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12-3720IN THEUnited States Court of Appealsfor the Second CircuitUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellant,
v.
LAWRENCE DICRISTINA,
Defendant-Appellee,
STEFANO LOMBARDO, a.k.a. MITZIE,
Defendant.______________________
On Appeal from the United States District Courtfor the Eastern District of New York
______________________
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE LAWRENCE DICRISTINA______________________
NEAL KUMARKATYALCHRISTOPHERT.HANDMANDOMINIC F.PERELLAELIZABETH BARCHAS PRELOGAR
HAGAN C.SCOTTENHOGAN LOVELLS USLLP555 13th Street N.W.Washington, D.C. 20004(202) 637-5600
Dated: March 21, 2013 Counsel for Lawrence DiCristina
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................. iii
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ....................................................................... 1
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 2
ISSUES PRESENTED ............................................................................................ 3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 4
STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................................................... 4
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .............................................................................. 9
ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................................12
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THATTHE IGBA DOES NOT CRIMINALIZE HOSTINGPOKER GAMES .................................................................................. 12
A. The IGBAs Definition Of Gambling Does NotEncompass Poker ........................................................................... 12
B. Plain Meaning And Common Law Underscore ThatThe Statutory Term Gambling Does Not Reach Poker ............. 17
II. THE GOVERNMENTS CONTRARY ARGUMENTSARE MERITLESS ................................................................................ 24
A. The Governments Definition Does Not Comport WithThe IGBAs Text .......................................................................... 24
B. The Governments Proposed Definition Of GamblingConflicts With The Statutes Text, Common Usage,
And Common Sense ...................................................................... 33
C. The Governments Definition Of Gambling ConflictsWith The Common Law ................................................................ 38
D. Legislative History Does Not Aid The GovernmentsArgument ....................................................................................... 42
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III. THE RULE OF LENITY REQUIRES RESOLVING ANYAMBIGUITY IN THE IGBA AGAINST THE
GOVERNMENT ................................................................................... 49
IV. DICRISTINAS ACQUITTAL MUST STAND BECAUSETHE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY REFUSED TOSUBMIT THE ELEMENT OF GAMBLING TO THEJURY ..................................................................................................... 52
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 57
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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iii
CASES:
Am. Amusements Co. v.Neb. Dept of Revenue,807 N.W.2d 492 (Neb. 2011) ....................................................................... 23, 40
Apprendi v. New Jersey,530 U.S. 466 (2000) ............................................................................................ 52
Automatic Music & Vending Corp. v.Liquor Control Commn,396 N.W.2d 204 (Mich. 1986) ............................................................................ 21
Bayerv. Johnson,
349 N.W.2d 447 (S.D. 1984) .............................................................................. 23
Beckv. Prupis,529 U.S. 494 (2000) ...................................................................................... 19, 24
Begay v. United States,533 U.S. 137 (2008) ................................................................................ 14, 27, 40
Bifulco v. United States,447 U.S. 387 (1980) ............................................................................................ 51
Boies v. Bartell,310 P.2d 834 (Ariz. 1957) ...................................................................... 19, 22, 31
Boosalis v. Crawford,99 F.2d 374 (D.C. Cir. 1938) .................................................................. 22, 31, 33
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Columbia,541 U.S. 913 (2004) ............................................................................................ 13
Chiarella v. United States,
445 U.S. 222 (1980) ...................................................................................... 37, 38
Christopherv. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012) ........................................................................................ 25
City of New Yorkv. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,524 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2008) ............................................................................... 29
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City of St. Paulv. Stovall,
30 N.W.2d 638 (Minn. 1948) ............................................................................. 23Clevelandv. United States,
531 U.S. 12 (2000) .............................................................................................. 51
Commonwealth v. Dent,992 A.2d 190 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) .................................................................... 41
Commonwealth v. LaBella,458 N.E.2d 763 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984) .............................................................. 22
Commonwealth v. One Electro-Sport Draw Poker Machine,443 A.2d 295 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) .............................................................. 19, 21
Commonwealth v. Two Electronic Poker Game Machines,465 A.2d 973 (Pa. 1983) ......................................................................... 19, 22, 23
DOrio v. Startup Candy Co.,266 P. 1037 (Utah 1928) ..................................................................................... 23
Delano v. State,
168 P.2d 659 (Okla. Crim. App. 1946)............................................................... 23
Donovan v. United States,580 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1978) ............................................................................. 28
Drew v. State,10 Ark. 82 (1849) ................................................................................................ 22
Evans v. Michigan,133 S. Ct. 1069 (2013) ........................................................................................ 55
Faircloth v. Cent. Fla. Fair, Inc.,202 So. 2d 608 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) .......................................................... 21
FCCv. AT&T Inc.,131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011) ........................................................................................ 33
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Games Mgmt., Inc. v. Owens,
662 P.2d 260 (Kan. 1983) ................................................................................... 23Garrettv. State,
963 So. 2d 700 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007).............................................................. 41
Giordenello v. United States,357 U.S. 480 (1958) ............................................................................................ 38
Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. Wilson,130 S. Ct. 1396 (2012) ........................................................................................ 34
Ill. Tool Works v. Independent Ink, Inc.,547 U.S. 28 (2006) .............................................................................................. 51
In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor,856 A.2d 320 (R.I. 2004) .................................................................................... 41
In re Allen,377 P.2d 280 (Cal. 1962) ........................................................................ 15, 22, 37
In re Lee Tong,
18 F. 253 (D. Or. 1883) ................................................................................ 21, 23
In re Request of Governor for Advisory Op.,12 A.3d 1104 (Del. 2009) ................................................................................... 22
Johnson v. Phinney,218 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1955) ........................................................................ 31, 33
Joker Club LLCv. Hardin,643 S.E.2d 626 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) ................................................................. 41
Jones v. United States,526 U.S. 227 (1999) ............................................................................................ 48
Kingv. St. Vincents Hosp.,502 U.S. 215 (1991) ............................................................................................ 29
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Ladnerv. United States,
358 U.S. 169 (1958) ............................................................................................ 51Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc. v. Gibson,
359 P.2d 85 (Nev. 1961) ..................................................................................... 23
Lashbrookv. State,550 N.E.2d 772 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) ................................................................. 22
Ling Nan Zhengv. Liberty Apparel Co.,617 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2010),cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2879 (2011) .................................................................. 53
McBoyle v. United States,283 U.S. 25 (1931) .................................................................................. 13, 25, 46
Medley v. D.L. Runnels,506 F.3d 857 (9th Cir. 2007) ........................................................................ 53, 54
Mendelsohn v. Bidcactus, LLC,2012 WL 1059702 (D. Conn. Mar. 28, 2012) .................................................... 22
Mohamadv. Palestinian Auth.,132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012) ........................................................................................ 25
Molloy v. MTA,94 F.3d 808 (2d Cir. 1996) ..........................................................................passim
Morrow v. State,511 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1973) ................................................................... 22, 31, 54
People ex rel. Ellison v. Lavin,71 N.E. 753 (N.Y. 1904) ..................................................................................... 31
People v. Hunt,616 N.Y.S.2d 168 (City Crim. Ct. 1994) ............................................................ 39
People v. Li Ai Hua,885 N.Y.S.2d 380 (City Crim. Ct. 2009) ...................................................... 23, 39
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People v. Melton,
142 Misc. 2d 649 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.1991) ............................................................... 39People v. Mitchell,
444 N.E.2d 1153 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) ................................................................. 42
People v. Stiffel,61 Misc. 2d 1100 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.1969) ............................................................... 39
People v. Tillman,820 N.Y.S.2d 511 (City Crim. Ct. 2006) ............................................................ 39
PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin,532 U.S. 661 (2001) ............................................................................................ 36
Postv. St. Paul Travelers Ins. Co.,691 F.3d 500 (3d Cir. 2012) ............................................................................... 28
