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CHAPTER 5
THE MIZORAM ACCORD
5.1. INTRODUCTION
The origin of the Mizos, like those of many other tribes in North Eastern
India is shrouded in mystery. It is generally accepted that they appeared as a part
of the great Mongoloid wave of migration from China and later moved out to
India to their present habitat. It is possible that the Mizos came from Shinlung or
Chhinlungsan located on the banks of the river Yalung in China. They first settled
in the Shan State and moved on to Kabaw Valley to Khampat and then to the
Chin Hills in the middle of the 16th century.
The earliest Mizos who migrated to India were known as Kukis, the second
batch of immigrants were called New Kukis. The Lushais were the last of the
Mizo tribes migrate to India. The Mizo history in the 18th and 19th Century is
marked by many instances of tribal raids and retaliatory expeditions of security.
Mizo Hills were formally declared as part of the British-India by a proclamation
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in 1895. North and south hills were united into Lushai Hills district in 1898 with
Aizawl as its headquarters.
But folklore has an interesting tale to offer. The Mizos, goes the legend,
emerged from under a large covering rock known as Chhinlung. Two people of
the Ralte clan, known for their loquaciousness, started talking noisily while
coming out of the region. They made such an uproar that the leg god called
‘Pathian’ threw his hands in the air in disgust, and said “Enough is enough!” He
felt thattoo many people had already been allowed to step out and closed the door
with the rock.
History often varies from legends. But the story of the Mizos getting out
into open from the nether world through a rock opening is now part of the Mizo
fable. Chhinlung however, is taken by some as the Chinese city of Sinlung or
Chinlingsang situated close on the sino-Burmese border. The Mizos have songs
and stories about the glory of the ancient Chhinlung civilization handed down
from one generation to another powerful people. It is hard to tell how far the story
is true. It is nevertheless possible that the Mizos came from Sinlung or
Chinlungsan located on the banks of the river Yalung in China. According to
K.S.Latourette, there were political upheavals in China in 210 B.C. when the
dynastic rule was abolished and the whole empire was brought under one
administrative system. Rebellions broke out and chaos reigned throughout the
Chinese State. That the Mizos left China as part of one of those waves of
migration. Whatever the case may have been, it seems probable that the Mizos
moved from China to Burma and then to India under certain circumstances. They
first settled in the Shan State after having overcome the resistance put up by the
indigenous people. Then they changed settlements several times, moving from
the Shan State to Kabaw Valley to Khampat to Chin Hills in Burma. They finally
began to move across the river Tiau to India in the Middle of the 16th Century.
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The Shans had already been firmly settled in their State when Mizos came
there from Chhinlung around 5th Century. The Shans did not welcome the new
arrivals, but failed to throw the Mizos out. The Mizos had lived happily in the
Shan state for about 300 years before they moved on the Kabaw Valley around
the 8th Century. It was in the Kabaw Valley that Mizos got the opportunity to
have an unhindered interaction with the local Burmese. The two cultures met and
the two tribes influenced each other in the spheres of clothing, customs, music
and sports. According to some, the Mizos learnt the art of cultivation from the
Burmese at Kabaw. Many of their agricultural implements bore the prefix Kawl
which was the name given by the Mizos to the Burmese.
Khampat (now in Myanmar) is known to have been the next Mizo
settlement. The area claimed by the Mizos as their earliest town, was encircled
by an earthen rampart and divided into several parts. The residence of the ruler
stood at the central block called Nan Yar (Palace Site). The construction of the
town indicates that the Mizos had already acquired considerable architecture
skills. They are said to have planted a banyan tree at Nan Yar before they left
Khampat as a sign that the town was made by them.
The Mizos, in the early 14th century, came to settle at Chin Hills on the
Indo-Burmese border. They built villages and called them by their clan names
such as Seipui, Saihmun and Bochung. The hill and difficult terrain of Chin Hills
stood in the way of the building of another central township like Khampat. The
villages were scattered so unsystematically that it was not always possible for the
various Mizo clans to keep in touch with one another. The present Indian state of
Mizoram was called the Lushai Hills and was a district of Assam, before it
became a Union Territory and afterwards a full-fledged state. The Lusei people
were the first Mizo people to have an external exposure and hence the ethnicity
was initially known as the Lushai people. The demand for a distinct political
territory for the people of Lushai Hills resulted in the creation of a separate Union
Territory and afterwards the State of Mizoram (Adhikari 2013).
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5.2. CONCEPT OF MIZO STATEHOOD
The process of the consolidation of the British administration in tribal
dominated area in Assam started in 1919 when Lushai Hills along with some
other hill districts was declared a Backward Tract under government of India Act.
The tribal districts of Assam including Lushai Hills were declared Excluded Area
in 1935. This concept is discussed in greater detail later.
It was during the British regime that a political awakening among the
Mizos in Lushai Hills started taking shape. The first political party, the Mizo
Common People's Union was formed on 9th April 1946. The Party was later
renamed as Mizo Union. As the day of Independence drew nearer, the Constituent
Assembly of India set up an Advisory Committee to deal with matters relating to
the minorities and the tribals. A sub-Committee, under the chairmanship of
Gopinath Bordoloi was formed to advise the Constituent Assembly on the tribal
affairs in the North East. The Mizo Union submitted a resolution of this Sub-
committee demanding inclusion of all Mizo inhabited areas adjacent to Lushai
Hills. However, a new party called the United Mizo Freedom (UMFO) came up
to demand that Lushai Hills join Burma after Independence.
Following the Bordoloi Sub-Committee's suggestion, a certain amount of
autonomy was accepted by the Government and enshrined in the Six Schedule of
the constitution. The Lushai Hills Autonomous District Council came into being
in 1952 which led to the abolition of chieftainship in the Mizo society. The
autonomy however met the aspirations of the Mizos only partially.
Representatives of the District Council and the Mizo Union pleaded with the
States Reorganization Commission (SRC) in 1954 for integrating the Mizo-
dominated areas of Tripura and Manipur with their District Council in Assam.
The tribal leaders in the Northeast were laboriously unhappy with the SRC
Recommendations. They met in Aizawl in 1955 and formed a new political party,
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Eastern India Union (EITU) and raised demand for a separate state comprising of
all the hill districts of Assam. The Mizo Union split and the breakaway faction
joined the EITU. By this time, the UMFO also joined the EITU and the demand
for a separate Hill state by EITU was kept in abeyance.
