufficient evidence to
support her claims. (R. 80, Defendant-Appellee's motion, p. 3.) The Defendant-Appellee's
claims were specious and belied by the evidence that was before the jury. Barlock also moved
for a new trial under Civil Rule 59(A). (R. 80, see Defendant-Appellee's motion.) Plaintiff-
Appellant filed a brief in opposition to Defendant-Appellee's motion. (R. 85) Additionally,
Plaintiff-Appellant filed motions for prejudgment interest and attorney fees.3 (R. 86, 88)
Defendant-Appellee did not file a brief in opposition to either motion. Nonetheless, the trial
' The trial court never ruled on those unopposed motions. However, eight months after they werefiled, on June 18, 2008, the trial court indicated that it would hold those motions in abeyanceawaiting the conclusion of the new trial on Plaintiff-Appellant's claim of intentional infliction ofemotional distress. (R. 93)
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court did not rule on them. (See docket.) Eight months later, on May 30, 2008, the trial court
issued its ruling denying Defendant-Appellee's motion for JNOV and motion for new trial on the
claim for invasion of privacy. (R. 92) The trial court did, however, grant Defendant-Appellee's
motion for a new trial on Plaintiff-Appellant's claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. (R. 92) Notwithstanding the fact that the court previously denied both the motion for
summary judgment and the motions for directed verdict on the same evidence, incredibly the
trial court now claimed that the judgment in regard to the intentional infliction of emotional
distress shocked its conscience. The court stated:
In this case, Plaintiff did not present such evidence of serious emotional distress.The jury's verdict on this issue shocks the Court's sense of justice and faitnessand cannot be reconciled with the evidence. Although Plaintiff suffered somedegree of emotional distress, the events giving rise to this lawsuit did not precludePlaintiff from performing her daily tasks. Plaintiff was actively occupied with herobligations and coped adequately, as a reasonable person.
***
Although the Court does not mean to diminish the significance of the distress thatPlaintiff endured, the weight of the evidence clearly shows that Plaintiff's distressdid not rise to the level of severe and debilitating under the law.
Therefore, the jury's verdict on Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction ofemotional distress was not sustained by the weight of the evidence, andDefendant's motion for a new trial pursuant to Civil Rule 59(A)(6) is granted asto this claim.
(R. 92, trial court's Joumal Entry and Opinion, p. 7-8.)
On June 24, 2008, Ms. Phelps timely filed her notice of appeal on the issue of the trial
court granting Barlock's motion for new trial on the intentional infliction of emotional stress
claim. (R. 94) On June 26, 2008, Barlock filed a notice of appeal. (R. 95) On June 30, 2008,
the trial court stayed the proceedings in this case due to the filing of the notice of appeal. (R. 96)
Both parties fully briefed their positions in the court of appeals.
6
Seven months later, after briefing was complete, on January 22, 2009, the Cuyahoga
County Eighth District Court of Appeals dismissed the appeals, sua sponte, claiming a lack of a
final appealable order. The appellate court stated:
ALTHOUGH THE TRIAL COURT ENTERED THE PARTIES' AGREED PERMANENTINJUNCTION (#10) AND THE TRIAL COURT ENTERED JUDGMENT ON THE JURY'SVERDICT ON THE OTHER TWO CLAIMS (#83) AS WELL AS BARLOCK'S MOTIONFOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT AND FOR NEW TRIAL (#92),THE TRIAL COURT HAS NOT DETERMINED ATTORNEY FEES AND PREJUDGMENTINTEREST. LIKEWISE, THE TRIAL COURT GRANTED BARLOCK'S MOTION FORNEW TRIAL ON THE INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIM.SUA SPONTE, THIS APPEAL IS DISMISSED FOR LACK OF A FINAL APPEALABLEORDER. EACH PARTY TO BEAR HIS OR HER OWN COSTS. SEE CIV.R. 54(B);INTERNATL. BHD. OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL UNION NO. 8 V. VAUGHNINDUSTRIES, L.L.C., 116 OHIO ST.3D 335, 2007-OHIO-6439, 879 N.E.2D 187[ATTORNEY FEES]; MILLER V. FIRST INTERNATL. FID. & TRUST BLDG., LTD., 113OHIO ST.3D 474, 2007-OHIO-2457, 866 N.E.2D 1059 [PREJUDGMENT INTEREST]...
