+ All Categories

Download - Chapter 5

Transcript
Page 1: Chapter 5

Chapter 5 :Evaluating the Data

Introduction and Old Testament

Nothing is more ludicrous than to assume life begins at conception. The problem relating to it theologically, doctrinally, biblically and every other way are absolutely heretical, ludicrous and a manifestation of the emotional revolt of the soul and ignorance in regard to the teaching of the

pdf 1

Page 2: Chapter 5

Word of God.

Most evangelicals and fundamentalists who hold to this view (life begins at conception) have copied once again the Roman Catholic Church because of their ignorance of the Word of God. [This is] heresy.

These are strong words. While these statements may be examined in areas outside of a theological framework (that is, logically and philosophically), it is just that framework that will be the focus of this chapter. Thieme's indictment is clear: If you believe life begins at conception, you certainly do not know the Word of God. According to Thieme, a true student of the Word knows that the Bible teaches life begins at birth. Utilizing the literal foundation of interpretation previously discussed, these propositions are analyzed and evaluated. Each point is examined to see if it is a cogent Scriptural conclusion.

Preliminary Matters Historical Inaccuracies

Before Thieme's propositions and doctrinal position are assessed, a few side issues need to be discussed. Thieme clearly sets his position in contrast to Traducianism. In other words, when he goes on the attack, he attacks Traducianism. Though he calls himself a "modified" Creationist, he strongly implies he is speaking for Creationists. While Thieme states in his book that some Creationists believe that life begins at conception and others at sometime during gestation, Thieme mentions theologians such as Jerome, Aquinas, Calvin, Berkhof, and Hodge as being Creationists. Thieme immediately then states that Creationism distinguishes between biological life and soul life (as if to tie these theologians to his notion of biological life). This is followed by a "clarification of the Creationist position." Thieme's intent is to lead one to believe that the Creationism that he espouses (namely, soul imputation at birth) is a widely held view among Creationists. He then sets himself in opposition to Traducianists. While Thieme is opposed to Traducianism, his major opponent, in reality, is conception Creationism. This "substitution of opponents" at best is misleading; at worst, it is deceiving. He incorrectly states that the majority position among Christians is Traducianism. While he does comment in his book that the Eastern Orthodox Church is Traducian, he states repeatedly in his lectures that the Roman Catholic Church is Traducian. This assertion is clearly false. Harold O.J. Brown points out that the most widely held view is Creationism. This position is held by most Calvinists and the Roman Catholic Church. The New Dictionary of Theology also states, "Creationism is the official teaching of Roman Catholicism." Not only is Creationism the official teaching of Catholicism, their officials have seen fit, through their ordinary magisterium, to condemn Traducianism. Most conservative Protestants are Creationists who believe that life begins at conception. Thieme represents a very small number of Creationists. While this is certainly not an argument by majority, the point must be made that Thieme has shown a considerable lack of scholarship in representing his view and misrepresenting the Roman Catholic view.Another related issue is Thieme's comment on the early church. Thieme attests, "One of the greatest theological problems that was resolved by the early church, but has become

pdf 2

Page 3: Chapter 5

unraveled since that time, is what is the origin of life" (emphasis added). The clear implication of this statement is that the early church fathers were "squared away" in knowing that Scriptures taught that life begins at birth. This is unquestionably a false statement. Thieme offers absolutely no historical evidence to support this proposition. In fact, historical research supports the opposite conclusion. In his valuable work, Abortion and the Early Church, Michael Gorman clearly details the position of the early church both on the status of the fetus and the concept of abortion. Based on his research, the following is a brief survey of statements made and positions held by early church fathers. The earliest Christian views on abortion and the inherent view of the status of the fetus are found in the Didache and the Epistle of Barnabas. The Didache states, "Thou shall not murder a child by abortion / destruction." The Epistle of Barnabas repeats the exact same words. Comments preceding the abortion prohibition in the Didache state that one should love his neighbor more than his own life. The idea is that the fetus is not seen as part of its mother, but as a neighbor. Abortion is viewed as "self-centered" and not "other-centered" neighbor love. The Apocalypse of Peter, an important non-canonical apocalypse, additionally shows how the early church viewed abortion. A portrait of hell itself included graphic details of those who aborted children. Clement of Alexandria (ca. 150-215) wrote about aborted children who were taken to safety by an angel while the parents are punished for their sin. Clement also quotes from an unknown writer who argues that the fetus is a living soul. Clement states that this author quoted Scripture to support his conclusions (namely, Luke 1:41). Clement himself wrote extensively on abortion. A common and repeated theme was that abortion was the taking of a human life that is under God's care, design and providence.Athenagoras was an early Greek apologist for Christianity. When defending Christianity against false accusations, he mentions that women who abort their children are murderers. Athenagoras spoke for the accepted orthodox Christian position. Another well-known early church father and apologist was Minucius Felix. He wrote extensively about many subjects, including abortion. He accused the pagans of committing "infanticide" before they give birth. The Latin word translated "infanticide" is parricidium, which is a Roman legal term for intentional killing, especially the murder of a relative.Many others, such as Hippolytus (ca. 170-236) and Cyprian (ca. 200-258), viewed abortion as murder. As Christianity was furthered established, ecclesiastical laws against abortion were passed. Great church fathers, such as Jerome, Basil, Ambrose, Augustine, and Chrystostom, commented on their view of the status of the fetus in the womb. Basil (ca. 330-379) mentioned that abortion is murder, even as the fetus is in a formless state. The well-educated Bishop of Milan, Ambrose, also spoke out against abortion, quoting Jeremiah 1:5 and noting God's care and providence of the fetus. Jerome (ca. 342-420) also viewed abortion as murder. While Augustine, like Tertullian, saw a distinction between a formed and unformed fetus, both men viewed abortion as being wrong. The great "golden-mouthed" John Chrysostom vigorously condemned abortion. The ecclesiastical laws themselves, starting with the Council of Elvira about 305, condemned abortion. Another council of bishops at Ancyra set punishments for abortion. This additionally generated comments by church fathers condemning abortion. Concerning the church's historical view of abortion and the status of the unborn, one study concludes:

pdf 3

Page 4: Chapter 5

For the whole of Christian history until appreciably after 1900, so far as we can trace it, there was virtual unanimity amongst Christians, evangelical, catholic, orthodox, that, unless at the direct command of God, it was in all cases wrong to take innocent human life. Abortion and infanticide were grouped together as early as the writing called the Didache which comes from the first century after the crucifixion. These deeds were grouped as murder in that those committing or co-operating in them were, when penitent, still excluded from Communion for ten years by early Councils. . . . The absolute war was against the deliberate taking of innocent life, not in the sense of sinless life, but in the sense that life which was innocens (not harming). . . . We may note that this strictness constituted one of the most dramatic identifiable differences between Christian morality and pagan, Greek or Roman morality.

The many church fathers who viewed abortion as murder clearly recognized the fetus to be a living human being under God's care. One certainly cannot murder someone that is not a living human being. Two conclusions may be drawn from the preceding information: 1) Thieme's comment that the early church viewed life as beginning at birth is clearly false; and, 2) even with a distinction between a formed and unformed fetus, the taking of that life was never an option approved by the early church. The mindset of the early church was a far cry from Thieme's comment that Roe vs. Wade (and the subsequent freedom for the mother to kill her unborn) "is probably one of the wisest and most brilliant decisions that the Supreme Court has made in many, many, many years," and that the decision to abort the child "is a private matter between a doctor and a patient."

The Art of Diversion

Another example of Thieme's failure to argue properly for his position is his use of straw man arguments or diversion of the issue. Proper logical structure was discussed in chapter 3 and is a basis for the critique that follows. Theologically and logically, Thieme states his position in contrast to a position that does not exist or is irrelevant to the issue at hand. For example, Thieme uses a major diversionary argument as he elaborates on John 1:3. The context of the passage (as well as others, such as Colossians 1:16), points to Christ creating all things. This would certainly include an individual's soul. Thieme belabors the point that Jesus Christ created everything. Somehow, Thieme must believe that constant repetition of this point adds to his position that life begins at birth.

In response to this diversion, the first question to be asked is, who believes Christ did not create everything? The Traducianists? If that is the case, Thieme has once again misrepresented them. While they do believe that body and soul are generated through human procreation, they would still view God as ultimately responsible via mediate creation.Thieme commits the same fallacy as he points to Isaiah 57:16 to support his claim that there is no human life in the womb. He uses this passage to emphasize emotionally that

pdf 4

Page 5: Chapter 5

it is God who gives life. This is once again a straw man argument. He apparently fails to realize that no one (that is, the Evangelicals and Fundamentalists whom he is taking to task) is arguing to the contrary. Somehow, he believes this straw man bolsters his position. Thieme does the same thing with Isaiah 42:5 which speaks about God giving and sustaining life. No one argues this point. The "life in the womb" issue is again diverted to a "does God give and sustain life" issue. The individuals with opposing views on the status of the unborn would agree wholeheartedly that God gives and sustains life. The point at issue here is not addressed in the exposition of these passages. These examples say nothing about neshamah being given at birth to the human race.Thieme's mentor, Dr. Lewis Sperry Chafer, was a Traducianist who would never argue that Christ did not create everything. But once again, it is conception Creationists who make up the larger body of Christians that Thieme is "arguing" against. There is no foundation for his line of reasoning, since it is not disputed that Christ is the Creator of all things. Thieme has simply used a smoke screen tactic that strongly and deceptively implies that if one believes that life begins at conception, he does not believe that Christ is the Creator of all. Nothing could be further from the truth. This straw man argument provides absolutely no support for his position and says nothing about the time when God creates life.Thieme also engages in a diversionary argument using Psalm 51:5. He states that the sin nature is transmitted through biological life. He then uses this assertion to argue that God is not the author of sin. The "life in the womb issue" is now diverted to "is God the author of sin" issue. The sin nature is said by Thieme to be "dormant" in the womb because there is no soul life. If there was soul life, God would be the author of sin. Thieme then goes on to say that Psalm 51:5 mentions birth first because that is when life begins. Thieme contends that the phrase "in sin did my mother conceive me" shows where the old sin nature originated, and the phrase "I was brought forth in iniquity" means that at birth is when the old sin nature was activated.Thieme's interpretation is heavily flawed. He states that birth is mentioned first in Psalm 51:5 because that is when life begins. He has also stated that, "what is important is emphasized first." Does this mean if one can find conception mentioned first in a passage, it is the point to be emphasized and that is when life begins? The fact is, conception is mentioned before birth dozens of times throughout Scripture. Here is a case where Thieme's argument backfires in favor of the conception camp. Additionally, the entire "dormant old sin nature" teaching is so speculative and ad hoc that it hardly deserves response. If Thieme is correct in his assertion, one must wonder how the entire history of Christian scholarship could have missed this "truth." But the teaching's fatal flaw is not that it fails to have the support of the scholars; it fails because it has no biblical support.Psalm 51:5, like so many other passages, clearly states that it was David who came into existence at conception (the personal pronoun me is used). Even if this passage were teaching that the unborn are only potential sinners, it would still imply the the unborn are actual persons, since only actual persons can be potential sinners, just as only actual persons can be potential farmers, teachers, baseball players, and so on. To use Psalm 51:5 to declare there is no life in the womb because God is not the author of sin is diversionary and unwarranted. Psalm 51:5 uses Hebrew parallelism to indicate David was a sinner at conception by

pdf 5

Page 6: Chapter 5

virtue of Adam's original sin. Because of what had already occurred, David was brought forth in iniquity. In synthetic Hebrew parallelism, the second line of the verse amplifies and explains the first. Norman Geisler made the following point:

The very fact that humans are declared sinners from conception reveals that they are human, that is, part of the fallen human race. It is only by virtue of being part of the Adamic human race that we are conceived in sin.