In Mizoram, hilly topography and shifting cultivation technology
prevented the development of settled societies and concomitant state formation
of the kind seen in Manipur’s valley region. But like Manipur’s hill areas, villages
in Mizoram were autonomous, isolated and constantly at war with one another.
However there did exist, among the ruling Sailo clan, a sense of hierarchy of
chiefs, even if they were independent of each other (Reid, 1942). This, combined
with inter-clan feuds and flows of goods leading to the concentration of wealth in
the Sailo clan of the Lushai sub-tribe, enabled the development of some sort of
supra-local authority (Lehman, 1963). McCall (1949) found that even though
each village remained an autonomous unit and chiefs frequently clashed over
dominance, it was the Sailo chiefs who by the early nineteenth century had gained
control of the area.
The Lushai polity was composed of Hanmchawm, the ‘commoners’,
governed by a chief of the Sailo clan who was aided by his officials. Commoners
could rise to important positions in the chief’s administration, but could never
become chiefs themselves (McCall, 1949). Sailo chiefs were despotic and were
supported totally by tribute from commoners. They owned all land in the village.
Commoners, who were made up of a large number of subsidiary clans and
families, did not have much by way of individual rights. The burden on them was
heavy. Chiefs could order capital punishment; seize food stores and properties of
their villagers; order villagers to provide free labour; and demand payments.
There were, however, limits to their powers over their subjects. The latter could
migrate to another village if the rule of the chief becam difficult to bear. Chiefs
depended on the Zawlbuak, the young men’s barracks, to provide security to the
village from external threats and to enforce rules of discipline within. They also
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promoted Tlawmnghaina, the code of community obligation, which implied a
sense of public service. Chiefs also supported the development of their duhlian
dialect among their subjects (McCall1949, pp.96-98).
The Chin-Lushai Expedition of 1889-90 led to the conquest and
incorporation of the Lushai Hills into British India. This was followed by
administrative changes required by the state to maintain peace and to extract
revenue. By 1898, the whole of the Lushai Hills had been consolidated into a
single Lushai Hill District with its borders clearly marked out. Chiefs were
forbidden from raiding each other. As in other areas, the state sought to ride
piggyback on pre-existing authority structures to penetrate society and acquire
the legitimacy it needed to rule. The strong presence of Sailo chiefs in the hills
provided the colonial state with that opportunity (Reid 1942, p. 27). In doing so
the state upheld the authority of the chiefs (McCall 1949, p. 202). Chiefs were
made responsible for tax collection and for maintaining peace within their
jurisdiction. The guiding principles of the state remained clear: not to interfere in
the internal matters of the people and their chiefs; to uphold the authority of the
chiefs; and to rule through them, while holding them responsible for to provide
effective administration. The attempt was to impose as few (legal) enactments as
possible, and to rely on customary codes and practices (Reid, 1942, p. 56).
However, it is significant that the colonial state in the Lushai Hills worked in a
manner that, while bringing the chiefs on board and upholding their authority,
helped consolidate its own position at the cost of the chiefs’. In this sense the state
behaved in ways very different from how it was behaving around the same time
in Manipur.
First, the state consolidated its hold territorially. While the region was
divided into two districts immediately after conquest, they were later brought
together into a single Lushai Hills district, with a Superintendent based in Aizawl
as the centre of political and administrative authority. Lushai chiefs were an
integral part of the administration, being given the responsibility for governing
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their villages. In 1901 the system was strengthened with the introduction of the
‘circle system’. The district was divided into sixteen circles, each with an
interpreter to act as a liaison between the chiefs and the superintendent. In 1906
the first rules for the administration of the Lushai Hills were introduced
(Government of Assam, 1906). These rules significantly constrained the authority
that chiefs had traditionally enjoyed, removing many powers they had previously
enjoyed, such as ordering capital punishment, confiscating property of their
subjects and taxing traders (Chin Hills Regulation, 1896). Chiefs were brought
under the supervision of the Superintendent of the district, who could regulate
and even punish them. The chiefs’ judicial authority was also curtailed. While
they still sat in judgment over petty cases, appeals against which now rested with
the Superintendent, criminal cases, especially heinous crimes, were removed
from the purview of chiefs altogether. Henceforth chiefs would act only as the
eyes and ears of the Superintendent in matters relating to more serious crimes.
Further, in 1927, all customary laws prevalent in the district were compiled
(Parray, 1927). This provided uniformity in the administration of justice and thus
made the task of the Superintendent’s supervision over the motley tribes easier.
It also consolidated the incorporation of village chiefs into the administrative set
up headed by the Superintendent.
Perhaps the strongest measure of the colonial state that undercut the
authority of the chiefs was the taking away of proprietary rights that chiefs had
traditionally enjoyed over land. Under the 1901 ‘land settlement’ system
introduced in the district, each chief was issued a lease over his domain for life.
Within the assigned territory, chiefs could move about, as they liked, as long as
they paid revenue and observed government orders. While ‘settlement’ stabilize
village boundaries, it implicitly meant that all land belonged to the state. The
independence that the Lushai chiefs had enjoyed so far was abolished and they
were made instruments of the colonial state administration. It also meant that
chiefs could be removed and also be created. The state soon began to issue rights
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over tracts of land to men it considered useful for its purpose (McCall 1948, p.
245).
Independence saw the Lushai Hills being retained as a part of Assam state,
but with special features. Constitution makers created a special administrative
arrangement for the northeast region, particularly its tribal areas, as a measure for
tribal self-rule. These Autonomous District Councils (ADC) were elected bodies
and were empowered with substantive legislative, executive and judicial
authority. First elections to the Lushai Hills District Council (LHDC) were held
in 1948. The Mizo Union, a political party with anti-chief sentiments, won a
majority of votes. One of the first measures that the MU-dominated Lushai ADC
took was to pass the Lushai Hills (Abolition of Chief-ship) Regulation, in 1952,
claiming that the “institution of chief-ship with its unlimited autocratic
possibilities is a misfit with democracy and as standing in the way of the well-
being of the district” (LHDC, 1953). In 1954, the Government of Assam under
pressure from the LHDC acquired the rights of Lushai chiefs (Government of
Assam, 1954). This act was to have a profound effect on the authority structure
in the state. It changed fundamentally the basis of land and power relations.