On January 28, 2009, Ms. Phelps filed a motion requesting that the appellate court
reconsider its decision dismissing her appeal as the trial court's granting a motion for new trial
was a final appealable order as specifically outlined in O.R.C. §2505(B)(3) which affirmatively
states that an order granting a new trial is a final appealable order. Nonetheless, on February 26,
2009, the appellate court denied Plaintiff-Appellant's Application for Reconsideration stating:
MOTION BY APPELLANT FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ENTRY NO. 417547DISMISSING THESE APPEALS IS DENIED. COURTS AVOID PIECEMEAL APPEALSIN THE INTEREST OF JUDICIAL ECONOMY. SEE, E.G., INTERNATL. BHD. OFELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL UNION NO. 8 V. VAUGHN INDUSTRIES, L.L.C., 116OHIO ST.3D 335, 2007-OHIO-6439, 879 N.E.2D 187 (ATTORNEY FEES]; MILLER V.FIRST INTERNATL. FID. & TRUST BLDG., LTD., 113 OHIO ST.3D 474, 2007-OHIO-2457, 866 N.E.2D 1059 [PREJUDGMENT INTEREST]. VOL. 676 PG. 624. NOTICEISSUED.
Nonetheless, this decision by the appellate court is in error and deprives Plaintiff-
Appellant of her fundamental right to appellate review. In support of her position, the Plaintiff-
Appellant presents the following argument.
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LAW AND ARGUMENT
Proposition of Law No. I: The granting of a motion for a new trial on onecause of action is a final appealable order.
The Ohio Constitution specifically provides the right to appeal a judgment or final order
unless the appellate court's jurisdiction is limited by law.
Court of appeals shall have such jurisdiction as may be provided by law to reviewand affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or final orders of the courts of recordinferior to the court of appeals within the district.
See, O.Const. Art. IV, Sec. 3(B)(2).
Accordingly, any judgment or final order not otherwise restricted by law, i.e., an
enactment by the General Assembly, is immediately reviewable through the appellate process
and constitutionally guaranteed. The appellate court's dismissal of Plaintiff-Appellant's appeal
was in error as it is well established in Ohio's jurisprudence that the granting of a motion for a
new trial is a final appealable order. See, Colvin v. Abbey's Restaurant, 1999-Ohio-286 ("It is
now well settled ... that the granting of a motion for a new trial is a final appealable order under
R.C. 2505.02 citing Price v. McCoy Sales & Service, Inc. (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 131, 11 of the
syllabus; see also, Rohde v. Farnaer (1970), 23 Ohio St.2d 82, 86-90. R.C. 2505.02 specifically
provides simply that "an order that ... grants a new trial" is a final appealable order. See O.R.C.
§2505.02(B)(3) ("An order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, modified or reversed,
with or without a retrial, when it is one of the following: ... (3) an order that vacates or sets
aside a judgment or grants a new trial"). Thus, the appellate court's sua sponte dismissal of Ms.
Phelps' appeal was improper.
The appellate court determination, sua sponte, that there was no final appealable order
created an unworkable situation where Plaintiff-Appellant will not have an opportunity for an
appellate court to review the trial court's decision to grant Barlock's motion for new trial on the
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intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. If this matter returns to the trial court for a new
trial on Ms. Phelps' claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, Ms. Phelps will be
deprived of her lawful right to have the trial court's grant of a new trial on that claim reviewed
by a superior court.