Life in the womb does not demand the conclusion that God is the author of sin. One may even embrace Thieme's model of the transmission of the old sin nature through the genes of the father, maintain that it is Adam's and man's responsibility, and still have God imputing life at the moment of conception. There is no real conflict here. To say, as Thieme does, that there is necessarily a conflict and that this would make God the author of sin is misleading, misrepresentative, and diversionary.

The context of the following remarks made by Thieme involves the grave error that he alledges most of the members of the Body of Christ have committed. According to Thieme, Fundamentalists and Evangelicals have joined the Roman Catholic Church believing that sexual intercourse produces human beings. He builds the "straw man" by stating that these people believe that man is the creator of life and then argues against that belief. Take note of other statements Thieme has made along these lines: "The Bible never teaches . . . that the source of human life is copulation." "It is arrogance to think mankind creates mankind." "No woman ever carried human life — that's arrogance!" The "straw" issue is painfully obvious. Supposedly, if one believes life begins at conception, one also believes that man is the creator of life.

There are two misleading elements in Thieme's teaching. Not only does it imply that all of these people (Fundamentalists, Evangelicals and Catholics) are Traducianists (which has just been refuted), but these people believe that mankind creates life. This is not even a fair representation of Traducianism. While Traducianists recognize that the process of soul perpetuation involves the act of procreation, they certainly recognize God's mediate creation of the soul. This is why Traducianists reject abortion. It is not solely because of man's role, but because of God's role. But even this point is not the main issue. The vast majority who oppose the concept of life beginning at birth are not Traducianists but Creationists who believe God creates life at conception. Thieme is quilty of attacking a position that does not exist among those he claims to represent fairly. Thieme then goes on to say "Creationists distinguish between . . . soul life and biological life." This statement has no foundation in established fact. While this may represent his minority position, it clearly does not represent that of the vast majority of Creationists. With this concept of biological and soul life, Thieme makes a fatal mistake. He fails to make a distinction between dualism (the recognition of body and soul or the material and immaterial aspects of man), and his position of distinguishing between biological life and soul life. Thieme equates the two. Extensive research done by this writer has found no other orthodox Christian teaching that does not recognize dualism (either dichotomous or trichotomous). The overwhelming majority of Creationists (as well as all Traducianists) believe that the body and the soul start "life" at the same time. There is never one without the other until death.

pdf 6

Page 7: Chapter 5

Grammatical and Etymological ArgumentsIs "Biological Life" Taught in the Bible?

John C. Rankin articulates a common sentiment among Creationists. He

recognizes that there are serious problems with the translation of the term nephesh (soul) due to its primary English connotation. This connotation denotes the metaphysical sense of the soul separate or separable from the body. This understanding, which is similar to that of the Gnostics, challenges the validity of corporeal, "biological" life as being pertinent in defining personhood and in defining the locus of the imago Dei. In other words, corporeal, "biological" life is personhood - is human life. Rankin quotes from the exegetical expertise of Hebrew scholar Edmund Jacob:

Nephesh is the usual term for a man's total nature, for what he is and not just what he has. This gives the term priority in the anthropological vocabulary. . . . The classical text in Gen. 2:7 clearly express this when it calls man in his form. It has no existence apart from the body. Hence, the best translation in many instances is person comprised of corporeal reality.

Rankin further supports his view of nephesh by quoting renowned scholar Hans Walter Wolff:

Nephesh stands for needy man per se . . . nephesh therefore does not say what a man has, but who the person is who receives life (hayyin): "Person," "individual," "being." . . . If we survey the wide context . . . we see above all man marked as the individual being who has neither acquired, nor can preserve, life by himself, but who is eager for life, spurred on by vital desire, as the throat (the organ receiving nourishment and for breathing) and the neck (the part of the body which is especially at risk) make clear.

The etymology of nephesh is rooted in the throat and neck, as Wolff points out. This is because nephesh denotes a state of needfulness. Man is always dependent on God. Just as Adam needed God's breath, all of mankind looks to Him as Creator and Sustainer of that life. Reference works such as that by Harris, Archer and Waltke as well as Kittel and Friedrich support of this understanding. In an independent study, Dr. Bruce Waltke voices the same sentiment, recognizing that man "is" soul. In other words, independent exegetical and etymological studies coincide with the thrust of what these men and many others have concluded: "soul" life, this side of eternity, does not exist without "biological" life.

Thieme heavily relies on the initial creation pattern in Genesis 2:7 in an attempt to argue for "biological life." He focuses on several words that illustrate God's creative act. Genesis 2:7 states that God "breathed" [naphach] into his (Adam's) nostrils the breath of life [neshamah hayyah] and man became a living being [nephesh hayyah]. Thieme claims that the verb, naphach, which is translated "breathed into," resulting in neshamah hayyah, the "breath of life," paints a verbal picture of God directly bestowing incorporeal soul life to a human being.

There are two points one must consider. First, why does Thieme say that this

pdf 7

Page 8: Chapter 5

soul-life is "bestowed directly to a human being"? (emphasis added). It makes no sense to call this "object" a human being, according to Thieme's model of "nonhuman" or "subhuman" biological life. Second, the context of Genesis 2:7 is speaking about Adam. This contradiction is quite relevant in Thieme's comments, which are discussed below. Thieme mentions that the neshamah refers to God's breath which gives life. Thieme also states, "note the striking contrast between the tangible flesh, blood and bone of biological life and the intangible essence of soul life." Here is another example of Thieme putting something into the biblical text that is not there. Is he speaking about the flesh, blood, and bone of Adam? Does this imply that Adam was "animated" with "biological" life — heart pumping, blood flowing (like an infant in the womb) - before soul life is imputed? According to Thieme's own teaching, the answer would be an unequivocal "no." Yet, that answer certainly does not coincide with his "flesh and blood" statement. Thieme confuses the issue by stating that God formed and gave life to Adam simultaneously. Yet the logical "creation order," according to Thieme, is first biological life, then soul life, then human life. This "order" clearly does not match the term "simultaneous." Consequently, when Thieme talks about "tangible flesh and blood," it does not seem coherent to say the text is speaking about Adam (using Thieme's model). But Adam is exactly what the context of Genesis 2:7 is all about. Thieme says that until "God exhaled His breath into the first human body which was formed biologically alive, man could not be a living soul" (emphasis added). In other words one has a picture of the first human body (Adam) somehow biologically alive (animated), but not having a soul. This idea is unreasonable, counter-intuitive and not found in the text.

Thieme has attempted to sidestep this problem by stating that Adam and Eve were given biological life and soul life simultaneously. However, Thieme has contradicted this ad hoc concept with his very own teaching. It is clear that his suggestion regarding the simultaneous imputations would work well for Adam, but not for the rest of the human race. Thieme needs to keep his "biological life" concept intact in order to prove there is no life in the womb. Unfortunately, because of this, problems arise. The fact is that the fetus has flesh and blood and heartbeats and brainwaves. The term "biological life" is Thieme's way to "label" the physiological entity in the womb. But to extract a category of life (i.e., biological life) is ad hoc, poor exegesis, and internally inconsistent. His final comments, again focusing on the Hebrew verbs found in Genesis 2:7, leave one in a quandary.

Therefore, the joining soul life, depicted by the verbs barah and asah, with biological life, depicted by the verbs yatsar and banah, formed a third category, human life, nephesh hayyah (Gen. 2:7), in the first man and woman.

It would be more logical to leave the formation of Adam without any kind of life and have God impute neshamah in order to give life, whether biological or otherwise. Dr. Bruce Waltke expresses his misgivings with Thieme's exegesis. With one of the foremost Hebrew scholars in the world questioning Thieme's exegesis, one wonders how people less knowledgeable of biblical Hebrew can sift through his rhetoric. Waltke states,

pdf 8

Page 9: Chapter 5

As seen in the creation of woman the distinction between biological life and soul life is arbitrary. I find the statement "this biological life and soul life were given simultaneously, first to Adam" is confusing. His thesis thus far aimed to show these as diachronic developments, not synchronic . . . the statement "'formed' biologically alive" has not been validated by exegesis.

Thieme takes certain aspects of his paradigm and applies them toward creation after the Fall. But this is not until he has changed several key concepts. Thieme states that because of the Fall, ovulation would be initiated, and biological life would be conceived as a result of copulation.

The idea that ovulation did not occur until the Fall is pure speculation on the part of Thieme. Before the Fall (Gen. 1:28), the Lord gave man the command to be fruitful and multiply. Thieme assumes the process would be totally different after the Fall. He gives no evidence to support this claim. Thieme makes another unsubstantiated proposition when he states that because of sin and the subsequent sin nature after the Fall, biological life and soul life can no longer be given simultaneously.Is this the conclusion one is forced to adopt? Upon looking back at chapters 3 and 4, one may ask, have all alternatives been explored? Has Thieme taught this issue in such a way that one is lead to false alternatives? Is it possible that God uses procreation as a vehicle to create a new, unique, forty-six chromosome human genotype zygote and at the moment the union takes place (sperm and egg), God's neshamah is imputed? Thieme will surely say "no" because of other problems that arise. However, this alternative is possible and the other "problems" that Thieme claims exist have biblical solutions as well. One conclusion is certain - the biblical data Thieme has presented clearly does not demand the conclusions he has drawn.

The Breath Argument

A closely related principle that Thieme uses to support his conclusion again involves an ad hoc use of the Hebrew term neshamah. Thieme says that the original breath of life — the moment Adam became a human being — set the pattern for the first dramatic instant of human life for all humanity. A newborn baby draws its first breath when God imparts His divine breath into the infant's nostrils (emphasis added).