If there was any doubt at all who the owner of land was in the Lushai Hills
during colonial times, the 1954 acquisition of rights of chief-ship removed it all
in one quick stroke. While the British had asserted the state’s primacy, Lushai
chiefs continued to enjoy rights over land in perpetuity. This they could sublet to
tenants, and by virtue of state protection the chiefs had upheld their special
privileges and arbitrary rights that came at the expense of the commoners.
Abolition of chief-ship in 1952 meant that land became the property of the state
and chiefs’ privileges no longer existed. Notably, and unlike other land reform
regulations in the country, chief-ship abolition in Mizoram did not mean that
ownership automatically passed on to tenants under the former chiefs. All
allotments given by the chiefs were also cancelled. Tenants had to seek fresh
allotments from the LADC (Das, 1986). The act also led to the burden of village
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administration shifting from chiefs and their councillors to elected Village
Councils (VC) (Government of Mizoram, 1953). VCs are today responsible for
day-to-day village administration. They collect land revenue and taxes, distribute
jhum (swidden) land and ensure that government regulations are complied with.
Chief-ship abolition also led to changes in the legal framework of the state.
There are two functioning legal systems. One exists under the Autonomous
District Council (ADC) and the other under the Deputy Commissioner, the
executive head of the district. The former is a three-tier system of courts, at the
village, intermediate and ADC level, with jurisdiction over minor cases. These
courts, which use Mizo Hnam Dam (customary code) besides the Indian Penal
Code (IPC), are open, fast and cheap. A measure of their legitimacy is that not
too many appeals against their judgement have been made (Thanhranga, 1994).
Courts under the Deputy Commissioner try cases outside the powers of the ADC
courts established under the Lushai Hills District Council (Administration of
Justice) Rules 1953. Despite the dual legal system in practice in the state, and
the use of customary codes, what is noteworthy here is that both legal systems
exist within the formal legal framework of the state. They have the state’ sanction
and are integrated within it. Significantly it is the Guwahati High Court that has
revisionary jurisdiction over both systems, thus incorporating them fully within a
unified institutional framework of the state.
The impact of these consolidating moves has been significant. Abolition
of chief-ship, consolidation of the administrative and legal framework under the
state, and bringing tenants directly in contact with it, has helped consolidate the
state’s authority. This has enhanced the state’s social control while weakening
drastically any challenges to its authority from social forces. The state’s enhanced
autonomy enabled Mizoram to be the only hill state in Northeast India to have
attempted successful reforms in land ownership and distribution. This has led,
among other things, to written laws, definition of tenant rights and propriety
protection by issue of land certificates.
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5.3. THE ‘MAUTAM’ FAMINE AND INSURGENCY
In 1959, Mizo Hills was devastated by a great famine known in Mizo
history as ‘Mautam Famine’. The cause of the famine was attributed to flowering
of bamboos which consequently resulted in rat population boom in large
numbers. After eating up bamboo seeds, the rats turned towards crops, infested
the huts and houses and became a plague to the villages. The havoc created by
the rats was terrible and very little of the grain was harvested. For sustenance,
many Mizos had to collect roots and leaves from the jungles. Others moved out
to faraway places while a considerable number died of starvation (Chatterjee,
1994).
In his hour of darkness, many welfare organizations tried their best to help
starving villagers to facilitate supplies to the remote villages. With no organised
porters, animal transport was used to carry the air-drop food supplies. Earlier in
1955, Mizo Cultural Society was formed in 1955 and Laldenga was its Secretary.
In March 1960, the name of the Mizo Cultural Society was changed to 'Mautam
Front' During the famine of 1959-1960, this society took lead in demanding relief
and managed to attract the attention of all sections of the people. In September
1960, the Society adopted the name of Mizo National Famine Front (MNFF). The
MNFF gained considerable popularity as a large number of Mizo Youth assisted
in transporting rice and other essential commodities to interior villages
(Nunthara, 2002).
The Mizo National Famine Front dropped the word 'Famine' and a new
political organization, the Mizo National Front (MNF) was born on 22nd October
1961 under the leadership of Laldenga with the specified goal of achieving
sovereign independence of Greater Mizoram. Large scale disturbances broke out
on 28th February, 1966 in government installations at Aizawl, Lunglei,
Chawngte, Chhimluang and other places simultaneously. The uprising is
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discussed in details in the following section. However, it is worthwhile to note
that while the MNF took to violence to secure its goal of establishing a sovereign
land, other political forces in the hills of Assam were striving for a separate state.
The search for a political solution to the problems facing the hill regions in Assam
continued (Chatterjee, 1994).
The Mizo National Front was outlawed in 1967. The demand for statehood
was gained fresh momentum. A Mizo District Council delegation, which met
Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi in May 1971, demanded a full-fledged state
for the Mizos. The union government in its own offered the proposal of turning
Mizo Hills into a Union Territory (UT) in July 1971. The Mizo leaders were ready
to accept the offer on the condition that the status of Union Territory would be
upgraded to statehood sooner rather than later. The Union Territory of Mizoram
came into being on 21st January, 1972. Mizoram got two seats in Parliament, one
each in Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha (Joshi, 2005).
Rajiv Gandhi's assumption of power following his mother's death
signalled the beginning of a new era in Indian politics. Laldenga met the Prime
Minister on 15th February, 1985. Some contentious issues, which could not be
resolved during previous talks, were referred to him for his advice. All trends
indicated that neither the Centre nor the MNF would waste the opportunity that
has now presented itself. New Delhi felt that the Mizo problem had been dragging
on for the long a time, while the MNF was convinced that bidding farewell to
arms to live as respectable Indian Citizens was the only way of achieving peace
and development. Statehood was a prerequisite to the implementation of the
accord signed between the MNF and the Union Government on 30 June 1986
(See Appendix D). The document was signed by Laldenga, on the behalf of
MNF, the Union Home Secretary R D Pradhan on behalf of the Government, and
Lalkhama Chief Secretary of Mizoram.
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However, lesser known is the “confidential” agreement signed by the
Congress party with the Mizo National Front which led to the signing of the Mizo
Accord. This agreement, signed on June 25, 1986, five days prior to the signing
of the Mizo Accord, took care of Laldenga’s demand of installing him as Chief
Minister of Mizoram. The agreement was signed by Laldenga of MNF and Sri
Arjun Singh, the Vice President of INC (See Appendix C). The incumbent Chief
Minister Lal Thanhawla became the Deputy Chief Minister under the new
coalition government headed by Laldenga as Chief Minster (Lalrintluanga 2009).