Progress Vending, Inc. v. Dept of Liquor Control,394 N.E.2d 324 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978) ................................................................ 23
Question Game Co. v. Ploner,
273 Ill. App. 187 (1933) ..................................................................................... 22
Ramirezv. City Demonstration Agency,549 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1976) ................................................................................ 28
Reddv. Simmons,167 So. 65 (Miss. 1936) ...................................................................................... 23
Roberts IIv. Commns Inv. Club of Woonsocket,431 A.2d 1206 (R.I. 1981) .................................................................................. 23
Rosenkranzv. Vassallo,473 A.2d 991 (N.J. Ct. App. 1984) ..................................................................... 19
Rouse v. Sisson,199 So. 777 (Miss. 1941) .................................................................................... 21
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Sanabria v. United States,
437 U.S. 54 (1978) .............................................................................................. 55Sash v.Zenk,
428 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2005) ............................................................................... 50
Scheidlerv. Natl Org. for Women, Inc.,537 U.S. 393 (2003) ............................................................................................ 38
Simpson v. United States,319 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2002) ................................................................................. 51
Skillingv. United States,130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010) .................................................................................. 49, 52
Smith v. United States,507 U.S. 197 (1993) ............................................................................................ 44
Smith v. United States,508 U.S. 223 (1993) ............................................................................................ 46
Staples v. United States,
511 U.S. 600 (1994) .............................................................................................. 3
State ex rel. Green v. One Five Cent Inning Base Ball Machine,3 So. 2d 27 (Ala. 1941) ....................................................................................... 22
State v. Bally Beach Club Pinball Mach.,119 A.2d 876 (Vt. 1956) ..................................................................................... 19
State v. Dorau,198 A.2d 575 (Conn. 1938) ................................................................................ 20
State v. Grimes,49 Minn. 443 (1898) ........................................................................................... 22
State v. Hahn,586 N.W.2d 5 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) ............................................................. 23, 40
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State v. Pinball Machs.,
404 P.2d 923 (Alaska 1965) ............................................................................... 19State v. Shorts,
32 N.J.L. 398 (N.J. 1868) ................................................................................... 20
State v. Stroupe,76 S.E.2d 313 (N.C. 1953).................................................................................. 23
State v. Wassick,191 S.E.2d 283 (W. Va. 1972) ............................................................................ 23
Town of Centerville v. Burns,126 S.W.2d 322 (Tenn. 1939) ............................................................................ 21
Town of Mount Pleasantv. Chimento,2012 WL 5870814 (S.C. Nov. 21, 2012) ............................................................ 35
Union Bankv. Wolas,502 U.S. 151 (1991) ............................................................................................ 46
United States v. Aleynikov,
676 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2012) ........................................................................... 27, 51
United States v. Atiyeh,402 F.3d 354 (3d Cir. 2005) ............................................................................... 26
United States v. Banki,685 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2012) ................................................................................. 53
United States v. Bass,404 U.S. 336 (1971) ............................................................................................ 50
United States v. Gaudin,515 U.S. 506 (1995) ............................................................................................ 52
United States v. Gonzalez,110 F.3d 936 (2d Cir. 1997) ............................................................................... 52
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United States v. Gotti,
459 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2006) ............................................................................... 39United States v. Granderson,
511 U.S. 39 (1994) ........................................................................................ 50, 51
United States v. Hohn,8 F.3d 1301 (8th Cir. 1993) ................................................................................ 54
United States v. Marcucilli,287 F. Appx 126 (2d Cir. 2008) ........................................................................ 54
United States v. Persico,832 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1987) ............................................................................... 38
United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.,396 F.3d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 2005) .................................................................... 28, 29
United States v. Plaza Health Labs, Inc.,3 F.3d 643 (2d Cir. 1993) ....................................................................... 11, 25, 49
United States v. Reyes,
302 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2002) ................................................................................. 55
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc.,489 U.S. 235 (1989) ............................................................................................ 12
United States v. Santos,553 U.S. 507 (2008) ............................................................................................ 50
United States v. Vasquez,267 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2001) ..................................................................... 52-53, 55
United States v. Venturella,391 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2004) ............................................................................... 30
United States v. Wilson,420 U.S. 332 (1975) ............................................................................................ 55
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Van Peltv. State,
246 S.W.2d 87 (Tenn. 1952) .............................................................................. 23West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey,
499 U.S. 83 (1991) .............................................................................................. 45
STATUTES:
2 U.S.C. 285b(4) ................................................................................................... 48
18 U.S.C. 1955 ........................................................................................................ 5
18 U.S.C. 1955(a) ................................................................................................. 54
18 U.S.C. 1955(b) ....................................................................................... 2, 17, 25
18 U.S.C. 1955(b)(2)......................................................................................passim
18 U.S.C. 1955(e) ..........................................................................................passim
18 U.S.C. 3231 ........................................................................................................ 1
18 U.S.C. 3731 ........................................................................................................ 1
Act of April 29, 1878, 20 Stat. 39 ............................................................................ 48
Act of Jan. 31, 1883, 22 Stat. 411 ............................................................................ 48
Act of Sept. 19, 1890, 26 Stat.465 ........................................................................... 48
Gambling Ships Act, 23, 63 Stat. 89 (1949) ......................................................... 48
Johnson Act, 1, 64 Stat. 1134 (1951) .................................................................... 48
Paraphernalia Act, 1, 75 Stat. 492 (1961) ............................................................. 48
Revenue Act of 1941, 555, 55 Stat. 687 ............................................................... 48
Wire Act, 2, 75 Stat. 491 (1961) ..................................................................... 48-49
Act of Aug. 3, 1996, 110 Stat. 1484 ........................................................................ 48
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720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 28-1(b)(2) ............................................................................. 21
Ala. Code 13A-12-20(4) ....................................................................................... 20
Alaska Stat. 11.66.280(2) ...................................................................................... 20
Cal. Penal Code 337j(e)(1) ................................................................................... 41
Colo. Rev. Stat. 18-10-102(2)(a) .......................................................................... 21
Conn. Gen. Stat. 53-278a(2) ................................................................................. 21
D.C. Code 22-1704 ............................................................................................... 20
Fla. Stat. 849.08 .................................................................................................... 20
Fla. Stat. 849.086(1) .............................................................................................. 41
Ga. Code 16-12-20(2) ........................................................................................... 20
Haw. Stat. 712-1220(4) ......................................................................................... 20
Idaho Code 18-3801(1) ......................................................................................... 21
Ind. Code 35-45-5-1 .............................................................................................. 21
Kan. Stat. 21-6302(a)(2) ....................................................................................... 21
Kan. Stat. 21-6302(d)(1)(A) ................................................................................. 20
Ky. Rev. Stat. 528-010(3)(a) ................................................................................. 20
Md. Code 12-101(d)(1) ......................................................................................... 20
Md. Code 13-305(a)(4) ......................................................................................... 21
Me. Rev. Stat. 952(4) ............................................................................................ 20
Minn. Stat. 609-75(4) ............................................................................................ 20
Mo. Rev. Stat. 572.010(4) ..................................................................................... 20
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Mont. Code 23-5-112(13)(a) ................................................................................. 20
N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-292 .......................................................................................... 20