Ms. Phelps did not disagree that a motion for prejudgment interest and a motion for
attorney fees should be finalized prior to an appeal of the court's final judgment order, but those
motions are not germane to Ms. Phelps' appeal of the trial court's order granting a new trial on
the intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. They do, however, preclude the appeal by
Barlock. Here, the decisions regarding attorney fees and prejudgment interest cannot be resolved
until the appellate court resolves the granting of the new trial on the intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim.
What is legally required to happen in the present case is that the Court of Appeals must
rule on Ms. Phelps' appeal of the trial court's grant of a new trial on her claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress while at the same time dismissing Barlock's appeal as there is no
final appealable order related to him. If the appellate court's order dismissing the appeal is
affirmed, the matter would return to the trial court and jurisdiction would again vest in that court
for the new trial on the intentional infliction claim. However, if the appellate court overrules the
trial court's grant of a new trial, then the matter would return to the trial court for a final
determination as to Ms. Phelps' unopposed motions for attorney fees and prejudgment interest.
Thus, as it is a final order as it relates to Plaintiff-Appellant's claims, the appeal must be heard.
The appellate court's sua sponte decision dismissing the appeal is directly contrary to O.R.C.
§2505(B)(3) which affirmatively states that an order granting a new trial is a final appealable
order.
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CONCLUSION
The Ohio legislature and this Court have expressly held that an order granting a new trial
is a final appealable order. There are no additional statutory requirements and such an order is
immediately reviewable by the appellate court. Allowing the court of appeals' sua sponte
dismissal of Plaintiff-Appellant's appeal effectively precludes her from her right to have an
appellate court review the decision granting the motion for a new trial and impermissibly violates
Plaintiff-Appellant's constitutional and statutory right to an appeal. This matter clearly raises a
substantial constitutional question and is one of great general or public interest.
Respectfully submitted,
JOA F. BURR LM-(00599-74-)ansour, Gavin, Gerlack & Manos Co., LPAPublic Square, Suite 2150
Cleveland, OH 44113-1994Phone 216-523-1500; Fax 216-523-1705Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant Jane Doe
a.ka. Lisa Phelps
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
A copy for the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction has been sent via
regular U.S. Mail on this 11th day of March 2009, to:
Daniel F. LindnerLindner & Jordan LLP55 Public Square, Suite 1800Cleveland, OH 44113
Marcus S. SidotiSidoti & Sidoti Co., LPA55 Public Square, Suite 1800Cleveland, OH 44113
Attorneys for Defendant-AppelleeWilliam Barlock, Jr.
YF. BURKEJrO r^^Att rney for Plaintiff-Appellant Jane Doea. a. Lisa Phelps
11
ttts'G0 cuUZI
APPENDIX 1
Taurt of Apptttls uf M41u, TEuo* 19istrict
County of CuyahogaGerald E. Fuerst, Clerk of Courts
JANE DOE, A.K.A., LISA PHELPS
Appellant
0
-vs-
WILLIAM BARLOCK, JR.