The MNF volunteers came out of their hiding and surrendered arms to
makeshift bamboo huts for the purpose at Parva and Marpara. A total of 614
activists gave themselves up in less than two weeks in July. Large quantities of
small and big firearms including LMGs and rifles were received from them.
While the MNF kept its part of the bargain, the Centre initiated efforts to raise
the status of Mizoram to a full-fledged State. A constitution Amendment Bill to
confer statehood on Mizoram was passed in the Lok Sabha on 5 August 1986.
The formalization of Mizoram State took place on 20th February, 1987. Chief
Secretary Lalkhama read out the proclamation of statehood at a public meeting
organised at Aizawl's Parade Ground. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi flew in to
Aizawl to inaugurate the new state. Sri Hiteshwar Saikia was appointed as the
first Governor of Mizoram. Since then Mizoram has witnessed vast
constitutional, political and administrative changes in recent years. The
traditional chieftainship was abolished and the District and Regional Councils
(created under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution of India) gave a substantial
measure of local control. Today the Lais, Maras, and the Chakmas have separate
Autonomous District Councils. The Village Councils are the grassroots of
democracy in Mizoram.
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5.4. THE MIZO NATIONAL FRONT UPRISING (1966)
The March 1966 Mizo National Front uprising was a revolt against the
Government of India, aimed at establishing a sovereign state for the Mizos. On 1
March 1966, the Mizo National Front (MNF) made a declaration of
independence, after launching coordinated attacks on the Government offices and
security forces posted in different parts of the Mizo district in Assam. The
Government suppressed the uprising and recaptured all the places seized by the
MNF by 25 March 1966. Counter-insurgency operations continued over the next
few years, although the intensity of the rebellion diminished over time
progressively till its complete resolution in the 1986 peace talks. During the
Government operations to suppress the rebellion, the Indian Air Force carried out
airstrikes in Aizawl; this remains the only instance of India carrying out an
airstrike in its own civilian territory (Kumar, 2010 and Miglani, 2010).
Before the formation of the Mizoram state in 1987, the Mizo-dominated
areas in India were a part of the Mizo district of the Assam state. The Mizo
organizations, including the Mizo Union, had long complained of step-motherly
treatment at the hands of the Assam Government, and demanded a separate state
for the Mizos. Every 48 years, a cyclic ecological phenomenon called Mautam
leads to widespread famine in this region. When such a famine started in 1959,
the Mizos were left disappointed by the Assam Government's handling of the
situation. The introduction of Assamese as the official language of the state in
1960, without any consideration for the Mizo language, led to further discontent
and protests.
The growing discontent with the Government ultimately resulted in a
secessionist movement led by Mizo National Front (MNF), an organization that
had evolved out of a famine relief team. While the Mizo Union's demand was
limited to a separate state for the Mizos within India, the MNF aimed at
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establishing a sovereign Christian nation for the Mizos. The extremist section
within MNF advocated the use of violence to seek independence from India. A
special armed wing called the Mizo National Army (MNA) was created for the
purpose. The MNA consisted of eight infantry "battalions" organised on the
pattern of the Indian army. One of the battalions was named after Joshua, while
the rest were named after the legendary Mizo heroes: Chawngbawia,
Khuangchera, Lalvunga, Saizahawla, Taitesena, Vanapa and Zampui Manga. The
Lion Brigade (Chawngbawla, Khuangchera, Saizahawla and Taitesena
battalions) operated in the northern half of the district, while the Dagger Brigade
(Joshua, Lalvunga, Vanapa and Zampui Manga) operated in its southern half.
MNA consisted of around 2000 men, supported by another group called the Mizo
National Volunteers (MNV), which comprised an equal number of irregulars.
In the early 1960s, the MNF leaders including Pu Laldenga visited East
Pakistan (now Bangladesh), where the Government of Pakistan offered them
supply of military hardware and training (Patnaik, 2008). Laldenga and his
lieutenant Pu Lalnunmawia were arrested by the Government of Assam on the
charge of conspiring against the nation, but were released in February 1964 after
an undertaking of good conduct by Laldenga. However, shortly after their release,
MNF intensified its secessionist activities. The MNF members forcibly collected
donations from the Mizo people, recruited volunteers and trained them with arms
supplied by Pakistan.[4] By the end of 1965, the MNF weapon cache consisted
of the plastic explosives stolen from the Border Roads Organisation, rifles and
ammunition obtained from the 1st Assam Rifles (AR) headquartered at Aizawl,
crude bombs and Sten-guns.
The Indian armed forces, fresh from the Sino-Indian War of 1962 and the
Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, were focused on the Indo-Pak and Indo-China
borders. The extremist MNF leaders wanted to take advantage of this situation by
starting an armed rebellion to establish an independent Mizo nation. The
rehabilitation of the pro-Government Chakma refugees from East Pakistan in the
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Mizo district further instigated them (Bareh 2001). Accordingly, a plan
(codenamed "Operation Jericho") was created to systematically capture the power
in the Mizo district. The MNF aimed at taking over the treasuries and the petrol
pumps, neutralising the police force and capturing all the important non-Mizo
("Vai") officials. The MNF flag was to be hoisted at Aizawl on 1 March 1966,
followed by a victory parade on 2 March 1966. The MNF arsenal would be
supplemented by capturing the armories of the 1st Assam Rifles, the Border
Security Force (BSF) and the local police. The MNF leaders had hoped that they
would have a large number of sympathizers among the local police, the
Government officials and the AR, which would make the takeover peaceful. They
also hoped that if they could keep their flag flying in Aizawl for 48 hours, other
countries such as Pakistan would recognize the Mizo territory as a sovereign
nation and take up their case in the United Nations (Bareh, 2001). The volunteers
and the sympathizers of MNF were promised a prosperous future in the proposed
sovereign state. The plan was kept in strict secrecy. As a cover, the MNF leaders
indulged in public propaganda advocating use of "non-violent means" to achieve
independence for Mizos. The MNF commander Lt. Col. Laimana, who was
suspected of being a government informant, was assassinated on 1 January 1966
(Bareh 2001). On 27 February 1966, Pu Laldenga and some other MNF leaders
decided that the armed insurrection would start on 1 March. The instructions were
sent to launch simultaneous attacks on the posts of the 1st Assam Rifles and the
BSF. In case the attack failed, an alternate plan of concentrating near the Indo-
Pak border was also made.