N.D. Cent. Code 12.1-28-01(1) ...................................................................... 20-21
N.D. Cent. Code 12.1-28-01(1)(a) ........................................................................ 21
N.J. Stat. 2C:37-1(b) ............................................................................................. 20
N.M. Stat. 30-19-1(B) ..................................................................................... 20, 21
N.M. Stat. 30-19-1(C) ........................................................................................... 20
N.Y. Penal Law 225.00(1) .................................................................................... 39
N.Y. Penal Law 225.00(2) .................................................................................... 20
N.Y. Penal Law 225.05 ........................................................................................... 4
Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-1101(4) ............................................................................. 20, 39
Ohio Rev. Code 2915.02 (A)(2) ........................................................................... 21
Ohio Rev. Code 2915.02 (A)(4) ........................................................................... 21
Okla. Stat. 21-942 ................................................................................................. 21
Or. Rev. Stat. 167.117(7) ...................................................................................... 21
R.I. Gen. Laws 11-19-18 ....................................................................................... 21
Tenn. Code 39-17-501 .......................................................................................... 21
Tex. Code 47.01(1) ............................................................................................... 21
Utah Code 76-10-1101(2)(a) ................................................................................. 21
Va. Code 18-2-333 ................................................................................................ 21
2Vt. Stat. 13-2135(3) .............................................................................................. 1
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W. Va. Code 29-22C-3(32) ................................................................................... 41
W. Va. Code 61-10-5 ............................................................................................ 21
Wash. Rev. Code 9.46.0237 .................................................................................. 21
Wis. Stat. 945.01(1) .............................................................................................. 21
Wis. Stat. 945.01(1)(b) .......................................................................................... 21
Wis. Stat. 945.01(3) .............................................................................................. 21
Wyo. Stat. 6-7-101(a)(iii)(A) ................................................................................ 21
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS:
N.D. Const. art. XI, 25 .......................................................................................... 20
S.D. Const. art. III, 25 ........................................................................................... 20
LEGISLATIVE:
H. Rep. No. 91-1549 (1969) .................................................................................... 26
S. Rep. No. 91-617 (1969) ..................................................................... 13, 26, 43, 45
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedure of the S.Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. (June 3, 1969) .................................... 45, 46
Hearing Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,91st Cong. (1970) ......................................................................................... 43, 46
116 Cong. Rec. 854 (Jan. 22, 1970) ......................................................................... 44
116 Cong. Rec. 35204-05 (Oct. 6, 1970) ................................................................. 44
OTHERAUTHORITIES:
2 Whartons Criminal Law 1465a (1896) ............................................................. 19
C. Black,Richard M. Nixon: A Life in Full(2007) ................................................. 13
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A. Brisman, Casino Gambling: Winning Ways (1999) ........................................... 33
A. Cabot & R. Hannum,Poker: Public Policy, Law, Mathematics, and theFuture of An American Tradition, 22 T.M. Cooley L. Rev. 443 (2005) ............ 23
R. Flanagan, Tasmanian Devil, The New Yorker (Jan. 21, 2013) .......................... 31
H. Friendly,Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes,in Benchmarks (1967) ......................................................................................... 51
Group Invests $5 Million To Hedge Bets in Lottery,N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1992 .................................................................................. 31
C. Matthews,Kennedy & Nixon (1998) ................................................................... 13
J. McManus, Cowboys Full(2009) .......................................................................... 43
Merriam Websters Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 1996) ..................................... 18
P. Mushnick,Playoff System Fit for Losers,N.Y. Post, Aug. 30, 1998 .................................................................................... 16
The National Game, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1875 ..................................................... 13
Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) ................................................................ 17
A. Reber, The New Gamblers Bible (1996) ............................................................ 32
I. Rose & M. Owens, Jr.,Internet Gaming Law:Gambling and the Law (2005) ...................................................................... 32, 33
Websters Third New International Dictionary (1971) ........................................... 18
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IN THE
United States Court of Appealsfor the Second Circuit
_____________________________
No. 12-3720_____________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellant,
v.
LAWRENCE DICRISTINA,
Defendant-Appellee,
STEFANO LOMBARDO, a.k.a. MITZIE,
Defendant.______________________
On Appeal from the United States District Courtfor the Eastern District of New York
______________________
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE LAWRENCE DICRISTINA
______________________
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 3231. The
Government filed a notice of appeal on September 19, 2012. This Court has
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 3731.
INTRODUCTION
This case presents a question of statutory interpretation: Does the Illegal
Gambling Business Act (IGBA), a criminal statute aimed at fighting organized
crime, make hosting a poker game a federal crime punishable by up to five years in
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2
prison? The District Court correctly recognized that the answer is no. The IGBA
criminalizes certain types of gambling operations. 18 U.S.C. 1955(b). And it
defines the term gambling to include onlygames of chancea definition
consistent with the common law. Poker is no game of chance. As the District
Court found, and as the Government now concedes, Govt Br. 14, poker is
predominantly controlled by skill. The District Court therefore held that the IGBA
does not criminalize poker, acquitting Lawrence DiCristina.
In arguing that the District Court erred, the Government flees from the
IGBAs plain text. The Government openly urges this Court to ignore the IGBAs
definition of gambling. It argues instead that the statute should be read to
incorporate the Governments own definitionthat gambling is betting on an
uncertain outcome. Govt Br. 21. But that definition fails to give meaning to
Congresss words. And it is tethered neither to common law nor common sense.
After all, one cannot bet on a certain outcome, and so the Governments definition
amounts to betting on anything. That stunningly broad formulation would
classify investing, golf and fishing tournaments, and many other common activities
as gambling under federal law. It should be rejected.
The Government also suggests that this Court should defer to a historical
perception that poker is gambling. Govt Br. 39. But this case is not about any
supposed historical perception of poker (a perception the Government presents
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3
in one-sided fashion). It is about a criminal statute. Because the statute defines
gambling in a particular wayas including only games of chancethat is the
end of the matter. After all, [t]he definition of the elements of a criminal offense
is entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of federal crimes, which are
solely creatures of statute. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 604 (1994)
(alteration & quotation marks omitted). Congress could, of course, criminalize
poker if it saw fit. But Congress did not do so in the IGBA.
The District Courts decision thus honors the IGBAs clear language. And
affirmance would have no significant impact on law enforcement. States already
regulate poker and could continue to do so. SPA119. Federal prosecutors could
still go after organized crime. And Congress could weigh in if it wants to broaden
its regulatory reach. This Court should reject the Governments invitation to take
that decision away from the legislature, where it belongs.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Whether the District Court correctly held that hosting a poker game
does not constitute a federal felony under the IGBA.
2. Whether DiCristinas acquittal must be affirmed because he was
deprived of a jury determination of every element of the offense.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On December 9, 2011, a grand jury returned an indictment charging
DiCristina with violating the IGBA and conspiring to do so. GA10.1
On July 12,
2012, a jury convicted DiCristina on both counts. GA7. On August 21, 2012, the
District Court granted DiCristinas motion for a judgment of acquittal. GA9.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Lawrence DiCristina owns a small business on Staten Island selling electric
bicycles. SPA53. In December 2010, DiCristina began hosting poker games at his
shop after business hours. GA10. On game nights, DiCristina set up two tables at
which guests played a version of poker called No Limit Texas Holdem.2
Guests
played for chips representing money. A typical player might buy $100 worth of
chips, and the amount at stake in any hand started between $3 and $10. DiCristina
provided card dealers, food, and drinks. In return, he charged five percent of the
pot at stake in each hand played. SPA53-55.
Promoting gambling is a misdemeanor in New York,seeN.Y. Penal Law
225.05, but the State has shown no interest in prosecuting DiCristina for hosting
poker games. No one was ever harmed during or because of DiCristinas games.
1 GA refers to the Governments appendix, SPA to the special appendix,and R to District Court docket entries.2 When using the word poker, this brief typically refers to No Limit TexasHoldem. For an explanation of the games rules and mechanics,see SPA11-13.
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DiCristina has not been accused of any unlawful activity other than hosting poker
games, and no connection between the games and organized crime has been
suggested. See SPA55. The U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New York
nonetheless chose to charge DiCristina with committing federal felonies
violating the IGBA and conspiring to do sopunishable by up to five years in
prison. SPA5. The IGBA provides, as relevant:
(a) Whoever conducts * * * all or part of an illegal gambling businessshall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both.