First, notice that the phrase "original breath of life" is equated to Adam's first breath. This pattern supposedly follows with the baby's first breath. A question one must ask is, on what exegetical/linguistic/contextual basis does Thieme take what is an obvious figure of speech (God's breath), and so readily equates it to Adam's (and all mankind's) literal breath? The analogy of God's breath with the infant's first breath simply does not hold up. While breathing is certainly a necessity of life, there is no biblical evidence that life starts when the baby draws its first breath. The analogy fails because God's breath, neshamah, is clearly not the same as a baby's breath — particularly his first breath. It is reasonable to understand that the term neshamah may be associated or related to living creatures. But, once again, it would be a non sequitur to say that just because God "breathed" (again, understood figuratively, for God does not breath since He does not have a body and lungs) into Adam, that this figurative breath is the same as the baby's

pdf 9

Page 10: Chapter 5

literal first breath. Adam must be viewed as unique. The fact that Adam had no mother establishes the fact of his uniqueness. Thieme argues that Adam was not conceived; therefore, the "breath" must be equated with the baby's first breath, namely, the moment of birth. This line of reasoning fails in more than one way. Not only was Adam not conceived; neither was he born. If one wants to take the entire analogy literally, he must say that life begins at 40 (or whatever was the apparent age of Adam)! Additionally, there are many medical instances where a newborn is unable to take its first breath. Because of this, he must be put on a respirator, and the machine must breath for him. If a baby fails to take its first breath, is one to assume that it does not have human life? Or how about any human being who has been in an accident that has rendered him unable to breath? Such mishaps are not unusual and these respiratory victims must have their lungs oxygenated by artificial means. According to Thieme's breath = life argument, is the victim no longer a human being? The answer to that question is self-evident.An objective word study on neshamah finds a focus on the concept of life. While Thieme would undoubtedly agree that the spark of life is initiated and sustained by God, the question that Thieme is insistent upon is when this spark takes place. Certainly breathing is related to life, as Thieme has pointed out, but his conclusions clearly do not follow. According to Harris, Archer, and Waltke, the precise translation of neshamah must vary in accordance with its context and usage. There is no contextual evidence that even suggests that neshamah is given with, or equivalent to, the baby's first breath (contrary to Thieme). One would think that if Thieme's concept were true, it would be clearly spelled out in the whole counsel of God. There have been others who have argued in a similar fashion to that of Thieme on this point. Roy Ward understands nephesh from the standpoint of breathing. He states:

If nephesh is the fundamental anthropological term for the living being, the person in Hebrew thought, and nephesh is basically understood as a creature that breathes, then a fetus is not a nephesh, not a living person.

Ward's first premise is incorrect. Nephesh is not the fundamental anthropological word for living being. Harris, Archer, and Waltke have pointed out that leb became the richest biblical term for the totality of man's inner or immaterial nature. The vast majority of uses of leb refer to this immaterial nature in general or to one of the three personality functions of man: emotions, thought, or will. Secondly, Ward, like Thieme, commits the fallacy of deriving meaning from etymology. Nephesh can mean living being, soul, self, person, desire, appetite, emotion, or passion. Beckwith points out that the English word "person," is derived from the Latin "persona," which means to "have a mask." Using Ward's and Thieme's logic, one could argue that if one did not have a mask, they could not be a person. This type of fallacy is recognized and criticized by James Barr.It is interesting to note the comments of theologian Harold O. J. Brown, who states that an analogy between the historically unique Adam and an ordinary birth of a child is unwarranted. Dr. Brown states:

If God took inanimate matter and made a man from it, as Genesis 2:7 seems to be saying, then obviously what He created was not a human being until it was given life. But the fetus is not 'inanimate matter.' It is already alive. And it is already human." Therefore, "to apply Genesis 2:7 to human beings who are carried for

pdf 10

Page 11: Chapter 5

nine months in a mother's womb before birth is clearly ridiculous. This argument is seldom used by people who take Scripture seriously."

Thieme's "Verb" Argument

Turning now to Thieme's more detailed exegetical work, one finds him starting with the explanation of the four Hebrew verbs that depict God's creative handiwork. Thieme's teaching focuses on the word barah when speaking about the creation of soul life. His lectures clearly imply that there is an inherent connection between the term barah and soul life. This is in contrast to the term yatsar, which means "formed," and implies biological life. The context of Genesis 2:7a uses the word yatsar when speaking about "the dust" in the formation of Adam. Therefore, according to Thieme, yatsar is connected to biological life. Accompanying this concept is Thieme's teaching that "dust" is equated to or equal to biological life. These premises are extremely critical in the formulation of Thieme's doctrine on the origin of life.

A closer look is necessary to see whether Thieme's conclusions legitimately can be held in light of his given premise. Remembering the proper inductive framework delineated in chapter 3 will allow one to examine objectively the premises of Thieme's arguments. He claims that barah refers to soul life. Does the definition of this term somehow demand the conclusion of a particular object (namely, soul life)? The premise carries no weight. In logical reasoning, one would argue that there is no strength to the premise. Exegetically, there is no linguistic precedent in giving added, non sequitur meaning to this term. There are numerous times when the verb barah is used and soul life could not be a consideration. Dr. Bruce Waltke mentions the common dictionary definitions of "shape," "create," and "fashion" for the verb barah. He also gives further comments concerning the verb barah that are well accepted by Hebrew scholars:

The root barah has the basic meaning "to create." It differs from yatsar "to fashion" in that the latter primarily refers to the shaping of an object while barah emphasizes the initiation of the object.

Waltke also states:

Barah does not necessarily mean to "create something out of nothing." It is used exclusively of divine creation. In the second section of Isaiah (40-55) barah takes historical power and events as its object, many of which already exist in some form.

Allen P. Ross concurs with this analysis. Nowhere will a person find the idea of soul life

inherent to the verb barah.

What about the verb yatsar? The same problem arises. Thieme implies that

pdf 11

Page 12: Chapter 5

yatsar is inherently connected with the "dust" mentioned in Genesis 2:7 and that dust

equals biological life. The question must arise: just because God formed Adam from the

dust of the earth, does that mean the dust equals or represents biological life? This is a

HUGE jump from premise to conclusion. There must be some supporting or causal

evidence, either contextually or grammatically, in order to make this conclusion valid,

yet there is none.

Dr. Waltke's gives reasonable insight into the verb yatsar:

The basic root means "to form," "to fashion." While the word occurs in synonymous parallelism with barah "create" and asah "make" in a number of passages, its primary emphasis is on the shaping or forming of the object involved.

Once again Waltke avoids adding more meaning to yatsar than the verb deserves.

Hoffmeier also represents experienced Old Testament scholarship as he addresses the

term yatsar in the context of creation of man. He mirrors Waltke's comments and does

not validate Thieme's exegesis. One will not find an inherent or implied meaning of

"biological life" with the verb yatsar advocated in any scholarly reference works. Dr.

Waltke describes Thieme's exegesis on these verbs as arbitrary and against the data.

It is worth noting that Thieme will go to passages such as Jeremiah 1:5 in an

attempt to show the distinction between biological life and soul life. In doing so, Thieme

carries his presupposition into the text, and it is the presupposition that holds up the

interpretation. The problem however, is that the presupposition was never validly

established to begin with. To jump to a distinction between biological life and soul life is

not exegesis, but eisegesis. The best one can confidently induce from the data is the

recognition of the body and soul or the material and immaterial aspect to mankind.

In addition to barah and yatsar, Thieme also comments on the verbs, asah and

banah. He states, "These four Hebrew verbs are used to designate two of the three

categories of life." What is misleading is not the word study of these verbs, but the

premises/conclusions that Thieme declares to be true. These conclusions simply do not

follow a proper word study. Just because a certain verb is used does not mean it

"designates" a certain category of life.

After commenting on Genesis 1:26-27, Thieme offers several conclusions. These

pdf 12

Page 13: Chapter 5

will be examined individually:

(1) "God creates soul life and imputes it to biological life at birth." This is a beginning point for Thieme. Instead of a straight-forward and natural rendering of a text, Thieme reads his own ideas into all texts pertinent to the view of the fetus and its status. Thieme claims that certain Hebrew verbs designate certain categories of life. This assertion is clearly false.(2) "After the Fall of mankind, God provided initially the ovulation process so that biological life begins at conception." This is another example of Thieme's eisegesis. Where does the Bible state there was no ovulation prior to the Fall? This, at best, is an argument from silence and proves nothing about the beginning of human life. Does it logically follow that ovulation demands that human life could not start until birth? The conclusion is without warrant.(3) "Biological life is created mediately, the intermediate agent being husband and wife in copulation." (4) "Human life is created mediately by God." Again, there is the unsubstantiated

premise that biological life can "exist" without soul life. Somehow this life in the womb

is "animated"; yet it is not considered human life. Thieme claims that this animation is

never by the initiation of the fetus, that is, fetus-generated movement, but by reflex

motility, which is dependent upon stimulation by the mother. This claim is both

Scripturally and scientifically incorrect.

Exegetical studies of the verbs barah, yatsar, asah, and banah as well as the noun

neshamah, prove nothing about the time life is given to an individual. Proper systematic

study looks at all biblical passages that concern the status of the fetus. One must also ask

the following questions: Are characteristics inherent to life present? Do any passages

explicitly or implicitly point to the idea there is no life in the womb? How does God

view the status of the fetus? What does He call it? Is there even a suggestion that all that

is present in the womb is some sort of fetal matter that has no identity (that of a human

being) until it is born? These questions will be answered in the remainder of this

dissertation.

The General Use of min, According to Thieme

When dealing with the origin of life, Thieme attempts to educate his audience on

the use of the preposition min and its inherent implications. Before comments are

directed toward specific texts, a few introductory remarks on Thieme's constant and

repetitive emphasis on this Hebrew preposition are in order.

pdf 13

Page 14: Chapter 5

Like the proported "magical" connection between barah and soul life and yatsar

and biological life, mibeten (the preposition min plus beten, meaning out from the womb)

is said to "prove" that life does not begin until outside the womb. According to Thieme,

there is an absolute connection between mibeten and the beginning of life.

This pattern of reasoning is a familiar one as Thieme presents his arguments for

the meaning of mibeten. One is led to believe that those opposing him do not understand

what mibeten means. This misleads one to argue against a false opponent. No one

disputes that mibeten means "from the womb." The problem comes when this true

meaning of mibeten is mixed with Thieme's ad hoc meaning that the term also implies

there is no life in the womb and life does not begin until birth. Thieme clearly says

concerning the term mibeten, "This phrase actually tells us when life begins." Thieme

also mentions that the Greek translation of the Old Testament, the Septuagint (commonly

denoted as LXX), translates passages which contain mibeten as ek koilia or ek gastros.

These Greek verbs can only mean "out from" and, therefore, it is conclusive that life

begins at birth. This conclusion, however, is totally unsubstantiated.

First, it should be clarified that the preposition min (as with the preposition ek )

does not carry the connotation that Thieme demands. While both min and ek mean "out

of" or "away from," even in the ablative case, the source cannot be dismissed. The

prepositions mean "out from" or "away from," but many times they also designate origin.