The Government authorities did get some indications of the upcoming
armed action, but failed to anticipate its intensity. On the night of 27 February,
Rokima, the brother of the MNF lieutenant Pu Lalnunmawia was killed in an
apparently accidental blast, which was noticed by the Assam Rifles personnel.
All Assam Rifles posts were alerted to keep a watch on the movements of MNF
members.The security forces stationed in the Mizo Hills district included the 1st
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Assam Rifles (AR) headquartered at Aizawl, the 5th Border Security Force (BSF)
and the local police. On the night of 28 February/1 March 1966, the MNF
launched a series of simultaneous attacks on the 1st AR garrisons at Aizawl,
Lunglei and Champhai and the 5th BSF posts at Chawngte, Demagiri, Hnahlan,
Marpara, Tipaimukh, Tuipang, Tuipuibari, Vaphai and Vaseitlang.
The first attack by MNF began at about 10:30 pm IST on 28 February
1966, at the sub-treasury at Lunglei. A group 500–1000 strong attacked the camp
of the security forces and the AR post (Nag 2002). The attack was repulsed,
leaving two AR personnel dead and three more wounded. On 5 March, the
insurgents kidnapped R.V. Pillai, the Sub-divisional Officer. By 7 March, they
had captured the AR post as well as the Border Roads Task Force camp at
Lunglei. The MNF insurgents entered Aizawl on the night of 28 February 1966.
The same day, the Mizo district administration came across the copies of the two-
page declaration of independence distributed among the MNF leaders. Since the
insurgents had cut all the telephone lines, the local authorities could not seek
immediate help from Shillong or Silchar. Later, the commanding officer of the
Border Roads Organisation managed to send a wireless message to Silchar (Bareh
2001).
At 02:00 IST, on 1 March 1966, the insurgents attacked the telephone
exchange at Aizawl. An hour later, around 150 insurgents led by Pu Lalnundawta,
attacked the Aizawl District Treasury and looted money, arms and .303
ammunition. Within a few hours, the insurgents took control of all the important
centres of the Mizo district, paralysing the civil administration. They also seized
all the vehicles in the town. The law and order situation went beyond the control
of the local Police and the small units of AR posted in the district (Patnaik 2008).
T S Gill, the Deputy Commissioner of the Mizo district, took shelter in the AR
headquarters. The insurgents attacked the 1st AR battalion headquarters in
Aizawl unsuccessfully. They also attacked the AR post at Chhimluang on the
Aizawl-Silchar road, but were repulsed by the Riflemen. To stop any
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reinforcements from Silchar, they created several roadblocks and damaged the
only bridge on the road.
Around this time, several MNF leaders had gathered in Aizawl on the
pretext of a General Assembly. A few of the MNF leaders strongly opposed the
violence, and asked Laldenga to withdraw his orders for an armed action.
However, it was too late to discontinue the operation, as the rebels had already
attacked multiple places including Lunglei, Champhai and Demagiri. On 1
March, Laldenga made a declaration of independence, and exhorted all the Mizos
to join the revolt against the "illegal Indian occupation" of the Mizo territory
(Bareh 2001). On 2 March, the insurgents ambushed a patrol of the 1st AR, and
inflicted heavy casualties on them. After the 1st AR Battalion at Aizawl refused
to surrender, the MNF suicide squad launched an attack on them at 0900 hours
on 4 March. They lost 13 men in a counter-attack by the Assam Rifles soldiers.
Two helicopters with reserves, ammunition and water sent by the Government to
help the Riflemen could not land due to constant firing by the insurgents. Some
of the air drops meant for the Riflemen fell into the hands of MNF members. The
same day, the insurgents released all the prisoners from the Aizawl jail, who
looted the shops of the non-Mizos ("Vai"s), and also burned several huts in the
Aizawl bazaar (Bareh, 2001). Due to the AR's refusal to surrender, the victory
parade proposed to be held on 2 March was postponed to 10 March.
On 5 March, the insurgents led by Pu Hruaia plundered the Public Works
Department office in Aizawl, looting items for the "Mizoram Sawrkar"
("Mizoram Government") Office. On 11 March, the insurgents burned the houses
of the senior officials of the Mizo Union. At about 01:30 IST on 1 March 1966,
around 150 insurgents armed with lathis surrounded the sub-divisional officer of
the Public Works Department at Vairengte and asked him to get out of the district.
They also took over the departmental stores and the jeep. Similar incidents were
reported from Coinluang and Chawngte (Nag 2002). On the same day, the
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insurgents easily captured the AR post at Champhai, with help from their
sympathisers in the security forces.
At Kolasib, the insurgents took around 250 civil officials, the policemen,
the intelligence personnel and the road builders as captives, and kept them
without food and water. The women and children were also taken as captives and
kept separately in a small building (Bareh, 2001). None of the civilian officials
and government servants were hurt, as MNF expected their support in running
the administration of the proposed sovereign state.
5.5. THE CONFLICT: THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
According to a statement made by the Chief Minister of Assam Bimala
Prasad Chaliha, on 1 March, the insurgents who attacked the Aizawl treasury and
Lunglei numbered around 10,000. The Indian Home Minister Gulzari Lal Nanda,
in the Indian parliament on 3 March, stated the total number of rebels in Aizawl,
Lunglei, Vairengte, Chawngte and Chhimluang as 800–1300 (Nag 2008). On 2
March 1966, the Government of Assam invoked the Assam Disturbed Areas Act,
1955 and the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, proclaiming the entire
Mizo district as "disturbed". Bimala Prasad Chaliha condemned Laldenga for his
"betrayal", while the Gulzari Lal Nanda promised "stern action" with "all the
force" at the Government's command (Bareh 2001). A 24-hour curfew was
imposed in Aizawl on 3 March, and reinforcements were sent for the 1st AR by
helicopters. The IAF was asked to carry the troops in Mi-4 helicopters into the
besieged AR camp, accompanied with fighter escorts, but failed due to heavy and
accurate fire by the insurgents. The Toofani fighters of 29 Squadron operating
from Kumbhirgram and Hunter fighters of 17 Squadron operating from Jorhat
undertook independent missions to escort the troop reinforcements and to
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suppress the insurgents (Kumar, 2010). Later, when the Eastern Army
Commander Lt Gen SHFJ Manekshaw, MC flew over parts of Mizoram in 1968,
his helicopter was fired at by the insurgents (Sood 2006).