(b) As used in this section
(1) illegal gambling business means a gambling business which
(i) is a violation of the law of a State or political subdivision inwhich it is conducted;
(ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage,supervise, direct, or own all or part of such business; and
(iii) has been or remains in substantially continuous operation fora period in excess of thirty days or has a gross revenue of $2,000in any single day.
(2) gambling includes but is not limited to pool-selling,bookmaking, maintaining slot machines, roulette wheels or dicetables, and conducting lotteries, policy, bolita or numbers games, orselling chances therein.
* * *
(e) This section shall not apply to any bingo game, lottery, or similargame of chance conducted by an organization exempt from tax [underI.R.C. Section 501(c)(3)].
18 U.S.C. 1955.
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Before trial, DiCristina moved to dismiss the indictment. He argued that
poker does not constitute gambling under 1955(b)(2). That provision defines
gambling by enumerating nine specific games, and poker did not make
Congress list. To be sure, 1955(b)(2) contemplates that gambling also could
include other games. But DiCristina argued that the IGBA prohibits only those
that share the enumerated games common denominator: They are all games of
chance, i.e., games in which the outcome is predominantly controlled by chance
rather than skill. Poker does not share that key trait, he argued. In support, he
cited studies showing that players skills predominantly determine the results of
poker games. R69.
In response, the Government argued that hosting poker games violatedstate
law. And it contended that state infractions automatically qualify as gambling
under the IGBA, because 1955(b)(2) notwithstandingthere is no federal
definition of gambling in the Act. R76.
Before trial, DiCristina moved to call Dr. Randal Heeb, an economist,
statistician, and game-theory expert, as an expert on the role of skill in poker. R73.
At a pretrial hearing, Dr. Heeb described the rules and mechanics of poker,
detailing the myriad skill-based decisions poker players must make. SPA14. For
example, he described techniques for bluffing an opponent into folding superior
cards. SPA14-17. Dr. Heeb also explained his work analyzing 415 million hands
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of poker played online. The results demonstrated that skill affects the likely result
of even a single hand of poker, and that as the game is typically playedover
hundreds of handsthe role of skill outweighs that of chance. SPA21-22, 30, 41-
45. He acknowledged the chance involved in drawing any particular cards, but
explained that over time luck evens out while differences in skill persist, so that
skill matters more. He noted that other academic work uniformly embraced this
conclusion. SPA17-39.
The District Court accepted Dr. Heeb as an expert. But it rejected
DiCristinas argument that Dr. Heeb should testify at trial to help the jury
determine whether poker is gambling under the IGBA. R78 at 2-7. Instead, the
court took that question from the jury, reserving it as a matter of law to decide after
trial. GA188. DiCristina urged the court to reconsider on the ground that pokers
status qualified as an essential element of the IGBA offense and a mixed
question of law and fact for the jury. R79 at 2 n.1. The court again refused. For
purposes of trial it instructed the jury that [g]ambling includes playing poker for
money. GA205. With that instruction in mind, the jury convicted DiCristina.
DiCristina then moved for a judgment of acquittal on the grounds that poker
is not gambling and that the jury should have been permitted to determine that
issue. SPA5. The District Court granted the motion. The court rejected the
Governments claim that state law defined gambling under the IGBA. SPA92-
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101. Looking to the IGBAs text, the court held that poker did not fall within
1955(b)(2)s definition of gambling.
The District Court first determined that under the IGBAs definition, only
games predominated by chance qualify as gambling. SPA104. The court
recognized that in every game identified in 1955(b)(2), chance predominates
over the skill of the players in determining the outcome. SPA105. It rejected the
Governments claim that some of the enumerated games are games of skill. In
particular, it explained that sports-betting is not a game of skill because, unlike in
poker, a sports bettors skill does not influence game play. A sports bettor is
better able to picking a winning team, but cannot make them win. SPA111. The
court further reasoned that chance (as compared to skill) has traditionally been
thought to be a defining element of gambling and is included in dictionary,
common law, and other federal statutory definitions of it. SPA110. And it noted
that 1955(e), which exempts game[s] of chance played for charity, suggested
that the IGBA applies only to such games. After all, it would be notably odd if
games of skill were encompassed in the federal definition [of gambling], but only
games of chance were exempted from prosecution under 1955(e). SPA106.
The court then found that poker is not a game of chance. It observed that
the majority of poker hands end when one player induces his opponents to fold
so that regardless of the cards, the players decisions alone determine the
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outcome. SPA113. The court thus likened poker to golf and bridge, games of
skill in which luck nonetheless plays some role. It reviewed the expert testimony,
cataloguing the evidence that poker is a game of skill: Poker requires complex
decisions based on psychology, math, observation, and strategy; many people
reliably earn a living playing pokersomething that cannot be done playing a
game with random results; studies showed that skilled players perform better than
unskilled players when dealt the same cards; and all published studies conclude
that skill predominates in poker. SPA114. The District Court found those studies
accurate and persuasive. SPA118. By contrast, the court rejected the testimony
of the Governments expert, Dr. David DeRosa, who contended that poker is a
game of chance. SPA30. It found that Dr. DeRosa has provided no basis for the
court to conclude that chance predominates over skill in poker. SPA118.
Having determined that the IGBA defines gambling to include only games
of chance, and that poker is predominantly a game of skill, the District Court held
that the Government may not prosecute people under the IGBA for hosting poker
games. The court thus acquitted DiCristina.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. Switching course before this Court, the Government concedes that
poker is a game in which skill predominantly determines outcomes. Govt Br. 14.
That concession goes a long way toward resolving this appeal, for the only real
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dispute that remains is whether the IGBA covers only games of chance, as the
District Court held. It does. The statute evinces that key limitation twice over: It
defines gambling by enumerating nine games of chance, 18 U.S.C. 1955(b)(2),
thereby limiting the terms scope to similar games, and it uses the phrase game of
chance elsewhere in delimiting the statutes application, id. 1955(e). Dictionary
definitions confirm that gambling is limited to games of chance. And the common
law is to the same effect: Nearly all states limit gambling to games of chance,
and further provide that chance must predominate over skill for a game to
constitute gambling. In short, because the statutory term gambling applies only
to activities in which chance predominantly controls the outcome, and the
Government concedes that chance does not do so in poker, DiCristina did not
violate the IGBA by hosting poker games.
2. The Governments contrary arguments are weak. The Government
brazenly asks this Court to ignore the statutory definition of gambling altogether.
Govt Br. 16-18. But that is statutory nullification, not statutory interpretation.
Having abandoned the statute, the Government next proposes its own preferred
definition of gambling: betting on an uncertain outcome. Id. at 21. That
definition, however, is vastly overbroadsweeping in activities from stock
investing to bridge tournamentsand devoid of grounding in the IGBA or
common law. Finally, the Government says the legislative history shows that
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Congress intended to give federal prosecutors sweeping authority to target all
betting games that might violate state law. But that is an impermissible effort to
make legislative history trump statutory text: Congress did not rely on state law to
define illegal gambling in the IGBA; it included its own definition, and that
definition must be given effect. In any event, the legislative-history argument fails
on its own terms. Congress disclaimed any intent to bring all local gaming matters
into federal courts. The IGBA instead was designed to target syndicated illegal
gambling activities providing billions of dollars to the Mafia. The Government
concedes that poker was not such a game.
3. For these reasons, the IGBA does not criminalize DiCristinas poker
game. If, however, this Court determines that the IGBAs scope is ambiguous, it
should rely on the rule of lenity to affirm. The rule requires that [b]efore a man
can be punished as a criminal under the Federal law[,] his case must beplainly and
unmistakably within the provisions of some statute. United States v.Plaza Health
Labs, Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 649 (2d Cir. 1993) (quotation marks omitted; emphasis
added). Whatever may be said for the Governments arguments, they do not
establish that poker is plainly and unmistakably criminalized by the IGBA.