Appellee
Date 01/22109
COA NO. LOWER COURT NO.91698 CP CV-60614091706 CP CV-606140
COMMON PLEAS COURT
MOTION NO. 417547
ALTHOUGH THE TRIAL COURT ENTERED THE PARTIES' AGREED PERMANENTINJUNCTION (#10) AND THE TRIAL COURT ENTERED JUDGMENT ON THE JURY'S VERDICT ONTHE OTHER TWO CLAIMS (#83) AS WELL AS BARLOCK'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENTNOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT AND FOR NEW TRIAL (#92), THE TRIAL COURT HAS NOTDETERMINED ATTORNEY FEES AND PREJUDGMENT INTEREST. LIKEWISE, THE TRIAL COURTGRANTED BARLOCK'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL ON THE INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OFEMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIM. SUA SPONTE, THIS APPEAL IS DISMISSED FOR LACK OF A FINALAPPEALABLE ORDER. EACH PARTY TO BEAR HIS OR HER OWN COSTS. SEE CIV.R. 54(B);INTERNATL. BHD. OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL UNION NO. 8 V. VAUGHN INDUSTRIES,L.L.C., 116 OHIO ST.3D 335, 2007-OHIO-6439, 879 N.E.2D 187 [ATTORNEY FEES]; MILLER V. FIRSTINTERNATL. FID. & TRUST BLDG., LTD., 113 OHIO ST.3D 474, 2007-OHIO-2457, 866 N.E.2D 1059[PREJUDGMENT INTEREST]
ADDITIONALLY, JANE DOE'S APPELLEE'S BRIEF FILED IN CASE NO. 91698 ON OCTOBER22,2008 DOES NOT CONTAIN A STATEMENT OF THE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR OR ASTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES. APP.R. 16. BARLOCK'S REPLY BRIEF FILED IN CASE NO. 91698 ONDECEMBER 1, 2008 AND APPELLANT'S BRIEF FILED IN CASE NO. 91706 ON OCTOBER 10, 2008AS WELL AS JANE DOE'S APPELLEE'S BRIEF FILED IN CASE NO. 91698 ON OCTOBER 22, 2008ALL CONTAIN FOOTNOTES WHICH FAIL TO MEET THE MINIMUM TYPE SIZE OF TWELVE POINTSAS MANDATED BY APP,R. 19(A). FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH APP.R. 16 AND 19 AS WELL AS LOC.APP.R. 16 MAY RESULT IN DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL, STRIKING THE BRIEF OR DENIAL OF THERIGHT TO ARGUE. LOC.APP.R. 16(B). COUNSEL ARE ADMONISHED TO COMPLY WITH ALLAPPLICABLE RULES IN FUTURE FILINGS IN THIS COURT.
JUDGE SEAN C. GALLAGHER, CONCURS
ANNOIINCEMENT OF DBCISION Administrative JudgePER APP. R. 2211^1, 22i=1 AND 2eIM COLLEEN CONWAY
E,D
CA08091698 56221112
oONE'fiLED AAiD 90URNALIZEDPER APP. R. 22(E)
FEB 2 6 2009RALD E. FUERST
CLERK F HRT OF APFEALS GEI4ALD E. FUERST
gY DEP• Tnis Is an announcement of Courf's dec7;fon. CLERK 0^0 T OF APPEALS
}A,ailon for reooqrlderQ^iop must be filed within 10 days trom cu e^^ .. DEP.
E9 0 61 64
APPENDIX 2
Tuur# uf Ap.^ea1s af 04tn, Erg4t4 DYstrtctCounty of Cuyahoga
Gerald E. Fuerst, Clerk of Courts
JANE DOE, A.K.A., LISA PHELPS
Appellant COA NO. LOWER COURT NO.91698 CP CV-60614091706 CP CV-606140
COMMON PLEAS COURT-vs-
WILLIAM BARLOCK, JR.
Appellee MOTION NO. 417889
Date 02126/2009
Journal Entry
MOTION BY APPELLANT FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ENTRY NO. 417547 DISMISSING THESE
APPEALS IS DENIED. COURTS AVOID PIECEMEAL APPEALS IN THE INTEREST OF JUDICIAL
ECONOMY. SEE, E.G., INTERNATL. BHD. OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL UNION NO. 8 V.
VAUGHN INDUSTRIES, L.L.C., 116 OHIO ST.3D 335, 2007-OHIO-6439, 879 N.E.2D 187 [ATTORNEY
FEES]; MILLER V. FIRST INTERNATL. FID. & TRUST BLDG., LTD., 113 OHIO ST.3D 474,
2007-OHIO-2457, 866 N.E.2D 1059 [PREJUDGMENT INTEREST].
Adm. Judge, COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY,Concurs
RECEIVED FOR FILING
FEB 2 6 .2009
GERALD E. FUCLERK OF TSIE 41JiJRY.BY