On the afternoon of 4 March 1966, the IAF jet fighters strafed the MNF
targets in Aizawl using machine guns, allegedly causing few civilian casualties
(Bareh 2001, TOI 2011). The next day, a more extensive airstrike was carried out
for about five hours. According to some Mizos, the planes used incendiary
bombs, resulting in fires that destroyed several houses in the Dawrpui and
Chhinga Veng areas. According to some other accounts, the houses were
destroyed in the fires started by the prisoners released from the Aizawl jail by the
insurgents. Apart from Aizawl, the neighbouring villages of Tualbung and
Hnahlan were also allegedly bombarded. No human casualties were officially
reported in these airstrikes, but most of the civilian population fled Aizawl, and
took refuge in the remote villages in the adjacent hills (Bareh 2001).
In the history of independent India, this remains the only instance of the
Government of India resorting to air strikes in its own territory (Kumar, 2010).
Locals claim that Rajesh Pilot and Suresh Kalmadi were among the IAF pilots
who dropped the bombs (Mazumdar 2011). Pu Zoramthanga, who went on to
become the Chief Minister of Mizoram in 1998, once said that the main reason
he joined the MNF and became a rebel was the "relentless bombing of Aizawl in
1966" (Assam Tribune, 2008). The operations were overseen by HQ Eastern
Command of the Indian Army, under Lt Gen Sam Manekshaw. The local
responsibility for the army operations was given to 101 Communication Zone
whose General Officer Commanding (GOC) was Major General Sagat Singh. 311
(Independent) Infantry Brigade Group was located at that point of time in Silchar.
An additional formation, 61 Mountain Brigade was moved from Agartala to
Aizawl. Subsequently, a regular division, HQ 57 Mountain Division was raised
at Masimpur, near Silchar which oversaw counter-insurgency operations in
Mizoram in the later stages. The leading battalion of 61 Mountain Brigade, the
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8th Battalion, Sikh Regiment (8 SIKH) advanced from Silchar into the disturbed
area on 3 March. The forces could reach Aizawl only on 6 March, due to the
roadblocks caused by the militants (Sood, 2006; Singh, 2002; Chatterjee, 1994).
On 7 March, they relieved the besieged AR garrison at Aizawl. On 8 March, the
2nd Battalion 11 Gorkha Rifles (2/11 GR) moved towards Champhai and the 3rd
Battalion Bihar Regiment (3 BIHAR) towards Lunglei. By 15 March, the entire
61 Brigade with its four battalions and supporting arms and services had moved
into Mizoram and by the end of the month had regained control of Mizoram
(Sinha, 2008).
5.6. WITHDRAWAL OF MNF
The insurgents had managed to capture all the posts of the 1st Assam
Rifles (AR) except the AR headquarters at Aizawl. Their chances of capturing
the AR headquarters were low after the IAF airstrikes. When the MNF leaders
heard about the likely arrival of the Indian Army in Aizawl on 7 March, they
decided to retreat to Lunglei, which was under the MNF control. The security
forces threatened to bomb Lunglei, but two Christian clergymen – H. S. Luaia
and Pastor C.L. Hminga – requested them to avoid it in order to prevent loss of
civilian lives. The two also persuaded the MNF not to attack the army (Patnaik
2008). After some resistance, the MNF rebels withdrew from Lunglei on 13
March, taking away some arms, ammunition and vehicles with them. The Indian
Army secured Lunglei on 14 March, and Champhai on 15 March. The 5th
Battalion, Parachute Regiment (5 PARA), was flown in by helicopters to Lunglei
on 14–15 March, set out for Demagiri and secured it on 17 March. By the 25th,
all the important towns and the posts had been freed from the MNF control.
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By the end of March 1966, the Indian security forces had captured 467
muzzle loading guns, 332 shotguns, 175 rifles, 57 pistols/revolvers and about
70,000 rounds of ammunition from MNF. However, MNF had also managed to
obtain a large amount of ammunition from the captured security forces posts. Its
weapon cache consisted of: around 1500 shotguns, 600 rifles (mostly .303 bore),
75 sten-guns, 30 revolvers/pistols, 25 carbines and 20 light machine guns. The
MNA headquarters, originally located in Aizawl was moved multiple times
during the conflict: first to South Hlimen (on 3 March), then to Reiek (on 18
March) and finally to the Chittagong Hill Tracts in East Pakistan.
The Mizo Union leaders blamed the MNF for the loss of civilian life, and
condemned the armed insurrection. The MNF accused the Indian Government of
"indiscriminate bombing on civilian population" during the airstrikes in Aizawl
(Biswas and Thomas, 2006). Two MLAs of the Assam state, Stanley DD Nichols
Roy and Hoover H Hynniewta, visited the Mizo district to take a stock of the
situation. Later in April, Roy moved a motion in the Assam Legislative Assembly
on the Aizawl air attack, calling the use of air force "excessive" (Hluna and
Tochhawng 2012).The MNF insurgents dispersed in smaller units, merged with
the local population and continued to carry out armed attacks against the security
forces in the district. The villagers suffered from both sides as the insurgents
would kill those resisting their entry into the villages while the villages suffered
reprisals from the security forces in case ambushes had taken place in their
vicinity (Sinha, 2008). The Mizo National Front was outlawed in 1967. The same
year, the Counterinsurgency and Jungle Warfare School was set up at Vairengte
to train the soldiers in fighting with the rebels in the North-East India.
As the insurgents found security and refuge in the large number of tiny
hamlets from which they would launch attacks on the patrols of the security forces
and later merge into the civilian population, the military felt the need to deny
them access to the common people. To solve the problem, the Government of
India resorted to a "grouping" policy in the Mizo district, starting in January 1967.
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Under the grouping policy, nearly 80 per cent of the rural population was shifted
from their villages and resettled along the highways. The old villages were burnt,
and the new settlements were kept under the control of the security forces until
1970. The Indian Army got greater freedom of action and succeeded in isolating
the insurgents from the people and cutting the insurgents' supply chain. This
grouping of villages resulted in a great deal of suffering for the indigenous
populace as their farms and houses were burnt and they could not have enough
farmland while being interred into these camps. Farming output went down a cliff
and people had to face near-famine conditions (Nunthara 1981). This grouping
has also been said to be the beginning of social evils in Mizoram. The villagers
were forced to move to these camps and agreement papers were often signed at
gunpoint. While insurgency continued at lower levels, the space for political
negotiations was created and led to Mizoram becoming a Union Territory and the
entry of the MNF into mainstream politics (Sinha, 2008). In August 1968, the
Government of India offered amnesty to the insurgents, which resulted in the
surrender of 1524 MNF members. This was followed by more amnesty offers
during 1969–70.