DiCristina thus cannot be punished as a criminal under the Federal law. Id.
4. In any event, DiCristinas acquittal must stand because the District
Court wrongly prevented jurors from determining whether poker qualifies as
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gambling under the IGBA. That violated DiCristinas right to a jury
determination of every essential element of the offense. And, because the District
Court subsequently acquitted DiCristina, the issue cannot be submitted to jurors in
a second prosecution without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause.
ARGUMENT
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE IGBA
DOES NOT CRIMINALIZE HOSTING POKER GAMES.
As the Government now concedes, the IGBA applies only to games that fall
within the statutes definition of gambling. Govt Br. 14. DiCristinas poker
game does not qualify.
A. The IGBAs Definition Of Gambling Does Not Encompass
Poker.
Determining the meaning of gambling in the IGBA begins where all such
inquiries must begin: with the language of the statute itself. United States v. Ron
Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989). The IGBAs terms demonstrate that
poker is not gambling under the Act.
1. Section 1955(b)(2) defines gambling: As used in this section * * *
gambling includes but is not limited to pool-selling, bookmaking, maintaining
slot machines, roulette wheels or dice tables, and conducting lotteries, policy,
bolita or numbers games, or selling chances therein. Poker is conspicuously
absent from the list. That is significant because 1955(b)(2) comprehensively
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defines the term gambling. S. Rep. No. 91-617, at 155. It thus includes
archetypal forms of gambling, such as slot machines and roulette. It also identifies
more obscure games such as bolita and policy. That the Act does not mention
poker in its wide-ranging enumeration of gambling activities is the first indicator
that it does not cover poker. It is, as the District Court said, the dog that didnt
bark. SPA103.
Pokers absence is all the more notable given that Congress was surely
aware of the game. Nearly a century before the IGBA, poker had already been
called The National Game. N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1875. In the era of the IGBAs
enactment, many Washington political figures played poker, including the
President who signed the Act into law. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of
Columbia, 541 U.S. 913, 917 (2004); C. Black,Richard M. Nixon: A Life in Full
61 (2007); C. Matthews,Kennedy & Nixon 33 (1998). That Congress carefully
enumerated so many activities to which the Act appliesfrom the obvious (dice
games) to the obscure (bolita)but chose to omit the well-known game of
poker, strongly suggests that poker does not fall within the Act. See McBoyle
v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 26-27 (1931) (omission of airplanes from statutory
list indicates statutory definition of vehicle excludes airplanes, given that they
were well known in 1919 when this statute was passed).
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2. Of course, 1955(b)(2) provides that gambling includes, but is not
limited to, the nine games listed. The definition can thus encompass unlisted
gamesbut only if they are similar to those the statute enumerates. See Begay
v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 146-147 (2008);Molloy v. MTA, 94 F.3d 808, 811-
812 (2d Cir. 1996). InMolloy, for example, this Court interpreted the term
alteration in light of this definition: Alteration means a change to an existing
facility, including, but not limited to, remodeling, renovation, rehabilitation,
reconstruction, [and] historic restoration[.] 94 F.3d at 811 (emphasis added). The
Court explained that a definition featuring the phrase including, but not limited
to sweeps in only things similar to those enumerated: Under the common sense
approach to interpreting a general provision in the light of a list of specific
illustrative provisions, ejusdem generis, we construe the general term (here,
change) to include only things similar to the specific items in the list. Id. at 812.
Thus, the Court found it significant that [b]y way of non-exclusive example, the
regulation lists only physical modifications of a relatively permanent nature to the
facility, and it construed the word alteration accordingly. Id.
Just like the regulation inMolloy, 1955(b)(2) defines the key term
gamblingthrough a non-exclusive list signaled by the phrase includes, but is
not limited to. 28 U.S.C. 1955(b)(2). As a matter of common sense, then,
gambling should encompass games similar to the specific items in the list.
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Molloy, 94 F.3d at 812. And there is one key common denominator shared by the
items in the IGBAs list: Each is a game of chance. 28 U.S.C. 1955(e). That
is to say, in each of the nine games, from lotteries to roulette to bookmaking to
bolita, chance is the dominating factor in determining the result of the game. In
re Allen, 377 P.2d 280, 281 (Cal. 1962); infra at 20-24 (describing common-law
test for games of chance). Winning in each game rests more on events the player
cannot controlwhere the ball lands on the roulette wheel, what lottery number is
picked, whether the Giants cover the spread against the Cowboysthan it does on
the players skill.
Not so in poker. The Government now concedes that skill predominates
over chance in poker. Govt Br. 14. That concession is correct. Although poker
players do not control the cards they are dealt, the cards are not the primary
determinant of outcomes. Indeed, in three-quarters of all poker hands, one player
wins because he convinces the other players to fold without ever learning who held
stronger cards. SPA45-46. As the District Court explained, poker players draw
on an array of talents, including facility with numbers, knowledge of human
psychology, and powers of observation and deception * * * to win even if chance
has not dealt them the better hand. SPA111. Moreover, the goal of a poker game
is not to win the greatest number of hands, but to win the most money. A skilled
poker player can therefore succeed even if she is unlucky in that she draws many
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weak hands and only a few strong ones. The skilled player will deduce when she
holds weak cards relative to her opponents, investing little in those hands.
Although she may lose those hands, she will lose little money in them. SPA14-15.
But on the occasions when she has strong cards, she will play skillfully to
maximize the value of the pot, so that her profits from a few strong hands outweigh
the losses from many weak hands. SPA14-17. She will also sometimes win pots
by bluffing opponents into folding even when she holds the weaker hand. SPA15,
SPA113.
Indeed, over the length of the best-known poker tournament the most skilled
players will outperform the least skilled 99 percentof the time. SPA44-45. In just
a single nights play at DiCristinas, the best players will tend to beat the worst
players 88 percent of the time. SPA40-41, SPA116-117. That exceeds the
advantage the best teams have over the worst in a major-league baseball game. See
P. Mushnick,Playoff System Fit for Losers, N.Y. Post 94 (Aug. 30, 1998). And
that is why the academic studies catalogued below uniformly conclude that poker
is a game of skill. SPA17-39;see SPA46 (quoting a study determining that poker
is as much a game of skill as golf). Poker is not just nota game of chance, it is
nothing like a game of chance. Poker thus does not fall within a statutory
definition of gambling that defines the term using games of chance, as the IGBA
does. See, e.g.,Molloy, 94 F.3d at 812.
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3. If there were any doubt about how to read 1955(b)(2) standing
alone, 1955(e) confirms that the unifying characteristic of the prohibited games is
that each is a game of chance. Section 1955(e) is a carve-out provision meant to
protect charities from the IGBA. It provides: [T]his section shall not apply to
any bingo game, lottery, or similar game of chance conducted by charitable
organizations. As the District Court observed, it would be notably odd if games
of skill were encompassed in the federal definition but only games of chance were
exempted from prosecution under 1955(e). SPA106. Congress surely did not
intend to protect the PTAs holiday raffle but not its annual bridge tournament.
Instead, reading the statute as a coherent whole establishes that 1955(b) prohibits
hosting a game of chance for profit, while 1955(e) allows hosting a game of
chance for charity. The Act simply has nothing to do with games of skill.
B. Plain Meaning And Common Law Underscore That The
Statutory Term Gambling Does Not Reach Poker.
The statutory term gambling thus does not reach poker. The words plain
meaning and common-law definition underscore that conclusion.