"Out from within" more accurately denotes their meaning. Dana and Mantey point this

out for the preposition ek (which is used in the Septuagint). Harris, Archer, and Waltke

similarly comment concerning min:

[The preposition means] "from." With verbs of motion of separation: to go from, or to be away from, i.e. without; or away from some other spot or direction . . . with other verbs it means out of . . . . Allied to this is the causal force . . . .(emphasis added).

When it comes to the preposition min, Thieme never emphasizes the concept of

"out from within." Yet this is the preferred meaning by Hebrew scholars. But Thieme's

more misleading tactic is to attach a meaning and conclusion to the preposition that is

simply not inherent to the term. Even Waltke concludes that, "He [Thieme] has invested

the preposition [min] with a questionable meaning to special plead his case . . .." It

pdf 14

Page 15: Chapter 5

appears that the overall context of a biblical passage is many times dismissed by Thieme.

In chapter 3 of this dissertation, there was an important rule on context that bears

repeating:

When the plain sense of Scripture makes common sense, seek no other; therefore, take every word at its primary, ordinary, usual, literal meaning, unless the facts of the immediate context, studied in the light of related passages and axiomatic and fundamental truths, indicate clearly otherwise.

Job's Use of the Preposition min

One of the clearest examples of exegetical and logical gymnastics comes with Thieme's exposition of the Book of Job. Thieme goes beyond sound exegesis when he takes his presupposition concerning life in the womb and eisegetes his meaning of mibeten into various passages of Job. For example, concider the following:

Naked I came from my mother's womb. (Job 1:21a)Come forth from the womb and expire? (Job 3:11b)Carried from womb to tomb (Job 10:19b, italics his).

Thieme asserts that the preposition min is extraordinarily explicit when used with verbs that express or imply separation or removal. Therefore, mibeten means "away from," "separated from," or "removed from" the womb. With this, according to Thieme, is the "proof" that life begins once one is "separated from," "removed from," or "away from" the womb. Thieme's mixing of truth with unsubstantiated presupposition should be quite obvious by now. Yes, mibeten means "from the womb", again, no one disputes that point. But min is also used in the common and repeated phrase, "from the Lord." Does this mean "removed from" or "separated from" the Lord? Of course not. Does mibeten demand that birth is the time when life begins? A close look at the passages that contain this phrase will aid in the analysis.Job 3:11 states, "Why did I not die at birth? Come forth from the womb and expire?" Thieme's translation states, "Why did I not die outside the womb? Go outside the womb and die?" Thieme discusses Job's stressful condition in which he made these statements. According to Thieme, despite this stressful condition, Job recognized that life begins outside the womb. This, claims Thieme, is because of Job's use of mirechem which means "out from the womb." While it has already been established that mibeten or mirechem can mean "out from the womb," it clearly does not follow that it also means there is no life in the womb. As shown earlier, the preposition min generally means "out from within." Dana and Mantey diagram this concept and show that the action of the preposition starts from a source. This should be quite obvious since Job uses the term yatsa, which means "come forth." Job wanted to come forth from the womb dead. Yes, he would be "separated from," "removed from," or "away from" — but dead. The natural reading and context

pdf 15

Page 16: Chapter 5

indicates that Job was alive in the womb and wanted to "come forth" dead. The text does not say that Job was to come forth from the womb, be given life, and then die. He wanted to come forth from the womb and expire. He could not expire if he came forth from within the womb without any life! The burden of proof is clearly on Thieme to show there is an essence change, that is, a life change as the baby emerges from within the womb. Thieme offers no such proof. And contrary to Thieme's dogmatic qualification not to use any personal pronouns for the fetus, Job uses the personal pronoun "I." Even if one is going to argue that this "I" does not come into existence until birth, there are many passages that use nouns or pronouns to refer to the fetus without using the preposition min or ek. For example, Job 3:3 states, "Let the day perish on which I was to be born." This is a passage Thieme would certainly emphasize since it mentions the word "born". Job then said, "and a night which said 'a boy is conceived.'" Not only is conception noted as Job's starting point, but contrary to Thieme's teaching, a boy — that is a human being, not some fetal matter with reflex motility - is conceived.

Job 10:18-19 is another controversial passage. Thieme argues in a familiar fashion as he focuses on the phrase, "Why then hast Thou brought me out of the womb?" Incredible as it may seem, the following is Thieme's interpretation of Job 10:18-19:

In other words, why have you brought me out of the womb? As long as I was in the womb, I was not a human being. Now that I am out of the womb, I am a human being.

This verse is actually saying just the opposite of what Thieme asserts. Job is stating that if he were not born, it would be as though he had not been. He is not saying he would have never existed. If he had died in the womb, he would have to be carried straight to the tomb ("womb to tomb," as the text says). If he died outside the womb, the text would say he would be carried from crib to tomb or nursery to tomb or wherever he was when he died. It would be as though he had not been, because his observable life could not have taken place. This is the same reason why Job states in verse 18 that if he had died in the womb, no eye would see him. If he died outside the womb, there are eyes that would have seen him. The term rendered, "as though" represents phenomenological language that individuals use all the time. For example, "My boss treats me as though I don't exist." This certainly does not mean the person does not exist. As Dr. Francis Beckwith points out, one cannot use "as though" unless one "is." Thieme also comments on Job 10:8-9 and 11-12. In these verses, He claims that Job was correct in verse 12 when he stated, "Thou hast granted me human life," thus attributing human life being bestowed immediately by God. But according to Thieme, Job was incorrect when he says, "Thou hast made me as clay . . .," attributing immediate creation of biological life to God. Thieme offers no exegetical criterion for evaluating Job's statements, whether true or untrue, other than his own presuppositions. In other words, when Job's statements appear to line up with Thieme's model, Job was espousing divine viewpoint. But if Job's statements do not line up with Thieme's model, Job was disillusioned, wallowing in self-pity, bitter, and in an overemotional state that causes a misunderstanding of divine principle. Thieme can easily differentiate between the two - not because of anything in the text itself, but because of his own preconceived notions

pdf 16

Page 17: Chapter 5

about the origin of life. Few, if any, scholars take this approach seriously. John Niemela, professor of Biblical languages at Chafer Theological Seminary, comments:

The most telling argument against Thieme's analysis comes in the analysis of Job 10. Whenever an expositor claims that a human author of Scripture affirms a doctrinal error, I regard such claims as conclusive proof that an expositor is working from an errant perspective. Though it is true Job suffered disorientation, Job 42:7 shows that this disorientation was limited to the things that Elihu and God corrected. Thus, unless the end of Job corrects an assertion from an earlier portion of the book, the earlier statement stands. This approach affirms the inerrancy of what the book of Job asserts. The book affirms all that Job said that was not corrected. It affirms all of the corrections of Job. We are not free to pick and choose.

David's and Isaiah's Use of min

Thieme's confused line of reasoning and exegesis continues as he focuses on David's and Isaiah's usage of the preposition min. Since Thieme thinks that Psalm 22:9-10 supports the idea that Christ was not a human being until His birth, comments regarding that issue will be reserved for chapter seven, where there is a discussion on the inception of the hypostatic union. Of importance to the present discussion are Thieme's comments on the phrases, "Upon thee was I cast from birth" (Psalm 22:10), and "The wicked are estranged from the womb . . . go astray from birth" (Psalm 58:3). In addition to the preposition min Thieme says the term rendered "estranged" is a verb of separation. According to Thieme, this once again "proves" there is no life until birth. In other words, Thieme would maintain these passages show that there is no human existence prior to birth. According to this logic, one is to conclude that because David was cast upon God from birth, there is no prenatal human existence. Likewise, in Psalm 58:3, since the wicked went astray from birth, there is no prenatal human existence. Interestingly, Psalm 58:3 is the same structure as Psalm 71:5-6. Psalm 71:6a states, "By You I have been upheld from my birth" (NKJV). But Psalm 71:5b states, "You are my trust from my youth" (NKJV). Using Thieme's logic, one is forced to conclude from verse 5b, that there is no pre-adolescent existence. Beckwith points out that Psalm 58:3 hardly proves that these men had no prenatal human existence. It can be argued reasonably that if life began at birth, the passage would say the wicked were always astray. It is likely that an author would use the word since when an entity acquires a certain attribute — such as going "astray" - but not denying that this entity existed before acquiring that particular attribute.As an illustration, one can say that he started stealing cars since 1990. It is implied that the same person existed, but did not steal cars prior to that time. Common sense tells us that an individual cannot do much in the womb. Even if he were able to do something (such as go astray, have emotion, and so on), no one would know much about it. This is because the unborn are "hidden" from the outside world. Birth is mentioned because the individual is now in the observable, outside world. Even then, a one day old child is not going to display the characteristics that will be common as he or she gets older. No one

pdf 17

Page 18: Chapter 5

will argue that a one day old child is not a person. This common sense response to Thieme's misguided logic would also apply toward comments that he has made regarding the inability of a fetus to be "evangelized" or express "volition" while in the womb. This is said by Thieme to offer proof of the non-human status of the fetus. But a nine month old fetus is going to respond about as much as a one day old child toward the Gospel. Thieme's arguments continue to beg the question. One needs to examine all of Scripture to determine God's view of the status of the fetus.Thieme repeats the same series of distorted messages as he considers Isaiah's usage of min. Isaiah contains several passages that have the word mibeten. Some of these passages use the word yatsar ("to form"), along with mibeten. According to Thieme, since biological life is now formed mediately (because of the Fall), yatsar no longer refers to God's immediate creation of biological life. Subsequently, when yatsar and mibeten are used together, they describe the creation of human life by God after the fetus is removed from the womb. Thieme points to, and comments on, the following passages:

Thus says the Lord who made you and formed [yatsar, created] you [your human life] from [after leaving] the womb [mibeten], who will help you . . . (Is. 44:2).

Thus says the Lord your Redeemer, and the one who formed [yatsar, created] you [human life] from [after leaving] the womb [mibeten] . . . (Is. 44:24).

Thieme concludes that the temporal use of mibeten marks the point of physical birth. The temporal use of min in passages such as those noted above can be translated "since" or "after." Consequently, Isaiah depicts birth after (emphasis his) separation from the womb as the genesis of human life. Thieme also comments on Isaiah 49:1:

He made me separated from the womb of my mother — the word for mother is imi (and) indicates there is mother dependence and that means there is no human life in the womb.

Two points need to be made. First, Thieme equates the words "after" and "since" in defining min. But these words do not mean the same thing. Thieme uses the definition of "after" when "since" may be the more accurate definition. One can say "since" 1990 and mean from 1990 onward. "After" 1990 would mean after 1990. Second, as stated earlier, Thieme never conveys the meaning of min to include the idea of source or origin, for this would destroy his thesis. Dr. Bruce Waltke makes this point when specifically commenting on Thieme's use of mibeten as well as his demand that certain passages be taken temporally (and therefore indicate that life does not start until birth):

"from the womb" probably describes the place where a . . . person originated (see our grammar, Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, pg. 21, entry 11.2.11a). Even its ablative sense still underlies the designation of origin. It could have a temporal sense (in Isaiah's usage), but I doubt it. Normally one interprets potentially ambiguous passages with non-

pdf 18

Page 19: Chapter 5

ambiguous ones. [The] NIV even translated (Isaiah 44:2) "in the womb" probably to avoid this very mistake.