5.7. REGROUPING OF VILLAGES
During the bombing of Aizawl by the Indian Army locals left their homes
and fled into the hills in panic. The MNA withered away into surrounding gorges,
forests and hills, to camps in Burma and the then East Pakistan. The air force
strafed Aizawl and other areas till March 13, 1966. This was the first— and only
— time that the air force has been used to attack Indians in India. It cleared
Aizawl and other cities of the MNA, but did not finish off the insurgency, which
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would last for another 20 years. Till the 1980s, the Indian military stoutly denied
the use of air attacks in Mizoram in 1966.
By 1967, the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) was in force in
the area that is now Mizoram. That year, the eastern military brass, led by the
then Lt General Maneckshaw, and government decided to implement the plan
that was called 'regrouping of villages.' At that time, there was one road coming
south from Silchar in Assam, that travelled all the way down to where the state's
limits ended. To the east and west of this road were vast tracts of forests, hills and
ravines, dotted with hundreds of villages. The military plan was to gather
villagers from all over, and cluster them along the side of this road stretching over
a length of 400 kilometres (Government Order, 1967). A population of fifty
thousand from 106 villages were shifted to these Protected and Progressive
Villages (PPVs) and the grouping of villages were completed in three phases. The
movement was supposed to be voluntary — people in some far off hamlet were
supposed to jump with joy when told to give up their land, crops and homes to
trek hundreds of miles and live behind barbed wire. Actually, the military told
villagers to take what they could carry on their backs, and burn everything else
down. Elders signed 'consent' papers at gunpoint (Barman, 2013).
In every case, villagers refused to move. When they were coerced to
march, they would refuse to burn down their properties. Then, the military officer
and his men would torch the whole place down. They would march in a column
guarded by the military, to their designated PPV. Life here was tough: each
resident was numbered and tagged, going and coming was strictly regulated and
rations were meagre. In the PPVs' confines, tribal conventions broke down. In the
scramble for scarce resources, theft, murder and alcoholism became widespread.
There was a general feeling that “they were treated as aliens and worse than
enemies (Government of Mizoram 1983).” The regrouping destroyed the Mizos'
practice of jhum, or shifting cultivation. There was little land inside the PPVs and
their original jhum areas had been left far behind in the interiors. Farm output fell
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off a cliff. Mizoram suffered from near-famine conditions, supplemented by what
little the military could provide, for the next three years.
Why were the villagers herded into the PPVs? The military reckoned that
keeping villagers under their eyes would keep them from sheltering insurgents or
joining the MNA. The original villages, crops and granaries were destroyed to
deny shelter and food to wandering insurgents. These ideas were picked up by
our officers from the colonial British playbook. The British had regrouped
villages during the Boer war in the early 20th century, in Malaya, where they
interned Chinese in special camps and in Kenya where villages were uprooted to
crush the Mau Mau uprising.
The scale of the Mizoram regrouping was huge. Out of 764 villages, 516
were evacuated and squeezed into 110 PPVs. Only 138 villages were left
untouched. In the Aizawl area, about 95 per cent of the rural population was
herded into PPVs. No Russian gulag or German concentration camp had hosted
such a large chunk of the local population. The first PPVs were dismantled in
1971, but the last ones continued for another eight years. Grouping of villages in
which people had to part with their ancestral homes has been considered by many
as the ''saddest chapter'' during the insurgency period in Mizoram from 1966 to
1986 (Barman 2013).
Though many said that the regrouping of villages in Mizoram ‘succeeded’,
Nandini Sundar (2011) argued that the concept of "success" and "failure" used by
studies of grouping is flawed, betraying a bureaucratic calculus. Whatever the
overt reasons given for grouping, what underlies it is the assumption that all
people in a given area, whether civilian or combatant, are potentially hostile.
Grouping is thus an act of war rather than effective counter-insurgency. She
further argued that from the perspective of basic principles like democracy,
citizenship, or the rule of law regrouping is always a failure, rather, “it is
profoundly destabilizing, since the government divides its own population into
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enemies and collaborators, in ways that begin to weaken the fundamental edifice
of citizenship”.
Based on interviews with civilians who endured grouping in the Indian
states of Nagaland and Mizoram in the 1960s and 1960s, this research shows how
for them, there was no ‘success’, only hardship. What they remember is not the
agricultural extension agents, the pharmacists or the administrative officers who
ostensibly manned the regrouped villages/ camps as part of a supposed ‘hearts
and mind approach’, but the army search operations, the starvation, the regime of
curfews and the reduction of identity to a roll call and a piece of paper. Separation
from their fields, their homes, and their forests filled them with a yearning which
no amount of ‘improved poultry and piggery’ could compensate for. Villagers
described themselves as objects: In Mizoram, the grouping was called khokhom,
which literally means driving villagers here and there; a term that sums up a world
of terror, like the Palestinian Nakbah or catastrophe to refer to the forcible
evacuations of 1948. People in Nagaland also mark time with reference to
grouping and the extended sojourns in the forest which preceded it: ‘the year we
came back from the jungles.’ (Sundar 2011)
5.8. THE POST MIZORAM ACCORD SCENARIO
Among ethnic and secessionist conflicts, the resolution of the Mizoram
issue was a notable success. Armed insurrection had persisted in Mizoram for
more than two decades. The movement by the Mizo National Front had racial and
religious overtones, and its declared aim was secession of Mizoram from the
Indian Union. There was an armed uprising in 1966 and violent conflict continued
well into the 1980s. The Mizoram Accord of June 1986 succeeded in bringing to
a satisfactory conclusion, the violent conflict of the past decades. One of the
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major fact that is said to have contributed to this historic conflict resolution is the
moderating influence and pressure of the Mizo civil society, especially the
women who had been the most aggrieved and affected during the periods of
violence (Government of India 2008)
After signing the memorable Peace Accord between the Government of
India and the MNF on June 20th 1986, Mizoram became a State in 1987. The
insurgency that broke out in Mizoram in 1966, lasted for twenty long years,
checking all development activities in the region. But the signing of this important
Peace Accord brought a new dawn to Mizoram, which is often called the land of
enchanting hills. The signing of the Peace Accord is, indeed, a turning point in
the development history of Mizoram. The era of peace and progress has now
come. As the reward for peace, development initiatives have been taken on
various fronts and the people of the State are the real beneficiaries of the fruits of
development. Till 1990s, Mizoram had three districts with three autonomous
District Councils. But now, the State has eight districts with three autonomous
District Councils. At present, Mizoram has twenty two towns with 22 rural
development blocks in the State. If one is really keen to analyse the socio-
economic development scenario of the eight North Eastern States, one could
easily find out that Mizoram is ahead of other northeastern states in many
respects.