1. Plain Meaning. The word gambling typically applies only to games
of chance. After an extensive survey of dictionaries, the District Court concluded
that dictionary * * * definitions of gambling argue in favor of a definition limited
to games of chance. SPA112;see SPA60-61 (citing, among other sources,
Gamble, The Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) (To play games of chance
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for money * * * .); Gamble, Websters Third New International Dictionary 932
(1971) (1: a: to play a game of chance for money or other stakes)). The
Governments brief itself identifies still more dictionaries defining gambling
using the phrase game of chance. Govt Br. 19-20 & n.5.
Of course, dictionary definitions of gambling vary widely. SPA60. But
the definitions that encompass more than games of chance are far too broad to fit
the IGBAs text and structure. Defining gamble as to play a game for money or
propertyas does Merriam Websters Collegiate Dictionary 478 (10th ed.
1996)might cover poker, but it would also reach chess tournaments and the U.S.
Open, where players pay an entrance fee to compete for cash prizes. And one
could capture poker with the definition risking something on an uncertain event,
SPA61 (quoting the second meaning in Websters Third New International
Dictionary (1971)), but that would also sweep in speculative options trading,
401(k) investment decisions, and even dating. Such broad definitions make little
sense in a criminal prohibition and fail to account for the statutory definitions
inclusion of only games of chance. Investing, professional tennis, and poker are
unlike the nine games of chance enumerated in the statutory definition of
gambling; any definition that includes them should therefore be rejected. Instead,
the more common dictionary definitionplaying games of chance for money
best comports with the Acts text and structure.
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2. Common Law. The broad historical trend among the states provides
further support for defining gambling under the IGBA as playing games of
chance. That is so because the states have generally agreed on two crucial points:
First, chance is an essential element of gambling, and second, the categorization of
an activity as a game of chance (which is gambling) or a game of skill (which is
not) hinges on whether chance or skill predominates. Since the statutory term
gambling has a settled meaning at common law, it should be interpreted in
accordance with [this] widely accepted definition[ ], not as a departure from [it].
Beckv.Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 500-501 (2000).
a. Under the common law, gambling refers to games of chance. The
three elements necessary to gambling [are] consideration, a result determined by
chance rather than skill, and a reward. Commonwealth v. Two Elec. Poker Game
Machs., 465 A.2d 973, 977 (Pa. 1983);see also, e.g.,Rosenkranzv. Vassallo, 473
A.2d 991, 995 (N.J. Ct. App. 1984); State v.Pinball Machs., 404 P.2d 923, 925
(Alaska 1965);Boies v.Bartell, 310 P.2d 834, 837 (Ariz. 1957); State v.Bally
Beach Club Pinball Mach., 119 A.2d 876, 879 (Vt. 1956). As one of the most-
cited common-law treatises put it, [f]air and honest contests of skill * * * have
always been regarded as sustained by the common law, notwithstanding the fact
that a prize is attached to success; in contrast, gambling occurs when parties
stake money on chance. 2 Whartons Criminal Law 1465a (1896). That
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distinction makes sense. As many courts have emphasized, a game that fosters
* * * a desire to gain profit, not by [the players] own efforts, not as a reward for
skill or accomplishment, but solely by the lucky turn of chance * * * encourages
* * * the gambling instinct and * * * appeal[s] to the baser elements in [the
players] nature. State v.Dorau, 198 A.2d 573, 575 (Conn. 1938);see also, e.g.,
State v. Shorts, 32 N.J.L. 398, 401 (N.J. 1868) (chance is the evil principle against
which all [gambling] laws are aimed).
In accordance with this well-accepted definition, nearly all states have
recognized that gambling involves only games of chance, not games of skill.
Some states include game-of-chance language in constitutional provisions
prohibiting gambling. See, e.g., S.D. Const. art. III, 25 (The Legislature shall
not authorize any game of chance); N.D. Const. art. XI, 25. Others have
codified the game-of-chance element in their statutory definitions of gambling or
gambling device. See, e.g. Ala. Code 13A-12-20(4) (A person engages in
gambling if he risks something of value upon the outcome of a contest of
chance); N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-292 (prohibiting operating any game of chance).3
3 See also, e.g., Alaska Stat. 11.66.280(2); D.C. Code 22-1704; Fla. Stat.
849.08; Ga. Code 16-12-20(2); Haw. Stat. 712-1220(4); Kan. Stat. 21-6302(a)(2) and (d)(1)(A); Ky. Rev. Stat. 528-010(3)(a); Me. Rev. Stat. 952(4);Md. Code 12-101(d)(1); Minn. Stat. 609-75(4); Mo. Rev. Stat. 572.010(4);Mont. Code 23-5-112(13)(a); Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-1101(4); N.J. Stat. 2C:37-1(b); N.M. Stat. 30-19-1(B) and (C); N.Y. Penal Law 225.00(2); N.D. Cent.
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And still others expressly exclude games of skill from the statutory definition of
gambling. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. 18-10-102(2)(a) (Gambling * * * does
not include * * * [b]ona fide contests of skill).4
Although the state enactments use
varied language, the consensus is striking: There has long been a legislative
distinction between games of chan[c]e, which are prohibited [as gambling], and
games of skill, which are not. Faircloth v. Cent. Fla. Fair, Inc., 202 So. 2d 608,
609 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967).
State courts, like state legislators, agree that gambling involves playing
games of chance. Thus, even in those states that at some point lacked game of
chance language in their gambling laws, courts have refer[red] to the common-
law definition, which they have emphasized requires chance. Automatic Music &
Vending Corp. v.Liquor Control Commn, 396 N.W.2d 204, 206 (Mich. 1986);see
also, e.g.,Rouse v. Sisson, 199 So. 777, 778 (Miss. 1941); Town of Centerville
v.Burns, 126 S.W.2d 322, 323 (Tenn. 1939);In re Lee Tong, 18 F. 253, 257 (D.
Code 12.1-28-01(1); Ohio Rev. Code 2915.02 (A)(2) and (4); Okla. Stat. 21-942; Or. Rev. Stat. 167.117(7); R.I. Gen. Laws 11-19-18; Tenn. Code 39-17-501; Tex. Code 47.01(1); Utah Code 76-10-1101(2)(a); Vt. Stat. 13-2135(3);Wash. Rev. Code 9.46.0237; W. Va. Code 61-10-5; Wis. Stat. 945.01(1) and(3).4 See also, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. 53-278a(2); Idaho Code 18-3801(1); 720Ill. Comp. Stat. 28-1(b)(2); Ind. Code 35-45-5-1(d); Kan. Stat. 21-6302(a)(2);Md. Code 13-305(a)(4); N.M. Stat. 30-19-1(B); N.D. Cent. Code 12.1-28-01(1)(a); Va. Code 18-2-333; Wis. Stat. 945.01(1)(b); Wyo. Stat. 6-7-101(a)(iii)(A).
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Or. 1883); State v. Grimes, 49 Minn. 443, 446 (1898). In short, historically and
traditionally, gambling has been held to include * * * a result determined by
chance as opposed to * * * skill. Commonwealth v. One Electro-Sport Draw
Poker Mach., 443 A.2d 295, 297 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981), revd on other grounds,
Commonwealth v. Two Elec. Poker Game Machs., 465 A.2d 973 (Pa. 1983).
b. The states likewise agree about how to decide whether an activity is a
game of skill or of chance: they ask which predominates. As one canonical case
put it: The term game of chance has an accepted meaning established by
numerous adjudications. * * * The test is not whether the game contains an
element of chance or an element of skill but which of them is the dominating factor
in determining the result of the game. In re Allen, 377 P.2d at 281 (emphasis
added). Although gambling laws frequently change, the majority of states have
relied on this predominance test to sort games of chance from games of skill under
diverse statutory enactments. See, e.g., State ex rel. Green v. One Five Cent Inning
Base Ball Machine, 3 So. 2d 27, 29 (Ala. 1941);Morrow v. State, 511 P.2d 127,
129 (Alaska 1973);Boies, 310 P.2d at 837 (Ariz.);Drew v. State, 10 Ark. 82, 84-
85 (1849);Mendelsohn v.Bidcactus, LLC, 2012 WL 1059702, at *3 (D. Conn.