Thieme's ad hoc additions to the normal use and definition of min are highly irregular. Waltke shows the proper approach. He interprets, for example, the passages in Isaiah 44 by what is clear; Jeremiah 1:5 - before I formed you in the womb. Waltke additionally mentions that Thieme's comment regarding Brown, Driver, and Briggs' temporal use of mibeten is deceptive. It appears as though Thieme is offering support for his "life begins at birth" position from this reference when such is not the case. Waltke declares:

[This] is deceptive; this in fact is BDB's fourth option (entry #4, pg. 581). BDB on page 427 [sic] yts.r entry 2a cites Isaiah 44:2, 24 in connection with Genesis 2:7 forming Adam out of dust and Jeremiah in the womb (Jer. 1:15). . .he tries unsuccessfully to do away with this damaging evidence. [He is] unsuccessful because he seems to miss the point, "formed in the womb."

Isaiah 44 is especially interesting, since the chapter contains both the preposition min plus the verb yatsar. Thieme needs to break with one of his own "verb meaning connections" that he originally attempted to establish in Genesis. Thieme failed to argue effectively that there is an inherent connection between barah and soul life and yatsar and biological life. Thieme asserts that biological life in the womb is mother dependent, never God dependent. But because Isaiah 44:2 says, "the Lord made you and formed you from the womb," Thieme makes some interesting (and totally ad hoc) adjustments. He states that because of the Fall, yatsar no longer refers to the immediate creation of biological life, but when yatsar is used with mibeten it describes the immediate creation of human life (soul life added to mother dependent, biological life). This assertion actually contradicts Thieme's earlier teaching that the reason barah is used in Genesis 1 and 2 is because the soul is created "out of nothing." Yatsar is used with dust since the creation uses existing material. If this is true, even when understanding the Fall as Thieme understands it, why would the Holy Spirit now use the word yatsar to speak about soul life? According to Thieme's original model, barah should be used, since the soul is created out of nothing. Isaiah 44:2 describes God "making" and "forming" Isaiah. Yet, because of mibeten, Thieme claims this has nothing to do with what is in the womb. His interpretation is completely ad hoc and misses the point of the natural reading of the verse. Isaiah 44:24 and 47:5 are dealt with in the same manner by Thieme, and, again, the argument fails for the same reasons.

Use of the Preposition be

Another example of how inconsistent Thieme's teaching is involves his comments on the term bebeten. Psalm 139:13-14 states:

For Thou didst form my inward parts; Thou didst weave me in my mother's womb. I will give thanks to Thee for I am fearfully and wonderfully made; wonderful are Thy works and my soul knows it very

pdf 19

Page 20: Chapter 5

well.

Thieme has "flip-flopped" on the interpretation of this verse several times. Both interpretations will be discussed to show the ad hoc nature of his argument. In his 1985 Ephesians series, Thieme states that the correct translation of Psalm 139:13a is, "'You created my inner most being.' This is not a reference to the 'forming of parts' which is biological life, but that of soul life."

Thieme's 1991 series on "Israel in Conflict" also argues for verse 13 referring to soul life. He expands upon the Hebrew word kiljah, translated "inward parts," as meaning "kidneys," which is also known as the emotional seat of the soul. The term is, therefore, translated "soul." Thieme claims the second half of verse 13 switches subjects. The initial subject of "soul life" now jumps to "biological life," as David mentions God "weaving" or "knitting" him in his mother's womb. This is clearly ad hoc, for Thieme ignores the synonymous Hebrew parallelism occurring in this verse. There is no exegetical explanation for the "jump" from biological life to soul life, except for Thieme to stay within his paradigm. This particular interpretation by Thieme is completely at odds with his book (which was probably written about the same time as his 1991 lecture). In it, he states that bebeten appears to proclaim the womb as the weaving or nurturing place for human life. Bebeten means "in the womb." Thieme asserts that David is clearly expressing his gratitude to his Creator for forming his "inward parts." Thieme specifically defines "inward parts" as the physical or internal organs. He, therefore, concludes that "inward parts" indicate biological life in this passage. Thieme contradicts his earlier teaching on this passage when he finally points out that David is undoubtedly portraying construction inside the womb, not outside the womb. While Thieme's later interpretation clearly fits the context and plain sense of Psalm 139:13-14, several questions need to be asked. In light of this passage and this interpretation, how can he maintain that the fetus is totally mother dependent and never God dependent? Even though Thieme has argued that similar passages are speaking about God's mediate creation of biological life, there is nothing mediate alluded to in this passage. Even if this mediate premise is granted, David is clearly and definitively dependent upon God forming and weaving his unborn frame. Thus, Thieme's doctrine of mother dependency receives a fatal blow. This is but one of several passages that Thieme, or anyone adhering to his teaching, cannot effectively reconcile without acknowledging the fetus's dependence on God. There is no question that the fetus is dependent upon the mother, but there is also dependence upon God.Another disturbing inconsistency is when Thieme states that a misguided expositor of verse 13 might assert that God is personally concerned for the fetus before birth and conclude there is human life in the womb. This, claims Thieme, would deny the understanding of physical birth as the starting point of human life. His statement is absolutely incredible. Not only is it circular (for it begs the question), but even if one was "wrong" about the beginning of human life, the underlying principle and main point of the passage would be God's concern for the fetus before birth! Thieme is so busy upholding his theological "box" that he misses the spirit of the passage! He states that this passage clearly expresses exalted respect for biological life in the womb, but, as this dissertation later shows, this comment flies in the face of his comments on abortion.

pdf 20

Page 21: Chapter 5

Jeremiah 1:5 is a significant passage dealing with an individual "in the womb." Jeremiah stated, "Before I formed you in the womb I knew you, and before you were born I consecrated you; I have appointed you a prophet to the nations." Thieme claims that this is another passage that is related to God's omniscience and divine decrees. It appears as though Thieme is less forceful in this passage in his application of soul life being given outside the womb (this is not to suggest he is not of that conviction). But upon looking at his translation and interpretation, it is obvious why he is less forceful. The verb, yatsar - which he argued so diligently in Genesis 1 and 2 to refer to biological life, then switched in Isaiah 44:2 and 24 to mean soul life (human life) - is now back to biological life. So the examples given by Thieme look like this:

Isaiah 44:2 "the Lord who made you and formed [yatsar] from the womb" — reference to soul life.

Isaiah 49:5 "the Lord who formed [yatsar] me from the womb" — reference to soul life.

Jeremiah 1:5 "Before I formed [yatsar] you in the womb" — reference to biological life.

Even though Thieme does not directly say so in his book, it appears that the only possible pattern for this switch in emphasis is that yatsar is followed by mibeten (from the womb) in Isaiah, and yatsar is followed by bebeten (in the womb) in Jeremiah. There is absolutely no exegetical basis for these ad hoc patterns. It appears there is once again a magical formula. Supposedly, Yatsar + mibeten = soul life. Yatsar + bebeten = biological life. Yatsar by itself in Genesis 1 and 2 was a reference to biological life.

Just when one thinks he has a handle on Thieme's exegetical potpourri, one comes across Isaiah 43:7. In this passage, God exclaims, "Everyone who is called by My name and whom I have created [barah] for My glory, whom I have formed [yatsar], even whom I have made [asah]." The context clearly shows that God is directly involved with the formation and fashioning of one's body as well as the creation of one's soul. Thieme would undoubtedly take this passage and say that yatsar and asah refer to mediate creation, even though he would have no legitimate exegetical criterion for making that distinction.Job 31:15 is a passage that Thieme fails to deal with in his 1985 Ephesians series or his 1992 book, but contains the term bebeten. This passage states, "Did not He who made [asah] me in the womb make him, and the same one fashion us in the womb?" The text appears straightforward. Thieme could respond to this observation in one of two ways. The first would be to say that Job, in his "disillusioned state," claimed that while in the womb [bebeten], he was dependent on God for making [asah] and fashioning [kun] him. Since, according to Thieme, the fetus in the womb is mother dependent only, Job was not speaking from divine viewpoint. This line of reasoning would be similar to Thieme's comments on Job 10:8-9, 11-12. In verses 8 and 9, Job said that God has "fashioned and made me" and that God has "made me as clay." Thieme asserts that Job falsely equated biological life with human life. In verses 11 and 12, Job stated that, "has not God knit me together with bones and sinews?" Additionally, God has granted Job "life and lovingkindness." According to Thieme, Job correctly identifies his human life as being immediately bestowed by God, but

pdf 21

Page 22: Chapter 5

incorrectly asserts that biological life is an immediate creation of God. By now it is quite obvious that the only way one could come to these conclusions, in the same text, is by a preformulated theological grid that forces an interpretation according to that grid.The second argument that Thieme might advance is that Job was speaking about the mediate creation of biological life. This is probably Thieme's preferred interpretation, one that a disciple of Thieme's concludes, "This verse clearly talks about the knitting of biological life in the womb, but leaves the subject of the soul alone." There is absolutely no way one could, prima facie, walk into this text and see this so called mother dependent "biological life" versus God dependent "soul life." In Job 10:8-9 and 10-11, as with others, Thieme asserts there is only the mention of biological life, yet the pronoun rendered "me" is used. How could Job or David or anyone speak about God forming "me," when that "me" is not "me"? According to Thieme, it is a non-God dependent "it"! What can one say to such an exposition? It is not as though a student can go, for example, to a Hebrew or Greek reference work and find that yatsar + bebeten (or ek + kolia) does not equal biological life or that mibeten has an additional meaning of no life in the womb. When the totality of Thieme's teaching on this issue is examined, one simply prays that others will have enough common sense and exegetical objectivity to see how unsupported it is. Dr. Bruce Waltke comments on this type of exegesis and exposition as it specifically relates to Thieme. He maintains that the distinction between biological life and soul life is completely "arbitrary" and the examples and support given by Thieme "are not validated by the exegesis." Hebrew scholar and Ariel Ministries President Dr. Arnold G. Fruchtenbaum states:

[these meanings] would never be verified by any Hebrew lexicon. This is a very good example of where he [Thieme] imposes a meaning on a Hebrew word and it is not a Hebrew word [that the meaning] is derived from. This is typical of Thieme's handling of the Hebrew text . . . he will put [the words] on the board, but then impose his own meaning on it.