According to the Eleventh Finance Commission’s Index of Economic and
Social Infrastructure, Mizoram ranks first among the North Eastern States getting
82 per cent points followed by Assam which gets 77.7 per cent. Weightage given
in this index includes infrastructures available in agriculture, banking, electricity,
transport, communications, education, health and civil administration. Literacy is
another area in which Mizoram has done exceedingly well. At present, Mizoram
has the highest literacy rate among the Northeastern States. According to 2001
Census, the literacy percentage of the State was 88.8 per cent, second highest in
the country, next only to Kerala. This is amazing considering that Mizoram had
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its first ever High School only in 1944 and its first Under-Graduate College in
1958. Women’s literacy in Mizoram, at 86.13 per cent, is again highest in the
whole of North East. Moreover, according to the figure provided by the Economic
Survey of India 2002-03, gender differences in work participation in Mizoram,
that is, gender gap is one of the lowest in India. The national figure for the gender
gap is 26 while in Mizoram it is only 9. This is something that deserves
recognition of the authority.
The MHIP (Women Association of Mizoram) received the prestigious
National Award in 2002 for its good works. Moreover, the Educational
Development Index (EDI) prepared at the National level indicates that in the year
1995 Mizoram got the first rank, which means, highest in the nation. The four
broad parameters used for the EDI are investment in education, literacy
achievement, universalization of elementary education and availability of
educational facilities. This indeed is a significant achievement for the State of
Mizoram. The steady rate of increase in literacy and general education after
Independence, particularly after 1981, is no doubt the result of an all-round
improvement in educational infrastructure both at the elementary and secondary
educational levels.
Another remarkable progress made in Mizoram is in the field of
eradication of poverty. As one knows, poverty is one of the socio-economic
indicators for development. Below Poverty Level family estimates (BPL
estimates) prepared by the Ministry of Food and Civil Supplies of the Union
Government, indicates that in 1993-94 and in 1999-2000, Mizoram had the least
number of families living below poverty line in the whole Northeastern States.
The percentage of families living below poverty level in the State of Mizoram
was 25.66 in 1993-94 and 19.47 in 1999-2000. The corresponding figure for the
nation is 35.97 and 26.10 respectively. Had there been no peace in the state, it
would not have been possible on the part of Mizoram to achieve this
commendable position. One of the indicators of development is per capita
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income. According to the figure provided by the Economic Survey of India,
released each year before the Union Budget is presented, Mizoram has had the
highest per capita income among the seven States in the North East, for two
consecutive years. In 1998-99, the per capita income of Mizoram at current prices
was Rs. 13,479 and in 2011-12 it was estimated at Rs 54,689.10 This, no doubt, is
a big achievement for Mizoram which is very much land-locked and inaccessible
as compared to most of the other States in the North East.
The Human Development Index, 1991, published in the Economic Survey
2002-03, put Mizoram at the 7th position in the Nation, which again is highest in
the whole North-East. The positions of other states in the Northeast in this respect
are - Manipur 9th, Nagaland 11th, Tripura 22nd, Meghalaya 24th, Assam 26th
and Arunachal Pradesh 29th. In respect of rice and food grain production,
Mizoram’s productivity rate is above the Northeast States’ average. In rice
production, the Northeastern States’ average was 1,427 kg. per hectare in 1997-
98 as against Mizoram’s average at 1,624 kg. In the same year, the total food
grain production average in the Northeastern States was 1,400 kg. per hectare. In
Mizoram, it was 1,600 kg.
The productivity rate of Mizoram, as compared to other states in the
Northeast in respect of rice and total food grain production is third, in both cases.
To promote export, the Government of Mizoram submitted a project report,
requesting the Central Government to declare Mizoram an Agriculture Export
Zone (AEZ) for passion fruit. One of the most tangible outcomes of peace in the
State of Mizoram is the commissioning of Lengpui Airport in 1998-99. Lengpui
Airport is one of the best airports in the whole of North East. Commissioning of
this airport is a landmark in the history of Mizoram, as it greatly eased the
communication problem of the state. Till recently, air service linking Mizoram
with other parts of India had been only three days a week. But now it is 7 days a
10 Economic Survey of Mizoram (2012-13). Planning & Programme Implementation
Department, Government of Mizoram. Retrieved from www.mizoram.gov.in
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week. As we all know, road and communication happen to be one of the most
important infrastructures for development of a region or a state. By the end of
March 1989, the total road length in Mizoram was 4,850 km, against the total
road length of 2,662 km in 1983. This means that, the total road length in
Mizoram increased by 2,188 km, which translates into an increase of about 45
percent during a short period of six years. During the same period, the total length
of surfaced road also increased from 1,168 km to 1,760 km, an increase of 592
km surfaced road length. The road per 100 sq. km also increased from 12.62 km
in 1983 to 22.99 km in 1989. Road density in the State in 2005 was 27.5 km per
100 sq. km. Another remarkable development, as a fulfilment of Memorandum
of Settlement / Peace Accord 1986 was establishment of a High Court Bench in
Mizoram. Besides, a Central University called Mizoram University was
established in Mizoram on 2nd July, 2001.
Another step actively taken to fulfill one of the items of the Peace Accord
is in respect of Border Trade. To facilitate border trade (Indo-Myanmar trade in
particular) steps were taken actively by construction of roads, land customs
station and trade centre. Emphasis has also been given to border trade with
Bangladesh. Health services in general, and public health services in particular,
is another sector in which Mizoram has done a commendable job. Health services
both in terms of infrastructure and other facilities have been expanding steadily
in the state since the last two decades. In fact, the number of population served
by a hospital bed in Mizoram is the best in the whole of North East. As regards
to power and energy development, planned power development in Mizoram could
be said to have started since 1975-76, when Assam State Electricity Board ceased
to function in Mizoram. In those days, only two towns and three villages were
electrified. One notable achievement was that the State of Mizoram came on the
Grid Map of India in 1997 with the construction of about 140 km of 66 KV line
from Dulabcherra to Aizawl.