Mar. 28, 2012);In re Request of Governor for Advisory Op., 12 A.3d 1104, 1112
(Del. 2009);Boosalis v. Crawford, 99 F.2d 374, 376 (D.C. Cir. 1938); Question
Game Co. v. Ploner, 273 Ill. App. 187, 192 (1933); Lashbrookv. State, 550
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N.E.2d 772, 775 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); Games Mgmt., Inc. v. Owens, 662 P.2d 260,
264 (Kan. 1983); Commonwealth v.LaBella, 458 N.E.2d 763, 765 (Mass. App. Ct.
1984); City of St. Paulv. Stovall, 30 N.W.2d 638, 641-642 (Minn. 1948);Redd
v. Simmons, 167 So. 65, 67-68 (Miss. 1936);Am. Amusements Co. v.Neb. Dept of
Revenue, 807 N.W.2d 492, 502 (Neb. 2011);Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc. v. Gibson,
359 P.2d 85, 87 (Nev. 1961);People v.Li Ai Hua, 885 N.Y.S.2d 380, 383 (City
Crim. Ct. 2009); State v. Stroupe, 76 S.E.2d 313, 317 (N.C. 1953);Progress
Vending, Inc. v.Dept of Liquor Control, 394 N.E.2d 324, 329 (Ohio Ct. App.
1978);Delano v. State, 168 P.2d 659, 663 (Okla. Crim. App. 1946);In re Lee
Tong, 18 F. at 257 (D. Or.); Two Elec. Poker Game Machs., 465 A.2d at 977-978
(Pa.);Roberts IIv. Commns Investment Club of Woonsocket, 431 A.2d 1206, 1211
(R.I. 1981);Bayerv.Johnson, 349 N.W.2d 447, 449 (S.D. 1984); Van Pelt
v. State, 246 S.W.2d 87, 89 (Tenn. 1952);DOrio v. Startup Candy Co., 266 P.
1037, 1039 (Utah 1928); State v. Wassick, 191 S.E.2d 283, 287 (W. Va. 1972);
State v.Hahn, 586 N.W.2d 5, 10-11 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
In sum, the District Court correctly found that gambling under the common
law has historically required playing a game of chance, and that [m]ost states
find that an activity is * * * illegal gambling if a person risks something of value
on an activitypredominately determined by chance. SPA62 (quoting A. Cabot
& R. Hannum,Poker: Public Policy, Law, Mathematics, and the Future of An
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American Tradition, 22 T.M. Cooley L. Rev. 443, 445 (2005)). Because Congress
presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas attached to language with a
settled meaning at common law,Beck, 529 U.S. at 500-501 (citation omitted), this
consensus supports interpreting gambling in the IGBA the same way. And that
definition excludes pokera game the Government concedes is predominated by
skill.
II. THE GOVERNMENTS CONTRARY ARGUMENTS ARE
MERITLESS.
The Government argues for a far broader understanding of gambling. But
its arguments ignore the IGBAs text and fail to provide a workable definition of
the term.
A. The Governments Definition Does Not Comport With The
IGBAs Text.
1. The nine gambling games enumerated in 1955(b)(2) demonstrate
that the statute is limited to games of chance. See supra at 12-16. The
Governments counter to this approach, quite literally, is to suggest that this Court
ignore 1955(b)(2) altogether. The Government concedes that there is a federal
definition of gambling under the IGBA. Govt Br. 14. But the Government then
blithely asserts that 1955(b)(2) does not supply that definition. Id. at 16
(contending that 1955(b)(2) does not define gambling for purposes of the
IGBA (capitalization omitted)). In the Governments view, the provision merely
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contains a non-exhaustive list of examples of gambling activities, and those
examples should not be read to exclude other activities from the reach of the
statute. Id. at 16-17. The Government argues, in other words, that 1955(b)(2)
does no work and that the statutory definition of gambling must be found
elsewhere. Under its approach, the IGBA reaches the same games as it would have
if Congress had omitted 1955(b)(2).
That reading is untenable for two reasons. First, 1955(b)(2) obviously
does define gambling in the IGBA. As the Government admits, 1955(b)
provides definitions of the [statutes] relevant terms. Govt Br. 14. Section
1955(b) begins, like every statutory definition, with the words [a]s used in this
section. It then contains three terms in quotation marks, followed by words
explaining what each term means. The second term is gambling. If the
provision does not define gambling, it is hard to say what it does do.
The Government suggests that Section 1955(b)(2) is not a definition because
it is a non-exhaustive list. Govt Br. 16. But many cases treat non-exhaustive
lists as definitions. See, e.g., Christopherv. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct.
2156, 2162, 2171-72 (2012);Mohamadv. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1707
(2012);McBoyle, 283 U.S. at 26. That is true even for statutes using the words
includes but is not limited to; indeed, this Court has said such lists are
definition[s]. Molloy, 94 F.3d at 812;Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 645-646. And if
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there were any doubt, it is resolved by the legislative history, which makes clear
that Congress itself considered 1955(b)(2)s list a definition. See S. Rep. No. 91-
617 at 155-156 (Section 1955(b)(1)-(3) define an illegal gambling business.
* * * State and gambling are also defined comprehensively.); H. Rep. No. 91-
1549, at 54 (Paragraph (2) defines gambling * * * ). Indeed, the Government
acknowledges that Congress included 1955(b)(2) in the statute to replace an
earlier definition of gambling. Govt Br. 22-23. If Congress did not want
1955(b)(2) to define gambling, it would not have modifiedthe earlier definition,
it would have deletedit. The notion that 1955(b)(2) is something less than a
definition, and thus can be ignored, is baseless.5
Second, the Governments approach reads 1955(b)(2) out of the statute.
The Government advances a capacious definition of gambling that
5 The Government suggests certain cases have held that 1955(b)(2) does notdefine gambling. But it admits (at 17) that the only court of appeals that hasdirectly addressed the issue is the Third Circuit in United States v. Atiyeh, 402F.3d 354 (2005). AndAtiyeh acknowledged the definition of gamblingprovidedfor in 1955(b)(2). 402 F.3d at 372 (emphasis added). It declined to apply thatdefinition only because it believed a state-law violation alone satisfied the IGBA.See id. The Government concedes in this case (at 14) that a federal definition ofgambling must be satisfied and that a state-law violation alone will not suffice.
Atiyeh thus does not help the Government. Quite the contrary: It confirms that 1955(b)(2) contains the definition the Government seeks elsewhere.
The Government (at 17-18) also cites several cases upholding convictionsbased on activities not enumerated in 1955(b)(2). Those precedents serve onlyto illustrate a point never in dispute: The definition of gambling in 1955(b)(2)is not exhaustive. As the District Court explained, SPA103, none of those casesexamined whether poker is gambling under the IGBA. The cases thus do notsupport the Governments position.
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1955(b)(2)s non-exhaustive list of examples does not expand or contract.
Govt Br. 16, 21. But as the Supreme Court explained when confronting a broad
definition followed by a list of narrower examples, if Congress meant the statute
to be all-encompassing, it is hard see why it would have needed to include the
examples at all. Begay, 553 U.S. at 142. The Governments attempt to ignore
1955(b)(2) thus fails to give effect to every clause and word of this statute. Id.
(alteration & quotation marks omitted). That is particularly pernicious here
because the IGBA is a criminal statute and judges must be especially hesitant to
create surplus when the words describe an element of a criminal offense. United
States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71, 81 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted). To
avoid rendering 1955(b)(2) surplus, the provision must at least limit the meaning
of gambling to activities similar to those it enumerates. Begay, 553 U.S. at 142.