Ad Hoc ArgumentsCircular Reasoning Leads to other Logical Fallacies

At this point, it is beneficial to look at and piece together some patterns that Thieme has displayed. This gives one insight as other passages are examined and evaluated. Thieme argues in a circle in both his book and his lectures. His teaching starts with the non sequitur verb argument. This is based on the meanings he has adopted for certain Hebrew verbs. This then leads to his distinction between biological and soul life. It is this premise that he carries into a text to help give it "meaning." This is why, for example, John the Baptist could not have leaped for joy in his mother's womb, or Jacob and Esau could not have struggled together in the womb, or David was not in a sinful state in the womb. Since there is only biological life in the womb, according to Thieme, any movement or emotion is "reflex motility" that is mother dependent. What any passage could mean, as it relates to the status of the unborn, is

pdf 22

Page 23: Chapter 5

already decided according to this model.Another brief example of Thieme's circular reasoning appears in conjuction with

Job 1:21, which states, "Naked I came from my mother's womb." According to Thieme, since there is only biological life in the womb (presupposed premise), Job had to go "out from," "away from," "removed from" (mibeten) his mother's womb for there to be a beginning to his life. This supposedly shows that there is no life in the womb. This is a very common type of argument used by Thieme. Under careful analysis, it is plain to see that Thieme carries his presupposed premise into the text, and then uses the text to support his premise. This is clearly circular reasoning. As future passages are examined, this technique becomes clear.Despite Thieme's claim of spending hours and hours of study on the subject of whether there is human life in the womb, he presents a relatively small amount of exegesis to arrive at his conclusions. Both his book and his 1989 lectures start with conclusions early on. In his first lecture of the 1989 series he states:

Life beginning at conception to me is a heresy - totally antibiblical, completely wrong. Everyone who says life begins at conception has the biggest theological problem, they don't know it because they are too dumb, too emotional . . . you have beau coup problems which have no resolution apart from adding heresy to heresy and living a life of Christian moral degeneracy.

Beside the obvious logical problems with this ad hominem (poisoning the well) statement, it declares the opposing view false before all of the evidence is given. Thieme is most willing to assert propositions regarding life in the womb (or lack of) with the weakest of support. In addition to coming to a conclusion based upon the initial creation of Adam and the four verbs used in Genesis 1 and 2, Thieme claims that from a single verse — Psalm 100:3 — it "is conclusive that God made us and there is no human life in the womb." Briefly, one can examine the logical structure of Thieme's proposition: If A then B. If God made us, then there is no life in the womb. God made us, therefore, there is no life in the womb. Is this conclusion valid? Only if the initial premise demands that the conclusion will follow. Is this true with this proposition? Does the conclusion necessarily follow? While the structure is sound, anyone can plainly see this proposition is a non sequitur and therefore logically invalid. There is no compelling causal relation. Just because God made us does not prove there is no life in the womb. Is it possible that God could make us in the womb? Of course it is possible and further study helps answer that question.

The Boundaries of Life

Another unprecedented and ad hoc section of Thieme's book is entitled, "The Boundaries of Human Life." In it, Thieme extracts biblical passages that have the word rendered "born" in them. He then concludes that because the term is used, it establishes the beginning of human life. Once again, Thieme will properly state what the passage says, but then goes on to give an ad hoc explanation of what it means. This is done with the presupposition that the term rendered "born" marks the beginning of human life. He

pdf 23

Page 24: Chapter 5

mentions the following passages: Ecclesiastes 3:2 states there is "a time to give birth"; Isaiah 9:6 says, "for a child will be born"; Matthew 11:11 says about John the Baptist, "among those born of women there has not risen anyone greater"; Luke 2:11 states, "in the City of David there has been born for you a Savior." These verses, asserts Thieme, show that physical birth is the beginning of human life.

It is apparent that when employing this logic, one could single out any one word and reason that it represents a beginning point. Arguing from the "conception camp," one can take the term "conceived" and use it exactly the same way. For example, Eve conceived and gave birth to Cain (Gen. 4:1); Abraham went to Hagar and she conceived (Gen. 16:4); all of the genealogies in Genesis 29 said the female conceived; 1 Samuel 1:20 says Hannah conceived; Mary and Elizabeth conceived (Luke 1). One can go on and on with this type of repetition, but two points are in order.

First, if one was going to lean toward a genesis or beginning of life based on a word, it would have to be conception. Not only is that what the word means, but it obviously precedes birth. Hosea 9:11 is unquestionably clear as it encompasses the entire gestation period, "No birth, no pregnancy, no conception." The beginning point is conception. But not wanting to commit the same fallacy as Thieme, one must admit that the word tells us nothing about life in the womb. One can agree that the passages that Thieme uses to support this argument speak about being born, but to jump to the conclusion there is no life in the womb is undoubtedly a non sequitur.While the final passage discussed in this section is not found in Thieme's "boundaries of life," it is fitting to mention the passage at this time. Thieme turns to Ecclesiastes 12:7 which reads, "then the dust will return to the earth as it was, and the spirit will return to God who gave it." About this, Thieme claims, "at physical death, soul life and biological life (sic) are again separate." Thieme actually uses his term "biological life" to describe a dead body. While he has stated that biological life terminates at death, one is confused when Thieme says that biological life returns to the earth. One can conjecture that he would respond by saying that the dead body cannot move because it is not mother dependent. But the fact that he clearly implies the equation between a fetus and a dead body is nothing more than remarkable, and he calls the dead body "biological life!" This confusion certainly discredits his arguments within the scholarly community.

Rejoicing = the Beginning of Human Life

A similar misguided principle is espoused by Thieme when he argues that the angels rejoiced at Christ's birth, not at His conception. Because there was rejoicing at His birth, that supposedly must be when human life was given to Christ. Thieme declares the concept of rejoicing at birth, establishes birth, not conception, as the opening moment of human life. Once again, his unfounded presupposition is forced onto the text. The following question must now be asked. Does the fact that the angels rejoiced at Christ's birth say anything about life in the womb? Clearly, it does not. Thus, Thieme's conclusion is invalid. The phenomenological use of both Greek and English shows the birth process as the entrance of an individual into the observable world. Hence, just because the terms "born" or "birth" are used, it is unwarranted to jump to the conclusion that there is no life in the womb. These terms simply are describing what is being observed, and they technically say nothing about the time when God grants life.

pdf 24

Page 25: Chapter 5

It equally can be argued that there were plenty of individuals who rejoiced at Christ's conception, including Elizabeth and Mary (Luke 1:39-55). This was not a rejoicing simply because these two were miraculously pregnant. Elizabeth knew that Christ was inMary's womb. In Luke 1:43, Elizabeth called Mary the mother of "my Lord." This verse is in the aorist tense, indicating that the event of the incarnation had happened: Christ was already established in the womb and was present. If this was not the case, Elizabeth would not use the word "mother" in Mary's first month of pregnancy. The point is that even Mary, the mother of our Lord, rejoiced at Christ's conception (Luke 2:47). Utilizing Thieme's logic, one can argue that life begins at conception since individuals rejoiced at the conception of Christ. But this is a post hoc conclusion. At a minimum, this counterpoint clearly negates Thieme's argument and moreover should give an indication that there is something, rather than nothing (in terms of human life), in the womb.

A Dormant Old Sin Nature?

Thieme uses Psalm 51:5 and Psalm 58:3 to argue for yet another novel concept - the sin nature becoming active at birth. It is necessary to return to Psalm 51:5 and address comments by Thieme which pertain to this concept. Thieme omits this passage in his book, but briefly mentions it in his 1985 Ephesians series. The passage reads, "Behold I was brought forth in iniquity, and in sin my mother conceived me." Thieme's comments on this verse continue to reflect his pattern of interpretation.

In the latter half of the verse, according to Thieme, "sin" refers to the old sin nature. He says that, "Just as the womb of the woman was dormant before the Fall (no ovulation), so the sin nature is dormant until birth and the imputation of Adam's original sin." Thieme's reason for this statement is most interesting. Genesis 3:16 tells us that Eve was deceived in the garden. First Timothy 2:14 also speaks about this deception. Because of this, according to Thieme, Eve started to ovulate after the Fall. Thieme therefore reasons that Eve did not ovulate before the Fall and her womb was dormant.

When first hearing Thieme's argument, one might think that he has missed something. But Thieme does not expand or elaborate on his comments. He has failed to develop any causal relationship or strength to his argument. It is clear there is an incredible leap from premise to conclusion. Its logical structure would look like this:

1. Eve was deceived and sinned

\ 2. Eve began to ovulate

Now:

3. Because she began to ovulate

+

4. her womb was dormant before she was deceived

\ 5. the old sin nature is dormant in the womb

pdf 25

Page 26: Chapter 5

To describe such "scholarship" is difficult. At the very least, it is Ad hoc eisegesis. The Scriptures say nothing about when ovulation commenced, or whether there was ever a time when woman did not ovulate. Before the Fall, God gave the order to be fruitful and multiply. It would be strong and unsupported speculation that the process was different before the Fall. It even may be argued that there is an implication that the ovulation process was similar before the Fall and that the birth process involved some degree of pain, since God said, "I will greatly multiply your pain in childbirth." The implication is that there would have been some pain in order to multiply it. The Hebrew word translated "childbirth" is herayon, which literally encompasses conception and pregnancy. The implication of pain can be coupled with the fact that the literal meaning of herayon implies a process. This may lead one to the possibility that the reproductive process before and after the Fall was similar. But Thieme's position offers no valid biblical evidence. Since the Scriptures have little to say on this, one should not speculate to the degree that Thieme does, and then dogmatically assert that speculation as fact.

Additional Old Testament Passages

Several additional passages are addressed that have been commented on by Thieme's disciples, but have not been addressed in Thieme's book. This is not to say that these disciples are speaking for Thieme. But they may be extracting principles and exposition from his teaching on these passages during the teaching of other doctrinal series. Only a few passages are examined, since the conclusions rendered by Thieme disciples are nearly identical to that of Thieme.

Mark Perkins lists Isaiah 42:5 under the heading, "There is no soul in the womb." The text itself says:

Thus says God the Lord, who was creating the heavens and stretching them out, who was spreading out the earth and its offspring, who continuously gives breath to the people on it, and spirit to those who are walking on it.

Perkins notes that the verbs that describe action are active participles. This shows continuous action, namely - an act in progress - not one that occurs in a moment of time. Perkins argues that God sustains our soul life, even while in the human body. God uses neshamah and ruach as synonyms for soul life. The context determines the time at which the participial action occurs. For the sustenance of living souls, it is the present time. Therefore, God is the Creator and Sustainer of soul life.

One question should preclude any in depth examination of Perkins' exposition: How does it prove or support the proposition, "There is no soul in the womb"? Quite simply and clearly, it does not. Perkins has substituted the issue of life in the womb for the issue of God being the Creator and Sustainer of life. Perkins uses the logical fallacy of diversion just as his mentor did.