Perhaps aware that its construction creates surplus, the Government offers
that Congress listed these games because they provided the most lucrative sources
of gambling revenue for organized crime. Govt Br. 17 n.3. But explaining why
a provision might appear in a statute is a far cry from giving that provision effect.
Surplus provisions are surplus because they dont do anything, not because they
are mysterious.
2. Having deemed 1955(b)(2) irrelevant, the Government quibbles
with the District Courts effort to apply the provision through the canon ejusdem
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generis. The Government suggests that the canoncannot apply to definitions using
the phrase includes but is not limited to. Govt Br. 40-41.
This Courts decision inMolloy eviscerates the Governments claim. The
Court there applied the canon in circumstances identical to those here. See 94 F.3d
at 811-812 (applying canon to a non-exclusive definition that used the phrase
including, but not limited to). Other courts have done the same. See, e.g.,
United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(applying ejusdem generis to a non-exhaustive list containing [t]he words
including, but not limited to );Postv. St. Paul Travelers Ins. Co., 691 F.3d 500,
520 (3d Cir. 2012);Donovan v. United States, 580 F.2d 1203, 1207 (3d Cir. 1978).
Molloy controls here. The cases on which the Government relies (at 41), by
contrast, come from other circuits. They are also inapposite because they involve
statutes containing broad language, indicating that their drafters intended an
expansive scope. For example,Ramirezv. City Demonstration Agency dealt with a
clause containing the words any such project * * * including but not limited to.
549 F.2d 97, 104 (9th Cir. 1976) (emphasis added). Absent such an indication that
a list was not intended to limit the term it defines, courts routinely apply ejusdem
generis to lists beginning with the phrase includes but is not limited to. See, e.g.,
Molloy, 94 F.3d at 811-812;Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1200;Post, 691 F.3d at
520;Donovan, 580 F.2d at 1207.
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The District Court thus was correct to invoke ejusdem generis. But even if
that canon were put to one side, that would not make 1955(b)(2) irrelevant. After
all, the canon noscitur a sociis would accomplish the same end. SeeCity of New
Yorkv. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 384, 401 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing both canons
to explain that specific words limit general ones in the same list);Philip Morris,
396 F.3d at 1200. And even apart from Latin maxims, it is plain that a statutory
definition limits the meaning of the term it defines. Nothing (in Latin, English, or
any other language) suggests that the District Court should have determined the
meaning of gambling by disregardingCongresss description of that word in the
Acts definition section. [A] statute is to be read as a whole, since the meaning of
statutory language, plain or not, depends on context. Kingv. St. Vincents Hosp.,
502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991). The Governments approach does not read the IGBA as
a whole. Under its construction, 1955(b)(2) does nothing at all.
3. The Government also largely disregards a second important element
of the statute 1955(e). In its lone mention of 1955(e), it argues that the
provisions use of the phrase game[s] of chance demonstrates that Congress
plainly knew how to include such language in the statute when it wished to do so.
Thus, it says, that phrases absence from 1955(b)(2) must mean the term
gambling is not so limited. Govt Br. 16.
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That gets things backwards. As the District Court observed, the fact that
1955(e) exempts charitable game[s] of chance from the IGBA but says nothing
about charitable games ofskillstrongly suggests that games of skill were never
within the IGBA in the first place. SPA106;see supra at 17. If it were
otherwiseif the Governments approach were correctthen the two subsections
read together could criminalize games of skillrun by charities but not those same
charities games of chance. That would be absurd. And [a] statute should be
interpreted in a way that avoids absurd results. United States v. Venturella, 391
F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir. 2004). That is particularly so here given that Congress used
a term, gambling, that has historically referred to games of chance, thus uniting
the two subsections (b)(2) and (e).
4. The Government offers a final salvo on the statute: that reading the
IGBA to encompass only games of chance cannot be correct because 1955(b)(2)
lists bookmaking, which the Government claims is a game of skill. As evidence,
the Government cites news stories about a handful of people who have managed to
make money betting on sports through bookmakers. Govt Br. 29-33.
The argument is flawed. A few exceptional individuals do apparently use
rigorous analysis to profit from betting with bookmakers. Likewise, an elite group
of MIT students managed to consistently beat the house at blackjack, at least one
clever individual learned to exploit defects in a roulette wheel to make a sizeable
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profit, and investment firms have identified rare occasions when probabilities favor
buying lottery tickets. See SPA110; Group Invests $5 Million to Hedge Bets in
Lottery, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1992;R. Flanagan, Tasmanian Devil, The New
Yorker 54 (Jan. 21, 2013). But as courts consistently hold, the fact that a few
outliers can profit from a game of chance does not make it a game of skill; whether
a game is one of skill or chance is determined by examining the game as ordinarily
played. See Johnson v. Phinney, 218 F.2d 303, 307 (5th Cir. 1955);Boosalis, 99
F.2d at 376 ;Morrow, 511 P.2d at 129;Boies, 310 P.2d at 839;People ex rel.
Ellison v. Lavin, 71 N.E. 753, 756 (N.Y. 1904).
In all poker gameswhether the World Series of Poker or DiCristinasthe
players skill predominantly determines the outcome. The same is true in tennis,
chess, or any game of skill. Although only the top tier of players possess enough
skill to make a reliable living at the game, even a casual contest among rank
amateurs will likely be won by the best player. See SPA45 (in typical game, better
half of players will beat worse half 76 percent of the time).
Placing bets with a sports book, by contrast, is an activity in which chance
predominates, by design and in practice. The bookmaker typically establishes odds
with the goal of ensuring that 50 percent of all bets succeed and 50 percent do not.
It guarantees its profit by taking a fixed portion of all bets, setting the odds to
balance the money paid out on winning bets against the money it keeps on losing
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bets. When the system works properly, skill cannot help or hurt the typical bettor:
a bet has the same odds as a coin-flip. See A. Brisman, Casino Gambling:
Winning Ways 202 (1999).
The exceedingly rare professional sports-bettor profits by identifying
individual games in which the bookmaker got the odds wrong, so that one side of a
bet is more likely to succeed than the other. See A. Reber, The New Gamblers
Bible 286 (1996). But even the skilled bettor does not have some ability that
allows him to influence a games score.6 He works hard to identify the rare games
of chance where the odds favor himhe does not so much win a game as beat the
system. Again, however, the existence of a few such experts does not make
6
The Government claims (at 32) that the professional sports-bettorstechnique of placing strategic bets to shift the odds is analogous to bluffing in
poker. That is wrong. By bluffing, a poker player can win a hand withoutdepending on the one factor he cannot influencethe cards he is dealt. There is nomeans by which a sports-bettor can win without depending on a factor he cannotinfluenceathletes performance on the field. There is no sports-betting analogyto bluffing, because sports-betting is not analogous to poker. See I. Rose & M.Owens,Jr.,Internet Gaming Law: Gambling and the Law 19 (2005)(Where doesskill stop, and chance begin? The deciding factor lies in the individual bettors
participation in the event and the control over the results. The less input and
control a bettor has over the outcome of the contest, the higher the likelihood it is agame of chance.); SPA 110-111 (explaining array of poker skills unavailable tosports-bettors). In any event, even if the two skills were comparable, only one
bluffingis part of the game as ordinarily played. See supra at 6, 16. Bluffing isan inherent part of poker; every player, even a rank amateur, bluffs. By contrast,only the rarest of sports-bettors possess the analytic and financial resources to bet
both sides of a game in order to influence the bookmakers odds. See Govt Br. 32.
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bookmaking an activity where skill typically determines the outcome. See
Phinney, 218 F.2d at 307;Boosalis, 99 F.2d at 376.
The difference between poker and