Job 3:16 states, "Or like a miscarriage which is hidden, I would not exist, as

pdf 26

Page 27: Chapter 5

infants that never saw light." Perkins notes that Job was again wishing he had never been born, namely, that he had died immediately upon being born. Perkins notes that birth took place before death. He also states that the Hebrew word for miscarriage is used and this concentrates on the fetus that is ejected from the womb. Additionally, the fetus is biologically dead before it comes out.

Perkins translates the word rendered "infants" as "abortions," and then mentions that it is the same word in Hosea 13:16 and 2 Kings 8:12. His conclusion argues for a premature failing of the fetus. Because of this, Perkins claims Job clearly said that had this fetus been a miscarriage, he would have never come into being. From this, Perkins summarizes that when Job said he was born, he admitted existence; when he mentioned miscarriage, he was referring to non-existence. In response, note that it cannot be established that Job was born first, then died. On the contrary, everything in the context points to the existence of Job inside the womb (the pronoun "me" is used in Job 10:18, among others). Also consider Perkins' comment that the fetus is biologically dead before it came out. The following question must be asked: What in the text gives any suggestion that there is a difference between the life that had to (or wanted to) be killed in the womb (before it came out), and that which wanted to die (according to Thieme and Perkins) after it was born? Absolutely nothing. This is not only a case of forcing one's theological predisposition onto the text, but also of failing to see a distinction between dualism and biological life and soul life. Just because dualism would recognize that human life has a material and immaterial part does not mean there is a separate "biological life only" in the womb. The arguments being made by Perkins are an attempt to take phenomenological language and make it technical and esoteric - much more so than the original language would allow. Another example of faulty exposition as it relates to Job 3:16 is Perkins translating olal as "abortions." The Hebrew noun usually translated "infant," "child," or "little ones." Perkins mentions Hosea 13:16 and 2 Kings 8:12 to justify his rendering, but he fails to mention that olal is translated (in both cases) "little ones." Harris, Archer, and Waltke state that the context must determine the nuance of meaning of this word. They say that this word speaks of relationships. It is used to indicate the exercise of power over another person, generally in a bad sense. It is also used to depict the exploitation of one person by another person. This is clearly the case in Hosea and 2 Kings. Perkins' comments makes no logical sense. Of course, Job admits his existence! And yes, he was born. As he narrated his suffering, he was existing! His miscarriage would not say "he never existed." Rather, it would say he would not exist during this time of suffering. If a miscarriage would make Job non-existent in the womb, then why was Job (and David, Luke, and so on) referring to himself (obviously an existing being) in the womb? In other words, it is impossible to kill something, and then say that something never existed. The biological life argument presented by Perkins does not stand up. It fails in strength and causal relationship. Not only is that fetus "something" and "existent," it is called an infant (Job 3:16), given a gender (boy — 3:3) and given a personal referent (me, I — 3:16; 31:15).Job 3:16 is similar to Ecclesiastes 6:3-5. In this passage, Solomon anguished over the futility of life. Using the third person, he described a man unhappy with life. In Solomon's opinion, it would have been better if he had died before being born, or, "Better miscarriage than he." According to Solomon, this unhappy life, like a miscarriage, comes in futility and goes into obscurity. Even its name is covered by obscurity.

pdf 27

Page 28: Chapter 5

Perkins makes some interesting observations when commenting on Ecclesiastes 6:3-5. He recognizes that the word rendered "futility" is hebel. It describes a miscarriage's beginning as "empty." He also mentions that the word is often used to denote an idol. He then implies the connection between an idol which has physical likeness in stone or wood but is lifeless, to that of the miscarriage. He also mentions the that hebel is used to describe life without God. Perkins then argues that the word for rendered "obscurity", choshek, means "darkness"; therefore, the final destination of the fetus is darkness. He claims that the rendering "covered" or "hidden in obscurity" is figurative, since the miscarriage is not in a hidden state, but a state of nothingness. It also will never see the sun.

Perkins asserts that the sun in Ecclesiastes is used as a measure of life; in other words, as long as you are under the sun, you are alive. The term rendered "sun" portrays the realm of human behavior and experience. Not seeing the sun means never getting to live life at all. According to Perkins, the miscarriage never knows anything. The word yada is used and denotes an experiential or applicational sense of knowing. Perkins further explains that if there was a soul in the fetus, it would have known its mother; it would have known its womb. It would experience light and sound; yet Ecclesiastes 6:3-5 says it does not know anything. In response, note that while the term hebel sometimes refers to idols (not often as Perkins asserts; namely, 7 out of 70 times in the Old Testament), it clearly does not mean that in this context. Even the implied connection that Perkins makes is weak at best. Harris says of hebel that it is again the context that helps give the word its meaning. This term is used by Solomon as he realized one's inability to find fulfillment in work — be it his failure to be creative or to be in control over possessions. Harris also notes that rather than Solomon's observations being final conclusions on life, perhaps they reveal something about his premise and conceded premise. He may be attempting to demonstrate man's inability to find meaning in life apart from divine revelation and interpretation. This will always end in futility. Futility certainly does not demand that there is no life in the womb. Ecclesiastes 6:3-5 simply points out that effort can be made, but that effort may be useless or meaningless. Man can do all kinds of things, yet his life may be meaningless. If life is not lived with the acknowledgment of God's existence and the need for subsequent divine purpose and motivation, it is useless or futile. In this passage, all the "life that was lived" was as though it was never lived, because it had no meaning or purpose. This is the point of the miscarriage being futile. In the observable, functional world, it would not be allowed to live or to function. The clearer and more natural implication would be that there is life in the womb. If a miscarriage took place, this "life" would not be able to be "lived." If the miscarriage was "nothing" or had no existence it could not be compared to a futile life. It would have to be compared to something nonexistent. This is why Perkins interpretation makes no sense. The better analogy is a life that could not live, versus a life that did live, but did not have any meaning. Perkins' comments on obscurity (which he translates as "darkness") are also nonsensical. Darkness could not be the "final destination" for a miscarried fetus. And because Perkins, like Thieme, is trying to place esoteric meaning to phenomenological language, problems follow. Darkness is not nothing; rather it is something; it is darkness. If a miscarriage means there would be no existence, how could it go somewhere (i.e.,

pdf 28

Page 29: Chapter 5

darkness)? Perkins seems to recognize this in his commentary; yet he apparently feels comfortable with the untenable statements of a miscarriage being nothing and darkness being nothing. But you cannot say that something is nothing. On the other hand, if something ceased to exist, that does not mean it never existed or was "nothing" prior to ceasing to exist. Perkins' concept thus is incoherent. Ecclesiastes 6:4 says that a miscarriage's name is covered (or hidden) in obscurity. Perkins attempts to argue that the hidden state is actually a state of nothingness. This would have to be true if the fetus was nothing. But is that what the text says? First, the verse mentions the phrase "its name." How could a biological, non-personal "it" have a name? And how could nothing be hidden? The text needs to be taken at face value, recognizing the context and disposition from which Solomon was writing. Like the futile life that would be void or hidden from meaning, so would a miscarriage. Just because it was futile does not mean there was no life. As a matter of fact, in order for it to be futile, it presupposes life! Meaningless life is not the same as life not lived at all. Meaningless life is like life not lived at all. But the true comparison of the futile life should not be to "nothing," but to a life that would not partake in the ordinary everyday experiences that makes life, as we observe it, life. Perkins also comments that a fetus would "know" things if it had a soul. The word yada denotes knowledge obtained by experience. Perkins stretches this definition to include time in the womb as experience. One may ask what kind of experiential knowledge would a fetus have in the womb? For the sake of argument, given the premise that there is life in the womb, does Perkins think Solomon would be arguing for experiential knowledge in the womb? This is similiar to saying that a one-day-old child "knows" things. One cannot argue that a one-day-old child "knows" more than a nine-month-old fetus. The obvious intent of Solomon's statement is that a miscarriage would not be allowed into the outside world to experience the things that one normally experiences. There is nothing in this passage, however that supports the idea that there is no life in the womb.One last comment directed toward Perkins regards the term "barren." Perkins argues that the biblical definition of "barren" is an inability to bear children. He claims that while the inability to conceive results in barrenness, the definition includes women who can conceive, but cannot bring the child to term. This, according to Perkins, along with the fact that up to 60 percent of conceptions result in miscarriages, strongly indicate there is no life in the womb. This is another non sequitur conclusion based on an unproven premise and lack of evidence. Perkins claims the definition of barren includes those who can conceive, yet cannot bring a child to term. However, he offers no biblical justification for such a statement. Obviously, if one cannot conceive, she cannot bear children. Various passages point to a barren womb producing no children (Isa. 54:1; Gen. 11:30). And there are other passages that point to a barren womb not being able to conceive (Ruth 4:13; Luke 1:36). But there is no example of a woman, having the ability to conceive, being called barren. In light of the passages mentioned above, one cannot conclude that God would not define "barrenness" as the inability to conceive any more than He would define it to mean the inability to produce children. The later presupposes the former.Neither Hebrew nor Greek scholars say that "barren" can refer to a woman who has the ability to conceive. For example, Harris, Archer and Waltke simply mention the Hebrew word aqar as "hard, barren" with no further comment. Arndt and Gingrich define

pdf 29

Page 30: Chapter 5

"barren" (steira) as "incapable of bearing children." Liddell and Scott state that the term refers "to women past childbearing." For Perkins' to say there is no life in the womb is clearly invalid. As far as his comment on the high percentage of conceptions resulting in miscarriages, one question is in order. There are Third World countries with a high percentage of infant deaths at birth. If Ethiopia, for example, had 60 percent of their infants die at birth, would it prove anything about when God imputes life?

The Great Debate - Exodus 21:22-25

The last passage that Thieme addresses in his book is probably the most controversial one. Exodus 21:22-23 is a passage that has been heavily emphasized by Thieme and his disciples for decades. It is interesting to note that Thieme's interpretation of this passage has dramatically changed in recent years. Up until approximately 1989, Thieme held that the Exodus passage showed that killing a fetus demanded a different penalty than killing a human being; therefore, there is no life in the womb. As of 1992 (the printing of his book), he claims that the fetus mentioned in the Exodus passage is not killed and, in fact, not even harmed.

Since Thieme's book reflects the more recent interpretation, it is assumed that this is his current position. But because Thieme has held another view on this passage for so long, and recognizing that many of his disciples still hold to his previous view, both will be examined. Exodus 21:22-23 reads:

And if men struggle with each other and strike a woman with child so that she has a miscarriage, yet there is no further injury, he may surely be fined as the woman's husband may demand of him; and he shall pay as the judges decide. But if there is no further injury, then you shall appoint as a penalty, life for life.

Thieme's earlier interpretation taught that if a mother with child was struck so that the fetus was killed and miscarried, only a fine would be assessed. According to Thieme, if the fetus were a human being, then the penalty should be life for life. But this penalty was not assessed. Only a fine was levied; consequently, this passage "proves" there is no life in the womb. The "miscarriage" interpretation is common. While some conservative scholars have argued for the fetus being miscarried, personal research has been unable to find any conservative scholar that claims this passage proves that the fetus is not human. However, many liberal and pro-abortion theologians embrace this view and Thieme's conclusion. These individuals include Graham Spurgeon, Lloyd Kalland and Delores Dunnett. But no matter who holds this view, an objective analysis is necessary.Thieme's earlier interpretation, prima facie, fails in several ways. First of all, to say that this passage proves there is no life in the womb because a lesser value is placed on it, is a false conclusion. Even if this interpretation were correct, it still recognizes that the fetus has some value (namely, monetary). Thieme's position also fails to recognize that the incident certainly may be considered accidental. It can be argued cogently that while the two men fighting sought to do bodily harm to each other, they did not intend to harm the mother or her child. In most societies (such as ours), manslaughter does not carry the same penalty as premeditated murder. One is accidental, while the other is intentional.

pdf 30

Page 31: Chapter 5

Some acts are acts of negligence, while others are premeditated. Some accidental acts were given allowances so that the death penalty would not be invoked. One fact that is clear from verse 22 is that there was a fine imposed. Consequently, there must be value placed on the fetus. Even with this interpretation, it would be a tragic misapplication to say it would be morally justifiable to kill willfully the fetus in the womb.Others have agreed with Thieme that the word yasa means "miscarry" in this passage. These conservative scholars, however, come to very different conclusions than Thieme. Among those scholars are Meredith Kline, Robert Congdon, and Russell Fuller. Fuller points out that the Exodus covenant code is consistent with the culture and society in the ancient Near East. He demonstrates that these codes refute the argument that differences in punishment imply differences in personhood. The Old Testament itself states that if a slave owner beats his slave, without intending to kill or severely injure the slave, yet the slave dies a day or two after the beating, the slave owner was exempt from punishment (Exodus 21:20-21). If the same slave owner beat a fellow Israelite and after a day or two the Israelite died, the slave owner was punished.In addition to this, if a farmer failed to confine an ox known to gore people and that ox killed an Israelite, that farmer may be executed. But if the same ox killed a slave, only a fine would be imposed (Exodus 21:28-32). This indicates there were clear differences between slaves and Israelites, but in legal status only. The ancient Hebrews did not consider a slave as being nonhuman or even less human than the owner. Fuller concludes from this that:

To claim the OT depicts the fetus as nonhuman or less than human merely because of differences in punishments between the mother and the fetus is specious.

He goes on to state:

The argument . . . fails; root and branch, both in the larger Ancient Near Eastern legal context generally and in the Bible specifically. In fact Exodus 21:22 contemplates only an unintentional, negligent assault on a pregnant woman, not an intentional assault on the fetus. Thus to postulate from this passage that abortion on demand is acceptable under Biblical law is irresponsible and unconscionable.

Kline and Congdon voice similar sentiments. While they understand Exodus 21:22 to mean miscarriage, they unquestionably agree that the passage does not teach that the fetus is a nonperson. Kline opens up his definitive work on this passage by stating:

The most significant thing about abortion legislation is that there is none. It was so unthinkable that an Israelite woman should desire an abortion that there was no need to mention this offense in the criminal code.

Hebrew scholar Dr. Arnold Fruchtenbaum voices the identical sentiment. Even ancient Near Eastern pagan societies expressed their abhorrence with abortion. But Kline goes on to say that the law found in the book of the covenant (Exodus 21:22-25) is the

pdf 31

Page 32: Chapter 5

most decisive positive evidence in Scripture that the fetus is to be regarded as a living person. Kline argues that the word for "fine" may carry a more general meaning of punishment in various forms. This punishment could quite likely be death or a "ransom" to be paid in lieu of death. Because of this, even if one understands the passage to be speaking of miscarriage, it would not follow that the penalty for the destruction of the fetus was different in kind or even degree from the penalty for harming the woman. He proceeds to build his case from both an exegetical base and appeal to Ancient Near East codes.Kline makes an additional significant point pertaining to the law of lex talionis. This point has been expounded upon by Congdon, Russell, and Ronald Allen, among others. The lex talionis, or law of retribution, is not always "eye for eye, tooth for tooth, life for life." Kline points out that in Leviticus 24:18 when the talion formula begins "a life for a life," it continues with a list of lesser injuries in verses 19-20. He thinks the assumption that the monetary compensation in verse 18 is a continuation of the talion principal in verses 19 and 20, is warranted. In other words, lex talionis is not always literal. This is quite obvious in Deuteronomy 19:15-21. In these passages, Kline asserts there is no simple, literal equivalence between the terms of the talion penalty clause and all the variety of cases in which false witnesses might figure. The main concept would be a punishment commensurate with the crime. Even with the text at hand, Exodus 21:22-23, a literal application and retaliatory action of the talionis principle would, at minimum, be a strike to the abdomen of the offender. This clearly shows that the idea of the lex talionis formula is not necessarily eye for eye, but provides for equivalent justice.Congdon also gives a plausible defense of the miscarriage position. He recognizes an earlier point that suggests that Old Testament law has placed different values on different lives. The lives of slaves and foreigners were repeatedly given less value than Hebrew citizens. He, too, cites Exodus 21:20 and quotes Ronald Allen who comments,

Since a fine was paid for the life of a slave — certainly a human being — in the same way the paying of a fine for the life of the fetus does not indicate a life that is less than fully human.

Congdon recognizes the three different groups represented in the goring ox circumstances: Hebrew adults, Hebrew children and slaves. While in each case the ox is put to death, the owner is only subject to the possibility of death if a free Hebrew was killed. The slave's life is exchanged for 30 shekels of silver.

This principle is also seen in Leviticus 19:20, where illicit intercourse with a female slave dictates a lesser penalty. Additionally, Congdon refers to Leviticus 27, which assigns monetary values to different individuals: Hebrew males — 50 shekels; Hebrew females — 30 shekels; slaves — 30 shekels; male children one month to five years — five shekels; and female children one month to five years — three shekels. He therefore concludes that the second conditional statement in Exodus 21:23-24 is now easy to understand. If the pregnant woman died, life for life was the penalty. Lesser damage would dictate lesser punishment. Since the valuation of a child was less than a Hebrew adult, a commensurate punishment was given. This observation in no way implies that the fetus is less than human. And it certainly would not give grounds for "therapeutic" abortions. Unfortunately, this is the conclusion

pdf 32

Page 33: Chapter 5

of many under Thieme's teaching. Even if one accepts the miscarriage view, the divine perspective is well articulated by Congdon when he comments that any interpretation of Exodus 21:22-25 must treat the destruction of the unborn child as an unjust and illegal action. He states,

Frame is correct in stating that, 'it is perverse indeed to attempt to justify abortion by reference to a passage that condemns precisely the sort of destruction performed by the abortionist.'

While this interpretation is also common among Christian scholars, it appears from personal study that the majority of scholars see the Exodus passage in a different light. This view understands the term yasa as referring to a live birth. The literal translation of yasa means "to come forth." Consequently, the "woman with child" is struck causing her "children to come forth" (see marginal note in NASB). This is the understanding in the New International Version and the implication in the King James and New King James Versions.

This position is embraced by a significant number of Hebrew scholars, such as, Umberto Cassuto, Gleason Archer, Arnold Fruchtenbaum, Bruce Waltke, and Walter Kaiser. Other supporters include H. Wayne House, Keil and Delitzsch, J.W. Cottrell, J.K. Hoffmeier, and John Calvin.This view recognizes that the word yasa is used for live birth in every other instance in the Old Testament (Gen. 25:25-26; 38:28-30; Job 1:21; 3:11; 10:18; Eccl. 5:15; Jer. 1:5; 20:18) except one (Num. 12:12). It also recognizes that there is another word, a normal word, for miscarriage — shakal. This word always denotes death, yet, it is not found in Exodus 21:22-25. Consequently, the normal lexical definition points to live birth. This is coupled with the use of the word yeled, which means "child." Yeled is used instead of the technical Hebrew word for a miscarried fetus (nepel). Therefore, the passage appears to suggest that the children came forth alive, namely, a premature birth. According to this position, when one reads the phrase, "and if there is no injury. . .," he would understand the injury to refer to the mother or child. Conversely, if there is injury, then the penalty is life for life. This, again, would pertain to mother or child. This view would hold that the injury was intentional, at least to the degree that criminal negligence would demand the death penalty.Both interpretations give reasonable and plausible arguments for the human status of the unborn. The second interpretation (live birth) appears to fit more accurately the contextual flow as well as lines up with the many other Scriptural passages included in this dissertation that show the love, care, and providence the Lord has for the unborn.While two major interpretations of Exodus 21:22-25 have been discussed, Thieme's current position (as delineated in his book) has not been discussed. Since his book is the most recent teaching made public at the time of this writing, the interpretation expressed in its pages will be treated as his current position.This recent interpretation is a far cry from Thieme's earlier teaching, though the resulting application is the same. Thieme now agrees with those who render yasa to mean "come forth." Therefore, he accepts that the passage is speaking about a live birth. But true to Thieme fashion, he uniquely interprets yasa to carry the same idea as mibeten. According to Thieme, verse 22 sees no significant damage to the mother or child; therefore, a fine is imposed, apparently for the inconvenience of a premature birth. But if there is damage to either mother or child, then lex talionis will apply — eye for eye, tooth

pdf 33

Page 34: Chapter 5

for tooth, life for life. Up to this point, Thieme's position coincides with many other conservatives. The next proposition he states is not only unique, but nothing short of incredible. Thieme asserts that lex talionis applies only to a time after birth. No punishment or compensation is pronounced on the offending party for injury to the fetus in the womb or a still born child! In other words, according to Thieme, one could go up to someone's wife, smash her in the stomach, kill the fetus, and receive no consequences whatsoever. He concludes that the law of retaliation was written for living human beings, not mere biological life in the womb. This statement hardly deserves a response. If this passage is merely reiterating the life-for-life principle among "living human beings," why bother with the whole pregnancy scenario? To think that God has so little regard for the fetus, that it can be killed without penalty, is unthinkable. The main idea of the passage is to focus on the potential of injuring a mother with child and the possible injury to the child itself. To say yasa is equivalent to mibeten, in that it speaks of life after birth, is unfounded. This is not just another life for life passage. It specifically deals with a child in the womb. To miss this simple and clear theme is to miss totally the point of the passage.No matter whether one accepts the interpretation that Exodus 21:22-23 is referring to live birth as held by Waltke, Fructenbaum, or Cassuto, or that the passage is referring to miscarriage as held by Kline, Congdon, and Fuller, the view of the fetus is held in high regard - certainly a human being. Each of these interpretations is far more plausible and cogent than Thieme's. Most importantly, these interpretations are consistent with the totality of Scripture displaying God's concern for the unborn. Thieme's interpretation would assuredly cause one to wonder why God has so little regard for the fetus.

pdf 34


Top Related